Contents

List of Tables and Figures vii
Acknowledgments ix

1 Untangling the Puzzle of Coalition Burden Sharing 1
2 South Korea: Between Iraq and a Nuclear Crisis 39
3 Germany: Non-coalition, but Cooperating 89
4 Turkey: Involuntary Defection and Eventual Rapprochement 149
5 Putting the Pieces Together 203

Bibliography 225
Index 253
I was first attracted to the issue of coalition burden sharing, especially within the context of the Iraq War, while living in South Korea. I observed several anti-American protests due to the American military presence, and saw a liberal Korean president elected on a platform that argued for a reduced U.S. presence on the peninsula, along with greater decision role for Korea within the alliance. Given this high level of domestic and political resistance to the U.S., I was surprised when the newly elected Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, announced that the Republic of Korea (ROK) would support the U.S. led “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. Korea eventually provided the third largest contingent to the stability operations even though it had no direct stake in the intervention. I was puzzled by this outcome. Why would a state that was not directly affected by the Iraq crisis join the coalition, especially considering the strong anti-American rhetoric of the elections only months prior? Additionally, why would Korea provide such a large military contribution when that contribution was very unpopular domestically?

In addition to the ROK’s behavior, I was further intrigued by the different levels of support provided by other coalition partners in the two U.S.-Iraq conflicts. The Turkish parliament’s failure to grant U.S. ground forces the necessary access to launch a direct land assault against northern Iraq, after months of negotiations in late 2002-early 2003, struck a critical blow to the Bush administration’s military plan, and added an additional political disappointment to the “coalition of the willing.” This diminished level of support contrasts sharply with Turkey’s assistance to the 1991 Gulf War coalition. In that conflict, Turkish President Turgut Özal pursued active regional diplomacy to mobilize Middle Eastern support and allowed use of Turkish airbases for U.S. strikes into Iraq. Given Turkey’s robust support of past U.S. military efforts, and its economic incentives to work with the United
States to protect its interests in northern Iraq, why did the Turkish government refuse a substantial aid package to remain on the sidelines of the Iraq war and consequently risk U.S. censure? Why was the usually centrally controlled government unable to garner the support in the legislature for the memorandum of understanding negotiated with the United States, especially after the United States had significantly improved Turkish infrastructure to support the war in 2003?

Finally, Germany’s position concerning Iraq was also puzzling. First, why did Germany adopt an extreme foreign policy position in 2003 regarding the coalition when it could have quietly withheld support? The Schröder government not only declined to make a direct German contribution to the war, but also engaged in active counter-coalition-building by lobbying France and Russia to support Germany’s resistance to what Gerhard Schröder called an “adventure.”! Germany abandoned its traditional policy of balancing between Washington and Paris and instead created a counter-coalition with Russia and France against the United States. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S.-led coalition—even under a UN mandate—seriously undermined the diplomatic position of the Bush administration in building an effective coalition against Iraq. In addition, why did Germany cooperate with the United States in a variety of other aspects of the war effort while at the same time thwarting U.S. efforts diplomatically? Germany put no limitations on the use of U.S. military bases and actually supplied German soldiers to guard U.S. bases so that U.S. military forces could deploy to Iraq. This level of coalition participation is in contrast with the robust German financial support of Operation Desert Storm through “checkbook diplomacy.”

Pundits, commentators, journalists, and some international relations scholars simply attribute the lack of vigorous participation to the Bush administration’s “unilateralism” and the lack of international legitimacy surrounding the 2003 effort. Unfortunately, this explanation is not only incomplete, but flawed: it does not adequately explain why states such as South Korea supported the coalition robustly in the face of international and domestic criticism while others such as Germany opposed any intervention even under a UN mandate.

These initial observations motivated me to more broadly question why states assume burdens within security coalitions. This book seeks to answer the questions of why states contribute to ad hoc security coalitions and what factors influence their level and composition of support? Through an examination of the 2003 Iraq War coalition, this book presents a burden sharing decision model that provides a
Untangling the Puzzle of Coalition Burden Sharing

framework for explaining—and perhaps even predicting—how states will choose whether to participate in future military conflicts.

The Coalition of the Willing

Twelve years after Operation Desert Storm, events in Iraq again precipitated an international crisis and a U.S.-led military coalition. The coalition composition for the 2003 Iraq War differed significantly from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 2003, the international community was unified in its assessment that Iraq had violated its Security Council mandate to disarm, but was divided on the appropriate course of action. The United Kingdom and Spain were strong advocates in the Security Council for military intervention in Iraq. In particular, British Prime Minister Tony Blair significantly influenced U.S. war deliberations, convincing the Bush administration on the need for a Security Council Resolution in order to garner domestic and international legitimacy for the use of force. British and U.S. efforts were critical in garnering a unanimous consensus for Security Council Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002), which labeled Iraq in “material breach” of the of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687. This resolution put the onus on Iraq to prove that it did not have Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and warned Iraq that it would face “serious consequences” as a result of its continued violations of its obligations. This resolution solidified international support to engage Iraq, but left doubt on the meaning of “serious consequences.” The unanimous vote on Resolution 1441 disguised a number of fundamental policy differences among the Security Council Members.

While the United States saw Resolution 1441 as a stepping-stone for military action, France and Germany interpreted the resolution as a pretext for more aggressive weapons inspections. In early March 2003, the governments of France, Russia, and Germany informally rejected a second U.S.-British draft resolution advocating the use of force. Germany initially led international efforts against a war. The second resolution became a “trial of strength” between Paris and the United States. France went to great lengths to dissuade the United States and the United Kingdom from presenting a second resolution to the Council. In the end, the diplomatic efforts of France and Germany—and to a lesser extent Russia and China—assured that the second resolution was not brought to a vote. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder won reelection in national elections the previous September, partly based on his rejection of a U.S. military intervention in Iraq. He undermined U.S. efforts to build a military coalition by rejecting German participation in
a war even with a Security Council Resolution. France supported diplomatic action and weapons inspections, but eventually joined with Germany in a diplomatic blocking effort in the Security Council, once it was clear that war was likely. In the diplomatic buildup to the second resolution, Germany and France applied significant pressure on the former Soviet states of Eastern Europe to repel U.S. advances to participate in a coalition.

In a late January 2003 rebuke of the assertion that Germany and France were speaking for Europe, eight NATO members issued an open letter of support for U.S. policy towards Iraq. The eight included Great Britain, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Portugal. The letter from the NATO-Eight was followed by another endorsement from Eastern European nations aspiring to NATO and EU membership. The group, known as the Vilnius 10, included Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In an open letter, dated February 5, 2003, the group declared, “Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values.” They claimed that it was already clear Iraq was in breach of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. The Vilnius group gave the Bush administration a diplomatic boost by stating, “In the event of non-compliance, we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.”

Japan was very supportive of the second draft resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq and launched a diplomatic effort to persuade undecided members of the Security Council to support the resolution. Tokyo warned France on the dangers of splitting the international community and the Security Council over the resolution. In an official statement Japan warned, “[i]f the international community divides, it will not only benefit Iraq, but also place in doubt the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations.” Japan also offered financial assistance to states bordering Iraq, including $1.3 billion to Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.

The Iraq War coalition formed without a UN mandate for the use of force to disarm Iraq. The U.S. legitimized the invasion under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, referencing in particular Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. President Bush argued that these resolutions provided clear authority for the use of force against Iraq, even without the authority granted from additional resolutions.

The United States commenced combat operations in Iraq on March 19, 2003, with a “coalition of the willing” comprised of 40 countries that
publicly committed to the war effort. This coalition provided a variety of support, including logistical and intelligence support, over-flight rights, and humanitarian and reconstruction aid, but did not necessarily provide direct military assistance for combat operations. Table 1.1 illustrates military contribution to the coalition for combat operations. The table depicts troop strength for the initial coalition and percent of that nation’s total armed forces. Only six coalition members (besides the United States) provided military support to conventional combat operations, and only four coalition members committed troops to combat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
<th>% Total Active Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>900*</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>300*</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>150*</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Provided non-combat mission support outside Iraq such as chemical decontamination and logistic support units.


As the Iraq war progressed, the composition of the coalition evolved from predominately a U.S., U.K., Australian coalition to a multinational coalition of many small to medium-sized contributors; however, the United States still provided the bulk of military forces. Figure 1.1 shows aggregate troop levels during the Iraq War. U.S. participation is shown in white and multinational partner participation is in black.
Figure 1.1 Coalition Strength for Stabilization Operations

These data show that while U.S. forces responded to changing security conditions in Iraq, non-U.S. coalition contributions remained relatively steady from 2003 to 2005, and then steadily declined thereafter. These data are puzzling in that the coalition seemed to lose multinational support even after the United States gained international legitimacy from a successful Iraqi election in January 2005 and a succession of UN Resolutions authorizing support of stability operations. U.S. burdens fluctuated to the security situation, while coalition partners were insulated from these changes and maintained a rather steady—if not declining—level of burden. These data seem to show that legitimacy based on UN authorization did not significantly affect the collective effort; one would expect the international presence to increase as the coalition gained legitimacy through successful elections and UN sanction.

Throughout the operation, the United States continued to pursue UN Security Council support in an attempt to gain support for the military effort. In the wake of the U.S.-led invasion, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1472 on March 28, which called on, “the international community also to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq.” This resolution authorized the use of “Oil-for-Food” funds to be used in the humanitarian effort. It also marked the U.S.-led coalition as an occupying power. Resolution 1483, on May 22, established the Iraq Development Fund. This resolution was significant in that it was the first UN Resolution that provided a measure of international legitimacy to states, other than the United States and Britain, for participating in the military coalition. By late May 2003, the United Kingdom and the United States had begun redeploying significant combat strength home on the assumption of a pacific occupation combined with the anticipation of international support for post-war administration. The security situation in Iraq, however, continued to decline throughout the summer of 2003; by October, the Bush administration pressed the UN for an additional resolution to garner support for the Iraq coalition. Resolution 1511 on October 16 provided legitimacy to the Iraqi Governing Council, which was the provisional government of Iraq, established by the U.S. led Coalition Provisional Authority. More importantly for the Bush administration, the resolution provided a mandate for member states to contribute to the multinational force in Iraq to maintain security under a unified command until Iraq established a representative government. The UN continued to provide a mandate for the multinational coalition under Resolutions 1546 (2004), 1637 (2005), 1723 (2006) and 1790 (2007). Finally, the UN mandate for providing security assistance to Iraq
Coalition Politics and the Iraq War

expired December 31, 2008. This review of UN Security Council actions shows that the military coalition, although initially lacking UN authority, had gained UN Security Council approval beginning in the fall of 2003.

Unfortunately for the Bush administration, coalition partner presence declined throughout the duration of the war. Although the UN—and to a lesser extent the Iraqi government—provided a level of legitimacy to the U.S.-led occupation, international participation actually declined as resolutions supporting the effort mounted. Figure 1.2 presents the level of coalition partner participation as a percentage of the total military effort.

Figure 1.2 Percentage of Non-U.S. Participation in Iraq Coalition

These data reflect coalition military support to Iraq stability operations after the conclusion of conventional combat operations in May 2003. Non-U.S. coalition contributions peaked at 17.3 percent of the total effort in February 2004; four months after the coalition gained full UN support, and steadily declined to 7.5 percent by May 2007. This seems to indicate that the mild support for nation building operations was suffering under the weight of an ongoing military operation and

Data Source: The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, September 10, 2007
increasingly violent insurgent attacks. The United States was suffering from the classic collective action predicament; because it had significant military forces in Iraq, it was expected to maintain a disproportional amount of military burden.

Coalition support not only decreased over the duration of the conflict, but coalition composition significantly changed throughout. Table 1.2 illustrates the level military support, by year, of the top contributors to the Iraq coalition. As evidenced by these data, the military coalition evolved over the life of the Iraq War. The United Kingdom rapidly downsized its 45,000 strong invasion force and installed a significantly smaller contingent of peacekeepers in the south. Poland robustly supported peacekeeping operations initially—even leading coalition operations south of Baghdad—but reduced its support to providing a battalion sized combat element and a divisional headquarters. Spain also initially provided robust support to the reconstruction effort, but terminated that support following the March 2004 Madrid train bombing and the election of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who campaigned on Spanish troop withdrawal.

Table 1.2 Military Contribution to Stability Operations
March 2003-March 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>142,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>8,220</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: The Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index*, Multiple March Issues
South Korea remained a firm supporter of military operations for several years; however, its support waned due to domestic pressure resulting in a complete withdrawal in December 2008.

Although military support to the coalition is a significant indicator of burden sharing, financial support is also an essential element of coalition participation. States typically substitute financial support for military support when they are domestically unable or unwilling to contribute military forces. During the 1991 Gulf War, Japan and Germany—constitutionally limited from deploying military personnel—were the third and fourth largest financial contributors to the coalition, underwriting many U.S. military expenses. In that conflict, the United States was reimbursed almost entirely for its military expenses as it collected approximately $74 billion in 2007 dollars from coalition partners. The limited financial support the United States received for its 2003 operations in Iraq stand in stark contrast to the 1991 Gulf War. The United States not only funded its own operations, but also directly funded several coalition partners’ participation. Table 1.3 presents a list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total (Millions)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland*</td>
<td>$988.4</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>$295.0</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>$63.1</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>$12.5</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>$2.0</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nations</td>
<td>$123.3</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,494.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Funding to Poland included funding for troops operating under its command.

Data Source: GAO-07-827T, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007)
of countries that received U.S. assistance to participate in the military coalition. These countries provided personnel, or other material military support, to the multinational force in Iraq, but were not financially able to support their troops in the field for extended periods and therefore required financial assistance to prepare their troops for the operation. Between 2003 and 2007, the United States provided approximately $1.5 billion to 20 countries to support their military contribution to the Iraq coalition.

U.S. objectives in Iraq also required a significant financial investment for the reconstruction of the Iraqi government and infrastructure. In October 2003, a UN-sponsored donors’ conference was held in Madrid, shortly after passage of Security Council Resolution 1511. Foreign donors pledged approximately $20 billion in grants and loans for Iraq reconstruction, but grants and loans for reconstruction were only a small portion of the international commitment. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, more than $139 billion has been raised for Iraq reconstruction through three main sources: Iraqi funding of $71.01 billion, U.S. funding of $51.00 billion, and international funding of $17.79 billion. International assistance includes $6.04 billion in grants and $11.75 billion in pledged loans. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of international donor grants by country. The white bars display pledges to Iraqi reconstruction and the black bars show funds committed. The largest non-American contributors are Japan, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and South Korea. This $6 billion in international grant assistance pales in comparison to the $51 billion appropriated by the United States.

This short summary of military, economic, and diplomatic engagement underscores the variety, scope, and duration of contributions that states make to participate in multinational coalitions. Each method of contribution requires negotiation on the international level regarding the composition and timing of contributions. At the same time, however, state executives must make the case for action—or inaction—with their domestic publics. State executives must continually reassess their contributions in light of the domestic and international costs and benefits inherent in a coalition action.

Because of this tension between the international environment and domestic politics, a multi-level model is ideal to untangle the puzzle of constraints placed on decision-makers by the international environment and domestic politics. The burden sharing model presented here reflects the choices state executives must make to balance state imperatives when called to participate in a coalition.
Due to the complex nature of burden sharing decisions, no single analytical outlook can adequately explain state burden sharing behavior. Systemic theories such as collective action or realist theories describe the systemic forces that influence state chief executives, but these...
theories do not explain decision outcomes. Systemic theories are unable to explain the foreign policies of individual states because they do not examine the sources of state level variation. For instance, Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory predicts that states will balance against an external threat, but it cannot explain why a state is perceived as a threat in the first place. Balance of threat theory treats threat perception as an exogenous variable rather than as a social construction. Collective action theory explains the problems initiating and executing a collective event in pursuit of a public good. However, this approach is agnostic to political motivations for allying in the first place. It fails to explain coalition contributions as a result of side-payments, bargaining, or alliance dependence. For coalitions, burden sharing decisions take the form of a two-level game where the state executive must balance international and domestic interests. 18

In most coalition burden sharing situations, states have choices that can be explained in terms of domestic politics and goals of key actors. State-level analytical approaches are necessary to explain the influence of domestic politics and society on foreign policy decisions. Domestic structure research convincingly demonstrates the influence of differing domestic structure on state foreign policy. States’ foreign policies are not simply the result of international constraints defined by power, but also vary according to the executive’s willingness and political ability to respond to systemic necessities. The research demonstrates that domestic political processes help to shape a state’s definition of the national interest and its ability to implement it. 19 Content and consistency of foreign policy result as much from the constraints of domestic structures as from international systemic influences. 20 However, one cannot understand a state’s foreign policy merely through structures. Scholars must also understand the biases and influences of key constituencies in the foreign policy process to determine how structure translates these influences into policy. A theory of individual influence is necessary to complete the picture since foreign policy is the culmination of many individual lessons from history that form decision maker’s beliefs.

Individual and cognitive theoretical approaches explain the influence of individuals’ beliefs on foreign policy. Cognitive theory provides a methodology for exploring the influence of decision maker experience and beliefs the formulation of effective foreign policy strategies. John Lewis Gaddis maintains that every U.S. presidential administration has “certain assumptions about American interests in the world, potential threats to them and feasible responses, which tend to be formed before or just after an administration takes office.” 21 This
statement highlights the influence of past experience on future policy choices; decision makers may be predisposed to certain coalition choices regardless of systemic pressures. Common ideologies, perceptions of threat, domestic and societal influences, and individual motivations all affect foreign policy outcomes in some respect.

Since burden sharing decisions lie at the intersection of domestic and international politics, only a multi-level model may explain the spectrum of constraints and opportunities defined by the dynamics of the international system and each state’s domestic political structures. When domestic political considerations are not included in the study of foreign policy, researchers are limited to developing a set of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for foreign policy decision making. The foreign policy decision maker must answer to an international audience that includes other political leaders, international organizations, and regional institutions while keeping an eye on maintaining office. The international arena establishes the attributes of the executives’ menu of available choices for a particular foreign policy decision. Systemic theories, based only on the international environment, are incomplete because they do not explain domestic constraints on choices and ignore domestic forces that motivate state executives. Domestically, the executive must answer to an audience that includes supporters, critics, constituents, agents responsible for execution of policy, and most importantly, challengers for the leadership position. However, domestic models alone do not explain national motivations for foreign policy choices. The domestic audience shapes and is shaped by the international environment, but each alone only partially explains why states make the foreign policy decisions that they make. Integrated models provide an attractive choice for explaining multifaceted decisions, particularly when simpler, existing theories have an uneven track record in explaining complex outcomes.

The burden sharing decision model presented in Figure 1.4 is a multi-level model of foreign policy decision making that accounts for the international, domestic, and cognitive influences on state burden sharing decisions. This model is a reformulation of the security decision model originally developed by Andrew Bennett, Danny Unger, and Joseph LePgold to explain the contributions to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The model accounts for the interactions between the cognitive, international, and domestic domains and provides multiple causal paths to outcomes.
Figure 1.4 Burden Sharing Decision Model

- Outcomes and Effects
  - OUTCOME 1: No Contribution
    - State Keeps Its Distance
  - OUTCOME 2: Contribution in area(s) with public or state support
    - State Reveals Its Preferences and Pays
    - State is Entrapped and Pays anyway
  - OUTCOME 3: No Contribution in area(s) with public or state opposition
    - State Keeps Its Distance

- Domestic Factors
  - Domestic Structure
    - Type I
    - Type II
    - Type III
    - Type IV

- International Factors
  - Alliance Dependancy?
    - Yes
    - Security is a public good provided by a large state; the state's quantity even if the state does not contribute
    - No
    - State Perceives Threat (good is partially private)
      - Yes
      - Historical Lessons/Learning
      - No
      - Public Opinion Supports Contribution

- Cognitive Factors
  - No
Independent Variables
The blocks depicted in the first three columns of the burden sharing decision model represent the independent variables affecting foreign policy outcomes.

Cognitive Factors

*Historical Learning.* Studies employing a cognitive approach that focus on beliefs and images held by political elites provide a powerful source for understanding foreign policy behavior. Policy makers rely heavily on historical analogy to simplify and understand complex situations. A historical analogy provides a comparison of some past experience with a current decision, so that some important aspect of the past experience can provide an insight into the current problem. Analogy helps decision makers define the nature of the situation, assess the stakes, and provide policy prescriptions. Unfortunately, this use of analogy often results in poor policy choices. Policy makers tend to oversimplify complex lessons, neglecting important historical details, which leads to inappropriate analogizing and misguided policy choices. Additionally, vivid personal events are more likely to guide decision makers than other more relevant events. Decision makers tend to “learn” from events in which they were personally involved, rather than from others’ experiences. Historical learning through analogy can explain foreign policy outcomes that seem irrational when considered merely through systemic paradigms.

Learning is the application of historical analogy from past experience to facilitate understanding of a particular policy question. Given the complexity of measuring cognitive beliefs and values, I incorporate a simplified cognitive model that can offer useful predictions of state beliefs concerning coalition burden sharing. This analysis makes four assumptions on the influence of beliefs and choice heuristics on actors in their use of analogies to make decisions. First, a key component of beliefs consists of the lessons or analogies drawn from the past. Second, individuals rely on their particular society’s experiences as sources of lessons and analogies. Third, lessons and analogies are more likely to be influential if they involve events that are recent, vivid, evocative, personal, or of significant historical importance. Finally, decision makers who undergo similar experiences will tend to share dominant sets of analogies and lessons.

With these assumptions in mind, the case study analysis considers the following beliefs in the historical lessons and learning module. First, the
study will assess the motivation for collective action. Beliefs about the
threat of Saddam Hussein to regional stability, and his capability to
proliferate nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to terrorist
organizations should affect perceptions of the public good of collective
action. Beliefs about the likelihood of free riding should matter as well
since state burden sharing decisions are influenced by expectations of the
collective effort. Secondly, coalition contributions should be shaped by
beliefs about the influence of force and diplomacy on external threats. Each
state decision has the potential to be affected by whether each state’s most
important and recent experiences of using force was successful. Thirdly,
decisions should be influenced by perceptions of alliance dependence.
States that recently experienced entrapment by an ally should be reluctant
to contribute to the Iraq coalition. Conversely, states that experienced
abandonment should be more likely to contribute if they believed that a
failure to support an ally in an earlier case led to their abandonment.
Additionally, states that suffered abandonment after supporting an ally
should be even less likely to support another coalition without extreme
guarantees. Finally, leaders should be more likely to contribute if they
believed a failure to do so in an earlier instance led to a domestic backlash.
Conversely, if recent military intervention led to domestic backlash leaders
should be wary of making major contributions to another coalition.

According to the learning hypothesis, leaders will be more likely to
contribute to an effort if they gained full participation rights, influenced
decision making, and received compensation in the form of increased
influence with the coalition leader, or material benefits, for their
participation in previous efforts. Leaders will be less likely to contribute if
they recently experienced alliance entrapment or abandonment. Leaders
should be more likely to contribute if they believed a failure to do so in an
earlier instance led to a domestic backlash, conversely, they would be less
likely if participation generated domestic backlash.

Historical learning is expected to not only influence whether a state
supports a coalition, but it is likely to affect the method and timing of
support. Past “mistakes” or “successes” influence the makeup, duration,
and timing of support. One lesson is the influence of timing on past
coalition efforts. Early or late support to a coalition can influence the
ingrained lessons learned. Early support runs the risk of entrapment in an
action that grows well beyond the initial level of commitment.
Additionally, joining a coalition too early runs the risk that a state’s effort
is taken for granted because it did hold out in bargaining for a larger share
of the coalition benefits. Late support, on the other hand, can be seen by
the coalition leader as a lack of support, thereby running the risk of
abandonment. On the other hand, late support may have saved a state from entrapment in a failed intervention.

International Factors

International, or systemic factors, are those broad factors that define and shape the international environment and explain the interaction of external inducements and constraints on states foreign policy behavior. Systemic theory allows the understanding of the context of action before explaining unit level variation.

Balance of Threat. Since private versus collective incentives significantly influence the motivation for burden sharing, the balance of threat block in the burden sharing decision model seeks to explain whether an ally considers the action a “war of choice,” or a necessary intervention to counter an existential threat. This block of the model aims to identify state motives for action. If a collective action, one can expect to see states attempt to free ride. On the other hand, if states consider the coalition as countering a significant threat, one can expect to see states robustly supporting the effort. Since collective action problems can be overcome when states have private incentives, the balance of threat block aims to explain contributions that cannot be explained by the collective action proposition.31

States will generally balance by forming alliances against a perceived threat. Stephen Walt, in *The Origins of Alliances*, outlines four factors—military capability, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions—which affect states’ perceptions of threat.32 However, the question of how states identify threats is relevant. Walt takes threat as given; a composite of the four factors outlined above. In this formulation, there is an implicit assumption that the source of greatest threat is obvious to decision makers. Yet the question of how states actually identify threats is much more complex.33 Walt provides no guidance to how states prioritize among the four elements of threat: “One cannot determine a priori which sources of threat will be most important in any given case; one can say only that all of them are likely to play a role.”34 When analyzing an environment of multiple potential threats to a state, it is essential to unpack the bundle of independent variables Walt designates as encompassing threat. The differentiation of threat better defines the environmental conditions in which policy is formulated. The type of threat and adversary will have an obvious impact on policy choices.35
Threat perception is a function of the ordering of multiple sources of threat to a given state. Identity and ideas are as important as material power in determining the influence of threat. States overwhelmingly identify ideological and political threats to internal stability, emanating from abroad, as more salient than threats based upon aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities. Internal unrest threatening the existing government is perceived as dangerous as a direct invasion. Therefore, for many Persian Gulf states, a resurgent Iraq was not seen as threatening as Iran, ideologically bent on causing domestic disturbance to further its political agenda. Similarly, a weakened Iraq that does not check Iranian influence may be more threatening to Gulf States than an Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This argument does not discount the typical material based depictions of threat, but rather emphasizes the influence of domestic and transnational political identity factors in explaining threat perceptions. It looks to additional factors to help explain state choices in an indeterminate structural environment.

This study operationalizes threat as a factor of material capability and intentions to influence a state internally and externally. If military defeat is seen as the most serious threat to regime security, then state decision makers should seek to balance against the state that is geographically closest and whose aggregate military power capabilities is the greatest. Even if that state’s intentions are not immediately hostile, its power presents the most serious threat to state security because intentions can change drastically and rapidly. Since the first Gulf War diminished Iraq’s power projection capability, the balance of threat effect should be most visible in states where Iraq could potentially threaten with offensive WMD. If, on the other hand, ideational factors are seen as the most serious threat to security, then state leaders should balance against the state that manifests the most hostility toward their regimes, regardless of that state’s aggregate power and geographic proximity. Hostile intent is defined as public attempts by one state to destabilize another state’s ruling regime through propaganda, or support by one state for domestic or exile political groups opposed to another state’s ruling regime, or threatening with military or economic sanctions. In this instance, leaders do not see military capabilities by themselves as threatening, but rather view external threatening challenges to their domestic legitimacy and security as being more serious than threats based simply upon a preponderance of military capabilities.
Collective Action. Lacking private incentives—such as threat—collective action theory aims to explain how groups unite to fulfill a common action. Collective action involves group benefits that are inherently shared and therefore they cannot be privatized for individual benefit. Since the benefits are shared, everyone has an incentive to “free ride” on the contributions of others; to let others pay the price of the good. The reason for the smaller expectation is due to how size affects marginal gains calculations. A state acting rationally is expected to increase the supply of a good until its marginal cost equals its marginal gain. However, when such reasoning leads a powerful state to contribute, less powerful states will be tempted to ride free because their efforts cannot be expected to secure much more of the collective good than what will be already supplied by the larger states. Because of this tendency to “free ride,” a collective action usually needs a powerful organizer that can overcome the resistance of states to contribute to an action.40

The value of the collective good should influence state participation in a collective coalition. Those states that highly value a public good are expected to contribute significantly towards obtaining that good. Much of the political disagreement with the United States in the buildup to the Iraq War concerned the value or worth of the “public goods” for potential coalition allies. States clearly did not value the collective action equally. This observation conflicts with most of the existing literature on collective burden sharing. The majority of collective action studies of NATO, for example, assume that states equally value the “collective good.” In the Iraq War, however this assumption did not hold. To determine the collective benefits of the Iraq War, this study identifies three collective goods: the disarmament of Iraqi offensive WMD; the stability of global oil markets; and lastly, the stabilization of the region through the removal of the Hussein regime.

Based on defense expenditures, the United States dwarfed all coalition and potential coalition nations in military spending, comprising 11 percent of the next nine spenders combined and nearly seven times the second largest spender (China). This fact should encourage a coalition partners to free ride, or keep their distance altogether, since the United States possessed more than enough military power to provide the public good.

The collective action hypothesis predicts that the United States and United Kingdom would provide a majority of coalition forces while other partners would provide a minimum. Since the U.S./U.K. bloc was willing and capable for a near-unilateral action, other states had a motivation to ride free. The United States alone was militarily capable of disarming Iraq
untie the knot. Since the United States held the capability for unilateral action, other states had a diminished collective action motivation to participate.

**Alliance Dependence.** Another external dynamic that affects coalition formation and burden sharing is the concept of the alliance security dilemma. Potential allies face a security-autonomy tradeoff when entering into a defense pact; if an excess of “security” exists, a state may opt to trade some of the excess for more autonomy by loosening alliance bonds or by reducing support to the ally on some issues, potentially risking the ally’s support on future security issues.42 However, the security-autonomy tradeoff creates a tension between two fears, the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment.43 This “alliance security dilemma” recognizes that each ally has alternative alliance choices and may opt for one of them if it becomes dissatisfied with the present allies. Therefore, a pervasive aspect of alliances is the constant fear about being deserted by one’s ally. Exercising too much autonomy runs the risk of abandonment, or defection, by allies. Abandonment can range from realigning with one’s adversary, withdrawing from the standing alliance, failing to make good on explicit commitments, or failing to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.44 The most common form of abandonment is the failure to support the ally diplomatically in a dispute with its adversary, when support was expected.45 The trade-off also creates another fear: being too dependent on an ally and risking entrapment. Entrapment occurs when a state becomes entangled in a conflict central to an ally’s interests but peripheral to its own, in the hope that the gains of preserving the alliance will outweigh the risks and costs of future war. Entrapment occurs when one state values the preservation of the alliance over the cost of fighting for its ally’s interests.46

The risks of abandonment and entrapment tend to vary inversely. A possible hedge against abandonment is to increase one’s commitment to an ally, thus increasing the ally’s security and reducing its temptation to defect. However, this increases the likelihood that one will be entrapped by the ally. Concerns about possible entrapment may be reduced by limiting commitment to the ally or by withdrawing support in specific crises. However, this strategy risks devaluing the alliance for the ally and causing its defection. Acting to reduce one’s own alliance concerns tends to increase the ally’s concerns.

The alliance security dilemma arises because reducing the risk of entrapment tends to increase the risk of abandonment: the greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally,
the higher the risk of entrapment. These pressures apply even without a formal alliance if weaker coalitional partners are vulnerable to security threats that they cannot deal with alone. Weaker states, dependent on a dominant ally for security, are significantly influenced by future promises as much as threats of abandonment. Future promises provide the motivation to participate in peripheral security coalitions.

Dependence is not limited to the security realm; states may also be dependent economically or politically. States will be more likely to support an ally that can impose costly adjustments to existing relationships. Additionally, allies may also support an effort in response to incentives, such as military aid or debt forgiveness. Hence, alliance dependence refers to a state’s susceptibility to arm twisting and the conditioning of incentives by coalition leaders.

The alliance security dilemma also influences inter-coalition bargaining considerations. A strategy of strong commitment and support will have the undesired effect of reducing bargaining leverage over the ally. Conversely, bargaining power over the ally is enhanced when support is doubtful because one can make credible threats of non-support. Alliance bargaining thus favors the strategy of weak or ambiguous commitment.

The severity of the alliance security dilemma, and the intensity of fears of abandonment and entrapment, is determined largely by commonality of interests, level of dependence, and commitment to the ally. Thus, the dilemma will be mild when the allies have a high proportion of common interest. The allies will have little fear of abandonment because of shared interests, and since the threat of abandonment has little credibility, they will have little bargaining advantage over each other. In contrast, the alliance security dilemma will be most severe if the allies do not share common interest in the conflict, or if they face the same adversary but have different conflicts with that adversary. Then both the likelihood of abandonment and the cost of entrapment will be high. The allies will simultaneously be skeptical of the other’s commitment and anxious against being trapped into a widening conflict.

The burden sharing decision model operationalizes alliance dependence by analyzing a state’s susceptibility to demands and incentives from the coalition leaders. The most important determinant is the relative dependence of a potential coalition partner on U.S.-provided security. Additionally, trade and economic dependence on the United States should also factor into state burden sharing decisions. The more dependent a state is the more likely the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of abandonment. In the Iraq War case, the greater a state’s
dependence on the United States relative to entrapment concerns, the more it should have contributed to the anti-Hussein coalition. I measure coalition member’s dependence in terms of military and economic ties or other assistance that would be hard to replace with other partners. Britain would be expected to strongly support America because of the shared interests and close diplomatic, economic, and military ties between them. Japan and South Korea are also likely to strongly support due to the U.S. balancing role against China and North Korea in East Asia. Due to the diminished threat of Russia to Western Europe, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Canada should show a reluctance to be entrapped in a U.S. incursion into Iraq. Finally, according to this theory, Iranian, Chinese, and Russian participation should be zero. The effects of alliance dependence are clearest when states make contributions unrelated to any collective action pressures or immediate Iraqi threat. Evidence of alliance dependence is most likely to be seen in bargaining considerations and U.S. pressure to generate support.

U.S. pressure is expected to be highly visible when it becomes part of a “two-level” bargaining game between an ally’s leadership and domestic constituency. As part of a “two-level” bargaining situation, the leadership of an ally will use international pressure to gain concessions from domestic constituencies. Conversely, potential allies will use domestic pressure to gain leverage with the coalition lead in the alliance or coalition bargaining situation. An ally’s negotiators may invoke domestic pressure concerns to soften the coalition lead’s demands, or might use international pressure to garner domestic support.

Internal Factors

Public Opinion. Public opinion plays an important role in the formation of state preferences and the introduction of those preferences into policy choices. Most of the available literature on the interaction between mass public opinion and elites in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies can be categorized into three broad concepts, a “bottom-up” approach, a “top-down” approach, and a “structural” approach where public opinion influence is shaped by issues, domestic structure, elite coalitions and cleavages.

The first concept, the “bottom-up” approach, assumes that public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy. In this mode, leaders follow mass beliefs. This approach assumes the Kantian notion of democracy in which domestic opinion has a great impact on foreign policy. The public has a strong influence on foreign policy because the people bear the costs of
a given foreign policy decision. However, the empirical record for the "bottom-up" thesis shows mixed results. Numerous cases exist where elites have made crucial foreign policy decisions in the absence of public consensus. Examples include the U.S. decisions favoring an active international role post World War II, the West German decision to rearm and join NATO in the early 1950s, the French decision to build an independent nuclear force and leave NATO military structure, and more recently the military surge in Iraq.

A second approach, the "top-down" approach of public opinion, posits an orientation where public consensus is more a function of elite consent that trickles down to the mass public. This approach assumes a state-centered approach to foreign policy. It presumes the public is easily manipulated by political leaders in the foreign policy realm because of the low salience of international issues compared to domestic issues, combined with the low degree of public knowledge on foreign policy issues. In this view, public officials tend to respect their constituents’ preferences on domestic issues, but feel unconstrained on issues pertaining to foreign affairs. However, scholars have reported a high degree of consistency between U.S. public opinion and foreign policy, including a high degree of congruence between shifts in public opinion and changes in foreign policy. Additionally, researchers have also shown public opinion shifting before policy changes, suggesting the weakness of the "top-down" hypothesis.

Lastly, the third approach argues that the role of public opinion varies across issue area, domestic institutional structure, and coalition-building process among elites. This approach assumes that "bottom-up" or "top-down" theories ignore the rich diversity in the ways that public opinion influences policy decisions. Simplistic theories tend to ignore that public opinion and societal groups may influence the policy-making process in several ways and at different stages. The public can directly affect decision making by changing policy goals or how those goals are prioritized or by narrowing the range of policy options. Moreover, the public may also indirectly affect policies by influencing the coalition building processes among the elites. It can influence the positions of bureaucracies or single actors within the government. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, in their review of the state of the discipline with regards to studying public opinion, suggest that domestic structure and societal interaction with the government influence foreign policy. According to their hypothesis, public and elite opinion interact with each other and are transformed into policy decisions differently depending on the issue area, domestic structure, leadership preferences, and elite coalition building processes. Thomas Risse-Kappen and Ole Holsti, in their studies of public opinion on foreign
policy, have demonstrated that understanding domestic structures and coalition-building processes is essential to explain the impact of public opinion on the foreign policy. With these developments in mind, the next section discusses the interaction of public opinion with domestic institutions and politics and their effect on burden sharing outcomes.

**Domestic Structure.** Domestic structure theory provides simplifying assumptions concerning the interaction of the state and society, which in turn allow the prediction of likely foreign policy outcomes. Domestic structure approaches seek to explain the role of the interaction of state political institutions with a given state’s society. They determine the selectivity of political systems to societal demands.

The burden sharing decision model incorporates a structural approach to understanding domestic influence of foreign policy decisions. Table 1.4 shows the typology of executive influence based on state structure. This

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Executive Structure</th>
<th>Degree of Executive Autonomy from the Legislature</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
<th>Non-autonomous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Centralized              | Type I  
  **Cognitive Explanation:**  
The beliefs of a chief executive determines the burden sharing strategy. | Type II  
  **Societal Constraints:**  
Burden sharing strategy is formulated by a chief executive whose preferences reflect public and legislative pressures. |
| Decentralized            | Type III  
  **Elite Coalition Building:**  
The state’s policy is determined by intra-elite bargaining | Type IV  
  **Elite Coalition Building Subject to Societal Constraints:**  
Policy is the outcome of compromise and coalition building among elites whose preferences reflect societal pressures |

Adapted From: Susan Peterson, *Crisis Bargaining and the State*
typology of state-societal relations provides a framework for predicting outcomes based on domestic structure theory. The organization of decision making authority varies along a continuum from centralized to decentralized based on the number of bureaucratic agencies, ministries, and other governmental offices that have authority over a given issue. A centralized configuration exists when foreign policy decision making is restricted to relatively few government officials. The second element, degree of executive autonomy from the legislature, defines the executive autonomy vis-à-vis society. The greater the executive autonomy, the less control the legislature can exert over the content of a state’s foreign policy. The legislature exerts control through two possible causal paths. First, the legislature may possess the authority to make policy for a specific issue area. For instance, the Turkish parliament must approve the stationing of foreign troops on its soil. Second, the executive may be responsible to and dependent on the legislature for tenure in office. A foreign policy executive that is not constrained by the legislature is considered autonomous, while an executive constrained by the legislature is considered non-autonomous.\textsuperscript{55}

In a Type I structure, decision making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive enjoys near total autonomy from legislative scrutiny. In a Type I environment, foreign policy depends on cognitive explanations, or the strategic beliefs of the chief executive.\textsuperscript{66} Cognitive explanations distinguish between those who view the international system as conflictual and those who see a more harmonious world.\textsuperscript{67} While the structure of decision making authority determines that the chief executive is responsible for decision making, the content and rigidity of the leader’s own beliefs explains how the state responds to burden-sharing requests.\textsuperscript{68}

In a Type IV state, domestic political factors have the greatest influence on foreign policy decisions. A Type IV structure exists when the foreign policy decision process is composed of a number of different offices that share responsibility for foreign policy decision making, and when the legislature performs a significant oversight function. In this type of state, domestic pressures shape national leaders’ preferences, and the state’s policy response is the result of internal bureaucratic bargaining. Unable to act alone, individual policy makers must recognize domestic opponents who may appeal directly to the public. Interest groups, political parties, the media, and public opinion shape the policy-making process because the foreign policy executive is responsible to the legislature and, indirectly, to the public. Because of the many hands formulating policy, even the most powerful leaders must build a coalition of support for their preferred policy. State institutions shape national policy preferences by
allowing societal actors a voice in the process. State structure determines that policy will be the outcome of domestic bargaining and coalition building.\textsuperscript{59}

Decision making in a Type III state resembles that of the Type IV state with one exception. An internal process of coalition building and compromise among bureaucratic agencies exists, however, the executive branch benefits from significant autonomy from the legislature. Therefore, societal constraints do not enter the decision-making process. Foreign policy elite actors appeal to various bureaucratic or institutional constituencies, since a direct appeal to the public or interest groups would be ineffective. No representative element exists to channel public opinion into the policy-making process. Coalition politics prevail in a state where foreign policy is created by a multitude of actors.\textsuperscript{70}

Finally, Type II states are characterized by need for the large-scale coalition building by the chief executive. The chief executive cannot ignore domestic considerations created by the executive-legislative relationship. Thus while a centralized cadre formulates foreign policy, the existence of administrative, regulatory, or legislative procedures enable societal influences to assume a legitimate role in the government’s policy process.\textsuperscript{71} Policy preferences will reflect not only the executive beliefs, but will also reflect the pressures exerted by political parties, interest groups, public opinion, and the legislature. One would expect the executive to give attention to societal groups’ interests in this configuration.\textsuperscript{72}

These two components of state structure—structure of the foreign policy executive and degree of executive autonomy from other societal actors—determine the avenues through which foreign policy is made, but do not determine outcomes. These components determine the contingent conditions where cognitive, bureaucratic, or domestic bargaining theories dominate. In all cases, it still remains necessary to determine the preferences of the decision making elite and society to determine the executive influence on outcomes.

The domestic structure typology provides a predictive framework of the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. Type I states are expected to make contributions in response to pressure from the alliance leader unless preexisting beliefs, or a threat to key national interests exist. Conversely, Type IV states are likely to keep their distance or ride free due to the influence of societal pressure and the need to build an elite consensus for coalition participation. Type III states are expected to support the coalition to the level of support determined by elite consensus, while Type II states are expected to be support to the limit of public and legislature support. The domestic structure typology formalizes the link between public opinion and foreign policy and explicitly stipulates the causal
mechanisms in which public opinion becomes expressed in foreign policy decisions.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is a state’s relative contribution to the Iraq War coalition. Coalition contributions are measured as military, economic, and diplomatic contributions to the Iraq coalition, and post war stability operations. Coalition contributions are ranked according to the level of commitment to the coalition. This book operationalizes the level of commitment in the following manner. States that provided combat forces in Iraq demonstrate the highest level of commitment: stationing troops within Iraq could generate the largest domestic backlash and therefore these states incur the greatest amount of political risk. The next highest level of support would go to those states that provided personnel into areas surrounding Iraq, significant financial contribution, allowed basing of coalition personnel, and/or diplomatically supported the U.S. position in the UN. The next level of support includes states that provided nominal military support such as over-flight rights or refueling privileges, provided a minimum level of economic support, or eventually diplomatically supported the Iraq coalition. Finally, the lowest level of commitment includes those states that provided no support, or were outspoken diplomatically in their opposition to the U.S.-led coalition.

The security coalition model has three contribution outcomes indicating a state’s contribution or lack thereof towards the coalition objective. The model accounts for equifinality; therefore, there may be more than one path to a given outcome. The outcomes include: (1) no contribution, or negative contribution; (2) the state contributes robustly in areas with public or state support; and (3) the state supports minimally and does not contribute in areas with public or state opposition. These three outcomes generate four possible explanatory effects that match a state’s contribution, or lack thereof, to the coalition. States will either (1) keep their distance; (2) free ride; (3) show their preferences and pay; or (4) pay due to entrapment.

A state “keeps its distance” if it neither shares the public or private security “good,” and does not contribute to the coalition. This situation is likely if a state does not benefit from the coalition and is not alliance dependent on coalition members. States that do not share the public good but are alliance dependent—such as on NATO—may also “keep its distance” due to domestic constraints, but they risk alliance abandonment in the future.
A state “free rides” if it perceives security to be a private or public good but does not contribute. Free riding is likely when a state believes other states will provide adequate security without its contribution and if the state is not dependent coalition members. Free riding also occurs when a state under-contributes to the coalition. States are likely to free ride when domestic pressures limit involvement. Similar to the “keep the distance” effect, alliance dependent states risk abandonment if they free ride.

Two effects occur when a state contributes robustly to a coalition, they “reveal their preferences” or are “entrapped and pay.” States “reveal their preferences and pay” when they share in the public or private good and fear that it will be undersupplied by the coalition. In this instance, they will reveal their preferences for the public or private good and supply support appropriately. Conversely, states are “entrapped and force to pay,” when they do not highly value the good but are highly dependent on a coalition partner. States seeking favor from a dominant power may be forced to support a coalition even if they have no direct stake security good.

Two additional burden sharing models currently seek to explain the complexity of coalition burden sharing decisions, but each is limited in its application. In “Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO policy in Kosovo,” David Auerswald presents an integrated model explaining state decisions for participation in the 1999 Operation Allied Force. He examines the variation in burden sharing in NATO’s intervention using four relatively sparse, existing approaches to foreign policy analysis: theories of collective action, balance of threat, public opinion, and government institutional structures. In his analysis, Auerswald developed a simple, integrated, decision making model that incorporates the core concepts from each existing explanation in a staged, conditional manner. Auerswald’s research demonstrates that the integrated model is more explanatory than each theory individually. Although his model provides a parsimonious explanation for NATO burden sharing in Kosovo, it suffers from two significant weaknesses. First, Auerswald’s analysis is limited to “wars of choice” where direct threat is insignificant. Although he accounts for threat in his theory, he limits its influence by stating, “I assume that no group member’s survival is threatened, an assumption consistent with the vast majority of contemporary interventions of choice by western powers.” Although this restriction was valid for the Kosovo intervention, it limits the generalizability of the model. Since the model fails to account for threat, it does not account for the dynamics of burden sharing where the adversary directly threatens some members of the coalition. The second limitation of the model is that it assumes knowledge of the “K-Group,” or collective action core group, in advance. Outcomes significantly change whether one is a member of the
collective action core, but the designation of the group is tautological in Auerswald’s analysis. K-Group membership is exogenous to the model, but determination of group membership is typically determined by level of support for a particular intervention. Determining K-Group members in advance is difficult if not impossible methodologically. Membership in the core of a collective action group is often the product of “strategic behavior” that Auerswald admits is missing from the model.76 In total, Auerswald’s model is a useful, but limited, analysis tool.

The second burden sharing model was proffered by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Leipgold, and Danny Unger to explain burden sharing decisions in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.77 The Bennett, Leipgold, Unger model is a multi-causal theory that accounts for international, domestic, and cognitive influences. It incorporates the same international factors as the Auerswald model, but also accounts for threat in a state’s decision calculus. The strength of the Bennett, Leipgold, and Unger model is that it accounts for a greater range of interventions than the Auerswald model. This model accounts for complex interactions between independent variables, and provides multiple causal paths to outcomes. It is not limited to a certain subset of interventions and therefore is generalizable to a wider range of security interventions. The weakness of the Bennett, Leipgold, and Unger model, however, is that its explanation of domestic influences on decision making is overly complicated making it difficult to employ for the foreign affairs specialist.

The domestic institutions and politics conceptualization, as presented in Bennet, Leipgold, and Unger security decision making model, provides a rich, nuanced approach to the influence of society on foreign policy decisions. However, the interaction of the theories is difficult to operationalize into a predictive framework. Due to the complex interactions of the domestic variables, predictions are indeterminate.78 To improve the predictive capability of the model, these state-societal interactions may be simplified using assumptions developed recently in the area of domestic structure theory. The burden sharing model presented in this chapter preserves the external and cognitive theorizing of the Bennett model, but significantly improves its predictive and analytic capability by presenting a structural approach to explain the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy decisions.

Methodology

I incorporate in-depth qualitative analysis on state burden sharing decisions—each case from a different domestic structure typology—to explore the influence of domestic politics on Iraq War burden sharing
decisions. Cases were selected based on their importance to the U.S.-led coalition as well as their differing state-society relations. This methodology highlighted the influence of domestic structure under similar constraints. Additionally, the following three case studies demonstrate the influence of war duration on coalition participation. A coalition leader must expend significant effort to manage coalition participation when war duration is long and the costs of participation are high.

Chapter two presents an analysis of South Korea’s support of the coalition. The ROK, representing a Type I domestic structure where decision making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive enjoys near autonomy from legislative scrutiny, was the third largest provider of military forces for a significant portion of the stabilization effort. Korea’s economic participation was also significant. Korea’s contribution of over $250 million to the Iraq reconstruction fund marked it as a significant donor, within the top ten states providing monetary support to Iraq. Korea’s participation was significant theoretically considering it had no direct national interest in the Iraq War.

Chapter three analyzes the German decision to lobby against the U.S. position concerning Iraq. Within a year of declaring Germany’s unqualified support to the U.S. global war on terrorism, Schröder became the first Western leader to issue a categorical “no” to the Bush administration for participation in the Iraq War. The Schröder government not only declined to make a direct German contribution to the war in 2003, but also engaged in active counter-coalition building by lobbying France and Russia to support Germany’s resistance to the U.S. “adventure.” Germany abandoned its traditional policy of balancing between Washington and Paris, and instead created a counter-coalition with Russia and France against the United States. Due to the influence of German national elections, incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government reflected a Type II domestic structure. Schröder was able to commandeer the foreign policy process and imprint his preferences on German policy by appealing directly to public attitudes during his re-election campaign concerning the use of force in Iraq. Since Schröder’s stance resonated well with the public, he was able to accomplish a policy coup and develop a policy position individually, rather than through the typical collaborative process. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S.-led coalition, regardless of the Security Council’s position, seriously undermined the diplomatic position of the Bush administration in building an effective coalition against Iraq.

Finally, chapter four explores the Turkish decision to remain on the sidelines for the invasion of Iraq, even under immense U.S. pressure. Historically, Turkish foreign policy was forged in a highly centralized
manner that did not necessarily reflect societal interests, reflecting a Type I domestic structure. Due to national elections in November 2002—which prompted a change of the ruling party and a restructuring of the National Assembly—Turkey acted rather as a Type IV state in the domestic structure typology. During the approach to the Iraq War, Turkey showed decentralized decision making that was dominated by the influence of a newly elected National Assembly. This influence was not immediately recognized by the Bush administration and U.S. attempts to influence Turkey failed to account for the change in political dynamics. The Bush administration’s inability to win Ankara’s approval for a northern front in the Iraq War significantly affected U.S. war plans and dealt a serious blow to U.S.-Turkish relations.

I close with a discussion of this research and implications for coalition participation. Several factors influence the proliferation of military action within coalitions rather than alliances. The United Nations Security Council has become more active in collective security and peacekeeping operations. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have approved numerous operations that would have previously garnered a veto.59 These UN authorized security missions are typically implemented through ad hoc coalitions since the UN maintains no standing security agreement. Secondly, the United States has fought only two military actions since World War II as a member of a standing military alliance. It rather chooses to engage in military action unilaterally or as a member of a coalition.80 The termination of Cold War alignments and alliances will continue to contribute to a less rigid and more dynamic structure of international security favoring coalitions over alliance military action. “Coalitions of the willing” will need to be formed to answer to security dilemmas not anticipated by formal alliance structures. When a sense of urgency combines with sufficient international support for undertaking joint military action, coalitions—rather than alliances—are more likely to distribute costs among military members and politically provide a sense of legitimacy and common purpose for a given action.81

With this in mind, a more detailed understanding of coalition burden sharing is a significant and timely topic.

---

Untangling the Puzzle of Coalition Burden Sharing


6 Pauly and Lansford, Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War, 96.


8 Quoted in Pauly and Lansford, Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War, 97.

9 Ibid.


12 The opening paragraph of resolution 1472 notes, “Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


See Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.”


For a detailed description of the model see Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War*. This model is limited in that the complexity of its Domestic Institutions and Politics module makes it very difficult to operationalize.


This definition builds on the work of Khong and Reiter in that it recognizes that decision-makers use analogy to simplify complex cognitive problems and that lessons are “learned” from past experience. See Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars.

These assumptions draw heavily on the methodology in Bennett, Leopold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 14-17.

The determination of threat is critical to determining the amount of publicness of the security intervention. A non-threatened ally will likely display collective action motivations, while a threatened ally will more likely participate fully with a countering coalition. Ibid., 10.


Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, 24.


Although it is now known that Iraq did not have WMD capability for some time, overtly Iraq maintained the threat of WMD that was seen as credible by many parties. This threat can be accounted for in balance of threat theory. Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the Inside,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006). For a detailed review of the delusion throughout Iraq’s military regime see Kevin M. Woods and Joint Center for Operational Analysis (U.S.), Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership (United States Joint Forces Command, Joint
Coalition Politics and the Iraq War


38 This method of coding threat is seen in Gause, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf.”
40 Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
45 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 182.
46 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 12.
48 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger found that several states in the Desert Storm coalition were motivated not so much by actual dependence on the United States, but rather expected future dependence. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 347-48. This behavior is consistent with a hedging strategy, see Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).
51 For an excellent discussion on the intensity of the alliance dilemma see Snyder, Alliance Politics, 186-92.
54 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.”
55 Page and Shapiro statistically show public opinion leads policy outcomes, but fail to determine the mechanisms in which public opinion affects elite behavior, see Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (1983).


61 Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.”

62 Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.”


64 In a methodology adapted from Susan Peterson’s work to explain state strategies for crisis bargaining, the domestic structure block presents a typology of likely responses to a burden sharing situation based on the centralization of the executive branch of government in the influence of society through the legislature. See Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict. See also Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms.”


67 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 3.


69 Ibid., 36-38.

70 Ibid., 38-40.

Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, 40-41.


Ibid., 643.

Ibid., 658.

For a full discussion of the security decision model, see Bennett, Leppard, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War.

David Auerswald notes that he had to simplify the complicated methodology in Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo.” Gerald Steinberg in a review of Friends in Need notes “the heavy weapons of social science were too powerful for the issues at hand” in Gerald Steinberg, The American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (1998), 743-44.


The U.S. participated with alliance partners in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, even these actions were somewhat ad hoc since Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was not activated. Participation by NATO states was voluntary for these military actions. Terry J. Pudas, “Preparing Future Coalition Commanders,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 3 (1993/1994). In non-Article V operations no one can know with certainty the extent to which NATO members ultimately will contribute, see Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo.” U.S. participation in Afghanistan is separate from NATO stabilization operations.