


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Dorm Room Dealers:  
Drugs and the Privileges  
of Race and Class

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and Erik D. Fritsvold

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# 1

## Overlooked Illegal Markets: Dealing Dope, College Style

**The scene is stark: an odious drug-dealing partnership comes** to a head with a dispute over money and threats of severe, even fatal violence. Dallas—until recently a drug dealing associate and good friend—arrived at Brice’s house early in the morning, unannounced.<sup>1</sup> He woke Brice and began demanding “fuckin’ compensation.” Brice asked his girlfriend to leave while he confronted a visibly irate Dallas. Brice was disgusted with his long-time partner. “I told him, ‘I don’t ever want to see you again. If I ever see you again I will do something drastic.’” Brice suggested that he had a gun nearby and iterated his demand that Dallas leave immediately. But Dallas—perhaps because he felt a true sense of injustice or perhaps due to the influence of the stimulants he had likely taken earlier—would not leave.

Brice, in turn, refused to acknowledge that he owed Dallas anything.

“Fuck it,” said Dallas. He reached into his pocket and, rather than a weapon, brandished the business card of Brice’s father. Dallas said, “Let’s just see what your dad thinks about your newfound interests.”

This moment, in both its genesis and outcome, not only challenges the archetypal portrayals of drug dealers, but also serves as a defining moment in the approximately six years of fieldwork that went into this research.<sup>2</sup> Unlike the stereotypical drug-related conflicts often depicted in popular media, this dispute did not take place on the mean streets of Baltimore, Harlem, Detroit, or South Central, but rather in the shadow of the ivory tower. This conflict did not take place between marginalized youth struggling to survive, between

ghetto superstars struggling to get a rep, or between junkies looking for their next fix, but rather between educated, white college students of relative privilege. This conflict was less about desperation and social disorganization and more about the themes that emerge in undergraduate business economics courses. A few years after the above-described exchange, instead of ending up as yet another collateral consequence of the US war on drugs—permanently disabled, in prison, disenfranchised, or dead—both Brice and Dallas had reinvented themselves as successful young professionals, members of the legitimate white-collar workforce.

What follows is a firsthand account of Brice, Dallas, and roughly fifty others that might accurately be described as part of the silent majority of US drug dealers,<sup>3</sup> an off-the-radar collection of middle- and upper-class drug pushers whose deviant behaviors are largely unknown beyond the limits of their social networks; whose dealings are typically not directly associated with violence; and whose often flagrant illegal activities are generally carried out without the hindrances of police scrutiny and without the stigma of being labeled a criminal. Here is an insider account of a college drug-dealing network that existed essentially unmediated, hidden in plain sight. Welcome to the silent majority of the collegiate drug-dealing world; welcome to *Dorm Room Dealers*.

## **Anti-Targets**

STOPPER (COLLEGE DRUG DEALER): Where I'm from, stoners were kids who wore hemp. We have a kind of granola culture. But these kids [at this university], you weren't looking at the 4.0 students, but they were normal, they were involved, good majors—business majors—they didn't fit the stereotype of what a drug user would look like. These kids were pretty upstanding kids to most people. They just smoked a lot of weed.

Currently, more than 7 million people in the United States are under what criminologists and criminal justice professionals refer to as “correctional supervision.” This means that on any given day more than 3 percent of the US adult population, or one in every thirty-one persons eighteen years of age or older, is living on probation, parole, or in one of the country's thousands of jails and prisons.<sup>4</sup> At the

beginning of 2008, approximately 2.3 million of these people under correctional supervision were locked up in state and federal prisons or in local jails, amounting to an incarceration rate in the United States of 762 per 100,000.<sup>5</sup> To put these figures into a global context, in both total population and rate, the United States incarcerates more of its citizens than any other industrialized, democratic nation. Further, the number of people behind bars in the United States and the rate of incarceration are substantially higher than those of many nations, including China, Russia, and Iran, whose citizens have fewer freedoms and are lorded over by despotic regimes.<sup>6</sup>

While these figures are startling in and of themselves, they only tell part of the US criminal justice story in the new millennium. These data fail to show the extent to which the present-day girth of our criminal justice system has been fed by excessively punitive drug policies enacted during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations and enhanced during the subsequent Clinton and George W. Bush administrations continuation of the “war on drugs.” Over the course of these administrations,<sup>7</sup> the number of incarcerated drug offenders rose by more than 1,000 percent, primarily as a result of increased law-enforcement scrutiny and not as a result of increased rates of offending.<sup>7</sup> Currently in the United States, approximately 20 percent of state prisoners and more than 50 percent of federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug-law violations as their most serious offense. By way of pre-drug war context, in 1980 only 6.5 percent of state and 25 percent of federal prison inmates were sentenced to prison for drug-law violations. Additionally, despite the hearty rhetoric behind the get-tough antidrug laws that characterized the era, those incarcerated for drug-law violations since the war on drugs began have tended to be users and low-level dealers rather than major dealers and drug kingpins.

Perhaps the most widely commented upon and ethically problematic outcome of the war on drugs has been the disproportionate negative impact these policies have had on poor and minority communities, particularly African Americans. While comprising only 13 percent of the US population, African Americans make up nearly one-half of the more than two million people behind bars in the United States, more than 35 percent of all persons arrested for drug abuse violations, and approximately 45 percent of state prison inmates serving time for drug offenses. This is despite the fact that drug-user data suggest that racial and ethnic groups in the United

States tend to have rates of drug use close to their representation in the US population. For example, federal government drug-use surveys indicate that African Americans make up about 15 percent of the total drug user population while whites comprise over 70 percent of all drug users.

According to criminologist Elliot Currie, author of the award-winning *Confronting Crime*, “Nationally, there are twice as many Black men in state and federal prison today as there were men of all races twenty years ago. More than anything else, it is the war on drugs that has caused this dramatic increase.”<sup>8</sup> Adding to Currie’s drug policy assessment, Yale law professor Steven B. Duke writes, “By almost any measure, Blacks suffer disproportionately from drug prohibition . . . racial minorities suffer from drugs and drug prohibition vastly out of proportion to their representation in the population.”<sup>9</sup>

These glaring disparities have even garnered the unlikely attention of high profile politicians who typically steer clear of questioning the rationality of drug policy for fear of being labeled soft on crime. For example, in 2007 while vying for the Republican Party nomination during a PBS-sponsored presidential debate, Republican candidate Ron Paul spoke out against the drug war saying, “For instance, blacks make up 14 percent of those who use drugs. Yet 36 percent of those arrested are blacks. And it ends up that 63 percent of those who finally end up in prison are blacks. This has to change. We don’t have to have more courts and more prisons. We need to repeal the whole war on drugs. It isn’t working.”<sup>10</sup>

Clearly then, poor and minority populations along with the other “low hanging fruit”<sup>11</sup> upon whom the drug war primarily has been focused have faced disproportionate consequences for their participation in illegal drug activities. But this book is not directly about the targets of the war on drugs and those who have borne the greatest brunt of its criminal justice scrutiny since the early 1980s. Rather, this book is about one specific group of *anti-targets*, a network of drug dealers who have operated with relative impunity while making little effort to conceal their illicit activities. In spite of the “zero tolerance” zealotry driving the drug war, for these boys and girls next-door who are comfortably shielded from criminal justice scrutiny by race- and class-based privileges woven into the fabric of US society, the drug war has apparently made no discernable difference in how they construct their drug distribution networks or carry out their routine dealing activities.

Over a period of approximately six years beginning in 2001, we were provided with uncommon access to a drug-distribution network that publicly thrived largely off of the criminal justice system's radar. This network was almost entirely comprised of affluent current and former college students, and its members provided an array of illegal drugs to several colleges in Southern California.<sup>12</sup> What began as an examination of what we speculated would be somewhat low-level and benign drug peddling between college students turned out to be an exploration of a much more extensive and serious drug-dealing network—a collection of college drug dealers loosely subdivided into several primary strains of fluid, informally organized distribution channels servicing one common user base.

From the number of network dealers we spoke with and the substantial access barriers to the user community without legitimate entrée, it stands to reason that the members of this network supplied the majority of marijuana consumed at one university. The network also was responsible for supplying significant amounts of marijuana to students at several other local colleges and universities. In fact, over the course of this research, one of our key informants had emerged as one of the area's foremost pot dealers, moving anywhere from five to ten pounds of marijuana per week and grossing between \$80,000 and \$160,000 per month in ill-gotten revenue. This particular dealer was a large-volume wholesaler selling marijuana primarily in pound or multi-pound increments and almost never selling quantities of less than one-quarter pound; therefore his profit margins were less than if he were to stretch out the product by selling pot in smaller increments. Nonetheless, when his operation was at its peak, this particular dealer hauled in total weekly profits ranging from \$2,500 to in excess of \$5,000, certainly more cash than he could hide under his mattress.

This network's larger dealers blew a substantial amount of their profits on partying with friends, supporting the drug use of friends and other hangers-on, high-tech media equipment, "pimped out" accessories for their cars, and other whimsical expenditures. In fact, Brice, one of the primary dealers profiled throughout this study, used some of his drug sale profits to fund a three-month excursion to Asia. Not only was he able to comfortably bankroll his entire Asian adventure with drug proceeds, but was also able to pay rent and utilities for himself and his roommate who remained at home. Similarly, Weasel, another wholesale supplier to dealers in the network, was unable to

make a scheduled interview with us because he decided to take an impromptu European vacation. At the height of his dealing, LaCoste, one of our network's most interesting characters, was selling approximately one pound of marijuana per week to his fellow students. When asked what he bought with his estimated profits of \$1,200 per week, he replied:

LACOSTE: Whatever I want. I used to go on shopping sprees first semester a whole bunch, like, whatever I want. I want to buy these rims for my car [a \$50,000 Cadillac purchased for him by his parents] that are tight . . . the ones that spin . . . yeah, those are sick. Ah, I just buy shit. I spend lots of money.

Additionally, a handful of dealers channeled some of their proceeds into legitimate business ventures. Since most of the dealers we observed and interviewed were already children of privilege, these material excesses and investment capital almost never drew them any unwanted attention from law enforcement or university officials.

Over the course of our observations and interviews with the network's dealers, users, and several people charged with policing their behaviors, we also uncovered relatively robust markets for cocaine, "party" drugs, and prescription drugs, all servicing the same college populations. And, while the scope, depth, and wealth to be gained from wheeling and dealing in this market were often remarkable, there were several other discoveries that proved more noteworthy. Among the more startling of our findings were the near absent or, perhaps more accurately, pathetic risk-minimization strategies employed by most of the dealers with whom we came into contact. Given their families' affluence and their place at an expensive private university, these dealers stood to lose a great deal if caught selling drugs, a seemingly irrational choice.

We also found ourselves intrigued by our dealers' motivations for selling drugs, motives that were generally different in many ways from those associated with stereotypical street-drug dealers popularized by mainstream news and entertainment media. These impetuses were quite revealing and demonstrated the angst, insecurities, greed, and often arrogance of the dealers we observed and interviewed. They were also often accompanied by a variety of rationalizations and "techniques of neutralization" that served, at least in the minds of many of our dealers, to mitigate what they knew to be illegal activity.



Finally, while not entirely surprising—given the well-documented tendency of the criminal justice system to closely monitor the illegal activities of the poor while simultaneously turning a blind eye to similar activities carried out by the non-poor—we were still taken aback by the lack of criminal justice and university administration attention paid these dealers, despite the brazenness, incompetence, and general dearth of street smarts that tended to characterize the dealers’ daily practices. For the most part, members of the network managed their extensive drug-dealing activities virtually immune to law enforcement scrutiny, and we theorize that our dealers’ racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds allowed them and their clientele to exist freely as anti-targets in the US drug war and to maintain a nondeviant public status despite their flagrantly illegal behavior.

The findings we report upon in this book are based on hundreds of hours of observation and dozens of formal interviews with current and former dealers and their clients. The past experiences and rapport that we and our research assistants had with participants in this network allowed us to provide a detailed sociological description of the individual and collective behaviors of these “law-abiding lawbreakers.” As drug researcher Patricia Adler has noted, this unusual view from the inside is one of the very few perspectives from which social science can learn about inherently secretive criminal organizations.

### **Location, Location, Location**

Once again, the network we explored operated primarily in Southern California. More specifically, our dealers principally sold their wares in a coastal and near-coastal metropolitan area also situated within reasonable driving distance to the US-Mexico border. This location offered both geographic and cultural advantages to drug dealers of all backgrounds, including those who operated in our network. Given the vastness of the US-Mexico border and the fact that most of the world’s cocaine is produced in South America, quite logically the southwest US border serves as the primary point of entry for cocaine smuggling into the United States, with an estimated 65 percent of all illegal cocaine imports traversing this land route. In addition, marijuana produced in Mexico remains the most widely available to US consumers, and California supplies much of its own consumer demand as the leading producer of both indoor and outdoor domestically grown

marijuana.<sup>13</sup> In fact, agricultural staples like lettuce, tomatoes, oranges, strawberries, and even grapes trail behind marijuana as California's number-one cash crop. As part of a statewide drug eradication campaign that has been in existence for twenty-five years, in 2007 alone state authorities seized 2.9 million marijuana plants worth an estimated \$10 billion from backyards, public lands, and forests.<sup>14</sup> In spite of this and other federal, state, and local eradication efforts, in 2006 an estimated \$15 billion dollars of marijuana was grown in the state.<sup>15</sup> By way of comparison, the state's total farm sales in 2006 generated \$31.4 billion.<sup>16</sup>

In addition to the land routes, maritime routes from Mexico to the United States make this metropolitan area an ideal point of entry for drugs, and evidence of illegal drug shipments is routinely found in the nearby coastal waters. For example, in April 2008, the US Coast Guard discovered an 18-foot boat loaded with 362 pounds of marijuana a few miles up the coast from our network's home turf. This vessel had crashed into rocks during a pre-dawn drug-smuggling run and was one of several drug-smuggling boats that authorities had come across in recent weeks along the same several-mile stretch of shoreline.

On the demand side, this particular Southern California location offers distinct cultural advantages to drug dealers. Proportionally, people living in metropolitan areas, either small or large, are more likely to use illicit drugs than those in more rural parts of the country. Also, the rate of illicit drug use in the western United States is higher than that of any other region in the country, leading to a larger market for illegal drug sales.<sup>17</sup> Finally, the beach communities in this metropolitan area are dominated by what could be called a "surfer culture" as well as transient and other nonpermanent populations. Characteristics of these communities include a reputation for tolerance of personal freedoms and a general acceptance of soft drug use.

## **Method and Access**

Ethnographic investigations of criminal organizations, groups inherently clandestine to some extent, mandate rapport and trust between researcher and subject. And even though we were completely forthcoming with our research agenda, it often took months of relationship building for us to secure key dealer interviews and otherwise gain the

access necessary to physically observe drug transactions and the day-to-day activities of the dealers in our study. Primarily, we gained entry to this community of drug dealers and users largely through what Patricia Adler defined as “peripheral membership.”<sup>18</sup> In this role, we maintained relatively close relationships and regularly interacted with many of our study’s key dealers. However, consistent with Adler’s description of this particular approach to research, in order to maintain objectivity and a balance between participant and observer, at no time did we actually engage in the central activities that defined group membership and group identity.

Even with this as our research philosophy and strategy, it would be reasonable to ask why these dealers would trust us enough to tell all of the details of their illicit activity and, in several cases, allow us into their homes while they conducted their business. In both instances—interviews and observations—our personal backstories and reputations as established, “down,” trustworthy, and visible members of the local community directly facilitated the requisite confidence necessary to carry out this study. By way of example, one researcher not only existed as a peripheral member of this group for several years, but also had a longstanding personal relationship with Brice, a key dealer in the study, and Cecilia, another of the study’s linchpins. This same researcher was active in the local surfing and environmentalist community, was a member of several local bands, worked at a local surf shop, and was a surfing instructor on a popular stretch of beach frequented by members of this drug-dealing network.

As another avenue of access, we enlisted research assistants familiar with the network’s drug scene to identify and conduct interviews with other dealers and former dealers not revealed during the period of peripheral membership. To our surprise, nearly all of these interviews were granted with little resistance on the part of the subjects who typically spoke freely of their dealing exploits. Only once did a campus drug dealer identified by one of our research assistants prove difficult to pin down for an interview. On three separate occasions, he failed to show up as scheduled. Frustrated, we made it explicitly clear that he was entirely free not to sit for an interview with us, and under no circumstances would we ever reveal his identity. Ultimately, we were able to secure his interview by providing him with a signed letter reassuring him that his identity would be kept confidential. To protect the anonymity of all of our subjects, we

crafted pseudonyms to identify dealers and other tangential people involved in the study.

We also conducted interviews with several university officials we felt would be able to offer insight into our hub campus's drug policy and enforcement, particularly with respect to the university's disciplinary procedures and how the punishments for known drug dealers are meted out. These interviewees held positions in various offices ranging from campus housing to university police. Most officials we contacted for interviews readily consented to our request. During the interviews, however, they tended to recite policy talking points. They often refrained from discussing the more subtle ways the policies were actually enforced and the extrajudicial considerations taken when deciding how to proceed in a campus drug-dealing matter. Some university officials were not as amenable to being interviewed. For example, the director of the campus police canceled interviews with one member of our research team twice. He then required that the research assistant submit questions to him beforehand. She complied with his request and submitted a series of questions revolving around basic university policy and known incidents of drug use and sales on campus. Nonetheless, after receiving the list of questions, the director ultimately declined our interview request and refused to respond to the particular questions in writing.

For the purposes of data analysis, we found Robert Merton's *post factum* sociological interpretation to be the analytical tool that best corresponded with the goals of the research. In outlining this research strategy, Merton suggested that the function of this approach is not to test a specific theory or hypothesis. Rather, the documentary evidence obtained is allowed to guide and illustrate the theory. Because it allows researchers to remain open to social dynamics and displays of power that might otherwise be obscured by more traditional research models, and because there is very little ethnographic and qualitative research on drug-dealing networks that operate at private universities, we found this method to have distinct advantages over other interpretive tools.

Throughout the course of the research, all efforts were made to triangulate our data; we attempted to verify individual accounts and events provided in interviews with participant observation and subsequent interviews with other dealers. Our intent was, as articulated by Daniel Miller, to "evaluate people in terms of what they actually do, i.e., as material agents working with a material world, and not

merely [in terms] of what they say they do.”<sup>19</sup> While we were able to verify the bulk of accounts that appear in this book, some of the narratives provided are solely the account of the individual dealer being interviewed. Our approach, as well as the absence of constrictions that can be imposed by past findings, allowed us to, as anthropologist Clifford Geertz suggested, enter the research as objectively as possible and allow the gestures, overtures, behaviors, and statements of the dealers in our network to serve as a story they tell themselves about themselves.

### **The Dealing Community**

The approximately fifty subjects at the center of this study were all college students at various Southern California colleges and universities, but most attended one particular private university that served as the focal point of this research. With two exceptions, each of the dealers in our network was active (they had not yet walked away from drug dealing) when we were acquainted with them. During the primary period of interviews and observation, these subjects ranged in age from eighteen to twenty-four and all but three of the dealers we formally interviewed were men. We do not think that this reflects a selection bias; rather it reflects a gender imbalance among college students who choose to sell drugs. Regarding other demographic data, with the exception of two Hispanics, one African American, one Black/Caucasian person, one Persian/Caucasian-American, and one Asian/Caucasian person, all of the dealers in our network were Caucasian. Further, among the relative few minorities listed above, most either white-identified and/or their nonwhite ethnic attributes were imperceptible. As was the case with gender, we did not choose to interview principally white dealers. We simply did not encounter many who were nonwhite. As is the case with most of the private universities in Southern California, the vast majority of the student body at our study’s hub university is white.

With the exception of the one African American dealer, all of the dealers in this network were from families that range from middle-upper class to affluent/upper class. In fact, some of our dealers had parents of considerable prestige, status, and economic standing. For example, at least one and possibly two subjects had parents who were current or former city mayors in other states. Other parents included

international and domestic businesspeople, car-dealership owners, doctors, psychiatrists, and accountants and accounting executives for major firms.

In drug research literature, a distinction is often made between drug markets that are “open” and “closed.”<sup>20</sup> The drug market that made up our network’s home turf could be primarily described as closed. In open markets, dealers sell to any potential customers, only screening out those who they suspect of being police or posing some other threat to their operation. Dealers who operate in closed markets sell only to customers they personally know or customers who can be vouched for by other buyers. Indeed, on at least one occasion, a dealer interviewed for this study noted that he refused to sell marijuana to someone claiming to have a mutual friend because that friend in common was not present to vouch for him. Closed markets offer both dealers and customers more security and, because of the closer interpersonal ties and consistent supply streams, closed markets offer customers some degree of quality assurance over the drugs they buy.

While the dealers in this community sold and consumed various types of drugs, most of the activity revolved around soft drugs, particularly the sale and consumption of marijuana. Still, some of our dealers sold modest quantities of cocaine, and others dabbled in party drugs like ecstasy. The subjects range from those who sold drugs solely to support their own drug habit (sometimes unsuccessfully, as they are either bad businessmen who give away too much of their product to friends or, like the character Smokey in the 1990s cult film *Friday*, they simply keep more of their product for personal consumption than they put on the market for sale), to those who provided relatively large quantities of drugs that were then distributed to a significant number of drug consumers and smaller distributors at area colleges. While in many cases these categories are not mutually exclusive, of our fifty subjects approximately thirty focused overwhelmingly on marijuana and other traditional “street drugs.” The remaining twenty subjects focused predominantly on prescription drugs and typified the classic “user-dealer” model; these twenty subjects provide a vivid window into the “secondary market” that is the focus of Chapter 4.

Like Brice and Dallas, the vast majority of our network’s dealers graduated from drug sales before or at the same time they graduated from college; a few others elected to make a career of drug sales

rather than enter the legitimate work force. Some of the dealers we interviewed were more articulate and candid than others; therefore, more of their comments are included in this book. These interviews, observations, and discussions stirred the reflections that follow on the drug activities of affluent youth, the ignorance of these activities by those in positions of formal authority, and the impact both have on shaping the perception of drug dealers in the United States.

## **Outline of the Book**

In the chapters that follow, we offer a description and analysis of this affluent Southern California drug-distribution network. Chapter 2 explores the first illicit drug market that we came across during the course of this study. Chapter 3 uses observational and interview data to more deeply explore what we have identified as six primary motivations for the distribution of illicit drugs among the members of this college dealing network. This chapter also takes a look at the distinctly different motives and rationalizations that exist among dealers in the pharmaceutical market.

The focus of Chapter 4 is a relatively vigorous prescription-drug market that we came across almost by accident. We found that drugs like Adderall and OxyContin are traded relatively freely among college students, but for seemingly different reasons and significantly less money than the aforementioned illicit drugs. We discuss this secondary market in terms of what drugs are sold; the size and scale of the market; how drugs are obtained (as they all originate from a legitimate source); and dealer/user characteristics.

Chapter 5 discusses our dealers' perceptions of self. Specifically, we examine how members of our network view themselves in light of their ongoing participation in illegal activity. We also explore how they justify and neutralize their illicit behavior through what we have coined "mental gymnastics." Finally, in this chapter we briefly shed some light on how other people's opinions of our dealers are, in part, influenced by our dealers' views of themselves.

Chapter 6 examines what we refer to as the "un-risky business" of drug sales at and around a private college campus. We discuss actual versus perceived risks and our network's dealers' competence as criminal actors in light of these risks. We also look at how our dealers were treated by criminal justice system and university offi-

cials on the few occasions that they were implicated for engaging in illegal drug activity.

In the final chapter, we catch up with some of our dealers and see where they are now. We ask the question, were any of their dreams deferred by their foray into the world of illicit drug sales? The chapter ends with a brief discussion and reflective assessment of US drug policy as we enter the second decade of the new millennium.

As this manuscript neared completion, the national news media and prominent law enforcement officials momentarily engaged the issue of illicit drug markets on college campuses. Operation Sudden Fall, a joint yearlong undercover operation by the Drug Enforcement Administration and the San Diego State University Police Department yielded 125 arrests, predominantly of college student drug dealers and drug users. This event offered additional insights into the world of college drug dealers, provided additional fodder for this research, and constitutes the majority of this book's epilogue.

## Notes

1. To protect the identity of the subjects in our study, we have created pseudonyms to identify all dealers and tangential persons.

2. The first phases of this research were published in Mohamed and Fritsvold, "Damn It Feels Good to Be a Gangsta."

3. Thanks to Peter Moskos for the term, "silent majority."

4. The state of California alone operates thirty-four adult prisons and contracts with six out-of-state facilities to alleviate overcrowding within existing in-state institutions. Municipal governments in the state operate hundreds of county, city, and other local jail facilities.

5. US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, "Number and rate (per 100,000 US residents) of Persons in State and Federal Prisons and Local Jails."

6. According to Christopher Hartney in a November 2006 report from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the United States incarcerates at a rate 4 to 7 times higher than its Western peers in the UK (145), France (88), Germany (95), and Italy (102). More telling, US incarceration rates are still unrivaled by undemocratic nations such as Iran (206), Zimbabwe (139), China (118), Cuba (487), and Russia (607). China, with over 1.3 billion citizens, has an estimated incarcerated population of 1.5 million people, while Russia has fewer than 1 million. See Hartney, "US Rates of Incarceration."

7. Fellner, *Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs*.

8. Currie, *Crime and Punishment in America*, p. 13.



9. Duke, "Drug Prohibition," p. 571.
10. [www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/special/forums/transcript.html](http://www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/special/forums/transcript.html).
11. Kentucky Senate Judiciary Committee, Testimony of Secretary J. Michael Brown.
12. We will frequently refer to Southern California throughout this narrative. Geographically speaking, this region is roughly defined as that part of California south of Santa Barbara (approximately 100 miles north of Los Angeles) encompassing the major metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, San Diego, San Bernardino, and Riverside. Collectively, this region has a known population of approximately 25 million people and is home to well over sixty colleges and universities.
13. US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drug Trafficking in the United States."
14. *The Economist*, "Marijuana: Home-Grown."
15. Bailey, "Pot Is Called Biggest Cash Crop."
16. Goodhue, Green, Heien, and Martin, *Current Economic Trends in the California Wine Industry*.
17. Among persons aged twelve or older, the rate of current illicit drug use in 2006 was 9.5 percent in the West, 8.9 percent in the Northeast, 7.9 percent in the Midwest, and 7.4 percent in the South. See US Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies, *Results from the 2006 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings*.
18. Adler, *Wheeling and Dealing*.
19. Miller, *Capitalism*, p. 17.
20. Sampson, *Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes*.