Introduction

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Why this volume now? Much has changed for the United Nations Security Council since the end of the Cold War. Its decisions—largely improvised and inconsistent though they may be—have, for good and ill, profoundly affected international relations. Among other things, the Council’s decisions have eroded conceptions of state sovereignty firmly held during the Cold War years, altering the way in which many of us see the relationship between state and citizen the world over.

Two crises in international relations centered on Iraq, in 1990–1991 and in 2002–2003, have led to two totally different views of the UN in general and the Council in particular. Following the first, marked by the mobilization of many countries to eject Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait under a strong Council mandate, extraordinary and unjustified euphoria took hold among practitioners and some scholars about the potential of the UN to serve as the agent for the “new world order” advertised by President George H. W. Bush in 1990. At the time of the second crisis, obituaries were written for the UN, as well as for the idea of international order that it represents. In both cases, these extreme views of the UN suggested that international practitioner, media, and scholarly opinion was not rooted in a sound understanding of what the Security Council is good at and what it is bad at. Moreover, there was a general failure to understand how the Council continues to coexist with an older form of international relations still based on sovereign states pursuing their various national interests. This volume seeks to give a rounded assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Council as an institution. It also seeks to identify what is novel and what may be enduring in its approaches to a widening agenda of international security issues since the end of the Cold War.

Given the centrality of individual state interests at the UN, however unpalatable to some, the question arises as to whether the Council, in terms of the perceived legitimacy of its decisions, can be more than the sum of its
parts. Perhaps the key driver in Council decisions today, both actively and passively, is the agenda of the United States. This has raised questions about the extent to which the Council can resist (beyond the Iraq issue) the “pull” of U.S. policy preferences. As of mid-2003, there is also concern that the Council could find itself confined to mandating UN humanitarian, peacekeeping, and transitional government mop-up operations after U.S.-led military interventions. This tension—between military and political power and the power of legitimacy—runs through this volume.

Aim and Scope

It is hard enough to take a snapshot of the Council, with its long agenda, opaque proceedings, and uncertain impact on international relations, at any given time. Perhaps for this reason, the Council has not been addressed often other than through the lens of international law, a particular crisis, or one individual’s memoirs. Sidney Bailey and Sam Daws’s magisterial volume on the Council’s procedures, which also covers with great acuity a number of substantive issues, is the principal reference tool for students of the Council.\(^1\) Other brief but incisive overviews were offered by Sir Brian Urquhart and the late Sir Anthony Parsons in the early 1990s, but they are now mostly of historical interest.\(^2\) The Council today displays elements of continuity with the Council described so admirably by Andrew Boyd in *Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg* more than thirty years ago, not least with respect to the salience of national interest within it.\(^3\) However, with the geopolitical setting completely altered by the end of the Cold War, the issues addressed by the Council and the way in which they are addressed have evolved radically. Furthermore, the Council occasionally today features female ambassadors, most recently including Madeleine Albright of the United States and Patricia Durant of Jamaica.

By slicing and dicing in many different ways the Council’s decisions and activities, the substantive themes of its work, and the institutional developments in its life, this volume attempts to assess its objectives and performance during the turbulent, frequently hyperactive years it has experienced in the post–Cold War era. The contributors represent a mix of practitioners, many of whom have served on the Council or sought to implement its mandates; knowledgeable academics, a number of whom have published extensively on related topics; and members of the community of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) interacting frequently with the Council.

As in any endeavor of this type, even an ambitious and long one such as this, choices were required. The reader might wonder why we address certain trends and not others—for example, why we do not offer a chapter on developments in peacekeeping. As topics like this one are addressed in a
number of chapters from a variety of perspectives, we decided that offering a synthesis chapter covering them risked repetition. In other instances, we thought that a particular phenomenon or case, no matter how important or interesting in its own right, shed little more light on the workings and aims of the Council than did some other case offered in the volume. Accordingly, while we do present in Chapter 7 a thoughtful exploration by Elizabeth Cousens of the Council’s tentative and unconvincing approach to conflict prevention, we do not devote a chapter to peacebuilding (or “nation-building” as U.S. government officials sometimes refer to it) because a number of our case chapters deal with the inadequacies of the Council’s strategies to date for sustaining the peace it sometimes helps to establish. As for Iraq, its importance has been such within the Council that it is addressed in many of the chapters, centrally so in those on the use of force, weapons of mass destruction, and sanctions.

Our Approach

Our approach is not theoretically driven. When the contributors met in January 2003, they debated key issues pertaining to the Council, joined by a number of Council ambassadors. Helpfully urged on by Thomas M. Franck, we did consider a number of possible models for the Council’s role in international relations: an Athenian model, essentially consultative; a Congress of Vienna conclave model under which the Council is devoted to norm-development, as many in Washington would have us believe is the Council’s most characteristic trait today; and a Roman model allowing for mobilizational governance—under this scheme, the Council serves as a senate constraining the emperor. In the post–Cold War era the Roman model may apply best, with the U.S. president cast as emperor, but contemporary history is proving sufficiently fluid that we were not persuaded that any such theoretical approach would be profitable for this venture. We are content to let our research and conclusions serve as theory fodder for others.

One snare for any writer on the Security Council relates to its identity. As a matter of convenience, authors sometimes refer to the Council when they mean its members, a majority of its members, or only some of its members. Another relates to assessments of UN “success” and “relevance.” Differences of appreciation will be clear throughout the volume and in its conclusions, being defined largely in the eye of individual beholders.

The table of contents makes clear our approach to the story. The first section focuses on factors in Council decisionmaking that are new in the post–Cold War era, often drivers of decisionmaking such as the humanitarian impulse or terrorism. We move on to focus for several chapters on one key change: the greater resort to the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN.
Charter allowing for the enforcement measures of sanctions and the use of force. We then offer ten chapters covering evolving institutional factors affecting the Council, from the role of NGOs to pressures for Council reform. In order to illustrate a number of these themes, we offer eleven brief case studies that we believe shed particular light on new approaches by the Council. In the final section, we seek to offer an interpretation and an integration of points raised in all these chapters, doing justice to none of the contributors singly, but aiming to offer one possible synthesis of their views. In neither this introduction nor in the final section do we follow the order of the table of contents; rather, we seek to isolate key crosscutting themes.

The End of the Cold War at the UN

How did the changes in the Council in the post–Cold War era come about? The Council initially viewed its role as preventing a third world war. As the Cold War came to define global politics, the Council moved to tackle prevention of regional conflicts (often between client states or proxies of the superpowers) from spilling into a global conflagration. In this, the Council made a helpful contribution on several occasions.

One important signal of the decisive thaw in the Cold War was a noticeable improvement in the climate among the permanent five (P-5) members of the UN Security Council as of 1986. The first evidence of the relaxation in East-West tensions within the Council was the cooperative manner in which these countries discussed options for the position of UN Secretary-General as Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s first term drew to a close in 1986.

In late 1986, Sir John Thomson, the UK permanent representative to the UN, took the initiative to call together the P-5 ambassadors, at his residence away from UN headquarters and delegation offices, for an informal discussion on how they could contribute to an early end of the murderous Iran-Iraq War. The others welcomed this initiative, although China apparently remained reserved over P-5 activism for some time. A system of regular P-5 informal meetings soon took hold. These meetings helped anticipate and defuse conflicts among the five and allowed them to exchange notes on their national positions respecting various crises of the hour, if not formally to coordinate their positions.

As it turned out, the P-5 agreed without much difficulty to a second term for the incumbent, who in January 1987 challenged them publicly to tackle resolution of the Iran-Iraq War. As of mid-1987, Security Council proposals for a cease-fire, monitored by a small UN observer mission, were making serious headway. The post–Cold War era, initially such a hopeful one, had started at the UN.
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s celebrated *Pravda* and *Izvestia* article of September 17, 1987, seeking “wider use of . . . the institution of UN military observers and UN peacekeeping forces in disengaging the troops of warring sides, observing cease-fires and armistice agreements,” called for the P-5 to become “guarantors” of international security. However, P-5 cooperation required some time to take root.

Converging perspectives among the P-5 on a number of international crises, particularly on the need to disentangle the superpowers from them, allowed the Council to initiate action toward settlements. Between 1988 and late 1989 it established five peacekeeping operations to assist the settlement of conflicts in Afghanistan (UNGOMAP) and between Iran and Iraq (UNIIMOG), to implement linked agreements on the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola (UNAVEM I) and independence for Namibia (UNTAG), and to help the resolution of three conflicts in Central America (ONUCA).

While the end of the Cold War had to some extent already unlocked the Council’s potential to contribute to the resolution of serious problems of international peace and security, drawing on newfound cooperation between the superpowers, the Council’s approach to conflicts remained relatively cautious until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

**Operation Desert Storm and Its Immediate Aftermath**

This event, and Iraq’s formal annexation of Kuwait only days later, led the Council to adopt a mandate authorizing the use of force by a coalition of member states. Council decisions on Iraq, including measures adopted following the March 1991 end of hostilities to bring about the partial disarmament of Iraq, to encourage protection of Iraqi minorities, and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish population, were important not only in their own right but also because they proved precedential in many respects.

The success of the coalition’s military campaign against the Baghdad regime, in retrospect, appears to have induced an era of euphoria in the Council, an era that could not have arisen during the Cold War. Having successfully tackled a conceptually straightforward challenge to international peace and security in the form of Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait, the Council now waded into the murkier waters of civil wars and intercommunal strife, with which it had little experience. The Council seemed to believe that because enforcement of its decisions against Iraq had been successfully carried out, the constraints on and limitations of UN peacekeeping had fallen away. This era of euphoria can be described as lasting roughly between March 6, 1991, the date of Resolution 686, on the end of hostilities in the Gulf region, and October 13, 1993, when the
Council adopted Resolution 873 following the failure to deploy successfully the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)—this only a week after the deaths of eighteen U.S. Army Rangers in Somalia had seriously undermined prospects for the sustainability there of UNOSOM II. The unique circumstances of the Gulf crisis, notably the threat that supplies of petroleum, the lifeblood of the major Western economies, could be cut off, did not recur. Consequently, neither did the unity of purpose that characterized international response to Iraq’s attack on Kuwait. During this period of barely thirty-one months, the Council accelerated the pace of its work, adopting 185 resolutions, versus 685 in the preceding forty-six years of UN history, and launching fifteen new peacekeeping operations as compared to seventeen in the previous forty-six years.

Building on an emerging view in much of the world that the UN Security Council was at last coming into its own, the first ever Security Council summit was convened January 31, 1992, to discuss new orientations and activities for the Council. The summit’s statement, the high-water mark of enthusiasm over a purported new international order, noted (optimistically) that “the Security Council has begun to fulfill more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Recently elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali responded with a wide-ranging, thoughtful, and ambitious document, An Agenda for Peace. This report advocated, inter alia, consideration in certain circumstances of a “preventive deployment” of UN peacekeepers to forestall hostilities known to be looming; and, when circumstances warranted, the use of force by the UN itself rather than by coalitions of member states. An Agenda for Peace noted that peacekeeping had been carried out “hitherto” with the consent of all parties, hinting that this might not be necessary in the future. It seemed to assume a quantum leap in the willingness by member states to support UN action in the peace and security field.

By January 1995, following serious setbacks in Bosnia and the inability to stop the genocide in Rwanda, the UN’s most disastrous failure in decades, Boutros-Ghali, in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (more of a reassessment than an addendum), was sounding a more “realistic” note, drawing lessons from the UN’s experience on the ground over previous years: “Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command or control [enforcement] operations except perhaps on a very limited scale. . . . It would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the Organization is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities entrusted to it.”
Emergence of the Permanent Five
The much improved climate among the P-5 in the post–Cold War era can be gauged by the sharp decline in the use of the veto: only 12 substantive vetoes were invoked from January 1990 to June 2003, compared to 193 during the first forty-five years of the UN’s history. Veto threats remained highly relevant, as the Council’s dealings on Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in early 2003 make clear, but very few issues seriously divided the P-5 after 1987 (the Arab-Israeli conflict remaining one of them). The ability and disposition of the five permanent members—those holding veto power—to cooperate with each other seriously diminished the margin for maneuver of other Council members, as several chapters in this volume make clear (such as Chapter 16, on Council working methods, by Susan Hulton, and several case studies by a variety of contributors). Some of them, including Finland and Canada, had in earlier times developed skills and occupied political space as “helpful fixers”; or, in the case of some developing nations, had learned how to play the permanent members against each other, greatly amplifying the voice and enhancing the apparent influence of the non-aligned movement within the Council.

Soon, however, elected members were grumbling that they were systematically marginalized, a complaint given more weight by a tendency of the Secretariat to consult privately with some or all of the P-5 before advancing recommendations to the Council as a whole. Chapter 17, on relations between permanent and elected members of the Council, by Kishore Mahbubani, an ambassador representing a nonpermanent member of the Council, makes clear why this dynamic is grating and may have proved counterproductive over time. Tacit collusion between the P-5 and the Secretariat was aggravated, from the perspective of other members, by the growing resort to “informal consultations” for decisionmaking purposes rather than the open Council meetings that had served as the principal forum for Council decisionmaking in earlier decades. High-handed behavior by the P-5 reached a zenith in December 2002, when the United States forced the Council presidency to reverse a Council decision on access to a report by UNMOVIC and inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, insisting on differentiated arrangements for permanent and elected members, a highly undignified (and unusually public) process widely denounced, not least by Kofi Annan.

The P-5 do not “manage” the Council, although they do dominate it, not least by monopolizing most of the drafting. Scheduling is coordinated by the presidency, and individual agenda items have increasingly been managed by limited-membership steering groups, often “Groups of
Friends” (generally but not always composed of Council and recent past Council members), who along with the Secretary-General propose options and preferred courses of action to the Council as a whole. Teresa Whitfield examines this important, often controversial, recent development in Chapter 21.

The Permanent One
It would be misleading to suggest that the P-5 are not only often cohesive but also equal. It has been clear for some years, perhaps mostly strikingly so since the Dayton Accords of late 1995, that the United States has emerged not only as the sole remaining superpower but also as the principal driver of the Council’s agenda and decisions, passively and actively. This development introduced new challenges into management of the Council’s goals, work, and decisions, for both good and ill, as discussed by Nathan Miller and Frederick Rawski in Chapter 24, on the U.S. relationship with the Security Council, sometimes described elsewhere as an effort at dual containment.20

An Expanding Agenda: Substantive Innovation
The post–Cold War period has been marked by the Council’s disposition to tackle many more conflicts than it had been able to earlier, when it was stymied by East-West animosities and the plethora of vetoes (cast and threatened) by the permanent members. The end of the Cold War unlocked implementation of the Council’s earlier decisions on Namibia, as documented in Chapter 27 in Cedric Thornberry’s gripping account of this early episode of UN-controlled transitional arrangements. Since 1990 there have been momentous shifts in the Council’s approach to conflict and its resolution. Factors held by the Council as constituting a threat to international peace expanded to include a coup against a democratically elected regime (documented in Chapter 31, on Haiti, coauthored by Sebastian von Einsiedel and myself, and in Chapter 5, on democratization, by Gregory Fox); a range of humanitarian catastrophes (discussed in Chapter 30, on Bosnia, by Mats Berdal, and in Chapter 35, on East Timor, by Stewart Eldon), particularly those generating large outflows of displaced persons and refugees, internally and internationally (as discussed in Chapter 3 by Thomas Weiss); and acts of terrorism (as cataloged in Chapter 6 by Edward Luck).21 Steven Ratner, in Chapter 37, on the role of the Council in international law, explores some of the relevant issues.

This, in turn, allowed the Council to act on a range of conflicts, mostly internal in nature, which it most likely would have avoided in the past, when the Cold War antagonists often played out their hostility through regional proxies and were prepared to frustrate Council involvement. These
included conflicts in El Salvador (discussed in Chapter 28 by Blanca Antonini); Sierra Leone (detailed in Chapter 33 by John Hirsch); the former Yugoslavia (dealt with in this volume most directly by Mats Berdal in Chapter 30, and Paul Heinbecker in Chapter 34); Mozambique (dissected in Chapter 29 by Aldo Ajello and Patrick Wittmann); and Rwanda (discussed in Chapter 32 by Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, and enriched by separate insider accounts from Colin Keating and Ibrahim Gambari in Chapters 32.1 and 32.2). In many of these conflicts, the Security Council found itself contending with armed nonstate actors, a new phenomenon addressed here in Chapter 8 by Andrés Franco. The Council’s decisions in the 1990s proved highly innovative in shaping the normative framework for international relations and stimulated several radical legal developments at the international level, notably the creation of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively. This greatly intensified pressure for a more universal International Criminal Court (ICC), a statute for which was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome in 1998. These developments are covered in this volume by ICC judge Philippe Kirsch, John Holmes, and Mora Johnson in Chapter 19. As Cameron Hume argues in Chapter 38, the Council will have to continue to be creative in adapting to new challenges posed by failing states and transnational threats.

Interstate conflicts did not altogether cease to break out, as Chapter 36 by Adekeye Adebayo, on the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict of the late 1990s, demonstrates. However, with very few exceptions, the wreckage of the Cold War was successfully addressed once the superpower confrontation came to an end. Certain conflicts of an earlier era, such as the Israeli-Arab dispute, addressed by Bruce Jones in Chapter 26, and the worrying tensions over Kashmir, still bedevil the international agenda, but they are rare. Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, in Chapter 2, make clear that, contrary to media and public perceptions, conflict is on the decline and there are few reasons to harbor nostalgia for the nuclear terror–induced “stability” of the Cold War.

An intriguing trend relates to the Council’s role in mandating UN roles in the oversight of territories. This occurred not only in Namibia and Eastern Slavonia but also, in a less comprehensive form, in Cambodia and Bosnia. It reached its zenith in Kosovo, touched upon in Chapter 34 by Paul Heinbecker, and East Timor, covered in Chapter 35 by Stewart Eldon and supplemented in Chapter 35.1 with a separate view from the field by Ian Martin. The Council’s role in mandating such “virtual trusteeships” is discussed in Chapter 15 in a crosscutting manner by Simon Chesterman.

Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, serious tensions resurfaced in the Council over issues relating to state sovereignty, legitimation of the use of force, and the growing incidence of unilaterialism by some major UN mem-
bers. Differences crystallized in 1998 and 1999 over conflicting objectives and approaches among the P-5 to Iraq and Kosovo. While discord over Kosovo was contained by agreement on the parameters of a UN-administered transitional regime in this territory, the agreement was achieved at the price of lack of clarity over future constitutional arrangements and could hold the seeds of future problems. Iraq remained highly nettlesome, with the P-5 coming together on key resolutions such as 1284 and 1441, but ultimately deadlocked by mid-March 2003, when military action against Iraq was initiated by the United States and several of its allies.

The ebb and flow of Council business has tended to obscure the extent to which its decisions cumulatively since 1990 have undermined rigid conceptions of state sovereignty and eroded the position of governments claiming the sovereign right to conduct themselves at home free of international interference, even on matters that could undermine domestic security and the stability not only of their own countries but eventually of neighboring ones (for example, by massively abusing human rights or engaging in ethnic engineering or cleansing).

Chapter VII of the UN Charter
Prior to 1990 there was little resort to those provisions in the UN Charter relating to the coercive measures the Council can invoke. Mandatory sanctions were imposed by the Council in only two instances: Southern Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. A naval blockade to enforce the Rhodesia sanctions regime was authorized but rapidly failed once it became clear that force would not be used to back it up. The use of force itself was explicitly authorized only in the case of Korea in the early 1950s (in the absence from the Council of the Soviet Union), and in a much more tentative and limited way in the Congo in the early 1960s. The latter episode was not widely considered a success, confirming in many the view that the use of force should be avoided by the Council in its decisionmaking.

With the new mood among the P-5, the Council, with several intractable conflicts on its agenda, moved rapidly in the post–Cold War era to impose its will on a range of international actors through a dizzying array of sanctions regimes (occasionally backed up by naval blockades) discussed in Chapter 11 by David Cortright and George Lopez and through the frequent authorization of force, both by troops under UN command and by coalitions of member states. In Chapter 13, David Angell adds a personal comment on Canada’s efforts to ensure a degree of enforcement of the sanctions regime against UNITA in Angola. New issues, such as internal disarmament, became subject to enforcement, notably in Iraq as discussed in admirably dispassionate fashion by Pascal Teixeira da Silva in Chapter
14. Adam Roberts discusses in Chapter 9 the links between the use of force, international law, and the authority of the security council, while Frank Berman dissects in Chapter 10 perhaps the most famous of the enforcement resolutions, 678 of November 1990, on Iraq. Chapter VII decisions occasionally gave rise to significant tensions among the permanent five, as documented in Chapter 12 by Peter van Walsum in a personal account of his two years as chair of the Council’s Iraq sanctions committee. Much of this struggle unfolded privately, although insightful reporting by Colum Lynch of the Washington Post and Carola Hoyos of the Financial Times occasionally revealed it through the media.

While the Council’s assertive exploration of the Chapter VII provisions initially seemed to hold out the hope that a new world order could be constructed with the UN at its center, many of the coercive strategies of the Council failed because of the application of insufficient or inappropriate resources, wishful thinking, and a flight from reality that seemed to overtake the Council in the years 1992–1995. Doubtless a sense of individual responsibility of member states was seriously undermined by the mechanics and compromises of committee decisionmaking, but several instances of spectacular Council failure seem no less lurid years later than they did in the headlines of the day, notably those arising from the UN’s involvement in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

Because of a greater resort to the Council to authorize the use of force internationally, but also because of a noticeable tendency to avoid doing so in certain cases, arguments have grown that, even beyond narrowly constructed cases of self-defense, explicit Council authorization for the use of force may no longer be required, however politically useful it can prove.

Institutional Factors
During its early decades, the Council had few institutional partners. This has changed radically since the early 1990s. Today, due to limited resources and for reasons of substantive burden-sharing, the Council’s decisions often foresee cooperation with regional organizations (broadly defined to include such institutions as NATO as well as more classic regional organizations as originally envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter). This trend is discussed in Chapter 20 by Shepard Forman and Andrew Grene. NGOs have also come to play an important role, although a largely unheralded one, in the Council’s life. James Paul discusses aspects of this development in Chapter 25, as does Joanna Weschler in Chapter 4, on human rights in the life of the Council.

The relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council is explored in Chapter 18 by Marrack Goulding, the UN’s premier negotiator for many years, who contrasts the tenure of Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992–1996) with that of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982–1991). He (and Mahbubani) make clear that the Secretariat’s relationship with the Council is often intermediated by the P-5. In Chapter 22, Connie Peck offers an account of that increasingly ubiquitous figure in international relations, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General, mostly responsible for overseeing complex peace operations or mediation efforts in the field. The Council’s relationship with these individuals has varied in form and substance but is increasingly recognized as important. In a Council retreat during December 2002, extensive discussion occurred on the function and importance of appropriate incumbents.²²

With the more active role played by the Council in international relations has come pressure for Council reform under several headings: its working methods, composition, and the veto all came under heavy criticism as of the early 1990s. However, pressure for reform has achieved little change beyond the Council’s increasingly open working methods, as discussed by Bardo Fassbender in Chapter 23, and there is little prospect of early agreement among the membership on significant change in years to come, not least because it is widely accepted that there is a tradeoff between expansion of the Council, to achieve a more representative composition, and effectiveness of the body, which continues to be much prized by a number of powerful governments. While most countries have developed a scheme for Council reform perfectly tailored to maximizing their own situation with respect to a reformed Council, their preferred fallback is not some other country’s scheme but the status quo.

The Media

The media play an important role in the life of the Council, often producing international pressure for action to address man-made disasters or to head off cataclysms, including those concerning North Korea and Iraq and potentially involving weapons of mass destruction. The Cable News Network (CNN) has often been described as the Council’s “sixteenth member,” and its UN bureau has done much through its weekly program “Diplomatic License” to make the Council and its decisions better understood. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has consistently sought to interpret insightfully iconic images of Council ambassadors meeting in the fabled Council chamber and then delivering themselves of competitive but often misleading (and soon forgotten) pronouncements on the proceedings.

The media influence the Council most strongly through its member states. Governments react to public pressure, largely shaped by the media. Governments mostly like to tax and spend. By and large, they are averse to risk. Thus, when international crises develop and public pressure to address
them builds through the media, a default option for governments is to delegate to multilateral organizations such as the UN the responsibility to respond.

That said, media reporting of the Council itself is mostly reactive and event-driven. The Council’s “home” broadsheet, the New York Times, has given it considerable attention, often in commendable depth through the writing of Barbara Crossette and James Traub. The Paris daily Le Monde has also done an excellent job of looking beyond the wire service headlines, and the Financial Times has fielded talented correspondents at the UN. However, there may not be much more to be said, and we consequently do not offer a chapter specifically covering this topic.

Envoi

In order to set the stage, Peter Wallensteen, one of the world’s foremost thinkers on both the nature and the pattern of violent conflicts today, together with Patrik Johansson, discusses in Chapter 2 the trends in Council decisions in recent years. Thereafter, as outlined above, we address a number of individual factors and cases relevant to the Council’s performance in the post–Cold War era. Our conclusions aim to offer a range of broader thematic observations.

Notes

8. Resolution 678, November 29, 1990. Operation Desert Storm originally was confined to aerial attacks on Iraq. The broader military campaign was designated as Operation Desert Saber, but the moniker Desert Storm eventually displaced it.
9. A number of the measures adopted by France, the UK, the United States, and their allies, particularly in northern Iraq (to protect, through a no-fly zone, and provide assistance to the Kurds), were initiated without explicit Council authorization. These measures were, however, not then seriously challenged within the Council. Some of the humanitarian activities of Operation Provide Comfort were eventually taken over by the UN.

10. Contributing importantly to the unity of the international community in confronting Saddam Hussein in 1990 was an impressive diplomatic campaign by President George H. W. Bush, his secretary of state, James Baker, and their skilled U.S. ambassador at the UN, Thomas Pickering, to assemble a formidable diplomatic coalition to this end. These conditions were not reproduced in 2002 when the United States sought to increase pressure on the Baghdad regime.

11. Resolution 873 re-imposed sanctions on Haiti.


16. All vetoes since May 1990 were by the United States (mostly on the Israeli-Palestinian struggle), except for two by Russia (one over the financing of UNFICYP in Cyprus and another over sanctions against Serbia), and two by China (both on peacekeeping operations, one in Guatemala, the other in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although each was motivated by a Taiwan connection). This count does not include vetoes on the selection of the UN Secretary-General, mostly registered during nonpublic sessions of the Council.

17. During periods when seven members of the nonaligned movement sit in the Council, they theoretically possess a “sixth veto.” By all withholding consent simultaneously, they can block resolutions. However, the cohesion of the movement has proved weak within the Council in recent years (although it was displayed to a degree in March 2003 on Iraq).


21. How far the Council’s agenda has opened up to nontraditional issues can be gauged from its refusal in 1989 to accede to UK pressure for discussion of international narcotrafficking and environmental issues as potential threats to peace, while on January 10, 2000, under a U.S. presidency (in the person of Vice President Al Gore), it engaged in a debate on the implications of the AIDS pandemic in Africa for stability and peace on that continent in the twenty-first century.

23. In fact, all three of the major wire services, Agence France Presse, the Associated Press, and Reuters, report very well on the UN through insightful and sharp correspondents, but the nature of their clientele discourages extensive analysis. The Inter-Press Service, an agency favoring developing-country perspectives, has done well at the UN on this latter score.
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