


EXCERPTED FROM

# Arms Control and Cooperative Security

edited by  
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and James J. Wirtz

Copyright © 2009  
ISBNs: 978-1-58826-684-2 hc  
978-1-58826-660-6 pb



LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

1800 30th Street, Ste. 314

Boulder, CO 80301

USA

telephone 303.444.6684

fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the  
Lynne Rienner Publishers website  
[www.rienner.com](http://www.rienner.com)

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# An Introduction to Arms Control and Cooperative Security

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*Jeffrey A. Larsen*

In this book, we assess the role, value, and purpose of arms control and cooperative security in the new millennium. We explore arms control theory, arms control's successes and failures during the Cold War, changes to the international security environment in recent years, and the likelihood of future cooperative security arrangements or arms control agreements in various issue areas and geographic regions.

## **What Is Arms Control and Why Is It Important?**

*Arms control* can be defined as any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, or types of military forces, weapons, or facilities. Whatever their scope or terms, however, all plans for arms control have one common factor: they presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action among the participants regarding their military programs.

Although the negotiating methods, regions of concern, and weapons involved may have changed, the underlying principles and objectives of arms control remain relevant today. Arms control may not be as centrally important as it was during the second half of the twentieth century, but in its broadest definition—one that encompasses not only traditional negotiations and agreements but also nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and disarmament—it still has a role to play in a globalizing world that has ongoing security concerns.<sup>1</sup> Arms control and cooperative security initiatives should be seen as part of a nation-state's foreign policy toolbox, available when necessary to enhance that state's security. Seldom are they the only tools available; they complement, rather than substitute for, diplomatic, economic, and coercive military actions.

Arms control is but one of a series of alternative approaches to achiev-

ing international security through military strategies. As an early writer on the topic explained, arms control belongs to a group of closely related views whose common theme is “peace through the manipulation of force.”<sup>2</sup> One conceivably could achieve such an end state in multiple ways: by placing force in the hands of a central authority, by creating a system of collective security, by accepting a balance of power between the key actors in the system, by establishing a system of mutual deterrence, by abolishing or reducing force, or by imposing restraints and limits on forces. The latter choice reflects what we generally call arms control.

In a system of sovereign states with the capability to build and maintain sizable armed forces, states cannot always ensure that rival states will not attempt to achieve influence by pursuing military superiority. Trust often does not exist. States therefore interpret incoming information about the military capabilities of rival states in the worst light. Evidence of a new military program or spending by one state requires other states to respond in a similar fashion to prevent an adversary from achieving superiority. This security dilemma can produce an arms race, thereby increasing political tension between states, raising the probability and severity of crises, and possibly causing war. Arms control tries to address the negative effects of this security dilemma.<sup>3</sup>

Early theorists defined arms control in the broadest sense to refer to all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of ensuring international stability. As Hedley Bull put it, arms control is “cooperation between antagonistic pairs of states in the military field, whether this cooperation is founded upon interests that are exclusively those of the cooperating states themselves or on interests that are more widely shared.”<sup>4</sup>

Arms control analysts of the early 1960s were in agreement that the objectives of arms control were threefold. For Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, these were reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the political and economic costs of preparing for war, and minimizing the scope and violence of war if it occurred.<sup>5</sup> Bull visualized similar objectives for arms control: to contribute to international security and stop the drift to war; to release economic resources otherwise squandered in armaments; and to preclude preparing for war, which is morally wrong.<sup>6</sup> Students and practitioners have debated which of these objectives should take priority, but most national security analysts have agreed that the prevention of war should be the foremost goal of arms control.

Until recently, political leaders and the media seemed to have a more limited definition of arms control. They generally believed that it was a set of activities dealing with specific steps to control related weapon systems as codified in formal agreements or treaties. During the Cold War, many analysts and much of the general public focused on the bilateral arms control

negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. They came to expect that arms control required a formal treaty, a system of inspections to ensure compliance, and an enforcement mechanism to compel compliance. But those three elements are not always necessary for arms control. Arms control is a process involving specific, declared steps by a state to enhance security through cooperation with other states. These steps can be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral. Cooperation can be implicit as well as explicit.

### *Cooperative Security*

This book places arms control under the rubric of cooperative security, a concept that has grown in popularity in recent years. The term has been used to outline a more peaceful and idealistic approach to security. One commonly accepted definition of *cooperative security* is “a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.”<sup>7</sup> Cooperative security is slightly different in meaning than collective security or collective defense. *Collective security* is “a political and legal obligation of member states to defend the integrity of individual states within a group of treaty signatories.”<sup>8</sup> *Collective defense* is more narrowly defined as “the commitment of all states to defend each other from outside aggression.” By contrast, cooperative security can include the introduction of measures that reduce the risk of war; that is, measures not necessarily directed against any specific state or coalition. International institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union (EU) certainly fall under the definition of collective security, but groups such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) just as easily fall within collective defense. Such cooperation can take place among states that have little in common but, as the cases of NATO and the EU show, cooperative security can advance much further when the states are like-minded, liberal democratic market economies. In those cases, the parties can use their shared liberal values to move beyond simple defense pacts, perhaps even achieving proactive efforts in the field of collective diplomacy, economics, and military action outside their common space.

### *Arms Control Versus Disarmament*

There is a difference between conceiving of arms control as a means to achieving a larger goal and seeing arms control as an end unto itself.<sup>9</sup> The arms control process is intended to serve as a means of enhancing a state’s national security. Arms control is but one approach toward achieving this goal. Arms control could even lead states to agree to increases in certain categories of armaments if such increases would contribute to crisis stabili-

ty and thereby reduce the chance of war. This conception of arms control should be distinguished from general and complete disarmament. Proponents of disarmament see its goal as simply reducing the size of military forces, budgets, explosive power, and other aggregate measures. Their rationale is that armaments have been the major cause of international instability and conflict, and only through reductions in the weaponry of all nations can the world achieve peace.

Advocacy of disarmament as part of a state's arms control policy can also be part of a "means to an end" approach. For example, the United States and other countries have negotiated two global conventions that endeavor to rid the world of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). The United States decided in both cases that maintaining such weapons would not enhance its security, even if they were still possessed by other states. Efforts to rid the world of CBW were perceived to enhance the security of all states. Similarly, the United States and Russia have agreed to eliminate certain classes of strategic arms.

Disarmament has a longer legacy than arms control and was a common theme in international relations literature of the 1950s. In the early 1960s, international security specialists began using the term *arms control* in place of *disarmament*, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on arms control published during that era all referred to this semantic problem and preferred arms control as a more comprehensive term.<sup>10</sup>

Bull suggested that, although disarmament and arms control are not the same, they nevertheless intersect with one another. Disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments while arms control is restraint internationally exercised on armaments policy, which not only addresses the number of weapons, but also their character, development, and use.<sup>11</sup> Yet in the early 1960s, many members of the pro-disarmament crowd viewed Schelling and Halperin as traitors to the cause when they published *Strategy and Arms Control* because their book abandoned the utopian goals of many disarmers. These two authors believed that they were merely extending the breadth and reach of disarmament studies to make them more operationally relevant to military studies.<sup>12</sup>

Disarmament is not a dead concept. Indeed, several recent high-profile op-ed pieces in the *Wall Street Journal* called for the United States to pursue global nuclear zero as a primary national security and foreign policy goal. The authors included a former secretary of state, secretary of defense, national security advisor, and senator. They argued that

reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations.

Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible. We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.<sup>13</sup>

These types of sentiments suggest that both policymakers and academics might again champion nuclear disarmament as the ultimate motivation for contemporary diplomatic initiatives. The level of interest in disarmament concepts is seen in the fact that, since the first of those op-eds was published in January 2007, the principles and vision they espouse have been endorsed by two-thirds of all living former US national security advisors, secretaries of state, and secretaries of defense as well as President Barack Obama.<sup>14</sup>

### **Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy**

Arms control held a preeminent position during the second half of the Cold War, as shown in the United States by the creation of a separate Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, years of effort spent negotiating strategic arms limitation and reduction treaties with the Soviet Union, and the widespread confluence of policy requirements and academic interest in the field. Despite all its successes, however, arms control was never of decisive importance. As the authors of an acclaimed text on security have stated, arms control “has rarely been seen as decisively important or a solution in its own right. On the contrary it is a fundamentally conservative policy, aimed solely at introducing some measure of predictability into an adversarial relationship. It cannot by itself create stability, much less peace, and to hope otherwise is to saddle it with unreasonable expectations that are bound to go unfulfilled.”<sup>15</sup> Arms control alone could not resolve the world’s security problems or the confrontational nature of US-Soviet relations.

After forty years as the centerpiece of US national security policy, however, arms control lost its luster after the Cold War ended, especially after 2001. Some policymakers and analysts claimed that arms control was not living up to its promises despite considerable optimism immediately following the end of the Cold War. To survive as a viable international security policy, they argued, arms control needed to adapt itself to new arenas and new approaches. Suggestions abounded at the turn of the millennium for enhancing the role of cooperative security measures as a supplement or complement to more traditional attempts to control arms. Yet official Washington lost interest in thinking about new arms control issues or dealing with the operational and funding aspects of existing treaties and agreements. These feelings emerged during the administration of President Bill Clinton, but they grew stronger when George W. Bush took office in 2001. As one expert wrote, “The traditional arms control process of negotiating



legally binding treaties that both codify numerical parity and contain extensive verification measures has reached an impasse and outlived its utility.”<sup>16</sup>

### *The Development of Arms Control Theory*

National security objectives of the United States include protecting and preserving its fundamental freedoms and institutions by deterring or preventing attack on US national interests at home and abroad.<sup>17</sup> New threats have necessitated reordering the priorities among traditional US national security objectives. Deterring nuclear attack is now less urgent than, for example, preventing or countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, or securing fissile materials. Yet the grand strategic objectives of arms control as an instrument of national security remain virtually unchanged, at least in general terms.

Nevertheless, the conceptual problems facing defense planners and arms control policymakers at the operational level are fundamentally different today from those that confronted the founders of traditional arms control theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

*Arms control and national security.* The founding premise of traditional arms control theory—that arms control can be an important adjunct to national security strategy—has, in practice, not always been obvious or consistently observed because arms control is inherently a counterintuitive approach to enhancing security. Arms control makes national security dependent to some degree on the cooperation of prospective adversaries. It often involves setting lower levels of arms than would otherwise appear prudent based on a strict threat assessment. It mandates establishing a more or less interactive relationship with potential opponents and, in the case of mutual intrusive verification and data exchanges, exposes sensitive national security information and facilities to scrutiny by foreign powers. It requires seeking and institutionalizing cooperation where the potential for conflicts of interest seemingly far outweigh common objectives. It is fundamentally a high-stakes gamble, mortgaging national survival against little more than the collateral of trust and anticipated reciprocal restraint, often in a geopolitical context fraught with political hostility and tension. It is, in fact, a voluntary (and not always reversible) delimitation of national sovereignty. Viewed from this perspective, arms control is not obviously better than its alternative—unilaterally providing for one’s own security.<sup>18</sup>

What then has compelled the United States and other nations to structure so much of their national security posture on an approach that seemingly contradicts a country’s natural instincts toward self-sufficiency and self-preservation? An answer to this apparent paradox is that arms control allows security to be established by negotiation at levels of weapons lower

than would be the case if these levels were determined unilaterally. The mere act of negotiating arms control also may lead to better communication, deepened understanding, and reduced hostility among adversaries.

*Arms control theory.* Arms control theory refers to the assumptions and premises of strategic analysts who first developed arms control as an adjunct to national security in the 1958–1962 time frame. Traditional arms control theory was the product of a unique confluence of factors, and it reflected the assumptions, analyses, and policy priorities of defense analysts and policymakers of that era.<sup>19</sup> The rethinking of arms control in this period was part of a general reevaluation of US defense and foreign policy that was precipitated by dissatisfaction with the postwar diplomatic and arms control stalemate. Negotiations over armaments policy with one’s potential adversary was not a novel concept. Since 1945, the United States had sought to establish through diplomatic means a variety of disarmament arrangements (e.g., the Baruch Plan, Open Skies, and the Atoms for Peace proposal). Nevertheless, long negotiations and multiple proposals had yielded no tangible results, primarily because of Soviet objections to those verification regimes deemed essential by the West. In the mid-1950s, policymakers began rethinking an approach that had emphasized general and complete disarmament, and to consider instead limited, partial measures that would gradually enhance confidence in cooperative security arrangements. Thus, more modest goals under the rubric of arms control came to replace the propaganda-laden disarmament efforts of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

*Basic tenets of traditional arms control.* The period that began with the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference and lasted through the 1962 publication of the proceedings of a Woods Hole Summer Study and the parallel studies going on at Oxford University produced the canons of modern arms control theory.<sup>20</sup> Out of the literature of this golden era of arms control emerged a virtual consensus on several key assumptions, which may be considered the basic tenets of traditional arms control theory.

First, arms control was conceived as a way to enhance national security. As Bull explained, “arms control or disarmament was not an end in itself but a means to an end and that end was first and foremost the enhancement of security, especially security against nuclear war.”<sup>21</sup> Or, as Schelling and Halperin stated near the end of their book, “the aims of arms control and the aims of a national military strategy should be substantially the same.”<sup>22</sup> This principle established national security as the dominant goal of arms control, not the reduction of arms per se. In fact, it was understood that not all reductions were necessarily useful. There was an explicit recognition that arms control could be harmful if not properly guided by overall national security strategy. According to Schelling,

many of the ideas that came to be identified as the arms control point of view were pertinent to the unilateral shaping of military forces. Most of the academics associated with arms control probably did not consider themselves arms controllers but rather analysts of foreign policy or national security policy. Most believed that there was no contradiction between an interest in military strategy and an interest in the possibility of collaborating with potential enemies to reduce the likelihood of a war that neither side wanted.<sup>23</sup>

Second, the superpowers shared a common interest in avoiding nuclear war; this common interest could and should be the basis for effective arms control agreements. According to Bull, "The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a political and ideological conflict, one moreover that sometimes took a military form, did not mean that they could not recognize common interests in avoiding a ruinous nuclear war, or cooperate to advance these common interests."<sup>24</sup> This assumption was one of the most important (and controversial) conceptual departures from past thinking promulgated by the new arms control theory. Previously, it was assumed that relaxation of political tensions had to precede achieving substantive arms control agreements. The founders of traditional arms control theory, on the other hand, believed that the threat of global nuclear annihilation was so paramount that it transcended political or ideological differences. It was not necessary to fully resolve political conflicts before proceeding to negotiate arms control agreements; solutions to both could be advanced simultaneously.

Third, arms control and military strategy should work together to promote national security. The unity of strategy and arms control was a central tenet of traditional arms control theory. Such unity was essential if arms control and defense policy were to avoid working at cross purposes. For example, if the implementation of US defense strategy required deploying certain types of weapons that were restricted by arms control agreements, this could defeat the overall purpose of the United States' national security posture and erode the legitimacy of both the arms control process and US defense policy.

Finally, it was understood from the beginning that arms control regimes need not be limited to formal agreements, but also could include informal, unilateral, or verbal agreements. The US-Soviet Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) of 1991–1992 are among the best known examples of these efforts.

The authors of a book published by the Brookings Institution proposed that modern arms control should focus on two overarching dangers, and they postulated three new tenets for the field. As its central organizing principle, they recommended that arms control attempt to prevent the spread of nuclear materials and biological pathogens.<sup>25</sup> In this proposal, they were following in

the footsteps of the early pioneers in the field of arms control while changing the focus from nuclear deterrence to WMD proliferation—focusing especially on the two types of WMD deemed most dangerous. They then identified three critical needs, or organizing principles: (1) to provide early warning of the proliferation of these weapons' components to dangerous regimes, (2) to integrate coercive enforcement aspects into the body of arms control capabilities, and (3) to harmonize arms control and nonproliferation efforts into larger US foreign policy goals. They suggested that arms control can simultaneously assuage concerns by allies and other states, encourage cooperative actions on a narrow set of issues, reduce the inclination of potential adversaries to acquire or use such weapons, and deter or deny the use of such weapons against the advanced countries.<sup>26</sup> This approach widened arms control's purpose into the realm of cooperative security.

### *Objectives of Arms Control Theory*

For arms control to be an effective instrument of national security, its objectives must be determined by, and be in close harmony with, the broader objectives of overall national security strategy.<sup>27</sup> At the most basic level of abstraction, three grand conceptual dilemmas dominated strategic thinking and the formulation of US national security objectives during the Cold War: (1) What deters? (2) How much is enough? (3) What if deterrence fails? Arms control was developed in an attempt to deal with these three questions.<sup>28</sup>

Traditional arms control theory was based on the premise that the superpowers inherently shared an area of common ground (avoiding nuclear war), and that this element of mutual interest could serve as the basis for limited, cooperative arrangements involving reciprocal restraint in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. In defining the scope and application of arms control, Schelling and Halperin set forth three general objectives for arms control:

We believe that arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.<sup>29</sup>

Clearly, establishing the requirements of deterrence must precede and form the basis for creating policies for reducing the risk of nuclear war while the goal of reducing defense spending must be informed by some notion of what constitutes sufficient levels of weapons. And any scheme for

limiting damage should war occur presupposes at least some thought as to the nature of warfare and how forces are to be employed in combat. Thus, the primary objectives of traditional arms control theory—reducing the risk of war, reducing the costs of preparing for war, and reducing the damage should war occur—are necessarily determined by the three great dilemmas of military policy.

*Reducing the risk of war.* Arms control was seen as a prime means of setting limits on and restraining strategic arms race behavior. For early arms control theorists, restraining certain types of technology was practically synonymous with reducing the risk of war. The underlying premise was that war was most likely to begin with a surprise nuclear attack made possible by unrestrained competition in ballistic missiles, guidance and control technology, and nuclear weapons. Therefore, those weapon systems employing technologies that in theory most contributed to the ability to execute a surprise nuclear attack against the nuclear retaliatory forces of the other side, or that undermined the ability of either side to hold deterrent targets at risk, became principal candidates for arms limitation agreements.

*Reducing the cost of preparing for war.* Arms control theorists believed that controls would release economic resources otherwise squandered on military spending. They believed that armaments races were economically ruinous and that disarmament or arms control would make possible the diversion of resources toward worthier objectives.<sup>30</sup> If arms control succeeded in providing the same degree of security at lower levels of weapons than would otherwise be the case, it could lead to fielding fewer weapons and thus lower overall defense spending. Further, if certain types of technology were mutually outlawed, there would be fewer costs associated with defense research and development, weapon production, and force deployment, operations, and maintenance.

*Reducing the damage should war occur.* If fewer weapons were fielded as a result of arms limitation agreements, and nevertheless war should occur, overall damage would be less than it otherwise would have been. But fielding fewer weapons is not the only way to reduce damage in the event of war. Damage also could be limited by developing certain types of active defense strategies and technologies such as ballistic missile defense.

\* \* \*

In practice, the first of the three main objectives proposed by traditional arms control theory—reducing the risk of war or, more specifically, reducing the risk of surprise nuclear attack—came to eclipse and overshadow the

other two. Achieving the first objective would also indirectly satisfy the second and third objectives. The process grew in complexity over the next four decades. It usually involved negotiations, but sometimes was accomplished through unilateral decisions or reciprocated arrangements.

Arms control during the Cold War assumed a high priority on the national security agenda as a way of managing the superpower nuclear rivalry. The new importance of arms control was a reaction to the bipolar structure of the international system and the revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons. Generally, these negotiations were limited in scope and focused on increased strategic nuclear stability between the superpowers. The conduct of bilateral negotiations became very formal; agreements took years to reach. Every possible implication for the strategic balance was scrutinized while increasingly complex provisions for verification became part of the process to guard against cheating. Even after a treaty was concluded, the benefits and pitfalls of arms control continued to be hotly debated.

### **Arms Control in the Post–Cold War Era**

As the Cold War ended, the conception and execution of what was referred to as arms control began to change. The changes began with an increase in the number and types of bilateral arrangements between the superpowers. As rapprochement between the superpowers deepened, the fora and scope for other negotiations began to broaden. Regions beyond Europe began to turn to arms control as a means to build security.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the West experienced a flush of optimism and activity regarding arms control. The early 1990s were truly a high-water mark for arms control as formal agreements and cooperative measures were signed and entered into force with astounding speed. Many of these, in fact, were agreements reached years before, but finally were being ratified. Arms control found a place in dealing with the new concerns of advanced weapon proliferation, regional instability, and economic and environmental security. The value of arms control appeared to be growing in the new world as states attempted to implement treaties already in place, stem the illegal proliferation of WMD to rogue nations or groups, and meet their security needs in a multipolar, more interdependent world. The early post–Cold War years now appear to have been an era of excessive optimism about new opportunities for arms control. In fact, there has been considerable debate over the past decade regarding the future value of arms control—even with respect to existing treaties and agreements.

The traditional role for arms control in the Cold War—to enhance stability and forgo potentially devastating misunderstandings between the two superpowers—may no longer be of central concern within the interna-

tional community nor achievable in some new fields. The United States must seriously consider what role arms control can play in enhancing its future national security considerations. These new roles might be considerably different than the way we have thought about arms control in the past. The George W. Bush administration came into office with a particular mindset that disliked arms control agreements because treaties appeared to hobble the United States from adopting a unilateral approach to enhancing its national security. As a result, the Bush presidency represented a series of setbacks for arms control advocates: abandoning negotiations on a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), signing a bare-bones Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) with no verification or compliance provisions, rejecting the Ottawa Convention on Landmines, rejecting further consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, rejecting negotiations on a verification provision for the Biological Weapons Convention, and refusing to sign the UN Arms Trade Treaty. At the same time, the United States began to pursue more unilateral approaches to guaranteeing its security such as preventive war, preemption, and counterproliferation.

The Bush administration's early decision to abandon the ABM Treaty and to deemphasize the role of arms control in US foreign policy was welcomed by some observers as a realistic response to the end of the Cold War. The traditional role of arms control for the preceding generation—to enhance stability and forgo potentially devastating misunderstandings between the two superpowers—was no longer a central concern within the international community. By contrast, less formal international collaboration that organized collective action to stem the threat posed by clandestine terrorist networks and entrepreneurial groups that traffic in weapons of mass destruction, dual-use items, and associated delivery systems increased in importance. Cooperative security, which even included extensive collaboration in domestic policy, seemed to offer a new and promising policy instrument in the fight against terrorism and the threat posed by WMD. For example, the Proliferation Security Initiative, a relatively informal effort that enables an international consortium to coordinate existing national capabilities and policy to combat trafficking in illicit materials, is often identified as the prototype for future cooperative security efforts. The problem, as some authors have pointed out, is that the Bush administration's plan to deemphasize arms control, which may have seemed reasonable or at least workable in early 2001, was never adjusted to the post-9/11 security environment or the global war on terror. All of these challenges required international cooperation rather than a unilateral, go-it-alone approach. Yet the latter was the attitude of the Bush administration during its eight years in office.

## Does Arms Control Have a Future?

Today, there is considerable debate over the future value of traditional arms control. We are at a crossroads, with the future direction of arms control uncertain but its past value indisputable. As one recent article put it, “The practice of formal arms control is not dead, but it is definitely ill.”<sup>31</sup> The United States must seriously consider what role arms control can play in enhancing future national security considerations. These new roles might be different than the way policymakers and scholars have thought about arms control in the past. In fact, as I have written elsewhere, one could make the counterintuitive case that, despite its unwillingness to admit the value of arms control for national security, the Bush administration actually pursued a form of “neo-arms control” with its approaches to international security concerns.<sup>32</sup> The goals were basically the same as those of traditional arms control; only the means and the terminology were changed. The Bush administration’s emphasis on preemption, preventive war, enhanced national military capabilities, and a willingness to undertake unilateral actions were simply a different, and sometimes more effective, means of handling security challenges formerly dealt with by arms control.

So is arms control dead? Does it still have a role to play in enhancing a state’s security? Can it make a comeback as a US policy option in the Obama administration? These questions call out to the national security community. As one analyst has written, “The place of arms control in US national security strategy and its continued relevance to the evolving global strategic landscape cannot be taken for granted. Times are changing, and it is right and necessary to ask what arms control strategies best suit US interests.”<sup>33</sup> President Obama announced during his campaign that arms control would be returned to its rightful place in the panoply of national security tools, but what its purpose will be in dealing with modern threats from proliferation, rogue states, and nonstate actors is not completely clear. Indeed, one hopes that the Obama administration does not abandon the more innovative and constructive cooperative security initiatives launched by its Republican predecessors, especially if it chooses to champion a return to a more traditional arms control agenda. The whole concept of how one achieves national security must be reconsidered—in much the same way that the global security environment must have appeared to the founders of the theory of arms control in the early 1960s.

Concern about the future of arms control, however, may be misplaced; there still remains a vital role for this process to play. Many Americans no longer view Russia as much of a strategic threat, but it is still a spoiler in terms of arms control and cooperative security. This raises multiple questions: Should arms control be geared toward different problems? Should Russia now take a backseat to new concerns, such as an emerging China,



troublesome relationships in South Asia, or the threat posed by global terrorism? Can Cold War arms control institutions work in terms of the new strategic relationship between the United States, Russia, China, and other nations? Are existing arms control institutions and treaties obsolete? Perhaps a new combination of unilateral approaches, nontraditional incentives, joint activities, and other imaginative collective security measures can supplant the reliance on classic, treaty-based negotiations.

At the same time, the threat of WMD proliferation continues, particularly given the heightened threat from emboldened terrorist organizations (as has been shown by major terrorist attacks since 2001 on the United States, Great Britain, Spain, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere), the emergence of spontaneous cells that harbor a grudge against local authorities, and the emergence of new proliferation challenges. In the face of these threats, how can arms control address emerging security relationships and regional arms races?

As bipolarity fades, what new multilateral institutions are needed for arms control? What new kinds of arms control are necessary or possible? In recent years, attention has focused on several new topics of interest in the security realm that call out for means of control, including information warfare, landmines, space, cyberspace, and biological weapons. Will agreements to manage these areas call for new types of provisions such as requiring states to criminalize certain activities or requiring cooperation in the face of nonstate threats? UN Security Council Resolution 1540, approved in 2005, was a major step in this direction.

Efforts to reach agreement in many of these areas face great challenges if the traditional arms control focus on force structure levels and strict verification is used as criteria for evaluation. Nonstate actors have also become players by raising issues to the international agenda and creating momentum for agreements such as the 1997 Ottawa Treaty. We need to broaden the definition of arms control to encompass nonstate as well as state actors.

One might consider arms control in broader terms as encompassing all nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts. These can be broken into two major categories: *preemption*, which is a state's military response to the consequences of proliferation that focuses on the weapons and their delivery systems; and *prevention*, the response to a failure of nonproliferation processes.<sup>34</sup>

## **Overview of the Book**

This book has assembled chapters by a dozen experts on arms control, national defense, proliferation, and regional studies to explore arms control theory, arms control's successes and failures during the Cold War, changes to the international security environment in recent years, cooperative securi-

ty, and the likelihood of future arms control agreements in various issue areas and geographic regions. These analysts explore the contemporary role of arms control and assess the future prospects for US arms control policy and national security strategy. The book's objective is to offer a fundamental assessment of the future of arms control and cooperative security, especially as some crucial Cold War arms control agreements near expiration dates codified in their treaties.

The chapters address issues that are larger than simple overviews of past approaches and current policy—they incorporate themes, directions, vectors, and future possibilities for the concepts of arms control and cooperative security. Each chapter assesses the role, value, and purpose of arms control and cooperative security in the new millennium. The book deals with the conceptual and historical background of arms control, weapon-specific concerns and issues, regional considerations, and new topical areas in which arms control may have a role to play.

The first four chapters relate arms control to national security objectives and the national security-making process. They also examine efforts by the superpowers and their allies to use arms control during the Cold War to enhance their security as well as the legacy of these efforts on the post-Cold War environment. These chapters establish the underlying concepts and principles that guide the conduct of arms control by reviewing the history of arms control efforts, the international and domestic contexts in which the process takes place, and the fundamental requirement for effective transparency, verification, and compliance measures.

James M. Smith begins, in Chapter 2, with a review of historical themes across the arms control era from disarmament to Cold War arms control to today's return of nonproliferation as the central organizing theme. In Chapter 3, Kerry M. Kartchner gives us an overview of the international system, and provides us with a new arms control paradigm for dealing with the most dangerous threat we face today: WMD proliferation. The world has changed since 2000, Kartchner argues, and the old Cold War-style arms control must also change in order to prove useful in today's security environment. In Chapter 4, Jennifer E. Sims provides an overview of the politics and strategic culture of the arms control policymaking process, using the United States as a case study.

In the second half of the book, the authors discuss specific types of weapons and efforts to control their proliferation and use. These include strategic nuclear systems, chemical and biological weapons, conventional forces, and the fissile components of nuclear weapons. They also look at global regions of particular interest to the United States and examine their perspectives on arms control—past and future. The authors consider how arms control might prove useful in improving security in new, nontraditional areas of particular importance to the United States. They consider the

asymmetries and vulnerabilities that face the international system and, in particular, the United States in the years ahead, as well as the argument for the international acceptance of the normative aspects of cooperative security. They also project the long-term future for arms control.

In Chapter 5, Forrest E. Waller Jr. reviews the core arena for Cold War arms control: strategic nuclear systems. He lays out four potential directions for future arms control efforts, which all point to the logical conclusion of such a movement: zero nuclear weapons. In Chapter 6, Leonard S. Spector looks at the nonproliferation regime in all of its aspects, seeing it as composed of four major components that fall under the larger constellation of international efforts to stem the spread of WMD and advanced delivery systems. And in Chapter 7, Michael Moodie examines specific regions of the world that are of greatest concern as well as new threats and opportunities for arms control that seem most important in those regions. He also asks whether regions actually matter in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world.

The next two chapters each address new approaches to dealing with the global security environment. In Chapter 8, Lewis A. Dunn focuses on the large toolkit of actions that a state can undertake to improve its security in the context of cooperative security, a means and process for enhancing the mutual security of partnering countries. In Chapter 9, Guy B. Roberts focuses on some of those new initiatives for multilateral and unilateral approaches, including counterproliferation, preemption, compliance, and the use of international law. He takes a skeptical view of traditional arms control treaties and argues for alternative means of providing for enhanced national security, including cooperative international security initiatives that create a web of proliferation denial.

In Chapter 10, Rebecca E. Johnson provides a thoughtful discussion of the potential development of international norms through universal arms control agreements and regimes. She reminds us that human security needs are broader and unlikely to be resolved by means of hard power. Johnson also echoes most of the previous chapters by pointing out that traditional arms control has been failing to deliver on its promises in recent years, which calls out for a new approach to dealing with tomorrow's security challenges. She advocates universal normative regimes and a return to disarmament as preferable to traditional arms control. Finally, in Chapter 11, James J. Wirtz captures the themes and key points of the book and points us toward arms control's future.

## **Conclusion**

The arms control momentum from the Cold War, which infused books on the subject in the 1990s, has waned. Nevertheless, with new arenas for arms

control consideration, a better appreciation for arms control's place in the larger pantheon of cooperative security efforts, and new partners to deal with, the whole concept of arms control must be reconsidered.

The future direction and roles for arms control and cooperative security initiatives are uncertain. But the authors in this book believe that they can continue to play an important part in helping to mitigate contemporary security challenges. As Schelling and Halperin wrote in 1961, "Adjustments in military postures and doctrines that induce reciprocal adjustments by a potential opponent can be of mutual benefit if they reduce the danger of a war that neither side wants, or contain its violence, or otherwise serve the security of the nation. That is what we mean by arms control."<sup>35</sup> Nearly fifty years later, those perspectives on the role and value of arms control as a tool of national security remain valid. As the authors show in the chapters that follow, these can be extrapolated to new fields of interest in international relations.

## Notes

1. In their attempt to update the definition of arms control, for example, Michael Levi and Michael O'Hanlon wrote that "properly defined, [arms control] is any coordinated international action to constrain the development, production, and use of dangerous technologies," including weapons and their delivery systems. Michael A. Levi and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *The Future of Arms Control* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 128–129.

2. Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 4–5.

3. Two classic works dealing with arms races are Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races Prerequisites and Results," in C. J. Friedrich and S. E. Harris, eds., *Public Policy: Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration*, vol. 8 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1958), pp. 41–86; Colin Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon," *World Politics* 24, no. 1 (1971): 39–79.

4. Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, p. xxxv.

5. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p. 3. (Orig. pub. 1961.)

6. Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, pp. 3–4.

7. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1992), p. 6. Other good works on this subject include Janne Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); John D. Steinbruner, *Principles of Global Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); and Dan Caldwell, "Cooperative Security and Terrorism," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association, Whittier, CA, October 2001.

8. One can envision four rings of security that make up collective security writ large: individual security, collective security, collective defense, and promoting

stability. For more on this argument, see Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*, The Marshall Center Papers No. 3 (Garmisch, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, April 2001).

9. Some of the concepts in the following sections are expansions of ideas from the introduction to the first edition of this book. See Gregory J. Rattray, "Introduction," in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray, eds., *Arms Control Toward the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 1–15.

10. For more on the background of these terms, see Richard Dean Burns, *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 2–3.

11. Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, p. vii.

12. Thomas Schelling, comments at the authors' conference for the second edition of this book, McLean, VA, 12 July 2001; also remarks made by Professor Schelling at a Roundtable in Honor of Thomas Schelling at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 2001.

13. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007, p. A15. See the same authors in a follow-up editorial, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," *Wall Street Journal*, 15 January 2008.

14. As reported by Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodol, "The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2008): 81. See also President Barack Obama's arms control and nonproliferation goals on the White House website at [www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign\\_policy](http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy).

15. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 249.

16. Richard D. Sokolsky, "Renovating US Strategic Arms Control Policy," *Strategic Forum* no. 178 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, February 2001), p. 1.

17. My thanks to Kerry Kartchner for providing much of the material in this section from his chapter in the first edition of this book. See Kartchner, "The Objectives of Arms Control," in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray, eds., *Arms Control Toward the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 19–34.

18. *Ibid.*

19. The term *traditional* is used here to denote something of historical origin that retains its vitality and relevance, and captures the connotation that the objectives of traditional arms control theory remain cogent and compelling in the present era. See Hedley Bull, "The Traditional Approach to Arms Control Twenty Years After," in Uwe Nerlich, ed., *Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 21–30.

20. The three basic works on traditional arms control theory were all published in 1961: Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*; Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*; and Donald G. Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York: George Braziller, 1961), earlier published as a special issue devoted to arms control in *Daedalus: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* (1960).

21. Bull, "The Traditional Approach to Arms Control Twenty Years After," p. 21.

22. Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, p. 142.

23. Thomas Schelling, "Foreword," in Jeffrey A. Larsen, ed., *Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. xii–xiii.

24. Bull, "The Traditional Approach to Arms Control Twenty Years After," p. 22.
25. Levi and O'Hanlon, *The Future of Arms Control*, p. 9.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 9–16.
27. In the introduction to their seminal book, *Strategy and Arms Control*, Schelling and Halperin stated: "There is hardly an objective of arms control to be described in this study that is not equally a continuing urgent objective of national military strategy—of our unilateral military plans and policies," p. 3.
28. Throughout much of the Cold War, these three dilemmas were elaborated mostly in nuclear terms: What deters nuclear war? How many nuclear weapons are enough? What if nuclear deterrence fails? But they are equally applicable to the full range of defense scenarios, including policies and threats involving conventional, chemical, biological, and other weapons.
29. Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, p. 1.
30. Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, p. 3.
31. "US Nuclear Weapons Policy and Arms Control," *Policy Dialogue Brief* (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, 13 November 2007).
32. See Jeffrey A. Larsen, "Neo Arms Control and the Bush Administration," *Disarmament Diplomacy* 80 (2005): 49–54.
33. Brad Roberts, "The Road Ahead for Arms Control," *Washington Quarterly*, 80 (2005): 49–54.
34. Baylis et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, p. 247.
35. Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, p. 143.

## Suggested Readings

- Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction* (Washington, DC: The Arms Control Association, 1989).
- "Arms Control: Thirty Years On," special issue, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 120, no. 1 (1991).
- Brennan, Donald G., ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York: George Braziller, 1961).
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- Burns, Richard Dean, ed., *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993).
- Carter, Ashton B., William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1992).
- "Is Arms Control Dead?" special issue, *Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2000): 171–232.
- Larsen, Jeffrey A., *Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
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- Larsen, Jeffrey A., and James M. Smith, *Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005).
- Levi, Michael, and Michael O'Hanlon, *The Future of Arms Control* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).
- Schelling, Thomas C., and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985). (Orig. pub. 1961.)

Woolf, Amy F., Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 9 April 2008). (Updated regularly.)