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Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process

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

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Issues and Approaches

As peace negotiations have resulted in the settlement of intrastate violence and wars since the late 1980s, more than two dozen societies have been going through difficult phases of postconflict reconstruction. The negotiated settlement of long-term conflict brings new challenges as well as opportunities for social transformation. Whereas dramatic changes were brought to South Africa, East Timor, and Namibia, some countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are still in the transition toward a stable political entity despite heavy international intervention. The formation of a transitional government in 2003 was expected to bring an end to the devastating civil wars of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which killed an estimated three million people either as a direct result of fighting or in ensuing humanitarian disasters. The demand to rebuild divided societies emerging from serious long-term conflict in Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, and Haiti as well as the DRC is overwhelming, and recent efforts reflect the complex nature of the process of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding involves a process comprising various functions and roles. It often entails a wide range of sequential activities, proceeding from cease-fire and refugee resettlement to the establishment of a new government and economic reconstruction. The end of violent conflict has to be accompanied by the rebuilding of the physical infrastructure and the restoration of essential government functions that provide basic social services. In the long run, stability cannot be achieved without the participation of former adversaries in a democratic political process and socioeconomic reform.

The dynamics of peacebuilding are affected by dialectic human interactions and perceptions as well as the social environment. It takes time to overcome both psychological and structural obstacles resulting from protracted conflict locked in vicious cycles of confrontation. Social reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation are essential elements that make a peace process durable and sustainable (Galtung 1998).

The practice of peacebuilding originally evolved out of an institutional adjustment to peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention responding to internal conflict situations. Although Nigeria and the Congo had to rebuild

war- torn societies in the 1960s (in the case of the Congo with UN political and military intervention), more systematic attention was drawn to postconflict reconstruction with the shift of the international focus from Cold War politics to civil wars, often arising from interethnic conflict. Since the Namibia operation in 1989, peacebuilding has been widely recognized as a distinctive area of policy and operations.

The efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan and Iraq can be understood in the context of the new U.S.-led war on terrorism rather than reflecting on the transformation of local conflict dynamics through negotiation. Projects of establishing new governments as well as social reconstruction have been driven by the demand to create a local political order that is compatible with Western global strategies. Other peacebuilding efforts devoted to democratization and development have been geared toward supporting military and diplomatic activities. Reconciliation and social rehabilitation will remain remote goals until ongoing hostilities and armed resistance come to an end.

Not all peace processes are the same, especially in considering divergence in inherent conflict situations, including the intensity and level of violence in intergroup relations and their impact on transformative dynamics. However, some overall conceptual and analytical approaches can be suggested to identify steps and actions for bringing about harmonious relations between former adversaries and reconstructing postconflict societies. To enhance our understanding of the strategies necessary for lasting peace, we need to look at how various dimensions of peacebuilding can contribute to behavioral changes and structural transformation.

This book is grounded in an understanding that analysis of the complex processes of peacebuilding has to be more systematic and coherently organized. Most reconstruction programs rely heavily on "democratic" institution building and economic recovery through free market–oriented policies. It is often assumed that a peacebuilding process ends with the establishment of a new government along with the introduction of economic recovery packages. Not much analysis has been conducted as to how institution building and political transition are undermined by the lack of social and economic foundations. While establishing a stable government at the center is important, not enough attention has been paid to local political and social context, which can determine the sustainability of peacebuilding projects.

Peacebuilding approaches oriented toward helping to reestablish the former status quo in post–civil war situations are not likely to lead to longer-term social transformation. This is well exemplified by the return of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe, political killings and intimidation by the dominant political party in Cambodia, and the continuing influence of former political and military elites accused of massacres in Guatemala and El

Salvador. A focus on mere restoration of order has serious limitations, for it ignores imbalances between groups in existing political and economic structures. Democratic processes and development are undermined by political and economic arrangements that allow the use of mineral or other resources to benefit former warlords, military generals, or government officials as well as those whose interests are protected by them. Peacebuilding strategies must be geared toward modifying social structures and processes associated with such power imbalances.

Strategies for the effective mobilization of institutional and communal resources to overcome the legacy of violent conflict need to be investigated along with specific circumstances under which various peacebuilding approaches can be applied. To be best adapted to existing realities, implementation programs have to be contextualized to the particular circumstances of a recipient society. The needs of victims of violence (such as women, children, and the elderly) and their role in development and social rehabilitation must be taken into account in the construction of peace.

In examining the complexities of peacebuilding, this book begins with an investigation of major assumptions, objectives, and conditions under which peacebuilding proceeds and has been implemented. Then it explores security and demilitarization, protection of human rights, political transition, development, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation. The analysis draws on past and ongoing experiences of peacebuilding and, when appropriate, suggests areas where existing strategies and approaches need to be reconsidered.

Behavioral and Structural Contexts

The task of peace builders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other post–civil war societies is to confront unique psychological and ethical situations arising from a conflict system. Even with a negotiated settlement, shooting, bombing, shelling, and other types of violence do not necessarily stop immediately. Where there is still violence or threats of violence, physical safety is obviously an important concern. In addition, the end of an internal war poses many social problems such as disputes over ownership rights and organized criminal violence. The pain surrounding the conflict remains evident and serves as an obstacle to a return to normal life. Thus, overcoming physical, mental, and emotional challenges remains a crucial challenge for those who have to rebuild their own societies.

Peacebuilding operations are, in a technical sense, charged with "monitoring or implementing a negotiated settlement between two or more hostile

parties" (Bertram 1995, p. 388). In practice, postconflict peacebuilding starts when conflict has been controlled to the degree that normal social activities can be resumed for the reconstruction of a violence-torn society. As intense violence becomes less visible, conditions for longer-term political and social stability take root. Reconciliation and reconstruction designed to transform intercommunal relationships can take place in the absence of active violence. The control of violence at the interpersonal and intercommunal level is thus a prerequisite to establishing a constructive relationship.

Because conflict does not disappear in many social circumstances, its proper management is an important task in transforming adversarial relationships. To prevent the disruption of a peace process, a cease-fire and other agreed-upon peace settlement measures have to be observed and, under certain circumstances, may have to be enforced. However, peacebuilding cannot merely depend on violence control methods or therapy imposed on unwilling patients. Trust- and confidence-building measures have to be taken in order to induce cooperation and produce positive attitudes that create an atmosphere more conducive to the peaceful settlement of differences.

Given that progress in peacebuilding relies on improvements in intercommunal relationships, psychological transformation has to be supported by correcting the damage and loss inflicted upon victims of oppression and violence. Changes in perception promoted by education and reconciliation have to proceed alongside structural reform to prevent a return to dominant relationships. It would be naive to believe that a few training workshops and facilitated dialogue sessions, designed for reconciliation activities, could break the cycle of violence.

Failing to provide solutions to the root causes of the problems that generated the war allows new conflict dynamics to undermine the search for peace. Although the operating goal of peacebuilding has been considered to be averting the revival of a violent conflict brought under control, it should not be understood as a mere short-term prevention strategy. The main issue is to gradually create conditions which will ensure that there is no reason to resort to destructive means again, and thus peacebuilding is a long-term activity going beyond the immediate imperative of stopping the armed conflict.

To prevent a recurrence of violence, root causes have to be tackled by structural transformation. Thus, a long-term strategy is aimed at addressing "the principal political, economic, social and ethnic imbalances that led to conflict in the first place." Peacebuilding can be generally characterized in terms of supporting "structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 32). Agreement needs to be reached in key reforms, leading to a broad scope of structural changes.

Challenges

Whereas dynamics of conflict resolution have to be extended to a comprehensive and durable peace process, the implementation of peace agreements may not necessarily be linear or orderly, and may not even guarantee an expected outcome. In some postconflict settlement processes (e.g., Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, the DRC), continued hostilities and mistrust end with renewed fighting, and efforts to reach another settlement need to be undertaken. For instance, an agreement between contending groups in Liberia in September 1995 did not end the chaos but was followed by renewed war. The negotiations of new terms finally resulted in the election and creation of a new government in 1997. However, subsequent abuses of power by Charles Taylor, a former warlord elected as president, engulfed Liberia once again in a civil war, requiring a cease-fire agreement between the government and rebel forces in 2003. The entire cycle of war, peace agreement, collapse of a new government, renewed fighting, and requirement of a new negotiated settlement has been causing unnecessary human costs.

Sudan, from independence in 1956 to the present, has also manifested a pattern of entrenched wars and periodic efforts at peacemaking between the predominantly Muslim north and the animist and Christian south. Settling Africa's longest-running civil war proved to be difficult because of the persistent attempts by the minority government to impose an Islamic state on a largely non-Muslim population. The newest settlement process, begun with a 2002 accord granting some autonomy in the south, was likely to be complicated by a separate conflict in the western region of Darfur in 2004, involving systematic killings of civilian populations by government-supported militia forces.

Even though it is not easy to bring adversarial parties to the negotiation table, it is an equally formidable task to ensure that the parties maintain their commitment to abide by the agreement. Postconflict situations not only provide opportunities but also pose substantial risks for former adversaries. As long as the residue of anger and hatred endures, the outcomes of security and political arrangements such as disarmament and elections involve high stakes.

As efforts are made to carry out the provisions of a formal accord, the society will be marked by intense uncertainty and struggle over the scope and pace of prescribed reforms. Divergent expectations, feelings of insecurity, and a lack of established political procedures and normative standards increase the tension. During the interim period, continuing suspicion generates an unpredictable atmosphere for the future that makes community cooperation difficult. In El Salvador, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) responded to a lack of progress in the land transfer program by halting a phased disarmament in October 1992, and the govern-

ment made a failed attempt to stop former rebel groups from participating in elections following the discovery of hidden stockpiles of weapons that should have been turned in.

The process of implementing a peace agreement can unravel for various reasons. First of all, the parties may come to the conclusion that the agreement fails to address their underlying concerns and thus abiding by it no longer serves their best interest. New issues arising during the implementation, as well as old issues underlying adversarial relationships, have an impact on postconflict settlement, as illustrated by the Northern Ireland and Palestinian-Israeli peace processes. When there are multiple parties in a conflict, any settlement arrangement becomes very complex; the government may reach an agreement with one party that is objected to by another party. In Burundi, a serious obstacle to the implementation of power-sharing terms between the government and the main Hutu rebel group (regarding the allocation of political, military, and police posts) may arise as another rebel group enters the process.

The challenges of a postconflict settlement process are different from those of small group negotiations or mediation settings. The stated goals of peace agreements, developed out of compromise solutions at the negotiation table, may contradict the demands of various group members. In most instances, the concerns of all elements in civil society are not likely to be incorporated in making compromise deals (e.g., territorial divisions, return of refugees). The compromise solutions often encounter internal opposition of the rank-and-file whose interests may have been neglected in a pact reached at the elite level.

Thus, the challenges to a postconflict settlement process stem from the fact that a significant part of the constituents may not support the negotiated solutions. In fact, peace agreements do not necessarily result in an outcome that satisfies everyone's interests (such as those of the Jewish settlers in the Israel-Palestinian conflict or Unionist party members opposed to power sharing with Catholics in Northern Ireland). In the midst of internal factional struggles, even the proponents of the original agreement may begin to lose enthusiasm when their support base wanes. If extremists on either side choose to destroy progress with violent tactics, the accord may unravel altogether.

In short, peace agreements do not simply mark the end of an old conflict, and sometimes they contain the seeds of their own destruction. Foot-dragging and broken promises reignite intercommunal fighting with accusations of cheating, generating new hostilities. On the other hand, an insistence on too rigid terms for settlement produces a political crisis because restrictive provisions may bring about more disputes over implementation. Renegotiation of provisions contested by powerful constituents is necessary for a flexible adjustment of peace plans. Thus, the

postaccord process has to evolve in a way to respond to the concerns of new stakeholders and expand the number of constituents.

Commitment and Motivation

A lack of genuine commitment makes the transition to peaceful relations very difficult. The long civil war in Angola, which can be traced back to the struggle for independence from Portugal in 1975, illustrates how difficult it can be to bring about stability. The brutal phase of Angola's armed conflict continued with the rejection of the election victory of the incumbent government by the opposing National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrilla forces in 1992 and its resumption of insurgency. A peace implementation process could genuinely begin only after the death of the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002. In the Cambodian peace process, destructive forces such as the Khmer Rouge had to be brought under control before there could be political stability.

Warring factions do not suddenly change their behavior after a peace agreement. The need for peace enforcement depends on the parties' respective degrees of commitment to the accord. The continued intolerance of other groups in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina is a good indicator of the potential for renewed violence, and preventive deployment of forces was necessary. Thus, the effects of nonviolent problem solving have to be carefully assessed with the evolution of the political transition and community building. The commitment will be weak if the parties do not have enough stake in a shared future. When the main parties withdrew from the transition governments in the Ivory Coast (2003) and Burundi (2004), the fragile process could easily have broken down completely without external support.

Intermediaries can change the dynamics of a conflict by getting involved in continued efforts to diffuse tension (Mitchell 2002; Pruitt and Kim 2003). Proactive intervention measures should focus on detecting threats and minimizing the risk of violent escalation. Unfortunately, in the midst of escalating violence in Rwanda, the threat of a UN withdrawal by the end of March 1994 was not effective in convincing the parties to stop politically motivated murders and assaults. In the absence of trust, an escalating spiral of alleged violations and counter-recriminations is likely to occur without third party intervention. The significance of a third party's role in preventing the eruption of renewed violence in volatile situations is well demonstrated by the timely intervention of the international community to stop the withdrawal of rebel forces from the 1994 election process in Mozambique.

In the implementation of a peace agreement, third parties can bring both incentives and deterrence power to keep the peace process from derailing. External aid can be used not only to prevent the breakdown of a fragile

peace process but also to lend support to new initiatives. Material incentives have been commonly employed as a carrot to motivate former adversaries to abide by their agreement. The commitment will be weak if the parties do not find enough stake in transition; therefore major donors often promise funds to support demobilization of former combatants and development assistance. Side payments, given in the form of rewards, have been used to induce cooperation especially when former adversaries depend on a third party's resources for rebuilding their own communities.

When there is failure to comply with peace provisions, a balanced response is considered more appropriate. Caving in to an unreasonable demand has not proved productive, because it encourages further demands by the obstructing party while being unfair to the complying party. In fact, the case of Cambodia suggests that concessions to an aggressive faction can bring serious disruption. When Hun Sen refused to accept the election outcome in 1993, concessions were made to help his party share government power, but this policy emboldened him to wipe out his opponents from cabinet positions militarily in 1997. External actors' failure to insist on respect for human rights (as a means for soliciting cooperation) permitted an atmosphere of intimidation and undermined popular confidence in democracy and human rights protection.

If one of the parties is willing to violate rules despite the concessions of the other parties, difficult policy questions are raised. Obviously, obstructers need to be counterbalanced with supportive elements. Policy tools and mechanisms have to be developed for weakening the positions of spoilers who attempt to disrupt a peace process. Such policies may include not only direct intervention (e.g., peace enforcement in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Somalia) but also strengthening one of the parties (e.g., Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

In the event that one of the former opponents returns to violence (e.g., attacks on UN peacekeeping troops as well as civilians by rebel forces in Sierra Leone in April and May 2000), an enforcement function might be called for to prevent a breakdown of law and order. Powerful third parties may threaten military sanctions to impose rules and overcome the resistance of extremist parties to negotiate. Given the high cost of military operations, peace enforcement functions have been seriously considered only when political institutions and norms do not exist to regulate the behavior of the parties or when violent opposition to a peace process becomes an obstacle. In Bosnia, where extreme nationalists and war criminals attempted to obstruct political institution building and movements of other ethnic groups, the deployment of NATO troops served as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. Enforcement was also used to bring war criminals in Bosnia to justice through the international judicial system.

Coercive measures can be selectively applied to targeted groups to bring about desirable effects. Coercion is a short-term option and can involve a

high cost. It should be employed to inhibit recurrent violence that may disrupt the entire process or lead to mass killings. The application of successful coercion has not been easy without well-coordinated efforts, as we have seen in the failure of the 1993 UN operations to control local militia groups in Somalia.

Mechanisms to Resolve Differences

Renegotiation of the process to settle differences may be required if many unresolved issues surface on the road to the creation of political institutions and economic reform. Given that failure to identify and manage incompatible positions is likely to set back a political settlement, there has to be continued confidence in resolving conflict peacefully with a concrete package of mutual commitments and actions. As negotiations, rather than threats and intimidation, must be a principal norm to guide behavior, a mechanism to sort out opposing interests is crucial to overcome the ambiguities and confusions.

Effective communication between former enemies is essential for confidence building. This can be achieved through a successful operation of such mechanisms as the joint political-military commission in Mozambique. National forums were organized in South Africa and Ethiopia to discuss proposed new national constitutions. Institutions that facilitate a collaborative process can help reduce transaction costs in managing relationships between various parties. Identification of common interests through negotiation, consultation, arbitration, mediation, and problem-solving measures contributes to sustaining and reinforcing the process to explore mutually satisfying formulas. The system of communication also has to allow marginalized groups to express their unmet needs and translate their concerns into constructive agendas.

Differences of interpretation arising from ambiguities in a peace agreement may be effectively handled in a multilateral negotiation forum, sometimes with third-party mediation or facilitation. An impartial forum, along with formal conflict management mechanisms such as ethnic conciliation commissions, can be created to conduct fact-finding missions and hold public hearings on issues that have caused intergroup tension. A mutually satisfying formula can also be explored by an informal search for alternative ways and means to clear suspicion. Confidential negotiation may be conducted at a higher level to break through the impasse especially at the height of intergroup hostility.

A nationwide network can contribute to mitigating widespread political violence, especially when a society is deeply divided by ethnic and/or class differences. As happened in the postconflict settlement in several Central American countries, critical issues such as land distribution can be overseen by national and local peace commissions comprised of various warring fac-

tions. After the peace agreement was reached in El Salvador, both the progress and the problems of the peace process were discussed by the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), which included two government representatives and two FMLN members as well as representatives from each party in the legislative assembly.

Consultative mechanisms of dialogue and understanding can solidify cooperative relations, thus preventing a fragile settlement process from dissolving into a renewed outbreak of violence. Conciliation commissions representing diverse ethnic groups can be designed to provide an impartial forum for the peaceful expression of majority-minority conflicts. These mechanisms are used to investigate potential or actual incidents and suggest solutions to the community problems that generate intergroup animosity.

A facilitated process can be used to renegotiate such aspects of a peace accord as a revised schedule of demobilization of forces, reform of the security apparatus, and land transfer. Resolving differences at the negotiation table does not necessarily lead to building trust at a societal level, and there is a continuing need for the reconciliation of competing values and interests in achieving sustainable peace (Botes 2003). In South Africa, civil society building could not have proceeded without the healing of past wounds and the search for a common future; this is contrasted with Northern Ireland where not all the stakeholders were fully engaged in overcoming ethnic and religious fragmentation.

A more desirable and successful settlement of violent conflict relies on the commitment of warring parties to determine their future in political forums but not through violent tactics. The strategies and rules of survival during peacetime are different from those of wartime when planning inevitably focused on immediate survival. If rules of peaceful competition for power are to be established, losers may have to be persuaded, even pressed, to accept the outcome of implementation of the agreement.

As those who benefit from the status quo want to maintain their privileges, some form of serious confrontation is inevitable. A process of peacebuilding must give real evidence that the dominant party cannot simply impose its will or eliminate the other side while the weaker party is committed to nonviolent structural transformation. Even though demands for change made by a weaker party are often not met, peace agreements should help provide a framework for continuing efforts to transform unbalanced relationships. The goal of peacebuilding needs to be formulated out of a shared vision arising from mutual understanding and a collaborative spirit of problem solving.

Institutional Transformation

The notion of "neoliberal peacebuilding," characterized by the establishment of formal democratic processes combined with promotion of a market

economy, has been accepted almost universally in spite of some reservations about its application strategies (David 2002; Duffield 2002; Parris 1997). At one level, liberal democratic visions stress formal institutions and rules as well as political representation through elections. Thus, reforms in the direction of democratic institution building mostly focus on creating a fair process for political competition. At another level, the existence of civil society is a precondition for expressing popular demand and enhancing democratic values. A plurality of groups and associations need to be promoted to balance out any abusive power of the state.

Without nurturing a civil society, the social-political dimension of peacebuilding is highly fragmented, permitting a concentration of power or oppressive relations. Nonstate associations can symbolize the elements of trust, cooperation, and inclusion needed for the growth of a mature civil society (Bernardo and Ortigas 2000). Formal elections in Liberia and Haiti were not accompanied by an empowerment of civil society and prevention of renewed violence. In El Salvador and Guatemala, dominant political structures still exist, and the continued domination of the military and landlords has weakened prospects for democracy and economic reform.

In the absence of a pluralistic democratic tradition, serious attention needs to be paid to the substantive outcomes of the formal political process, which may lead to deepening social and economic disparities. It has often been pointed out that a competitive political process is not always adequate as a response to deeper causes and consequences of communitarian violence reflecting ethnic cleavages, internal colonization, regional grievances, and a lack of cultural autonomy. In political transition, the majority of international programs "appear to focus on the form and structure of the rule of law while evading its substantive content" (Mani 2000a, p. 101). When it is seen as a technical task, institutional reform fails to take into account the specific cultural and historical needs of individual societies such as postcolonial ethnic hierarchies. The process of transforming the dynamics of an intrastate conflict is closely associated with a social/historical trend toward demands for greater group autonomy. In the midst of ethnic hostility and other social divisions, it takes time to institutionalize the expression of diverse demands of social groups in a functional manner.

Democracy can be consolidated with mature political conditions promoting both external and internal legitimacy. A stable political order does not necessarily emerge from a new constitutional framework. Political mobilization in a divided society often leads to strengthening ethnonationalism, politics of exclusion, and partisan loyalties (Byrne and Keashly 2000). Harmony of opposing values and norms cannot be achieved without a reconciliation of social divisions along ethnic, religious, and class lines deepened by the fragmentation of political life.

The existing realities of managing and regulating conflict often contradict political pluralism in which success relies on the assumption that

power is more or less evenly distributed among a plethora of interest groups. In fragmented societies, special attention needs to be paid to political institutions that channel demands and translate them into policy. Where there is insufficient institutionalization of the political process (e.g., Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), personal and patrimonial links have an impact on the distribution of assets and access to economic gains as well as political positions (Boas 2001; Conteh-Morgan 2003). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, privatization of state industries based on market rationalism was manipulated to reward loyalty to the nationalist corporate system. Nationalist parties, controlled by patrimonies, manipulate formal politics, infusing fear into voters. By successfully co-opting ethnonationalism, patrimonies have effectively controlled political parties, while lending legitimacy in relation to the external world for negotiating power with international institutions (Pugh 2001).

Postconflict reconstruction is a more challenging task for societies marked by the deep social inequalities that are common to many divided and impoverished countries. As we have seen in Zimbabwe, political stability and social reconciliation hinge, in the long run, upon how to decrease the gross inequalities between racially and ethnically divided groups through poverty reduction. In fact, inequality was used as a means of political manipulation by President Robert Mugabe, who wanted to maintain his power. In promoting development and social rehabilitation, civil society can be empowered to be aware "of the socio-economic and cultural circumstances that shape their lives and their capacity to transform that reality" (McKay 1998, p. 359).

In addressing political and social causes of communitarian violence, peacebuilding encompasses much more than technical tasks such as setting up government institutions and providing judicial and other services. Multiethnic and multicultural configurations significantly influence the success of elections and other formal democratic procedures that have to reflect respect for greater autonomy and diversity. In the areas of judicial and police reform, ethnic balance is as important as the development of professional ethics and the establishment of universal standards for human rights. Distributional aspects of macroeconomic policies have to be considered in the context of social and political needs if inequity and animosities are to be reduced; a strict consideration of inflation control and other technical indicators is not enough. New institutional arrangements will result from a renegotiation of the political balance in ethnicity, economic status, gender, and generation.

Peacebuilding Dimensions

Activities involved in rebuilding war-torn societies are designed to enhance public security, generate economic recovery, facilitate social healing, and

promote democratic institutions. Peacebuilding in postsettlement settings entails both short-term and long-term frameworks. In the aftermath of a negotiated agreement, the management of humanitarian crisis situations changes to become assistance in social and economic rehabilitation. Short-term management plans are based on intense negotiations to defuse volatile situations and respond to the immediate needs of returning refugees and other marginalized groups. In the absence of local administrative structures (needed for basic social services), essential government functions can be restored by international administrators or peacekeeping forces. Most settlement agreements include a timetable for a cease-fire, the subsequent demobilization of armed combatants, and the organization of local and national elections.

Stable relations between communities can be created through efforts to rebuild political, economic, and social structures that have collapsed or are dysfunctional. Such peacebuilding strategies as the promotion of national reconciliation, social and economic improvement, as well as reform of state institutions and political representation, aim at reducing socioeconomic cleavages and regional animosities. Thus the end of a violent conflict must be accompanied by significant changes in socioeconomic institutions that extend beyond the maintenance of a cease-fire, disarmament, and the conversion of warring factions into political parties.

The re-creation of political institutions is a crucial task for maintaining stability in failed states such as Liberia, Somalia, and Afghanistan where civil wars have destroyed the foundations of both governmental and civic institutions. Movement toward the long-term goals of a sustainable economy and self-governance will enhance the prospects for empowerment and trust building. What has happened in the past needs to be confronted in order to heal a fractured community, and the parameters of peacebuilding will eventually be tested by attempts to bring former perpetrators to justice. The goals of peacebuilding will ultimately be achieved by reconstruction and reconciliation that are geared not only toward changing behavior and perceptions but also toward social and institutional structures that can be mobilized to prevent future conflict.

Assessment

There has been a growing interest in research on the conduct of existing peacebuilding operations, especially since the mid-1990s, among policymakers and scholars. United Nations agencies, the World Bank, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other international agencies have created special units that deal with postconflict reconstruction, while Western governments have contributed to peacekeeping operations and development aid for societies recovering from violent

conflict. Research on peacebuilding, thus, has reflected on practical experiences rather than being engaged in purely theoretical debates.

The majority of research has been concentrated on peacebuilding experiences in Cambodia, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Liberia, South Africa, El Salvador, Guatemala, former Yugoslavia, and other countries that involved significant international intervention.[1] While some of this research is descriptive with a focus on one country, others try to compare the experiences of countries as a group. Scholarly interest has also led to a proliferation of literature on different aspects of peacebuilding, ranging from the dynamics of ending civil war (Fortna 2004) to peacekeeping and policing (Gordon and Toase 2001; Dwan 2002); from elections (Kumar 1998; Reilly and Reynolds 2000) and political transition (Call and Cook 2003; Milliken and Krause 2002) to reconciliation (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse 2003; Gloppen 2002; Hayner, 2001); from development assistance (Esman and Herring 2001; Collier et al. 2003) to gender and rehabilitation (Date-Bah and Walsh 2001; McKay 2000). Such areas as peacekeeping and reconciliation drew more attention than development and political transition.

Conceptual efforts have also been made to put a diverse range of topics together but without much success in integrating multiple dimensions of peacebuilding (Jeong 2002; Newman and Schnabel 2002; Pugh 2000a; Reychler and Paffenholz 2000; Sampson et al. 2003; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). Some studies take short-term crisis intervention approaches with an extensive focus on emergency relief and control of violence. Conflict management efforts such as peacekeeping need to be linked to a longer-term process of not only transforming the psychological environment of adversarial relationships but also social change. By illustrating the interdependence of various elements of peacebuilding roles, our research will be able to accomplish a more thorough examination of complex aspects of peacebuilding.

Due to continuing challenges and questions, the issues surrounding peacebuilding operations need to be investigated more fully. One of the best-known experts observes that the field is in the stage of identifying the pieces of the puzzle that are essential to rebuild divided societies recovering from communal violence (Alger 2000). The challenge is how to deepen knowledge about the potential contributions of each piece while attempting to discern how the various strategies fit together. The diverse aspects of peacebuilding have yet to be integrated in a manner that would help us assess whether and how each fits into an overall process.

This book seeks to provide an integrative peacebuilding model with an assessment of past achievements and current trends. The conceptual framework presented here can be applied not only to societies that have been successful in restoring relatively stable relations between former adver-

saries (e.g., Mozambique, El Salvador, and Namibia) but also to societies whose reconstruction efforts have yet to produce visible results (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia).

Overview

This book examines social and psychological as well as political factors that play important roles in the success or failure of initiatives to bring peace. Some chapters discuss security and political transition, while others are devoted to such topics as development, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation. These themes are illustrated in terms of conditions under which the project of rebuilding a postconflict society has proceeded in different countries. In assessing what has worked and has not worked, most importantly, the book's analysis examines conceptual and policy approaches that have been applied in various circumstances.

This introductory chapter has surveyed the major assumptions, objectives, and obstacles to the implementation of peacebuilding. It can be a long, difficult process to overcome deep-seated hostilities in a society that has been sharply divided by the experience of violence. While the reestablishment of a national government through elections following control of violence is certainly a very important step toward sustainable peace, changing behavior and attitudes as well as structural constraints to peace cannot be easily obtained without addressing other dimensions.

Based on this understanding, the second chapter, "Peacebuilding Design," discusses the conceptual tools needed for assessing and explaining various experiences of postconflict reconstruction. In a synergetic approach, public security, democratic transition, social rehabilitation, and development complement each other in reweaving the fabric of deeply divided societies. Issues surrounding the formulation of peacebuilding goals and strategies as well as priorities for different types of operations are explored. The chapter also looks at ways in which different dimensions of activities connect to each other in terms of sequence and levels of analysis. For instance, social and political change will not start without the control of violence in the short term. At the same time, short-term emergency aid and other humanitarian activities have to be considered in the context of their impact on civil society building at a local level. Improving the economic and social conditions—even though it may take time—is critical to long-term political stability.

Diverse approaches to the control of violence, maintenance of order, and protection of civilians from human rights abuses are discussed in Chapter 3, "Security and Demilitarization." Control of violence and commitment to the nonuse of violence require demilitarization and conversion of mili-

tary functions for the construction of civil society. Continuing violence inhibits intermediate- and long-term reconstruction efforts. The experiences of Namibia, Mozambique, and other countries suggest that such demilitarization programs as demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into productive sectors of society are critical to the creation of a sustainable security environment.

In the initial stage of peacebuilding, normalization of relations is supported by confidence-building measures along with the acceptance of mutual security. In the process of demobilization of combatants, clear sets of norms and expectations among former adversaries can be introduced along with making each other's motives transparent. Peacekeeping, illustrated by the examples of East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, can be used to stabilize a postconflict situation by enhancing a security environment through maintenance of order and enforcement of rules. Improvement in human rights is a major component in institutional reform, in that oppression, left unchallenged, would continue to be a source of social tension and violence.

Chapter 4, "Political Transition," examines diverse paths to the creation of stable political order and, more importantly, sustainable democratic relations between groups within a new political structure. Establishing order especially in failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan is difficult due to a lack of common political loyalty and affiliation. Since it is not always easy to find a satisfactory political framework after many years of struggle, it sometimes takes extended negotiation sessions and considerable compromise. The design of a new political structure must reflect cultural practices and social experiences; further, mechanisms to reconcile the incompatible demands of group interests should be explored in ethnically divided countries such as Ethiopia. A variety of constitutional models for power sharing between majority and minority groups can be examined in terms of how to overcome exclusive ethnic, religious, or regional loyalties.

Holding elections is only the first step toward the establishment of a functioning political system. Political stability is not immediately brought about by elections without stable institutional relations and consensus on political values, as is suggested by the case of Liberia. Building a political and administrative infrastructure requires a delicate balance between different concerns for the fulfillment of conditions for democracy. Different models of power sharing can be arranged to guarantee self-rule for identity groups and encourage tolerance of different values and cultures as well as protect diverse economic interests.

Development strategies are the main theme of Chapter 5. A development process is a means for supporting economic conditions of marginalized groups as well as improving material well-being. Owing to the problems related to a lack of human capital and destruction of physical infrastructure,

it is a challenging task to restart economic development halted by violent conflict. The capacity of indigenous organizations to mobilize resources in a local setting is the key to a grassroots development approach. Synergies for development have to be generated by humanitarian assistance in order to meet the emergent needs of refugees and local populations.

Economic growth and patterns of income distribution have to be considered in an integrative framework of building harmonious relations between different social groups. Economic programs must be designed to bring about stability and equity, since social tension is created by not only perceived but also real imbalances in income and wealth. In promoting the goal of peace, development programs (e.g., land reform in El Salvador) need to address the social and economic ills that are the roots of violence. Development cannot be easily disentangled from democracy and security.

How to build renewed ties between groups beyond meeting their immediate physical survival needs is one of the central questions of social rehabilitation. Practices of and approaches to social rehabilitation and reconciliation are discussed in Chapter 6. Communities tormented by repeated violence do not have a social foundation of security, because the violence has destroyed the realm of ordinary life. The threads of personal well-being and intergroup harmony are rewoven through the promotion of social justice and equity. The process of resolving community problems benefits from the utilization of indigenous cultural institutions and norms.

As we have seen in Bosnia and Rwanda, violence leaves psychological and social wounds that have to be healed by reconciliation efforts. Envisioning a new future is not possible without acknowledging past abusive relationships. Reconciliation, based on compassion, forgiveness, and restitution, facilitates a return to normality by bringing both psychological and social healing. The truth commissions set up in South Africa and other postconflict societies compile a record of human rights violations for preventing future abuses, although they are, in general, not given authority to conduct criminal proceedings in order to avoid resistance from former abusers.

Chapter 7, "Operational Imperatives and Coordination," looks at intermediary activities along a continuum from violence prevention to social reconstruction. To fit in a particular postconflict settlement process, these third-party functions may be modified. For instance, peacekeeping has been expanded beyond its traditional role to such areas as assisting in food distribution, confiscation of weapons of local militia groups, and restoration of basic government infrastructure and transportation systems.

Intermediaries coordinated by the UN and other international organizations can change the dynamics of a conflict, as they contribute to a continuing dispute resolution process. In general, there is a division of roles between different agencies in their involvement in crisis management, help-

ing renegotiate timetables, and providing technical expertise as well as financial and material resources for infrastructure building. The level of intervention can be, in part, determined by the degree of local administrative capacity.

Overall this book suggests what can be done to improve peacebuilding practice and integrates the main themes explored in earlier research. The recovery of a fractured community increases its ability to change the dynamics of the cycle of conflict. Social and psychological processes of peacebuilding are geared toward illuminating transformative possibilities that correct imbalanced relationships. The transformation of adversarial relationships ultimately has to focus on the problems attributed to original and new sources of serious conflict. A participatory process is designed to enhance the long-term goals of a sustainable economy and self-governance.

Conditions for the success or failure of peacebuilding are affected by not only objective but also subjective environments that enhance or prohibit transition to a sustainable peace. Conceptual tools are needed to assess the impact of different conflict transformation activities. For strategies to be effective, timing, priority setting, and other conditions that have an impact on behavior and structure should be taken into consideration. To understand the effectiveness of different elements of peacebuilding, we would do well to examine how security, political, social, and economic components support each other in reweaving a divided society's fabric.

Notes

1. For case studies, refer to Adebajo 2002; Anstee 1996; Arnson 1999; Bose 2002; Byrne 2001; Candio and Bleiker 2001; Cramer and Goodhand 2002; Hirsch 2001; Holiday 2000; Manning 2002; Lincoln and Sereseres 2000; Marks 2000; Martin 2001; Mekenkamp, van Tongeren, and van de Veen 2002; Rogel 2003; Suhrke, Arne, and Kristian 2002.