


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Race, Gender, and the
Labor Market:
Inequalities at Work

Robert L. Kaufman



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1

Why Study Race and Gender Labor Market Inequality?

*A beginning is the time for taking the most delicate care
that the balances are correct.*

—Frank Herbert (1965: 3)

Perhaps the most straightforward answer to the question posed by the chapter title is simply that such inequalities persist despite considerable social changes. This is true whether one considers ethnographies of the everyday experience of minorities and women in the workplace, studies of the success or failure of job seekers in local labor markets, or large-scale statistical analyses of employment representation and earnings using nationally representative data such as the focus of the research reported in this book.

To my mind, the most convincing evidence for continuing status-based discrimination comes from audit studies. Bendick (2007: 4) succinctly describes the logic and method of audit studies as “a systematic research procedure for creating controlled experiments analyzing employers’ candid responses to employees’ personal characteristics.” Although popular opinion may discount the existence of preferential evaluations and treatment, Bendick’s survey of thirty recent audit analyses demonstrates how these careful studies have verified the continued operation of preferential evaluations, both in employment and other settings (see also Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Fix and Struyk 1993; Pager 2003; Pager 2007; Pager and Quillian 2005; Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009; Turner, Fix, and Struyk 1991; Braddock and McPartland 1987; Yinger 1995). For example, in the Turner, Fix, and Struyk study, sets of black and white job candidates were paired, given equivalent credentials, and sent to apply for the same entry-level jobs. The study’s results were as systematic as they are startling to popular opinion:

It found that black applicants were less likely to receive an interview than their white counterparts. If they got an interview, they were likely to have a shorter one and to encounter more negative remarks. They were more likely to be denied

a job and more likely to be steered to less desirable jobs. (<http://www.urban.org/pubs/catalog/discrim.htm>)

A recent variation on this methodology (Pager 2003; Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009) focused on the role an applicant's criminal record plays in the hiring process. Having a criminal record substantially reduces call-backs after the initial application, and this is significantly more pronounced for black than for white applicants among certain types of employers (e.g., suburban employers or when applicants had personal contact with the employer). Overall, this work documents the persisting and substantial preference of employers for white applicants, *even if they have criminal records* (Pager 2003: 960): "Blacks are less than half as likely to receive consideration by employers, relative to their white counterparts, *and black nonoffenders fall behind even whites with prior felony convictions*" (emphasis added).

This last finding is a powerful reminder of just how pervasive and how strong the social forces are that maintain and create privileged treatment in the labor market based on observable status characteristics.

In this book, I thus begin by focusing on the mechanisms by which race-sex groups are allocated and segregated into labor market positions. I then explore how such employment segregation affects earnings determination, how this differs across race-sex groups, and how these processes are contingent on economic and social contexts. My use of the term *race-sex groups* is purposeful in order to recognize the necessity of considering the intersection between race and sex rather than treating race and sex as separable phenomena. Thus I develop my ideas and design my analyses around comparisons among black women, black men, white women, and white men.¹ In the next section, I describe four different jobs that illustrate the kinds of inequalities and issues that I explore in this research.

Food for Thought: Profiles of Some Race-Gender-Typed Jobs

Consider two pairs of jobs. Each pair requires similar levels of general skill and training but differs in terms of some of the specific skills required, the nature of the work performed, and the context within which work occurs.² The first pair includes pressing machine operatives in laundries and garbage collectors for sanitary services. Both are routine, relatively low-skilled jobs, with poor physical working environments, a history of moderate declines in the number of jobs available, above-average levels of unemployment, and a high level of unionization. They differ in that garbage collecting offers more opportunity to work full time, requires more physical exertion but less physical dexterity, and takes place in a somewhat noncompetitive market compared to the very competitive market for laundries. The second pair comprises registered nurses in hospitals and pilots

and navigators in air transport. Both are relatively autonomous and high-skilled jobs, with stable employment opportunities and below-average unemployment, and require about average physical exertion but above-average levels of clerical perception. The jobs in this pair differ in that work as a pilot involves worse physical environmental conditions and has a much higher union presence, requires even higher physical dexterity and math skills but lacks the requirement for nurturing skills that nurses must have, and takes place in a somewhat non-competitive market compared to the oligopolistic market for hospitals, with a correspondingly lower level of profitability.

Why are these varying profiles of interest? Because the pairs of jobs also differ in their employment opportunities and their consequences for workers by race and by sex. Even taking into account human capital, family/marital structure, and geographic residence, there are marked differences in which race–sex group members are employed in each of these jobs.³ Black women disproportionately work as pressing machine operatives in laundries in many parts of the country, as do black men as garbage collectors for sanitary services, white women as registered nurses in hospitals, and white men as pilots and navigators in air transport. These jobs differ not only in who is more likely to find employment in them, but they vary as well in the outcomes for workers employed in them. Despite considerable similarities in their profiles within pairs, there are substantial earnings disparities between the jobs in each pair. Garbage collectors earn more than twice as much as pressers, just as pilots do compared to registered nurses. Moreover, earnings gaps among race–sex groups vary systematically across these four positions, taking into account individual and group differences in human capital, family structure, geographic residence, and labor supply.⁴ The race and gender disparities are greatest among pilots and least among nurses (with one minor exception), with only somewhat larger gaps among pressers and garbage collectors than among nurses.

How can we explain such differences? Some scholars focus on workers' characteristics and argue that such employment segregation and earnings gaps result from skill deficits among race–sex groups or from workers' choices and preferences for kinds of work. Others emphasize the nature and context of work and workplaces and argue that disparities result from market structures and forces, from race–sex stereotyping of work and queuing mechanisms, and from devaluation processes. My approach, laid out in Chapter 2, integrates ideas from each perspective, but emphasizes constraints *on* workers more so than it does choices *by* workers. The empirical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that the operation of race–sex stereotyping and devaluation processes, as moderated by external pressures and internal resources, are of central importance.

A skeptical reader might well question (with good reason) whether such “cherry-picked” evidence really indicates the existence of widespread labor market disparities among race–sex groups. In the next section, I overview trends in employment segregation and earnings gaps among race–sex groups and present some summary evidence in an effort to reassure such a reader.

Evidence of the Persistence of Labor Market Differences

Employment Segregation


The classic and simple way of documenting differences in the sorting of groups into labor market positions is to use the index of dissimilarity (Reskin 1993).⁵ This measures the proportion of a group who would have to trade labor market positions with members of the other group so that both groups had identical distributions across positions. Studies most commonly use occupations to define labor market positions. A good summary of trends in occupational segregation through the 1990s is provided by King (1992), whose findings I have updated to include 2000 (see Figure 1.1). These results indicate that

- From 1940 through 1960, differences between the occupational distributions of African Americans and whites were fairly substantial and roughly stable at around 40–45% for black men versus white men and 60–65% for black women versus white women.
- From 1960 to 1980, the differences declined substantially to about 30–34% for both African American men and women.
- From 1980 to 1990, and again from 1990 to 2000, there have been small declines of about another 2–3% each decade.
- Sex segregation within racial groups is consistently much higher than racial segregation within sex groups and has generally shown a lower rate of decline. In fact the decline from 1990 to 2000 was less than 1% among whites and about 1.5% among blacks.

Such findings actually underestimate the extent of labor market segregation because they mask segregation that occurs within occupations by *both* sex (Bielby and Baron 1986; Jacobs 2001; Peterson and Morgan 1995; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993) and race (King 1992; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). One way of showing this is to calculate segregation using more detailed definitions of labor market positions. Figure 1.1 presents indices of dissimilarity among race-sex groups for 1980, 1990, and 2000 using three-digit census occupations (nearly 400 in number), while Figure 1.2 presents indices of dissimilarity using six-digit census industry-occupation combinations (about 40,000 in number).⁶

The indices calculated for more detailed labor market positions in Figure 1.2 show notably higher levels of segregation, especially by race, than do those in Figure 1.1 for occupations alone. On average, the extent of racial segregation is 20–30% higher and the degree of sex segregation is 10–15% higher for the more finely grained positions. Overall, these results suggest that about 33% of blacks (or whites) would have to change their labor market placement in order to achieve an even distribution of racial groups across detailed labor market positions and that, within racial groups, nearly 60% of women (or men) would


Figure 1.1 Employment Segregation for Occupations, 1980–2000



have to change their labor market placement in order to achieve an even distribution of sex groups across positions. Note also that there were much smaller changes in sex segregation between 1990 and 2000 in contrast to the rate of decline across the prior thirty years.

Some might argue, however, that such measures *overstate* the extent of racial inequality because they fail to take into account racial differences in labor market inputs (such as education, experience, and family status) or geographic location (region and metropolitan residence) that influence placement into labor market positions. In reality, although such factors are consequential for individual success in the labor market, they explain only part of the racial or gender differences in occupational distributions. To illustrate, Figure 1.3 presents results from the 1990 Census using 107 industry-occupation groups.⁷ It shows the index of dissimilarity for both the *observed* industry-occupation distributions for race-sex groups and the *net* industry-occupation distributions for race-sex groups. (Note that the absolute levels of observed segregation are smaller than those in the prior figures due to the higher degree of aggregation.) Observed segregation is measured by the index of dissimilarity for the *actual* distribution of pairs of race-sex groups across the 107 industry-occupation cells. I calculated net segregation as the index of dissimilarity for the *predicted* distribution of pairs of


Figure 1.2 Employment Segregation for Occupation by Industry, 1980–2000



groups across the 107 cells, where the prediction takes into account how groups differ in human capital, family structure, and geographic residence.⁸ What is most important in this figure is the difference between observed and net segregation. Adjusting the labor market placement of race-sex groups to reflect group differences in the control variables reduces segregation by at most three percentage points (a 12% reduction). Indeed, for sex segregation among whites, the net segregation is actually higher than the observed. Thus, moderate to high levels of racial and gender employment segregation still exist, and relatively little of this segregation is due to differences in human capital, family status, or geographic residence.

One factor that these analyses do not fully address is the role of individual preferences and the self-selection of women and minorities into certain types of jobs (e.g., a preference for public-service employment among minorities). Family status is often assumed to constrain women's preferences, and thus the variables for family status partially control for the influence of women's preferences. As I discuss in more detail later, self-selection is of secondary importance because, while it does narrow choices by job seekers, they are equally if not more constrained by the limited set of jobs actually offered. In fact, there is little

Figure 1.3 Observed and Net Aggregated Employment Segregation, 1990



evidence that such value differences influence sex differences in the jobs selected (Barry 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1988; Glass 1990; Glass and Camarigg 1992; Padavic 1991).⁹

There is little reason to consider a comparable argument concerning race differences in job selection. To the best of my knowledge, a differential values or rational-choice argument about job selection by race has not been made in the literature. Indeed Tomaskovic-Devey (1993: 40) noted that it “would be a potentially racist assumption.” Furthermore, research finds at most minimal differences between blacks and whites in job or work values (Day and Rounds 1998; Gupta, Tracey, and Gore 2008; Johnson 2002).

Earnings

What implications does such segregation have for labor market rewards? It is commonly argued that a share of the differences in earnings among race-sex groups can be attributed to differences in the earnings of the labor market positions into which they have been sorted (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1980; Council of Economic Advisers 1998; Darity and Myers 1998; England 1992; Glass, Tienda, and Smith 1988; Kaufman 1983; Marini 1989; Parcel and Mueller 1989; Taylor, Gwartney-Gibbs, and Farley 1986; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). The basic premise is that minorities and women occupy jobs that typically have lower

levels of earnings than those jobs occupied by white men and that this fact can explain some part of the earnings differences among groups.

How large are the earnings gaps among race-sex groups, how have these changed over time, and how much of the gaps can be attributed to segregation as opposed to other causes? The Council of Economic Advisers reported that (for full-time workers):

Wages of white men continue to exceed those of all other groups of workers (Labor Markets [Tables] 4, 5, and 6). Studies indicate that black men's wages rose relative to white men's between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s, especially in the South. But this trend reversed sometime in the mid- to late 1970s, and black men's relative pay declined for at least 10 years. The evidence of the last 10 years is mixed. . . .


After reaching near parity in the mid-1970s, black women's wages have fallen relative to those of white women. . . . Young, college-educated black women reached pay parity with their white counterparts in the early 1970s but have seen their relative wages fall about 10 percentage points since then (Labor Markets [Tables] 5 and 7). (1998: 23)

According to the data in this report, among full-time workers in 1997 black men earned 74% of what white men earned, while black women earned 83% of what white women earned. Thus racial earnings gaps have persisted and even increased to some degree. Although gender-wage gaps have decreased, women still earned only 75% of what men earned among whites, but 84% of what men earned among blacks.

While the Council of Economic Advisers (COEA) acknowledges the importance of the link between labor market segregation and earnings (1998: 24), they did not directly assess its impact or whether declines in segregation have led to a lessened contribution of segregation as a source of disparity. Figure 1.4 presents data on earnings by race-sex group for 1980 and 1990 that make clear the interplay between employment segregation and earnings gaps. Although some of the magnitudes differ from the COEA report (because the sample includes all workers, not just full-time workers), it shows similar patterns and trends overall. The size of the total gap among groups (the height of each bar) was relatively stable between 1980 and 1990, but showed opposite trends for race gaps than for sex gaps. Within sexes, the race gap in earnings increased, but much more so for men than for women. Within racial groups, the sex gap in earnings decreased, but much more so for blacks than for whites.

These gaps in annual earnings remained fairly substantial in 1990, aside from the very small gap between white women and black women.¹⁰ On average, white men earned much more than the other three race-sex groups. Black men earned \$11,000 less, or 62% of white men's earnings, a sharp contrast from the small race gap in earnings among women. Both white women and black women earned about \$16,000 less than white men, or about half of what they

Figure 1.4 Decomposition of Earnings Gaps Among Race-Sex Groups, 1980 and 1990



earned. There was also a notable sex gap among blacks. Black women earned about \$5,300 less than black men, or about 25% less.

What are the sources of these gaps? The typical way to think about these discrepancies attributes between-group earnings gaps to only two sources: one due to differences among groups in their average levels of, say, human capital; and one due to differences among groups in the return to human capital which they receive (see, for example, Althausser and Wigler 1972; England et al. 1994; Featherman and Hauser 1976; Kaufman 1983). However, I have refined this approach (Kaufman 1983) to distinguish a third source, that amount due to segregation of groups into jobs that pay better or worse. More formally, then, the three sources of earnings gaps are defined as follows:

1. *Composition* is the share of the gap attributable to between-group mean differences in factors that affect earnings (e.g., differences in average education between groups). This component captures “compensable” differences between groups, including those due to pre-labor market discrimination (e.g., in educational attainment).

2. *Returns* is the share of the gap attributable to between-group differences in the payoff to factors that affect earnings (e.g., different returns to education for groups). This component captures discrimination in the form of unequal payoffs for labor inputs to some extent, although it is recognized that this is not “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination.

3. *Segregation* is the share of the gap attributable to “the impact of the differential distribution of the groups across labor divisions coupled with the differential earnings of employment in the various labor market divisions” (p. 589)—for example, differences in mean earnings between skilled craft positions (disproportionately employing white men) and low-skilled household service positions (disproportionately employing black women). This component thus captures the extent to which an unequal distribution of groups across positions creates inequality in earnings, *even if there were no earnings discrimination against groups within positions*.

Figure 1.4 reports the results of applying this three-component decomposition to data from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. In this analysis, the predictors of earnings included measures of human capital, family structure, geographic residence, and labor supply. Including labor supply is a somewhat conservative strategy (i.e., maximizing the composition component and minimizing the return component) because labor-supply indicators mix together involuntary with voluntary reduction of supply by some workers (e.g., some women).

Although the total gaps in earnings were very stable (the total height of the bars for each pair), the same is not true of the sources of the gap. The *returns* and *segregation* components were more volatile than the total gaps. But the *composition* component was nearly constant. Aside from the very small reversal of the gap between white women and black women,¹¹ the *composition* bars in Figure 1.4 show that group differences in the mean of the earnings-generating characteristics contributed to the gap in both 1980 and 1990 by about \$3,600 for black men compared to white men; \$7,000 for white women compared to white men; \$3,100 for black women compared to black men; and \$6,700 for black women compared to white men.

In proportionate terms, the share of the gap due to group differences in *composition* was also fairly stable, aside from a large increase in the share of the gap between black men and black women. In 1990, group differences in *composition* ranged from 33% of the earnings gap between black men and white men to 60% of the earnings gap between black women and black men. Clearly pre-labor market differences were an important source of earnings gaps between groups, especially of the sex gaps within race groups.

In contrast to this stability, the size of the *returns* component increased between 1980 and 1990 for all group comparisons, although the component is still negative for black women compared to white women.¹² All else constant, there was a larger earnings gap between groups in 1990 than in 1980 because of

changes in the returns paid to group members. For black men compared to white men, the gap increased by \$700 to over \$3,700; for white women compared to white men, the gap rose by \$700 to nearly \$7,100; for black women compared to black men, the gap increased by \$400 to nearly \$1,900; and for black women compared to white men, the gap jumped by over \$1,000 to \$5,600.

In 1980, the *returns* component ranged from 22% of the earnings gap between black women and black men to 40% of the earnings gap between white women and white men. By 1990, this proportionate share had also increased, now ranging from 34% to 45%. Although the larger group differences in returns cannot be unambiguously attributed solely to increasing discrimination, it is important to note that this formulation of the decomposition model measures group differences in returns *within* sets of similar labor market positions. Thus, within-position differences in payoffs produced a sizable and growing component (both absolute and relative) of the earnings gap among groups. Moreover, it equaled or exceeded the proportionate share of the gap due to pre-labor market *composition* for black men compared to white men and for white women compared to white men.

The *segregation* component showed opposite trends for race gaps than for sex gaps (the top black bars in Figure 1.4). Within sex groups, the *segregation* component increased the black-white gap in earnings from 1980 to 1990, especially for men. For black men compared to white men, the gap rose by \$500 to nearly \$3,600; for black women compared to white women, the gap increased by under \$100 to \$2,300. However, the *segregation* component decreased the sex gap in earnings from 1980 to 1990, especially between black men and women. For black women compared to black men, the gap dropped by \$1,900 to \$200; for white women compared to white men, the gap fell by \$1,400 to \$1,500; and for black women compared to white men, the gap decreased by \$1,300 to \$3,800. By 1990, the *segregation* component was only a minor part of the earnings gap between sex groups. Thus, some part of the increases in the proportionate share of the *returns* component (especially for black women compared to black men) were due to the reduction in the contribution of the *segregation* component. But the *segregation* component remained a substantial component of the race gaps, \$2,300 for women and nearly \$3,600 for men. Indeed, for black men compared to white men, each of the three components accounted for about a one-third share of the total gap.

The value of these decomposition results is that they clearly indicate the role that labor markets play in reproducing prior inequality as well as producing inequality among race-sex groups through their participation in the labor market. Except for black women compared to white women, a substantial share of the earnings gaps among groups can be explained by pre-labor differences (from 33% to 60%). Thus pre-labor market group differences and inequalities are strongly reproduced within the labor market as earnings inequalities among groups. But the labor market is not just a passive generator of inequality. Fully

40–67% of the earnings gaps are not simply reproduced from preexisting differences. This remainder can be attributed to more active labor market processes creating race and sex inequality, including those of discrimination and segregation.

Contributions to Gaps in What We Know

Given the evidence presented in this chapter, how can we make sense of such patterns of inequality? I suggest that the starting point is to examine the mechanisms that sort race-sex groups into labor market positions, to analyze how employment segregation and other labor market processes affect earnings determination and the production of earnings gaps among race-sex groups, and how the latter may differ across race-sex groups. Over the past twenty-five years, sociologists and economists alike have explored a wide variety of explanations for the persistent employment and compensation differentials between men and women and between blacks and whites. However, despite considerable speculation and empirical study, generalizable knowledge about the processes generating such labor market inequalities remains limited for several reasons.

Perhaps the most critical shortcoming has been the lack of theoretical and empirical attention to the intersection of race and gender (for an exception see the work by McCall (2000a,b, 2001a,b): “The extant scholarship focuses either on gender composition or on race composition; we found almost no research that simultaneously takes gender and race into account to examine, for example, what establishment characteristics are associated with the employment of women of color” (Reskin, McBrier, and Kmec 1999: 356–357). This is surprising given the marked differences in race employment-segregation levels within sexes but comparable sex-segregation levels within races noted above. This constrains researchers’ ability both to test theory and to formulate policy recommendations if, as many scholars argue should be the case, the effects of race and sex are not additive but interactive. Consequently, I give due consideration to the intersection of race and gender in developing theoretical expectations, designing the analyses, and interpreting results.

Second, despite the large volume of research in this area, studies have tended to be piecemeal, testing a few factors, rather than providing comprehensive empirical evaluations. And there are still unanswered questions and some critical shortcomings of the commonly used research designs. For example, an unresolved issue of long debate in the earnings-gap literature is why the “femaleness” of a job decreases wages (Groschen 1991). Past research has documented wage disparities among female-dominated, sex-integrated, and male-dominated jobs and speculated about the reasons for disparities, but such speculations are rarely tested explicitly. Human capital deficiencies are insufficient to explain

these differences (England 1992; Groshen 1991; Kilbourne et al. 1994a) and a compensating differentials explanation is inconsistent with the empirical findings (Groshen 1991; Jacobs and Steinberg 1990). The literature suggests that workplace discrimination is key, but direct and comprehensive tests of the processes argued to create and underlie workplace discrimination are few.

Similarly, trends in and levels of workplace segregation by race or by sex (but rarely both) have been studied extensively but systematic research is lacking on how the conditions of work and workplace characteristics affect workplace segregation. Even for such a central criterion as general skill, Reskin, McBrier, and Kmec review (1999: 339) found that “little research exists on how the skills establishments require affect its [race and sex] composition.” To move beyond the plethora of narrow or mono-causal models, I draw on an eclectic literature in sociology and economics to develop theoretical expectations: dual economy and segmented markets, race segregation, sex segregation, statistical discrimination, queuing approaches, human capital, Becker’s theory of discrimination, comparable worth, cultural feminism, and gendered evaluation of work. I use segmented market theory and race-sex queuing theory as complementary perspectives to integrate ideas from these varied approaches as detailed in Chapter 2.

A third shortcoming, especially in the employment-segregation literature, has been the use of overly broad or circularly defined labor market segments to define the positions across which workers are segregated and within which earnings gaps are measured. For example, virtually all studies of employment segregation define labor market positions using occupations, rather than using more finely grained labor market positions that also take into account the economic sector within which workers are employed.¹³ Unlike past categorizations of labor market segments, I use a combination of detailed occupation and detailed industry of employment to define labor market positions that embody the race- and sex-segregated contours of the labor market without resorting to a circular definition using the observed race or sex composition of positions (see Chapter 3). Disaggregating occupations by economic sector is only a partial step toward the ideal of analyzing jobs (i.e., specific job titles in particular firms) and it provides a varying degree of within-occupation detail and variation. For example, registered nurses work overwhelmingly in a limited set of health-care industries (hospitals, doctor’s offices, etc.) whereas janitors and cleaners work in virtually every industry. I have chosen to use this definition of positions and data because of the advantages they provide in terms of generalizability across geographic locales and the full range of positions as well as providing data at both the worker and position level (see the next point).¹⁴

A related concern is that for a long time virtually all studies of employment segregation analyzed aggregate units (occupations or industries) but failed to control appropriately for worker-level determinants (e.g., human capital or family status) that affect the matching of workers to positions.¹⁵ Only a few such studies controlled for these at all, introducing substantial specification error. If

such factors were controlled, they were typically included as worker characteristics aggregated to the position level (e.g., England, Allison, and Wu 2006), a strategy that suffers from a type of ecological fallacy (Krivo and Kaufman 1990). More recently, a body of work on segregation has developed using job- and/or establishment-level data that avoids this problem (e.g., Fernandez and Mors 2008; Fernandez and Sosa 2005; Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2004; Kmec 2005; Petersen and Saporta 2004; Stainback 2008). As I describe in Chapter 3, I employ a two-step procedure to control properly for worker-level factors, resulting in an appropriate measurement of position-level differentials among race-sex groups.

A Brief Guide to the Rest of the Book

In the next chapter, I lay out the details of my integrated perspective and apply it to develop the series of hypotheses empirically assessed in subsequent chapters. In Chapter 3, I discuss the census and other data sources that I used to develop the measures for these analyses and the statistical techniques I employ. The following three chapters present and describe the results of analyses that seek to answer two initial questions posed in Chapter 2:

1. How do the working conditions and task requirements of labor market positions, the nature of industrial product and labor markets in which they are embedded, and their linkages to other actors (e.g., the government and unions) affect the degree and type of employment segregation in 1990 among race-sex groups, taking into account worker differences in human capital, family structure, and geographic residence? In particular, do race- and gender-typing of task requirements create corresponding employment segregation by race and sex (assessed using the base model in Chapter 4)?

2. Similarly, how do these factors affect the earnings gaps among race-sex groups? Can (stereotypic) working conditions and skills/task requirements explain the effects of race-sex composition on earnings gaps, again giving due consideration to the effects of differential human capital, family structure, and geographic residence (explored using the base model in Chapter 5)?

I elaborate these initial questions and analyses by arguing that there are economic and social contexts across which such processes may vary systematically. Thus I assess two further issues:

3. How are the determinants of employment segregation and earnings gaps moderated by (interact with) economic contexts such as market power and observed changes in demand for labor? Specifically, do market power and other forms of economic buffering from market pressures intensify the effects of

normative factors (e.g., race- and gender-typed tasks and working conditions) and does employment growth diminish such effects (elaborated in the extended models in Chapters 4 and 5)?

4. How are the determinants of employment segregation and earnings gaps moderated by (interact with) larger societal contexts, specifically regional differences between the North and South? Given the documented regional differences in levels of racial prejudice, are segregation and earnings gaps higher in the South and are the effects of race-typed tasks and working conditions larger in the South (assessed in Chapter 6)?

The concluding chapter reexamines the contributions of this research, highlights major findings and their implications for the multiple theoretical perspectives that I summarize in Chapter 2, provides some suggestions for future research, and identifies some policy implications of the results.

Notes

1. As I discuss in Chapter 3, I exclude other race-ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanic and Asian subgroups) from my analyses because their inclusion would have required using an overly aggregated definition of labor market positions. In Chapter 7, I speculate about how the processes and results I find might apply to other groups.

2. The following characterizations use the measures of general skills and training, race- and gender-typed tasks, and other characteristics of labor market positions discussed in Chapter 3. For a quick overview of how these are defined, see Table 3.4.

3. For details of how such employment representation measures are constructed, see the discussion in Chapter 3.

4. For details of how the earnings gaps, net of the controls for individual factors, are constructed, see the discussion in Chapter 3.

5. The index of dissimilarity is calculated as (Duncan and Duncan 1955):

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{Occ=1}^0 \left| \frac{n_{Occ, Group 1}}{N_{Group 1}} - \frac{n_{Occ, Group 2}}{N_{Group 2}} \right|$$

6. These data use occupation and industry comparably coded to the 1990 Census standard codes for all three censuses by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) project. The number of actual occupation-industry combinations in the data varied by census: 43,276 in 1980; 46,473 in 1990; 39,293 in 2000.

7. These groupings are aggregations of the six-digit industry occupations. The industry groups are defined by product type (using Browning and Singlemann's 1978 classification) and by the extent of industrial market power (concentration of sales). The occupation groups are defined by skill type (combinations of working with people, data, or things) and by skill level. See Chapter 3 for more detail on these indicators.

8. The net distributions were derived from the effects of race-sex group membership on labor market position from a log-linear analysis controlling for the effects of human capital, family structure, and geographic residence on labor market position.

These race-sex effects were used to adjust the observed distributions to remove the effects of differences among race-sex groups in the control variables (for details of this procedure see Kaufman and Schervish 1986).

9. Even preferences for typical work are only weakly associated with job choices (Jacobs 1989; Rosenfeld 1983; Rosenfeld and Spenner 1992), and many scholars argue that these preferences often reflect the influence of past labor market discrimination (Reskin 1993; Marini 1989).

10. This is much smaller than the gap among full-time workers because black women are much more likely to work full time than are white women.

11. The negative component for black women compared to white women indicates that, rather than decreasing, the gap increases by about \$200 after adjusting for differences in composition.

12. For black women compared to white women, the gap *decreased* by \$400 *less*, to over \$1,400.

13. A related concern in the employment-segregation literature is that the few existing analytic studies that do use a more detailed definition of employment positions are difficult to generalize because they rely on restricted samples (or case studies). For example, Bielby and Baron's (1986) classic analysis of job segregation by sex is limited to job titles in mixed-sex occupations for a sample of California establishments over-representing manufacturing industries and excluding some major industries. Similarly, Tomaskovic-Devey (1993) analyzes job-level sex segregation and racial segregation for a North Carolina sample.

14. Although scholars have long recognized that for studying labor market mechanisms the ideal definition of positions would be jobs (e.g., Baron and Bielby 1986; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993; Petersen and Morgan 1995), there are trade-offs in balancing this against other concerns. For example, job-level studies are harder to generalize as they are typically limited by geographic locale (Baron and Bielby 1986; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993; analyses of the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality [MCSUI] data [Bobo et al. 2000]) or to a subset of industries or occupations (Baron and Bielby 1986; MCSUI analyses; Petersen and Morgan 1995). And many, but not all, of the job-level studies lack data on worker characteristics, which are a key factor in understanding labor market processes and outcomes.

15. Tomaskovic-Devey (1993) has both worker-level and organization-level data, but he analyzes them separately. His job-level segregation analyses do not control for the effects of worker characteristics, nor do the worker-level analyses control for job/firm characteristics.