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Global governance is a commonly used concept encompassing a number of institutions, forces, and trends in world politics. Within its purview are organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO); the globalization of production, trade, and finance; the activism of transnational social movements (some opposed to globalization); multilateral efforts to halt global warming; and challenges to state sovereignty in the face of humanitarian crises. Few are against the need for global governance—and indeed for better forms of such governance—but many disagree about the more specific analytical and ethical issues and problems that it suggests.

In recent years the global governance literature has become more sophisticated, as many have sought to clarify the concept and situate it within disciplinary debates and established socioscientific methodologies (see, for example, Ba and Hoffmann 2005; Barnett and Duvall 2005a; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). However, the place of ethics in global governance has not received much attention. In an important article, Craig N. Murphy (2000, 789) argues that global governance is both “poorly done” and “poorly understood,” and that moral problems and crises at the heart of world politics are typically misdiagnosed and unchallenged by scholars and political leaders. This book responds to these intellectual and moral challenges by analyzing ethics in global governance politics. The central argument guiding this and the following chapters is that ethical reasoning and moral norms are part of the political constitution of global governance and that, within that context, ethics is vital to challenging and changing the political realities and problems of world order.

This book is not intended as an exercise in moral philosophy, but it draws upon the vocabulary and concepts of various ethical theories and perspectives as applied to global governance issues. Arguments and justifications about what is right and wrong, good or bad, in ethical terms are
discussed in the context of issues such as sovereignty, power, inclusion, responsibility, legitimacy, rights, democracy, self-determination, care, fairness, and equity. Ethics is central to global governance because the actors and authority structures of world politics are motivated, justified, challenged, and criticized in relation to such ethical principles and objectives. The question of how best to understand and solve the moral dilemmas that challenge actors and authority structures cannot be answered by moral theory alone; an ethics separated from the realities of politics, however contested, is useless in practical terms. By the same token, one cannot understand the exercise of power, the dilemmas of decisionmaking, and the problematic outcomes of global governance politics without an ethical conscience and imagination. A politics separated from ethics, however demanding and intractable the moral dilemmas we face, is unacceptable and dangerous. Thus, ethics and politics are neither categorically dichotomous nor identical activities. Rather, they are symbiotic and mutually constitutive. Each is an essential domain of responsibility and obligation for human beings; both pose no easy solution to the demands of human interrelatedness.

Ethics is treated by many political analysts as extraneous to the central dynamics of global governance (see Frost 2004), however. Theoretically, mainstream realist and liberal approaches to world politics marginalize or overlook the importance of ethics to global governance. Realists have assumed an ethical vacuity at the heart of world politics. Ethics is “window dressing” or merely something to adorn or cover up what one has accomplished by the use of power without any regard for right and wrong. From this vantage point, justice in global governance, as with all politics, to cite Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic (1968, 15), is merely about “the advantage of the stronger.” Theoretically, then, realism typically treats ethics as a separate domain from politics (see, for example, Morgenthau 1985, 12–17). Moreover, realism’s materialist view of power and politics prevents an appreciation of the significance of ethics because outcomes are viewed as a result of calculations based on material interests rather than ideational or normative considerations. (International ethics developed as a separate subfield in international relations because of the negligible weight given to ethical reality by realists.) Neoliberal institutionalists share realism’s materialist view. They treat liberal ethical values—such as peace, human rights, and democracy—as superior and desirable objectives; yet these objectives are viewed as separate from the political world of power and interest among egotistical states (see Keohane 1984, 247–259). The contributors to this book challenge this mainstream tendency to separate material forces from ethical reasoning; ethics is fundamental to understanding how and why actors deal with the material forces they confront.
Analytically, the mainstream approaches to global governance tend to associate politically significant and determinative behavior with states, excluding nonstate actors from their frameworks. Although neoliberal institutionalists appear to create more theoretical space for ethics than do realists, as mediated by international institutions and regimes, they share a state-centric focus with realists, and thus limit the analytical scope of relevant behavior to states and their conduct within international organizations. The contributors to this volume view global governance as a broader site of politics, including not just sovereign states, but also international organizations, civil society organizations, and social movements.

Normatively, many liberal approaches assume that because global governance is about managing collective problems of interdependence and globalization, it must be “good.” However, such an assumption prevents scrutiny of existing power hierarchies in world politics and the distributive effects of the political economy of global governance arrangements. Additionally, the absence of mechanisms for interest articulation, participation, or accountability is generally viewed as a serious problem (Buchanan and Keohane 2006), but existing global governance mechanisms are viewed by many liberals to be ethically sound, if in need of some adjustments and tinkering (see Slaughter 2004).

By focusing on ethics, this volume provides a more complete picture of global governance politics. If ethical reasoning and moral norms shape, direct, and even discipline or limit global governance politics, then ethical analysis is vital to understanding the various relations, impacts, and sites of domination in world politics. Additionally, by engaging in ethical reasoning and reflection on which moral norms matter and why, in addition to which ones ought to be respected, why, and how they should inform the political sphere, the scholars in this volume contribute to an ongoing debate about the contemporary world order and the directions and changes required to challenge and improve global governance. Nonetheless, the authors here do not forward a shared or substantive ethical perspective on global governance. Indeed, there are some tensions, differences, and even disagreements among some of the chapters about, for instance, whether cosmopolitan or universalist principles can and ought to be the basis of global governance politics. All agree, however, that ethics matter to the politics of global governance and that, in the various issue areas examined, these politics require ethically motivated reform. Global governance, argues Murphy (2000, 799), is “a site, one of many sites, in which struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge are taking place.” This introductory chapter locates ethics on the terrain of this political site and then in relation to the subsequent chapters on state sovereignty, civil society, the UN, democracy promotion, humanitarian intervention, human security, the global economy, and the environment.
Ethics in the Politics of Global Governance

The idea of “governance without government” is a persistent theme in thinking about global politics over the past two centuries (see Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Even without a centralized world state, that is, even in a context of anarchy—viewed by realists as an amoral realm—political actors have been motivated by the pursuit of fundamental moral objectives. Moreover, these actors have sought to deliberately and consciously steer global politics toward the realization of values such as security, order, justice, freedom, and individual rights.¹ In this section, I argue that ethics has constituted the discourse and practice of global governance in gradually more complex ways. As this governance has become more intricate and extensive, ethics has also informed more critical and reflexive views about the moral legitimacy of global governance practices. Rather than examining the political impact of ethics, my aim is to reveal the premises of four paradigmatic moral visions that inform reasoning about the purposes of global governance. In doing so, this chapter builds a context from which the subsequent chapters of this volume flow; those chapters engage in analyses of specific global governance actors, institutions, and issues in ways that link questions of moral vision with outcomes, problems, conflicts, and dilemmas.

There are four paradigmatic moral visions of global governance politics:

- An ethics of reform—to liberalize and civilize the states system
- An ethics of responsible governance—to provide adequate governance on a global basis
- An ethics of cosmopolitan community—to govern for humanity rather than in the interests of particular states or groups
- An ethics of critique—to challenge and transform global governance as a site of power, domination, and/or bad governance

These visions are not mutually exclusive or contradictory although some tensions may exist among them. The purposes of global governance, the agenda of institutions such as the UN, and the interests that ought to be served are questions that have been framed differently in each of these general visions.

An Ethics of Reform

For much of the past two hundred years, global governance has been conceived as the project of reforming the states system so as to prevent violent conflict and war among states. This has given global governance a clear direction or purpose, one that aligns with the liberal vision of world politics.
If global governance referred simply to the exercise of influence or control on a worldwide or intercontinental scale, then the European empires of centuries past would qualify as global governing institutions. Similarly, if the concept was simply about involuntary mechanisms that guide interstate relations in one direction or another, but without any clear moral purpose or end, such as the balance of power, then global governance would be coeval with the sovereign states system (see Holsti 1992). But neither empire nor the balance of power, as particular forms of politics operative at the global level, are typically counted as manifestations or instances of global governance. To speak of global governance, then, is never to simply describe an objective reality that unfolds apart from human choice; it is not a natural state of affairs or inevitable status quo. To speak about global governance is, as Marie-Claude Smouts (1998, 88) states, “an intellectual and ideological choice,” but it is also, as with human agency in general, a moral choice.

The modern states system and capitalist social relations emerged hand in hand in the seventeenth century. By the eighteenth century, liberal reformers like Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, among others, put forward the early moral case for global governance (see Aksu 2008; Murphy 1994). Such governance was conceived as the need to develop practices and institutions that could ameliorate the moral failings of the states system’s politics in ways that allowed the moral strengths and rights of individuals to flourish. For such thinkers, global governance is conceived as a projection or application of the ideals and dynamics of liberal domestic politics to the corrupt or defective politics of European states (see Hoffmann 1995, 160). Liberal reformers articulated the need for norms, laws, and institutions as rational means to mitigate, prevent, and ultimately eliminate war and violence. Here global governance is viewed as morally superior to the whims of unfettered sovereign states and the vagarious balance of power.

In discussing the states system’s failings, however, liberal advocates of global governance have rejected centralized global or supranational coercive authority. The sovereign state per se is not, in this vision, the only institutional source of war and injustice. Indeed, actual sovereign states are the frequent victim of other states’ realpolitik and imperialist ambitions and policies. Such ethical concerns clearly remain salient today, particularly for states in the developing world that have been subject to interventions and imperialism by powerful states. Thus, and as the chapters by Samuel Makinda and Tom Keating suggest, sovereignty is a defensible value, one that offers a protective barrier against abuse and violence; it is also constitutive of the most widely shared norms of global governance.

If world government and imperial hierarchy are rejected forms of politics, what remains? International organizations, law, multilateral or collective decisionmaking, and diplomacy are instruments that, as surrogates to world government, ought to mitigate war and violence among states. Much
like a division of powers or checks and balances within a liberal polity, such practices allow for the settlement of conflicts without violence. However, such governance mechanisms are often liable to fail according to skeptics like Stanley Hoffmann (1981, chapter 1). States may simply use such legal and diplomatic practices to justify their own unilateral, self-serving actions. Global governance institutions do not, then, achieve complete transcendence of the politics of the states system (Hoffmann 2003). Yet they do provide an opportunity for states to develop gradually a common moral vocabulary in a multilateral process. In such a process, unilateral and self-seeking intent and behavior are made more obvious and are more easily framed as corrosive to the international community’s ethical standards. Also, as Murphy argues (1994), by moderating and smoothing over conflicts, particularly among states in the industrial age, the ethics of reforming the states system supports the expansive dynamics of capitalist markets across borders. The chauvinist tendencies of states acting to protect their particular in-group against the threat of the out-group is offset by a wider set of cross-cutting, bourgeois interests in peace and prosperity. Global governance, then, is driven by the ethical vision and interests of liberal political ideology (see Barnett and Duvall 2005b, 5).

States are important, leading players in the ethics of reform. In the aftermath of systemwide wars and in light of pressure from societal voices, both domestic and transnational, states have created organizations such as the League of Nations, the UN, and, regionally, the European Union (EU). A commitment to norms of nonaggression, the pacific settlement of disputes, and collective security are at the core of such organizations. Human rights and humanitarian norms play an important role inasmuch as states have made a causal connection between enshrining the value of human dignity and international peace and security. Built on the legacies of nineteenth-century humanitarian and antislavery movements, states have consented to a broad array of human rights norms and laws in the aftermath of World War II (Forsythe 2000). States also recognize the importance of economic and social cooperation as a means of harnessing the collective benefits of trade and commerce. As Jacqueline Best’s chapter in this volume shows, economic liberalism has been the dominant perspective of the industrialized states that have created and championed world economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the WTO. Global governance and positive, deliberate state decisions and actions go hand in hand in the ethics of reform vision.

A corollary to the centrality of states in this moral vision is that failures of global governance are also the failures of states. States are unwilling or unable to commit to the appropriate cooperative norms and institutions, mired as they are within a recalcitrant political reality. Yet a serious controversy among global governance advocates is whether global governance
institutions can coerce or impose values such as peace, human rights, and economic prosperity by overriding or challenging state sovereignty. Within the ethics of reform vision, a tension between “pluralist” and “solidarist” conceptions of international order has divided global governance advocates and scholars. Pluralists tend to emphasize state consent and the necessity of restraint and forbearance in essentially domestic matters. Solidarists, by contrast, argue that sovereignty is not absolute and that communitywide values may warrant direct action and intervention. Pluralist thinking is more tolerant or patient in the face of certain state failures, depending on their gravity. Solidarists see global governance as a means of responding to violent threats to values such as democracy, human rights, and human security.

The chapters by Makinda on state sovereignty, Cecelia Lynch on civil society, Keating on democracy promotion, and Catherine Lu on humanitarian intervention engage the controversy between pluralist and solidarist visions differently. For pluralists, the efficacy of global governance ultimately depends on state consent for legitimacy that, in turn, depends on a variety of political conditions that cannot be taken for granted. As Keating shows, states and populations may not trust other states or international institutions—often with good reason. Power and calculations of national interests are inevitable brakes on progress. Nationalist ideology is a powerful force that limits internationalist sentiments and, within multinational states, can cause conflict and disorder. The pacifying dynamics of industrial capitalism are far from guaranteed in that they rely on a host of other political conditions. Pluralists point to these limitations on global governance as reasons for a “nonperfectionist” ethics of reform. Although the ultimate goal is to remedy the moral failings of the states system, neither analysts nor decisionmakers should assume that global governance will transcend that system altogether (see Hoffmann 2003). Moreover, global governance cannot solve every moral problem put on the agenda, from human rights abuses to environmental degradation. Most important, global governance actors need to consider the likely impact of decisions; the possibility of doing more harm and creating greater disorder through moral zeal remains as large a problem, if not larger, than doing nothing (see Jackson 2000). For pluralists, then, the ethics of global governance must work largely within certain limits of the politics of the states system.

Solidarists argue that a common morality exists prior to and autonomous from the states system (Wheeler 2000). Indeed, states have acted on the basis of this morality—both unilaterally and collectively, and with or without the support of civil society organizations—to stop states and situations from offending a minimum standard of humanity. As Lu’s chapter demonstrates, human rights abuses and humanitarian crises create demands for global governance that suspend the default norm of nonintervention. The mandate of global governance is not simply to moderate inter-
state violent conflicts but to reduce severe threats to humanity more broadly. Thus, a solidarist version of an ethics of reform views the legitimacy of global governance institutions and actors in a more demanding light. The failure to confront evils that are within the power of the international community to prevent threatens the liberal project of reforming the states system. If liberal global governance overlooks the fundamental interests of the actual individual victims of widespread starvation or genocide, then whose interests does it truly serve? It is not moral perfectionism, then, or zeal to solve each and every problem that underlies a solidarist vision of reform. It is, rather, recognition that global governance politics takes place in a human community, as well as a community of sovereign states.

An Ethics of Responsible Governance

Global governance is also viewed as a process of creating and strengthening the authoritative capacities of governing agents worldwide. Fundamental political objectives like security, order, justice, and welfare are conventionally the responsibilities of governments. But the capacity of states to provide these goods is questionable. As Makinda’s chapter argues, states are constituted as territorial authorities and consequently lack the legitimate right to unilaterally control issues and events outside of their borders. However, transnational issues such as trade, health, migration, and the environment affect the interests of states and societies. These issues also create mutual concerns and transnational solidarities among citizens worldwide, as Lynch’s chapter on global civil society shows. Since at least the eighteenth-century advent of public unions—regulating such things as postal and telegraph communications, and rivers and waterways—global governing institutions have authorized a variety of actors to solve problems that states cannot independently address (Claude 1971; Murphy 1994). Reflecting this interest, the solving of governance problems in a world polity has been a salient ethical vision of global governance (see Weiss 2000).

Global governance here pushes beyond the territorialist and statist assumptions of traditional liberal international reform to the states system. The central moral problem is not simply providing an improved framework for interstate relations or, as with the solidarists, defending fundamental moral values from direct attack. Instead, the objective is to close the regulatory gaps in world politics that allow political, social, and economic problems to go unresolved. Although stemming war, violence, and abuse among and within states remains important, such issues are shaped by other political, social, and economic factors. While early liberals like Kant (1991) thought that industry, commerce, and a cosmopolitan civil society would curtail absolutist and bellicose states, these same forces have historically created pressures for, and have demanded, a much greater role for global
governance institutions. They have also led to more purposeful norms and networks of cooperation among and across states and societies (Slaughter 2004).

David Held and Anthony McGrew (2002, 8) capture the essential concerns of an ethics of responsible governance:

Given the absence of world government, the concept of global governance provides a language for describing the nexus of systems of rule-making, political coordination and problem-solving which transcend states and societies. It is particularly relevant to describing the structures and processes of governing beyond the state where there exists no supreme or singular political authority. Theoretically, it is much more than simply a descriptive term: it constitutes a broad analytical approach to addressing the central questions of political life under conditions of globalization, namely: who rules, in whose interests, by what mechanisms and for what purpose?

The questions Held and McGrew pose are traditionally believed to be relevant only in relation to the domestic social context. For instance, John Rawls’s well-known view that there is a “second contract” among states—distinct from and thinner than a primary social contract domestically—illuminates traditional liberal reformism (Rawls 1999). By contrast, an ethics of responsible governance vision argues that political authority and responsibility are being relocated and dispersed in ways not captured by Westphalian assumptions about state sovereignty. As Fred Halliday (2000, 19) writes, “We already have a many-layered global governance system, and indeed one of the central issues is to overcome, through reform, the defaults of a system that has been up and running for several decades. The question is how to make this governance system more effective, more just, and more responsive to the changing international system.”

Similarly, James N. Rosenau (1997, 175) argues that a changing international system creates new realities and pressures that empower an array of actors and create a constellation of problems and dilemmas:

Fragmenting countries, troubled economies, fragile polities, and restless publics . . . highlight the normative implications of the ever greater civic responsibilities that turbulent conditions are imposing on individuals and the ever sharper choices leaders have to make between the whole group and the subgroup, between order and autonomy, between centralized power and decentralized authority. Individuals, leaders, and societies may be capable of facing up to these challenges, but it remains to be seen whether they can cope with the unfamiliar normative challenges that have arisen in the widening space of the domestic-foreign Frontier.

Rosenau’s “Frontier” refers to governance problems and issues that are neither wholly domestic nor international but rather are deterritorialized in ori-
gin and impact. In a responsible governance framework, the institutions and actors of global governance gain some autonomy from the logic of the states system. States do not disappear but rather become pieces that fit in a larger, multilevel puzzle with other systems, such as the global economy, world information and communications technologies, the global environment, and a wide range of intergovernmental, transnational, and private actors.

Within an ethics of responsible governance vision there are no easy, uncontested answers to ethico-political problems. Indeed, there is plenty of room for disagreement about the questions posed by Held and McGrew regarding “who rules, in whose interests, by what mechanisms, and for what purposes?” Each question points to different interests, dilemmas, and trade-offs. For example, favoring nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to deliver humanitarian and development aid, to assist in postconflict reconstruction, and to conduct human rights monitoring may prove effective, particularly if states or the UN have limited resources. However, how democratically accountable are NGOs? Do they reflect the interests of outsiders and of Western states or broader, impartial interests? Do they undermine self-determination and the capacity of indigenous civil society actors in target societies? Another example is UN Security Council expansion. Increasing the number of permanent member states may increase legitimacy and geographic representation, but may decrease effectiveness and the capacity to respond to actual humanitarian emergencies. Dilemmas such as these are discussed in the chapters by Makinda, Lynch, Keating, and Lu. In sum, an ethics of responsible governance widens the range of relevant governing authorities and the moral issues that require political action.

An Ethics of Cosmopolitan Community

The ethics of reform and of responsible governance is often motivated by a broader cosmopolitan vision. As discussed, solidarist reformers argue that global governance ought to promote and be responsive to obligations that we have to individuals as individuals rather than to accommodating the interests of sovereign states. As well, advocates of an ethics of responsible governance, such as David Held (2005), invoke cosmopolitanism when answering the question about whose interests global agencies should serve. An ethics of cosmopolitan community vision is therefore not a rival or alternative to the two visions discussed above. It is instead a substantive justification for such frameworks. An ethics of reform and responsible governance is required precisely because of the moral and, increasingly, the sociological unity of the human community (Beck 2006).

Cosmopolitanism provides content for the ethics of global governance that challenges the default particularism of the states system, as well as the
harmful effects of the global market (see Pogge 2002). Although cosmopoli-
tan thought predates these historic realities, with roots in antiquity, a dis-
tinctly modern, progressivist cosmopolitanism developed in Enlightenment
Europe (Schlereth 1977; Kleingeld 1999). For example, Kant enthousiastic-
ally endorsed the transnational solidarism felt across the continent about the
French Revolution. In his view, the mere idea of a state founded on citizen
equality, liberty, and individual rights had universal validity. His condemna-
tion of the war system springs from his view that it violates and destroys
ind cidual humanity and the teleological perfection of the species. Similar-
ly, Marx’s revolutionary socialism is premised on a cosmopolitan
vision of the human species’ emancipation from capitalist productive rela-
tions. Human equality and autonomy from the destructive effects of market
relations are universal and general (rather than national) goals. Reflecting
these intellectual legacies, an ethics of cosmopolitan community views
global governance as a means of serving the interests and needs of individu-
als qua world citizens. In turn, as Patrick Hayden (2005, 7) writes, “World
citizens act as concerned individuals and members of global civil society
by, among other things, becoming informed about the tendencies of global-
ization and helping to steer global governance in desirable directions. World
citizens exhibit a consciousness that global goals can be promoted and that
globalization and global governance are susceptible to change through the
cooperative efforts of transnational networks and coalitions.”

Global governance institutions, norms, and activism are influenced by
cosmopolitan sentiment and are also a means—but not the only means—by
which duties to humanity are discharged. In 1795, Kant foresaw such senti-
ment: “The peoples of the earth have . . . entered in varying degrees into a
universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of
rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere” (Kant 1991, 107–108). In
an era of global markets, nuclear weapons, and world pandemics, Rosenau
(1997, 180) echoes the same point two hundred years later: global gover-
nance is a response to the “feeling that the well-being, perhaps even the fate
of the species, is at stake and that some kind of action has to be taken.”

As Murphy (2002, 177–178) suggests, the history of global governance
has been influenced by “high cosmopolitanism,” a sentiment that encourages
governments to “risk resources in new liberal internationalist projects” such
as banning inhumane weapons like landmines and creating international
criminal courts. The ethics of transcending moral particularism invariably
involves changes and challenges to the concrete and particularistic politics of
states and intergovernmental organizations (Franceschet 2002). Perhaps
ironically, states have created intergovernmental organizations such as the
UN to “save succeeding generations” of “peoples” from the brutality of
states, to use the Charter’s most cosmopolitan flourish. States have also cre-
ated human rights and humanitarian norms and standards that entrench indi-
Individual rights on a global scale. Leadership by liberal states and a desire for legitimacy have motivated states in this regard. By adopting the cosmopolitan language and values of transnational solidarity groups and NGOs—such as antislavery, peace, and women’s movements—states have built expectations that global governance must serve a community of humankind. The chapters by Makinda, Lynch, Archibugi and Marchetti, and Lu investigate the importance of cosmopolitanism in motivating global governance; and the chapters by Keating, Robinson, and Best call into question political agents’ and institutions’ use of the cosmopolitan vision to justify particular policies.

An Ethics of Critique

Murphy’s argument that global governance is poorly understood and poorly done illustrates a fourth vision, an ethics of critique. Global governance has emerged and developed in a context of reflexive modernity; actors have the capacity to question international institutions and practices that fall short of their stated ethico-political purposes. They also have the power to challenge and reframe the dominant moral norms of global governance. Each of the three ethical visions previously discussed has been contested by analysts and actors drawing on an ethics of critique, which is a broad vision that supports a range of responses, from critical liberalism to more radical Marxist, feminist, poststructuralist, and ecological approaches. The common denominator among these critical frameworks is the idea that global governance is a moral-political issue and not simply a solution. The chapters in this book share in this critical orientation to global governance, each in its own way.

An ethics of critique has led critical liberals to question the assumptions of earlier thinkers in the internationalist tradition. The legalistic and reactive conflict resolution tools of global governance, the kind that flow from Kantian and Wilsonian assumptions, seem dangerously quaint and irresponsibly weak in an era of mechanized warfare and nuclear weapons. Additionally, as Makinda’s and Lu’s chapters illustrate, the strong focus on state sovereignty can be highly problematic in a context of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Similarly, the assumption that commerce and free trade lead to peace and prosperity has been challenged by more reflexive and critical liberals. Particularly after economic crises, such liberals have questioned the laissez-faire assumptions of global governance and have advocated measures to humanize global capitalism (Murphy 1994; Murphy 2002, 178; Richardson 2001). As Best’s chapter shows, liberals, from John Maynard Keynes to Joseph Stiglitz, have challenged classical and neoliberal assumptions about global economic governance. Such critical liberals do not dispute the reformist ends or purposes of global governance. Rather, they have questioned the capacity of unreconstructed global governance to deliver these moral ends.
More radical variations on the ethics of critique reveal and contest the ideological and political functions of global governance in relation to hegemony and inequality in world politics. Gramscians have argued that global governance institutions and norms have helped to manage the conflicts in globalizing capitalism to the benefit of particular states and transnational classes (see Cox 1986; Murphy 1994; Gill 2005). Feminists have argued similarly with regard to gender hierarchy in world politics (see Rai and Waylen 2008). Fiona Robinson’s chapter on security governance and human security develops this line of argument. Poststructuralists have argued that global governance both constitutes and conceals the power relations that control difference and dissidence (see Dillon 2004; Dillon and Reid 2000). Among these perspectives is the view that global governance has not simply failed to reform the pathologies of the states system, as early liberals had hoped; rather, global governance plays a vital role in creating and augmenting power relations and structures that disadvantage some to the benefit of others (see Lederer and Müller 2005). An ethics of critique is based, then, on a moral obligation to uncover, identify, and challenge the ways in which global governance negatively affects the subordinate and the marginal in world politics. Such an obligation requires analysts and actors to question the liberal and cosmopolitan visions of global governance and to confront how hierarchy is produced and maintained.

* * *

These four visions are not an exhaustive map of the ethics of global governance. However, they demarcate the most salient and characteristic motivations for global governance. These frameworks do not instruct exactly how particular issues and dilemmas in global governance ought to be solved. Nonetheless, they do provide a structure within which the relevant actions can be examined. There may be coherence between visions, such as an ethics of responsible governance and of cosmopolitan community; but depending on a number of contextual factors, there may be discord and tension between, for example, the practices constituted by an ethics of reform and the confrontational politics animated by an ethics of critique. Ethics can be a unifying but also a divisive force in the politics of global governance. The chapters that follow investigate these dynamics in more specific terms.

**Organization of the Volume**

Any study of the ethics of global governance needs to take into account the central agents and institutions of world order. Chapters 2 through 4 are about state sovereignty (Samuel Makinda), global civil society (Cecelia...
Lynch), and the United Nations (Daniele Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti). These chapters analyze how global governance actors and institutions are constituted, challenged, and changed by ethical norms. They also illustrate the moral tensions and dilemmas that continually reshape the political dynamics of global governance. Sovereignty, emancipation, human rights, peace, democracy, and (economic) justice are moral values to which states, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society actors are all dedicated. Yet the meaning of these goals is not always obvious or uncontroversial; moreover, these goals do not receive equal moral weight by various actors. Nevertheless, global governance has provided a framework for developing a common ethical vocabulary among agents and for processes of moral learning and socialization. Thus, states and other actors have constantly engaged in redefining the norms attached to sovereignty, and the UN has been a forum in which democratic legitimacy and the rule of law have become public standards for global political life. Civil society actors have not just agitated for access to this global political life to press for various moral causes; they have become direct participants in the tasks of governance. As some civil society actors become partners or co-agents with states and intergovernmental organizations, they have encountered dilemmas and criticisms about their actions (not least from other nonstate actors from civil society with different ethical perspectives). In this way, civil society actors, not unlike states and intergovernmental organizations, are not just empowered by new opportunities in global governance, they also face profound constraints and limits on their agency.

Although state sovereignty and global governance are frequently held as contrary (if not contradictory) terms, Samuel Makinda’s chapter asserts otherwise. Without sovereignty, global governance would be incomplete; without global governance, sovereignty would be unintelligible. Makinda analyzes the ethical implications of three distinct conceptions of state sovereignty: juridical, empirical, and popular. Each of these claims to state authority depends upon global governance institutions, rules, and norms. Juridical sovereignty implies that the state is not subject to hierarchical or external authority except that of international law. However, international society confers the status of sovereignty to independent political units; states depend on global governance for recognition. Empirical sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to control the people, resources, and institutions within its territorial borders. Internal governing capacity is influenced profoundly by global governance institutions, particularly in the case of weaker or dependent states in the global political economy. Finally, popular sovereignty rests on the notions that (1) all people are equal and entitled to fundamental freedoms and (2) government legitimacy rests on consent of the governed. Makinda argues that the history of global governance has seen various attempts to uphold and contest political power through the sover-
eignty ideal. Most recently, a contest has reemerged in which popular sovereignty is counterpoised against juridical and empirical sovereignties as the basis for international legitimacy. Drawing on a solidaristic ethic of reform, Makinda argues that sovereignty today is made ethical when it enhances global human emancipation.

Sovereign states exist alongside, are influenced by, and interact regularly with civil society actors. Cecelia Lynch argues that civil society actors are embedded in and indispensable to the politics of global governance. The conventional image of civil society actors, one that they actively reinforce, is that of the moral conscience and ethical activist in global politics against the narrow, selfish interests of states and market actors. Lynch shows how this image, while not entirely untrue, is far more complicated and contingent upon political, ideological, and economic factors than is often recognized. Civil society actors are in fact divided and constrained by the discourses that constitute the dominant liberal democratic ideological spaces in which they operate. Although not all such actors share the Western, humanist, secular, and, above all, liberal ethical values that dominate global governance, the ones that do are accorded greater status and access in terms of mediating and managing the problems of global governance. By the same token, whether it be in relation to peace and security, humanitarianism, or economic justice issues, civil society actors are frequently torn between managing the ethical problems of global governance and taking a more critical stance against the dominant political structures in place. Lynch suggests that the extent to which civil society actors can successfully challenge or transform the institutional features of global governance is not a given reality. In some issue areas, civil society actors can at best ameliorate the worst effects of the pathologies of global governance; in other instances, however, such actors can exploit the openings and contradictions within global governance to critique and to disrupt extant power relations.

The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization comprised of sovereign states but with significant openings for civil society actors. Founded on the basis of the pragmatic policy concerns of states after World War II, but also on wider objectives like peace, human rights, and economic and social development, the UN is caught between realpolitik and the ethics of cosmopolitan community. Daniele Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti argue that an effective institutional order in favor of peace, human rights, and economic and social development presupposes another ethical value: democracy. It is not simply democracy within separate states and societies that is of significance, however, but also democracy among and within the global, intergovernmental, and transnational bodies that increasingly affects the lives of individuals around the world. Archibugi and Marchetti analyze the democratic potential of the UN and also the necessity of going beyond the dominant liberal democratic paradigm, which is not just statist but hege-
monic—with Western states imposing, sometimes by force or coercion, democratic requirements on weaker states. Recent efforts to reform the UN have the potential to improve the organization in light of democratic criteria, such as the rule of law, controlling the use of force, and protecting vulnerable individuals from state abuse. However, Archibugi and Marchetti propose a much more ambitious agenda of improving democratic participation in the UN. Although there are many obstacles and entrenched interests that would resist this cosmopolitan project, coalitions of civil society actors and enlightened governments could bring about more significant democratic openings for individuals to influence the governing forces that affect their lives.

With regard to such forces, there are a number of specific and salient ethical problems and issues that consume the actors and institutions of global governance. Chapters 5 through 9 analyze the ethics of global governance in that the authors critically assess the morality of applying ethical ideas and norms to concrete issues and problems. Democracy promotion in postconflict and postauthoritarian states and societies (Tom Keating); humanitarian protection of civilians through military force (chapters by Catherine Lu and Fiona Robinson); management of the global political economy by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Jacqueline Best); and the global environment (Richard Matthew, Heather Goldsworthy, and Bryan McDonald) are political problems that offer no easy solutions. Nonetheless, global governance is commonly defined by the idea that such problems can and need to be solved by actors who possess good ethical intentions. These chapters show, however, that a critical analytical impulse—an ethics of critique—is required to check and limit the default liberal, optimistic attitude in global governance, one that, to paraphrase Isaiah Berlin (2002, 172–173), holds that all good things must come together. Among other things, the ethical perspectives of dominant groups often fail to take into account alternative moral understandings and cannot subordinate or assimilate difference and otherness. Global governance politics, like all politics, finds no easy moral answers to the puzzle of how best to frame actors and issues in the modern and, increasingly, postmodern condition.

Tom Keating argues that democracy promotion by global governance institutions and actors, including sovereign states, intergovernmental institutions, and civil society organizations, is fraught with ethical difficulties. Distinguishing between the norm of democracy and the norm that democracy ought to be promoted by outside actors, Keating offers a far more cautious approach to cosmopolitan obligations than Archibugi and Marchetti. In practice, Keating suggests that the norm of democracy promotion in global governance has not typically improved democratic participation or augmented and improved citizens’ participation in determining their life conditions. To the contrary, outside actors have intervened in target states to promote democracy in ways that favor outside interests over those of local
self-government. While democracy is a worthwhile ethical objective, Keating argues that we need to question whether democracy promotion is the inherently moral practice many assume given the poor and paternalistic way it has been conducted.

Catherine Lu argues that, although one should remain critical and skeptical of the way that states and other global governance actors have coupled humanitarian objectives with military force, nonintervention as a general doctrine is not an ethically plausible stance in today’s world order. To be neutral in the face of politically induced humanitarian disaster is ultimately to side with the stronger, belligerent forces who seek to destroy members of rival populations. Nevertheless, Lu recognizes that there are numerous ethical dilemmas in saving vulnerable groups in conflict zones. She outlines the problems and challenges of applying humanitarian force in the areas of legal authorization, operationalizing and applying force, and the impact of force on the politics of both domestic and global governance. Lu contends that humanitarian intervention practices are shaped by the politics of the existing states system and global governance mechanisms. These limiting factors should shape our expectations about what humanitarian force can accomplish; however, she also suggests that we should judge the current practices of the UN and states against a more modest set of pragmatic ethical criteria. Lu argues that the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) concept provides a general and positive framework for improving global governance practice, although there are no guarantees about the future directions for humanitarian intervention in light of the limited and imperfect nature of global politics.

Fiona Robinson analyzes the gendered assumptions underlying liberal approaches to human rights and humanitarian intervention. In contrast to Lu, she argues that the “human security” and R2P concepts in the global governance of security and intervention reflect a narrow and flawed ethics. Drawing on an alternative view, a feminist ethics of care, Robinson exposes the way in which a particular, masculinist conception of individual rights and militarism is wrongly cast as a universal solution for the world’s victims of violent conflict. She argues that abstract and individual rights, and the use of military force to vindicate them, do not address the root causes of human suffering; this is because liberals and cosmopolitans wrongly understand such problems in a “moment of crisis” rather than as part and parcel of an unequal and stratified world order. Robinson argues that we should look at the world through a different ethical lens, one that recognizes the role of women as caregivers in a context of mutual vulnerabilities that are constituted by global power imbalances. A feminist ethic of care is a nonpaternalistic ethic of solidarity that grounds the obligation to assist in a broader project of transforming world order. In contrast to liberal rights–based approaches, the virtue of caring in politics is that it transcends the problematic dichotomies
between the needy and the strong and between so-called victims and saviors. Violations and suffering are instead countered on a continuing, day-to-day basis and by caring people rather than in a reactive and violent way by elites who possess little understanding of daily life at the margins.

Jacqueline Best examines the role of ethics in relation to international economic institutions’ governance of the global economy. Although such institutions have typically depicted their policies in technocratic and ethically neutral terms, they have more recently embraced a moral discourse. On the one hand, Best argues that there is greater potential for improving global economic governance by making the ethical substance of economics more explicit and apparent. Here she notes the trouble with the common assumption, shared by a number of contemporary liberal political theorists, that economics is an ethically neutral realm. Such an assumption is not only out of step with classical economic thinkers such as Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes; it also fails to recognize that economics is constituted by judgments about autonomy and solidarity, universality and difference, and individuality and social responsibility. Best illuminates how ethical judgments on the priority of such values were fundamental to the construction of sequential waves of global economic governance: laissez-faire liberalism, embedded liberalism, and neoliberalism. On the other hand, Best is cautious and skeptical about the moralization of global economic policies by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. She argues that there is a danger that these institutions are using ethical discourse instrumentally to depoliticize highly contentious policies.

Richard Matthew, Heather Goldsworthy, and Bryan McDonald argue that environmental ethics has the potential to shape global governance politics. They suggest, however, that at present the impact of environmental ethics has been minimal; only the concept of sustainable development has made some inroads in global governance rhetoric and practice. Environmental ethics shares with global governance the idea that the most significant world problems cannot be solved within a territorialist framework of egotistical sovereign states. However, global governance has historically supported a humanist assumption that continued industrial expansion and progress is possible without concern for the environmental costs. Matthew, Goldsworthy, and McDonald suggest that the key virtue of environmental ethics—the knowing and the respecting of nature—should be mainstreamed not simply into the typically known problems of pollution and global warming, but in all aspects of global governance policy. As examples, they demonstrate that issues not typically associated with the environment, in particular food safety and security and microfinance in the developing world, have ecological implications that should not be ignored. The greening of global governance requires, then, not just adding nostrums like sustainable development to the discourse of global governance institu-
tions, but thinking about the impact of global governance solutions on the multiple systems that sustain human life.

Craig Murphy concludes the volume with an argument to recast the central ethical problem of global governance: how to deal with a single, global human community of fate. Historically, the solution to the reality of human interrelatedness in a world of diverse values has been to keep societies sufficiently separate if not distant. Realists, for instance, argue that prudent statecraft can mediate an estrangement of human societies and, on occasion and up to a point, help to avert, mitigate, and manage violent conflicts. Until the twentieth century at least, when the means of physical destruction threatened to wipe out the species, solutions premised on maintaining a given physical and political distance between societies remained plausible. However, the same forces—political, economic, and social—that have erased the territorial buffers between each industrial society’s destructive capabilities have also created mutual vulnerabilities and insecurities among human populations in virtually every other area. Globalization has meant that, in Murphy’s words, “we can no longer walk away” from each other. Certainly the development of international institutions, international law, and global civil society has fostered a workable (if contentious) ethics to cope with the problems of a single, global community of fate, argues Murphy. Yet these ethical solutions, as the other contributors to this volume also show, are often not enough. Murphy stresses that globalization and global governance are heavily determined to serve the values and interests of the powerful, and to manage the oppositional demands and claims against the powerful. He contends that the ethics of global governance ought to foster a different sense of responsibility than has prevailed among the most powerful agents in global society, particularly the United States. In contrast to conventional wisdom, the ethics of the powerful should not simply be conceived as the duty to wield one’s own power more responsibly; more radically, such an ethics ought to be about giving up and ceding power. To whom should power be ceded and on what basis? Murphy acknowledges that philosophers and political scientists still need to develop answers to these questions, and state leaders are loathe to view political responsibility in such terms. As a starting point, however, he suggests that we reframe the ethics of global governance as a process of reducing the gap between the wide “circle of influence” and the much narrower “circle of concern” that characterize the most powerful agents in world politics. Efforts to persuade the powerful to relinquish some of their vast influence over the single, global community of fate, and to allow global governance actors the authority and resources to address the wider concerns of the global community would not be easy. Yet, as Murphy suggests, such a bold ethical strategy is a far more plausible solution to the problem of human interrelatedness today than simply “walking away” from the “other.”
Notes

1. See Jackson and Sørensen (2007, 6) on the importance of certain fundamental objectives, such as security, order, justice, and welfare, to theories of international relations.

2. The distinction between pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society is commonplace in English School or International Society approaches. See, for example, Jackson (2000) and Wheeler (2000).