# Contents

*Preface*  
*Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen*  
*Foreword, James Jonah*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction: Blue Berets, Burning Brushfires</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Stealing of Suez and the Sahara: The UN in North Africa</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>“No More Congos!” The UN in the Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Orphans of the Cold War: The UN in Southern Africa</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Tragic Triplets: The UN in West Africa</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Conflicts of Identity: The UN in the Horn of Africa</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Conclusion: From Burden Shedding to Burden Sharing</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bibliography*  
*Index*  
*About the Book*
1

Introduction:
Blue Berets, Burning Brushfires

As Secretary-General I was duty-bound to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council to the letter. But as a lifelong student of international law, I lamented this situation, which both disparaged international law and displayed the United Nations not as an organisation of sovereign states equal under the Charter but as a political tool of the major powers.
—Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General, 1992–1996

This book is about the games that great powers play. These games often determine the outcomes of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere. After the first armed UN peacekeeping mission was deployed to end the Suez crisis of 1956, the politics of the Cold War would truly overshadow future missions, as most dramatically illustrated by the Congo crisis four years later. The first armed UN mission in Egypt had been created as a result of the machinations of Britain and France. Future peacekeepers would also succeed or fail based on these same machinations, for good or for ill. The Suez crisis of 1956, to a large extent, set the tone for the later Congo crisis. The United States and Britain lined up on the side of pro–Western Congolese leaders and sought to use the UN peacekeeping mission to oppose the “radical,” nationalist prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, in order to prevent the spread of Soviet communism (which was supporting Lumumbist elements) to this huge country at the heart of Africa. France refused to pay any peacekeeping dues and, later, from the 1970s, would attempt to draw the Congo into its neocolonial francophone sphere of influence in Africa.

More positively, the end of the Cold War and increased cooperation between the United States and Russia facilitated the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia. None of these
missions would have been possible during the Cold War era of proxy wars waged by the superpowers. During UN missions in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire after 2000, the British and French still demonstrated some residual colonial attitudes of guilt and possessiveness in their former colonies. Historical ties largely determined US support for the UN mission in Liberia, a close Cold War ally during the 1980s. The Russians, under Mikhail Gorbachev, were able to nudge former Marxist allies in Angola and Mozambique to the negotiating table as they sought improved ties with the West in the late 1980s. China similarly pushed the government of Sudan—its third-largest trading partner in Africa—to accept a UN peacekeeping force in the volatile Darfur region in 2007. The games that these powers play, which I have described elsewhere as creating a system of “global apartheid,” must always be placed at the center of any analysis of UN peacekeeping missions, for it is often these games that help determine the course and outcome of these interventions. The apartheid system that I describe here is of course different from the legalized racism in South Africa or the pre–civil rights United States and focuses more on the fact that the majority of populations in much of the Third World live in widespread poverty as a result partly of the global structures of political and economic power. Like domestic structures in racist societies in South Africa and the United States of the past, however, the consequences of apartheid are similar in terms of darker populations in the Third World suffering the worst forms of an oppressive, unjust system. Peacekeeping has often operated on the basis that those who mostly pay the piper also call the tune, and Western interests (the Permanent three [P-3] of the United States, Britain, and France) have tended to dictate where and when these missions are deployed and for how long.

The five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5) of the anachronistic UN Security Council—the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France—still largely reflect the alliance of victors dating from the end of World War II in 1945. The Council must thus be urgently democratized to ensure stronger permanent membership from Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. While the formal use of the veto by the P-5 has declined, it is still effectively used in the closed-door consultations of the Council, which is where much of its serious business occurs. Many of the archaic procedures and policies of the Council are well known to the five permanent members, who also have privileged access to UN documents through Secretariat staff. Decisions are often based on complex and not always visible trade-offs between members of the P-5 that have been worked out over many years. Since no written records of these closed-door consultations are kept, the five permanent members represent the Council’s institutional memory, giving them a huge advantage over the ten rotating members—sometimes dismissed as “tourists” by P-5 members—who only serve two-year terms. In this study, I have sought to assess the views of key P-5 representatives.
The need for a book that assesses UN peacekeeping in Africa over the past five and a half decades is clear: between 1948 and 2011, about 40 percent (27 out of 65) of the UN’s peacekeeping and observer missions were deployed in Africa; nearly half of the fifty UN peacekeeping missions in the post–Cold War era have occurred on the continent; the “Katanga rule” (peacekeepers using force in self-defense and to assist missions to fulfill their tasks) and the “Mogadishu line” (peacekeepers avoiding “mission creep”) were both influenced by African cases; Africa hosted the most numerous and largest UN peacekeeping missions in the world in December 2010; much of the UN’s socioeconomic and humanitarian efforts are located in Africa; and the world body has established subregional offices in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, and Central Africa, as well as peacebuilding offices in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic (CAR), Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Two Africans—Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ghana’s Kofi Annan—were Secretaries-General during the critical post–Cold War years of 1992 and 2006, while Boutros-Ghali, Annan, Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, and Sudanese scholar-diplomat Francis Deng were involved in leading some of the most important conceptual debates and initiatives on UN peacekeeping and interventions after the Cold War. In June 2011, six out of fourteen UN peacekeeping missions were in Africa (Western Sahara, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], South Sudan, and Darfur), while about 70 percent of its personnel were deployed on the continent. Sixty percent of the UN Security Council’s deliberations also focus on Africa.

But despite the importance of the UN to Africa, there has been no exclusive study that has assessed the UN’s peacekeeping role on the continent over the past five and a half decades. This book represents an effort to fill this gap. Other studies by Mats Berdal, William Durch, Lise Howard Morjé, Roland Paris, Paul Diehl, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, and Page Fortna have covered some of this ground but have not focused exclusively on African cases and are not based on the same practical experiences and African insights. In fact, although many of the peacekeeping missions in the world in recent times have been deployed in Africa and other developing countries, this literature, though generally insightful, has been Western-centric and self-referential, almost as if the thinking and experiences of scholars and practitioners living on continents where the missions take place are not worth reading. Many Western scholars also often pull their academic punches when discussing the role of their governments in abysmal failures such as Somalia and Rwanda. I have tried to criticize these great powers where necessary, and to praise them where appropriate. It is, however, important that Western scholars avoid labeling the genuine criticisms of scholars from the “global South” who wish to expose the transparent double standards of the powerful as “polemical.” As Palestinian American scholar
Edward Said frequently noted, “speaking truth to power” should be a mission of all independent scholars, and peacekeeping is one of the areas where standards of “global apartheid” are most frequently applied with tragic consequences.

**Concepts and Contingencies**

The historical approach that I adopt in this book highlights the crucial role that contingencies play in analyzing unique cases like the fifteen that are assessed here. I argue that one of the most crucial factors in explaining the various outcomes of these cases can often be found in contingencies. While concepts derived from past peacekeeping experience are useful to bear in mind, they must always be carefully applied. These cases demonstrate the importance of focusing attention on the significant role of domestic, regional, and external actors, while not treating regions as autonomous subsystems of the global order.

The relationship between international, domestic, and regional security has been the subject of close study by, among others, Barry Buzan. Buzan described three levels of analysis in security studies: state (local), subsystem (regional), and system (international). This analytical framework requires one to understand the distinctive security dynamics at all three levels before assessing how they interact. I focus on these three interdependent levels in five African subregional systems. I have not formally adopted or tested Buzan’s concept of the regional security complex, however, due to its limitations in these cases; I instead seek to demonstrate that contingencies at these three levels—rather than any established security patterns or theories—were critical factors in explaining the outcomes in the fifteen UN peacekeeping cases presented here.

The choices of national actors, regional states, and external great powers often shaped how these fifteen peacekeeping missions started, developed, and ended. By examining interests, motivations, and policies in detail, these historical narratives help us to explain the complex processes through which UN peacekeeping succeeded or failed in each case. Intraregional relations often depended as much on contingent circumstances as on long-standing patterns of interests and alignments. Geographic contiguity and the destabilizing effects of war eventually determined the policies of several national actors, subregional states, and external powers.

I also seek to demonstrate that only by achieving a degree of consensus at all three interdependent levels were peacekeeping successes facilitated in some of these fifteen cases. This calls attention to the need for more scholars to study the complex interaction at all three levels in order to capture the dynamics that lead to peacekeeping successes and failures. All three levels are interconnected: without the commitment to disarmament of powerful
warlords such as Angola’s Jonas Savimbi and Liberia’s Charles Taylor, it proved difficult for UN peacekeepers to achieve peace in both countries; without the healing of subregional divisions, the peacekeeping interventions lacked subregional legitimacy, and warring factions often continued to enjoy military support from regional or external states; without external support from great powers, UN peacekeeping often lacked adequate resources and military effectiveness.

My focus on contingencies does not mean that some findings from the fifteen African cases cannot be used to derive broader lessons for other cases outside the continent. The argument here is that any lessons must not be seen as a panacea or formula to be applied to all cases. One must always take into account contingent factors of “spoilers,” domestic and regional interests, and the role of external actors through a comprehensive understanding and investigation of each specific case.

In this book, I adopt a historical and analytical approach. The five main chapters focus on fifteen case studies in five African subregions: North Africa (Egypt and Western Sahara); the Great Lakes region (the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi); Southern Africa (Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique); West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire); and the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, South Sudan, and Darfur). These diverse cases all offer important lessons for peacekeeping and reflect the largest and most important operations in Africa in the past fifty years.

Justifying the Historical and Comparative Approach of the Book
I have consciously set out to analyze these important peacekeeping missions in five African subregions in order to enable policymakers to draw valuable policy lessons from the cases. The cases are idiosyncratic, and an understanding of each one is important in its own right. Some of the Western scholarship on UN peacekeeping in Africa has theoretical ambitions that often seem detached from the reality of peacekeeping missions on the ground. Even some of the most reputable of these analysts lack a proper grasp of the important domestic and regional intricacies of the cases with which they deal, resulting in flawed and sometimes superficial analyses in which Africa is used as an exotic backdrop to draw theoretical generalizations invented in Western laboratories. The approach here seeks to do the opposite by drawing together the complex domestic, regional, and external dynamics that shape peacekeeping outcomes in UN missions in Africa based on the insights of both Western and African analysts. This is, of course, not to suggest that African insights are inherently better than Western ones, but that a combination of both perspectives will enrich analysis in this critical area.
Some of the recent studies in the field have asked useful questions about the division of labor between the UN and regional organizations; how to measure success and failure in peacekeeping missions; and the impact of peacekeeping on local populations. These studies, however, still lack a basis in rigorous examination of the domestic, regional, and external factors that shape peacekeeping missions. Some of the US-inspired political science methods applied to peacekeeping often appear to be blunt tools that produce analyses that are sometimes esoteric, jargon-laden, and somewhat detached from peacekeeping realities on the ground. As American Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis famously noted, the failure of political scientists to predict an event as momentous as the end of the Cold War surely leads to a questioning of the presumed tools of these academic alchemists.

Assessing UN peacekeeping in Africa therefore requires a similar nuanced understanding of the domestic, regional, and external intricacies of the cases being investigated. Idiosyncrasies such as a profound understanding of the motives of recalcitrant warlords such as Angola’s Jonas Savimbi and Liberia’s Charles Taylor; the roles of Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemons and Uganda and Rwanda as regional spoilers; and the machinations of external “godfathers” such as the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia in their historical spheres of influence are critical factors that are often missed in theoretical approaches. Much of the most insightful work on the UN has been published by insider practitioners such as Conor Cruise O’Brien, Brian Urquhart, Rajeshwar Dayal, Marrack Goulding, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, David Hannay, Kishore Mahbubani, Chinmaya Gharekhan, Shashi Tharoor, John Bolton, and James Jonah, and it is still critical to combine academic rigor with policy insights in this important area of endeavor. Peacekeeping in Africa is clearly too important to leave to theoreticians in Western academic laboratories.

The main issue here is not that African peacekeeping has startling revelations and insights that may not exist in any other part of the world. It is that in order to draw lessons from African and other cases elsewhere in the world, one must first properly understand the specific domestic and regional dimensions of the cases that are being explained. If these complex dynamics are not well understood, the wrong lessons may be drawn from the cases. Thus, I do not argue that key lessons are to be derived from African cases that cannot simply be drawn from cases in the Balkans, Asia, or Latin America. My expertise and interest happen to be in Africa, and I have therefore focused on fifteen cases on my own continent. But I have first sought to understand the domestic and regional dynamics of each case, before relating them to the UN and the external level. In my view, a theoretical knowledge of peacekeeping will prove inadequate to explaining key outcomes in UN peacekeeping missions without a sound grasp of often intricate domestic and regional dynamics.
Key Peacekeeping Issues
Since the UN’s peacekeeping successes and failures are often contingent on the domestic, regional, and external dynamics of conflict situations, it is important to pay particularly close attention to the *politics* of peacekeeping and not just to focus on its technical and logistical constraints. While these technical and logistical deficiencies are often important, the existence of political consensus among domestic, regional, and external actors—particularly the powerful members of the Security Council—is often more significant in determining the success or failure of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Technically deficient peacekeeping missions can still succeed with strong political support, while the most technically brilliant peace operations are likely to be undermined by a lack of political commitment on the part of key national, regional, and external actors. The UN succeeded in Namibia, Mozambique, and, eventually, in Sierra Leone and Burundi, despite logistical and financial constraints, while well-resourced missions in Somalia and Angola (the UN Angola Verification Mission [UNAVEM III]) were spectacular failures.

In determining success in UN peacekeeping missions, I have adopted the simple and straightforward definition of a peacekeeping mission as one that brings peace and stability to a particular case by implementing the key tasks of its stated mandate (e.g., ceasefire; disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation; elections) even if these are not fully completed before the mission concludes. It is important, however, in measuring success, that there is some stability in the country after the peacekeepers have left, even if all their tasks have not been completed. Based on a thorough assessment of these fifteen cases, three key factors stand out as having most often contributed to success in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa: (1) the interests of key permanent members of the UN Security Council must be aligned to efforts to resolve the conflict in question, along with a willingness to mobilize diplomatic and financial support to peace processes; (2) the willingness of belligerent parties to cooperate with the UN to implement peace accords is critical and, in cases where such cooperation is not forthcoming, the development of an effective strategy to deal with potential spoilers who are prepared to use violence to wreck peace processes; and (3) the cooperation of regional players in peace processes is important, as well as their provision of diplomatic and/or military support to UN peacekeeping efforts.

It is the alignment of interests at these three interdependent levels—domestic, regional, and external—that has often shaped the course and outcome of the fifteen cases examined here. I have particularly highlighted the critical role of the most powerful members of the UN Security Council, as they are the only actors who have the power to start or end peacekeeping missions by the world body. They also play a crucial part in the two other factors: the Security Council must work to ensure the consent of domestic parties in implementing peace agreements, and the Council has the authority to develop incen-
tives for cooperation or sanctions for noncompliance. The five permanent members of the Security Council have also frequently played a key role in our third factor—regional cooperation—as they often have clout over regional actors, which they can employ to encourage cooperation (sometimes even funding regional contingents to deploy to peacekeeping missions) or to sanction countries supporting spoilers by “naming and shaming” them through UN reports, or by applying diplomatic or economic pressure on them.

Three other subfactors are worth noting in determining the success of UN peacekeeping missions: (1) the absence of conflict-fueling economic resources in war zones; (2) the cessation of military and financial support to local clients by external actors; and (3) the leadership of peacekeeping missions by capable UN envoys. It is also important to note that the presence or absence of these factors does not automatically determine the outcome of peacekeeping missions. All of these factors will likely not be met in every case of success or failure.

A historical background of previous UN missions in Africa is essential to understanding the context of the current UN missions on the continent, and it is also important to note Africa’s innovative contributions to global peacekeeping. The UN mission to Egypt after the Suez crisis in 1956 effectively represented the birth of armed international peacekeeping. Four years later, the UN’s credibility was badly shaken by its controversial intervention in a turbulent civil war in the DRC between 1960 and 1964. The organization was struggling to keep peace in the same country in another protracted civil war five decades later. The Congo, a huge country at the heart of Africa, crystallizes the difficulties that the UN has experienced in its peacekeeping efforts on the continent since 1956. In this book I examine historical case studies in Suez and the Congo and draw lessons for the thirteen post–Cold War peacekeeping cases in Africa. Significantly, all but three of the post–Cold War cases (Namibia, Western Sahara, and Ethiopia-Eritrea) are cases of civil war, reflecting the changing nature of post–Cold War peacekeeping across the globe. The varied cases, most of which have seen the large-scale deployment of troops, have been selected for the significant lessons that they provide for UN peacekeeping in Africa and beyond.

Africa has thus been a giant laboratory for UN peacekeeping and has repeatedly tested the capacity and political resolve of an often self-absorbed Security Council whose five veto-wielding permanent members were often too divided during the Cold War to make decisions on peacekeeping. The end of the Cold War by 1990, and the increased cooperation of the Security Council raised great expectations that the UN would finally be able to contribute decisively to ending wars in Africa. Under the loose heading of peacekeeping, the UN launched an unprecedented number of missions in the post–Cold War era. But despite the great expectations that with a more united Security Council, the Blue Helmets would fill Africa’s post–Cold
War security vacuum, hard times appeared after disasters in Angola in 1992, when warlord Jonas Savimbi brushed aside a weak UN peacekeeping mission to return to war after losing an election; in Somalia in 1993, when the UN withdrew its peacekeeping mission after the death of eighteen US soldiers; and in Rwanda in 1994, when the UN shamefully failed to halt genocide against about eight hundred thousand people and instead withdrew its peacekeeping force from the country. These events scarred the organization and made its most powerful members wary of intervening in Africa: an area generally of low strategic interest to them.

Based on the cases discussed in this book, there is a pressing need to establish a proper division of labor between the UN and Africa’s fledgling security organizations, which need to be greatly strengthened. Rwanda’s Arusha agreement of 1993, the DRC’s Lusaka accord of 1999, and the Algiers accords of 2000 that ended the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, all clearly revealed the military weakness of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), whose members lacked the resources to implement agreements they had negotiated without UN peacekeepers. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the UN took over peacekeeping duties from the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 2000 and 2003, respectively. The UN also took over the AU mission in Burundi and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004, as well as the AU mission in Darfur in 2007. The UN Security Council has not done much to strengthen the capacity of regional organizations and to collaborate effectively with them in the field. I will address this important subject in the chapters on the Great Lakes region, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa.

The UN missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, and Congo could, however, signify an innovative approach to UN peacekeeping in Africa based on regional pillars supported by local hegemons like Nigeria and South Africa, whose political dominance of such missions is diluted by multinational peacekeepers from outside their regions. By placing regional forces under the UN flag, the hope is that the peacekeepers will enjoy the legitimacy and impartiality that the UN’s universal 193 members often provide, while some of the financial and logistical problems of regional peacekeepers can be alleviated through greater burden sharing. These missions should also be more accountable, as the peacekeepers will have to report regularly to the UN Security Council. This might also force the Council to focus more effective attention on African conflicts.

The History and Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Africa
Between 1948 and 1978, the UN deployed only thirteen peacekeeping missions around the globe. The first armed peacekeeping mission occurred dur-
The Suez crisis in 1956. The UN Charter of 1945 had not mentioned peacekeeping, so Swedish UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld often referred to it as “chapter six and a half” because it fell between the UN Charter’s chapter six (peaceful methods for resolving conflicts) and chapter seven (peace enforcement). The first peace-enforcement mission took place in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 (the actual enforcement was mandated in 1961). This “first generation” of traditional peacekeeping interpreted the rules in interstate wars to allow for deploying an interposing force based on the consent of warring parties to maintain an agreed peace, with the peacekeepers maintaining strict neutrality. The phenomenon of peacekeeping triggered a financial crisis for the UN as the Soviet Union refused to pay for these missions during much of the Cold War era, and France also only selectively paid for peacekeeping missions. The UN General Assembly established a special committee on peacekeeping operations in February 1965 that tried to resolve some of these disputes.

Between the end of the Cold War in 1990 and 2010, about fifty peacekeeping missions were deployed. During the “second generation” of UN peacekeeping between 1988 and 1993, twenty UN peacekeeping missions were launched. Africa again innovated “multidimensional” peacekeeping in Namibia, in which tasks such as human rights monitoring; training police forces; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of soldiers; and strengthening state institutions became part of the UN’s mandate. The world body’s rigid “first generation” peacekeeping approach of not combining peace enforcement with consent-based peacekeeping came under serious challenge after the Cold War due to the difficult intrastate environments in which missions were now being deployed. This recalled the Congo crisis of the 1960s, which the world body had vowed never to repeat. With a proliferation of warlords in Angola, Liberia, and Somalia attacking peacekeepers in a bid to wreck peace processes, the issue of consent became more complicated. As UN peacekeeping evolved within a conservative UN Security Council that was reluctant to use force under any circumstances, Africa again pioneered the first mission in which peacekeepers were given an explicit right to enforce peace. The consent granted to the UN mission was at best ambiguous during the US-led peacekeeping mission into Somalia (Unified Task Force, or UNITAF) in December 1992.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* was a landmark document published in 1992 on the tools and techniques of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding for a post–Cold War era. The Security Council had asked the Egyptian scholar-diplomat to present it in January 1992. Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda* called for “preventive deployment,” a rapid-reaction UN force to enable action without the need to seek new troops for each mission, heavily armed peace enforcers for dangerous missions, and the strengthening of regional peacekeeping bodies to lighten the burden.
on the United Nations. In the same year, Boutros-Ghali established a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN Secretariat in New York to oversee peacekeeping missions while the rival Department of Political Affairs (DPA) continued to focus on peacemaking and mediation efforts. At its peak in 1994, the UN deployed seventy-five thousand peacekeepers to seventeen trouble spots at an annual cost of $3.6 billion, reflecting the euphoria of this era. UN debacles in Bosnia, Angola, Somalia, and Rwanda quickly dampened this optimism and led to a retrenchment of peacekeeping missions between 1993 and 1998, so that by 1999, only nineteen thousand peacekeepers were deployed around the world.

Based on these disappointing peacekeeping failures, Boutros-Ghali released the more circumspect Supplement to an Agenda for Peace in January 1995. This was followed several years later by the Brahimi Report on peacekeeping of August 2000, which sought to strengthen the UN’s peacekeeping capacity and suggested innovations such as preapproving funds for peacekeeping missions; improving the rapid deployment of civilian personnel to UN missions; strengthening communication between UN headquarters in New York and the field; and increasing the size of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations from four hundred to six hundred. However, this report, named after the man who chaired it, Algeria’s Lakhdar Brahimi, was disappointingly short on details on how to improve relations between the UN and Africa’s regional organizations—the continent’s main peacekeeping preoccupation. The report’s constant warnings that the UN should not undertake those missions where it could not guarantee success was seen by many in Africa as code for avoiding African conflicts, following UN debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994). A report named after one of Africa’s most illustrious public servants had thus ironically ignored the continent’s most urgent peacekeeping needs.

The “third generation” of UN peacekeeping emerged in 1999 with the deployment of peacekeepers to the DRC, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Kosovo, and East Timor, and later in Liberia, Burundi, and Sudan. The UN peacekeeping budget had grown to $5 billion in 2005 (equal to US expenditures in Iraq in one month in the same year). Many of these missions, however, failed to heed the conditions set out in the Brahimi Report: the pace of deployment continued to be lethargic; peacekeepers brought poor equipment to missions; the DPKO struggled to cope with managing the missions; and the UN Secretariat often failed to stand up to the Security Council’s sometimes quixotic demands. UN peacekeeping fell back into its usual pattern of “muddling through,” being directed largely by the consensus that could be mustered among the great powers in the Security Council, but sometimes improvising successes and saving lives in the process in places like Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
The UN and Africa’s Regional Organizations

In this book, I focus on relations between the UN and Africa’s regional organizations, which remains the continent’s most pressing peacekeeping challenge. The five cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Sudan’s Darfur region all represent examples of the UN’s peacekeeping cooperation with ECOWAS and the AU. Unlike the Brahimi Report of August 2000, the December 2004 UN High-Level Panel report seemed at first to give priority to relations between the UN and Africa’s regional organizations. This approach was championed by a prominent African on the panel, Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzania’s former OAU secretary-general, who had sat in Addis Ababa for twelve years (1989–2001) experiencing the frustrations of seeking assistance from the UN Security Council in many African conflicts in countries such as Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.28

David Hannay, another panel member and former British permanent representative to the UN, was also a strong advocate of strengthening ties between the UN and Africa’s regional organizations, having worked on these issues from 1994 to 1995 with Ibrahim Gambari, Nigeria’s former permanent representative to the UN (1990–1999). The UN High-Level Panel held one of its meetings in Addis Ababa in April 2004 and met with senior AU officials and African civil society actors to gain their perspectives on relations with the UN. At the time, it was felt that this was a clear sign of the blue-ribbon commission’s desire to focus on the UN’s ties with African actors and institutions. But in the end, the panel’s report devoted five paragraphs out of 302 to Africa’s most important peacekeeping challenges. Like the Brahimi Report before it, another high-level group had failed to grasp the UN–regional cooperation nettle, despite assurances from representatives during their meetings—one of which I attended as a resource person—that this was a key area of high priority.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report to the General Assembly of March 2005, “In Larger Freedom,” called on donors to devise a ten-year capacity-building plan with the AU, which is developing an African standby force for peacekeeping. The 15,000-strong pancontinental force is based on five subregional brigades built around members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Both Annan’s 2005 report and the UN High-Level Panel report of December 2004 advocated UN financial support for Africa’s regional organizations. Although there is still a lack of sufficient financial and political support for this plan, particularly among the P-5, the world body must learn lessons from the AU’s difficult peacekeeping experience in Sudan’s Darfur region between 2004 and 2007. These challenges effectively forced the AU to hand the mission over to the UN
through the authorization of a AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in July 2007. Africa must ensure that the UN assumes its proper peacekeeping responsibilities on the continent, supporting and then taking over regional peacekeeping missions to ensure sufficient legitimacy and resources. The continent must also be vigilant to ensure that the proposed UN/AU ten-year capacity-building plan is implemented and expanded to subregional bodies, given the tendency since 2002 of donors such as the Group of Eight industrialized countries to make similar, yet unfulfilled promises.

Building on the ten-year capacity-building plan with the AU, in April 2008 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on peace and security in Africa, in which it recognized “the importance of strengthening the capacity of regional and subregional organizations in conflict prevention and crisis management” and acknowledged “the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organizations when they undertake peacekeeping under a United Nations mandate.” Nine months later, an AU/UN panel, led by former Italian prime minister and former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, submitted a report suggesting ways to enhance cooperation between both organizations. The Prodi report was brutally frank in defining the problem: “There is a growing anomalous and undesirable trend in which organizations lacking the necessary capabilities have been left to bear the brunt in terms of providing the international community’s initial response, while others more capable have not engaged. This inversion of responsibility is generating a trend of benign neglect in which interests rather than capabilities prevail.”

The panel criticized the deployment of peacekeeping missions into difficult environments without the means to keep peace, on the basis that “having something on the ground is better than doing nothing.” It dismissed this approach as a “recipe for failure.” The report then made sensible proposals such as: enhancing the strategic relationship between the UN and the AU, particularly between the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council; having the UN provide resources to AU peacekeeping in a sustainable way; funding UN-authorized AU missions for six months before the UN takes over such missions; and establishing a multidonor trust fund to finance such missions.

A major problem with this report, however, was that it focused almost exclusively on the African Union, to the detriment of African subregional bodies such as ECOWAS and SADC, which have often acted independently of the AU in undertaking peace initiatives. ECOWAS also has more peacekeeping experience than the AU and in some ways demonstrated more capacity than the continental body in missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2003. In suggesting technical solutions to some of the UN’s peacekeeping challenges with regional bodies, the Prodi report also missed the politics behind peacekeeping decisions in which the P-5 seeks to retain as much
flexibility in decisionmaking as possible and to determine on a case-by-case basis whether its interests are at stake before supporting interventions.

By the time South Korean UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported on progress on the ten-year capacity-building program in February 2011, it was clear that not much progress had been made in establishing sustainable support for regional peacekeeping in Africa. The UN had provided capacity-building support to the AU Commission in Addis Ababa to establish its African Standby Force, as well as furnished planning, operational, and logistical support to AU missions in Sudan’s Darfur region and Somalia; the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) was coordinating activities between both bodies by July 2010; the world body supported AU mediation efforts in Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Somalia, and Darfur; and four meetings had been held between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. But the funding to implement the ten-year capacity-building program of 2005 had not been approved, resulting in ad hoc support from existing projects, while no full-fledged program of activities had been developed to fulfill the objectives of the plan, nearly halfway through its ten-year life span.\(^3^3\)

Another important document worthy of mention is the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support’s (the latter department was created in 2007) report of July 2009, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*,\(^3^4\) a review of nearly a decade of the Brahimi report’s implementation. This “New Horizon” report was explicit about the strain on the UN’s resources made by the growing demands for peacekeeping missions with 116,000 personnel deployed across fifteen countries at the time (compared to 20,000 when the Brahimi report was published in 2000).\(^3^5\) The report offered eight key practical recommendations: requiring peacekeeping to be part of an active political strategy aligning mandates, objectives, and resources; sustained dialogue between the UN Secretariat and member states, as well as between the field and headquarters to ensure impartiality in Secretariat planning and the integrity of UN command and control; improved rapid deployment; clarity on the requirements for “robust” peacekeeping and the protection of civilians, as well as on key peacebuilding tasks such as security sector reform; a new and comprehensive approach to resource generation for peacekeeping; more highly mobile military, police, and civilian capabilities for future UN peacekeeping missions; improved burden-sharing and interoperability with regional organizations; and a new field support strategy that stresses flexibility, accountability, and innovation, including sharing assets and creating regional service centres.

The “New Horizon” report, however, failed to define a strategic vision between the UN and regional organizations in Africa, due to the desire of powerful Security Council members to continue to retain flexibility in launching peacekeeping operations. The report echoed many of the Brahimi report’s recommendations on the need for peacekeeping to be linked to a viable political strategy; for protecting civilians through robust action; for
improving the UN’s peacekeeping capacity at both headquarters and in the field; and for timely provision of resources to back up mandates. It also echoed the Prodi report’s call for greater cooperation with regional organizations. At its February–March 2010 session, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping (chaired by Nigeria’s permanent representative, Joy Ogwu) also took up this call, urging the UN Secretariat to improve interoperability and to enhance cooperation with regional bodies. However, the failure of the powerful members of the UN Security Council to adopt many of these recommendations and to craft a strategic approach to engaging with Africa’s regional organizations continues to stall progress on many of these sensible proposals.

Returning to the history of UN peacekeeping in Africa, in the first four and a half decades of the UN’s existence, there was only one UN peacekeeping operation in Africa—the controversial Congo intervention (1960–1964). The UN only returned to Africa as a peacekeeper twenty-five years later in 1989, when it administered apartheid South Africa’s military withdrawal from Namibia and supervised that country’s first democratic election. During the next decade, seventeen peacekeeping operations were undertaken by the UN in Africa. The UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Ethiopia-Eritrea and the critical support of Western governments for the UN operations in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and the DRC demonstrate the importance of powerful external actors to peacekeeping missions in Africa. The P-5 must, however, be more even handed in considering where the UN should deploy. The United States, France, and Britain successfully pushed for peacekeeping interventions in stabilizing their historical spheres of influence in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, respectively, between 2000 and 2004. It is worth noting that Africa has played its part in UN peacekeeping missions; the continent’s armies took part in 53 out of 63 UN peace missions between 1948 and 2008, while 40 percent of peacekeepers deployed globally during this period came from Africa. Between 2000 and 2010, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya were among the top ten troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions around the globe. Many prominent Africans have also served as special representatives of the UN Secretary-General in diverse peacekeeping theaters and have commanded UN peacekeeping missions, with varying degrees of success. By 2008–2009, the UN peacekeeping budget had risen to $7.1 billion, with about $5.1 billion spent in African missions. In July 2009, the UN’s four largest and most complex missions—the DRC, Darfur, South Sudan, and Chad—were based in Africa, accounting for 63 percent of the organization’s peacekeeping budget. Between 2008 and 2009, an incredible $6.8 billion out of an annual $7.8 billion peacekeeping budget was spent on meeting the direct needs of UN missions (including $4.1 billion spent on military and civilian personnel costs), while only $10.8 million went toward “quick impact” projects to assist local communities.
The Responsibility to Protect and to Rebuild

Since the Somalia peacekeeping debacle in 1993, there have been frequent arguments that the UN should pursue “selective” rather than “collective” security, on the grounds that the world body does not have the resources to intervene everywhere. The Brahimi report of 2000 sought to entrench such an approach, arguing that the UN must learn to say no to unrealistic requests from the Security Council. I argue strongly throughout this book that such a dangerous approach in fact lets the powerful members of the Security Council off the hook instead of keeping their feet to the fire. Arguments for selective security, though clearly not intended to do so, could unwittingly lead to condoning mass killings, and even genocides, such as in Rwanda in 1994. Furthermore, this approach ignores the normative development of concepts such as “sovereignty as responsibility” and the “responsibility to protect,” which insist that the Security Council has the primary responsibility—as the UN Charter clearly notes—for maintaining international security everywhere around the globe.

In similar guise to the Brahimi report, respected scholar Stephen Stedman argued in 2002 that “Without great or regional power interest, the United Nations should not implement the hard cases.” Two equally respected scholars of the UN, Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum, though recognizing that selectivity has undermined the UN’s legitimacy and reputation as an impartial body, note that “selectivity has been part of the UN framework, and has been an unavoidable feature of the actions of the UN Security Council and of all UN member states.” Accepting such selectivity as inevitable could, of course, result in UN interventions being based solely on cases in which powerful Security Council members have important interests to protect, rather than on the need to protect innocent civilians in violent conflicts. The regional interventions launched by ECOWAS in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997) and by the AU in Burundi (2003) and Darfur (2004) demonstrated that even logistically and financially deficient missions can often help save lives and stabilize conflict situations until UN peacekeeping support can be attracted. Even the more limited British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000) and French-led European Union interventions in the DRC in (2003 and 2006) helped to strengthen already deployed, but deficient, UN peacekeeping missions.

Africans have contributed greatly to the normative case that the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians in cases of armed conflicts. Sudanese scholar-diplomat Francis Deng, the UN special representative of the Secretary-General for internally displaced persons between 1992 and 2004, in 2007 became the special adviser of the UN Secretary-General for the prevention of genocide. Along with other academic colleagues at the Washington, DC–based Brookings Institution, he developed the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” in 1996. This approach sought ways to operationalize the idea and to convince African governments to adapt the conti-
nent’s changing post–Cold War security architecture to protect populations in danger. Deng also argued that, in situations of armed conflicts, countries are often so divided on fundamental issues of sovereignty and legitimacy— with some factions calling for external intervention—that the validity of sovereignty must be judged by the views of African populations rather than just national governments or powerful warlords. He further observed that in domestic disputes in parts of Africa, relatives and elders have traditionally intervened even without being invited to do so. Aside from scholars, African statesmen have also championed these ideas. South Africa’s president and Nobel peace laureate, Nelson Mandela, told his fellow leaders at the OAU summit in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in 1998: “Africa has a right and a duty to intervene to root out tyranny . . . we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene when behind those sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny.”

Both the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) cochaired by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans and Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, and the 2004 UN High-Level Panel built on Deng’s ideas. The commission noted that, if governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens from serious harm, then the international community has a duty to protect them, ignoring the principle of nonintervention for a higher goal. Five criteria were laid out to legitimize such interventions: (1) the seriousness of the threat must justify the use of force; (2) the purpose of the military action must be to avert the specific threat; (3) all nonmilitary options must have been exhausted; (4) the use of military force must be proportionate to the threat; and (5) the chances of the military action succeeding in averting the threat must be high.

In his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali had argued forcefully for humanitarian intervention in places like Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, advocating the use of regional security arrangements to lighten the UN’s heavy peacekeeping burden. He saw the “responsibility to protect” in universal terms, castigating Western powers for focusing disproportionate attention on “rich men’s wars” in the Balkans, while neglecting Africa’s more numerous orphan conflicts. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was also a vociferous proponent of “humanitarian intervention.” As Annan noted, “States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice-versa. Nothing in the UN Charter precludes recognition that there are rights beyond borders.” Annan’s promotion of humanitarian intervention and his support of the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility,” developed by his special representative for internally displaced persons, Francis Deng, met with strong opposition from many leaders, particularly in Africa and much of the Third World. These leaders feared that such interven-
tions might be used by powerful states to threaten their own sovereignty. This was ironic, considering that the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 has one of the most interventionist systems in the world in cases of genocide, egregious human rights violations, unconstitutional changes of government, and situations that have the potential to lead to regional instability. Though this mechanism has not been widely used, the AU has applied sanctions on military regimes in Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Mauritania, and Guinea.

In a similar guise to Deng and Boutros-Ghali, Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzania’s former permanent representative at the UN (1970–1980), the secretary-general of the OAU (1989–2001), and the chief mediator for the AU in Sudan’s Darfur region between 2005 and 2008, noted: “We should talk about the need for accountability of governments and of their national and international responsibilities. In the process, we shall be redefining sovereignty.” Salim regarded Africa’s regional organizations as the “first line of defense” and called on them to promote democracy, human rights, and economic development. He further argued that “every African is his brother’s keeper” and called for the use of African culture and social relations to manage conflicts. Salim was instrumental in the establishment of an OAU security mechanism in 1993, which subsequently sought to manage conflicts and to protect populations in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Comoros through deploying military observers. The mandate of the AU mission in Darfur (2004–2007) explicitly called for the protection of civilians even if this was often difficult to implement in practice. The mandates for UN missions in Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sierra Leone, the DRC, South Sudan, and Darfur also included clauses for the protection of civilians, even if again this was often difficult to do in practice. The recognition of the need for peacekeepers to protect civilians is an important normative development after the shameful Rwandan genocide of 1994.

More recently, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in his 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, noted that “the evolution of thinking and practice in Africa [of R2P ideas] has been impressive.” Ban outlined three pillars in a bid to operationalize the idea of the responsibility to protect around the world: the protection responsibilities of the state, international assistance and capacity building, and timely and decisive response. Possible mechanisms to be used included: legal instruments, the UN Human Rights Council, the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC), carefully targeted sanctions, and the UN/AU ten-year capacity-building program. The emphasis is clearly on conflict prevention, but failing that, on early and flexible responses carefully tailored to specific situations. Francis Deng, as the UN Secretary-General’s adviser on genocide prevention, and US scholar Edward Luck, as his special adviser on R2P, both worked closely to develop and implement these ideas.
One of the key constraints on peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere has been the failure to undertake effective and sustained peacebuilding after conflicts and to provide the necessary resources to try to ensure that countries do not slide back into conflict. Peacebuilding, if effectively undertaken, can help avoid further peacekeeping interventions through early prevention of conflicts. The concept is often associated with the “second generation” of post–Cold War UN missions in places like Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Somalia, where efforts have been made to adopt a holistic approach to peace. Not only are diplomatic and military tools employed in building peace; today’s peacebuilders also focus on the political, social, and economic root causes of conflicts in societies emerging from civil war. Peacebuilding thus aims to promote not only political peace, but also social peace, and the redressing of economic inequalities that could lead to further conflict. Both the UN High-Level Panel report of 2004 and Kofi Annan’s 2005 report “In Larger Freedom” called for the establishment of a peacebuilding commission, as well as a peacebuilding support office within the UN Secretariat, which were both agreed in December 2005 and established in 2006.

The peacebuilding commission aims to improve UN postconflict planning, focusing particularly on establishing viable institutions; ensuring financing in the period between the end of hostilities and the convening of donor conferences; and improving the coordination of UN bodies and other key regional and global actors. This commission interacts both with the UN Security Council and its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and involves the participation of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The peacebuilding commission is composed of thirty-one members from the Security Council, ECOSOC, and the most significant contributors of financial support and troops to the UN. The first chair of the commission was Angola’s permanent representative to the UN, Ismael Gaspar Martins, while the first two countries to be reviewed were Burundi and Sierra Leone. A multiyear standing fund was established with voluntary contributions. Due to pressure from developing countries, the commission focuses largely on postconflict reconstruction and not on conflict prevention. However, based on UN experiences in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Central African Republic, many Africans feel that this commission may represent yet another effort at political alchemy that does not make much difference in mobilizing the resources required for postconflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. The first five years of the commission’s existence have proved disappointing and have so far failed to match the great expectations at its birth that it would promote more effective peacebuilding in Africa and improve UN coordination in countries such as Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic.
Having provided a background of the approach of this book and the key issues involved in UN peacekeeping in Africa, the rest of the book will address the fifteen cases and offer some concluding reflections and recommendations flowing from the cases. Through a comparative examination of these cases of UN peacekeeping in five African subregions, from Suez to Sudan, over a period of five and a half decades, I seek to draw out the key domestic, regional, and external factors that have often contributed to the success or failure of peacekeeping missions. The concluding chapter summarizes these key factors and argues for the need to ensure greater burden sharing between the UN and Africa’s fledgling regional organizations, as well as to establish an effective division of labor between these actors. Only through such efforts can what Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui, described as a Pax Africana be achieved on the African continent.\(^{60}\)

Notes
The author would like to thank Devon Curtis, Page Fortna, Paul Williams, and Musifiky Mwanasali for their insightful comments, which greatly improved this introduction.


9. These ideas were first developed in Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).


11. See, for example, Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010). This book is a far cry from the useful and more readable Paul F. Diehl, Peace Operations (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).


13. See, for example, Diehl and Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations.


18. See, for example, Margaret Vogt, “The UN and Africa’s Regional Organisations,” in Adebajo, ed., From Global Apartheid to Global Village, pp. 251–268.

19. For a lucid introduction to the topic, see Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). For an entertaining review of the early years, see O’Brien, The United Nations.


32. Ibid., p. 8.


34. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, July 2009).

35. Ibid., p. 4.


38. These UN special representatives include: Cameroon’s Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (Rwanda); Mali’s Alouine Blondin Beye (Angola); Nigeria’s Ibrahim Gambari
(Angola and Darfur); Algeria’s Mohamed Sahnoun (Somalia); Mauritania’s Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Burundi, the West Africa office, and Somalia); Senegal’s Ibrahima Fall (the Great Lakes region); Nigeria’s Olú Ademújí (Central African Republic and Sierra Leone); Senegal’s Lamine Cissé (Central African Republic); Togo’s Albert Tévoédjré (Côte d’Ivoire); Tunisia’s Kamal Morjane and Cameroon’s Namanga Ngoni (both served in the DRC); Botswana’s Joseph Legwaila (Ethiopia-Eritrea); Ethiopia’s Berhanu Dinka (the Great Lakes region); Uganda’s Francis Okelo (Sierra Leone); Tunisia’s Hédi Annabi (Haiti); Kenya’s Yash Ghai (Cambodia); Guinea’s François Lonseny Fall (Central African region); Tunisia’s Azouz Ennifar (Ethiopia-Eritrea); Congo-Brazzaville’s Rodolphe Adada (Sudan’s Darfur region); Haile Menkerios (Sudan); Egypt’s Hany Abdel-Aziz (Western Sahara); Chad’s Abou Moussa (Central Africa office); Mozambique’s João Honwana and Rwanda’s Joseph Mutaboba (both Guinea-Bissau); Tanzania’s Augustine Mahiga (Somalia); Ethiopia’s Sahle-Work Zewde and Nigeria’s Margaret Vogt (both Central African Republic).

39. These UN force commanders include: Ghana’s Emmanuel Erskine (Lebanon); Nigeria’s John Aguiyi-Ironsi (the Congo); Zimbabwe’s Philip Sibanda and Nigeria’s Chis Alli (both served in Angola); Kenya’s Daniel Opande (Liberia and Sierra Leone); Senegal’s Abdoulaye Fall and Togo’s Gnakaoundé Béréna (both served in Côte d’Ivoire); Nigeria’s Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor (Liberia); South Africa’s Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwebi (Burundi); Nigeria’s Martin Agwai and Patrick Nyamvumba (both served in Darfur); Nigeria’s Moses Bisong Obi (South Sudan).


41. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda, pp. 28–29.


46. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed.

51. See Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility.
53. Salim, “The OAU Role in Conflict Management.”
54. Cited in Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed, p. 17.