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Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States

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

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Introduction: Changing Security Patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa

Unprecedented domestic and regional security threats are challenging many sub-Saharan African states. The region's balance of military power between state and insurgency appears to be shifting often in favor of the latter, and African states are deploying their forces beyond their borders more frequently. An arc of conflict runs from the Horn of Africa down to southern Africa. Ethiopia and Eritrea have engaged in an especially destructive conventional conflict with weaponry new to Africa. The exceptionally brutal "low-intensity" insurgencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone have destabilized parts of West Africa, while the military free-for-all in Congo* has formed the geographic center of an interlocked series of conflicts and instability stretching from Chad and Sudan in the north to Angola and Zimbabwe in the south in what is termed Africa's "first world war."[1] The low-intensity nature of most African conflicts—decentralized insurgent groups having few fixed bases or targetable economic-military assets, while wielding low-cost but effective weaponry and engaging in often indiscriminate brutality against civilians—poses exceptional problems for conventionally trained militaries.

Responsibility for security, but not the power to achieve it, has devolved increasingly from the West and the United Nations to individual states and regional organizations. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected this when he stated that the UN "does not have . . .

*In May 1997, Zaire became the Democratic Republic of Congo, which I refer to as Congo (not to be confused with the Republic of Congo, or Congo-Brazzaville) throughout this book.

the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures. . . . Under present conditions, *ad hoc* Member States' coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict."[2] "African solutions for African problems" is the prevailing mantra about security on the continent. But many African nations lack adequate security capability, either to defend their own territorial integrity or to participate effectively in the conditions suggested by Secretary-General Annan.

This book assumes that the political nature of the state strongly influences military professionalism—a concept that includes both military capabilities and political responsibility to the state[3]—and that competent and loyal militaries can safeguard political and economic development. Max Weber cited the monopoly of military coercion as a defining characteristic of the post-1648 state system,[4] and Martin van Creveld writes that "the first duty of any social entity is to protect the lives of its members. Either modern states cope with low-intensity conflict, or else they will disappear."[5] Provision of effective security allows peaceful development and validates the state to its citizenry.

Personal rule, sub-Saharan Africa's predominant governing method since independence, has often weakened military professionalism. The civil-military divide has been breached by civilians attempting to manipulate military affairs and by military officers who pursue political control of the state. The resultant weaker militaries increasingly threaten state legitimacy in the post–Cold War era.

In the pages that follow I identify three military strategies that African states are using to address the threats to their present existence. The strategies are regional intervention forces, private security companies, and Western-sponsored upgrades of state militaries—and I argue that they are likely to fail unless African states emphasize indigenous military professionalism. Most academic works examine African armed forces as political actors, but few works have assessed *military* behavior and potential.[6] This book focuses on military capabilities and examines these armed forces' political responsibility primarily in relationship to military operations and their conduct toward the civilian population.

This book also examines several security dilemmas that African states and their supporters face. The first and most important involves the tension between military capabilities and political responsibility. Africa has had some ninety military coups since 1963, and many rulers believe that their political survival depends on emphasizing military loyalty at the expense of capability; thus, some rulers have debilitated their own security forces in an effort to preserve political power. The

result is weak militaries that cannot address the often growing domestic and regional threats to fragile regimes.

Generalizing about some forty-five differing states poses obvious difficulties. Although Cassandra-like observers may point dramatically to "failing" or "collapsed" states as indicating "new barbarians" or a "coming anarchy"[7] (Sierra Leone and Somalia), Africa also boasts countries that have negotiated inclusive peace settlements of their previous conflicts (South Africa and Mozambique) and those whose economic growth rates rank among the world's best (Uganda and Ghana). Furthermore, each state's security situation can change quickly (Sierra Leone). Some states have had little or no insurgency activity since independence (Botswana and Ivory Coast) and have few worries about any shifting of security balances. Militaries in some states have refrained from seizing power (Senegal and Zambia).

This book maintains that many African militaries lack significant technical skills, but it acknowledges that: First, military capabilities are relative—that is, an African military only needs to be mediocre by first world standards when facing manifestly incompetent opponents; Second, there are the African militaries that appear competent and loyal, for instance, those of Senegal, Ghana, and Botswana; Third, even unprofessional militaries have professional officers who excel in military skills and who avoid political involvement. Nigeria's military, which this book singles out as often acting unprofessionally during the 1980s and 1990s, at least once had numerous capable officers who preferred that partisan politics and the military remain separate. And, finally, once-capable militaries can "reprofessionalize" under a determined head of state. President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria began pursuing this goal following his election in mid-1999.

All the same, many ill-prepared African states face security threats beyond their capabilities, given that some African states are little more than juridical entities.[8] In recent history, the colonial rulers and then the superpowers had helped to prop up these states before 1990, thus postponing the states' regimes' need to develop their own capable militaries. By the mid-1980s, two factors—parasitic personal rulers who had denied basic political and human rights (while often emasculating their states' militaries) and unfavorable shifts in exported commodities and imported oil prices—had further weakened African regimes. Writers began using such labels as "lame leviathans" and such adjectives as "enfeebled," "quasi," or "vacuous" to describe any given African state.[9] "Globalization," the growing influence of powerful international government and private organizations, has helped to shift the military bal-

ance of power toward the insurgents since 1990. Foreign-instigated economic and political reforms, accompanied by drops in foreign aid, usually weakened regime control whereas the largely unregulated mineral, arms, and mercenary markets, on balance, have assisted rebel groups.

Increasing donor demands for African democratization and economic reform further debilitated some governments' effective authority following the Cold War. Dropoffs in foreign military and economic assistance reduced the availability of patronage with which leaders could purchase domestic support and security. Less foreign support also attenuated the possibility of non-African military intervention that would protect regimes from domestic or foreign enemies.

The end of superpower rivalry has proved empowering for insurgents in several respects and has dramatically changed the nature of African conflict. During the Cold War, foreign supporters usually linked their material support to groups exhibiting acceptable ideological or political agendas; Warsaw Pact nations often being the primary suppliers to African rebellions. Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demobilization or shrinking of non-African militaries, such cash-strapped nations as Bulgaria sell equipment to insurgents without political preconditions.

Insurgents now enjoy greater freedom of action. Mary Kaldor describes the current "new wars" as a mixture of war, wide-scale human rights abuses, and organized crime.[10] Since 1990, the attacks on noncombatants and relief agencies, the use of child-soldiers, and the targeting of economic resources (often to pay for readily available weaponry) has surged. The availability of weapons has escalated the number of armed participants, especially poorly trained militias and insurgent groups, and contributed to the militarization of African political discourse. Adding to the volatile mix are skilled demobilized soldiers from South Africa and Eastern Europe.

Many African states now lack the military resources to halt the shift of the coercive balance. Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were three examples during the 1990s of countries having virtually no national military to face growing armed opposition. From 1960 to 1990, insurgencies and invasions overthrew only two sub-Saharan African states (Chad and Uganda); during the 1990s, however, armed force, exclusive of coups, toppled at least six governments.

Regional geopolitical rivalries appear to be spreading rapidly as African states increasingly disregard concepts of national sovereignty. Shrinking Western strategic interest and the corresponding lack of patronage undermine some regimes while encouraging expansionist

tendencies in others. Some of the militarily more capable states, notably Uganda and Angola, are projecting their forces into neighboring countries, especially in southern and central Africa, often to destabilize the existing authority. Specific reasons for this include economic aggrandizement, preemptive self-defense, greater availability of long-range weapons systems, the growth of armed participants, and the personalities of various leaders. I suggest that "military mercantilism"—a regime's regional use of its military for financial gain—as a growing cause of African conflict. Weakened states and regional conflicts are closely linked because fragile states often attract external intervention, either to protect or overthrow the existing regime.

Some twenty-five major conflicts since 1960 have sapped Africa's already limited human, political, and economic infrastructure.[11] Africa's wars have killed more than 7 million people and created about 19 million refugees. In terms of physical destruction, money diverted from developmental budgets, and soaring defense spending, the economic toll has proven staggering. The effects of war linger long after the fighting: devastated infrastructure and generations of poorly educated and violence-prone youths will hamper economic investment and development in the near future. These military conflicts could lead to what *Africa Confidential* terms "a massive restructuring of the continent's international system, which will strengthen some states and maybe obliterate others."[12]

The human toll, horrific in its own right, contributes to political instability. Ninety percent of all deaths have been innocent civilians. Rapes, assaults, and robberies—almost certainly results of war—scar vast numbers of civilians. Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has inflicted amputations and mutilations on perhaps 20,000 civilians. Human Rights Watch writes that Sierra Leone's conflict also has seen

> men, women and children, probably numbering in the thousands . . . abducted by the [rebel] AFRC/RUF for use as combatants, forced laborers, or sexual slaves. Women have been actively targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. Children have been targets of killings and violence and are forcibly recruited as soldiers.[13]

Furthermore, fighting often increases the risk of disease. As part of the overall damage to public health, conflicts disrupt access to medical treatment and to food and suitable water. Two years of fighting in Congo alone may have killed close to two million people, and the

International Rescue Committee notes that "the overwhelming majority" of these deaths "are attributable to preventable diseases and malnutrition."[14] Some belligerent forces deliberately target medical facilities for destruction. Recent wars have significantly contributed to the spread of AIDS and other diseases.[15] For example, 92 percent of Sierra Leone's rebels have tested positive for sexually transmitted diseases.[16] UN and regional peacekeeping forces have also contributed to the spread of AIDS.[17]

Refugees created by the conflicts not only reflect existing political problems but also create new ones, draining as they do recipient states of resources and sometimes posing serious security threats. Several of the post–Cold War conflicts have generated very many refugees: Liberia's war, for instance, sent over a million refugees into neighboring states, and Somalia's conflict spilled about a million refugees into Kenya and Ethiopia.[18] Refugees themselves may join fighting groups (Rwandan Tutsis in Uganda accounted for 20 percent of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army during the 1980s) and occasionally form emigré armies: Tanzania and Uganda sheltered armed groups that overthrew, or helped overthrow, two governments. Tanzania, along with Ugandan dissidents, toppled Idi Amin's regime in Uganda in 1979, and Uganda helped Rwandan exiles to overthrow the Hutu government in 1994. The armed Hutu refugees in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) became the pretext for an invasion of Zaire by the Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda and by Uganda, Rwanda's close ally—an invasion that helped to topple the government of Sese Seko Mobutu.

Brutal conflict can aggravate the initial causes of the fighting and destroy the possibility of a common loyalty to a country with ethnically diverse societies (Rwanda and Burundi, for instance, have ongoing cycles of retributive internal violence).[19] In addition, domestic conflict can quickly spread to other fragile states: Liberia's fighting helped to spark Sierra Leone's war (1991 to present), encouraged coups in Gambia (1994) and Sierra Leone (1992, 1996, 1997), played an indirect role in a failed coup attempt in Guinea (1996), and created a serious refugee situation in all of Liberia's neighboring states. Some wars, notably that in Congo during the late 1990s, can intensify neighboring conflicts.[20] Attacks in Namibia by the Caprivi Liberation Army in August 1999 apparently were sponsored by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in retaliation for Namibia's support of Laurent Kabila's Congo government—a major opponent of UNITA.

Conflict may also undercut the legitimacy of traditional authority

and thus increase the difficulty of postconflict political development; heavily armed youngsters challenged the authority of the clan elders in Somalia during the early 1990s, for example. And conflict has reversed potential transitions to democratization in Rwanda and Angola.

The increased availability of weaponry is another long-lasting effect (as well as a cause) of conflict and has contributed to the militarization of political discourse. Thirty years of war have seen Africa import some 10 million automatic assault rifles and innumerable other weapons, many of which have remained in circulation long after the initial hostilities ended. The longed-for ending of the Cold War and apartheid released large weapon supplies from conflict areas, notably in Ethiopia, South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. In the late 1980s Mozambique, a nation of some 16 million people, had about 1 million AK-47s in *private* hands (the price, as low as $5 for each rifle, proved an especially attractive feature). Antipersonnel land mines in their random destructiveness also hurt future economic development.[21]

Although "collapsed states" are not exclusively a post–Cold War phenomenon, the problem of African state survival has deepened and spread since 1989.[22] Some nations have instituted impressive reforms that augur well for long-term development; South Africa, Uganda, Ghana, Mali, and Mozambique are some of Africa's tentative success stories. Yet conflicts in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and both Congos have destroyed economic infrastructure, inflicted massive human suffering, weakened hopes for a cohesive national identity within these countries, and often spread into neighboring countries. Surprisingly, some of Africa's poorest states have engaged in protracted wars. Rwanda has had troops in Congo since 1997, and Ethiopia and Eritrea plunged into a disastrous, conventional border conflict that wiped out most of their previous economic gains.

The World Bank predicted a 3.8-percent median growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa in l998, down from 4.5 percent in 1997. While numerous factors, such as fluctuating commodity prices, also affect growth levels, conflict appears especially important. Noting this growth decline, the *Economist* suggests that

> the biggest threat to Africa now comes from war. . . . War now consumes Africa from the Horn to Namibia. Nearly a third of sub-Saharan Africa's 42 countries are embroiled in international or civil wars . . . at least 13 have sent troops to neighbors' wars. Other countries are plagued by gangs of armed criminals, who can be as disruptive as political rebels.[23]

Salim Ahmed Salim, secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), draws a strong link between peace and growth: "There is a clear recognition among leaders that as long as there is conflict, all the talk about economic development will remain just that, talk. And as long as this conflict remains so widespread, the outside world will just not care about Africa."[24]

Africa's post-1990 security situation shares some strong characteristics with other world regions. Much of Chapter 3 examines four of these commonalities: the Cold War's ending and the resulting negative effects on existing problems, the changing nature of insurgency warfare, the disinclination of the international community to intervene militarily, and the promises and pitfalls of greater regional security responsibility.

African and other third world conflicts can threaten some Western interests. They can pull Western states into costly and dangerous efforts at "peacekeeping," "peace enforcement," or "nation building" in areas seemingly unimportant to the West, and such interventions are financially costly. The Somalia intervention cost the United States about $1.5 billion, mostly between December 1992 and December 1993. Peacekeeping and "operations other than war" (OOTW) can lessen Western military readiness.[25] Damaged economic and educational infrastructure hurts international economic development, worsening public health standards raise the possibility of pandemic diseases, and increased migration to Western countries can inflame nativist sentiments. Collapsed states allow a power vacuum into which forces threatening to international stability, such as terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, and money laundering, can quickly enter and spread.[26] If unchecked, the violent death of an "unimportant" state can create worrisome precedents for battlefield conduct in future conflicts. Michael Brown maintains that "the international community . . . will find its distinctions and norms hard to sustain in the long run if it allows them to be trampled in ethnic conflicts in which civilians are attacked deliberately and systematically. So the breakup of a state, even a small one, also has implications for international law and order."[27] On the other hand, professional African militaries would lessen the need for outside forces and could assist UN and other peacekeeping missions.

Can African Militaries Strengthen African States?

Some critics argue that African militaries are unprofessional, irrelevant, or dangerous and that a "military solution" is oxymoronic. Other

observers suggest that militaries have the potential to contribute to state stability. This section examines these varying positions.

Unprofessional Militaries

African security forces may worsen, rather than cure, the problem of instability. Many of Africa's militaries are unprofessional, lacking both technical expertise for combat and political responsibility to the state.[28] Samuel Decalo characterizes most African militaries as technologically limited, each with "a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal differences."[29] Since professionalism is a central focus of this book, I give it considerable attention below.

The "unprofessional" argument assumes that national political structures and values help determine a force's character and that Africa's prevailing system of personal, rather than institutional, rule has proven incompatible with military professionalism. Armed forces that are neither militarily competent nor politically responsible threaten national development.

Professionalism usually requires an *institutionalized* system of stable and widely accepted political values that exist independent of a specific regime. Implicit is the distinction between the state (ongoing) and the regime (temporary). In other words, the values and interests of the state, including the military, claim precedence over any other temporarily powerful group or leader. This resembles Max Weber's distinction between "rational-legal" and "charismatic" authority as well as Huntington's definition of political modernization.[30] The primacy of civic (inclusive) versus ethnic (or other subgroup) nationalism is implicit within the institutionalization argument.[31]

Groups within most institutionalized political systems have both rights and responsibilities—Weber's "fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules."[32] This horizontal distribution of power ensures that each government agency enjoys some functional autonomy and that no one branch of government controls the distribution of state resources.

Military professionalism is a two-way street. Civilian and military officials agree not to cross the divide into each others' affairs. The armed forces enjoy considerable jurisdiction in military matters: they determine selection and promotion of personnel using their own merit criteria, and they implement policies of command and control, manpower, firepower, intelligence, communications, and logistics. The balancing of power among government agencies and between the govern-

ment and the public specifically helps to check unpopular military incursions into foreign lands (opposition to France's rule in Algeria and to U.S. intervention in Vietnam are two major examples).

The professional military's political responsibility requires it to accept state control and to subsume such subnational loyalties as ethnicity, regionalism, and ideology.[33] The military accomplishes this with its own internal system of responsibility. Officers and enlisted men accept the rank structure and abjure using their coercive capabilities for subnational or individual gain (ethnic coups, private business ventures, or human rights violations being three possibilities). Professional forces also accept that civilian oversight can assist military efficiency.

Africa has had predominantly personalist political systems since independence, and such regimes have often sustained unprofessional militaries. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, while noting significant differences among personal rulers, wrote in the early 1980s that "politics in most black African states do not conform to an institutionalized system. . . the new African statesman was a personal ruler more than a constitutional and institutional one."[34] Most contemporary scholars of the African state concur with this view: Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle conclude that "authority is entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler's preferences rather than any codified system of laws."[35] The long list of examples of rulers who typified a *l'état, c'est moi* deportment include Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, and Samuel Doe of Liberia.[36] The primacy of personal (and corporate), instead of state, interests has been the military's "prime characteristic," according to Decalo.[37]

Personalist political systems diverge markedly from institutional ones because the rulers have greater freedom to advance the short-term interests of the regime, including security, at the expense of developing long-term state institutions.[38] A ruler's control of the state's resources provides maximum patronage powers and prevents the growth of functionally autonomous power centers whose expertise could promote national development; rulers sometimes even turn to foreign collaborators rather than sanction indigenous capability. Bratton and van de Walle observe this distinction between regime survival and national needs when they write that personal rulers "selectively distribute favors and material benefits to loyal followers who are not citizens of the polity so much as the ruler's clients."[39] The resultant uncertainty can bolster a ruler's power by maximizing public dependence on one-man rule and the state's patronage capabilities. Personalist African rulers since the

mid-1990s have deployed their militaries into neighboring countries without having to seek parliamentary or public acquiescence.

These leaders reverse Huntington's argument that institutionalization can create stability. Rather than increase the coherence of state institutions as a source of strength, these and other rulers construe state (including military) and private-sector development as threats to their rule and deny them functional autonomy. ("There is no such thing as a definite sphere of authority and of competence," writes Weber about charismatic systems.)[40] Such rulers contradict realist assumptions about the primacy of the state and the salience of national interest. Plundering of state resources and emasculation of the military by rentier governments has resulted from this emphasis upon the regime versus the state. Unprofessional militaries beholden to regimes rather than to states have exacted an economic toll upon national development. Jacques de Barrin wrote about the abusive Ugandan military in the mid-1980s and how it "came to undermine the very state which built it up and relied upon it."[41] Some rulers have gone so far as to voluntarily surrender aspects of national sovereignty by inviting foreign firms to assume important state or parastatal responsibilities; the hiring of private security or mining companies as substitutes for local capability are two such examples.

Several, especially southern African, countries have militaries that were linked historically during the liberation struggle to the political parties now in power. Examples include Mozambique's armed forces with Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Zimbabwe's with Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU), and Namibia's with South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). Despite postindependence integration of some nonparty officers and enlistees, the bulk of the top officers retain membership in, and a long identity with, the prevailing party. None of these three militaries has staged coup attempts, but loyalty may be restricted more to the ruler and/or party rather than to the state.

Personal rule in Africa and its denial of functionally autonomous power for the military has hurt the armed forces' professionalism. Personalist leaders see the combination of technical expertise and political loyalty as a security dilemma because the autonomy that military competence requires impinges upon a ruler's desire for personal control. This is the first security dilemma discussed in this book; countries with personal rule rarely have both loyal *and* competent forces. Faced with this tension between two major components of military professionalism, personalist rulers subvert the armed forces for their own political

survival (and usually financial gain). Their frequent crossing of the civil-military divide eliminates an army's politically disinterested ethos and almost always weakens its military capabilities.

Denial of a military's functional autonomy allows a ruler (who may be a military officer himself) to select, promote, reassign, and cashier personnel on the basis of subnational loyalties, most notably ethnicity, rather than merit. Africa's rulers have often stripped the militaries of operational competence while proffering various patronage rewards to personnel to ensure their allegiance. Christopher Clapham notes that basing selection and promotion on (usually ethnic) patron-client relationships hurts effective military capabilities: "The patron-client structures which form the common currency of African social organisation are particularly ill-adapted to the needs of large and disciplined military forces."[42]

Manipulation by personal rulers often includes parallel forces (e.g., presidential guards, state-sponsored militias, indigenous security companies, mercenary groups), which peripheralize the national militaries by siphoning off supplies, soldiers, responsibilities, and prestige. Such forces usually answer only to the ruler, function as a counterweight to the established military, and serve only his personal interests.

"Privatization of security" is generally used to describe corporate (or "mercenary") military involvement in Africa. Yet, as Clapham notes, the term can just as readily be applied to the hijacking of the national security forces by an unrepresentative government for its own gain.[43] I contend that much of Africa's military structures have some private aspect, whether to push rulers' personal or subnational desires or to seek financial gain. Many personalist rulers have reconfigured their forces to match their regimes'—rather than the states'—ethnic, regional, or religious loyalties. National security, which should protect all citizens of the state, becomes a partisan or entrepreneurial force. To alleviate anger in the often enfeebled officer corps, personalist rulers often exacerbate the zero-sum relationship of the regime versus state by allowing, and sometimes encouraging, the soldiers to appropriate military funding (especially by equipment procurement practices) or to intrude into the civilian economy by granting significant economic rights, such as search and seizure authorizations. Sometimes this privatization becomes overtly commercial, as when the regime grants commercial licenses to active-duty officers or when officers transfer soldiers and material from the country's military into their own private security firms. Several African militaries, including Zimbabwe's and Congo's, have recently followed a long-standing international practice

of establishing commercial companies that often have little to do with national defense.[44]

Peripheralization and privatization damage Africa's security in many ways. Parallel forces can exacerbate social divisions: they are usually ethnically based and they use force, or at least its threat, to pursue the personal policies of their commander. By answering directly to their presidents, the forces are even less accountable than the national militaries. Parallel groups create divisions and competition between themselves and national militaries as they compete for resources, personnel, and status. State-sponsored militias usually have poorer human rights records than the national army and, by increasing the number of armed and often poorly trained fighters, may increase the nation's insecurity. Profit seeking, when accompanied by nonaccountability, may well encourage human rights abuses and perhaps even the perpetuation of conflict.

Military rulers themselves are often to blame for the lack of professionalism: surprisingly, "securocrat" rule has lessened defensive capabilities. Political administration and personal business matters attract the attention of officers in military regimes and weaken such mundane and relatively unrewarding security capabilities as training and discipline. Military budgets after a coup have often risen, but more money has not brought greater efficiency, the army's unquestioned authority encouraging unmonitored and unnecessary spending. The hope of some scholars during the 1960s that praetorian militaries could become capable modernizers of backward states, as in Kemal Ataturk's Turkey, has rarely been realized.[45]

Various actors, such as civilian political leaders, subnational groups, and ambitious military officers, cross the civil-military divide but the results are similar: political militaries in Africa often cannot redress the coercive balance and assist peaceful development.

The Irrelevance of Military Solutions

The second limitation of military contributions to peaceful settlements in Africa is that battlefield victories rarely deal with the underlying social, economic, and political causes of conflict or the peaceful means of conflict resolution. In other words, armed force addresses the effects rather than the cause of conflict. "The longer-term answer to managing conflicts," notes Timothy Sisk, "is to improve the capacity of African institutions at regional, sub-regional, national and local levels to manage tensions and mediate disputes without recourse to violence and

armed insurrection."[46] Donald Snow adds that "the best form of counterinsurgency is good government."[47] Finally, military victories by themselves may exacerbate resentment from the losers and raise the possibility of continued opposition.

The Danger of Military Solutions

A third limitation is that a capable military defense of an intolerable status quo *is* clearly undesirable: it hamstrings development while bottling a discontent that later might explode violently. Various African rulers have disavowed common democratic standards, including the distinction between the interests of the ruler versus the interests of the common good and the state as an impersonal mediator between conflicting parties. The racist states of southern Africa, as well as Mobutu's Zaire and Haile Mariam Mengistu's Ethiopia, were clearly unrepresentative and unusually repressive. Strong military capabilities lessen the willingness of such governments to engage in peaceful diplomacy.

The nature of some African governments, notably those that define "security" as regime or minority stability only, may not justify their defense. Africa's putative wave of democratization has receded, and personal rule, which had been Africa's predominant and unrepresentative mode of government for its first thirty years of independence, has continued. Additionally, some regimes appear to have institutionalized illegality. Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou worry about a growing "criminalization of the *state* in Africa" [emphasis added] whereby unaccountable rulers are privatizing the state, and sometimes the security forces, for their own economic gain.[48]

This introduces the second security dilemma, a choice between sovereignty and legitimacy. Stability, per se, is not an unalloyed ideal, and coups, rebel movements, or subversion by neighboring states can provide a welcome cleansing of kleptocratic and repressive regimes. Few people mourned the overthrow of Uganda's Idi Amin. Yet the OAU in its 1963 charter forbids interference in the internal affairs of fellow African states, fearing that any precedent, regardless of the target's legitimacy, could spark a series of attacks and counterattacks that would set African development back.

The third security dilemma focuses on the tension between a state's domestic and regional policies and how outside, especially Western, states should respond. A government may implement needed economic reforms but pursue an aggressive regional policy that includes invasion of its neighbors. Several reformist African states commended by

President Clinton in 1997 as constituting an "African renaissance" have received U.S. military assistance to protect their domestic reforms, but they have concurrently mounted military attacks on their neighbors, Rwanda and Uganda being two such examples. A closely related problem is that military assistance may inadvertently destabilize the recipient by increasing fears and military buildups by its neighbors.[49] Sometimes a government that practices deplorable domestic policies may play a constructive role regionally by dispatching peacekeepers to troubled states, perhaps to offset international criticism of its internal policies. The Babangida and Abacha governments in Nigeria during the 1990s were manifestly undemocratic and kleptocratic toward their citizenry but they also provided massive support to the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peacekeeping force in Liberia and then Sierra Leone.

The Case for Military Contributions to Stability

African militaries can contribute to lasting stability, despite possible limitations. Military professionalism in the third world has recently received sharpened interest as a key component of development. Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) has made military reform a top priority, but as Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short acknowledges, "Development organisations have in the past tended to shy away from the issue of security sector reform."[50] The World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit states its increasing belief that "the state of a country's security has a major impact on the Bank's ability to respond to the country's needs."[51] And Michael Ignatieff writes that "more than development, more than aid or emergency relief, more than peacekeepers, these societies need states, with professional armies under the command of trained leaders."[52]

National forces have lacked professionalism partly because the political rulers have not encouraged such professionalism. I posit that militaries often reflect national political values and that a more representative and less personalist political system could elevate a military's capability and loyalty by encouraging transparency, meritocracy, and accountability.

Furthermore, professionalism is relative. Some unprofessional state militaries have significantly violated human rights, but some insurgencies have established a worse record—especially during this post–Cold War era of less control by foreign patrons.[53] Even relatively professional militaries, when compared to irregular forces, usually exercise

greater selectivity in personnel recruitment, pay more attention to the restrained use of force, and are more accountable to the general public for their deeds—for example, discerning between combatants and noncombatants, legitimate and illegitimate targets, and civilized and brutish treatment of prisoners.

The absence of a professional force encourages subnational groups to look after their own defense. Citizens face greater threats from such nonstate actors who make local rather than national appeals, provide little or no training in proper military conduct during hostilities, lack established enforcement mechanisms against members who mistreat innocent civilians, and exhibit less vulnerability than states to international criticism. Factions may lower conduct from controlled *bellum hostile* (warfare restricted by standards) to uncontrolled *bellum romanum* (slaughter, or unrestricted warfare).[54] Some ECOMOG officers and enlistees stole significant resources from Liberia and Sierra Leone and committed some human rights abuses, but their malfeasance appears limited when compared to violations perpetrated by the rebel groups.

Peaceful conflict resolution may well be "the longer-term answer" to conflicts, as Sisk notes. But conflicts often require military muscle to stop immediate human rights violations and create a "mutually hurting stalemate" that forces the combatants to talk peacefully.[55] Rwanda's 1994 genocide saw the Rwandan government and civilian militias kill some 700,000 Rwandan civilians within a two-month period. An international study group concluded that "in retrospect, a capable force of 5,000 troops inserted during April 7–21 could have significantly squelched the violence, prevented its spread from the capital to the countryside, and removed the RPF's [Rwandan Patriotic Front's] pretext for renewing its fight with the RGF [Rwandan Government Forces]."[56]

A few analysts believe that thorough prosecution of wars provides for a more lasting peace than many of the attempts to end conflicts peacefully. Edward Luttwak writes that "an unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace," whereas well-meaning relief aid and cease fires often prolong the conflict by allowing combatants to rebuild their capability.[57] This view has its African proponents.[58] Some military victories have helped to create greater stability and national integration: Nigeria's defeat of Biafran secession, as well as a commendable reconciliation policy toward the rebels, largely dissolved further thoughts of an independent eastern Nigeria. The Rwanda

Patriotic Front's defeat of the Hutu *génocidaires* saved innumerable lives and ushered in a period, perhaps tentative, of greater peace.[59]

Some African regimes (such as contemporary Congo or Cameroon) are clearly undemocratic and repressive, and therefore probably not deserving of any military assistance, but other governments (such as present-day Nigeria and Uganda) have attempted desirable reforms, thus obviating clearly objectionable insurgencies. Sometimes an unproductive or unrepresentative status quo is preferable to the insurgent alternative. Sierra Leone's RUF has committed gross acts against Sierra Leonean civilians, and its insurgency (along with a brief stay in power) has damaged the country far more than the basically inept, and often corrupt, national government of Ahmed Kabbah.

Finally, those professional militaries that demonstrate loyalty to the state, rather than only to a specific regime, assist countries experiencing an interregnum between authoritarianism and a hoped-for democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville noted that "the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways,"[60] and a powerful umpire can facilitate the peaceful transition.

Three Approaches

African governments have been experimenting with three approaches to internal security: regional intervention forces, private security companies, and Western attempts to assist military professionalism. Each of these offers some hope of protecting African stability and development. I hypothesize that a variety of military and political factors—especially the unwillingness of many governments to encourage the development of professional militaries—have prevented these options from offering significant relief. This book studies how these experiments could be improved and whether political democratization may help develop both a military's technical capabilities and its political loyalty.

Regional and private (mercenary) military groupings are two dramatically different alternatives for state security. Multinational forces have become the preferred form of intervention during the post-Cold War period, and regional groupings offer several hypothetical advantages over nonregional units: greater knowledge of the region, acceptance, commitment, and more suitable military capabilities. ECOMOG, created initially from five West African militaries, became the first third world peacekeeping force after the end of the Cold War, and its considerable commitment of eight years in Liberia (1990–1998) and more

than two years in Sierra Leone (1997–2000) provides important lessons for regional peacekeeping.

Mercenary companies were a sometimes dominant military power in Europe prior to the 1700s, despite widespread criticism. Machiavelli counseled his prince that private soldiers were either incompetent or disloyal.[61] But with a decline in state military capability, security theoreticians and futurists suggest that private security could regain some of its historical importance. Martin van Creveld believes that "the spread of sporadic, small-scale war will cause regular armed forces themselves to change form, shrink in size, and wither away. As they do, much of the day-to-day burden of defending society against the threat of low-intensity conflict will be transferred to the booming security business; and indeed the time may come when the organizations that comprise that business will, like the *condottieri* of old, take over the state."[62]

Private security companies (PSCs) form a part of the much larger wave of global "privatization" that has reshaped thinking about foreign policy as well as erstwhile government functions (e.g., postal service, utilities, public health). Western governments since 1945, but especially since 1990, have increasingly permitted or even encouraged such private actors as relief agencies, businesses, and retired statesmen to assume responsibilities that states had once monopolized.[63] Privatization assumes lower costs, less state responsibility or accountability, and greater efficiency.[64]

Private security companies are growing worldwide, and Executive Outcomes, while unique in some ways, and defunct by early 1999, nonetheless illustrates many of the significant attractions as well as the clear limitations of private security. Executive Outcomes, a South African-based private army, helped local forces to counter insurgencies in Angola (1993–1996) and Sierra Leone (1995–1997). Executive Outcomes no longer functions, but numerous other companies, both African and non-African, have acquired a wide range of contracts.

But restructuring existing African forces into multinational forces or supplementing them with private security will prove insufficient. National forces will remain the basic military unit in Africa, even as many of them are unable to maintain essential skills and discipline. This ineptitude multiplies when they are combined into regional forces to which they bring a jumble of doctrines, equipment, and languages. Upgrading of national militaries is a *sine qua non* of African security, but achieving it presents serious problems.

The U.S.-proposed Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is an effort to increase Africa's level of military professionalism, beginning

with national battalions. ACRI, initially proposed in 1997, has become the first-ever attempt to provide Western funding and training for an interoperable third-world peacekeeping capacity. Its training and much of its equipment is standardized so that battalions from the participating states can quickly unite into a single force when needed. Any success of ACRI and other Western initiatives could relieve some of the political pressure on the West and the UN to intervene in unfamiliar or relatively unimportant crises.

Structure of the Book

In examining the security effects of colonialism and then personal rule, Chapter 2 discusses why African states cannot rely on their national militaries to redress the balance of power. The chapter also examines the tension between efficiency and loyalty and why military rule has often reduced security capabilities.

Chapter 3 briefly examines some causes of African conflicts and discusses why the balance of military power is shifting against many African states and why Africa cannot depend on Western states or the United Nations for military intervention.

Chapter 4 examines multinational African military forces, the first external defense option for redressing the military balance. Regional military groupings have several hypothetical advantages over nonregional interveners, and this chapter assesses whether ECOMOG has demonstrated the groupings' validity. The chapter stresses the need of multinational units for already-professional national forces and maintains that personal rule in West Africa during the 1980s had debilitated most of ECOMOG's contingents.

Chapter 5 looks at the burgeoning private security field and whether Executive Outcomes's experiences in Angola and Sierra Leone disprove Machiavelli's concerns about the competence and loyalty of mercenaries. It then argues that military capabilities and political responsibility to the state are not the only two criteria for evaluating PSCs because these companies have contributed to the privatization of state resources by self-seeking African officials. The privatization and commercialization of security by African officials is a largely unexamined phenomenon that is helping to entrench personal rule governments and, perhaps, to prolong conflicts.

Chapter 6 uses ACRI to assess whether foreign training programs, the third external security option, can professionalize African militaries

significantly enough for them to help redress the power balance. The domestic versus regional dilemma arises here because ACRI has provided training and some equipment to Uganda, which later destabilized the neighboring countries of Congo and Sudan. It is argued here that foreign attempts at professionalization will have limited success, at best.

The final chapter offers judgments about the three foreign attempts to assist African military professionalism and suggests that just as authoritarian states have encouraged militaries to be unprofessional, more democratic regimes could assist the military capabilities and the political loyalty of their national forces. Yet, the fourth security dilemma arises here: can democratization, which hopes to encourage stability, become a domestically and regionally destabilizing force?

Notes

1. Susan Rice, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, quoted by Marina Ottaway, "Post-Imperial Africa at War," p. 202.

2. Quoted by Mark Malan, "The Crisis In External Response," in Cilliers and Mason, *Peace, Profit, or Plunder?* p. 46.

3. The very rich, but generally dated, literature on African civil-military relations includes Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa;* Ruth First, *Power in Africa;* Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations;* Kenneth W. Grundy, *Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa,* and Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change.* Single-nation studies include Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military,* and Thomas Cox, Civil *Military Relations in Sierra Leone*. The U.S. Department of Defense–commissioned country handbooks, produced initially by The American University and later by the Library of Congress, include a national security chapter.

4. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* p. 154.

5. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War,* p. 224.

6. For example, Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa.*

7. Paul Richards coins the term "new barbarians," which he critically considers a "Malthus-with-guns" perspective on post-1990 conflicts. Richards puts Robert Kaplan and Martin van Creveld into this school. Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest,* pp. xiv, xvii; Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy."

8. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa.*

9. Thomas Callaghy, "The State As Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa," *The African State in Transition* (London: Macmillan, 1987); Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, "Disengagement From the State in Africa." Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "The Marginality Of

African States," in Carter and O'Meara, eds., *African Independence: The First Twenty–Five Years.* Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works,* p. 1. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle examine the economic aspect: "State elites in Africa have sought political power primarily to obtain and defend economic benefits, to the point that they have blocked private accumulation by independent groups in society, thus undermining the entire project of economic development." Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments In Africa,* p. 47. Joel Migdal argues along the same lines in *Strong Societies and Weak States*. See also William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States.*

10. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity, 1999).

11. These are estimates obtained from U.S. government officials and relief agencies. The figure includes internally displaced as well as external refugees. The statistics may be too conservative. Jakkie Cilliers, writing in the mid-1990s, mentions "35 major armed conflicts, which together have taken the lives of almost ten million people" and which, along with drought and disease, "have given the continent a refugee population currently estimated at 26 million people." Jakkie Cilliers, "Security and Transition in South Africa," in Diamond and Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy.*

12. "Emerging Maps: Africa Scrambles For Africa," *Africa Confidential* 40,1, (January 8, 1999), p. 1.

13. Human Rights Watch, "Sierra Leone. Sowing Terror: Atrocities Against Civilians In Sierra Leone," July 1998, p. 4.

14. "New Evidence Reveals Staggering Loss of Life in Eastern Congo: 1.7 Million Dead in 22-Month War." Press release, International Rescue Committee. Http://www.theirc.org.

15. The *New York Times,* writing about AIDS in Rwanda, notes that "the [Rwandan] upheaval broke down social taboos against promiscuity and the ever-present threat of violence made it harder to persuade people to worry about a disease that takes years to show up. . . . Even if arrested now, the epidemic will take the life of 1 person out of 10 in the next decade." *New York Times*, "Ravaged by War and Massacre, Rwanda Faces Scourge of AIDS," May 28, 1998. Refugee flows create serious disease problems that can rapidly move beyond the refugee population.

16. "A War Against Women," *Washington Post,* April 11, 2000.

17. "HIV/AIDS: UN Peacekeepers Spread Disease," *Los Angeles Times,* January 7, 2000. The UN now sponsors a Civil Military Alliance to Combat HIV and AIDS to lessen the AIDS spread by its soldiers.

18. The Rwandan genocide, within a single twenty-four-hour period in 1994, forced 250,000 panicked civilians into Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire.

19. Some countries have adopted policies of remarkable tolerance that lessen postconflict violence. Reconciliation policies help lower tensions and the chances for more conflict. The Nigerian government in 1970 welcomed the defeated "Biafrans" back into Nigeria and worked to prevent retribution against the Ibos. The majority governments in Zimbabwe and South Africa adopted reconciliation policies that defused much suspicion and anger, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission being a major example.

20. Referring to Congo, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Susan Rice testified that a "political vacuum in the heart of Africa is a perfect setting not only for various state and non-state actors to replenish themselves and rebuild strength but an attractive venue for [anti-American] groups." She cites Libya's and Sudan's involvement in the war and then speculates that the conflict has "contribute[d] both to the intensity and possibly the duration of the Angolan civil war . . . [and] has the potential to adversely affect Burundi's peace process," as well as assisting armed Rwandan Hutus who "are a tremendously destabilizing factor for the entire Great Lakes region." "Central African Conflict and Its Implications for Africa and for the Future of U.S. Policy Goals and Strategies," Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs.

21. Antipersonnel mines can divert large amounts of money to the victims and prevent them from contributing to national development (Angola probably has over 10 million land mines still buried and the highest percentage per capita of quadriplegics in the world). Mine-infested territory reduces the amount of arable land. Removal exacts both human and financial costs: some common mines cost $2 to produce but $1,000 to remove from the ground.

22. William Zartman defines collapsed states as those "where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart . . . the phenomenon is historic and worldwide . . . but nowhere are there more examples than in contemporary Africa." I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Posing the Problem Of State Collapse," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration Of Legitimate Authority*, p. 1.

23. "A Continent Goes to War," *The Economist*, October 3, 1998, p. 47. The World Bank's chief of the Africa region's Capacity Building Division states that "it is becoming clear that the first order of business is to restore stability over an increasingly fragmented political and administrative environment." Mamadou Dia, "Indigenous Management Practices: Lessons for Africa's Management in the '90s," in Ismail Serageldin and June Taboroff, eds., *Culture and Development in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994), p. 171.

24. "Africa Ills: Insights on Cure but Avoiding the Medicine," *New York Times*, February 10, 1996, p. 6.

25. Militaries traditionally have trained soldiers for offensive combat operations, rather than OOTW, which detract from the military's primary mission and often require different doctrines and tactics. The U.S. Army in 1999 believed, according to the *Washington Post*, that "the strain of peacekeeping is so great that two of its 10 divisions are unready for war." "Army's Unready Divisions" Budget Feint or Fact?" *Washington Post*, November 15, 1999. Also see Stephen J. Cimbala, "Military Persuasion and the American Way of War," *Strategic Review*, Fall, 1994, quoted in "Army SOF: Right Tool for OOTW," *Special Warfare* (10,3) Summer 1997, p. 4. Peacekeeping's inherent restraint upon military force can create psychological distress among soldiers who cannot stop wide-scale human rights abuse. "Price of Waging Peace: Romeo Dallaire's Collapse Symbolizes a New Type of Stress Afflicting Soldiers," *National Post* (Canada), July 15, 2000.

26. This book notes that foreign states have entered Congo for personal

and political reasons. One of the more worrisome possibilities is that of North Korea's providing troops and training to the Kabila government in return for what London's *Sunday Telegraph* terms "access to the country's largest uranium mine, "Alarm over North Korea's Secret Deal for Congo Uranium," *Sunday Telegraph,* January 16, 2000.

27. Michael Brown, "Introduction," *The International Dimensions Of Internal Conflict,* p. 9.

28. Samuel Huntington defines expertise as "the basis of objective standards of professional competence for separating the profession from laymen and measuring the relative competence of members of the profession." Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* p. 8.

Welch underlines the "'modern' organizational characteristics . . . centralization, discipline, hierarchy, communications, and *esprit de corps*." Claude Welch, "The Roots and Implications Of Military Intervention," *Soldier and State in Africa,* p. 38.

"The principal *responsibility* of the military officer is to the state," notes Huntington, and the state is the "single recognized source of legitimate authority over the military forces." Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* p. 16 [emphasis added]. Huntington also lists corporate identity as an element of professionalism.

Few militaries anywhere are fully technically expert and politically responsible, yet, as William Gutteridge notes, professionalism's ideal criteria provide valuable "guidelines and reference points" for evaluating security forces. William Gutteridge, *Military Regimes in Africa,* p. 27.

29. Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa,* pp. 14–15.

30. Rational authority rests "on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands whereas charismatic authority depends on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person." Max Weber, "The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority," in S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Max Weber on Charisma and Nation-Building,* p. 46.

Huntington describes political modernization as "the rationalization of authority: the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a singular, secular, national political authority. . . . It means national integration and the centralization or accumulation of power." Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," p. 378.

31. Civic nationalism is "based on equal and universal citizenship rights within a territory [and] depends on a supporting framework of laws . . . as well as effective institutions. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, depends not on institutions, but on culture." Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 86.

32. Eisenstadt, *Max Weber,* p. 66.

33. Institutionalized militaries can appear very "political" when discussing defense budgets with civilian authorities, but they agree not to enter purely civilian matters and to accept final civilian authority.

34. Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa,* pp. 1, 16. The

authors note important differences within the inclusive "personal rule" label by distinguishing among "prince" (Senegal's accomodationist Leopold Senghor), "prophet" (Ghana's messianic Kwame Nkrumah), "autocrat" (Côte d'lvoire's managerial Félix Houphouët-Boigny), and "tyrant"(Uganda's despotic Idi Amin). The differences within personal rule helped to shape the national militaries.

35. Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa,* p. 61. Chabal and Daloz write that "what all African states share is a generalized system of patrimonialism. . . . The state in sub-Saharan Africa has not been institutionalized, in that it has not become structurally differentiated from society and an acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high level of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a lack of institutionalization, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors. . . . To focus on political elites is thus to highlight the ways in which power is personalized and how legitimacy continues primarily to rest on practices of redistribution." Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works,* pp. xix, 2. See also Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa,* pp. 61–96.

36. Writing in the mid-1970s about Africa's "military cliques," Decalo observed that their "overriding preoccupation [is] with personal and corporate aggrandizement" and that the military fragments "only *indirectly* and *secondarily* along ethnic, class or ideological lines . . . [but] is primarily a consequence of the eruption of competing personal ambitions." Decalo, 1976, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa,* p. 24.

37. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa,* p. 24. Examples in the 1990s include the massive misappropriation of state resources by military officers in Sierra Leone and Nigeria and reported multiple cases of corruption in Uganda.

38. "In African political systems," as Peter Lock notes, "the distinction between state and government has little tradition. Security means in the first place, regime security." Peter Lock, "Africa, Military Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry," in Cilliers and Mason, eds., *Peace, Profit or Plunder?* p. 24.

Hastings K. Banda, former president of Malawi, reflected that "nothing is not my business in this country: everything is my business, everything. The state of education, the state of our economy, the state of our agriculture, the state of our transport, everything is my business." Banda, quoted in Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa.*

39. Ibid., p. 61.

40. Eisenstadt, *Max Weber,* p. 50.

41. Jacques de Barrin, "Behind the Facade of Uganda's Democracy," *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* July 22, 1984, quoted in Chazan et al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa,* p. 60. Van de Walle writes that "surveys of businesspeople consistently reveal that public sector failures in most countries of the [African] region constitute a major obstacle to private-sector activity . . . roadblocks . . . appear to have no function other than to provide income to underpaid officers; but they raise the costs of commerce, sometimes substantially so." Nicolas van de Walle, "Africa and the World Economy," in Harbeson and Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics,* p. 268.

42. Christopher Clapham, "African Security Systems: Privatization and the Scope For Mercenary Conflict," in Mills and Stremlau, eds., *The Privatisation of Security in Africa* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 37.

43. Ibid., p. 24.

44. Chapter 4 of this book examines this growing practice. For an global overview, see "Soldiers In Business," *New York Times,* September 27, 1999.

45. L. W. Pye, "Armies In the Process Of Political Modernization," in J. J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries.* Nicole Ball noted in 1989 that the "modernizing characteristics ascribed to the military frequently lacked substance. In other instances, the modernizing attributes can be shown to have existed in particular countries at specific points in time but they cannot be assured to exist continuously." Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World,* p. 17. Exceptions to this rule could be presidents Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Yoweri Musevini of Uganda.

46. Timothy Sisk, "Institutional Capacity-Building for African Conflict Management," in Smock and Crocker, *African Conflict Resolution,* p. 104.

47. Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars,* p. 84.

48. Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa.*

49. Writers sometimes refer to this problem as "*the* security dilemma." See Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War.*

50. Clare Short, "Recent British Initiatives," March 1999. Http://www.dfid.gov.uk

51. Post-Conflict Unit, "Security, Poverty Reduction & Sustainable Development. Challenges for the New Millennium." The World Bank, September 1999, p. v.

52. Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor,* pp. 159–160.

53. Notable exceptions exist. Paul Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) *may* have acted responsibly toward civilians. Philip Gourevitch writes that "what most vividly impressed observers in the waning days of the genocide was the overall restraint of this rebel army, even as its soldiers were finding their ancestral villages, and their own families, annihilated." Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You,* p. 219. Other observers believe that the RPF was responsible only when compared to the *génocidaires* and that the RPF committed serious human rights abuses in Rwanda and then Zaire as it searched for young Hutu men.

54. Ignatieff, *Warrior's Honor,* pp. 148–149.

55. Term from I. W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

56. Scott Feil, *Could Five Thousand Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?* p. 2. General Roméo Dallaire, the UN's military commander in Rwanda, was the first to assert that five thousand professional soldiers could have stopped the genocide from occuring. Gourevitch writes about Dallaire's conclusion that "no military analyst whom I've heard of has ever questioned his judgement, and a great many have confirmed it." Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You,* p. 150.

57. Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs.*

58. Ali Mazrui asks about Rwanda and other conflictual countries, "Are we witnessing the colonial state being washed clean with buckets of blood? Are these [conflicts] . . . birth pangs of a new African political order wanting to be born?" Ali Mazrui, "Conflict As a Retreat From Modernity," in *Conflict in Africa* (London: J.B. Tauris, 1995), Oliver Furley, ed., p. 22.

Steven Kavuma, Uganda's Defense Minister, told the *Washington Post* in 1999 that the fighting was "the destruction of the old order and the creation of a new order. There is no way we could have jumped from colonialism to just broad, peaceful Africa. Much of this [fighting] was inevitable. It will take time." "New African Leaders Turn on One Another," *Washington Post*, September 2, 1999.

59. The RPF committed its own, more limited, atrocities against real or suspected *génocidaires* in mid–1994.

60. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution,* p. 176.

61. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince,* pp. 44, 46.

62. Van Creveld, *Transformation of War,* p. 207.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler ask: "Why not, when nations have already lost the monopoly of violence, consider creating volunteer mercenary forces organized by private corporations to fight wars on a contract-fee basis for the United Nations, the *condottieri* of yesterday armed with some of the weapons . . . of tomorrow?" Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival At the Dawn of the 2lst Century,* p. 273.

63. The number of UN-accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs) has risen from forty-one in 1948 to over 1,500 at present, and NGOs provided some $10 billion of international aid in 1997. Many relief agencies have assumed functions once firmly held by donor states. Some private foundations and religious groups have entered political diplomacy. The San Egidio community, a Vatican lay organization, supervised Mozambique's negotiations that ended a civil war, which, directly and indirectly, had killed about a million people.

64. John D. Donahue characterizes the potential advantages as "unencumbered administrative flexibility and concentrated decision-making authority that allows for the fastest technical adaptation and the greatest devotion to cost control." John D. Donahue, *The Privatization Decision,* p. 216. Donahue notes that "privatization is not only an inelegant term; it is also lamentably imprecise," Donahue, *The Privatization Decision,* p. 5. For example, it may refer either to a government's divesting itself of parastatals or to the government's contracting out for services often previously supplied by the government.

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