Contents

List of Illustrations ix
Preface xiii

1 Introducing Comparative Studies 1

Part 1 Historical Legacies
2 Precolonial History (Or, What Your “World Civ” Class Might Have Left Out) 29
3 Colonialism: Gold, God, Glory 43
4 Independence or In Dependence? 55
5 Linking Concepts and Cases 69

Part 2 The International Economic System
6 Globalization: Cause or Cure for Underdevelopment? 107
7 Structural Adjustment: Prices and Politics 139
8 Alternative Approaches to Development 159
9 Linking Concepts and Cases 167

Part 3 Politics and Political Change
10 From Ideas to Action: The Power of Civil Society 187
11 Linking Concepts and Cases 225
12 The Call to Arms: Violent Paths to Change 243
13 Linking Concepts and Cases 281
14 Ballots, Not Bullets: Seeking Democratic Change 300
15 Political Transitions: Real or Virtual? 331
16 Linking Concepts and Cases 343
Part 4 Beyond the Nation-State

17 Sovereignty and the Role of International Organizations 361
18 Global Challenges—and Responses 394
19 Linking Concepts and Cases 415
20 Dealing with a Superpower: Third World Views of the United States 431
21 Linking Concepts and Cases 439

Part 5 Conclusion

22 Are We Living in a New Era? 457

List of Acronyms 460
Glossary 463
Notes 486
Selected Bibliography 524
Index 536
About the Book 546
At the end of the twentieth century, the world was riding out one of the longest economic booms in generations. Democra*cy was breaking out everywhere, the United States and what was left of the Soviet Union were new friends, and technology was indeed making the world a smaller place. Globalization was a buzzword of the era, and one of the dominant images of the times involved a lone man stopping a line of Chinese tanks by simply standing in front of it. Yet this was also a time when the majority of the world’s population lost ground economically, when record numbers of people were attempting to subsist on less than one dollar a day. In addition, many of the political changes we were seeing at century’s end were more virtual than real. The toppling of dictators the likes of Duvalier, Mobutu, Suharto, and Barre had the effect of taking the lid off a pot now free to boil over.1

Nationalism reared its ugly head in ways that post–World War II generations had never seen. The results defy the imagination. To describe some of it, we coined a new term for a very old practice—“ethnic cleansing.” Rape was finally recognized as a systematic weapon of war, not simply “boys being boys” in its aftermath. In another major turnabout, Russia went from being a contributor to being a competitor for foreign aid, something that was rapidly becoming scarce as Western donors decided that the countries that needed it the most had suddenly become much less interesting. We had new concerns to keep us up at night; AIDS and the greenhouse effect had largely replaced mutual assured destruction as global threats. Sure, weapons of mass destruction were hardly a thing of the past, but instead of attack from a superpower now it was rogue states and nongovernmental actors that threatened to deliver their chemical and biological nasties through the most mundane of delivery systems. We all got a crash course in “dirty bombs,” and learned that they were far more likely to be conveyed by suitcase or transport container than intercontinental ballistic missile. New and horrific diseases such as Ebola began to pop up from place to place.

1 Terms appearing in small capital letters are defined in the glossary, which begins on p. 463.
place. And just as we thought we had finally vanquished them, old killers that we thought we had beaten, such as tuberculosis and smallpox, were again among us.

Until very recently most of us thought that these were the concerns of far-away countries we would never visit. Yet as much as Americans were jolted from their relative complacency into a new awareness of the world around them that crisp blue September morning in 2001, for much of the rest of the world it was just more of the same. On an individual level at least, the events of that day brought Americans closer to understanding the sense of horror, loss, fear, and even anger that so many others experience on a daily basis. While much of the world mourned with the United States, many people felt like it was time that the citizens of one of the most powerful countries on the planet begin to take more of an interest in the world around them. Such a string of tragedies is hardly something one can prepare for, but perhaps some would not have been taken so off-guard had we not been so insular in our concerns. Americans had just months earlier elected a president who clearly had little interest in foreign affairs and campaigned promising an isolationist approach that focused on domestic issues. His foreign policy advisers made it be known that the United States would not answer all the world’s “911” calls, nor be “the world’s social worker.”

However, since the September 11 attacks this president has become much more internationalist in his concerns and is leading a worldwide war on terrorism. Even if it is motivated primarily by self-interest, it is crucial that Americans attempt to understand the world that we are a part of and with which we are inextricably bound—now more than ever. And if we are to avoid some of the mistakes of the past, it is just as crucial to recognize the importance of perspective—that there are at least two sides to every story. If we are to be adequately prepared to respond to the challenges of the future, our understanding of the world must change to include attention to the ostensibly “powerless.” These are the people living in the countries that compose much of what we variously term the “third world,” or the “non-Western world”—the majority of the world’s inhabitants whom we had, until recently, conveniently forgotten.

What’s to Compare?
In this introduction to the comparative studies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, we take a different spin on the traditional approach to discuss much more than politics as it is often narrowly defined. As one of the social sciences, political science has traditionally focused on the study of formal political institutions and behavior. In this book, we choose not to put the spotlight on governments and voting patterns, party politics, and so on. Rather, we turn our attention to all manner of political behavior, which we consider to include just about any aspect of life. Of interest to us is not only how people are governed, but also how they live, how they govern themselves, and what they see as their most urgent concerns.

The framework we employ is called a political interaction approach. It is an eclectic method that presents ideas from a variety of contemporary thinkers and
Imagine that the world is a village of 1,000 people. Who are its residents?

- 585 Asians
- 123 Africans
- 95 East and West Europeans
- 84 Latin Americans
- 55 Russians and citizens of the former Soviet republics
- 52 North Americans
- 6 people of the Pacific

The people of the village have considerable difficulty in communicating:

- 165 speak Mandarin
- 86 speak English
- 83 speak Hindu/Urdu
- 64 speak Spanish
- 58 speak Russian
- 37 speak Arabic

This list accounts for the native tongues of only half the villagers. The other half speak, in descending order of frequency, Bengali, Portuguese, Indonesian, Japanese, German, French, and over 200 other languages.

In this village of 1,000 there are

- 329 Christians (among them 187 Catholics, 84 Protestants, 31 Orthodox)
- 178 Muslims
- 132 Hindus
- 60 Buddhists
- 3 Jews
- 253 people belonging to other religions, as well as people who describe themselves as atheist or nonreligious.

One-third of these 1,000 people in the world village are children, and only 60 are over the age of sixty-five. Half the children are immunized against preventable infectious diseases such as measles and polio. Just under half of the married women in the village have access to and use modern contraceptives.

This year twenty-eight babies will be born. Ten people will die, three of them from lack of food, one from cancer, two of them babies. One person will be infected with the HIV virus. With twenty-eight births and ten deaths, the population of the village next year will be 1,018.

In this 1,000-person community, 200 people receive 80 percent of the income; another 200 receive only 2 percent of the income. Only 70 people own an automobile (although some of them own more than one car). About one-third have access to clean, safe drinking water. Of the 670 adults in the village, half are illiterate.

The village has six acres of land per person:

- 700 acres are cropland
- 1,400 acres are pasture
- 1,900 acres are woodland
- 2,000 acres are desert, tundra, pavement, and wasteland

Of this land, the woodland is declining rapidly; the wasteland is increasing. The other land categories are roughly stable. The village allocates 83 percent of its fertilizer to 40 percent of its cropland—that owned by the richest and best-fed 270 people. Excess fertilizer running off this land causes pollution in lakes and wells. The remaining 60 percent of the land, with its 17 percent of the fertilizer, produces 28 percent of the food grains and feeds 73 percent of the people. The average grain yield of that land is one-third the harvest achieved by the richer villages.

In this village of 1,000 people there are

- 5 soldiers
- 7 teachers
- 1 doctor
- 3 refugees driven from their homes by war or drought

The village has a total yearly budget, public and private, of over $3 million—$3,000 per person, if it were distributed evenly. Of this total:
theories. We characterize this as a comparative studies rather than a comparative politics textbook because our approach is multidisciplinary. We divide our attention between history, politics, society, and economics in order to convey more fully the complexity of human experience. Instead of artificially confining ourselves to one narrow discipline, we recognize that each discipline offers another layer or dimension, which adds immeasurably to our understanding of the “essence” of politics.

Comparative studies then is much more than simply a subject of study—it is also a means of study. It employs what is known as the comparative method. Through the use of the comparative method we seek to describe, identify, and explain trends—in some cases, even predict human behavior. Those who adopt this approach, known as comparativists, are interested in identifying relationships and patterns of behavior and interactions between individuals and groups. Focusing on one or more countries, comparativists examine case studies alongside one another. They search for similarities and differences between and among the selected elements for comparison. For example, one might compare patterns of female employment and fertility rates in one country in relation to others. Using the comparative method, analysts make explicit or implicit comparisons, searching for common and contrasting features. Some do a “most similar systems” analysis, looking for differences between cases that appear to have a great deal in common (e.g., Canada and the United States). Others prefer a “most different” approach, looking for commonalities between cases that appear diametrically opposed in experience (e.g., Bolivia and India). What is particularly exciting about this type of analysis is stumbling upon unexpected parallels between ostensibly different cases. Just as satisfying is beginning to understand the significance and consequences of the differences that exist between two cases we just assumed had so much in common.

Most textbooks for courses such as the one you’re just beginning take one of two roads. Either they offer case studies, which provide loads of intricate detail on a handful of states (often the classics: Mexico, Nigeria, China, and

---

**Figure 1.1 continued**

$181,000 goes to weapons and warfare  
$159,000 goes to education  
$132,000 goes to healthcare

The village has buried beneath it enough explosive power in nuclear weapons to blow itself up many times over. These weapons are under the control of just 100 of the people. The other 900 people are watching them with deep anxiety, wondering whether they can learn to get along together; and if they do, whether they might set off the weapons anyway through inattention or technical bungling; and if they ever decide to dismantle the weapons, where in the world village they would dispose of the radioactive materials of which the weapons are made.

*Sources:* Adapted from Donella H. Meadows, “If the World Were a Village of One Thousand People,” The Sustainability Institute, 2000; and North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, “If the World Were a Village of One Thousand People,” www.nscentre.org.
Figure 1.2 What’s in a Name?

In this book we take a comparative approach to the study of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Today it is more common to hear the states of these regions variously referred to as “developing countries,” “less developed countries,” or “underdeveloped countries.” These are just a few of the labels used to refer to a huge expanse of territories and peoples, and none of the names we use are entirely satisfactory. First, our subject—four major world regions—is so vast and so heterogeneous that it is difficult to speak of it as a single entity. Second, each name has its own political implications and each insinuates a political message. For example, although some of them are better off than others, only an extreme optimist could include all the countries contained within these regions as “developing countries.” Many of the countries we’ll be looking at are simply not developing. They are underdeveloping—losing ground, becoming worse off.5

Those who prefer the term “developing countries” tend to support the idea that the capitalist path of free markets will eventually lead to peace and prosperity for all. Capitalism is associated with rising prosperity in some countries such as South Korea and Mexico, but even in these countries the majority has yet to share in many of its benefits. However, the relative term “less developed countries” (or LDCs) begs the question: Less developed than whom—or what? The answer, inevitably, is what we arbitrarily label “developed countries”: the rich, industrialized states of Western Europe, Canada, and the United States, also known as the West (a term that, interestingly enough, includes Japan but excludes most of the countries of the Western Hemisphere).

Although the people who talk about such things often throw about the terms “developed” or “less developed” as a short-hand measure of economic advancement, often such names are resented because they imply that somehow “less developed” countries are lacking in other, broader measures of political, social, or cultural development. Use of the term “developing,” or any of these terms for that matter, suggests that countries can be ranked along a continuum. Such terms can be used to imply that the West is best, that the rest of the world is comparatively “backward,” and that the most its citizens can hope for is to “develop” using the West as model.

At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that the West developed only at the expense of the rest of the world. For these analysts, underdevelopment is no natural event or coincidence. Rather, it is the outcome of hundreds of years of active underdevelopment by today’s developed countries. The majority’s resistance to such treatment, its efforts to change its situation, is sometimes referred to as the North-South conflict, or the war between the haves and the have-nots of the world. The names “North” and “South” are useful because they are stripped of the value judgments contained within most of the terms already described. However, they are as imprecise as the term “West,” since “North” refers to developed countries, which mostly fall north of the equator, and “South” is another name for less developed countries, which mostly fall south of the equator.

Another name signifying location, the all-inclusive “non-Western world,” invites still more controversy. As others have demonstrated, it is probably more honest to speak of “the West and the rest” if we are to use this kind of term, since there are many non-West, rather than a single “non-Western world.”6 At least “the West and the rest” is straightforward in identifying its center of reference. Blatant in its Eurocentrism, it is dismissive of 75 percent of the world’s population, treating “the rest” as “other.” In the same manner that the term “nonwhite” is demeaning, “non-Western” implies that something is missing. Our subject becomes defined only through its relationship to a more central “West.”

During the Cold War, the period of US-Soviet rivalry running approximately from 1947 to 1989, another set of names reflected...
this ideological conflict that dominated international relations. For decades following World War II the rich, economically advanced, industrialized countries, also known as the “first world,” were pitted against the Soviet-led, communist “second world.” In this rivalry, each side described what it was doing as self-defense, and both the first and second worlds claimed to be fighting to “save” the planet from the treachery of the other. Much of this battle was over who would control the “third world,” which served as the theater for many Cold War conflicts and whose countries were treated as pawns in this chess game. Defined simply as what was left, the concept of a “third world” has always been an unwieldy one. Neither first nor second, the “third world” tends to bring to most people’s minds countries that are poor, agricultural, and overpopulated. Yet consider the stunning diversity that exists among the countries of every region and you can see how arbitrary it is to lump them into this category. Not all of what we once called the third world can be characterized as such today. For example, how do we categorize China? It’s clearly communist (and therefore second world), but during the Cold War it viewed itself as the leader of the third world. What about Israel or South Africa? Because of the dramatic disparities occurring within these countries, they could be categorized as third world or first, depending on where you look. The same can be said for the United States. Visit parts of its inner cities, the rural South, or Appalachia and you will find the third world. And now, with the Cold War over, why aren’t the former republics of the Soviet Union included in most studies of the third world? Certainly the poorest of them are more third than first world.

The fact is, many countries fall between the cracks when we use the first world/third world typology. Some of the countries labeled “third world” are oil-rich, while others have been industrializing for so many years that even the term “newly industrializing country” (NIC) is dated (it is still widely used, but is gradually being replaced by names such as “new industrial economy” or “emergent economy”). Therefore, in appreciation of the diversity contained within the third world, perhaps it is useful to subdivide it, to allow for specificity by adding more categories. Under this schema, the NICs and a few others that are most appropriately termed “developing countries” are labeled “third world” (e.g., Taiwan, India, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico). “Fourth world” countries become those that are not industrializing, but have some resources to sell on the world market (e.g., Ghana, Bolivia, Egypt), or some strategic value that wins them a bit of foreign assistance. The label “LDC” is the best fit in most of these cases, since it simply describes their situation and implies little in terms of their prospects for development. And finally, we have the “fifth world,” which Henry Kissinger once callously characterized as “the basket cases of the world.” These are the world’s poorest countries. Sometimes known as “least less developed countries” (LLDCs), they are very clearly underdeveloping. With little to sell on the world market, they are eclipsed by it. The poorest in the world, with the worst ratings for virtually every marker of human development, these countries are marginalized and utterly dependent on what little foreign assistance they receive.

Clearly none of the names we use to describe the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East are satisfactory. Even the terms “Latin America” and “Middle East” are problematic. Not all of “Latin America” is “Latin,” in the sense of being Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking. Yet we will use this term as shorthand for the entire region south of the US border, including the Caribbean. And the idea of a region being “Middle East” only makes sense if one’s perspective is distinctly European—otherwise, what is it “middle” to? The point is that most of our labels reflect some bias, and none of them are fully satisfactory. These names are all ideologically loaded in one way or another. Because there is no simple, clearly most appropriate identifier available, you will find that at some point or another we use each of them, as markers of the varying worldviews you will see presented in this text. Ultimately, we leave it to the reader to sift through the material presented here, consider the debates, and decide which arguments—and therefore which terminology—are most representative of the world and therefore most useful.
India; curiously, the Middle East is frequently left out), or they provide a cross-
national analysis that purports to generalize about much larger expanses of
territory. Those who take the cross-national approach are interested in getting at
the big picture. Texts that employ it focus on theory and concepts to broaden our
scope of understanding beyond a handful of cases. They often wind up making
fairly sweeping generalizations. Sure, the authors of these books make reference
to any number of countries as illustration, but at the loss of detail and context
that comes only through the use of case studies.

We provide both cross-national analysis and case studies, because we don’t
want to lose the strengths of either approach. We present broad themes and con-
cepts, while including attention to the variations that exist in reality. In adopting
this hybrid approach we have set for ourselves a more ambitious task. However,
as teachers, we recognize the need for both approaches to be presented. We have
worked hard to show how cross-national analysis and case study can work in
tandem, how one complements the other. By looking at similar phenomena in
several contexts (i.e., histories, politics, societies, economics, and international
relations of the third world, more generally), we can apply our cases and com-
pare them, illustrating the similarities and differences experienced in different
settings.

Therefore, in addition to the cross-national analysis that composes the bulk
of each chapter, we offer eight case studies, two from each of the major regions
of the third world. For each region we include the “classics” offered in virtually
every text applying the case method to the non-Western experience: Mexico,
Nigeria, China, and Iran. We offer these cases for the same reasons that so many
others see fit to include them. However, we go further. To temper the tendency
to view these cases as somehow representative of their regions, and to enhance
the basis for comparison, we submit alongside the classic ones other, less pre-
dictable case studies from each region. These additional cases are equally inter-
esting and important in their own regard; they are countries that are rarely (if
ever) included as case studies in introductory textbooks: Peru, Zimbabwe,
Turkey, and Indonesia. (See the maps and country profiles in Figures 1.3 to 1.10
on pages 18 through 25.)

Through detailed case studies, we learn what is distinctive about the many
peoples of the world, and get a chance to begin to see the world from a perspec-
tive other than our own. We can begin doing comparative analysis by thinking
about what makes the people of the world alike and what makes us different. We
should ask ourselves how and why such differences exist, and consider the vari-
ous constraints under which we all operate. We study comparative politics not
only to understand the way other people view the world, but also to make better
sense of our own understanding of it. We have much to learn from how similar
problems are approached by different groups of people. To do this we must con-
sider the variety of factors that serve as context, to get a better idea of why
things happen and why events unfold as they do. The better we get at this, the
better idea we will have of what to expect in the future. And we will get a better
sense of what works and doesn’t work so well—in the cases under examination,
but also in other countries. You may be tempted to compare the cases under
review with the situation in your own country. And that’s to be encouraged,
since the study of how others approach problems may offer us ideas on how to improve our lives at home. Comparativists argue that drawing from the experience of others is really the only way to understand our own systems. Seeing beyond the experience of developed countries and what is immediately familiar to us expands our minds, allows us to see the wider range of alternatives, and offers new insights into the challenges we face at the local, national, and international levels.

The greatest insight, however, comes with the inclusion of a larger circle of voices—beyond those of the leaders and policymakers. Although you will certainly hear their arguments in the chapters that follow, you will also hear the voices of those who are not often represented in texts such as this. You will hear stories of domination and the struggle against it. You will hear not only how people have been oppressed, but also how they have liberated themselves. Throughout the following chapters we have worked to include the standpoint and perspectives of the ostensibly “powerless”: the poor, youth, and women. Although they are often ignored by their governments, including the US government, hearing their voices is a necessity if we are to fully comprehend the complexity of the challenges all of us face. Until these populations are included and encouraged to participate to their fullest potential, development will be distorted and delayed. Throughout this book, in a variety of different ways, you will find that attention to these groups and their interests interconnects our discussions of history, economics, society, politics, and international relations.

Cross-National Comparison: Recurrent Themes
As mentioned earlier, we believe that any introductory study of the third world should include both the specificity of case study as well as the breadth of the cross-national approach. Throughout the chapters that follow you will find several recurring themes (globalization, human rights, the environment, and AIDS), which will be approached from a number of angles and will serve as a basis for cross-national comparison. For example, not only is it interesting and important to understand the difference in the experience of AIDS in Zimbabwe as opposed to Iran, it is just as important to understand how religion, poverty, and war may contribute to the spread of the disease. In addition, if you’re trying to understand AIDS, you should be aware of its impact on development, how ordinary people are attempting to cope with it, and what they (with or without world leaders) are prepared to do to fight it.

In a variety of ways and to varying degrees, globalization, human rights abuse, environmental degradation, the emergence of new and deadly diseases, international migration, and the drug trade are all indicative of a growing world interdependence. By interdependence we are referring to a relationship of mutual (although not equal) vulnerability and sensitivity that exists between the world’s peoples. This shared dependence has grown out of a rapidly expanding web of interactions that tie us closer together. Most Americans are pretty familiar with the idea that what we do as a nation often affects others—for better or worse. On the other hand, it is more of a stretch to get the average American to understand why we should care and why we need to understand what is happen-
ing in the world around us—even in far-off “powerless” countries. However, whether we choose to recognize it or not, it is becoming more and more difficult to escape the fact that our relationship with the world is a reciprocal one. What happens on the other side of the planet, even in small, seemingly “powerless” countries, does affect us—whether we like it or not.

**Globalization**

The end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity that has resulted not only in some dramatic political changes, but also in a closer integration of the world’s economies than ever before. As a result, the world is becoming increasingly interconnected by a single, global economy. This transformative process is commonly described as globalization, and it is supported and driven by the full force of capitalism, unimpeded now because of the absence of virtually any competing economic ideology. The world has experienced periods of corporate globalization before (the last was associated with European imperialism). What is unique about this cycle is the unprecedented speed with which globalization is tearing down barriers to trade. It is also increasing mobility, or cross-border flows of not only trade, but also capital, technology, information—and people. As it has before, technology is driving this wave. The World Wide Web is as symbolic of this era as the Berlin Wall was of the Cold War. Because of their mobility and global reach, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNCs) are key actors (but hardly the only actors) in this globalization. This is a process that is rapidly unfolding and under no one’s control. In fact, even some of its advocates allow that globalization may be a process out of control.9

For those who embrace it, globalization’s dynamism and power are part of its appeal. They consider globalization to be a largely benevolent process. They see it as the surest route to development and prosperity—it is even credited with sowing the seeds of democracy worldwide. Because of globalization, no corner of the world remains isolated; new values are being spread that challenge traditional belief systems such as fatalism, elitism, and authoritarianism. Poverty is alleviated as trade is increased and jobs are created; as the lines of communication are opened up we learn from and begin to accept one another. Ideally, globalization will help to make us more aware of our common interests, our mutual dependence. Among other things, it has brought people together to form the basis of the international environmental movement; it has enhanced scientific cooperation and raised human rights as a universal concern (which some refer to as “moral globalization” or “the globalization of dissent”).10

According to its admirers, globalization is spilling over into a variety of areas, creating a “world village” based in cultural and political globalization. As it works to overcome the barriers between us, globalization enhances interdependence. It tightens the web of interrelationships that link the world’s peoples. Thanks to globalization, this deepening interdependence is fostering a sense of community and sharing over the identity politics that once divided us by religion, ethnicity, language, and so on. (Although interestingly, some analysts who are generally proglobalization argue that being wired for a free flow of information can actually produce hostility and anger. Much of this “shared” information promotes stereotyping and reinforces divisions.)11
Some analysts go even as far as to suggest that we are moving to a “postcultural” world in which the boundaries marking where one culture ends and another begins are increasingly blurred. They contend that globalization is not promoting homogenization and that it is not the same thing as Westernization; rather, globalization is promoting eclecticism and advancing our recognition of the world’s diversity. So-called traditional cultures aren’t so traditional. None of the world’s cultures have developed in a vacuum, unaffected by outside forces. Even those concerned about globalization’s impact admit that cultures aren’t static. They are always changing—globalization is just hurrying the process along.

In this sense, perhaps it can be said that globalization is producing a more homogeneous world. Then again, antiglobalists maintain that a more homogeneous world means cultural devastation for the majority. Globalization is a cultural bulldozer. Already the dollar has become the de facto global currency, and English has become the de facto global language. One of the most visible signs of this is the spread of Western consumer culture. While this is something proglobalizers generally celebrate, critics despise it as “coca-colonization.”

Critics argue that globalization isn’t so much about interdependence as it is about furthering dependence. Dependence is a form of international interdependence—except that dependence is marked by an extreme power imbalance. Antiglobalists point out that economic globalization is capitalist globalization, which means that corporations and the rich are being privileged over other social actors. The result isn’t anything new. Poverty, the exploitation of the underdog, the erosion of labor and environmental standards, and the abuse of human rights all predated globalization. The difference is that globalization has accelerated and intensified these trends.

Even the proponents of corporate globalization admit that it does create winners and losers; globalization brings profits but also problems. They also recognize that globalization is not a uniform process, and that its effects are more evident in some places than in others. Certainly, aspects of globalization such as deregulation or disappearing trade barriers are more obvious in some places than in others (e.g., the creation of trading blocs within Europe and in North America). Thus far, globalization is uneven: it appears to have hardly touched the most economically underdeveloped countries in the world, such as those in the Sahel. Yet this is increasingly the exception, and the rapid economic, sociocultural, and political change associated with globalization is the rule worldwide.

Its boosters argue that for better or worse, globalization is inexorable and inevitable; the integration of the world’s peoples has gone so far that we can never go back. However, history shows us that even this massive force could be reversed by international events. Nationalism and economic downturns have in the past contributed to the end of previous cycles of globalization. Continued oil shocks and another economic slowdown in the United States would very definitely affect the rest of the world. If it continued for long, it could also mean a return to economic nationalism and protectionist policies that could very quickly shred this interdependent web.
Human Rights
The idea that humans share certain natural, universal, and inherent rights—simply because they are human—dates at least as far back as John Locke’s *Two Treatises of Civil Government* (1690). The view that abusers should be held accountable for their wrongs, or that others should interfere with how a government treats its own citizens, is more recent in origins. It was not until the systematic murder of millions under Hitler’s Third Reich that the world was willing to challenge two dominant principles of international relations: nonintervention, or the legal obligation to refrain from involvement in the internal affairs of other states, and *SOVEREIGNTY*, the widely shared belief that *STATES* are the principal actors in international relations and as such they are subject to no higher political authority.\(^\text{16}\)

However, the Holocaust served as a catalyst to the development of what is now recognized as an international human rights movement. The Holocaust ostensibly taught us that in some cases the world must intervene against abusers and that state sovereignty must not always be held as sacrosanct. How a government treats its own people does affect the rest of us—and increasing numbers across the political spectrum are coming around to the view that it is high time we reconceptualize the persistent denial of human rights around the world as a security issue. If nothing else, respect for human rights is widely recognized as essential to international peace and stability. At least in theory, the international community accepts that it has a moral mandate to prevent the kinds of abuses associated with the genocide in Europe.

Over the fifty years following that genocide the world community set out to develop a variety of international norms to promote human rights and to institutionalize safeguards against the recurrence of atrocities. Prominent in this effort was the creation of the *UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS* (UDHR) in 1948, which is widely recognized as the most authoritative and comprehensive of all international statements on human rights. Composed of thirty articles addressing a broad range of issues, the UDHR is accepted as setting the standards to which all states should aspire. The UDHR includes attention to what are sometimes known as “first-generation” or “blue” rights: civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from torture or cruel and unusual punishment, the right to due process, the right to self-determination, and so on. These rights are based on the assumption that the individual should be protected against state actions that are unusual, arbitrary, or excessive. As long as the right to challenge the government’s misuse of authority is permitted, other rights (such as freedom from torture) will be safeguarded. First-generation rights are considered by many people to be key to the enjoyment of all other rights. Yet the UDHR also recognizes the importance of “second-generation” or “red” rights: economic, social, and cultural rights, such as access to decent food, shelter, work, education, and healthcare. This conception of human rights, sometimes known as the “human-needs” approach, considers the aspects of existence necessary to secure the basic development of the person primary. Proponents of second-generation rights maintain that a government’s denial of basic needs is as much a violation of human rights as the torture of dissidents.\(^\text{17}\)
Although the governments of virtually every country in the world use the language of human rights and claim to believe in the inherent dignity of human beings, for many years the world has been divided over how most appropriately to define human rights. The governments of most developed countries, especially the United States, have traditionally argued that political and civil rights should be prioritized. They contend that these rights, which place an emphasis on liberty, should come first, because the enjoyment of such freedoms will enable the individual to ensure for him- or herself the provision of subsistence or red rights. Yet who cares about freedom of expression and the other blue rights when one’s children are dying of hunger? As the former president of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, put it, “Human rights begin with breakfast.” He and others argue that those who seek to exclude red rights have it all wrong, since until people’s basic rights, or certain minimal physical needs, are met, there can be no development—let alone enjoyment of more ambitious rights, such as liberties. (Others point out that for poor countries, government guarantees of food and housing are actually much more ambitious than the relatively “cost-free” guarantees of freedoms, such as expression and assembly. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen maintains that the right to freedom of speech is a precondition for all other rights, since famine, torture, and other abuses rarely occur in countries with democratic governments and a relatively free press.)

The UDHR, whose drafters included Westerners and non-Westerners, attempts to get around this debate by proclaiming that human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, and that all are necessary for the full realization of human potential. Not everyone agrees. According to the proponents of CULTURAL RELATIVISM, including those who support the “Asian values” argument, human rights (or moral claims) should be defined as the product of a particular society’s culture and historical experience. Therefore, to talk about a universality of human rights is to impose one’s values on others. For them, political and civil rights are based in Western Enlightenment values, which have little appeal or relevance in Confucian cultures, wherein higher value is placed on order and discipline. Blue rights also uphold the rights of the individual over those of the community. This idea is unacceptable in many non-Western cultures, which hold that the rights of the individual should be subordinated to those of the group, since the individual has no meaning apart from the community to which he or she belongs.

Critics of the “Asian values” argument point to the complexity not only of Confucianism, which is not as conservative as many think, but also of Asian cultures themselves, of which there are a great variety and diversity. Asian cultures draw from many different influences, including Buddhism, which emphasizes individual freedoms and tolerance. Millions of non-Westerners, led by people such as Aung San Suu Kyi and Shirin Ebadi, reject arguments that political and civil rights or freedoms (such as freedom from torture) are uniquely Western. Many non-Western traditions view the individual and community as inseparable, and the relationship between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community as one of mutual obligation. While group rights can be used to restrict individuals, they can also exist to protect individual rights.

As you might imagine, this and other debates over how best to define
human rights have hamstrung international efforts to promote such rights. However, there is new momentum behind the human rights movement. Just as the Holocaust once spurred a concern with human rights, perhaps it was the specter of ethnic cleansing, its mass killing and systematic rapes, and the “too little too late” responses in Bosnia and Rwanda that have propelled this renewed interest. Once again, the human rights movement is developing—and not only toward finding other ways of holding accountable those responsible for such atrocities. The challenges associated with globalization have led to calls for expanding and refining the scope of human rights and including a third generation of “new” human rights. Debate has begun over whether other values of signal importance, such as the rights to peace, development, and a safe and healthy environment (or “green” rights) qualify as human rights. Are the rights to clean drinking water and to live in safety legally enforceable claims, or merely “wishes”? The third generation of rights remains the subject of heated debate. Yet even for the older generations of rights, there remain enormous differences between the governments of the world over how to define human rights, how and when human rights law should apply, and what priority should be given to different categories of rights. While this highly politicized debate continues, it is increasingly common for analysts to return to the argument that is at the core of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: that the distinction between human rights and human needs is an artificial one. Rather, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights are best understood as part of “a seamless web”—indivisible and interdependent.21 In other words, all the rights discussed here are important because it is difficult to fully enjoy one category of rights without the security offered by the others.

The Environment
Along with globalization and human rights, the health of the planet is another issue of interdependence (and also one that is arguably everyone’s business). Environmental issues will turn up in nearly all of the following chapters because the growing body of scientific evidence is becoming more difficult to refute. Development as it is currently being pursued, in both developed and in less developed countries, is contributing to a morass of environmental problems that transcend national borders and whose management will require global cooperation. Global warming, deforestation, desertification, loss of biodiversity, the depletion of fisheries and destruction of coral reefs, toxic dumping, water shortages—these are just a few of the problems whose solutions will require international cooperation.22

Take, for example, the issue of deforestation. Between 2000 and 2005, the world’s remaining rainforests suffered a net loss of 37 million hectares. That’s about 7.3 million hectares a year—an area about the size of Panama. Because there has been some reforestation, there has been some debate about whether deforestation has slowed in recent years. However, gross deforestation has not declined significantly and the loss of old-growth forests is alarming. This deforestation is most extensive in South America and Africa, where the forests are hot spots for biodiversity (they contain hundreds of species within a single hectare, whereas the average hectare of forest typically contains a handful of species).
However, 70 percent of the natural cover protecting these species has been lost in the last several decades. At the current rate, in ten to twenty years these hot spots will become theaters of mass extinction—comparable in scale to the demise of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago.23

Of similar cataclysmic value is the threat posed by the greenhouse effect or global warming to another common resource, the atmosphere. The greenhouse effect is produced by the emission of what have come to be known as greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide released by the burning of fossil fuels, as well as naturally occurring methane and nitrogen. Industrialization and economic growth based on the use of coal, oil, and natural gas have contributed to the release of these gases, which has reached record highs. Greenhouse gases are collecting in the upper atmosphere, covering the planet in a blanket of sorts. Incoming heat from the sun penetrates this blanket but is then trapped by it. The effect is likened to a greenhouse, which traps heat indoors. In this sense, the growth of economies based on the consumption of fossil fuels has contributed substantially to warming over the last fifty years.

While some scientists and politicians argue that global warming is not a man-made event, but naturally occurring and inevitable—part of a long cycle of alternating ice ages and periods of extreme heat—this is the minority view. The majority of the world’s scientists agree that we are experiencing a global warming; the main issue for debate is over how bad it will be—and how soon it will come. A 2001 study conducted by the highly respected Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that human activity is the principal cause of recent climate change and that the rate of warming is greater than estimated in earlier studies. A 2006 draft report released by this group of more than 2,000 scientists from 100 countries went further, arguing that it has amassed convincing evidence that climate change is already happening. Five of the six warmest years on record were 2001–2005, and concentrations of greenhouse gases are at unprecedented levels. According to these scientists, there is overwhelming evidence that the Earth’s climate is undergoing dramatic transformations because of human activities. They call this “anthropogenic warming” and warn that it may continue for decades even if man-made emissions can be curbed.24 If fossil fuel combustion continues at twentieth-century levels, virtually every natural system and human economy will be at risk. Higher temperatures will mean rising seas from melting ice caps, more frequent and severe storms, and more intense droughts. It will alter every ecosystem on the planet. Already we are seeing its effects. This climate change is exacerbating the misery of already poor areas, and creates a vicious cycle in which poverty and environmental degradation coexist and are accelerated by globalization.25

In a variety of ways, globalization is just hastening processes already well under way. However, because of its speed, globalization is putting unprecedented pressures on the planet’s capacities. Displaced rural populations are flooding the cities in search of their livelihood or pressing into the forests seeking new resources. This only contributes to the greenhouse effect, not only because the burning of forests releases more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, but also because the loss of these forests means the loss of “pollution sponges,” since forests absorb carbon dioxide and slow global warming. As LDCs embrace the
developed-country model, pursuing growth at any cost, they will increasingly become part of the problem. However, as it currently stands, the 25 percent of the world’s population living in developed countries consumes 80 percent of the world’s resources. The United States alone (5 percent of the world’s population) produces 25 percent of the emissions associated with global warming, yet the LDCs are likely to feel the most severe impact of environmental devastation. Not only are they more vulnerable to many of its effects, but LDCs also lack access to the technologies that might ameliorate its impact. Over the last few years, a number of creative solutions based on cooperative efforts have been proposed for dealing with the environmental problems that we share. Unfortunately, finger pointing and recriminations between developed and less developed countries, and efforts by even the richest developed countries to shift the burden of responsibility to others, suggest that the international leadership (and funding) so desperately needed to address these problems will continue to be sorely lacking.

**Disease**

Just as environmental degradation is taking an increasing toll on all of us, but especially the poor, so is disease. Not only is there an income gap between developed and less developed countries, but there is also a health gap. A variety of threats come together to explain why infant mortality rates remain higher in LDCs and why life expectancy has actually shortened in many LDCs: undernutrition, infectious diseases, and chronic debilitating diseases—all associated with poverty. These problems are related to much of the misery and hardship in all the regions we will study. Although tuberculosis, malaria, and the dehydration associated with diarrhea are bigger killers today, HIV/AIDS stands alone as the coming plague. It is already the leading cause of death of people aged fifteen to forty-nine worldwide. Although it is widely and mistakenly perceived in developing countries as a disease that has been brought under control, one that can be managed with the proper medical care, there is no cure for AIDS. In many LDCs its effects will be near apocalyptic. By conservative estimates, since 1981 over 25 million people have died, approximately 15.5 million children were orphaned, and in 2006 39.5 million men, women, and children were living with HIV or AIDS. According to then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the disease has already set back development in some African countries by a decade or more. It now threatens to have the same effect on Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Caribbean.

HIV/AIDS is by no means a problem unique to the third world, and within the third world it varies by region. However, 95 percent of all people with HIV/AIDS live in LDCs and the vast majority of them live in Africa. It is important to note that some areas of Africa, such as West Africa, are not as seriously affected as others. Although some analysts maintain that the rate of HIV infection may have peaked in the late 1990s and that infection rates may now be stabilizing for the first time, not all scientists agree. AIDS remains an exceptional threat, and it is still unclear whether AIDS will explode in Asia as it has particularly in southern Africa; the infection rate is far greater than any expert or computer model predicted fifteen years ago. This acute form of a viral infec-
tion is spread through sexual contact and other activities involving the exchange of body fluids. Around the world people become infected with HIV in a variety of ways, including blood transfusions, intravenous drug use, and both heterosexual and homosexual sex. Each country and region has its own particular mix of circumstances reflected by patterns of transmission. As you will read in Chapter 7, poverty is a major factor contributing to the spread of the disease.

In many places social norms not usually addressed also play a role in the spread of HIV. Many governments refuse to recognize that especially vulnerable groups, such as drug addicts, gay men, and sex workers, exist. In addition, because of social taboos, many governments have refused to discuss the transmission of HIV through unprotected sex. The result worldwide is a striking lack of awareness concerning its dangers. In many places, multiple sexual relationships for men may be socially tolerated or even encouraged. Other practices considered traditional, such as female genital cutting and wife inheritance, contribute to the spread of the disease. Similarly, imbalances of power often put females at risk of HIV infection. Females of all ages, especially young women (and married women), often have a difficult time rejecting a man’s sexual advances or insisting he wear a condom, since many cultures—Western and non-Western—teach females to be subordinate to male authority. In the long term, changing how males and females relate to each other and how men treat women and girls will be a fundamental advance not only against this disease, but also against many other barriers to development. In the near term, however, smaller, more mundane efforts must be made. In Uganda and Thailand, the governments have taken proactive measures to promote health education and safer sex. In many cultures, though, condoms are not regularly available and are stigmatized for a number of reasons. Women who use them are often treated with suspicion. Where fertility is celebrated and child mortality rates are high, condoms are rejected because they are a form of birth control.

However, condoms, vaginal microbicides, and other tools are a crucial means of helping women to take their lives (and the lives of their children) into their own hands. Without access to information and services to protect themselves, more women are infected with HIV every day. What was once thought to be a “gay male disease” has shifted, as the rates of infection in young women are three to five times higher than in young men. In Africa, women comprise 60 percent of all adults living with HIV—and 75 percent of all young adults (ages fifteen to twenty-four) living with HIV in Africa are female. What’s more, all of these estimates on the numbers of people with the disease are conservative, since it is likely that many people who are HIV-positive have no idea that they are dying. They can’t afford the tests, and given the stigma that people with AIDS face worldwide, many ask why they should bother. There is little recourse for the majority of those who would test positive, since they lack access to the medicines that could prolong their lives. Put yourself in their shoes: Why worry about something that might kill you ten years down the line when you’re struggling with a host of other life-threatening problems on a day-to-day basis? Such questions provoke a variety of reactions. In the meantime, the world is facing a pandemic that has been likened to the Black Death of the fourteenth century. If
it continues to go uncontained, its long-term impact may be unlike any the world has ever known.

Conclusions: It Depends on Who You Ask
Let’s put it flatly: there are no simple answers to any of the questions we have raised here or will raise throughout the chapters that follow. The best any of us can do is to present you with a wide range of thinking, or alternative perspectives on many of the challenges faced to some degree by all of us—but most directly by people living in less developed countries. In this book we will be looking at a series of issues of interdependence, such as the drug trade, migration, and arms transfers, from a number of angles. We ask that before you make up your own mind about any of these contending theories, you consider each of them on its own merits. We firmly believe that it is the only way to begin to understand the complex social phenomena we now set out to discuss.

Linking Concepts and Cases
The information in this section is provided as a primer for the case studies we will be discussing throughout the rest of the book. Figures 1.3 through 1.10 on pages 18 through 25 should serve as a point of reference for you as you go on to read about the histories, economies, and politics of the eight case studies introduced here. Throughout the book, we will return to the same countries, applying the ideas introduced in the conceptual chapters to the reality of their experiences.

Now It’s Your Turn
From a simple examination of the statistical information that follows, what would you expect to be the key issue, or the most pressing problem each country faces? What can a sketch such as this tell you about life in each of these eight countries? Which ones appear most similar, and in what ways? What are some of the most striking differences between these countries? What other information not included here do you consider deserving of attention? Why?
Formal Name: United Mexican States
Area, km²: 1.97 million
Comparative Area: Slightly less than three times the size of Texas
Capital: Mexico City
Establishment of Present State: September 18, 1810
Population: 107 million
Age Under 15 Years: 30%
Population Growth Rate: 1.1%
Fertility Rate (children per woman): 2.42
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births): 20
Life Expectancy: 75
HIV Prevalence (Adult): 0.3%
Ethnic Groups: Mestizo 60%, Amerindian 30%, white 9%, other 1%
Literacy: 92%
Religions: Roman Catholic 89%, Protestant 6%, other 5%
GDP per Capita (PPP): $10,000
GDP Growth Rate: 3% (2005)
Labor, Major Sectors: Services 58%, Industrial 24%, Agriculture 18%
Population in Poverty: 40%
Unemployment Rate: 3.6% (urban, with considerable underemployment)
Export Commodities: Manufactured goods, petroleum and petroleum products, silver, fruits, vegetables, coffee, cotton

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006
Figure 1.4 Peru: Profile and Map

Formal Name: Republic of Peru
Area, km²: 1.28 million
Comparative Area: Slightly smaller than the size of Alaska
Capital: Lima
Establishment of Present State: July 28, 1821
Population: 28 million
Age Under 15 Years: 31%
Population Growth Rate: 1.3%
Fertility Rate (children per woman): 2.5
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births): 31
Life Expectancy: 70
HIV Prevalence (Adult): 0.5%
Ethnic Groups: Mestizo 37%, Amerindian 45%, white 15%, other 3%
Literacy: 88%
Religions: Roman Catholic 81%, Protestant 2%, other 17%
GDP per Capita (PPP): $5,900
GDP Growth Rate: 6.7% (2005)
Labor, Major Sectors: Services 73%, Agriculture 54%, Industrial 18%
Population in Poverty: 54%
Unemployment Rate: 8.7% (with extensive underemployment)
Export Commodities: Copper, zinc, gold, crude petroleum, and petroleum products
External Debt: $30 billion (2005)

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006
Formal Name: Federal Republic of Nigeria
Area, km²: 923,768
Comparative Area: Slightly more than twice the size of California
Capital: Abuja
Establishment of Present State: October 1, 1960
Population: 131 million
Age Under 15 Years: 42%
Population Growth Rate: 2.3%
Fertility Rate (children per woman): 5.49
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births): 97
Life Expectancy: 47
HIV Prevalence (Adult): 5.4%
Ethnic Groups: (More than 250 groups) Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Ibo 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%
Literacy: 68%
Religions: Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%
GDP per Capita (PPP): $1,400
GDP Growth Rate: 6.2% (2005)
Labor, Major Sectors: Agriculture 70%, Services 20%, Industrial 10%
Population in Poverty: 60%
Unemployment Rate: 29%
Export Commodities: Petroleum and petroleum products, cocoa, rubber
External Debt: $37 billion (2005)

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006
**Figure 1.6 Zimbabwe: Profile and Map**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Name:</th>
<th>Republic of Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area, km²:</td>
<td>390,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Area:</td>
<td>Slightly larger than the size of Montana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital:</td>
<td>Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of Present State:</td>
<td>April 18, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>12 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Under 15 Years:</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate:</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate (children per woman):</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births):</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy:</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV Prevalence (Adult):</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups:</td>
<td>African 98% (Shona 82%; Ndebele 14%; other 2%), mixed and Asian 1%, white &lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy:</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions:</td>
<td>Syncretic 50%, Christian 25%, indigenous beliefs 24%, Muslim and other 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita (PPP):</td>
<td>$2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth Rate:</td>
<td>~7.7% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor, Major Sectors:</td>
<td>Agriculture 66%, Services 24%, Industrial 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in Poverty:</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate:</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Commodities:</td>
<td>Tobacco, gold, ferroalloys, cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt:</td>
<td>$5.2 billion (2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006*
Formal Name: Islamic Republic of Iran
Area, km²: 1.65 million
Comparative Area: Slightly larger than the size of Alaska
Capital: Tehran
Establishment of Present State: April 1, 1979
Population: 68 million
Age Under 15 Years: 26%
Population Growth Rate: 1.1%
Fertility Rate (children per woman): 1.8
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births): 40
Life Expectancy: 70
HIV Prevalence (Adult): 0.1%
Ethnic Groups: Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%
Literacy: 79%
Religions: Shia Muslim 89%; Sunni Muslim 9%; Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Bahai’ 2%
GDP per Capita (PPP): $8,400
GDP Growth Rate: 6.9% (2005)
Labor, Major Sectors: Services 45%, Agriculture 30%, Industrial 25%
Population in Poverty: 40%
Unemployment Rate: 11%
Export Commodities: Petroleum, carpets, fruits, nuts, iron, steel, chemicals
External Debt: $19 billion (2005)

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006
Formal Name: Republic of Turkey
Area, km²: 780,580
Comparative Area: Slightly larger than the size of Texas
Capital: Ankara
Establishment of Present State: October 29, 1923
Population: 70 million
Age Under 15 Years: 25%
Population Growth Rate: 1.06%
Fertility Rate (children per woman): 1.92
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births): 39
Life Expectancy: 72
HIV Prevalence (Adult): 0.1%
Ethnic Groups: Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20%
Literacy: 86%
Religions: Muslim (mostly Sunni) 99.8%, other 0.2%
GDP per Capita (PPP): $8,400
GDP Growth Rate: 7.4% (2005)
Labor, Major Sectors: Services 41%, Agriculture 35%, Industrial 22%
Population in Poverty: 20%
Unemployment Rate: 10.2%
Export Commodities: Apparel, foodstuffs, textiles, metal manufactured products, transportation equipment
External Debt: $170 billion (2005)

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006
Formal Name: People’s Republic of China
Area, km²: 9.60 million
Comparative Area: Slightly smaller than the size of the United States
Capital: Beijing
Establishment of Present State: October 1, 1949
Population: 1.31 billion
Age Under 15 Years: 20%
Population Growth Rate: 0.59%
Fertility Rate (children per woman): 1.7
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births): 23
Life Expectancy: 72
HIV Prevalence (Adult): 0.1%
Ethnic Groups: Han Chinese 91.9%; Zhuang, Uighur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean, and others 8.1%
Literacy: 91%
Religions: (Officially atheist), Taoist, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian
GDP per Capita (PPP): $6,800
GDP Growth Rate: 10.2% (2005)
Labor, Major Sectors: Agriculture 49%, Services 29%, Industrial 22%
Population in Poverty: 10%
Unemployment Rate: 9% (urban), substantial unemployment and underemployment in rural areas
Export Commodities: Machinery and equipment, textiles and clothing, iron and steel, optical and medical equipment, plastics
External Debt: $252 billion (2005)

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006
Formal Name: Republic of Indonesia
Area, km²: 1.92 million
Comparative Area: Slightly less than three times the size of Texas
Capital: Jakarta
Establishment of Present State: August 17, 1945
Population: 245 million
Age Under 15 Years: 29%
Population Growth Rate: 1.4%
Fertility Rate (children per woman): 2.4
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 births): 34
Life Expectancy: 69
HIV Prevalence (Adult): 0.1%
Ethnic Groups: Javanese 45%, Sundanese 14%, Madurese 7.5%, coastal Malays 7.5%, other 26%
Literacy: 88%
Religions: Muslim 88%, Protestant 5%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, Buddhist 1%, other 1%
GDP per Capita (PPP): $3,600
GDP Growth Rate: 5.6% (2005)
Labor, Major Sectors: Agriculture 46%, Services 41%, Industrial 11%
Population in Poverty: 16%
Unemployment Rate: 11%
Export Commodities: Oil and gas, plywood, textiles, rubber, electrical appliances
External Debt: $135 billion (2005)

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2006