


EXCERPTED FROM

# The Dynamics of Diplomacy

Jean-Robert Leguey-Feilleux



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ISBNs: 978-1-58826-629-3 hc  
978-1-58826-605-7 pb

  
LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS  
1800 30th Street, Ste. 314  
Boulder, CO 80301  
USA  
telephone 303.444.6684  
fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the  
Lynne Rienner Publishers website  
[www.rienner.com](http://www.rienner.com)

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# 1

# Introduction

This book analyzes the changing character of diplomacy—the changing ways in which states and other international actors communicate, negotiate, and otherwise interact. The world has undergone dramatic change, and some traditional forms of diplomacy are losing their prominence. Our complex global society has turned to new means of interaction to address international problems, and some scholars argue that diplomacy, a critical instrument of international relations, has been discarded, subverted, or supplanted. Hans Morgenthau, a prominent political scientist, repeated for more than thirty years that “diplomacy has lost its vitality, and its functions have withered away to such an extent as is without precedent in the history of the modern state system.”<sup>1</sup> Is it truly the end of diplomacy? But what is diplomacy?

## ■ The Meaning of Diplomacy as an Issue

“Diplomacy” is a term that is often used rather loosely. A number of books on “the diplomacy” of certain countries are really about their foreign policy or, more generally, the course of their foreign relations.<sup>2</sup> Other works, on the subject of *diplomatic history*, are really about the history of foreign relations.<sup>3</sup> And then there are books on the practice of diplomacy—that is, diplomacy as a *method* of political interaction at the international level—and the techniques used to carry out political relations across international boundaries (e.g., representation and communication). This is the sense in which “diplomacy” will be used here.<sup>4</sup>

At the core of the concept of diplomacy is the idea of communicating, interacting, maintaining contact, and negotiating with states and other international actors. Diplomacy, too, is an institution.<sup>5</sup> Many of its practices, perhaps initially the result of expediency or simple practicality, were institutionalized

over the years, and became part of customary international law. They were codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations<sup>6</sup> and in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.<sup>7</sup>

Diplomacy also implies a mode of behavior, a way of doing business, a certain professional style. Diplomats need to act with tact and circumspection in approaching foreign governments; they deal with matters of state that are frequently delicate. Discretion is essential. They need to work with officials who frequently have enormous egos, an acute sense of their importance, and exaggerated expectations of deference.<sup>8</sup>

Finesse is required to handle complex international issues in a foreign cultural environment, using a different language and dealing with very different modes of behavior. One needs to be cautious and highly perceptive, as misunderstandings can so easily arise and complicate further interaction.<sup>9</sup> By analogy, this type of behavior is occasionally called “diplomatic” when encountered in other walks of life or professions (“The matter was handled so diplomatically!”). As international relations change, “diplomacy” is used to refer to a larger variety of interactions, such as the international dialogue or negotiations carried out by heads of state in summit meetings (see Chapter 10).

The subject matter of diplomacy, too, has vastly expanded. For centuries, diplomacy was primarily concerned with matters of war and peace—the use of force—encompassing high politics and strategic interests. These matters are of course still prominent, and now include questions of international security, but a vast variety of other matters have been added to the diplomatic agenda, pertaining to the economy, technology, scientific developments, education, the arts, law, and so much more. There is virtually no aspect of life in society that has not, at one time or another, been on the diplomatic agenda. Interdependence and globalization have greatly contributed to this development. Many issues that once were primarily domestic, such as human rights, are now of international concern and of relevance to diplomacy.<sup>10</sup>

Diplomats need to be versatile; but in highly technical transactions (e.g., dealing with scientific issues or arms control), experts who are not members of the foreign service of their government must be brought in. The roles assigned to them secure their diplomatic status (even when their skills are less than diplomatic; but then again, the skills of diplomats have always varied considerably). It may also be noted that international relations are no longer the exclusive preserve of foreign ministries. A large variety of government departments are involved in foreign relations,<sup>11</sup> even to the point of sending their own personnel on diplomatic missions—a matter that complicates the task of coordinating a nation’s foreign relations. Diplomacy is thus increasingly carried out by a variety of people who are not foreign service officers.<sup>12</sup> Though many nations, including the United States, have long resorted to political appointments (i.e., outside the foreign service career) in selecting their ambassadors—people who need to acquire diplomatic proficiency on the

job—they are not necessarily unprepared for their assignments (although some are). Many have extensive international experience and knowledge of international affairs.<sup>13</sup>

A number of contemporary participants in diplomacy are not even “agents” or “intermediaries” in the traditional diplomatic sense of carrying out orders and implementing policy. Heads of state engage in negotiations and other forms of diplomacy in summit meetings. Granted, they *represent* their states; but they are chief decisionmakers. Similarly, directors of international agencies (e.g., the UN Development Programme [UNDP]), who are chief executive officers and top administrators, practice diplomacy in the fulfillment of their mandates. All of these are rather different from the typical diplomatic representative, although we must remember that a typical ambassador needs administrative skill, having an embassy to run.<sup>14</sup> Career diplomats are still important, but contemporary diplomacy is now carried out by many diverse people. Their work needs to be included in the concept of diplomacy. They are instruments in the conduct of international relations; they are the essential means of international transactions of the most diverse nature.

The functions served by diplomacy are expanding, and this, too, helps to explain the broadening of the concept.<sup>15</sup> Aside from representation, communication, negotiation, observation of the political situation abroad, and reporting (functions to be discussed in Chapter 7), diplomatic personnel in our age of mass communication must engage in a good deal of public relations. On the other hand, a greater portion of international relations is bureaucratized, which creates a greater amount of administrative work for members of diplomatic missions. Embassies must serve the needs of an expanding contingent of their fellow citizens traveling and working abroad. There is also a growing amount of legal work in the interpretation and application of international regulations, the processing of legal claims, and much more. The diplomatic process in international organizations has created even more functions to be served by diplomats. Some of these functions are somewhat unconventional, such as serving in non-national capacities in certain international offices, as will be seen later.<sup>16</sup> All of these developments have brought diplomacy far from the confines of traditional embassies in national capitals. Diplomacy retains many of its basic characteristics, but it has undergone significant changes.

Resort to different forms of diplomacy has contributed to the expansion of diplomatic functions. As the global environment has changed, new forms of interaction have evolved. The resident embassy in a national capital remains a very important element in the conduct of diplomacy, although its mission and structure are changing (see Chapter 7). Multilateral diplomacy is now an essential tool of international affairs;<sup>17</sup> increasing numbers of large international conferences and elaborate international organizations have required the opening of permanent delegations at the sites of organization—a new form of resident representation (see Chapter 8).

Multilateral diplomacy entails a variety of new techniques: the formation of national blocs, diplomatic caucusing, debating, elaborate decisionmaking processes, extensive committee work, and the use of parliamentary procedures. This is a very different diplomatic environment, generating greater interaction and new modes and styles of diplomatic work (see Chapters 8–10).<sup>18</sup> International actors, including national governments, accept all of this as diplomacy. They handle it as part and parcel of their diplomatic routine: the boundaries of the concept of diplomacy are thus expanding—hardly surprising given the changing nature of our global system and the need to address new problems. Under the pressure of necessity, international actors devise new ways of working together, supplementing or modifying older diplomatic techniques. Diplomacy is likely to continue evolving, with its essential characteristics probably retained, but other modes of interaction are coming into use.

The fact that states are no longer the only actors in the international political process is diversifying diplomacy and broadening the concept. International organizations are now significant participants in international relations. Their agents are diplomats who work with the representatives of nation-states and other organizations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and his envoys are examples of this new category of diplomats.<sup>19</sup> They do not serve the interests of any particular nation-state; they are international public servants subject only to their own organization's chain of command. Some engage in specialized lines of work—for example, many representatives of the World Bank are financial professionals, and many agents of the World Health Organization are physicians or public health administrators. It is interesting to note that the directors of these organizations are chief executive officers who participate in a considerable amount of diplomatic work.

The expanding realm of transnational relations is adding a new layer of diplomacy to international transactions.<sup>20</sup> The international actors involved are primarily nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs), also called transnational corporations. Some NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a number of environmental organizations are extremely active in international relations. They want to influence the decisions of other international actors, and thus send representatives of their own to engage those actors (see Chapter 5).

Recently, a number of international organizations (the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], the World Health Organization [WHO], the UN Children's Fund [UNICEF]) have found it effective to work with NGOs to implement some of their programs without having to work through governmental bureaucracies (and thus avoid red tape and corruption). NGO representatives are invited to participate in project planning, supervision of project implementation in the field, and various forms of consultation and cooperative missions. This amounts to significant institutional interaction. Some governments work with NGOs in similar fashion.<sup>21</sup>

Many multinational corporations seek to influence the governments of the countries in which they operate in order to obtain a variety of concessions (tax breaks, permissive legislation, exemptions from sundry environmental or other restrictions) to enhance their earning capacity, and to this end use some of their officers to maintain contact with government officials who may serve their purposes. Some MNC agents are posted in national capitals just for this purpose. In some countries, these MNC agents compete with the diplomatic representation of foreign governments (e.g., to obtain multimillion-dollar contracts—defense procurement is a huge field for this kind of activity). These can be very high-stakes negotiations.<sup>22</sup>

Thus the concept of diplomacy is now much broader. Later chapters will examine how this expansion is affecting international relations. But it must be understood here that it is the international actors themselves—the entities involved in international politics—that have caused this definitional broadening, by accepting the new modes of interaction as diplomacy. The advantages and limitations of these new modes will be discussed later in this volume.<sup>23</sup>

## ■ **Negotiation**

Negotiation is widely regarded as one of the major functions of diplomacy. In fact, diplomacy is frequently equated with negotiation.<sup>24</sup> It must be observed, however, that many diplomats are rarely called upon to negotiate anything; their work (e.g., in an embassy) simply entails other duties.<sup>25</sup> Diplomacy serves a large variety of functions, and negotiation, albeit important, is only one of them. It is nonetheless true that global society today is generating an increasingly large volume of negotiation, in part the result of complex interdependence. Each form of diplomacy examined in Part 2 of this volume brings its own method to the process, and must be studied separately. A substantial amount of negotiation is multilateral, taking place within a growing number of international conferences and international organizations (see Chapters 8 and 9). Resident missions in national capitals are now frequently asked to take up with their host governments certain aspects of multilateral negotiations presently conducted elsewhere. For example, through its embassy in a particular country, a government may seek to obtain greater cooperation from that state's representative who is currently involved in multilateral negotiations in a UN conference (i.e., the embassy will try to persuade the host government to issue instructions to its representative to be more cooperative). This embassy's intervention with the foreign government supplements the negotiations taking place in the multilateral forum. This is called "parallel diplomacy."

Some of these negotiations are used to conclude an increasingly larger number of treaties.<sup>26</sup> An even more extensive volume of negotiations, although less structured, takes place in the day-to-day decisionmaking process of the

many organizations involved in today's international relations (the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], the International Labour Organization [ILO], the UN Security Council, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], to mention a few). State interaction aimed at coordinating their efforts, or seeking joint activities, is in fact negotiation of a sort, taking the form of consultation.<sup>27</sup>

The process of negotiation<sup>28</sup> is made more elaborate by the number of participants, their diverse negotiating styles,<sup>29</sup> and the complexity of the issues facing global society: for example, the Law of the Sea Conference took nine years to produce its new treaty.<sup>30</sup> And, as interdependence increases, more diverse issues are brought to the international agenda. Preparation for formal negotiations is often as important as the official phase itself.<sup>31</sup> For negotiations among a very large number of states, a preparatory committee (often made up of all invitees) is frequently given the task of laying the groundwork over a period of several years, which means that the negotiations actually start long before the official process. Furthermore, the participants engage in side-negotiations to harmonize regional or "bloc" interests, and pairs of countries try, in periodic exchanges of their own, to harmonize their strategies for the main event.<sup>32</sup> Large multilateral negotiation efforts therefore lead to extensive diplomatic activity. Summit meetings, although usually small, or even bilateral, also require elaborate preparation, because the participants do not want their meetings to end in failure. Furthermore, they cannot meet for extended periods of time. Prior negotiations must therefore clear the way for rapid settlement when they do meet.<sup>33</sup>

Contemporary negotiations, particularly in large multilateral settings, are often made more difficult by the ideological stance of many of the participants. This tends to reduce the ability or even the desire to look for a common ground and to compromise. Ideology tends to foster rigidity among the negotiating parties. Self-righteousness, zeal for one's cause, conviction that fundamental principles are at stake—all of these make negotiations difficult. Compromise is viewed as a breach of faith, a betrayal of one's ideals. A crusading stance can easily block the search for a practical solution, as ideology often blurs one's perception of reality.<sup>34</sup> A related problem is the infusion into the negotiating process of extraneous issues, such as when a conference on healthcare is used to condemn Israel for its oppression of the Palestinian people.<sup>35</sup>

The diplomatic process is thus made more complex. It requires the involvement of more seasoned multilateral negotiators—people who are able to navigate through the turbulent waters of these proceedings. But many countries seem unwilling to face reality in this connection. Global society remains more proficient at approaching technology than human relations, and international actors do not attach enough importance to the selection of the people who act for them. Narrow political, monetary, or social considerations overshadow the requirements of cross-border interaction. Insufficient attention is paid to preparing del-

egates for multilateral work. Too many nations still treat bilateral and multilateral appointments interchangeably: a few tours of duty in national capitals alternating with multilateral work. This issue requires greater attention.<sup>36</sup>

NGOs are a factor in some international negotiations, especially in world conferences, such as the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) and the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994). Many NGO representatives try to influence the negotiation process. They attempt to reach government delegates wherever they may be accessible—outside conference halls, in the streets, or in their hotels. Conference organizers must now bear in mind this NGO drive to be heard. Special programs for NGO delegates may be held during conferences. Some NGO representatives are even occasionally invited to make presentations in the course of the official proceedings. Chapter 5 will discuss the role of the private sector in the diplomatic process.

The media constitute another factor of growing importance in international negotiations.<sup>37</sup> The media play a role in determining what receives public attention, of course, but they have a more direct effect on the negotiation process.<sup>38</sup> It is a well-accepted proposition that effective negotiations require a high level of confidentiality and secrecy. Offers and counteroffers are often too tentative to publicize; they would create a false impression of what the countries involved are trying to accomplish.<sup>39</sup> The media can have a negative effect on the negotiations when speculation and inaccurate information are taken as factual reporting, particularly when highly controversial or emotional issues are at stake.<sup>40</sup>

Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary-General at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis, recalled how harmful erroneous media reports were during the extremely difficult efforts to restore peace in the region:

The role of the press during delicate negotiations is indeed of incalculable importance. . . . The fact was that Egypt had made concessions which, if published, might create a serious problem for Nasser [the Egyptian president], but as long as the arrangements were not published some important segments of the world press would continue to proclaim that Hammarskjold had surrendered to Nasser. . . .

In such circumstances it is extremely difficult, if not impossible for the Secretary-General to set the record straight without destroying his position of confidence with the governments with which he is dealing, and he must usually suffer in silence the criticism aroused by false accounts of his own activities.<sup>41</sup>

It is impossible to keep the media from discussing the issues or from speculating; but to reduce this tendency, it is wise to provide plenty of material that they can use for their reports. For this purpose, important negotiation meetings are equipped with effective public information staffs, who provide ample background material, position papers, and public transcripts, and hold press

conferences at regular intervals. This, of course, does not put an end to speculation and erroneous reporting. Neither can it prevent intentional leaks, but professional negotiators know that this method of embarrassing or pressuring the other side creates distrust and hampers the negotiation process. Those who are interested in reaching an agreement may hesitate to break confidentiality.

The media can be used constructively. They provide a means of testing ideas and policy alternatives. They can be used to generate public support for the negotiations, and perhaps also to sustain momentum in the bargaining process, by publicizing what has already been accomplished and playing up the successful dimensions of the talks.<sup>42</sup> In any case, the media remain a fact of life. Organizers of high-visibility negotiations need to prepare for their onslaught and protect the negotiators from massive interference. This adds to the complexity of organizing large-scale negotiation events and increases the cost of the proceedings.

## ■ Foreign Policy

States usually follow established foreign policy in instructing their diplomats.<sup>43</sup> Of course, there are times when, on a given issue, a state may not have formulated its foreign policy, perhaps because the issue has just arisen and the matter is still under review, or possibly out of neglect or lack of foresight. In this case, the foreign ministry's instructions will simply be an ad hoc response to the situation in light of the circumstances and the preferences of whoever makes those decisions in the government (the foreign minister, cabinet, etc., depending upon the importance of the matter and the way the government's decisionmaking process is structured).

In any case, diplomacy is generally perceived as the implementation of foreign policy.<sup>44</sup> Diplomats are usually expected to make the best of the instructions they receive (although there will be times when they are directed to use their own judgment and act as they see fit). Diplomats do not make foreign policy, though their reports on what is happening in their host countries and recommendations as to what should be done may be factors in its formulation. But many other elements usually shape a nation's foreign policy: national priorities, the chief executive's leadership, advisers' recommendations, position papers from various sources, bureaucratic politics and the interaction of many other departments, intelligence reports, legal considerations, electoral politics, public opinion, the media, and much more.<sup>45</sup>

It is not surprising, then, that diplomats frequently feel ignored in the formulation of national policy.<sup>46</sup> Information overload can be a problem. With the phenomenal increase in the volume of communication between diplomatic posts and national capitals, some messages are not reaching policymakers. Communication gaps may also be the result of ineffective bureaucratic struc-

tures. When serious international problems arise, the chief of mission is usually brought home for consultation with decisionmakers to explore possible responses. The give and take in such conversations may better inform the diplomat on all the factors and often-conflicting interests involved.<sup>47</sup> Foreign offices, of course, are supposed to keep their diplomats informed about political trends at home. Periodically, a tour of duty at the foreign ministry helps to keep them in touch with the larger context of domestic politics. Still, there is often a substantial difference of perspective between the field and the home office, with diplomats feeling ignored when they receive their instructions.

All of this pertains only to the diplomacy of nation-states, still the prime movers in global affairs and the relevant entities to examine when discussing foreign policy. Other actors have their own decisionmaking processes.<sup>48</sup> Their representatives, too, have their own instructions to contend with and their own problems in communicating with those who direct their efforts. Even the UN Secretary-General must report to the Security Council or the General Assembly and justify his diplomacy—and he occasionally becomes embroiled in intense political controversy.<sup>49</sup> The Secretary-General's own envoys must carry out his instructions. Transnational relations are very different (see Chapter 5), but even here, someone (or a committee, or a board of directors) is providing direction, more or less.

## ■ **The Art of Diplomacy**

People involved in international fieldwork, particularly in the area of political relations, must be able to bridge many differences—cultural, geopolitical, and ideological—as well as conflicting state interests of all kinds, including strategic concerns. Career diplomats are prepared to be posted abroad; they are trained for it and, over the years, learn from experience. It must of course be acknowledged that the diplomatic career varies enormously from one state to the next.<sup>50</sup> Even within a specific foreign service bureaucracy, there will be significant differences in the proficiency of individual officers.<sup>51</sup> This is inevitable. People have different skills, different potentials; they respond differently to training programs. Political appointees have diverse backgrounds.<sup>52</sup> Some may be appointed for the worst of reasons—for example, as a reward for campaign contributions, or, in unstable systems, posted outside the national capital if they are perceived as a threat to the ruling faction.<sup>53</sup>

Beyond the regular foreign service, one now finds a growing category of government officials who end up in international posts as a result of circumstances, job specifications, or whatever moves people around in a government bureaucracy—for example, a labor department official in Washington being sent as a delegate to an annual meeting of the International Labour Organization in Geneva. Many will be challenged by a foreign assignment; others will

see a long-standing ambition fulfilled. But can they be effective in the task of bridging the international differences mentioned earlier? To be sure, there will be some low-risk assignments of a primarily bureaucratic nature in which deskwork is the main part of the job, and where the greatest extent of intercultural relations occurs after work in their apartment building or at the grocery store. But what about truly diplomatic placements? What qualities are needed for effective performance?

The most useful attributes are probably interpersonal skills (particularly communication) adapted to a milieu involving people of different cultures representing different political systems.<sup>54</sup> Good verbal skills are an asset, especially when assorted with a good working knowledge of foreign languages. Important multilateral meetings may be equipped for simultaneous translation. But there is always a good deal of consultation and communication to be undertaken outside from formal meetings and without the benefit of an interpreter.<sup>55</sup> Patience is insufficiently appreciated in modern societies.<sup>56</sup> It may be true that some international issues require fast action. But hasty decisions can be counterproductive. Diplomats often have a hard time convincing their superiors back home that they must wait for a more propitious moment to approach delicate questions. Also, many cultures do not attach the same importance to the clock as do industrial societies. For a person in the field, these questions are often a matter of common sense; but having to explain them to someone back home, thousands of miles away, who has little knowledge of local circumstances, is more difficult.

Tact and circumspection are useful in approaching important (and proud?) foreign officials. Formality and concern for protocol, too, remain characteristic of official relations, although the trend is toward fewer rigors, particularly in international organizations.<sup>57</sup> Adaptability is helpful.<sup>58</sup> Negotiations may be demanding.<sup>59</sup> Self-control and an ability to size up a situation or one's counterpart are important, although the stakes will not always be high. There is no substitute for experience. Imagination is of great value to creating alternatives to conflicting positions and finding common ground. Compromise may be the essence of diplomacy, but one's superiors back home frequently control what negotiators can do in this respect. Ideological stances foster rigidity.<sup>60</sup>

In most situations (and not just in negotiations), the development of trust with one's counterparts is a valuable asset.<sup>61</sup> But friendship, respect, and trust cannot be achieved overnight. Enmity or friction between international actors will complicate interpersonal relationships. Periods of tension can create polarization, making interpersonal relations more difficult. In conference work and other temporary assignments, diplomats hope to find people with whom they have already had constructive relations in earlier assignments. International networking is useful and frequently sought. But one problem in the development of lasting relations is the relatively frequent rotation of diplomatic personnel that many governments favor, which means moving to a new post

every three years or so. And with every move comes the need to build a new set of contacts and relationships. To be effective and knowledgeable about the host country and its politics implies that considerable time be spent in that country.<sup>62</sup>

Many countries justify the practice of frequent rotation as an effort to keep diplomatic officers from becoming too attached to the host country and, presumably, from developing a bias toward it (“localitis,” as they call it).<sup>63</sup> This belief implies a remarkable lack of trust in the ability of foreign service personnel to remain committed to the defense of the interests of their own nation even when they appreciate what the host country has to offer. Keeping foreign service officers familiar with the priorities and needs of their own nation can be achieved by periodic visits to their own capital, with briefings by relevant policymakers. This would seem far less disruptive than frequent rotation.

Multilateral diplomacy (see Chapter 8) is substantially different from the kind of work done in the normal resident mission (it involves, among other things, a multicultural environment, the use of parliamentary procedures, and extensive public speaking or debating). Allowing diplomatic officers to acquire experience in this multilateral environment and develop the necessary skills enhances their effectiveness.<sup>64</sup> Many countries, however, rotate their diplomatic personnel between bilateral and multilateral posts as if the functions were readily interchangeable. The skills needed in the diplomatic profession vary substantially with the functions and role of the individual officer. Many nonstate actors do not have the benefit of institutionalized “career diplomats.”<sup>65</sup> In practice, nonstate agents have demonstrated diplomatic proficiency, learning as they go and making a career of it.<sup>66</sup> Experience will always be a critical element in this profession.

## ■ Analytical Framework

Despite the considerable advances made by the social sciences and by political science in particular, there is no general theory of diplomacy or theoretical framework to facilitate systematic analysis.<sup>67</sup> The significant changes taking place in contemporary diplomatic practice are probably making the development of a general theory more difficult. It is nevertheless possible to devise an analytic framework to help this examination of what is happening in diplomacy.

A number of political scientists have followed the lead provided in 1961 by J. David Singer, who used two levels of analysis (domestic and international) in his study of international relations.<sup>68</sup> Singer pointed out: “In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis.”<sup>69</sup> Other analysts refashioned this approach to serve their own purposes and to focus on those aspects of the phenomenon they wanted to examine. The units

of analysis do not have to be identified as “levels.” The matter to be researched may be arranged differently. Kenneth Waltz, seeking to determine the major causes of war, ordered his investigation under three headings: people, the structure of the separate states, and the global system. He called these three categories “images of international relations”—his units of analysis—and organized his book around them.<sup>70</sup> It is to be observed that not only does each level (however identified) provide the boundaries for the analysis undertaken, but it also gives a different perspective for an examination of the material concerned—that is, a perspective pertaining specially to the level selected. For example, a political phenomenon examined from a global perspective is likely to look different when seen from a national vantage point.

James Rosenau distinguished five levels in building a “pre-theory of foreign policy.”<sup>71</sup> Others have designed categories to meet the specific needs of their projects—for example, by adding a regional level of analysis.<sup>72</sup> Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr made very successful use of six levels in their introduction to world politics.<sup>73</sup> Numerous writers of international politics textbooks are also using this organizing device.<sup>74</sup> A similar approach can be used to explore the transformation of diplomatic method, with a number of adjustments to meet the special needs of this study. The focus here is of course much narrower. The transformation of diplomatic method involves far fewer variables than the study of the entire structure of international politics or the making of foreign policy. It must furthermore be noted that many of the changes occurring at any one level do not modify diplomatic *method*,<sup>75</sup> even when the *substance*<sup>76</sup> of foreign relations is transformed: the same diplomatic procedures can be used over the years for very different diplomatic objectives or courses of action. Thus the analysis is more circumscribed. Five levels of inquiry are of particular importance here.<sup>77</sup>

First, a useful point of departure is an examination of the changes taking place at the *global level* that are leading to new avenues of diplomatic interaction. Chapters 3 and 4 examine developments at this level, the former focusing on the impact of complex interdependence,<sup>78</sup> and the latter taking up the changes produced by technological advancements.

Second, the *national level*, too, generates changes contributing to the transformation of diplomatic method.<sup>79</sup> Changes here are rooted in the way domestic societies and governments operate. The world remains essentially divided into nation-states, each one tending to embody a national culture and distinct political system. To be sure, states are no longer the only international actors, but they have a major impact on diplomatic method. Some of the ways in which states approach diplomacy tend to converge and may lead to new, and generally accepted, diplomatic methodologies. Other state practices diverge, thus producing greater diversity and, occasionally, problems.<sup>80</sup> This level of analysis provides material for a number of chapters in this volume where national influence is identified more particularly, Chapters 6, 7, 9, and 10.<sup>81</sup>

Third, the *transnational level* is of relatively recent vintage. It represents a growing phenomenon fostered by technological developments, a greater awareness of international civil society, and a growing trend toward globalization.<sup>82</sup> It amounts to the private sector of society interacting across international boundaries beyond the reach of state authorities. Interaction at this level bypasses intergovernmental activity, but does not hesitate to work with the public sector whenever it serves its purpose (particularly to modify its agenda).<sup>83</sup> Conversely, the public sector is increasingly finding it useful to work with the transnational order.<sup>84</sup>

Transnational phenomena are undoubtedly less momentous for the transformation of diplomacy than what is happening at the preceding levels. Nevertheless, transnational forces are growing and have an impact on diplomacy. Transnational actors, such as nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations, are playing an increasingly larger role in international society (particularly in the massive process of economic globalization) and affect diplomatic methodology. Chapter 5 examines the extent of its contribution (see in particular the case study on the diplomacy of the landmine treaty).

Fourth, changes are also generated at the *professional level*—that is, the level of individual participants in diplomacy, which is no longer limited to members of the foreign service. The practitioners themselves in their day-to-day interaction initiate new ways of doing their work. Chapter 6 deals with the changes introduced by the people who actually carry out diplomatic relations and who, to a significant extent, give diplomacy its special character. In this analysis, the roles of the individual players are considered (some analysts consider roles as a separate level).<sup>85</sup> Each role, or position, carries with it responsibilities (professional, social, and psychological demands and expectations) that influence behavior.<sup>86</sup>

Roles have a conservative tendency that inhibits novel behavior. In diplomacy, some roles are steeped in tradition and are a factor of continuity. But it must be remembered that superiors will redefine the roles of their agents. Changed circumstances will lead to collective pressures to perform differently. This has been very noticeable in the case of heads of international agencies.<sup>87</sup> The chapters in Part 2 of this volume, in their examination of diplomatic modes, consider the effect of roles.

Fifth and finally is the *functional level*, to which Part 2 of this volume is devoted. “Functional” is used in a broad sense, not at all limited to function, but including other elements such as structure and modus operandi in examining the various modes of diplomacy currently in use.<sup>88</sup>

Some of the diplomatic modes are well established, but evolving.<sup>89</sup> They are adjusting to changed circumstances, and it is important to examine how useful they remain and their prospects for further change. Other diplomatic modes are new and very different. They represent attempts by international actors to meet changing needs.<sup>90</sup> It is not certain whether they may all qualify as

“diplomacy,” and this needs to be examined. It is also important to inquire into their actual contribution to the international process and to see how they interact with the more traditional procedures.

Five chapters deal with this functional level of inquiry. Chapter 7 examines the current status of permanent representation in national capitals, the “classic” mode of diplomacy. It has lost much of its luster but remains useful.<sup>91</sup> It still has many of its traditional functions, but has acquired new roles<sup>92</sup> and is still adjusting to the new diplomatic environment.

Chapter 8 focuses on the rapidly expanding mode of international organization diplomacy, which has introduced a number of new practices—for example, diplomacy by international officials, such as heads of international agencies speaking for their organizations rather than a specific nation-state. It is doubtless the most diverse of diplomatic modes.<sup>93</sup>

Chapter 9 examines the use of temporary missions for a variety of purposes, two in particular: mediation (an analysis of its interaction with other diplomatic modes, especially resident representation—see the Yemen case study) and representation at international conferences, a proliferating mode of diplomatic interaction.<sup>94</sup>

Chapter 10 turns to summit diplomacy, which has become a standard way of conducting international business and seems to be acquiring greater popularity. Does it deserve the place it now holds in international affairs? This will be looked into as well as the specific ways in which it is carried out, requiring a good deal of diplomacy by other professionals. The chapter also presents another form of diplomacy, now extensively used: interaction between heads of executive departments across international boundaries, not only foreign ministers but other division heads as well (e.g., ministers of agriculture negotiating food issues). This can be viewed as “near-summit” diplomacy. It is widely called “ministerial” diplomacy, and serves a role that needs to be carefully reviewed. It is a new diplomatic trend that will likely expand.

Chapter 11 covers novel forms of interaction, some of them unconventional enough to be seen as reaching the edge of diplomacy. “Track II diplomacy” involves private citizens in the diplomatic affairs of states, although this form of transaction remains of limited scope and frequency.

Chapter 12 concludes the volume by examining trends, drawing lessons, and pondering the future of diplomacy in its complex and diverse manifestations. Throughout the volume, text boxes illustrate aspects of the diplomatic methods examined here, and case studies provide practical applications of modern diplomacy in their historical context.

## ■ Study Questions and Discussion Topics

1. What is diplomacy? Why is its definition an object of disagreement?

2. Who can be called a diplomat? Why is the issue debatable?
3. What is the role of negotiations in diplomacy? Why fear negotiations?
4. What distinction can be made between foreign policy and diplomacy?

To what extent is it wise to make such a distinction?

5. What is the role of diplomacy in the formulation of foreign policy?
6. How is foreign policy formulated? What are the factors that contribute to its formulation?

## Suggested Reading

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- Berridge, G. R. *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. 3d ed. New York: Palgrave, 2005.
- Cohen, Raymond. *Theater of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signalling*. New York: Longman, 1987.
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- Kremenyuk, Victor A. *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991.
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- Wittkopf, Eugene R., Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James M. Scott. *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003.
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## Notes

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 367. See also Barbara Gamarekian, "Has Diplomacy Become Out of Date?" in *The Modern Ambassador*, edited by Martin F. Herz (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1983), pp. 16–18. For additional criticism of diplomacy, see Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States* (New York: Routledge, 2004), chap. 10, "Criticisms of Contemporary Diplomacy," pp. 132–157. The diverse arguments will be discussed later, in the chapters pertaining to the diverse forms of diplomacy.

2. For example, Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997); Vernon McKay, ed., *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

3. For example, Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy: The Twentieth Century*, 4th ed. (New York: Norton, 1988); Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, expanded ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941–1945*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985).

4. Elmer Plischke, “Diplomacy: Search for Its Meaning,” in *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans*, edited by Elmer Plischke (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), pp. 27–40.

5. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 25–30.

6. Lori F. Damrosch, Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, eds., *International Law: Basic Documents Supplement*, 4th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2001), pp. 574–583.

7. Ibid., pp. 583–593. Other international conventions have codified the practice of diplomacy—for example, the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; *ibid.*, pp. 605–610. Like other institutions, however, diplomacy changes over time. The 1946 convention is an illustration of this evolution, as it formalized the application of diplomacy within the new framework of the United Nations.

8. Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 55–67.

9. Ibid. See also François de Callières, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, translated by A. F. Whyte (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1963 [1716]), pp. 103–132.

10. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2d ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1989), pp. 26–27.

11. Strobe Talbott, “Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective,” in *Diplomacy*, edited by Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne (London: Sage, 2004), vol. 3, *Problems and Issues in Contemporary Diplomacy*, pp. 368–370.

12. George F. Kennan, “Diplomacy Without Diplomats,” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (September–October 1997), pp. 198–212.

13. See Herz, *Modern Ambassador*, pp. 117–143, 167–176.

14. Which means having extensive administrative duties.

15. Hedley Bull, “Diplomacy and International Order,” in Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 1, pp. 81–91.

16. For example, when elected to chair certain UN committees, national delegates are usually expected to help these committees carry out their work programs rather than act in partisan fashion to protect their own national interests. See Chadwick F. Alger, “Decision-Making and Human Conflict,” in *The Nature of Human Conflict*, edited by Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 283–285. See also Chapter 8 in this volume.

17. Inis L. Claude Jr., “Multilateralism—Diplomatic and Otherwise,” in Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 1, pp. 367–377.

18. See also *ibid.*; Volker Rittberger, “Global Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-Making: The Case of UN-Sponsored World Conferences,” in Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 1, pp. 378–395.

19. A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2002), pp. 412–438. See also Robert W. Cox, Harold K. Jacobson, et al., *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

20. Transnational relations are relations across national boundaries *without* significant, direct participation or control by high-level governmental actors. Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, 6th ed. (Boston: Bedford, 2000), p. 400.

21. Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking, “Governments, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy,” in Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 3, pp. 79–95.

22. Susan Strange, “States, Firms, and Diplomacy,” in Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 1, pp. 352–366.

23. See also Rik Coolsaet, “The Transformation of Diplomacy at the Threshold of the New Millennium,” in Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 3, pp. 1–24.

24. G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 2d ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 1.

25. R. P. Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1997); Shawn Dorman, ed., *Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: American Foreign Service Association, 2005).

26. In the period between 1946 and 1996, the United States concluded more than 6,900 treaties (6,303 bilateral and 599 multilateral). Elmer Plischke, *U.S. Department of State: A Reference History* (Westport: Greenwood, 1999), p. 528; see tables of bilateral treaties, pp. 545–548, and multilateral treaties, pp. 559–560.

27. See Fred Charles Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 26–42.

28. See I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). See also Dennis Ross, *Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), “Negotiations: Twelve Rules to Follow,” pp. 187–215.

29. See the series of studies sponsored and published by the US Institute of Peace—for example, Nigel Quinney, *U.S. Negotiating Behavior*, Special Report no. 94 (October 2002); Charles Cogan, *French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with La Grande Nation* (2003); W. R. Smyser, *How Germans Negotiate: Logical Goals, Practical Solutions* (2003). See also Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1997); Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic, 2001).

30. See James K. Sebenius, *Negotiating the Law of the Sea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

31. Ibid., pp. 42–146. See also Berridge, *Diplomacy*, pp. 29–44.

32. That is, at the opening of the multilateral conference or the beginning of the international organization meeting that the membership is to attend.

33. See Erik Goldstein, “The Politics of the State Visit,” Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 2, pp. 357–380.

34. Richard W. Sterling, *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society* (New York: Knopf, 1974), pp. 156–178. See also Watson, *Diplomacy*, pp. 69–81.

35. This has been referred to as the “politicization” of conference proceedings. See Chapter 9.

36. James P. Muldoon Jr., JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan, eds., *Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today* (Boulder: Westview, 1999).

37. Berridge, *Diplomacy*, pp. 67–68. See also Chapter 6 in this volume.

38. Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, pp. 50–53.

39. Zartman and Berman, *Practical Negotiator*, pp. 215–219. See also W. Philips Davison, “News Media and International Negotiation,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 38 (1974), pp. 174–193.
40. Michele J. Gelfand and Jeanne M. Brett, eds., *The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford Business Books, 2004).
41. Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjold* (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 216, 221.
42. Berridge, *Diplomacy*, pp. 67–68.
43. Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 9–28.
44. It is to be noted that within the framework of broad foreign ministry guidelines, diplomats may be given enough room for initiatives of their own. But this varies with the political system and its leadership. Some ministries are addicted (to their own detriment) to micromanagement.
45. Steven W. Hook, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2005), pp. 153–188. See also Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), pp. 147–514.
46. J. Robert Schaetzel, “Modernizing the Role of the Ambassador,” in Plischke, *Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 266–276.
47. Wittkopf, Kegley, and Scott, *American Foreign Policy*, pp. 147–514.
48. See Paul F. Diehl, ed., *The Politics of International Organizations: Patterns and Insights* (Chicago: Dorsey, 1989). See also Cox et al., *Anatomy of Influence*, for various forms of decisionmaking in international organizations.
49. See, for instance, Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*; or C. V. Narasimhan, *The United Nations: An Inside View* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1988).
50. See, for instance, David Armstrong, “Revolutionary Diplomacy,” Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 2, pp. 381–394.
51. George F. Kennan, speaking of the US foreign service, noted: “The Service is, in the human sense, a very mixed bag.” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (September–October 1997), p. 209.
52. Clare Boothe Luce, “The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or Amateurs?” in Herz, *Modern Ambassador*, pp. 128–136, also pp. 117–127, 137–176.
53. Martin F. Herz, “Maxwell Gluck and All That,” in Herz, *Modern Ambassador*, pp. 96–104; “Ambassadorships: Findings of the Watergate Committee,” in Herz, *Modern Ambassador*, pp. 105–109.
54. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, “Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy,” Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 1, pp. 396–415.
55. See Ambassador Melissa Foelsch Wells in Ann Miller Morin, *Her Excellency: An Oral History of American Women Ambassadors* (New York: Twayne, 1995), pp. 212, 214–215.
56. Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, pp. 62–63.
57. (Lord) Gore-Booth, ed., *Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 1979), pp. 20ff.
58. Karl Gruber, “Common Denominators of Good Ambassadors,” in Herz, *Modern Ambassador*, pp. 62–66.
59. Fred Charles Iklé, “Negotiating Effectively,” in Plischke, *Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 364–372.
60. Sterling, *Macropolitics*, pp. 156–178; Watson, *Diplomacy*, pp. 69–81.
61. Zartman and Berman, *Practical Negotiator*, pp. 27–41.
62. It seems that governments would benefit from longer tenure in the same post. See Schaetzel, “Modernizing the Role,” p. 275.

63. François de Laboulaye and Jean Laloy, “Qualifications of an Ambassador,” in Herz, *Modern Ambassador*, pp. 67–71. See also Thomas A. Bailey, “Advice for Diplomats,” in Plischke, *Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 230–231.

64. See Seymour Maxwell Finger, *American Ambassadors at the UN: People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988).

65. However, some organizations are creating their own diplomatic service (e.g., the European Union).

66. Like their colleagues in the foreign service, some do well and others have more to learn.

67. See, for example, James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1997); Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Journeys Through World Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-four Academic Travelers* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988). For more on a general theory, see James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World* (Boulder: Westview, 1995); Jönsson and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, vol. 1, *Theory of Diplomacy*. See also Berridge, *Diplomacy*.

68. J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, edited by Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77–92. See also James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 20–29; see critique by William B. Moul, “The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 6 (1973), pp. 494–513.

69. Singer, “Level-of-Analysis Problem,” p. 77. He reasoned that an observer may always choose to focus on the parts or on the whole, the micro or the macro level of analysis. In the operation of general systems theory, however, he saw potential difficulty in the way in which the researcher would select the subsystems (the component parts of the whole system), and his study was intended to address this problem.

70. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 12.

71. These are the individual, role, governmental, societal, and systemic sets of variables. He did not call them “levels” of analysis but rather “philosophies” of analysis. James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics*, rev. ed. (New York: Nichols, 1980), pp. 128–129.

72. See, for example, James N. Rosenau, with Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd, *World Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 8–10. Here, Rosenau uses three levels of analysis—the national, regional, and global—as a framework to organize the book. Note that other levels, especially those that involve sub-national actors, are also analyzed in a number of Rosenau’s chapters, thus illustrating the flexibility of this method. See also Timothy J. Lomperis, *Flawed Realism: Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz on Vietnam—The Case for a Regional Level of Analysis* (unpublished, St. Louis University, 2005).

73. World system, international relations, characteristics of the society, governmental structure, roles of decisionmakers, and individual decisionmakers. Russett, Starr, and Kinsella, *World Politics*, pp. 12–16.

74. For example, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformations*, 9th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004), p. 17; John T. Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill,

2005), pp. 57–96; Steven L. Spiegel, Jennifer Morrison Taw, Fred L. Wehling, and Kristen P. Williams, *World Politics in a New Era*, 3d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004), pp. 33–95.

75. Understood in a broad sense—that is, form, procedure, means, modes of interaction, channels utilized, and all the other elements that will be studied in Part 2.

76. For example, when the states concerned decide to go to war.

77. Other levels of analysis could be chosen. The phenomena to be studied could be approached differently, and other researchers may choose to do so. But it seems that these levels are the most pertinent in examining the transformation taking place in diplomatic method and its consequences.

78. For example, the vast expansion and diversification of the subject matter of diplomacy. Many diplomats need new skills. Experts without diplomatic skill find themselves involved in diplomatic negotiations. See, for instance, Chapter 6. The question is now raised: “Diplomacy without diplomats?” See article of this title, by career diplomat George F. Kennan, in *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (September–October 1997), pp. 198–212.

79. It is acknowledged that what is done at the national level is often a consequence of transformation at the global level. Units of analysis do not operate in airtight compartments. This needs to be taken into account in one’s research work.

80. To a considerable extent, states control what their envoys do abroad—even if counterproductive. And the world has had its share of “exotic” systems (e.g., Muammar Qaddafi’s or the Taliban’s).

81. In Chapter 6, the personal level is emphasized, but national governments have a large impact on the methods used by their own diplomats. Chapter 7 is focused on the changes taking place in resident missions—the traditional embassies in foreign capitals. Chapter 9, particularly the segment on special missions, shows the bulk of them are still sent by national governments. Chapter 10 focuses on summit and ministerial diplomacy, in which the national element is important, although summity is heavily propelled by developments at the global level.

82. Hence much influence from the global level, and what is discussed in Chapter 3. See also Sterling, *Macropolitics*, pp. 492–514; Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 33–34.

83. Many nongovernmental organizations distrust the governmental sector.

84. See also Strange, “States, Firms, and Diplomacy,” pp. 352–366.

85. For example, Russett, Harvey, and Starr apply this tool of analysis to the larger category of “decisionmakers”; *World Politics*, pp. 14–15.

86. These tend to shape the individual’s perception of how he or she should perform. Wittkopf, Kegley, and Scott, *American Foreign Policy*, pp. 448–449.

87. For example, new expectations have developed in the diplomatic roles of UN Secretaries-General. See Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*. See also Cox et al., *Anatomy of Influence*, for other high international officials.

88. It is acknowledged that in political science, “functional analysis” is an ambiguous label. William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman identify several kinds of functional analysis. The broad type used here is presented as “eclectic functionalism”; it is the least developed theoretically. “Empirical functionalism” was given its impetus by Robert K. Merton in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1957). “Structural-functional analysis,” the most ambitious, was developed by Talcott Parsons in *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1951), and by Parson with Edward Shils, eds., in *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), and by Marion Levy in *The Structure of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). See Flanigan and Fogelman, “Functional Analysis,” in *Contemporary*

*Political Analysis*, edited by James C. Charlesworth (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 72–85. Functionalists are also found in international organization theory, where they focus on the rational administration of technical activities toward a higher degree of integration of global society. See Bennett and Oliver, *International Organizations*, pp. 11–13; Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, pp. 598–600. See also Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

89. For example, permanent representation in foreign capitals—the traditional embassies. See Chapter 7.

90. For example, direct interaction between executive departments of different countries (other than foreign ministries)—transgovernmental relations. See Chapter 3.

91. More than half of the countries of the world maintain only a limited number of embassies abroad. See Chapter 7.

92. For example, helping with the multilateral transactions carried out elsewhere. See Chapter 7.

93. The latest innovations are found in the European Union, which remains a grouping of independent states with their own diplomatic establishments. See Brian Hocking and David Spence, eds., *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

94. Many of the diplomatic procedures used in international conferences are comparable to what is done in international organizations (which have occasionally been called “permanent conferences”). The temporary nature of these conference missions, nevertheless, is a major difference in the conduct of diplomacy.