


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The Nation-State and Global Order:
A Historical Introduction to
Contemporary Politics
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Introduction: A Historical Approach to the State and Global Order

During the 1970s, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher blamed Britain's economic malaise and decline as a world power on the welfare-state programs put in place by the Labour Party after World War II. She and her Tory Party began to dismantle the welfare state by selling off nationalized industries, reducing social programs, and implementing monetarist economic policies. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan, president of the United States, was elected on a similar neoliberal agenda. To the Thatcherite critique of the welfare state, Reagan and his Republican Party added to their list of causes of the United States' economic malaise the hedonism of the 1960s, the rise of the new left, the anti-Vietnam War movement, the radicalization of the civil rights movement, and, later, the rise of feminism.

In 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Europe and, in 1991, collapsed, thus ending the bipolar system that had divided the world into two spheres of influence, one American and one Soviet, since the end of World War II. As Russian power faded and the United States emerged during the 1990s as the world's only superpower, the neoliberal agenda articulated by Thatcher and Reagan began to spread to the major states in Europe, including Russia and the states of Eastern Europe, and beyond to states in Asia, Latin America, and even Africa. Since then, the United States has become a hegemonic "hyperpower" and neoliberalism has become the dominant ideology within the global order.

These events prompted much speculation about their deeper meaning.¹ The first President Bush wrote that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the world's only superpower represented something more profound than just the ending of hostilities between two superpowers. For him, it marked the end of an old world order and the beginning of a new one.² Francis Fukuyama, then the deputy director of the Department of State's policy-planning staff, also saw in these events a deep significance. He published an article in which he argued that they proved that liberal democratic states, such as the United States, represented a kind of terminus toward which all states were evolving and at which all states would eventually arrive. Fukuyama also claimed that the gradually forming

global consensus around neoliberalism meant that history, manifested in ideological conflict, was coming to an end.³ Samuel Huntington, then a professor of government at Harvard University, saw these events as the beginning of a new phase of global history in which the fundamental conflicts will not be between nation-states, but rather between civilizations. For Huntington, the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics in the future.⁴

Does the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ending of the bipolar global order of the Cold War, the subsequent emergence of the United States as the global hegemon, and the spread of neoliberalism to all regions of the world represent a fundamental shift to a new global order devoid of conflict over ideology and rife with conflict along the fault lines between and among civilizations? Does the liberal democratic state represent the end of history? The only way that the significance of these events can be judged satisfactorily is by placing them into a broad and deep historical context. An analysis of how the current global order came to be will provide the frame of reference necessary to judge the claims of scholars who, like Huntington, see them as a fundamental watershed from an era dominated by conflicts within Western civilization to an era dominated by clashes between Western and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations or, like Fukuyama, see them as the ending of a long historical process of change through succeeding epochs because the final form of human governance has been finally achieved.

The Nation-State

Although Fukuyama's analysis recognizes the importance of the nation-state in these events, Huntington does not. Despite a brief passage in which he says that states will remain "the most powerful actors in world affairs," Huntington dismisses them as secondary to "civilization." In this regard Huntington is wrong. Civilizations do not exercise politico-military power, nation-states do.⁵ Although they are being challenged by the forces of globalization, about which we will say more later, nation-states, having eclipsed all other types of politico-military rule that have existed on the planet, are, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, the basic building blocks of the global order. Today, every square mile of land surface of planet Earth, except Antarctica, falls within the exclusive domain of one nation-state or another. In fact, the nation-state as a form of politico-military rule has become so ubiquitous that its existence is taken for granted, rarely noticed even by scholars of international relations.⁶

What is the nation-state? This is a difficult question to answer briefly because the words "nation-state" conjure multiple meanings and associa-

tions. Defining the nation-state is complicated by the fact that in contemporary English usage the words “nation” and “state” are used interchangeably. This problem is compounded among U.S. speakers of English because the received truth of U.S. political discourse is that the United States does not constitute a “state.” This is because the Founding Fathers never used the word when speaking or writing about the new politico-military entity that they were creating in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. Instead, they called it a “republic” or a “union.” When they used the word “state,” they were referring to one of the constituent parts of the new entity or to Britain. Thus, today, the word “state” to Americans means one of the several constituent parts of the union, such as New York State or the state of California. Americans tend to use the words “nation” or “country” to refer to what we mean by the word “state.”⁷

Nonetheless, the following characteristics can be recognized as the common currency of nation-states in the current global order. The nation-state is a type of politico-military rule that, first, has a distinct geographically defined territory over which it exercises jurisdiction; second, has sovereignty over its territory, which means that its jurisdiction is theoretically exclusive of outside interference by other nation-states or entities; third, it has a government made up of public offices and roles that control and administer the territory and population subject to the state’s jurisdiction; fourth, it has fixed boundaries marked on the ground by entry and exit points and, in some cases, by fences patrolled by border guards and armies; fifth, its government claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical coercion over its population; sixth, its population manifests, to a greater or lesser degree, a sense of national identity; and, seventh, it can rely, to a greater or lesser degree, on the obedience and loyalty of its inhabitants.⁸

Political Science and the State

Throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century the state received much scholarly attention. It was something that needed to be explained by political scientists who, at that time, were professors of law, history, and philosophy. Their understanding of the state was based on its formal-legal structures, that is, on constitutions, governmental structures, and lawmaking, especially among the European democracies.⁹ After World War II, especially among U.S. academics, scholarly attention shifted away from the formal-legal structures of the state to the “informal” politics within “society,” because formal-legal studies were thought to be too legalistic and too narrowly focused on state structures. The new focus, which can be called pluralism, sought out the ways in which the diversity of social interests, organized into political parties and pressure groups, produced public

The Nation-States of the World

Afghanistan	Djibouti
Albania	Dominica
Algeria	Dominican Republic
Andorra	Ecuador
Angola	Egypt
Antigua and Barbuda	El Salvador
Argentina	Equatorial Guinea
Armenia	Eritrea
Australia	Estonia
Austria	Ethiopia
Azerbaijan	Fiji
Bahamas	Finland
Bahrain	France
Bangladesh	Gabon
Barbados	Gambia
Belarus	Georgia
Belgium	Germany
Belize	Ghana
Benin	Greece
Bhutan	Grenada
Bolivia	Guatemala
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guinea
Botswana	Guinea-Bissau
Brazil	Guyana
Brunei Darussalam	Haiti
Bulgaria	Honduras
Burkina Faso	Hungary
Burundi	Iceland
Cambodia	India
Cameroon	Indonesia
Canada	Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Cape Verde	Iraq
Central African Republic	Ireland
Chad	Israel
Chile	Italy
China	Jamaica
Colombia	Japan
Comoros	Jordan
Congo	Kazakhstan
Costa Rica	Kenya
Côte d'Ivoire	Kiribati
Croatia	Kuwait
Cuba	Kyrgyzstan
Cyprus	Lao People's Democratic Republic
Czech Republic	Latvia
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Lebanon
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Lesotho
Denmark	Liberia
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Liechtenstein	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Lithuania	Samoa
Luxembourg	San Marino
Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Republic of)	Sao Tome and Principe
Madagascar	Saudi Arabia
Malawi	Senegal
Malaysia	Serbia and Montenegro
Maldives	Seychelles
Mali	Sierra Leone
Malta	Singapore
Marshall Islands	Slovakia
Mauritania	Slovenia
Mauritius	Solomon Islands
Mexico	Somalia
Micronesia (Federated States of)	South Africa
Monaco	Spain
Mongolia	Sri Lanka
Morocco	Sudan
Mozambique	Suriname
Myanmar	Swaziland
Namibia	Sweden
Nauru	Switzerland
Nepal	Syrian Arab Republic
Netherlands	Tajikistan
New Zealand	Thailand
Nicaragua	Timor-Leste
Niger	Togo
Nigeria	Tonga
Norway	Trinidad and Tobago
Oman	Tunisia
Pakistan	Turkey
Palau	Turkmenistan
Panama	Tuvalu
Papua New Guinea	Uganda
Paraguay	Ukraine
Peru	United Arab Emirates
Philippines	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Poland	United Republic of Tanzania
Portugal	United States of America
Qatar	Uruguay
Republic of Korea	Uzbekistan
Republic of Moldova	Vanuatu
Romania	Venezuela
Russian Federation	Viet Nam
Rwanda	Yemen
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Zambia
Saint Lucia	Zimbabwe

Source: UN member states, 2004

policy. Pluralists assumed that society was separate from and prior to the state. The state did what the groups in society wanted or pressured it to do. In short, politics was to be explained by what happened in society and the state was seen as being little more than one social group among the many that existed.

The new focus on society was connected to the extension of U.S. power after World War II. Political scientists in the United States sought to generalize the Western liberal democratic model of state and society, especially the U.S. version, to newly independent states. In this way, new states could be more easily incorporated into a world order in which U.S. interests and values would prevail, and communism would be unable to gain a foothold in the non-European world. In order to project the Western model of state and society, U.S. political scientists sought a “general” theory to explain how societies, no matter where they were, could function smoothly, if their economies, politics, and social structures were integrated and balanced. “Disequilibrium” among these balanced parts, it was feared, would create an instability that could be exploited by leftist groups in their bids for power and, thus, increase the influence of the Soviet Union.

Ironically, the disinterest of the discipline of political science in the state was, in part, a product of the state’s success. In the advanced capitalist states, such as the United States, Japan, and the states of Western Europe, the state more or less successfully managed increasing economic prosperity and steady advances in the welfare of their subject populations. Public policies considered “socialistic” when initially proposed, such as Social Security, healthcare for the poor and aged, unemployment insurance, and the minimum wage, became staples of these states. The so-called welfare state did not need serious analytic attention from political scientists because it seemed to provide a common good that few questioned. This positive view was reinforced by the fact that Western European states and the Japanese state had successfully transformed war-ravaged economies into prosperous, dynamic, capitalist powerhouses.

By the early 1970s, however, all was not well and the pluralist approach came under intellectual scrutiny and political challenge. Among mainstream political scientists, a new subfield of the discipline called “policy analysis” arose out of new bureaucratic-politics models of government and a new interest in decisionmaking. Policy analysis had two concerns in the United States. One was to explain how the United States became embroiled in the Vietnam War in spite of widespread domestic dissent and expert advice that the war could not be won. The hope was that models of bureaucratic politics would shed light on how foreign policy decisions could be better made to prevent future Vietnams.

The second concern was the search for answers to the vexing question of how state programs could be more efficiently managed in the face of

challenges by those who deemed them wasteful. While not reviving an interest in the state per se, and while accepting the prevailing pluralist model of the state, the policy-analysis approach did refocus on the activities of government bureaucracies. Eschewing an explicit concept of the state, policy analysis drew on theories of organizational behavior and decisionmaking that, in turn, were drawn from mathematics (game theory), social psychology, and cybernetic engineering. As with pluralism, the implicit normative emphasis of policy analysis was on promoting order, routine, and efficiency against the messy indeterminacy and contingency of politics. Hence, this backdoor reintroduction of the state envisioned it without politics.

The first political and social scientists to renew an interest in the state per se were crisis theorists, many drawing on various Marxist traditions.¹⁰ These theorists sought to explain why the welfare state seemed no longer able to sustain the prosperity and security of the postwar era. Many of these theories were inspired by Marx and traced the failures of the state to its inability to extract sufficient resources or to maintain its legitimacy in the context of a capitalist economy. Some argued, on the one hand, that the state could not take in enough money to pay for all its programs, along with Cold War military budgets (which were seen as necessary to ensure foreign outlets for capital and sources of raw materials); and some, on the other hand, argued that the legitimacy of the state, which rested on its promotion of equality, could not overcome the class inequality produced by capitalism.¹¹

Increasingly, in reaction to pluralism, policy analysis, and crisis theory, certain political scientists began to focus explicitly and look more favorably upon the state. These scholars examined how the state had functioned historically both as an organization of domination and as a promoter of reforms that might make good on the promises of the welfare state.¹² This effort to “bring the state back in” was critical of the way the state had been subordinated to society by the pluralists and neo-Marxist crisis theorists.¹³ Instead, these scholars began to look at how state institutions made decisions, under what influences, and with what effects. These statist theories viewed the state as an agent in itself, as an autonomous entity in the sense of being institutionally separate from society, which could take independent action, even against society’s wishes. Statist theories have led to fruitful studies of particular states by integrating historical sociology and political science. However, while statist theories have been attuned to the historical nature of particular states, they have assumed an ahistorical and reified concept of the state; states are historical, but the state as a form of politico-military rule is not.¹⁴

For the most part, these theorists have largely ignored international politics, although some crisis theorists did locate the state in the world cap-

italist economy.¹⁵ Also, pluralism had international parallels in theories of international integration, which sought to identify those behavioral principles of social integration among states and international organizations capable of producing international peace.¹⁶ The statist theories that did introduce the international dimension into a theory of the state were not very successful because of their ahistorical concept of the state. Eventually, these theories accepted the point of view of realist international relations that all states were conceptually the same; each sought to maintain sovereign territoriality against others in a systematic balance of power. Just as the state was seen domestically as autonomous because it was institutionally separate from the economy and society, the same was assumed to follow for the “states-system.” That is, states somehow existed autonomously from their societies, on the one hand, and from the global system of states, on the other.¹⁷

In the 1980s and 1990s constructivist theories developed that have contributed to a more thoroughly historical account of the state.¹⁸ These theories have explored how aspects of the state that pluralist and statist theories largely take for granted and do not explain historically are themselves historical constructs, especially the two primary aspects of the modern state: territoriality and sovereignty. Constructivist theories have also shown how war and violence constitute the state, and cannot be analyzed simply as resources or tools used by states, as well as how the distinction between the domestic “inside” of the state (a presumed sphere of order and law) and the international “outside” (a sphere of presumed anarchy and war) are not given ontological categories but are historically constituted of and by states.

A Historical-Constructivist Approach

The approach to the state taken in this book is inspired by these constructivist theories. It examines the formation of the modern sovereign, territorial state and the current states-system historically. It constitutes an archaeology of the transformations in the state and the states-system that led to the contemporary way of imagining and understanding political life and to the imposition across the globe of the territorial state as the only acceptable form of politico-military rule.

What are the advantages of a historical-constructivist approach? First, it shows that the assumption of most scholars of international relations that the nation-state, or something like it, has always existed and consequently is a universal manifestation of human nature, is wrong. A historical-constructivist approach shows that the state and the current states-system have not always existed and, therefore, are not products of human nature. It

shows that the nation-state and the states-system have histories that can be discerned. From these histories, it can be seen that there was a time on the planet when there were no nation-states and no states-system as presently constituted. Historical-constructivism shows that there was a time when there was a plethora of politico-military forms of rule that rivaled the state and were, eventually, surpassed by it.

One such historical rival and alternative was the city-state, which was a small, independent, self-governing, urban conurbation, surrounded by agricultural land, that engaged in trade and war with neighboring city-states. The city-state was unable to expand itself to incorporate additional territory in order to enhance its politico-military power because to do so would make it too large to be self-governing. The best historical examples of this form of politico-military rule are the city-states of ancient Greece (Athens, Sparta, etc.); the free cities of the Hanseatic League of North German cities (Bremen, Hamburg, Danzig, etc.) during the Middle Ages; and the republican cities (Venice, Genoa, Pisa, etc.) of what is today northern Italy during the Renaissance.¹⁹ A contemporary city-state is Singapore, which occupies only 641 square kilometers, but is dealt with by the current global system as if it were a nation-state.

Another historical rival and alternative form of politico-military rule was the empire.²⁰ The classical traditional empire, such as those of the Romans, Chinese, Incas, Syrians, Persians, Zulus, etc., was a form of politico-military rule that had only indirect and limited control over an extensive territory and heterogeneous population. Traditional empires were ruled by an elite that shared a language and culture among itself but ruled conquered subject peoples who were linguistically and culturally distinct from one another and from the ruling elite. The elite ruled indirectly through local rulers from the various ethnic and linguistic groups enclosed within the empire.

A traditional empire was, theoretically, expandable to encompass the entire globe because such empires did not have fixed borders. Imperial borders were merely frontiers that marked the empire's temporary outer limits where its army happened to have stopped and could be moved outward at will. In other words, the boundaries of a traditional empire did not demarcate an area of exclusive territorial jurisdiction based on a shared national identity, but defined a flexible zone of military and economic contact between the empire and the peoples outside of it.

Moreover, traditional imperial governments did not have a monopoly of physical coercion within the empire's jurisdiction and ordinary people did not have regular contact with imperial officials. Contact was occasional, usually only at tax-collection time, and often mediated by local elites from the various conquered peoples. Essentially, empires did not have, nor did they seek to engender systematically, a uniform shared imperial identity

among subject peoples. Recent traditional empires include the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian (later Soviet) Empire. Like Singapore, these empires were dealt with by the global system as if they were nation-states. Their disappearance, about which we will say more in later chapters, can be seen as a consequence of the increasing legitimization of the nation-state as the only acceptable form of politico-military rule on the planet.

A third historical rival to the nation-state is the tribe. A tribe is a non-territorial social group composed of numerous extended families grouped into clans, which are believed to be related to one another by being the descendants of a common mythical ancestor. Social solidarity is based on ties of blood and kinship, not territorialized national identity. Governance of the tribe is in the hands of a hereditary chief from one of the families or clans, usually assisted by a council of elders or warriors. The vast majority of human beings who have ever lived on the planet have lived in tribes. Tribes exist today, especially in Africa, but have been surpassed and overlain by the nation-state. Occasionally a tribe is given a state of its own (e.g., Botswana, Swaziland); more typically, however, a state contains many tribes (e.g., the Yorubas, Ibos, and Hausa-Fulani, to mention the largest in Nigeria), or a tribe straddles the borders between one or more states (e.g., the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran).

A historical-constructivist approach shows that war has been central to the formation of the nation-state. Military activity and the formation of the nation-state have been inextricably linked. Selection by competition, especially in war fighting, gave rise to the modern nation-state, although this should not be taken to mean that the process was determined by some transcendent logic.²¹ The organizational and technological innovations in warfare during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries gave a war-making advantage to the form of politico-military rule that had access to large volumes of men (for soldiers) and capital (money to pay, equip, and arm them) from their own subject populations. Competitive advantage also came to those politico-military forms of rule that were able to construct a coherent collective identity (i.e., a sense of nationhood) that overrode regional, class, and tribal loyalties, which in turn allowed entire societies to be mobilized for war.

Historical-constructivism shows that the form of politico-military rule that was the most efficient at mobilizing the men, money, and matériel for war was hierarchically organized within a sizable, but not *too* sizable, territory.²² In such forms of politico-military rule, rulers were able to take advantage of their territorial authority to construct uniform, centrally administered, territorially wide systems of law, taxation, weights and measures, coinage, tariffs, etc., which regularized and homogenized social and economic life and made the efficient extraction of the human and nonhu-

man resources necessary for making war possible. As we will show below, from the fifteenth century onward, the hierarchical authority over a sizable demarcated territory exercised by kings gave European monarchies a strong competitive advantage over rival forms of politico-military rule such as city-states and empires, which were eventually eliminated from the system as independent actors.

A historical-constructivist approach shows that the evolutionary success of such hierarchically organized and territorial demarcated forms of rule was not due to internal factors alone. Rather, success was also owed to the simultaneous construction of a system of similarly organized forms of politico-military rule from which emanated pressures and demands that units within the system conform to the forms of politico-military rule that dominated the system. Forms that violated the emerging dominant organizational logic came to be seen as illegitimate by the system and were forced to adapt to it or were eliminated from it. Thus, the formation of the nation-state and the formation of the current global states-system were mutually constitutive, interactive processes. In effect, once the states-system gradually transformed itself into a network of like states, it imposed structural limits on the types of states that were permitted and able to exist in the system. The construction of a particular ordered system of states involved interventions justified by reference to the norms that regulate state governing practices. When state practices did not fit the agreed-upon understanding within the system of governing practices of what these practices ought to be, powerful states sought to reinforce acceptable forms of rule by regulating the sovereignty of the nonconforming state. In other words, a state's relations with other states has had a historically mutually reinforcing effect on the whole structure of the states-system. The form of the state has tended to reproduce itself, internally and externally, by interventions from the most powerful states in the system, and within the confines of systemic rules and norms.²³

Moreover, a historical-constructivist approach shows that the characteristics of the modern state mentioned above came about very slowly, over a long period of time. Therefore, what constitutes a state differs over time. Different forms of the state have appeared and disappeared. The history of the state and the current global order of nation-states is a history of variation, change, and transformation from one dominant reality to another marked by a profound change in the basic units that compose global society and the way that they relate to one another. Change from one dominant reality to another defines different epochs or eras in the history of global society.²⁴

Four "great" or primary transformations from one epoch to another can be discerned. The first of these great transformations was the movement from the heteronomy of coexisting and competing politico-military forms

of rule (city-states, order-states, monarchies, principalities, duchies, countries, fiefs, bishoprics, theocracies, and empires) that existed in medieval Europe to the homonymous system of territorially segmented sovereign states hierarchically organized with clearly defined geographical boundaries and within which there exists a monopolization of politico-military power and coercion on the part of the central government.²⁵ This first great transformation, marked by the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years Wars (1618–1648), was the culmination of a thousand years of politico-military consolidation after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire that gave rise to territorialized politico-military rule in Europe.

The second great transformation was the imposition of the state and the European states-system on other areas of the globe. Outside of Europe, European states encountered traditional empires (Inca, Chinese, Ottoman, Persian, etc.) and a wide assortment of tribal peoples. These entities of politico-military rule were not recognized by Europeans as states in the European sense, nor were they accorded the privileges of sovereign statehood. There was no homogeneous interstate society at this time. Gradually, European states partitioned the globe into spheres of influence for trade and, finally, established colonies throughout. The colonies that the British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Belgians, Americans, and Germans held in the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa were, in effect, entities through which the European states-system was extended to the entire globe.

The third great transformation was the movement from a mixed global system of sovereign states in Europe and European colonial empires outside of Europe to the current global order in which sovereign, territorial statehood is the only legitimate and acceptable form of politico-military rule on the planet. This transformation began in Europe when the idea that sovereign authority flowed from God and was invested in a king (the “divine right”) was replaced with the idea that sovereign authority flowed from the people and was invested in leaders chosen by them. The rise of popular sovereignty during the late eighteenth century began to transform the European states-system, in which hereditary monarchy was the only legitimate form of the state, to the present global order in which the state based on some type of popular sovereignty, usually some type of liberalism, is the only legitimate form.²⁶

The third great transformation led to the fourth, which began at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, with the rise of nationalism.²⁷ Appearing first in Europe’s colonial possessions in the Americas as liberal nationalism, this fourth great transformation continued piecemeal until after World War II, when the idea of the self-determination of peoples—which held that colonized peoples were entitled to rule themselves, that is, to have their own sovereign state—became a principle of the global system of states. The legitimation of the principle of self-

determination led to a large number of colonies in Africa and Asia becoming independent sovereign states, however weak their governments, scant their control over their territory, and inchoate their people. Once independent, these former colonies became full members of the globalized European states-system with all the rights and privileges that sovereign statehood entailed. This fourth transformation is still going on as “nations” in various regions of the world demand their own sovereign states and receive them.

Finally, a historical-constructivist approach shows that these great transformations are slow and never “clean” or “neat.” A certain number of previously existing units of politico-military rule have survived, or have been allowed to survive, into subsequent epochs despite the fact that they were less efficient makers of war and should have disappeared from the states-system, and despite the fact that they have a form of governance that is at variance with the form that is accepted as legitimate in that epoch. Take the Vatican City, the globe’s smallest (109 acres) fully sovereign state, for example. It is the remnant of the once powerful and legitimate papal states (themselves a remnant of the Roman Empire) that stretched across the Italian Peninsula’s midsection and were part of the Holy Roman Empire during the Middle Ages. The Vatican City survived the above-mentioned great transformations not because it was able to compete militarily with its rivals nor because it was able to adjust its form of governance (absolute monarchy) to that which is legitimate within the current European states-system. Rather, it was allowed to continue to exist by the powerful units within the system, especially the Italian state within which it is entirely enclosed.

The Plan of the Book

The following chapters constitute an archaeology of the nation-state and the current global states-system. The focus of these chapters is on the transformations in institutions, ideologies, and governing practices that produced the nation-state and the current states-system. They contain a rich load of historical data and a number of case studies that show the importance of contingent historical conditions in the formation of particular states. They emphasize the role of war in the formation of the state as a form of politico-military rule.

The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 describes the first great transformation from the heteronomy of coexisting and competing forms of politico-military rule that existed in medieval Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire to the homonymous system of territorially segmented states of the early modern period. Part 2 discusses the specific forms that the territorially segmented sovereign states have taken within the spatiotemporal

framework of Europe and simultaneous construction of a states-system within that geographical space. Part 3 discusses the second and third great transformations: the extension of the territorially segmented sovereign state to areas of the globe outside of Europe and the movement from a global system of sovereign territorial states inside Europe and colonial empires outside of Europe to the current global order in which sovereign territorially segmented states are the only legitimate and acceptable form of human politico-military rule on the planet. Part 4 focuses on the challenges to the territorially segmented sovereign states as the dominant form of politico-military organization presented by globalization and technological change. In this last part of the book we will seek to answer the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter: Is the world experiencing its last great transformation to a new global order in which the territorially segmented sovereign state will no longer be the dominant form of politico-military rule and will be replaced by a form organized at the level of civilizations, at which time history as we know it will have ended? Or, are we witnessing the consolidation within the states-system of a particular form of the state to the detriment of others?

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15. Most notable are Marxist theories of capitalist imperialism and dependency, as well as Immanuel Wallerstein's "world systems theory." See his *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

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17. The most famous rendering of this was Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). For a critique of realist international-relations theory, which connects its disdain for theories of the state to its ahistorical positivism, see Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38:2 (spring 1984): 225–286.

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