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Growing evidence of climate change, along with the continuing threat of global terrorism, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, the rippling effects of higher food and oil prices, and financial markets’ meltdown in 2008, has brought home to Americans and to people around the world the complex governance challenges we face today. These also include the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation, large-scale humanitarian crises and intractable conflicts in several parts of the world, the persistence of deep poverty, and failed states.

None of these problems can be managed by sovereign states acting alone, even by the sole superpower, the United States. All require cooperation of some sort among governments and the increasing number of nonstate actors; many require the active participation of ordinary citizens; some demand the establishment of new international mechanisms for monitoring or the negotiation of new international rules; and most require the refinement of means for securing states’ and actors’ compliance. All illustrate the effects of globalization in intensifying the connections between peoples and states around the world.

In short, there is a wide variety of international policy problems that require governance. Sometimes the need is truly global in scope, as with terrorism or climate change. In other cases, the governance problem is specific to a region of the world or group of countries, as with the need to manage an international river or regional sea. But what do we mean by “governance,” and is the need for global governance increasing?

**What Is Global Governance?**

In 1995 the Commission on Global Governance, an independent group of prominent international figures, published a report on what reforms in modes of international cooperation were called for by global changes. The commission defined governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions,
public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal . . . as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 2).

How does governance relate to government? While clearly related, they are not identical. As James Rosenau (1992: 4) put it:

Both refer to purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, nongovernmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants.

Thus, global governance is not global government; it is not a single world order; it is not a top-down, hierarchical structure of authority. It is the multi-level collection of governance-related activities, rules, and mechanisms, formal and informal, public and private, existing in the world today. We refer to these as the pieces of global governance.

Although the idea of global governance has ancient roots, post–Cold War liberalism and globalization have heavily influenced contemporary conceptions of global governance. Analyzing these pieces of global governance and the actors in the politics and processes that have shaped them is the central purpose of this book. Post–Cold War liberalism and globalization have brought clear changes in who makes collective decisions over various parts of the international community and in the authority under which those decisions are made. Although states still exercise coercive power, global, regional, and transnational governance increasingly rests on new bases of authority. Thus, Emmanuel Adler and Steven Bernstein (2005: 302) note that “the decoupling of coercive force and legitimate rule is the most striking feature of contemporary global governance.” Our task is to explain the norms, structures, rules, processes, and challenges of global governance.

The Pieces of Global Governance

The pieces of global governance are the cooperative problem-solving arrangements and activities that states and other actors have put into place to deal with
various issues and problems. They include international or transnational structures such as formal international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); international rules or laws, norms or “soft law,” as well as international regimes in which the rules, norms, and structures are linked together in a specific issue area; ad hoc arrangements and global conferences; and private and hybrid public-private governance schemes (see Figure 1.1).

**Intergovernmental Organizations**

IGOs are organizations that include at least three states among their membership, that have activities in several states, and that are created through a formal intergovernmental agreement such as a treaty, charter, or statute. In 2008–2009, the *Yearbook of International Organizations* identified about 240 IGOs. These organizations range in size from 3 members (North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]) to more than 190 members (Universal Postal Union [UPU]). Members may come from primarily one geographic region (Organization of American States [OAS]) or from all geographic regions (World Bank). Although some IGOs are designed to achieve a single purpose (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]), others have been developed for multiple tasks (United Nations [UN]). Most IGOs are not global in membership but regional, wherein a commonality of interest motivates states to cooperate on issues directly affecting them. Among the universe of IGOs, most are small in membership and designed to address specific functions. Most have been formed since World War II, and among the different regions, Europe has the densest concentration of IGOs (see Figure 1.2).

IGOs are recognized subjects of international law with separate standing from their member states. In a 1949 advisory opinion, *Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, the International Court of Justice

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**Figure 1.1 Pieces of Global Governance**

- International structures and mechanisms (formal and informal)
  - IGOs: global, regional, other
  - NGOs
- International rules and laws
  - Multilateral agreements; customary practices; judicial decisions; regulatory standards
- International norms or “soft law”
  - Framework agreements; select UN resolutions
- International regimes
- Ad hoc groups, arrangements, and global conferences
- Private and hybrid public-private governance
(ICJ) concluded: “The Organization [the United Nations] was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality.”

IGOs serve many diverse functions, including collecting information and monitoring trends (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP]), delivering services and aid (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]), providing forums for intergovernmental bargaining (European Union [EU]), and adjudicating disputes (International Court of Justice, World Trade Organization [WTO]). IGOs are instrumental in helping states form stable habits of cooperation through regular meetings, information gathering and analysis, and dispute settlement as well as operational activities (see Figure 1.3). They enhance individual and collective welfare. They also “construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place,” in the words of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2005: 162). And, “they help define the interests that states and other actors come to hold.”

Yet how IGOs serve their various functions varies across organizations. Organizations differ in membership. They vary by the scope of the subject and rules. They differ in the amount of resources available and by level and degree of bureaucratization as well as in their effectiveness.

Why do states join such organizations? Why do they choose to act and to cooperate through formal IGOs? Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998: 6)
answer these questions by suggesting that IGOs “allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization’s ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states.” Thus, states join to participate in a stable negotiating forum, permitting rapid reactions in times of crisis. They join IGOs to negotiate and implement agreements that reflect self- and community interests. They participate to provide mechanisms for dispute resolution. They join to take advantage of centralized organization in the implementation of collective tasks. By participating, they agree to shape international debate on important issues and forge critical norms of behavior. Yet states still maintain their sovereignty and varying degrees of independence of action.

IGOs not only create opportunities for their member states, but also exercise influence and impose constraints on their member states’ policies and processes. IGOs affect member states by setting international and hence national agendas, and forcing governments to take positions on issues. They subject states’ behavior to surveillance through information sharing. They encourage the development of specialized decisionmaking and implementation processes to facilitate and coordinate IGO participation. They embody or facilitate the creation of principles, norms, and rules of behavior with which states must align their policies if they wish to benefit from reciprocity. For example, Chapter 9 explores how China’s admission to the World Trade Organization has affected its national policies and required extensive governmental reforms.

Most countries perceive that there are benefits to participating in IGOs and international regimes even when it is costly. South Africa never withdrew from the UN over the long years when it was repeatedly condemned for its policies of apartheid. Iraq did not withdraw from the UN when it was subject to more than a decade of stringent sanctions. China spent fourteen years negotiating the terms of its entry into the international trade system and undertaking changes in laws and policies required to bring itself into compliance with WTO rules.
Twelve countries joined the EU between 2004 and 2007, despite the extensive and costly changes required.

Although the earliest IGOs were established in the nineteenth century, there was a veritable explosion of IGOs in the twentieth century, as discussed in Chapter 3. Major-power wars (especially World Wars I and II), economic development, technological innovation, and the growth of the state system, especially with decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, provided impetus for creating many IGOs. Since the 1960s, there has also been a growing phenomenon of IGOs creating other IGOs. One study noted that IGO birthrates “correlate positively with the number of states in the international system,” but found death rates of IGOs low (Cupitt, Whitlock, and Whitlock 1997: 16). Of thirty-four IGOs functioning in 1914, eighteen were still operational at the end of the twentieth century. The Cold War’s end brought the death of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, both Soviet-bloc institutions. The creation of the UN in 1945 led to the demise of the League of Nations. The authoritative source for all data on international organizations, both IGOs and NGOs, is the Union of International Associations (UIA), located in Brussels, and its Yearbook of International Organizations.

Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs are private voluntary organizations whose members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a common purpose. Some organizations are formed to advocate a particular cause such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection. Others are established to provide services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid in war-torn societies, or development assistance. Some are in reality government-organized groups (dubbed GONGOs). Scholars and analysts distinguish between not-for-profit groups (the vast majority) and for-profit corporations; it is also common to treat terrorist, criminal, and drug-trafficking groups separately.

NGOs are increasingly active today at all levels of human society and governance, from local or grassroots communities to national and international politics. Many national-level groups, often called interest or pressure groups, are now linked to counterpart groups in other countries through networks or federations. International NGOs, like IGOs, may draw their members from more than one country, and they may have very specific functions or be multifunctional.

The estimates of numbers of NGOs vary enormously. The 2008–2009 Yearbook of International Organizations identifies over 7,600 nongovernmental organizations that have an international dimension in terms of either membership or commitment to conduct activities in several states. Exclusively national NGOs number in the millions. Many large international NGOs (INGOs) are transnational federations involving formal, long-term links among national groups. Examples include the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

NGOs' governance functions parallel many functions provided by IGOs and, like IGOs, they can be analyzed as both pieces of and actors in global governance. As pieces of governance, they provide processes at many levels to pressure or persuade individuals, governments, IGOs, corporations, and other actors to improve human rights records, protect the environment, tackle corruption, create a ban on landmines, or intervene in conflicts such as that in the Darfur region of Sudan. The Geneva Conventions delegate legal responsibility for humanitarian law to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Some IGOs, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), World Tourism Organization, and the UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), provide for NGO roles in their governance. As a result of global trends to privatize activities previously controlled by governments, services once provided by governments or IGOs are now often contracted out to NGOs. They deliver disaster relief, run refugee camps, administer development programs, strive to contain the international spread of disease, and work to clean up the environment. They are important pieces of global governance because of the ways they enable individuals to “act publicly” (Kaldor 2003: 585). Likewise, their “voluntary, local, and issue-specific character . . . [and the networks they create] make them a useful link between the subnational community and national and international communities and institutions” (Ku and Diehl 2006: 171). In this sense, they function as transmission belts among multiple levels of governance.

International Rules and Law
The scope of what is generally known as public international law has expanded tremendously since the 1960s. Although the statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes five sources of international law (treaties or conventions, customary practice, the writings of legal scholars, judicial decisions, and general principles of law), much of the growth has been in treaty law. Between 1951 and 1995, 3,666 new multilateral treaties were concluded (Ku 2001). They included the Vienna Convention on Treaties, conventions on ozone, climate change, and whaling, the Law of the Sea, humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions), human rights law, trade law, arms control agreements, and intellectual property law. By far the largest number of new multilateral agreements deal with economic issues. Treaty-based law has been particularly valued because the process of negotiation now involves all affected countries. Nonetheless, customary practice persists as an important source of new law, particularly because of the long time it takes to negotiate and bring into effect agreements involving large numbers of countries.
For purposes of global governance, one major limitation of public international law is that it applies only to states, except for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At present, except within the European Union, multilateral agreements cannot be used directly to bind individuals, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, paramilitary forces, terrorists, or international criminals. They can, however, establish norms that states are expected to observe and, where possible, enforce against nonstate actors, such as leaders of rebel groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.

Another problem in the eyes of many is the absence of international enforcement mechanisms and the role of self-interest in shaping states’ decisions about whether or not to accept treaties and other forms of international rules. International law has traditionally left states to use “self-help” means to secure compliance. In reality, the United Nations Charter and European Union treaties, for example, provide enforcement mechanisms, yet the threat of sanctions is not a key motivator for compliance with international rules.

Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995), instead, cite efficiency, interests, and norms as key factors, and treaty ambiguity and lack of capability as principal sources of noncompliance. States often value a reputation for law-abiding behavior and desire the benefits of reciprocity (the “golden rule” of “doing unto others as you would have them do unto you”); they are generally inclined to comply with international law. Peer pressure from other states and domestic or transnational pressures from NGOs may induce compliance. For weaker and developing states, failure to comply can be a consequence of inadequate local expertise and governmental capacity to do what is required for compliance. In short, the “force” of international law often comes from the “felt need to coordinate activities . . . and to ensure stable and predictive patterns of behavior,” and the reality is “imperfect, varied, and changing implementation and compliance,” with many factors affecting the extent to which states meet legal commitments (Jacobson and Weiss 1995: 122).

**International Norms or “Soft Law”**

Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of norms in international relations. These are shared expectations or understandings regarding standards of appropriate behavior for various actors, particularly states. They range from the norm that states are obligated to carry out treaties they ratify (*pacta sunt servanda*) to the expectation that combatants will not target civilians. Norms vary in strength, and determining whether one exists involves ascertaining whether states perceive that a certain practice is obligatory or expected. Some norms are so internalized in states that they are difficult to recognize unless a violation occurs. Still others are weak, contested, or “emerging.”

Many international legal conventions set forth nonbinding obligations for states that are in fact norms and sometimes referred to as “soft law.” Examples
of such soft law include human rights and labor rights norms, the concept of the global commons applied to the high seas, outer space, and polar regions, as well as the concept of sustainable development. Generally, “the degree of formalization determines the strength of a rule, especially when it is made legally binding” (Duffield 2007: 10).

Soft law can take a number of forms when a formal agreement is not possible. In 2005, for example, the final document of the UN-sponsored World Summit endorsed the emerging norm of responsibility to protect (R2P), which is seen as the soft-law basis for humanitarian interventions when states fail to protect peoples at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other major human rights violations.

In environmental law, an initial framework convention often sets forth norms and principles that states agree on, such as those for ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, and global climate change, but no concrete actions. As scientific understanding of the problem improves, the political environment changes, and technology provides new possible solutions (such as substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals, or carbon dioxide–producing energy sources), leading states, key corporations, and other interested actors may agree on specific, binding steps to be taken. Protocols are used to supplement the initial framework convention, and they are considered to form the “hard” law dealing with the issue. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, was the first attempt to give effect to general principles in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Negotiations are currently under way to produce a successor agreement—a hard-law agreement—that establishes state obligations to take urgently needed action. Soft law has the advantages of being easier to negotiate, more flexible, and leaving open the possibility of negotiating hard law in the future.

International Regimes

Scholars have developed the concept of international regimes to understand governance where principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures are linked to one another in a particular issue area. Where international regimes exist, such as for nuclear weapons proliferation, whaling, European transboundary air pollution, and food aid, participating states and other international actors recognize the existence of certain obligations and feel compelled to honor them. Because this is “governance without government,” they comply based on an acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules and underlying norms, and the validity of the decisionmaking procedures. They expect other states and actors also to comply and to utilize dispute settlement procedures to resolve conflicts. Key characteristics of international regimes are their association with a specific issue area and the links among the constituent elements.

International regimes encompass rules and norms, as well as the practices of actors that show both how their expectations converge and their acceptance
of and compliance with rules. IGO decisionmaking procedures, bureaucracy, budget, headquarters, and legal personality may be required (or established) within a given issue area, but individual IGOs, by themselves, do not constitute a regime. Some issues, such as nuclear accidents that trigger widespread nuclear fallout, do not need a formal organization that functions regardless of whether there is an accident. Ad hoc arrangements for decisionmaking and taking action when an accident occurs can be coupled with rules and norms. The regime for nuclear weapons proliferation, however, benefits from the inspection machinery and safeguard systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (even though it is not yet in effect), the UN Security Council’s enforcement powers, and the IAEA’s technical assistance programs to non–nuclear weapon countries for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Not all issue areas have resulted in regimes, as discussed in Chapter 2. But where regimes exist, they are key pieces of global governance.

Ad Hoc Groups, Arrangements, and Global Conferences
As multilateralism has become the dominant practice in international affairs, other types of global governance pieces have emerged. These include various ad hoc arrangements and groupings that lack a formal legal basis, UN-sponsored global conferences, intergovernmental panels and forums, and commissions.

The Group of Seven (G-7), for example, began in an ad hoc fashion in the mid-1970s, when summit meetings of governmental leaders were not yet common practice and major changes in international economic relations suggested the value of periodic, informal gatherings. These later evolved into a regular arrangement, but not a formal IGO. In 1992, Russia was invited to join the group for noneconomic discussions, thus creating the Group of Eight (G-8), which dealt with nuclear proliferation questions after the breakup of the Soviet Union and efforts to curb financing of terrorism after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. For the 2007 G-7/8 summit, Germany as host invited Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa to participate in G-8+5 discussions, recognizing that the G-8 no longer reflected the realities of world politics. A number of such “G” groups now exist. Led by India, Brazil, and South Africa, for example, the Group of 20 (G-20) (comprising both developed and developing countries) has played significant roles in WTO trade negotiations, demonstrating that the major economic powers could not have a free hand. The politics of these negotiations are discussed in Chapter 9.

When Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy decided to negotiate a convention banning antipersonnel landmines in 1996, none of the existing IGO structures, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly, seemed appropriate for achieving this goal in a short period of time. Instead, Axworthy convened a special conference in Ottawa in Decem-
ber 1997 for the sole purpose of securing agreement on a total ban by the largest possible number of countries. A similar process was used in 2007–2008 by Norway and other countries to conclude an international treaty banning cluster munitions.

Since the 1970s, the United Nations has convened many global conferences on economic, environmental, and social matters. Some have been designated “world summits” rather than “global conferences” because they have included meetings of heads of state and government. These conferences have spawned complex multilateral diplomacy, with NGOs, scientific experts, corporations, and interested individuals trying to influence outcomes. They have raised important issues of who gets to participate and in what ways. Often the results are disappointing to those most concerned about the issues, because they may represent the least common denominator of agreement among the large number of participants, of whom only states, however, actually have a formal say.

Conferences like the Summit for Children (New York, 1990), the Earth Summit (Rio, 1992), the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), and the UN Climate Change Conference (Bali, 2007) have been important global political processes for addressing interdependence issues, for seeking ways to improve the lives and well-being of humans, and for strengthening other pieces of governance. They also have raised awareness of interdependence issues; galvanized the creation, dissemination, and sharing of knowledge; created new norms and new international law; created new structures; and defined global political priorities. Cumulatively since the 1970s, the global conferences have also bolstered understanding of the linkages among issues of environmental protection, equal rights (especially for women), elimination of poverty, improved access to economic resources, sharing of knowledge and technology, and participation of local communities.

**Private Governance**

Private governance is a growing but little-studied phenomenon. Although the meaning of the term is disputed, private governance involves authoritative decisionmaking in areas where states have not acted, or have chosen not to exercise authority, or where states have themselves been ineffective in the exercise of authority. Examples include international accounting standards; the private bond-rating agencies, such as Moody’s Investors Service, whose rules can shape government actions through the threatened drop in a country’s rating; International Chamber of Commerce rules and actions; private industry governance, such as the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Manufacturing Principles and the Forest Stewardship Council; or labor standards within a single multinational firm such as Nike or Ford.

Cyberspace is governed by hybrid institutions, and presently involves a strong dose of private authority. Private firms are attempting to establish
enforceable intellectual property rules for music, software, and published materials available on the Internet. Visa and MasterCard have created the Secure Electronic Transaction protocol to enable bank-card transactions to be made securely via the Internet. As Debora Spar (1999: 47) notes about this electronic environment:

International organizations lack the power to police cyberspace; national governments lack the authority; and the slow pace of interstate agreement is no match for the rapid-fire rate of technological change. If rules are to emerge along the Internet, private entities will have to create them . . . [including] University consortia and library groups . . . industry associations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Business Software Alliance.

Private authorities are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. “What is evident, though,” Spar (48) says, “is that private entities will play an ever-increasing role in the development and management of electronic interaction. . . . They will assume quasi-governmental functions in many instances, regulating activity in their particular spheres through a combination of formal and informal rules, administrative and technical means.” The mix of public and private governance required by the Internet’s growth is explored further in Chapter 12. The various pieces of global governance are not well organized. They vary in scope, effectiveness, and durability. In subsequent chapters we shall explore them in more depth and specificity. We turn now, however, to identifying the key actors in global governance.

**Actors in Global Governance**

The complexity of global governance is a function not only of many pieces, but also of many actors, some of which are linked in networks. Such networks have become increasingly dense since the 1970s, when Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971) first pointed out the importance of regular interactions of governmental and nongovernmental actors across national boundaries. Such scholars as Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004), Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995), and James Rosenau (1997) have explored the existence of these networks and their policy impact. What differentiates the concept of global governance from international relations is the equal importance attached to such networks as well as to NGOs, multinational corporations, scientific experts, IGOs, and other types of actors along with states (see Figure 1.4). Whereas international relations is largely interested in politics between and among states, “the term global governance does not establish such a hierarchy. . . . In essence, global governance implies a multiactor perspective on world politics” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 191).
States continue to be key actors in global governance, creating many of the pieces and carrying out many of the activities. States alone have sovereignty, which has historically given them authority not only over their own territory and people, but also over powers delegated to international institutions. States create IGOs and set their mandates; they create international law and norms and determine their effectiveness through their compliance or failure to comply. Because the more than 190 states in the international system vary so dramatically, however, their relative importance in global governance will vary. Large, powerful states are more likely to play greater roles than are smaller, less powerful states. The United States, in particular, used its dominant position after World War II to shape much of the structure and rules of the postwar international system. At the time, IGOs offered a way to create structures compatible with American notions of political order and through which to promote US political and economic interests. Although support for such institutions was not necessarily ensured, governmental and public commitment were generally strong. The predominance of Americans in many secretariats and the relatively large share of operating and program funding contributed by the United States reinforced American influence over policies and programs of many IGOs.

Today, however, the United States cannot shape global governance alone, as even a sole superpower cannot dominate the many pieces of and actors in global governance. In the UN, the United States faced strong opposition, from small and large states alike, to the use of force against Iraq in 2003 and was later forced to seek Security Council authority for its continued presence in the country. In international economic governance, the United States works closely with the other G-7 members (Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, France, and Canada), yet, as noted earlier, emerging powers such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa refuse to accept US and EU dominance in international trade negotiations. On issues such as the International Criminal Court, the Convention to Ban Landmines, and climate change, large numbers of other countries (and NGOs) have demonstrated a willingness to act even in the face
of US opposition. We explore the fluctuations in US support for multilateralism further in Chapter 7.

Middle-power states play a particularly critical role, often acting in concert in the United Nations and other IGOs. Canada, Australia, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Argentina, and Nigeria, for example, are known for their commitment to multilateralism, ability to forge compromises, and support for reform in the international system. The essence of middle powers’ role lies in the importance of secondary players in international politics, as both followers and leaders.

For the large number of less developed, small, and weak states, power and influence generally come only insofar as they are able to form coalitions. IGOs provide arenas for this and also for international recognition and legitimacy. Through their collective efforts, small and developing countries have endeavored to shape the agendas, priorities, and programs of many IGOs over the past fifty years, with varying degrees of success.

States themselves may not all act with one voice in global governance. Increasingly, subnational actors such as provinces, state, and local governments are involved in international economic negotiations, implementing environmental regulations and human rights initiatives, acting independently and occasionally at odds with their respective national governments. Chapters 10 and 11 examine some examples.

Although states continue to be major actors in global governance, their governments, as Jessica Mathews (1997: 50) so aptly describes, “are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups. . . . The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while.” Power, indeed, is less concentrated in states and has diffused to the other actors in global governance.

**IGOs**

International relations scholars have long viewed IGOs primarily as agents of their member states and focused on their structural attributes, decisionmaking processes, and programs. After all, IGOs are formed by states, and states grant IGOs responsibilities and authority to act.

Yet when we speak of IGOs as actors, we are often referring to the IGO secretariat members who, as international civil servants, play key but often invisible roles in persuading states to act, coordinating the efforts of different groups, providing the diplomatic skills to secure agreements, and ensuring the effectiveness of programs (Mathiasion 2007). These officials include the UN Secretary-General and his or her under- and assistant secretaries-general; the directors-general of organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization; the UN High Commissioners for
Refugees and Human Rights; the UN Secretary-General’s special representatives for Afghanistan, for child soldiers, and for Kosovo; the president of the World Bank; the executive director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the president of the European Commission; and the country representatives of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). These individuals “will generally possess an identity that is distinct from that of any other entity and an interest in promoting the well-being of the organization and its membership” (Duffield 2007: 13). Stories are legion about the roles secretariat officials have played in achieving international trade agreements, cease-fires in wars, governments’ agreement to revise their development strategies to meet international guidelines, and organizational reforms.

Like other bureaucracies, IGO secretariats often do much more than their member states may have intended. For one thing, they must turn vague mandates into procedures and actions. Because individuals are international civil servants, they tend to take their responsibilities seriously and work hard “to promote what they see as ‘good policy’ or to protect it from states that have competing interests” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 5). Frequently, they must respond to new challenges and crises, provide policy options for member states, change their own missions, and formulate new tasks and procedures. For example, the UN Secretariat created peacekeeping at the height of the Cold War, and later devised peacebuilding operations. Prior to the Cold War’s end, the UN had not helped to monitor elections in member states, except in colonial territories in transition to independence. Responding to needs for help with elections in postconflict situations and in former communist states transitioning to democracy in the 1990s, the UN Secretariat, after some initial reluctance, developed its expertise in electoral assistance.

IGOs have resources, including money, food, weapons, and information. In fact, many IGOs play important roles in analyzing and interpreting information, giving it meaning that can prompt action. IGOs “thus help determine the kind of world that is to be governed and set the agenda for global governance” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 7). In addition, IGOs can often claim expert authority on the basis of the specialized knowledge and expertise that inheres in their secretariats. That knowledge and expertise also shape the way some organizations behave.

Contemporary scholarship is focusing on IGOs as actors. At one level, the “power” of IGOs is limited in terms of their ability to enforce decisions, except in specific cases such as the EU, which has supranational authority over member states in many policy domains, or the IMF, which can impose conditions on its lending. Most IGO actions are in fact recommendations. Their effectiveness lies in other actors’ willingness to make and comply with commitments. Their suasion is largely moral, based on the broad principles and values IGOs have often been created to serve or protect, such as human rights or peace. Peer pressure can be powerful, however, in pushing states to act in ways
that others wish, and IGOs are prime arenas for exercising peer pressure and moral suasion.

At another level, IGOs are not just tools of states. They are also purposive actors that have power to influence world events and, in some cases, authority and autonomy to act. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 21) argue, “The authority of [intergovernmental organizations] and bureaucracies generally, lies in their ability to present themselves as impersonal and neutral—as not exercising power but instead serving others.” The need to be seen in this way is crucial, for example, to the UN Secretariat or the EU Commission’s credibility. This interpretation of IGO agency and its implications is discussed further in Chapter 2.

To be sure, not all IGOs are alike, as we shall examine in subsequent chapters. Thus their authority and autonomy as actors in global governance will vary in kind and degree. As actors, however, they can also fail to act; like domestic bureaucracies, international bureaucracies may use inaction as a way to avoid doing something they oppose. IGOs may also act against the interests and preferences of strong or weak states; they may ally with other actors such as NGOs, other IGOs, and select states to pursue or protect certain policies; and they may attempt to persuade states to change their behavior—for example, by reducing corruption, eliminating food subsidies, or turning over war criminals for prosecution by the International Criminal Court.

NGOs

Like intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations are both pieces of governance and key actors, playing a number of roles. The growth of NGOs and NGO networks since the 1980s has been a major factor in their increasing involvement in governance at all levels, from global to local. The majority of the thousands of grassroots groups that exist in countries around the world are not part of formal networks, but may have informal links to organizations, such as large international human rights and development NGOs like Human Rights Watch and CARE, from which they obtain funding for local programs or training assistance. The links between grassroots and international NGOs are key to activities such as promoting population control, empowerment of women, healthcare, and environmental protection. The Internet, e-mail, and fax have been valuable tools for NGO mobilization, along with their mobility and autonomy, enabling them to access areas that governments and IGOs may be slow to reach.

NGOs have become key sources of information and technical expertise on a wide variety of international issues, from the environment to human rights and corruption. They frequently are key actors in raising awareness of and helping to frame issues. Thus, landmines came to be seen as a humanitarian rather than an arms control issue, for example (Thakur and Maley 1999). They lobby for policy changes by states, IGOs, and corporations. They contribute to international adjudication by submitting friend-of-the-court briefs to interna-
tional criminal tribunals such as those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as to trade and investment tribunals (Charnovitz 2006: 353–354). They also play important roles in monitoring states’ and corporations’ implementation of human rights norms and environmental regulations. And, they may as a result put pressure on states and other actors to change their behavior.

It is the large international NGOs, along with transnational advocacy groups such as the Coalition to Ban Landmines, that bring together hundreds of NGOs that are among the most visible NGO actors in global governance. Their roles have been particularly important in expanding human rights, humanitarian, and environmental law. NGOs participate at least indirectly in UN-sponsored global conferences and international negotiations, raising issues and submitting documents. In some instances, they have contributed treaty language such as with the Convention to Ban Landmines and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). They also educate delegates, expand policy options, set agendas, and influence the positions of key states (Betsill 2008: 178).

We explore the legal basis of NGOs, their diversity, and their activities in Chapter 6, as well as in the issue chapters of Part 3.

**Experts**

In a world whose problems seem to grow steadily more complex, knowledge and expertise are critical to governance efforts. There is a need to understand the science behind environmental problems such as climate change, ozone depletion, and declining fish stocks in order to consider policy options. Cost-effective alternatives have to be developed for fuels that emit carbon dioxide and ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons if there is to be political support for making policy changes and new rules. Thus, experts from governmental agencies, research institutes, private industries, and universities around the world have increasingly been drawn into international efforts to deal with various issues. The technical committees of the International Organization for Standardization, for example, are entirely composed of experts. Often experts may be part of transnational networks and participate in international conferences and negotiations, laying out the state of scientific knowledge, framing issues for debate, or proposing specific solutions. Since 1988, hundreds of scientists from around the world have participated on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose policy-neutral reports have provided key inputs for global climate change negotiations. Scholars have coined the phrase “epistemic communities” to identify networks of knowledge-based experts.

**Multistakeholder Actors**

Multistakeholder actors include experts, IGOs, corporations, professional associations, NGOs, and governments (although the latter are not always involved). These loose alliances of a broad range of participants “join together to achieve what none can accomplish on its own” (Reincke 1999–2000: 44).
Such groups take advantage of the ability to communicate with and travel rapidly among distant parts of the globe to promote collaboration, tap expertise, and disseminate new knowledge. The networks have the advantage of flexibility, which is often lacking in traditional governmental, IGO, and corporate bureaucracies. One of the oldest global policy networks is the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, founded in 1971 to coordinate and finance sixteen agricultural research centers around the world.

The UN’s leadership has begun to think more strategically about such networks. The Secretary-General’s Millennium Report points out, “Mobilizing the skills and other resources of diverse global actors . . . may increasingly involve forming loose and temporary global networks that cut across national, institutional and disciplinary lines” (Annan 2000). We examine the roles of experts and multistakeholder actors further in Chapter 6.

**Multinational Corporations**

Multinational corporations (MNCs) are a particular form of nongovernmental actor organized to conduct for-profit business transactions and operations across the borders of three or more states. Multinational corporations can take many different forms, from licensing local industries to providing foreign suppliers, contract manufacturing, turnkey projects, manufacturing, and assembly operations. What they share in common is that they are companies based in one state with affiliated branches or subsidiaries and activities in other states. They have the ability to invest capital and thus to create jobs, influence political actors, offer incentives to host governments, lobby for changes in state laws, and threaten to move jobs and investment elsewhere should the conditions not be conducive to profitable business.

Since the 1970s, MNCs have been increasingly recognized as significant international actors, controlling resources far greater than those of many states. The world’s largest MNCs account for four-fifths of world industrial output. In the 1990s, foreign direct investment grew rapidly, although it was still highly concentrated and distributed unevenly in Europe, the United States, Latin America (particularly Brazil and Mexico), and East and Southeast Asia (especially China). As actors in global governance, MNCs have “profoundly altered the structure and functioning of the global economy” (Gilpin 2001: 290). By choosing where to invest or not to invest, MNCs shape the economic development opportunities of individual communities, countries, and entire regions such as Africa, where little foreign investment takes place compared to East Asia. By moving production from communities such as Peoria, Illinois, or Dayton, Ohio, to Mexico or Malaysia, MNCs’ activities can benefit or hurt both developed and developing countries.

Globalization of markets and production in industries such as automobiles challenges corporate leaders and managers to govern these complex structures, and poses problems for states and local governments losing connection
to and control of these larger corporate networks. Corporate choices about investment have also changed the landscape of development assistance. Far more funding for development today comes from private investment capital than from bilateral, government-to-government aid, or from multilateral aid through the UN and other IGOs.

In short, MNCs’ activities have raised a number of governance questions: How can they best be regulated—through new forms of international rules, or through private mechanisms? How can they be mobilized for economic development in collaboration with international agencies and NGOs? How can less developed countries (LDCs) be assured that powerful MNCs will not interfere in their domestic affairs, challenge their sovereignty, destroy their resources and environment, and relegate them to permanent dependency? MNCs are particularly important actors in addressing trade, labor, and environmental issues. Their participation has been critical, for example, in efforts to address ozone depletion and global warming. They are also targets of NGO activism, as discussed further in Chapter 6.

Kofi Annan, during his tenure as UN Secretary-General, was a champion of new mechanisms to regulate corporate behavior and to engage MNCs as positive contributors to global governance. In 1999, Annan broke new ground for the United Nations by convening a meeting with world business leaders and exhorting them to embrace the UN Global Compact, whose nine principles cover human rights, labor, and the environment. Companies that participate must submit online updates of their progress for NGOs to scrutinize, thus involving NGOs in policing MNC compliance. This innovation is discussed further in Chapter 9.

The various actors in global governance cannot be analyzed in isolation from one another. Each plays key roles in efforts to deal with various issues and problems. Sometimes, they compete with each other for scarce resources, international standing, and legitimacy. At other times, their activities complement one another. In many instances, they are linked in complex networks. Subsequent chapters will explore the relationships among various actors in global governance.

**An Increasing Need for Global Governance?**

With a growing agenda of international challenges, the simple answer to this question is yes. Globalization is playing a major role in shrinking the planet, proliferating issues, and changing the roles of key actors. The Cold War's end contributed also to increased needs for governance. The emergence of transnational civil society and the contested nature of state sovereignty likewise factor into the rising need for global governance. These changes alter the roles of various actors and significantly affect the approaches to problem solving.
Globalization

In the 1970s, increasing trade and other links among states were seen as evidence of growing interdependence. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, clearly something more fundamental was happening than a mere interconnectedness among states and between states and individuals. International interdependence has been around for centuries, but economic globalization—the “integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology” (Bhagwati 2004: 3)—has broadened and deepened. The contemporary form is unprecedented in the degree to which not only economic markets, but also cultures, peoples, and states, are being linked together. This has spurred the proliferating networks of NGOs and financial markets, as well as the unwelcome, often illegal actors—terrorists and drug traffickers.

Globalization challenges the assertion by many international relations scholars that states are still the primary actors in international politics. More specifically:

It denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power. It involves a stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time such that, on the one hand, day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on the other, the practices and decisions of local groups of communities can have significant global reverberations. (Held 1997: 253)

Globalization encompasses two simultaneous yet contradictory patterns in world politics. One involves greater integration and interdependence between peoples and states, between states and other states, and between states and international bodies. This has been facilitated particularly by the communications revolution and by the preeminence of two core philosophies, economic liberalism and democracy. The integrative side of globalization is contradicted by its disintegrative tendencies. It has not ensured stability, as the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008–2009 energy, food, and financial crises demonstrate.

While globalization affects all spheres of human activity—economic, social, cultural, technological, environmental, and political—not all peoples or areas of the world are equally affected. Many critics, such as World Bank chief economist and noted international economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002), charge that globalization has deepened global inequality between the haves and have-nots, especially those living on less than a dollar a day. Others charge that it has contributed to environmental degradation, child labor, and cultural homogenization.
Many weak states have been unable to accommodate technological changes and the challenges of more open economies that make them vulnerable to competition and exploitation. Weak states may also be unable to provide the necessary public goods. There has been a resurgence of ethnic and religious identities and ethnic conflicts, and a weakening, if not failure, of some states. The disintegrative tendencies of globalization affect both states’ and individuals’ perceptions of uncontrollable global processes such as global financial markets and multinational corporations. Individuals themselves are increasingly alienated as they become further removed from political institutions that lack democratic accountability, or worry about a homogenization of cultures and declining value of labor in global markets. The need for global governance has never been greater. Yet one of the paradoxes of globalization is that global governance has to be accepted by states whose conceptions of interests and identity remain largely national and local.

Given the detrimental and beneficial effects of globalization, the question is not will globalization be governed, but rather, how will globalization be governed? UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000: 6) put it more bluntly: “The central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in squalor.”

Globalization has both coincided with and contributed to the changed international political environment resulting from the Cold War’s end, the growth of transnational civil society, and shifts in the nature of state sovereignty.

The Challenges of Global Governance

The Cold War’s End

The end of the Cold War was brought about by both political changes toward democratization and economic changes toward liberalization of the economy in the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolized the end of the Cold War, and two years later the Soviet Union itself disintegrated into fifteen separate, independent states. This marked the ending of one historical era and the beginning of another. The international system shifted from a bipolar structure to a post–Cold War structure that was simultaneously unipolar and a nonpolar, networked system of a globalized world.

At the outset, some suggested that history itself was at an end with the triumph of liberal capitalism (Fukuyama 1989) and the end of ideological competition, but those high expectations have not been borne out. Instead, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and end of the Cold War system revived ethnic rivalries and conflicts in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa, leading some to postulate a “clash of civilizations” as the new source of enduring conflicts in international politics (Huntington 1993). The Cold War’s end also contributed to reducing barriers to trade and investment, which in turn contributed to globalization. In short, it produced a new series of governance challenges.
Emergent Transnational Civil Society

Contributing to the Cold War’s end and benefiting from both increased democratization and accelerating globalization is the growth of civil society within many countries and transnationally. Civil society is not just NGOs; it is a broader concept, encompassing all organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market (i.e., government and business). It includes not just advocacy groups but also associations of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and scientists, along with labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious groups, ethnic associations, cultural groups, sporting associations, and political parties. The key distinction between NGOs and civil society groups is their links to citizens. Many NGOs are elite-run groups with tenuous links to citizens on whose behalf they claim to act. Especially in developing and newly democratizing countries, grassroots and national NGOs may depend on international funding. Like NGOs, civil society is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. People work together to advance both nefarious and worthy ends.

The spread of democracy to many corners of the globe has bolstered the growth of civil societies in countries where restrictions on citizens’ groups have been lifted. Civil society groups communicate with each other domestically and cross-nationally, creating new coalitions from the local to the global. These “networks of knowledge and action” (Lipschutz 1992: 390) are unconstrained by geographic borders and largely beyond states’ control. Transnational civil society groups permeate numerous issue areas, including the environment, human rights, technology, economic development, and security. Their demands for representation in processes of global governance contribute to the increased need to reform existing international institutions and to find new ways to incorporate actors other than states in governance.

Contested Nature of Sovereignty

These trends pose direct challenges to state sovereignty. The norm that states enjoy internal autonomy and cannot be subjected to external authority has been the bedrock of the Westphalian state system that has persisted from 1648 to the present. Some theorists focus on the erosion of sovereignty, suggesting that it may at one time have been absolute, but is now compromised by states’ own weaknesses, by external influences such as flow from globalization or the development of international human rights norms, or by other actors such as MNCs, NGOs, and global financial markets (Strange 1996). Others see sovereignty as always having been contested—for example, from within by ethnic groups seeking autonomy or self-determination (their own sovereignty)—and hence it varies across time, place, and issues (Krasner 1999).

Over time, then, the nature of sovereignty has changed with the blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign issues, contributing further to the increased need for pieces of global governance. The acceleration of globaliza-
tion, the rise of powerful nonstate actors, and the emergence of transnational civil society all undermine state sovereignty. Globalization is linking issues and actors together in complex new ways, where economic, humanitarian, health, and environmental problems respect no state boundaries. “Small events in one place can have catalytic effects, so that consequences later and elsewhere are vast” (Keohane and Nye 2000: 11). Viruses like those that cause severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) move around the world in a matter of hours, due to air travel. “New players, thorny problems, spillover effects, and the magnitude of cross-border flows together inflate the difficulty of coherent action at almost all levels of international affairs. . . . At the same time, these offshoots of escalating interdependence strongly influence the direction in which globalization will move—either toward tighter teamwork in meeting multiple challenges or toward division. . . . [T]he stakes are rising” (Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat 2001: 8). The processes for dealing with these challenges are predominantly multilateral in character. Therefore we turn now to a brief examination of the nature of multilateral diplomacy and practice.

 Processes of Global Governance: Multilateralism Matters

Multilateral negotiations have become “management tools in international politics” (Hampson 1995: 6) and a key variable in global governance outcomes. They are “the diplomatic bargaining processes through which the international community confers political legitimacy or comes to accept . . . [generalized] principles” (Hampson 1995: 3). Therefore, understanding the nature of multilateral diplomacy is key to understanding how IGOs function, how NGOs have become involved in governance processes, and how different kinds of outcomes (from degrees of success to failure) come about. But what differentiates multilateral diplomacy from traditional bilateral diplomacy, other than just the numbers of participants?

John Ruggie (1993: 8) has stated, “At its core, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.” Thus relationships are defined by agreed-upon rules and principles, and perhaps by organizations. Participants expect that outcomes will yield “diffuse reciprocity” (Keohane 1984) or roughly equal benefits over time. For example, the principle of nondiscrimination or most-favored-nation governing the global trade system prohibits countries from discriminating against imports from other countries that produce the same product. In collective security arrangements, participants must respond to an attack on one country as if it were an attack on all. By contrast, bilateralism is expected to provide specific reciprocity and roughly balanced (but not necessarily equal) exchanges by each party at all times.
Complex Diplomacy

Prior to the twentieth century, there was very little multilateralism. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, the nineteenth century was marked by the development of a number of public international unions and river commissions. The Concert of Europe provided a series of periodic gatherings of great (European) powers. Twentieth-century diplomacy saw the accelerated trend from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy to institutions, especially formal organizations, and the growth of conference diplomacy.

What makes multilateralism in the twenty-first century different from multilateralism at the end of World War II is its complexity. There are now literally scores of participants. States alone have almost quadrupled in number since 1945. The first sessions of the UN General Assembly now look like cozy, intimate gatherings. In fact, back then, the UN overall had fewer members than its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has today! Other types of actors add to the complexity, as do various coalitions of states. As one observer notes, “Large numbers . . . introduce a qualitatively different kind of diplomacy in international politics. The hallmark of this diplomacy is that it occurs between groups or coalitions of state actors” (Hampson 1995: 4). In addition, a central issue for many IGOs today is how to do a better job of incorporating nonstate actors into processes of global governing, since “securing agreement of government officials is not enough to permit the smooth running of these institutions” (O’Brien et al. 2000: 208).

Greater numbers of players (and coalitions of players) mean multiple interests, multiple rules, issues, and hierarchies that are constantly in flux. These all complicate the processes of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation—of finding common ground for reaching agreements on collective action, norms, or rules. Managing complexity has become a key challenge for diplomats and other participants in multilateral settings. For example, UN-sponsored conferences have several thousand delegates from 192 countries, speaking through interpreters in English, French, Russian, Chinese, Spanish, and Arabic. There are hundreds of NGOs and numerous private citizens. As one veteran noted, “They are all interested in the subject matter under discussion, all want to be kept informed of every detail, and all have the possibility of being present at almost all of the sessions” (McDonald 1993: 249).

Although the universe of multilateral diplomacy is diverse, there is actually a high degree of similarity in the structures of most IGOs and in the types of decisionmaking processes used. Let us look at key patterns in how decisions get made in IGOs and other settings.

How Do Decisions Get Made?

Historically, since IGOs have been created by states, the principle of sovereign equality has dictated one-state, one-vote decisionmaking. Indeed, until well into the twentieth century, all decisions had to be unanimous, as states would
not accept the concept of majority decisionmaking. This is often cited as one of the sources of failure for the League of Nations.

An alternative principle accords greater weight to some states on the basis of population or wealth and results in weighted or qualified voting. In the IMF and World Bank, for example, votes are weighted according to financial contribution. In the European Union’s Council of Ministers, qualified majority voting applies to issues where the EU has supranational authority over member states. The number of votes for each state is based on population; the number of votes required to pass legislation ensures that the largest states must have support of some smaller states; and neither the smaller states alone nor fewer than three large states can block action. Another form of qualified majority voting prevails in the UN Security Council, where the five permanent members each possess a veto and all must concur (or not object) for decisions to be taken.

Since the 1980s, much of the decisionmaking in the UN General Assembly, Security Council, and other bodies, as well as in global conferences, the World Trade Organization, and many other multilateral settings, has taken the form of consensus. Consensus does not require unanimity; it depends on states deciding not to block action and it often means that outcomes represent the least common denominator—that is, more general wording and fewer tough demands on states to act. “Pressure toward consensus,” Courtney Smith (1999: 173) notes, “now dominates almost all multilateral efforts at global problem solving.” The puzzle, he suggests, is “how an organization that is composed of 185 [sic] member states, influenced by numerous nongovernmental organizations, lobbied by multinational corporations, and serviced by an international secretariat reconciles all of these potentially diverse interests in search of a consensus on the most pressing issues of the day.” Key variables in consensus building are leadership; small, formal negotiating groups; issue characteristics (including issue salience to different actors); various actor attributes such as economic or military power or ability to serve as brokers; the amount and quality of informal contacts among actors; and personal attributes of participants such as intelligence, tolerance, patience, reputation, negotiating skills, creativity, and linguistic versatility. Let us look briefly at two of these: leadership and actor strategies. In Chapter 7, we also explore the role of culture and negotiating style.

Leadership

Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can come from diverse sources: powerful and not-so-powerful states, a coalition of states, an NGO or coalition of NGOs, a skillful individual diplomat, or an IGO bureaucrat. Leadership can involve putting together a winning coalition to secure agreement on a new international trade agreement; it may involve the skill of negotiating a treaty text acceptable to industry, NGOs, and key governments. It may be the efforts of a
coalition of NGOs and college students publicizing an issue such as sweatshops and pressuring companies to change their behavior. It may involve a government’s (or any other actor’s) willingness to act first—to commit monetary resources to a program or military forces for enforcement, to change trade laws, or to renounce development of a new weapons system. Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can also come from the UN Secretary-General, who might prod various other actors to do something, as Ban Ki-moon is doing with respect to global climate change.

**Actor Strategies**

The nature of the multilateral arena means that actors cannot just present their individual positions on an issue and then sit down. Delegates must actively engage in efforts to discern the flexibility or rigidity of their respective positions. They must build personal relationships in order to establish the trust that is essential to working together. Some states (and NGOs) will take a stronger interest in particular topics than others; some will come with specific proposals; some will be represented by individuals with greater familiarity or expertise on a topic than others; some will be represented by individuals with little or no experience in multilateral diplomacy while others have long experience; and some states’ positions will matter more than others because of their relative power in the international system, in a given region, or on a particular issue. The face-to-face interactions of the individuals representing participating states are what caucusing is all about. It may take place at the back of the General Assembly hall, in the delegates’ dining room, in a hotel lobby bar, at receptions hosted by particular countries, in the restrooms, or in the corridors surrounding the official meeting place.

A hallmark of multilateral diplomacy is the formation of groups or coalitions of states and, in many contexts, networks and coalitions of NGOs. Coalitions are a way of managing large numbers of participants. States can pool their power and resources to try to obtain a better outcome than they might by going it alone. Just banding together is not enough, however. Group members must negotiate among themselves to agree on a common position; they must maintain cohesion, prevent defections to rival coalitions, and choose representatives to bargain on their behalf. At some point, crosscutting coalitions need to be formed if agreement is to be reached with other parties. Often, it is small states or middle powers that exercise key bridging roles. For example, during the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations in the early 1990s, a group of countries called the “Cairns Group,” led by Canada, Australia, and Argentina, helped to resolve sharp disagreements between the United States and the EU over agricultural trade.

Very early in the UN’s history, regional groups were formed to elect nonpermanent representatives to the Security Council and other bodies. The Cold War produced two competing groups, under the leadership of the Soviet Union
and United States, as well as a group of nonaligned countries. In 1964, Latin American, African, and Asian states formed the Group of 77 (G-77), which remains an active part of UN politics today along with regional and other groups. These are discussed in Chapters 4 and 7.

A further actor strategy is the creation of networks to achieve greater policy coherence. Networks are horizontal associations of diverse actors that operate on the basis of shared normative and conceptual frameworks and the awareness that shared goals cannot be achieved by actors on their own. A network approach is a key strategy for many NGOs and has been used extensively for a variety of issues and problems, from promoting the rights of women and other groups to addressing the governance challenges of HIV/AIDS.

### The Politics and Effectiveness of Global Governance

The politics of global governance reflects “struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge” in the world (Murphy 2000: 798). Thus, power relationships among states matter, but so do the resources and actions of nonstate actors. The authority and legitimacy of pieces of global governance also matter. In addition, the accountability and transparency of multilateral institutions have become a growing concern. And, as with all types of institutions, effectiveness or the ability to deliver public goods and to make a difference matters.

**Power: Who Gets What?**

For some, the politics of global governance is about US power and dominant coalitions. To be sure, US power and preferences shaped, and continue to shape, many pieces of global governance, especially the liberal international economic system, and they ensure that US interests (and often European as well) are accommodated in many regimes. Yet, especially since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, US power and influence in the world have declined substantially. Even before then, the unilateralist policies of the George W. Bush administration were leading small, middle-power, and larger states to take initiatives without US participation, let alone leadership, such as with the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the convention banning antipersonnel landmines.

Yet the politics of global governance is not only about who gets included in decisionmaking, but also about who gets excluded (and at what price), as well as institutional bias and privilege (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 17). South African Peter Vale (1995), for example, argues that economic liberalism and the increased influence of multilateral institutions have only intensified “market-driven poverty” for the vast majority of Africans, Eastern Europeans, and others whose states are failing. The widening inequality between rich and poor, the failure to address growing environmental crises, concerns about
labor conditions in many areas of the world, and other shortfalls of contempor-
ary global governance have provoked a lively debate about the politics of
global governance and, in particular, the “who gets what” and “who benefits”
questions.

For Vale and many others, contemporary pieces of global governance are
“too geographically unbalanced, dominated by the largest economies. . . .
Most small and poor developing countries are excluded, as are people’s or-
ganizations. . . . The structures and processes for global policy-making are not
representative. . . . There are no mechanisms for making ethical standards and
human rights binding for corporations and individuals, not just governments”
(UNDP 1999: 8).

Yet power and influence in global governance do not belong only to pow-
erful states, coalitions of states, or even rising powers such as Brazil, China,
India, and South Africa. MNCs exercise power in investment choices and fi-
nancial markets. NGOs exercise soft power—the power to persuade, name, and
shame. They also command resources such as money from donations, and ex-
pertise that can be used to affect the lives of those who receive humanitarian re-
 lief or development assistance. IGOs such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees have the power to shape the development
and monetary policies of borrowing states, and the lives of millions of refugees.

We borrow from Ronnie Lipschutz (1997: 83) a useful set of questions re-
basis?” And, who benefits? Answers to these questions will emerge in subse-
quent chapters, but first we examine three critical challenges: legitimacy, ac-
countability, and effectiveness.

Legitimacy
Why do the powerful and not-so-powerful actors in global governance decide
to cooperate? Why do actors obey rules in the absence of coercion? The deci-
sion to comply with rules, norms, and law rests on legitimacy: “the belief by
an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed,” as Ian Hurd (2007: 30)
defines it. “Such a belief is necessarily normative and subjective [and] has im-
lications for behavior, as its presence changes the strategic calculation made
by actors about how to respond to the rule or institution. . . . [T]he decision
whether to comply is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution or
by a calculation of self-interest but, instead by an internal sense of rightness
and obligation.”

A key aspect of legitimacy in the international system is membership in
the international community, whose system of multilateral, reciprocal interac-
tions helps to validate its members, institutions, and rules. International insti-
tutions like the United Nations, for example, are perceived as legitimate to the
extent that they are created and function according to certain principles of
right process, such as one-state, one-vote. The UN Security Council’s legitimacy as the core institution in the international system imbued with authority to authorize the use of force derives from the widespread acceptance of that role, as we will discuss in Chapter 4. As political theorists have long noted, flags and rituals are important symbols of legitimate authority. Thus, when peacekeeping forces wear UN blue helmets, they symbolize the international community’s desire to preserve a cease-fire in hostilities and, since their coercive power is severely limited, it is their token presence that induces states and other actors to comply. When the Security Council refused to approve the US military operation in Iraq in 2003, it denied the United States the symbols of legitimacy and affected how the mission was regarded by much of the world. As Thomas Franck (1990: 205) explains, “It is because states constitute a community that legitimacy has the power to influence their conduct.”

Legitimacy is also intimately tied to whether the many nonstate actors and vocal members of civil society have a voice and can participate in global governance. Steve Charnovitz (2006: 366) asserts, “Intergovernmental consultation with NGOs can enhance the legitimacy of international decision-making, but it is the consultation itself that makes the contribution, not the quantity of NGO support obtained.” If IGOs’ decisionmaking processes exclude civil society or marginalize the voice of small, poor states, does that undermine the legitimacy and viability of these institutions? In Chapters 4 and 6, we explore the issue of NGO participation in particular.

**Accountability**

As a result of the diffusion of domestic democratic norms into the international arena, actors in global governance, including IGOs, NGOs, MNCs, experts, and ad hoc commissions, have faced growing demands for greater accountability and transparency. Some of these demands come from NGOs and civil society groups themselves; others come from democratic governments. Even if delegates to international conferences and IGO meetings come from democratic governments and are instructed by and accountable to elected officials, the conferences and meetings may well be closed to the public and operate more like private clubs. The UN Security Council, along with the World Bank, WTO, and IMF, have all been charged with operating in secrecy. There is also an active debate over the “democratic deficit” in EU institutions, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Despite the general call for accountability, there is no single, widely accepted definition. At its core is the idea of account-giving—reporting, measuring, justifying, and explaining actions. The question is to whom and for what actors are accountable, and how to measure this accountability. Are IGOs accountable only to their member states, for example? To whom are NGOs accountable? What about expert groups or private governance arrangements?

Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane (2005) have identified seven accountability mechanisms that operate in world politics, ranging from hierarchical and
fiscal accountability to peer and public reputational accountability. They add, however, that international accountability is relatively haphazard and less likely to constrain more powerful actors. Mark Bovens (2008: 14) explains why accountability is so important: “It provides legitimacy to public officials and public organizations,” he says, and “is meant to assure public confidence in government and to bridge the gap between citizens and representatives and between governed and government.” On the other hand, he adds, “accountability arrangements assure that public officials or public organizations remain on the virtuous path.”

Central to having accountability is ensuring transparency. With respect to IGOs, Alexandru Grigorescu (2007: 626) asserts that “information about an organization’s deliberations, decisions, and actions needs to be made available to determine if government representatives and IO officials are acting in the public’s interest. If this information is not public, officials cannot be held accountable for their actions.” And more generally, Chayes and Chayes (1995: 22) argue that transparency “is an almost universal element of management strategy . . . [that] influences strategic interactions among parties . . . in the direction of compliance.”

Some institutions may have established mechanisms for accountability, such as the WTO’s Appellate Body, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, and the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services. In other situations, an ad hoc body may be created to investigate a particular problem, as was the case with an independent inquiry committee (the Volcker Committee) that investigated the UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme. NGOs and member states have played key roles in pushing for such accountability and transparency.

Lack of transparency may adversely affect not only legitimacy, but also the efficacy of all kinds of institutions. An ongoing challenge for global governance in the future, then, is how to increase transparency and accountability of various pieces of governance—IGOs, NGOs, informal groups, and private authorities—without undermining the very conditions that enable deal-making and cooperation.

Effectiveness: Measuring Success and Failure

A third critical challenge involves the effectiveness of governance and the success or failure of different approaches to addressing needs and problems. What are the outcomes of rules and actions? How are people actually affected by the pieces of global governance? Is security increased, are health and well-being improved, is poverty reduced, is environmental degradation slowed? The task of assessing effectiveness is one of the central challenges in public policymaking, whether at local, national, regional, or global levels of politics and governance.

As P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2001: 13–14) note, “Effectiveness goes beyond formal compliance; parties may come into compliance with agreements effortlessly for a time and without undertaking any mea-
sures that change behavior or contribute to solving the problem. Agreements themselves may not be ambitious enough to provide more than temporary or cosmetic relief of global problems.”” The key question is: What works? “The complexity of international issues, their overlapping nature, and the turmoil of the arena in which they surface defy tidy theorizing about effective management.” There are many points of view and interests to be reconciled, shifting politics, and uncertainties about the efficacies of different policy alternatives.

In assessing effectiveness, several key questions may be asked. Who does what to translate agreements into action, including incorporating norms into domestic laws? Which techniques or mechanisms work best to get targeted actors to change their behavior, and what are the reactions to noncompliance? Who provides incentives or technical assistance to developing countries to get them to comply with environmental rules? Which actors employ diplomacy or public shaming, impose economic sanctions, or employ military force to punish failure to comply?

* * *

The challenges of global governance, then, include a variety of international policy problems and issues that require governance, not all of which are necessarily global in scope. Rather, what we see is a multilevel and often very diffuse system of pieces of governance with many different actors playing key roles alongside states. The need for more pieces of governance is clearly rising with globalization and other developments; the processes are complex; the politics, even in a world with a single superpower, is an ongoing struggle to control “who gets what”; and the issues of legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness require constant attention.

** Suggested Further Reading **


