


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Director's Comment

As this year's *Review* was being finalized, developments in Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, and Afghanistan remind us of this critical lesson from earlier operations: size matters.

In 1994, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, (UNAMIR) watched from the sidelines as a fragile peace agreement collapsed into mass genocide. Aside from a few episodes of heroics, the 2,400 troops of UNAMIR were easily pushed aside by the more than 50,000 combatants of the Forces Armées Rwandaise. Equal tragedy played out against similarly scaled forces in Angola. These missions were aptly described by a force commander of the period as "a bet—that the parties won't test our mettle." It's a bet the UN lost.

The Security Council learned that hard lesson. Five years later, 20,000 UN troops, reinforced at the vital moment by 2,000 UK Royal Marines, stood firm against an effort to overturn Sierra Leone's peace agreement and helped give that country a fresh chance. Sierra Leone is now entering its twelfth year of stability. Similarly scaled missions, occasionally reinforced both militarily and politically, would hold the line in Timor Leste and Liberia, both of which have—for now—put hostilities behind them. And as the *Review* was being prepared for publication, the UN force in Côte d'Ivoire, with 7,500 troops and unified political backing from the General Assembly, UN Security Council, the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was standing firmly behind the election results the mission itself oversaw.

Having registered success with missions in the 10,000–20,000 range, the UN extended that

model to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and later Somalia (via the AU.) But relative to size of territory and opposing forces, those missions are similar in scale not to those that oversaw successes in West Africa and Timor Leste, but those that met with dramatic failure in Central Africa in the early 1990s. With around 20,000 troops in the DRC, the UN has—totally unsurprisingly—been unable to prevent atrocities and rape or to truly lay the foundation for stable governance. In Sudan, as we send this volume to press, the UN faced an uncertain prospect: if tense political, resource, and territorial issues unresolved by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement escalated into crisis after the January referendum, would the 20,000 UN and AU troops, spread across an inhospitable terrain the size of Western Europe, be sufficient to prevent tragedy? History suggests not.

In Afghanistan, by contrast, the most recent surge brought US and NATO forces to an all-time high of 130,000 troops. These troops do not create the power to permanently defeat the Taliban, but effectively used they do give the coalition the leverage to negotiate effectively with all actors. The vital thing is to use that leverage to establish a credible Afghan and regional political dynamic that can maintain stability long after the drawdown of Western forces.

The massive overstretch and cost of UN forces in the Horn and Central Africa have led to questions about the sustainability of peacekeeping. Much of the past year was dominated by discussions of alternative models, cost reductions, the use of special political missions,

and reforms to the UN's operational architecture—a debate the NYU Center on International Cooperation has encouraged and occasionally joined. Elsewhere we have strongly reinforced the point that size alone is far from enough: capability matters and politics matters. The debate, though, must not neglect the point that force—an adequate force, with the right capacities—is

an essential tool for political negotiations. Force without politics is nothing; but politics without force will often fail, to the detriment of the UN and tragedy on the ground.

—*Bruce D. Jones*

Director, Center on International Cooperation



Strategic Summary 2010

Global Peacekeeping in Transition

While talk about transitions, imminent contraction, and consolidation in peacekeeping dominated discussions about global peace operations in 2010, overall deployment levels continued to rise. Much of the growth in global peacekeeping can be attributed to the United States' reinforcement of the NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, which increased by 59,462 troops in 2010 to a total of 130,492 troops—an 84 percent increase from 71,030 troops in 2009.* Yet, even if NATO is excluded from the picture, UN and AU peacekeeping deployments increased in overall size—the UN grew by 2.4 percent over the year, contrary to expectations, adding 2,362 peacekeepers to reach a total global deployment of 99,172. At the same time, the spiraling situation in Somalia and the potential for that conflict to spread beyond the country's borders led the AU to boost its peacekeeping force (Africa Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM) by some 40 percent with the addition of 2,078 troops. Overall, peacekeeping grew by 32 percent over the year; there were 256,170 peacekeepers deployed in 2010 compared with 194,379 in 2009.

Unlike military peacekeeping, where NATO's Afghan operation overshadows the UN's, overall police deployments in peace operations continue to be dominated by the UN. The UN accounted for 87 percent of all deployed police in 2010 with 14,025 civilian police. The next largest contributor, the European

Union, accounted for 10 percent of overall deployments this year with 1,623 civilian police.

Despite recognition of the need to broaden the base of UN troop contributing countries (TCCs), South Asian and African states continued to supply most of the troops for UN operations. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India remained the largest military contributors to UN-commanded operations. The US continued to be the largest military contributor to non-UN-commanded missions with 92,173 troops in ISAF.

Growth for UN-commanded operations slowed considerably in 2010. The measured drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the closure of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), led to significant reductions in two of the UN's major operations.

While continued growth in 2010 reaffirms peacekeeping's role in conflict management, these numbers stand in contrast to a growing reality: over the course of 2010, peacekeeping operations, especially the UN's, were under tremendous operational, political, and financial pressure to scale down. Simultaneously, the international community's appetite for the creation and deployment of new large-scale multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations weakened as well. No new peacekeeping mission has been mandated since the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was created on 31 July 2007.

It is against these trends that this year's volume highlights peacekeeping transitions—

*Year to year comparisons are made between September 2009–September 2010 for non-UN-commanded missions and October 2009–October 2010 for UN-commanded missions.


the withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation and the handing over of responsibility to national authorities, another international presence, or other regional and local actors.

As demonstrated in this volume, missions are transitioning amid a range of different operational environments. In Liberia, a phased withdrawal is proceeding in a relatively stable security environment. UNMIL continues to be on track in meeting its benchmarks ahead of the 2011 elections. Likewise, in Timor-Leste transition planning has commenced for the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) as the mission steadily hands over security functions to the national police. Conversely, MINURCAT precipitously ceased its operations—withstanding continued insecurity and ill-prepared Chadian security and justice institutions—after the government of Chad requested the Security Council not renew MINURCAT’s mandate. This abrupt denial of consent led to a hasty exit of peacekeepers.


In Haiti, the earthquake on 12 January 2010 devastated the country, resulting in severe loss of life, widespread humanitarian need, and destruction of infrastructure. The UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—which entered the year preparing for a drawdown—quickly became the primary search-and-rescue provider in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The mission’s flexible reaction to the disaster was even more remarkable given the casualties suffered by the mission itself after a staggering 102 personnel perished—the highest number killed in a single event in the history of UN peacekeeping.

In late 2010, MINUSTAH peacekeepers were blamed by the Haitian population for introducing the growing cholera epidemic, which after three months had killed 2,800 and infected 130,000 others. Compounding this already difficult environment was the presence of widespread violent protests that erupted following contested presidential elections. MINUSTAH’s quick adaption to these changing circumstances


Deployment of Military Peacekeepers, 2000–2010



Deployment of Military Peacekeepers Excluding ISAF, 2000–2010



Top Ten Military Contributors to UN-Commanded Operations: 31 October 2010




over the course of 2010 underscored the unanticipated setbacks that challenge a mission under transition.

The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) transformed into a stabilization mission (MONUSCO) in 2010 after

the president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, called for the mission’s withdrawal by mid-2011. As the UN’s largest and most expensive operation, MONUSCO faced serious pressures during the year, including deteriorating security in the east, continued predatory practices against civilians

Source of Deployed Police: 31 October 2010



by the state's own armed forces, an insurgency in Equateur Province, and over 300 mass rapes in North Kivu, some 12 kilometers from a MONUSCO base. Measuring these troubling developments against a stalled national security sector reform process, the continued presence of domestic and foreign militias, and general unpreparedness for the 2011 elections, the political and security situation of the DRC remained perilous.

Finally, South Sudan's referendum on independence presents the clearest case of a peace operation in transition. Preparations for the vote and its consequences have been the focus of UNMIS in 2010. UNMIS realigned its forces toward border flashpoints and provided an immense amount of support to referendum preparations. Yet at the close of the year, several points of contention—including the future of the oil producing Abyei region—remained unresolved between the two parties. With the future of the operation uncertain at the close of the year, its ability to protect civilians was further hindered following the withdrawal of the Indian helicopter deployments that represented nearly one third of the mission's aerial military capacity.

The resultant picture from 2010 is one of peacekeeping under continuing strain and

pressure, but also of continuing demand. As Ian Johnstone underscores in Chapter 1, "Peacekeeping's Transitional Moment," the challenges facing peacekeeping as pressure mounts for withdrawal are not easily overcome. Mitigating dilemmas arising from competing priorities against existing realities is crucial. For instance, how can a mission draw down sustainably in order to alleviate strains on resources while still allowing enough flexibility to reallocate those resources elsewhere given current and future needs?

Conclusion

The year 2010 ended with a 50 percent increase in authorized troops for AMISOM and likely reinforcements for the besieged UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Combined with the uncertainty in post-referenda Sudan, how will peacekeeping contract in overall numbers if the international community continues to buttress high-profile missions with more troops? Indeed, these events would seemingly contradict the narrative of contraction. What lies behind this, however, are two countervailing trends: that current operations continue to face pressure to

scale down in overall size, and that the international community is unwilling to deploy new, large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Thus, while conditions on the ground necessitate action, and sometimes additional reinforcements, the era of continued growth for multidimensional peacekeeping may be coming to a close.

The significant slowing in the global rate of UN deployment in 2010 is a sign of this predicted reduction. With MONUSCO, UNMIL,

and other major UN missions drawing down, conditions and or consent permitting, peacekeeping may well be entering a period of overall decline in global deployment—offsetting any small increases for specific missions. Regardless of the global picture, the future strategic direction of peacekeeping hinges on its performance over the coming year in the largest and most watched operations in the DRC, Sudan, Haiti, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Looking Back at the New Horizon Process in 2010¹

More than a year after launching the New Horizon reform initiative—aimed at strengthening UN peacekeeping to meet current and future demands—the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) took stock of the process in 2010 with their first *Progress Report*.² While meaningful progress was made in 2010 in terms of important institutional reforms, developments targeted toward more strategic reforms were lacking.

Whereas the New Horizon process was launched in 2009 at a time of considerable strain for peacekeeping amid record high levels of deployment, the 2010 *Progress Report* notes that UN peacekeeping may be entering a period of consolidation where the focus will be less on building new, large operations and more on transition in existing operations with renewed attention to the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus.

The ongoing efforts are focused broadly in two main areas: strategic and institutional reforms. Of these, strategic reforms, such as increasing the pool of troop- and police-contributing countries, registered little progress in 2010. Institutional

reforms, however, fared somewhat better. For instance, consultations among the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries, and the Secretariat on mandates and operations, and more open and inclusive formal and informal dialogues among peacekeeping stakeholders, became more common. The issue of protection of civilians (PoC) also saw progress at the 2010 session of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, or C34, when DPKO and DFS presented a draft operational concept note on PoC—a major step toward developing and operationalizing comprehensive mission-wide PoC strategies and trainings.

UN member states endorsed the DFS-proposed Global Field Support Strategy (A/64/633), which seeks to improve the resourcing and service delivery of field missions in 2010 in its almost fully proposed form. Its implementation in the coming year is expected to bring more rapid and effective mission startup and timely deployments, in addition to improving conditions for civilian support staff. The Review of International Civilian Capacities is also an important development

in this regard as it strengthens the availability of quality civilian peacekeeping personnel.

The obstacles that divide member states between those who fund peacekeeping operations and those who provide personnel remained. Little action was taken by current and potential force contributors to more consistently support UN operations, as essential questions about the limits and possibilities of peacekeeping remain unresolved. Compounded by financial concerns, member states demonstrated little incentive to back their words with actions on this front.

While some areas of the New Horizon agenda have progressed more than others, the initiative has only just begun. Peacekeeping must remain flexible in order to evolve to changing realities and demands in the field. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if peacekeeping’s so-called period of consolidation will provide the necessary space for tackling specific reforms or hinder their progress. A focus on transition planning and the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus appear to continue in the near future.

Notes: 1. To access all the New Horizon Reports, including the first paper *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* visit <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/newhorizon.shtml>

2. *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1*