The Political Economy of International Security

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Students of public and international affairs have long recognized the depth and complexity of the relationship between security and economic affairs. Authors as diverse as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Norman Angell, Karl Polanyi, Jacob Viner, Herbert Feis, and a host of others all incorporated both economics and security into their analyses. Yet throughout much of the middle to late twentieth century, and with a few prominent exceptions (e.g., Knorr 1973, 1978; Baldwin 1985; Gilpin 1975), mainstream international relations scholars tended to specialize in either security or economic issues. The theories, methods, and research programs of the two areas rarely coincided.

In recent years, however, interest in the intersections between security affairs and international economics has once again increased among both academic researchers and policymakers. Developments in both scholarship and the world of public policy and politics have called into question Cold War truisms about the primacy of security over economics and, more generally, the analytic and practical separation of the two areas. Scholars have begun reintegrating security studies and the study of international political economy (e.g., Kirshner 1998), thus broadening the substantive and theoretical boundaries of both fields. As the chapters in this volume will demonstrate, integration has had the practical effect of increasing the realms in which scholars have been able to link the two issue areas and academic specializations.

Policymakers in particular have addressed the economic implications of emerging security threats and, conversely, the security implications of economic phenomena like globalization. Already, public officials have collapsed some of the remaining artificial boundaries, as much out of necessity as conviction. The United States has taken both military and economic steps to protect its national interests in a world characterized by more lethal terrorist threats, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the
spread of dual-use commercial technologies, and the profusion of failed or failing states. Current events have thus reinforced the illogic of separating the so-called low politics of economics from the high politics of war and peace.

The extent to which other countries share, and shared, the U.S. view of the global security environment or what constitutes appropriate policy responses to this environment, is uncertain. We know that some countries have greeted U.S. efforts to use economic statecraft in the war on terror—not to mention the prosecution and the aftermath of the Iraq War—with skepticism. Many European analysts criticized continuing economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime. Now, with efforts under way to reduce the debt load on post-Saddam Iraq, attract foreign investors, and bring in international firms to bid on reconstruction contracts, many countries remain suspicious that the U.S. focus on economic and commercial issues stems from expediency, war profiteering, and opportunism. Yet the European Union and its members have drawn upon their commercial and financial strengths to help cope with political instability, both real and projected, in its own near-abroad, including the Mahgreb, the Balkans, and central Europe during the early stages of the post-communist transition.

Complicating matters is the open question of whether current security challenges are new or simply more virulent manifestations of long-term trends. It could be argued, for example, that Islamist terrorism is, at least in part, a by-product of late-twentieth-century economic globalization. Even the events of September 11, 2001, can be understood as another link in a chain of events dating back to the first Bush administration. Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida did not simply enter the public consciousness one September morning. Al-Qaida had been waging an undeclared war against the United States and its allies for over a decade (Benjamin and Simon 2002, pp. 219–293).

This volume explores how fields of international security and international political economy intersect by asking: What are the sources of continuity and change in the relationship between security and economics at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

### Continuity and Change

For virtually all social phenomena, the search for the sources of continuity and change occupies a central position within the scholarly discourse. This is especially true with regard to evolutions of the global economy and the interstate system. Rather than exploring the large and diverse literature that exists on global transformation, this introduction will discuss the major themes related to continuity and change in global society that underlie chapters written for this volume.
The following pages introduce possible changes in the overarching international environment, with an emphasis on how those factors influence the global economy; the theoretical and conceptual innovations that international political economy (IPE) and security studies scholars have developed to understand and explain these developments will be examined in much more detail in Chapter 2, in which Norrin Ripsman undertakes a critical survey of the realist literature linking political economy with national and international security.

The contributions to this volume focus on five parameters of potential change within the international political, economic, and security subsystems. No single chapter examines all five dimensions and no chapter author would agree with this summary of the issues.

**State Sovereignty**

Although state sovereignty remains an essential pillar of contemporary politics, there is growing evidence that the nature of sovereignty has been eroded both in specific cases and as a general norm (Krasner 2001; Biersteker and Weber 1996). As in the past, powerful states remain willing to violate sovereignty norms in the pursuit of their own economic and security objectives. Often, they operate with only cursory legal and political justifications. They are aided by international organizations, created in part to provide and manage global public goods in the collective interest of members, to impinge upon the formal sovereignty of individual members. Hence International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank programs habitually supersede the judgment of domestic political leaders and technical experts. The United Nations Security Council has increasingly invoked a norm of humanitarian intervention to justify action even against the explicit wishes of the parties involved in the conflict. In the Kosovo crisis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization even managed to overcome the traditional caution of its membership to intervene against Serbia.

Recent events have contributed to a further erosion of state sovereignty. With the announcement of the so-called Bush Doctrine, a declaratory policy of preemption, preventive war, and regime change, the United States has asserted both its right and its willingness to intervene militarily in the face of perceived global threats from rogue states and terrorists. Despite widespread international opposition to the U.S. position, other states, including Russia, Austria, and France, have hinted that they too are prepared to strike terrorists and other adversaries preemptively. As the recently issued report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel argues, even the United Nations may support preemption, providing decisions are made under UN auspices and in general accordance with the principle of just war theory (United Nations 2004).

In the economic sphere the implications are less stark, but with policies like the Millennium Challenge Account the Bush administration has assumed
a more aggressive stance toward using foreign aid as a tool of economic state-
craft. Indeed, if fully implemented the United States may be embarking on a
period of unprecedented economic coercion in the service of national security
ends. As will be discussed by Steven Hook and David Rothstein in Chapter 8,
the United States has also used its long-standing security assistance programs
more aggressively since September 11, 2001, to reward members of the vari-
ous “coalitions of the willing.” Beneficiaries include countries, like Uzbek-
istan, that have been willing to provide bases for the Afghan campaign, as well
as countries, like Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, that face internal
threats from Al-Qaeda.

Powerful European and Asian states have also used economic statecraft to
further their own political and diplomatic aims. Underlying security concerns
have motivated the policies of the European Union and its member states to-
ward postcommunist Europe, while Japan’s relatively generous foreign aid
programs have a great deal to do with its perceived need to maintain stability
in key economic partners across Asia.

In each case, there is a fine line between cooperation in pursuit of com-
mon goals and active interference in the affairs of sovereign states. Moreover,
whether other countries will emulate the recent aggressive military and eco-
nomic interventionism of the United States remains to be seen. It may be that
interventionist economic and military policies represent short-lived and un-
derstandable U.S. reaction to the horrific attacks of September 11. The will-
ingness of other countries to intervene in the affairs of other states may be less
important than the fact that they themselves are affected by the aggressive use
of both security and economic instruments by the United States.

Global Governance and Institutional Capacity

Global governance has been a long-standing theme in international relations in
various incarnations, from dreams of world government to the more modest
focus on international regimes (Krasner 1983), epistemic communities (Haas
1990), and transnational networks of nonstate organizations (Florini 2000,
2003). While none of the chapters in this volume focus explicitly on global
governance, several imply the importance of international cooperation for con-
trolling conflicts. More positively, many global public goods are beyond the
power and desire of individual nation-states to provide; only collective action
among nation-states facilitated by international institutions or hegemonic lead-
ership has the political capacity and material resources to provide such goods in
sufficient quantity and quality. At the intersection of security and economic
policies are transnational phenomena with adverse consequences for global se-
curity that cannot be handled by individual states or even small groups of states.

At both the state and interstate levels, then, we have seen renewed interest
in building governance capacity, especially with regard to increased responsi-
bility and accountability on the part of social actors at all levels of society. States are increasingly held responsible for harboring terrorists, turning a blind eye toward domestic groups with ties to terrorists, or exploiting resources, regions, and peoples. Accountability means risking unilateral or multilateral military intervention or the use of economic coercion such as sanctions or embargoes, or both. It also means channeling official development assistance and the programs of the international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to build or rebuild the governance capacities of states. International organizations have thus reoriented their own policies to ensure that they use governance as an independent variable in determining the suitability of particular countries for grants and loans.

As Virginia Haufler explains in Chapter 4, even multinational corporations are sometimes being held accountable for their behavior in conflict-torn regions. For many host countries it is no longer sufficient for corporate investors to offer capital and expertise in return for access to cheap labor, abundant raw materials, and lax regulatory regimes; they must also play a role in maintaining local security and brokering deals among conflicting factions. Transnational activists encourage corporate responsiveness by applying political pressure to become more conscious of the political, social, and increasingly, security implications of business decisions.

Public and Private Responses

In a related trend first brought to prominence by Susan Strange and John Stoppard (1991), alliances among and between states and firms have become common within the international political economy; there is a mutual interdependence between states and firms on a range of issues. For many years the United States remained officially and ideologically opposed to alliances between the public and private sectors to accomplish public purposes in the international system. U.S. opposition to public-private alliances has often been breached in practice, however. Commercial banks and other financial services firms, for example, were assigned important roles in managing the third world debt crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Dombrowski 1996).

States like France, Germany, and Japan, not to mention upwardly mobile middle-income countries like South Korea, have long promoted national champions and work closely with private firms to serve both commercial and national ends. More recently, the United States has caught up with its economic competitors by increasing the public use of the private interest (Schultze 1977). U.S. government agencies such as the Trade and Development Agency and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation seek to encourage U.S. overseas trade and investment by working closely with corporations.

In the security realm, this dynamic is evident in the defense industrial sector, the targeted sanctions regime, and the growing demand for corporate
responsibility among others areas. The U.S. government has (re)discovered that it cannot accomplish all of its foreign and security policy objectives if it relies solely on its own resources. The demands of the revolution in military affairs for technological innovation in weapons and systems are far too great to be funded solely from government military research and development accounts. Large commercial firms often dominate the most innovative business sectors—in communications, computing, and information processing, for example—and so the U.S. military draws heavily upon commercial and dual-use technologies for developing and acquiring cutting-edge, first-generation weapons systems necessary to conduct information age warfare (Dombrowski, Gholz, and Ross 2002).

**U.S. Hegemony and Unipolarity**

For better or worse, the international security system is unipolar and will remain so for the foreseeable future. No single nation or even group of nations can challenge U.S. military supremacy using conventional military forces. As has been commonly noted, the United States currently spends more on defense than the next twenty-five or so largest militaries in the world combined. There are, however, practical limits to U.S. power, as the aftermath of the Afghan and Iraq wars suggests. The U.S. military is relatively large, well funded, technologically sophisticated, and therefore powerful. But it would be sorely pressed, given current force levels, to wage more than one Iraq-sized adventure simultaneously or to use its overwhelming technological lead effectively in insurgencies and civil wars.

Further on the horizon remains the possibility that other states will decide to balance U.S. power either individually or collectively. Already the European Union has taken steps toward developing its own military capabilities, while countries like France and Russia have hinted at their willingness to lead efforts to neutralize and contain U.S. power. Much depends, however, on the willingness of other countries to forgo the advantages of free-riding and bandwagoning in the face of a global hegemon. Balancing would constitute an expensive and unpredictable course sure to inflict domestic and international costs on participating states.

On the economic front, the United States is much less dominant than in military matters. The European Union is now the single largest market in terms of purchasing power. Meanwhile, China has achieved economic growth rates that far exceed those in the United States and, for that matter, the rest of the world. The United States remains *primus inter pares* but often has to rely on suasion and “salami” tactics rather than on overwhelming material superiority. Since the Doha trade round and talk during the late Clinton years of rebuilding the global financial system architecture, the United States has only devoted intermittent attention to sustaining and expanding global economic
cooperation. On related areas such as environmental politics it has played the role of spoiler.

Yet the post–World War II international economic institutions, despite many modifications, continue to place the United States in a privileged position vis-à-vis other states and nonstate actors. Whether due to voting rules that effectively give the United States veto power over IMF decisions or the singular ability of the United States to opt out of international agreements, the United States is often able to avoid the constraints imposed on most other nations. The United States also maximizes its economic strength by pursuing a self-conscious policy of bilateralizing as many economic relationships as possible. The exercise of structural power remains one of the most powerful mechanisms for achieving U.S. policy objectives in both the economic and security realms.

To many contributors to this volume, much of the changing relationship between economics and security could be traced to developments with roots extending long before the outbreak of the global war on terror. If anything, they concentrated on long-term tectonics, what Charles Tilly has called “large processes” (1989), such as globalization, to account for recent changes in the behavior of states and other international actors.

Even more tenuous, from the perspective of several authors, is the claim that the relationship between international security and economic affairs itself is shifting. Rather, there is some evidence that what you find depends on where you look. In brief, recent scholarship has shed light on new issues because only in recent years have scholars developed analytic tools and empirical data. Hence, for example, in Chapter 5, Colin Kahl explores the ecological sources of conflict by summarizing a literature that has exploded due to new scholarly interest. Ecological factors, then, have not necessarily become more important as source of conflict, but rather scholars have conducted the in-depth research into past and ongoing conflicts to examine the phenomena. In a similar fashion, in Chapter 4, Virginia Haufler delves into the corporate accountability phenomenon’s migration from issues like “blood diamonds” to public and private demands that firms play a larger role in ensuring contributing to peace in countries where they invest.

Yet major changes may be afoot. The primary source of conflict and driving force underlying the acquisition of force is not the challenge of revisionist or rogue states specifically, but nonstate actors, namely terrorist groups with global reach and associated socioreligious movements, including radical Islam. The second Iraq war aside, much of the global war on terror targets nonstate actors, often in conjunction or partnership with other nonstate actors. The United States and its allies cannot, by themselves, track the sources and destinations of terrorist funds. Instead they must rely heavily on the cooperation of private financial service firms. In attempting to stabilize and rebuild failed and failing states, governments recognize the limited reach of official
development assistance. They understand both the essential role of humanitar
tarian nongovernmental organizations in alleviating suffering and the absolute
necessity of private capital for promoting economic growth. In short, wars and
internal conflicts today are not solely interstate affairs.

Such findings echo the literature on the relationship between economic de-
velopment and conflict. Traditionally, development specialists treated both the
domestic and international security environments as exogenous. Today, more
scholars recognize that the prospects for sustained economic growth and gen-
eral prosperity are undermined by security threats. Internal conflicts dampen
the willingness of multinational investors to do business. Civil wars, insurgen-
cies, and terrorists also erode the confidence of local businesses, leading to
pathologies such as capital flight. Worse still, high government expenditures
on weapons and security diminish the resources available for infrastructure in-
vestments, education spending, and other government programs. The World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for example, have recognized this
and sought to wean recipient countries off the military treadmill. Governance
in all forms, including the greater control over the level of expenditures on se-
curity, has become a cause for concern with these world bodies.

In sum, there are obviously many long-standing trends and processes in
the global economy that are affecting the shifting terrain for economic and se-
curity policies. Globalization, however it is defined, is neither new nor un-
precedented in world history. But the unipolar nature of the international se-
curity system is unprecedented and the military gap between the United States
and its potential challengers is large and growing. Reconciling a multipolar
global economy with a unipolar security system will be one of the foremost
challenges facing the world in the coming decades.

The extent to which the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Wash-
ington (and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) will affect how
these longer-term trends develop in the coming years, remains unknown.
Globalization may be slowed—either through the increased costs associated
with more extensive security measures or through the more skeptical views of
some about the impact of globalization on political instability, regional con-
flict, and the ability of nonstate actors to operate across national borders. On
the other hand, the lack of medium-term consequences for the U.S. national
economy or the global economy as a whole may have demonstrated once
again the resiliency of markets.

Volume Organization

This volume brings together chapters by scholars working at the intersection
of economics and security. The main purposes are to survey the state of the
field, encourage further scholarly exchanges, and improve interactions be-
tween academics and the analytic and policy communities charged with crafting national strategies in a changing global security environment. Taken individually and as a whole the chapter contributions will help

- set an agenda for further scholarly engagement between security studies and international political economy;
- provide a resource on the “state of the art” for those researching in this area or broadening their own scholarship to include insights from other subfields; and
- stimulate innovative thinking about the security and economic challenges facing the global community.

The contributions span a wide range of topics, from research traditional to security studies to arguments more often found in the IPE literature.

The volume is divided thematically into three parts. Part 1 explores emerging issues in the international political economy of security. Part 2 considers various dimensions of U.S. policies toward the political economy of security. Part 3 helps sketch the future of the global security and economic environments and explains how individual perspectives on economics and security may be shifting.

**Political Economy and International Security: New Intersections**

One of the areas where the research agendas of the security studies and international political economy communities have traditionally overlapped is in the domestic sources of military power. Historical research has demonstrated that one reason why states were able to outlast other competing types of polities (from empires to city-states to city leagues) was that they were a superior organizational form for extracting resources and transforming them into usable instruments of power (from large standing armies to advanced military technologies such as oceangoing warships). In Chapter 3, Emily Goldman and Leo Blanken provocatively examine how the emergence of the information age economy may shift the balance of power between states and nonstate actors in the production of security.

Some analysts have speculated that in an information-based economy, nonstate actors have new opportunities to compete with states, not directly by acquiring the traditional instruments of military power, but rather indirectly through the adoption of asymmetric strategies. Challengers to the status quo will not attempt to match the conventional military resources of the United States or the other major powers. Rather, they will adopt tactics, technologies, and strategies that leverage inexpensive, commercial, dual-use weapons against
the strengths of great powers. In the information age, this often means exploiting the reliance of great powers on information-processing, telecommunications, and sensor technologies, perhaps by launching cyber attacks against military and civilian targets.

If the military advantages of advanced industrial societies are being challenged by the transition to a postindustrial economy, weak and failed states find themselves in dire straits. Many are unable or in some cases unwilling to maintain the basic level of internal security necessary to promote economic growth and development, much less technological innovation. Local insurgencies, warlords, and terrorists have frightened foreign investors and made it increasingly difficult for these states to enjoy the benefits of economic openness and globalization. Moreover, as the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan demonstrates, weak or failed states have provided potential refuges and breeding grounds for terrorists.

Virginia Haufler argues that in response to this negative cycle, multinational corporations have come under pressure to perform a critical stabilizing role that was once the sole province of states. Taking a cue from the corporate social responsibility movements found in some Western nations, firms are assuming conflict mediation roles that may be incompatible with their narrowly understood corporate missions, but that may be a necessity for businesses operating in some of the world’s most desperate environments. Both home and host countries may be willing to cede powers, and even a measure of their own sovereignty, to firms that will use their own resources, expertise, and commercial leverage to intervene in civil wars. Public-private cooperation, then, seeks to reduce conflict and mediate between warring parties.

As the information age economy has changed the nature of security production and as economic globalization has helped thrust multinational corporations into the limelight in developing countries, another even older theme has reemerged. Scarcity as a potential producer of violence and conflict has long been a focus of both the IPE and security literatures as scholars theorized endlessly about the relationship between resource scarcity and violent conflict. In Chapter 5, Colin Kahl performs a valuable service by providing a conceptual framework for sorting through the competing claims of scholars.

In Chapter 6, Christopher Hughes investigates the impact of the war on terror and associated U.S. policies on Japan’s foreign and security policies. He concludes that Japan has shifted some of its policies to support U.S. positions. It has done so, however, in a way that reflects Japan’s unique foreign and security traditions, specifically Japan’s decisions to de-emphasize military force and assert the primacy of economic statecraft. Thus Japan contributes to the war on terror by supporting nation building and focusing foreign assistance programs on frontline countries. In the end, however, Hughes detects developments suggesting that Japan, over time, will move toward a more positive view of military instruments.
Chapter 6 differs in that it examines in detail how U.S. policies have influenced the positions of other governments; as such, it provides a transition to Part 2, which discusses U.S. policies and the emerging political economy of security. The chapter demonstrates that even countries outside the immediate area of operations for the war on terror can and do attempt to translate U.S. objectives into contributions that reflect their own foreign policy traditions. Given this, we find a need for more scholarship and policy analyses of how changes in U.S. international and regional security priorities in the period since September 11, 2001, have been accepted, modified, or rejected by both allies and adversaries. The same holds true for international and regional organizations.

As a whole, the chapters in Part 1 examine issues of enduring importance. By these accounts, change in the international security environment, when it occurs, is slow and uneven. Even in the case of Japan responding to the war on terror, pressure by the U.S. government and an increasing recognition of the threat environment resulted in a modification of the long-standing focus on human security rather than the wholesale revision of Japan’s security posture. Further, with the exception of the implications of postindustrial development for the vulnerability of military powers, these issues do not generally attract the full attention of U.S. policymakers.

U.S. Policies and the Emerging Political Economy of Security

Part 2 focuses on changing U.S. policies vis-à-vis the political economy of security. The underlying assumption is that the challenge of global terrorist groups and rogue states seeking or potentially seeking weapons of mass destruction has altered the political, economic, and military strategies of the United States and thereby helped provoke change in the overall global security environment. On a range of issues the United States has shifted course in ways that may force other countries and international institutions to adapt their own policies and reconsider their own values.

Academic interest in U.S. grand strategy has revived in recent years in part due to the efforts of scholars like Barry Posen and Andrew Ross (1996–1997) to systematically explore the links between strategic choices and policy outcomes. As John Lewis Gaddis has recently argued, the Bush administration’s September 2002 national security strategy “could be the most important reformulation of U.S. grand strategy in over half a century” (Gaddis 2002, p. 56). Nearly all efforts to analyze U.S. grand strategy, including recent contributions by Robert Art (2003) and innumerable others, pay relatively less attention to the economic dimensions of U.S. strategic choices than to the political and military implications. In this volume, however, Lars Skålnes, in Chapter 7, attempts to link the military-strategic components of U.S. strategy with their economic
analogues. Working from a realist perspective on national and international security, Skålnes argues that in an era of primacy, “U.S. policymakers may not be able to integrate economics and security in statecraft.” Why? Because in the relative absence of international threats, at least of the sort posed by a competing superpower, domestic politics will determine outcomes. If Skålnes is correct, current efforts to more closely link security and economic policies in order to wage the global war on terror are doomed to fail.

In Chapter 8, moving from the overarching U.S. strategic perspective to the specific policy instruments available to the U.S. government, Steven Hook and David Rothstein analyze U.S. participation in the contemporary global arms market. They focus on U.S. policies because the U.S. share of the global market meets or exceeds the combined shares of all other exporters. Specifically, they argue that since September 11, 2001, the United States has increased its security assistance to countries allied with itself or otherwise essential to fighting the war on terror. In the short term, arms sales shore up both friendly regimes and the domestic defense contractors being asked to invest in new weapons systems and technologies in a time of relatively low levels of defense spending.

For the rest of the world, these changes are critical. The United States, year in and year out, is the world’s largest exporter of weapons. For other arms-producing states seeking to save their own domestic jobs and ensure the continued vitality of their own defense industrial sectors, the U.S. export drive is threatening. Russia is perhaps the prime example of this dynamic as it struggles to earn hard currency from arms exports while competing directly with U.S. arms producers.

For those countries and even terrorist groups facing adversaries armed with U.S. weapon systems, arms transfers can shift the power calculus. Here the commercial interests of U.S. defense firms appear to coincide with U.S. national security objectives. On the downside, the ever-increasing volume of weapons loose in the world, including not just U.S. exports but those of other countries as well, fuels the fires of many long-standing conflicts.

In Chapter 9, Sue Eckert examines how the U.S. government works with private firms to meet its security objectives with regard to protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. With roughly 85 percent of critical U.S. infrastructure in private hands and the September 11, 2001, attacks graphically demonstrating the vulnerabilities of public and private facilities, private cooperation is a necessity in the post–September 11 world. Eckert recounts the important but seldom told story of how the Clinton and Bush administrations struggled to create a useful set of institutions and processes for facilitating public-private partnerships. In particular, she focuses on the promise and pitfalls of the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which were created to assist with the “voluntary gathering, analyzing, and dissemination of information to and from infrastructure sectors and the federal government.”
While focused on a U.S. case, Chapter 9 offers useful insights into the problems facing all advanced industrial societies in coping with terrorism. In particular, Eckert identifies “impediments to cooperation” between private enterprise and government entities that will be familiar to most involved in homeland security. They provide a useful starting point for developing policy solutions and guiding cross-national comparisons.

A Window on the Future

This first chapter in Part 3 challenges many theoretical and methodological orthodoxies and offers new ways for framing discussions about the international environment and looking to the future. In Chapter 10, one of the most provocative and innovative contributions to this volume, Mark Boyer and his colleagues at the GlobalEd project challenge readers to think about security through the eyes of the young. Using data from a series of surveys funded by the U.S. Department of Education, the authors explore how middle and high school students think about security. Surprisingly, they find evidence that today’s youth have a much broader conception of security than most adults, including academic specialists in international affairs and national security. Especially noteworthy is their finding that economic security is high on the list of concerns for children.

How long such beliefs will hold and how they will affect individual and collective decisions as the young grow into adulthood remain to be seen. Boyer and colleagues argue there is persuasive evidence in the literature of socialization that early beliefs are enduring and will indeed influence political activities in the future. If their conclusions are accurate, we can look forward to the closer marriage of security and political economy issues as today’s youth assume the mantle of leadership.

In Chapter 11, I revisit the themes explored in this volume to tease out the policy implications for the United States and other countries as the relationship between security and policy shifts still further, and as our understanding of the meaning of this shift advances. The focus on policy stems from a belief held by most of the contributors to this volume, a belief in “useable knowledge” and the need to bridge the gap between theory and practice, scholarship and policy analysis, that so often stymies efforts to improve people’s lives in times of change, challenge, and stress.

Conclusion

The task of reintegrating security studies more closely with the subfield of international political economy is a long and uncertain process. Yet if Norrin
Ripsman is right, there is a great deal of hope, because even realist scholars have long recognized the importance of political economy. What is required is a better appreciation for the traditions of both security studies and international political economy as well as a certain amount of skepticism about claims that the two fields are seldom united.

This volume offers research demonstrating how fruitful such efforts can be. Much depends on developments in the “real” world of government policymaking and changing global structures and relationships. The continued evolution of long-term macro processes like economic globalization and more recent developments like the emergence of global terrorism are forcing policymakers, the military, corporate leaders, not to mention journalists and academics, to consider more seriously whether it was ever appropriate to treat economics and security as entirely separate spheres of human activity.

Notes

I would like to thank Ellen Frost and two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this chapter. The views expressed here are mine alone; they do not necessarily represent those of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency or department.

1. Not to mention Marxists of all bents, including most prominently Lenin in his book *Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism*.

2. Chapter 2, Norrin Ripsman’s contribution to this volume, presents an excellent summary of this literature, so the scholarly debates over the relationship between economics and security and the scholarly differences between the approaches of security studies and international economy will not be rehearsed here.

3. The late Susan Strange was one of the first and most impassioned observers of the different perceptions and scholarly interests of American academics and those from Europe and elsewhere. See, for one example, Strange 1983.

4. For particularly noteworthy examples of this vast literature, see Gilpin 1981; Ferguson and Mansbach 1996; and Castells 1996.

5. For various perspectives on global governance see, for example, Waltz 1999; Reinecke 1997; and Hirst and Thompson 1995.

6. For a set of articles dealing with many of the major issues associated with unipolarity, see Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999.

7. In this respect, Eckert’s contribution bears a familial resemblance to Virginia Haufler’s chapter on corporate conflict resolution.