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Abdurahman, Abdullah
(1872–1940)
Abdullah Abdurahman, a politician and a physician, was born in the town of Wellington into a relatively affluent Cape Malay family. He received his medical training in Glasgow, Scotland, qualifying as a doctor in 1893, but received his early education in Wellington and then in Cape Town where he set up his medical practice upon returning to South Africa.

In 1904, Abdurahman was elected Cape Town’s first coloured city councilor, and he remained a councilor almost without interruption until his death. He worked to improve the conditions of the coloured community, especially within the field of education, and helped set up the first secondary schools for coloured children in Cape Town. But much of his political work was directed through the African Political Organization (APO), of which he was elected president in 1905. The APO’s goal was to fight the increasing racial oppression in the country, initially only on behalf of non-African coloureds. Before the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, Abdurahman unsuccessfully led two delegations to London to secure franchise rights for coloureds. (In the Union of South Africa, coloured males in the Cape Province who met certain income, property, and education standards were granted the right to vote.) Later, between 1927 and 1934, Abdurahman and the APO started working more closely with black African political leaders in an attempt to create a united front. However, little came of this, and some contemporary commentators regard the APO’s position as being too accommodating to the white authorities. By the late 1930s, other political parties, such as the more radical National Liberation League, had surpassed the APO in prominence, leaving Abdurahman and his party with a mixed political legacy. Nonetheless, Abdurahman was clearly a powerful politician and popular among the non-European community.

Achmat, Abdurazzack (Zackie)
(1962–)
Founder and president of the AIDS activist group the Treatment Action Campaign, Abdurazzack (Zackie) Achmat was a child activist in his native Cape Town (he was arrested numerous times between 1976 and 1980) and a gay rights activist
in JOHANNESBURG in the late 1980s and the early
1990s. Raised in a Muslim COLOURED family,
Achmat studied at the University of the Western
Cape where he received his bachelor’s degree in
English in 1993. He is a member of the AFRICAN
NATIONAL CONGRESS but has publicly clashed with
the political party’s hierarchy, particularly with
former South African president THABO MBeki,
over the government’s AIDS policies. Openly gay
and HIV-positive, Achmat helped found the
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
in 1994 and advocated for laws and policies for-
bidding discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion in the postapartheid dispensation. In 1998, he
helped found the Treatment Action Campaign, ini-
tially aimed at advocating for affordable and
accessible antiretroviral drugs (ARV) for people
living with AIDS. He himself has succumbed to
numerous AIDS-related illnesses and must take
ARV drugs. In January 2008, he married his part-
ner Dallie Weyers (South Africa legalized gay
marriage in December 2006). Achmat was nomi-
nated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004.

See also TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN

Act of Union
See SOUTH AFRICA ACT

Adams College
Adams College was a mission school established
by US missionary Dr. Newton Adams in 1853 in
present-day KwaZulu-Natal Province. It is the
second oldest school, after Lovedale, established
to educate black South Africans. Originally
named Amanzimtoti Institute, this school inspired
many Africans to attain higher levels of education
and boasts many famous alumni, including Chief
ALBERT LUTHULI, Chief MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI,
and Dr. Nkosasana Zuma. Like so many great
schools during the APARtheid era, Adams College
suffered the impact of racism and segregation but
has experienced a revival in the postapartheid era.
With the passage of the BANTU EDUCATION ACT
in 1953, the college was renamed the Amanzimtoti
Zulu Training School but was named Adams Col-
lege again with the demise of apartheid. Z. K.
MATTHEWS became the first black head of the
school in 1925, and prominent political leaders
including Luthuli and GOVAN MBeki were teach-
ers at the college for a period of time. The school
continues to operate today.

Affirmative Action
Also referred to as “employment equity,” named
for the Employment Equity Act passed in 1998,
affirmative action is integrally connected with the
government’s broader policy of BLACK ECONOMIC
EMPOWERMENT (BEE). Against a background of
racial disparities in skilled jobs inherited from
APARtheid, the law is designed to ensure that des-
ignated groups defined as black people (meaning
Africans, COLOUREDs, and INDIANS), women, and
people with disabilities have equal opportunities
for employment. The policy has been vigorously
applied in the public sector, though less vigor-
ously by private businesses. Businesses with more
than fifty employees and with an annual turnover
defined in the Employment Equity Act are subject
to the legislation. The law requires that employers
draw up an equity plan, achieve certain quotas and
specific outcomes, and submit reports to the
Department of Labor. Critics of affirmative action
argue that it has benefited a small group of well-
connected black businesspeople and has excluded
coloureds and Indians among its beneficiaries.
White critics claim it amounts to “reverse
racism.” In turn, proponents of affirmative action
argue that forty years of apartheid rule can be con-
sidered de facto affirmative action for whites and
that the postapartheid government has an obliga-
tion to redress some of the past imbalances.

See also BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

African National Congress
In the years following the 1994 democratic transi-
tion, the African National Congress (ANC) has
dominated South African politics. The legitimacy
and popularity of the movement has its more
immediate origins in securing black majority rule
in 1994, but its deeper genesis lies in the ANC’s
long history of resistance to white rule, both legally
until 1960 and underground and in exile until 1990.
The Formative Years (1912–1940)

The ANC was founded in 1912 as the South African Native National Congress (it became the ANC in 1923) at a convention in Bloemfontein called by Pixley Seme, a political activist, lawyer, and journalist who had been educated in Britain and the United States. The formation of the ANC was prompted by the 1909 South Africa Act of Union that largely excluded blacks from political franchise. (In the Cape, some African and Coloured males could vote as part of a qualified franchise.) Provincial congresses had emerged over the previous decade, and, in 1912, these were united under the leadership of John DUBE (president) and Solomon PLAATJE (secretary). Founder Seme, who was partly influenced by his studies in the United States at Columbia University where he gained some appreciation of the US structures of government, notably Congress, emphasized national unity over ethnic-regional divisions, and this remained a central policy.

The period of ANC formation saw diverse ideological currents among Africans: from Christianity, British empire loyalism, and liberalism to nascent African nationalism; the ANC did not adopt the latter until the 1940s, but its influence gradually spread. The nature of power in a white settler society created a deeply ambiguous context in which African political culture developed. ANC leaders were largely drawn from the mission-educated, Christianized black elite. However, given the nature of settler rule, this was a powerless elite, and the ANC had to seek support from a wide range of social strata.

The early ANC had a checkered history. In its first decade, it was clearly the major African political organization, submitting petitions against the NATIVES’ LAND ACT OF 1913 and other discriminatory legislation, with Plaatje as an eloquent publicist, and sending delegations to Britain in a vain but principled appeal for intervention. From 1918 to 1920, the Transvaal branch supported mass worker and anti–PASS LAWS demonstrations. This radicalism came to an end in the 1920s when the ANC was eclipsed by the populist INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION (ICU), while ANC members diverted energy into the liberal Joint Councils, largely white-initiated and -dominated groups supportive of interracial cooperation. Another short period of interracial cooperation.

At the provincial level, ANC politics were complex. While most members were urban based, a House of Chiefs was modeled on the British House of Lords, and ethnic politics were not entirely absent. In Natal, A. W. G. CHAMPION forged ties between the ICU and ANC, but the ANC in Natal was split. There also were rival branches in the Cape Province, with Western Cape ANC president James Thaele espousing radical GARVEYSM and James Calata in the Eastern Cape pursuing a moderate path. Nationally, the ANC remained weak and lacked strong media outlets. The Transvaal ANC’s organ, Abantu-Batho, became the national medium but was defunct by the early 1930s, and the ANC never developed a strong, permanent newspaper.

In its first three decades, the ANC remained small, with limited mass appeal. Provincial structures were loosely structured and poorly financed. Estimates of nationwide membership vary from 1,000 to 4,000 in the interwar years, though an interlocking of membership with grassroots, community-based Advisory and Vigilance associations gave it wider, indirect support. Nevertheless, the ANC lacked a mass membership. Leaders were overwhelmingly male and middle class, and women lacked full membership rights before 1943. Yet, some activists remained deeply concerned at the harsh conditions of most Africans, while the Bantu Women’s League (founded in 1918, which in 1948 became the ANC Women’s League) under Charlotte Maxeke worked with some ANC leaders, though it did not affiliate with the ANC until 1931.

In the mid-1930s, African politics were reignited by the discriminatory J. B. M. HERTZOG Bills. By the end of the decade, the ANC began to reorganize under Secretary Calata. In December 1940, the ANC elected A. B. Xuma as president. In addition to espousing African nationalist and liberal philosophies, Xuma oversaw the ANC’s steady growth to a more centralized, financially viable body. Membership grew from 1,000 in the 1930s to...
5,500 by 1947. Xuma’s reforms included abolition of the elitist Upper House and equality for women, confirmed in a new 1943 ANC constitution and the 1948 formation of the AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS WOMEN’S LEAGUE. Xuma led a committee that coauthored Africans’ Claims in South Africa (1943), calling for African self-determination. He forged an alliance with the SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN CONGRESS, and ties with African labor unions were strengthened by the work of ANC communists such as J. B. Marks and Moses Kotane.

Years of Growth and Protest (1940–1960)
The growth of African nationalism was seen in the 1944 formation by ANTON LEMBEDE, WALTER SISULU, NELSON MANDELA, and OLIVER TAMBO of the AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS YOUTH LEAGUE, which undermined Xuma’s moderate position after the NATIONAL PARTY’s victory in the 1948 elections, and its brutal promotion of APARtheid pushed the ANC to adopt in 1949 a radical Program of Action endorsing direct action by boycotts and strikes.

The defiance campaigns of the 1950s saw the ANC develop into a mass movement; the 1952 protests boosted numbers from 20,000 to 100,000. Now, its constituency was truly national with great strength among urban workers, as in PORT ELIZABETH. The ANC supported campaigns against forced removals of blacks from areas designated for whites and BANTU EDUCATION, if ineffectively. Mandela emerged as the powerhouse behind the campaigns, and, with African liberation on the continent imminent, the ANC was buoyed, posing a real challenge to PRETORIA, which intensified repression. The ANC fought back by forging the Congress Alliance with INDIAN, coloured, and white progressives and, in 1955, by hosting the Congress of the People that adopted the FREEDOM CHARTER to embody aspirations of all South Africans; it became a central ANC policy document. These wider alliances prompted a 1959 split spawning the PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS. The state continued to harass ANC leaders, many of whom were on trial from 1956 to 1961 in the TREASON TRIAL.

For much of the 1950s, ALBERT LUTHULI was the ANC president. The first African awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, he remained a committed Christian and a firm proponent of the African nationalist and liberal ideas of an ANC that emphasized majority rule by constitutional means. This peaceful avenue, however, was closed when the government banned the ANC in 1960, leading it to resort to armed struggle and exile.

Exile Years (1960–1990)
After the ANC’s outlawing in 1960, Mandela and communist leader JOE SLOVO founded Umkhonto we Sizwe (translated as Spear of the Nation and also referred to as MK), the people’s army. MK was an integral part of the liberation movement led by the ANC but technically separate due to risk of repression. Following the arrest of much of the ANC leadership and their banishment after the RIVONIA TRIAL to ROBBEN ISLAND, the focus of ANC’s work shifted to exile. This does not mean it ceased to have influence inside South Africa—on Robben Island, Mandela, GOVAN MBeki, and other ANC leaders educated a new generation of freedom fighters from the 1976 SOWETO STUDENT UPRISING who were sent to the island, and underground structures persisted—but the ANC was now illegal, as its machine was smashed. The vacuum in black politics was filled in the late 1960s and 1970s by the BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT and labor unions, and in the 1980s by the UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF), which aligned with the ANC.

MK continued to operate, now from exile. Sabotage of the early 1960s directed primarily against apartheid military sites and strategic economic and energy positions developed into wider military campaigns from forward bases in the FRONTLINE STATES. In 1982, the ANC was pressured to leave Mozambique, which had been a main base of operations for them, but MK continued to implement effective special operations, notably symbolic attacks on the headquarters of Pretoria’s army and the Sasol oil refinery. The ANC, however, continued to view armed struggle as only one pillar of a strategy that also included politics and international solidarity.

Tambo became the chief leader in exile as the ANC constructed important bases in the Frontline States, notably Tanzania and Zambia, and in
Mozambique after 1975. A major ANC office was located in Britain, which hosted a significant number of exiles. The ANC launched a major diplomatic initiative by opening offices from India and the United States to the Pacific. Many leaders were prominent in diplomatic and solidarity work. In the 1960s, important foundation work was done by Tambo and Robert Resha, with ANC publications such as Sechaba founded to unite and educate widely dispersed members. Others active in exile included Johnny Makatini in New York, ANC India chief representative Mendi Msimang, Edwin Funde in Australasia, writer Alex La Guma in Cuba, Alfred Nzo, Ruth Mompati, and Frene Nosher Ginwala.

In Tanzania, the ANC’s Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College educated the 1976 Soweto Uprising youth streaming out of South Africa. The ANC in exile worked closely with the South African Congress of Trade Unions and recreated its military, women’s, youth, and religious structures through the work of people such as Slovo, Andrew Masondo, Mavis Nhlapo, Gertrude Shope, and Father Michael Lapsley. After the ANC’s 1969 Morogoro Conference, whites were permitted to join the ANC, with Slovo serving on its Revolutionary Council and other progressive whites, including Jack Simons, Ray Alexander, and Albie Sachs, prominent in exile structures.

Exile was a lonely, isolating experience, accompanied by assassinations orchestrated by Pretoria (Joe Gqabi in Harare and Dulcie September in Paris) and occasional dissent, as in MK camps in Angola. The ANC sought to overcome the alienation of exile by creating cultural formations such as the musical troupe Amandla! By the mid-1980s, the ANC’s diplomatic strategy was working, with sectors of white South African society willing to negotiate and more countries recognizing the ANC as a legitimate representative of the South African people rather than Pretoria. The ANC had become a government-in-waiting.

Transformation and Rule (1990–)

With financial sanctions biting, the Cold War over, and intense internal opposition, the apartheid regime unbanned the ANC and released Mandela in February of 1990. The ANC quickly and effectively reestablished its structures inside the country, successfully navigating a complex and dangerous transition period fraught with political violence from the state and from political rivals such as Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), as seen in the 1992 Boipatong Massacre, for instance, where IFP members attacked the resident of an informal settlement south of Johannesburg, killing forty-five people. Eager to open up space for negotiations, the ANC suspended armed struggles in mid-1990, encouraged lifting of sports sanctions banning South African athletes and sports teams from competing in international competitions, and entered negotiations in 1991. In Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, the ANC succeeded in gaining agreement for democratic elections, which it won convincingly in 1994 (receiving 62.6 percent of the vote) and again in 1999, 2004, and 2009—so much so that commentators were worried that the ANC’s transition from a liberation movement to a more conventional political party had been accompanied by shift to a “one-party dominant party” situation. This electoral dominance was underlined when the ANC later won provincial elections in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, taking over seats previously held by other parties. The ANC’s return from exile also saw tensions with ex-UDF forces over the level of democratic inner-party practices.

The Mandela administration (1994–1999) achieved impressive advances in reconciliation, housing, electrification of black townships, and economic stability. Mandela endorsed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, formed in 1995, as a way to heal a nation divided under apartheid. Yet, while apartheid was dead, elements of its socioeconomic legacy persisted to limit the impact of ANC policies. Government sought first to boost domestic accumulation and social equality in the Reconstruction and Development Program but, in 1997, jettisoned its prosocialist policies to introduce the capital-friendly Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Strategy.

Thabo Mbeki’s administration (1999–2008) continued Mandela’s economic policies but also failed to solve high black unemployment and inequality. Mbeki adopted a controversial and
widely derided position on HIV/AIDS, avoiding proven medical treatment. Like Mandela, Mbeki played an active role in African affairs, including conflict resolution. He encouraged black pride through the concept of African Renaissance and African economic empowerment through New Partnership for African Development, returning the ANC to a strongly African nationalist ideology, underlining that the ANC’s abandonment of most of its radical programs echoed processes in other postcolonial African countries. The ANC Youth League and the ANC Women’s League remain important constituents, while the alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party persists despite recent serious tensions over economic policy and internal democracy.

By 2006, rising labor and internal ANC dissatisfaction with Mbeki’s overly centralized rule widened deep fissures, resulting in Mbeki’s replacement by the controversial Jacob Zuma as ANC President in 2007, and then by Kgalema Motlanthe as state president in September 2008. A breakaway Congress of the People (COPE) party later that year was the first major ANC split since 1959. In 2009 elections, COPE had difficulty establishing a separate platform, receiving only 7.4 percent of the vote, and while the ANC’s majority weakened nationwide from 69.69 percent to 65.9 percent, it increased in KwaZulu-Natal. In municipal elections in May 2011, the ANC slipped to 61 percent, with COPE falling to only 2.1 percent, and with some areas reporting higher abstention rates. Zuma’s assumption of the state presidency from May 2009 has not seen major policy changes. The government continues to struggle to find solutions to massive deindustrialization and unemployment—the economy revived only partially by staging the 2010 soccer World Cup—as well as rising xenophobia and dissatisfaction over the slow pace of land reform.

Notwithstanding these problems, the ANC remains Africa’s oldest nationalist body with outstanding achievements, not least of which are the ending of apartheid, establishment of democracy, and the winning of three consecutive elections.

See also Armed Struggle; Democratic Politics Since 1994; Freedom Charter; Government Structures; Nelson Mandela; Thabo Mbeki; Sol Plaatje; Oliver Tambo; Jacob Zuma

Bibliography


—Peter Limb
African National Congress Women’s League

Five years after women were admitted to the African National Congress (ANC), they established a branch in 1948. The African National Congress Women’s League’s major campaigns were the 1952 Defiance Campaign and a mass women’s march in conjunction with other women’s groups in Pretoria on August 9, 1956, protesting government repression (celebrated as Women’s Day in South Africa after Apartheid). After 1994, it declined in influence. Some of its prominent members and leaders include Lillian Ngoyi (the first woman elected to the ANC’s National Executive Committee in 1956), Albertina Sisulu, and Winnie Mandela.

See also African National Congress; Winnie Mandela; Lillian Ngoyi

African National Congress Youth League

The African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) was founded in 1944 by Anton Lembede, Ashby Peter Mda, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo as the youth wing of the African National Congress. It marked the rise of a new generation of leadership of South Africa’s African population that was more radical and confrontational than its predecessors.

The ANCYL developed its own manifesto in 1944, and its Program of Action was adopted by the ANC in 1949, signaling the Youth League’s increasing control over the entire organization. This was in part due to the leadership of Mandela, who was elected national secretary of the Youth League in 1948. A year later, he and other founding members of the ANCYL were elected to the National Executive Committee of the ANC. The Youth League mobilized mass protests and called for civil disobedience and strikes against racial discrimination and the newly implemented apartheid system. It was under the leadership of many Youth League founders that the ANC launched Defiance Campaigns in the 1950s, invigorating the ANC and expanding the movement dramatically.

In 1959, many ANCYL members broke away to form the rival Pan Africanist Congress. After 1960, when many of the liberation movements were banned by the government, the Youth League continued its activities underground during the remainder of the apartheid years. In 1990, President F. W. de Klerk legalized the ANC and its associated organizations including the Youth League. After many years in exile, the ANCYL was rebuilt inside South Africa with the main objective of mobilizing all sectors of youth into active participation in the struggle to secure democracy.

See also African National Congress; Apartheid; Anton Lembede; Nelson Mandela; Walter Sisulu; Oliver Tambo

African Renaissance

Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa from 1999 to 2008, popularized the idea of an African Renaissance after South Africa’s democratic elections in 1994. This concept calls on African people and nations to be the key drivers of change and development on the African continent as opposed to having Western nations set and push the agenda. Key elements of the African Renaissance include social cohesion, democracy, economic rebuilding and growth, and the establishment of Africa as a significant player in geopolitical affairs. Although this term’s popularity has waned in the past decade, it continues to be a significant part of the South African intellectual agenda after Apartheid.

Among other things, the African Renaissance is a philosophical and political movement aimed at ending the violence, elitism, corruption, and poverty that plague the African continent and replacing them with a more just and equitable order. Thus, the African Renaissance agenda encourages education and the reversal of the “brain drain” of African intellectuals, and urges Africans to take pride in their heritage as well as to take charge of their lives.

Undergirded by a pan-Africanist ideology, the goals of the African Renaissance have been
taken up by a new generation of African leaders, including President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. Together with President Mbeki, as well as other African leaders, they have sought to transform the African Renaissance vision into a practical reality through such projects as the creation of the African Union (that replaced the old and relatively ineffective Organization of African Unity), the New Partnership for African Development, and the Millennium Africa Programme that seek to define a new relationship between Africa and the West based on partnership and on Africans taking ownership and responsibility for the continent’s economic development.

The African Renaissance has also drawn criticism from some circles, as some see the concept as utopian and impractical given the prevalence of conflict and war in many parts of Africa. Others suggest that it is a South African project aimed at spreading the country’s dominance throughout the continent. The project has also been accused of conforming to the dictates of neoliberal globalization and thus promoting the interests of the West over those of Africa.

**African Union**

Established in 2001, the African Union (AU) is a continental organization composed of fifty-three African member countries, covering the entire continent except for Morocco (which opposes the membership of Western Sahara in the AU). It succeeds the amalgamated African Economic Community and the Organization of African Unity and has the expressed goal of uniting and integrating the African continent. Eventually, the AU aims to have a single currency (the Afro) and a single integrated defense force, as well as other institutions of state, including a cabinet for the AU heads of state. Inspired by the vision of an African Renaissance, the AU works to secure democracy, human rights, and sustainable economic development for the continent. South Africa played a founding role in the AU, and South African president Thabo Mbeki was the organization’s first president.

**Afrikaner(s)**

Afrikaner is both a self-identity (equal to an ethnic identity) as well as a political identity among a significant portion of South Africa’s white population forged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The identity became synonymous with the policy of apartheid, the South African state, and the National Party. The term Afrikaners was first used in the early eighteenth century to refer to whites of a variety of European heritages. However, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that it was used exclusively to refer to white Afrikaans speakers (a significant proportion of Coloured People and a smaller group of black South Africans also speak Afrikaans). By the early twentieth century, there were significant economic and social differences among Afrikaans speakers. In recent decades, the link between an Afrikaner nationalist identity, regime, and state, which characterized the years of apartheid government as well as sustained a balance of ethnic, racial, and class forces, has fractured.

The group identity of Afrikaners has fluctuated considerably over time but was most coherent during the apartheid era when an organizational axis of the state and the National Party offered systematic access to the ear, agency, and largesse of the government. Indeed, with the onset of democratic, majority rule in 1994, many suggested a bleak future for Afrikanerdom under an African National Congress (ANC) government perceived to be broadly opposed to Afrikaner interests. In spite of the recent and marked increase in white poverty levels, it is evident that the Afrikaner minority still retains a substantial material and cultural inheritance accrued during the apartheid era. While some Afrikaners feel increasingly marginalized in this new order, others are thriving in the new South Africa.

Racial hierarchies were present from the foundation of the Dutch Cape Colony in the seventeenth century and were gradually transformed into a hierarchy of legal status groups based on race that established the basis for a racial order, with whites being viewed as superior and blacks being viewed as inferior. The extension of British control over the colony during the nineteenth cen-
tury increased with the prohibition of the slave trade during 1807 and, more significantly, a battery of legislation from 1828 onward that served to weaken the colonialists’ authority over their native workers. Nonetheless, relations between the different frontier communities established further into the interior of South Africa and settlers were at times harmonious.

The discovery of diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886, respectively, signaled the advent of modern capitalism in South Africa and an era characterized by fundamental societal change. Thereafter, development by different racial groupings progressed unevenly, with English-speaking white capitalist entrepreneurs fast accumulating wealth and power, and the African population being transformed into a poor proletariat, and this more broadly contributed to the fractured class and ethnic awareness upon which an Afrikaner nationalist identity would be founded. It also shaped perceptions among Dutch-Afrikaner professionals that a significant section of their group was faced with economic and cultural degeneration. Thus, in 1875, the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners (Fellowship of True Afrikaners) was established to champion the cause of the Afrikaans language. The Afrikaner Broederbond, which was founded in 1918 and comprised a middle class and urban-orientated elite, formulated similar strategies ensuring that Afrikaans was recognized as an official, exclusively racially defined language alongside English in 1925.

It was not until the National Party’s 1948 electoral victory that the highly successful and rapid socioeconomic transformation of the status of the majority of Afrikaners properly began. Apartheid provided an ideological axis for this nationalist order, and in the decades that followed, the broad social coalition that had sustained the rise to power was continually refashioned. From the start, contradictions were apparent both within the nationalist alliance and apartheid itself. These came to a head with efforts to reform apartheid in the form of the vicious broedertwis (divisions between brothers), which centered upon the changing composition of the Afrikaner volk (an ethnic group or a people) during the early 1980s. The emergence of the Conservative Party, which followed the National Party’s split in March 1982, shattered any semblance of political unity among the volk. In particular, the rise of an urbanized managerial middle class and a relatively independent group of capitalists in the commercial and financial sectors led them to begin to side with their white English-speaking class counterparts as economic growth began to conflict with a nationalist identity.

National Party attempts at liberalizing the economy during the late 1980s meant that the government and its business allies began the political transition to majoritarian liberal democracy in 1994 with considerable confidence. Indeed, these efforts bore fruit during the bilateral negotiations between the then National Party government and the ANC, and during the transition process itself, 1990 to 1994, as domestic business elites helped to secure a favorable transition characterized by a successful macroeconomic compromise among policy elites. The fact that the dramatic political transition to majoritarian, democratic rule and the adoption of a new constitution was not matched by significant economic restructuring has meant that the postapartheid growth path and distributive regime have maintained overall levels of inequality, including most importantly those related to the distribution of economic power; of property and land; economic, entrepreneurial, and educational opportunities and experience; and the share of income and per capita income of the different population groups. Nonetheless, the white population’s share of total income has declined from a high point in the 1970s. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, white household incomes increased by 67 percent between 1995 and 2004, while African household incomes were only 24 percent of whites in 2004, and a mere 1 percent higher than in 1995.

The end of apartheid also meant the end of Afrikaner political control, but white Afrikaans speakers remain important in postapartheid South Africa due to their longstanding economic and cultural influence built up during the decades of apartheid. During 2010, the white population formed 9.2 percent of the total population; how-
ever, Afrikaans and English speakers comprised 13.35 percent and 8.2 percent of the total population respectively, as the majority of Afrikaans speakers today are not white. Most striking has been the manner in which Afrikaner groupings have adapted to the loss of political power while also experiencing a substantial rise in economic influence. Since the end of minority rule, there has been an acceleration in ethnic affiliations centered upon the characteristics of culture, descent, and language, and the range of identification among Afrikaans speakers is considerable. A large section of the coloured community, black Afrikaans speakers, and verloopte (walked away) Afrikaners remain outside of any established community.

A resurgence of group-based politics among Afrikaners has placed the legitimacy of minority cultural rights, including most prominently language rights (the taaldebat), at the top of the group’s cultural agenda. Tensions between the ANC government’s goal of increasing diversity and addressing past inequities through the widening of access in the higher education sector on the one hand and the survival of Afrikaans as an academic language with higher functions have come to center upon the historically Afrikaans-speaking University of STELLENBOSCH in an ongoing and high-profile public debate. The unique population and language demographics of the Western Cape Province, where the University of Stellenbosch is located, as well as the insistence of the vocal taalstryders has made this a test case for the self-styled guardians of the Afrikaners’ language and culture. Interestingly, the Afrikaans-speaking universities have been at the forefront of radical transformation in higher education, to address the racial imbalances in access and the critical need to educate growing numbers of black South Africans to take up skilled and leadership positions within the economy. Among the younger generation, a wider cultural revival has seen Afrikaans literature and music flourish over the past decade to encompass many voices, which range from Bok van Blerk’s controversial and nostalgic elegy to Koos de la Rey during 2007 to more mainstream and traditional genres.

Much of the dialogue among Afrikaans intellectuals during the postapartheid period has focused upon disputes over perceptions of marginalization, entitlement, and belonging, and the prospects of divorcing Afrikanerness, characteristically expressed in terms of cultural attributes and less frequently descent, from Afrikaner nationalism, a political project. These perceptions have struck a chord with the 100,000 blue- and white-collar, predominantly white members of the trade union Solidarity, which campaigns against government policies, including AFFIRMATIVE ACTION and empowerment initiatives. Nonetheless, the Afrikaans business elite and the middle class remain key to both the national economy and success of the government’s empowerment initiatives. Paradoxically, the enrichment of these constituencies has ensured that class and even race constitute significant divisions among the grouping. It is too early to identify the extent of the transformation that is occurring among the Afrikaner grouping today, but it is clear that Afrikanerness and being an Afrikaner have a diversity of meanings in postapartheid South Africa.

See also AFRIKANER WEERSTANDSBEWEGING; ANGLO-BOER WAR; APARTHEID; BOER REPUBLICS; BROEDERBOND; F. W. DE KLERK; POLITICAL CULTURES AND IDEOLOGIES; H. F. VERWOERD

Bibliography

Afrikaner Nationalism
See Political Cultures and Ideologies

Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), meaning Afrikaner Resistance Movement, is a political and paramilitary group committed to the restoration of an independent Afrikaner republic, or “Boerestaat,” within South Africa. At the height of the movement in the 1990s, during the negotiations for a new democratic dispensation, the AWB boasted a following of 70,000 members and received much domestic and international publicity as a white extremist group.

Founded in 1973 by Eugene Terre Blanche, the AWB from its inception opposed the reform of apartheid laws and the so-called liberalizing influences within the ruling National Party. The targets of AWB violence, particularly during the State of Emergency from 1984 to 1986, were often unarmed blacks. It especially opposed liberation movements such as the African National Congress in which members of the South African Communist Party played an important role. Terre Blanche was a flamboyant orator and forceful personality, and at the AWB’s height was able to convert several thousand white South Africans to his cause. The group was responsible for disrupting the formal talks between the apartheid government and the ANC and other key black liberation movements being held at the Kempton Park Conference Center just outside of Johannesburg when AWB members drove an armored car through the glass front of the building, threatened delegates, and pasted slogans on the walls. The AWB was also behind the failed attempt to defend the dictatorial government of Lucas Mangope in the homeland of Bophuthatswana, which led to many innocent civilian deaths.

In 2001, Terre Blanche was sentenced to six years in prison for assaulting a gas station worker and the attempted murder of a security guard and former employee of his. He was released in June 2004 after serving three years. During his time in prison, he became a born-again Christian, claimed he had moderated many of his more racist views, and preached reconciliation as “prescribed by God.” In 2010, Terre Blanche was beaten to death on his farm by two black farmworkers after a dispute over wages.

AIDS
Initially identified in the United States as early as 1981, AIDS was first reported in South Africa in 1982. As was the case in the developed world, the early South African epidemic was concentrated mainly among gay men, blood transfusion recipients, and hemophiliacs. But in the early to mid-1990s, it became clear that the epidemic had become generalized, with various studies confirming that HIV had already entered the general population by 1989. The 2010 data suggest that over 700 people were dying of AIDS-related illnesses—and even more became newly infected—each day.

With more than five million people estimated to be living with HIV and general prevalence levels that only started to stabilize from 2005 to 2009, South Africa’s epidemic remains one of the country’s most pressing challenges. But while the absolute numbers are disturbing, the unequal distribution of the epidemic is alarming. For example, prevalence levels among females are significantly higher than among males, being 2.7 times higher in the 15–19 age group. HIV prevalence peaks at 32.7 percent among women in the 25–29 age group. Among men, a lower peak—25.8 percent—is reached more gradually and a few years later.

Geography, socioeconomic status, and race also have an impact on vulnerability to HIV infection. Prevalence is greatest in KwaZulu-Natal, being more than four times higher than in the Western Cape. Furthermore, those living in urban informal settlements, where proper housing, sanitation, and electricity is scarce, are most at risk of infection, with prevalence in this group being 50 percent higher than among those living in similar conditions in rural areas. Although epidemic levels are observed among all groups, black Africans
are disproportionately affected—with the Human Sciences Research Council noting that “race is an important epidemiological variable because it embodies socio-economic contexts that influence risk of HIV infection.”

Prevalence levels only tell part of the story. The large number of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) is accompanied by a crisis of AIDS-related deaths, reflected in dramatic changes in the country’s mortality profile. Between 1997 and 2004, for example, death rates for women age 20 to 39 more than tripled. In the same period, deaths for men between 30 and 44 more than doubled. For women, deaths peaked at age 30 to 34; for men, they peaked at a relatively lower level somewhat later.

At the same time, AIDS-related deaths among PLWHA in the developed world started to fall dramatically. A medical breakthrough in 1996 showed that combinations of antiretroviral (ARV) medicines could control the replication of HIV, reducing levels of the virus in the blood to undetectable levels and allowing the damaged immune system to recover. Among those with access to the new combination therapies, HIV infection was transformed from an automatic death sentence to a chronic but manageable medical condition.

In the context of unacceptably high prevalence rates and seemingly avoidable deaths, how does one assess the country’s response to the epidemic? One way is to consider the manner in and the extent to which the legal and policy framework has been developed and used to limit and/or protect the rights of PLWHA and those at risk of HIV infection. Another is to evaluate public sector, civil society, and business interventions aimed at preventing and treating HIV infection and providing care and support for PLWHA and their families.

Responding to the Epidemic: The Early Years
As was the norm internationally, South Africa’s initial response lacked humanity and insight. The first reported AIDS-related deaths were described as isolated cases, with the APARTHEID government assuring the public that there was no need to panic as only gay men were considered to be at high risk. In 1987, regulations provided for foreign nationals with HIV to be denied entry to and/or to be deported from the country. A year later, 1,000 foreign mine workers with HIV were repatriated after their contracts were not renewed. Two years earlier, a survey found a 0.02 percent prevalence of HIV among South African mine workers, with a significantly higher prevalence of 3.76 percent among mine workers from Malawi.

The early 1990s witnessed a significant shift. Shortly after its unbanning in February 1990, the still-exiled AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) hosted a health conference in Maputo that recognized the need to prioritize HIV prevention. CHRIS HANI, a senior SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY and ANC leader who was assassinated three years later, warned against “allow[ing] the AIDS epidemic to ruin the realization of our dreams.” Noting that “statistics indicate that we are still at the beginning of the AIDS epidemic in our country,” Hani predicted that, if left “unattended,” the epidemic would “result in untold damage and suffering.” Soon thereafter, the ANC worked closely with the then Department of Health (DoH) to set up the National AIDS Convention of South Africa (NACOSA), an umbrella body to coordinate the country’s response. In late 1993, just seven months before South Africa’s first democratic elections and the adoption of its first Bill of Rights, the country’s highest court (at the time) recognized the right of PLWHA to medical confidentiality. But at the same time, HIV prevalence among antenatal clinic attendees mushroomed—from an estimated 0.7 percent in 1990 to 7.6 percent in 1994.

Within months of President NELSON MANDELA’s government taking office, the NACOSA AIDS Plan—which included a focus on law and human rights—was adopted as official policy. A new HIV/AIDS directorate in the Department of Health sought and received assistance from the then Wits University–based AIDS Law Project—now SECTION27—on the implementation of a rights-based approach. Numerous court decisions and legislative developments gave substance to the new constitutional protections against unfair discrimination and unjustifiable limitations of the right to privacy.

The rumblings of dissatisfaction, however, had also begun. In 1996, the Department of Health’s funding of a musical production—
deeply flawed HIV prevention messages—came under fire, primarily because public sector tender processes had not been followed. This was followed shortly thereafter by the Virodene scandal, which saw official cabinet support for an alleged cure for AIDS—later determined to be a toxic industrial solvent—that had been tested on human subjects without the approval of the relevant medicine regulatory authority.

Mandela, who—like former US president Bill Clinton—became increasingly outspoken on HIV/AIDS after leaving office, has admitted that he could and should have done more when in power. It was during his presidency that highly active ARV therapy became the standard of care in the developed world; when research proved that ARV medicines were effective in preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV; when Gugu Dlamini was stoned and stabbed to death shortly after publicly disclosing her HIV status, accused of shaming her community near Durban; and when Zackie Achmat, Mark Heywood, and others formed the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). These developments were to set the scene for the heightened conflict between civil society and the post-Mandela government.

Denialism Rears Its Ugly Head
In a speech delivered in Parliament in October 1999, just six months after coming into office, former president Thabo Mbeki began his public questioning of the causal link between HIV and AIDS. Early the following year, he established an international AIDS advisory panel tasked with—among other things—advising him on whether, in fact, HIV causes AIDS. The panel, composed of equal numbers of orthodox scientists and denialists, reached a predictable deadlock.

The evidence shows that Mbeki supported the position of the denialists and that powerful elements of denialism continued to bedevil the country’s response to the epidemic throughout his presidency. A 2008 study published by researchers at Harvard University conservatively estimates the cost of denial in South Africa at over 330,000 lives.

Yet despite his views, the first term of the Mbeki presidency also saw significant legal and policy developments. Numerous statutes and regulations expanded the rights of PLWHA, with a host of legal actions and court judgments addressing issues such as unfair discrimination in the workplace, access to essential medicines, and the state’s obligation to implement a comprehensive program to prevent transmission of HIV from mother-to-child. By April 2002, the cabinet had recognized—albeit reluctantly—the role of ARV medicines in the prevention and treatment of HIV infection.

Largely as a result of the civil society campaign for the public provision of ARV treatment, which was spearheaded by TAC, the cabinet later agreed to develop—and subsequently adopted in November 2003—the Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management, and Treatment for South Africa. But it would take the threat of further litigation some four months later before the plan was implemented and the state started to provide ARV treatment to public health system users.

According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), more PLWHA in South Africa are said to be accessing ARV treatment—in the public and private sectors collectively—than in any other country. But absolute numbers only tell part of the story. South Africa’s treatment gap—the difference between those who have and those who need—still remains large. According to official figures, public sector coverage was 56 percent by the end of November 2009. With new ARV treatment guidelines that came into effect in April 2010, which contemplate much earlier initiation of ARV treatment for infants, pregnant women, and those who are also infected with tuberculosis, the treatment gap will have dropped significantly.

In the area of prevention, policy interventions that previously had a limited impact are finally giving way to more comprehensive programs. While the discredited ABC approach—abstain, be faithful, and condone—officially remains in place, it is now being supplemented by a range of new interventions. These include an ambitious HIV Counseling and Testing campaign, which aims to have fifteen million South Africans tested for HIV by the end of 2011, and the intro-
duction of free voluntary medical male circumcision services.

At the intersection of treatment and prevention lies mother-to-child transmission prevention services. While countries such as Thailand and Uganda have long abandoned suboptimal protocols, South Africa was slow to develop its program in line with international guidelines. In response to civil society pressure, the protocol was first amended in 2008 to introduce a more effective protocol that nevertheless still fell short of globally acceptable standards. By April 2010, however, the program had developed to the point where it fully recognized the centrality of maternal health, offering pregnant women options that placed their health needs at its center. According to scientific consensus, this is best for both mother and child.

**Broader Impact of the Country’s Response**

Notwithstanding its negative impact, the AIDS epidemic has managed to place health and other socioeconomic entitlements on the political agenda. It has reinvigorated civil society, allowing for mobilization and action across class lines. TAC, for example, has been able to pull organized labor, the faith-based sector, academics, and health care providers together. Many unemployed people have been trained in treatment literacy, being both willing and able to assist in the provision of public health care services. Well supported by legal groups such as SECTION27 and the Legal Resources Centre, TAC has also made creative use of the law to compel a reluctant state— as well as numerous drug companies—into action.

The impact of these positive developments in South Africa has been felt beyond the country’s borders. TAC’s leadership at the International AIDS Conference in Durban in 2000 forever changed the relationship between the prevention and treatment of HIV infection. Before, the two were pitted against each other. Although a significant global treatment gap still exists, by the middle of 2010 an estimated three million PLWHA were accessing ARV treatment in the developing world. Without Durban, this would not have been possible.

Furthermore, South Africa’s united stand against the multinational pharmaceutical industry in 2001—which saw TAC and the state on the same side—paved the way for a groundbreaking agreement on patents and public health at the World Trade Organization’s Doha, Qatar, meeting in November of that year. The prices of many ARV medicines, integral to any comprehensive HIV/AIDS program, have plummeted since then. Whereas in 2001 it cost US$727 to treat an adult in a developing country for one year with a standard triple ARV first-line regimen, for countries that have chosen to exercise their rights to access generic medicines, the same treatment can be provided in 2011 for as low as US$61.

**Mbeki Leaves Office**

On September 25, 2008, KGALEMA MOTLANTHE replaced Thabo Mbeki as president of the Republic of South Africa. While Mbeki had continued—right until the end of his administration—to deny the existence of any crisis, with Manto Tshabalala-Msimang—his health minister—remaining steadfast in her refusal to concede the inadequacy of her department’s performance, others in senior positions in government had already started to take action in late 2006.

Working in collaboration with all sectors of civil society, these partners in government finalized and the cabinet adopted the National HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2007–2011 (NSP) in early May 2007. In addition to setting clear targets and time frames and allocating responsibility for the implementation of a range of prevention, treatment, and other key interventions, the NSP contemplates transforming the South African National AIDS Council into a truly consultative body that delivers on its mandate as the country’s leading advisory and oversight structure on the epidemic.

A cabinet reshuffle following Mbeki’s departure saw the appointment of Barbara Hogan—a well-respected and independent-minded member of Parliament—as the new minister of health. Addressing an international conference only a few weeks after taking office, Hogan acknowledged the causal link between HIV and AIDS, recognized the depth and severity of the crisis, and committed the government to achieving the NSP targets. But a budgetary and management crisis in the Free State Province in late 2008 cast doubt on
the sustainability of the national ARV treatment program and Hogan’s ability to rehabilitate and reinvigorate her department.

Shortly after coming into office in May 2009, President JACOB ZUMA appointed Aaron Motsoaledi—a medical doctor—as his new minister of health. Dr. Molefi Sefularo, Hogan’s competent deputy, retained his position. But so too did Thami Mseleku, Tshabalala-Msimang’s trusted director-general, who was only removed from office in September 2009. His removal paved the way for a scaling up of the NSP’s implementation, the introduction of new ARV treatment and prevention protocols, and the rebuilding of relationships between government and civil society.

The Eighteenth International AIDS Conference held in Vienna in July 2010 signaled the completion of South Africa’s return to an evidence-based response to the epidemic. Both Motlanthe and Motsoaledi addressed plenary sessions of the meeting, with the latter receiving a standing ovation. While there is reason to be hopeful, much of the damage caused by Mbeki’s decade of denialism remains. It will take sustained effort from all, accompanied by the allocation of significant financial resources, to turn the epidemic around.

See also HEALTH; THABO MBeki

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All-African Convention

The All-African Convention (AAC) was founded by Professor Davidsson Don Tengo Jabavu in 1935 in response to President J. B. M. Hertzog’s Native Bills, which were intended to increase the percentage of land allocated to native reserves from 6 percent to 13 percent, but also to disenfranchise black Africans and prevent them from owning land outside of the reserves. The convention brought together the entire spectrum of opposition to the white government and included a number of leaders and provincial bodies of the African National Congress (ANC). Given the overlap in membership, the relationship between the AAC and the ANC was always an issue, with the AAC offering somewhat of an alternative to the ANC at the time. As the AAC turned more militant, it later partnered with Coloured and Indian organizations to form the Non-European Unity Movement to reject cooperation with the government and push for full rights for all black South Africans. The AAC itself was short-lived; by the 1950s, its following had waned and some of its members joined the ANC or the South African Communist Party.

See also African National Congress; Davidsson Jabavu

ANC

See African National Congress

Anglo-Boer War

The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand (literally white water ridge), the area surrounding Johannesburg, in 1886 made the Transvaal—until then a struggling independent Boer Republic—potentially a political and economic threat to British supremacy in southern Africa. This was at a time when Britain, which had gained Cape Colony and Natal along the coast in the first half of the nineteenth century, was engaged in the scramble for African colonies with France and Germany.

In 1896, the Jameson Raid, a scheme devised by Cecil Rhodes, the prime minister of the Cape Colony, to overthrow the Transvaal government under President Paul Kruger, failed abysmally. This caused Afrikaner nationalism to flare up throughout South Africa. Although Kruger was only interested in preserving the independence of the Transvaal, the British colonial secretary, Sir Joseph Chamberlain, and the British high commissioner in South Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, believed that the Transvaal was pressing for a united South Africa under Afrikaner rule. Milner, a self-acknowledged race patriot, resolved that if the Transvaal refused to grant the right to vote to foreign mine workers and other foreigners whocame because of the mines (Uitlanders)—mostly British—war would be the only way to facilitate the development of the British gold mining industry in the Transvaal and to eliminate the Boer oligarchy, which allegedly threatened British supremacy. In this way, Milner became involved in the Transvaal’s domestic issues, stirring up agitation, which, if successful, would ensure a British majority in the Boer state. In the diplomatic tussle that followed, Kruger refused to budge on the issue of the vote, despite a meeting with Milner in spring 1899 in Bloemfontein, the capital of the other Boer republic. A political deadlock was reached.

Beginning of War

On October 11, 1899, the Anglo-Boer War broke out after Britain rejected the Transvaal ultimatum demanding that all disputes between the two states be settled by arbitration; that British troops on the borders of the Orange Free State and Transvaal be withdrawn; and that troops from all over the British empire bound for southern Africa by sea from Britain should not be permitted to disembark at the ports of the Cape Colony and Natal.
The Orange Free State joined the Transvaal in terms of the military alliance signed between the two Boer republics in 1897. As the war progressed, the British Army was reinforced by volunteer contingents from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape Colony, and Natal.

The first five months of the war was a set-piece battle phase. The Boers besieged Ladysmith in Natal and Kimberley and Mafeking (the black town was called Mafikeng before the British annexation in 1885, but the British called the white town that developed there Mafeking, a name that stuck until after 1994 when it was again renamed Mafikeng) in the Cape Colony, while the British forces strove to relieve their beleaguered garrisons in these towns—Lord Paul Methuen in the west and General Redvers Buller in Natal. From their camouflaged positions, the Boers scored impressive victories at Stormberg and Magersfontein in the Cape Colony, and Colenso in Natal in mid-December 1899 (called “Black Week” in Britain) and Spioenkop in Natal in January 1900. But, by February 1900, there was a dramatic change in fortunes. Kimberley and Ladysmith were relieved, and the Boer general Piet Cronjé surrendered at Paardeberg in the Orange Free State with 4,000 burghers who were Boer civilians. All the Boer fronts collapsed under British pressure.

The next six months’ time was a period of great confusion for the Boers. Everywhere, they were compelled to retreat. On March 13, 1900, Lord Frederick Roberts, the British commander-in-chief, occupied Bloemfontein, and on June 5, 1900, he took Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal. He then annexed the Orange Free State on May 24, 1900, and the Transvaal on September 1, 1900.

Lured by British promises of peace and protection, many Boer civilians surrendered and were called handsellers (having “hands up”). By the end of the war, they totaled no fewer than 20,000 men—about a third of the original Boer force. (Another third of the Boers were taken prisoners of war, and the last third were call “bitter-enders” for having stayed in the field until the end of the war.) In the last six months of the war, about 5,400 of these handsellers joined the British Army as collaborators (known as “joiners”).

Meanwhile, there was a revival in the Boer military effort. In the Orange Free State, General Christiaan de Wet led the recovery of Boer resistance with surprise attacks on Roberts’s vulnerable line of communication. After Roberts had dispersed the Transvaal forces in the last pitched battle of the war at Bergendal (Dalmanutha) in the eastern Transvaal in August of 1900, General Louis Botha, like De Wet in the Free State and General Koos de la Rey in the western Transvaal, applied guerrilla tactics by swiftly gathering his scattered commandos, attacking isolated British columns, and then disappearing into thin air. In this way, the resistance of about 20,000 Boer bitter-enders was to continue for almost two years—in what became known as the guerrilla phase of the war.

Lord Horation Kitchener, successor to Roberts, adopted a threefold strategy to end the war. First, he continued to implement Roberts’s scorched earth policy. The Boer republics were deliberately and systematically devastated, with towns and thousands of farmsteads burned or ravaged. This onslaught on the Boer means of survival was exacerbated by a destruction of their food supplies, including livestock and crops.

Second, Roberts’s concentration camp system was expanded. Boer civilians, especially women and children whose houses had been burned, were forcibly confined to camps. In Kitchener’s view, this meant that burghers on commando (that is, in the field) would no longer be able to obtain food from women on the farms and would have to surrender to reunite their families. Black people, too, were taken to concentration camps, partly to deprive the burghers of another source of food as they had been providing the Boers, voluntarily or involuntarily, with their own supplies. The bad administration of the camps led to poor quality food, unhygienic conditions, and inadequate and inefficient medical arrangements, all of which meant that civilians suffered terribly. Eventually, 26,000 Boer women and children, 2,000 Boer men, and at least 20,000 black people died in these British camps.

Third, Kitchener launched his military drives. This was a method of trapping commandos against lines of blockhouses that were constructed in a network across the entire theater of war, for,
by 1901, the Boers had moved deep into the Cape Colony to spread the war over a larger area and incite colonial Boers into rebellion.

In the long run, Kitchener’s strategy was effective. Despite some resounding Boer victories—for example, at Nooitgedacht, Bakenlaagte, and Tweebosch in the Transvaal and Groenkop in the Orange Free State—fifty-four out of sixty Boer delegates at Vereeniging in the Transvaal decided on May 31, 1902, to submit to the unfavorable British peace terms. The Transvaal and the (by this time) Orange River Colony became crown colonies of the British Empire. The Boers had lost their independence.

African Participation

Although both the Boer and British leaders initially believed that the war should be “a white man’s war,” Africans played an important part too, and, as has been seen, suffered severely. From the beginning of hostilities, both warring parties employed Africans in noncombatant roles. About 10,000 agterryers (black henchmen, or literally after-riders) accompanied the Boers to perform camp duties on commando. A very small number of them unofficially took up arms on the Boer side. In the British Army, at least 14,000 Africans operated as wagon drivers, and, increasingly, Africans were employed in combatant roles as spies, guides, and eventually as soldiers. Under Kitchener’s command, they were armed for self-defense against the Boers, who summarily executed them when captured. By the end of the war, there were probably 30,000 armed Africans in the British Army. Moreover, African communities drove Boer commandos and families from large areas in the Transvaal, curtailing Boer operations and thus contributing to the Boer acceptance of the peace terms.

Outcome of the War

The imperial policy promoted by Milner, including rigorous Anglicization efforts, failed soon after the war and merely fanned Afrikaner nationalism.

The war devastated the Afrikaners both economically and psychologically; it also increased the number of poor whites who had been emerging before the war, and accelerated urbanization as bywoners (landless Afrikaners) flocked to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand to eke out a living. In the course of the twentieth century, the Afrikaners gradually came to dominate South African politics, and they resolved to become independent of the British sphere of influence. This shaped them as race patriots and gave rise to an aggressive nationalism that promoted Afrikaner aspirations to attain self-determination and predominance in South Africa. This, together with a fear of the African majority, helps explain the implementation of the apartheid policy. With the formation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961, the Peace of Vereeniging seemed, in a certain sense, to be avenged.

Africans were equally devastated by the war, with similar results as far as poverty and urbanization. Moreover, their occupation of Boer-owned land was not recognized nor did they receive an extension of the qualified franchise that was practiced in the Cape Colony and Natal (meaning that an African male who owned land and paid a certain amount of taxes could vote in these British colonies).

Historiography

Although the debate on the causes of the war soon became a favored topic for historians, the military course of the conflict, the role of prominent commanders, and the political aspects were the focus of research until the 1970s. These themes have by no means been exhausted, but historians have since begun to consider other aspects of the war, thus dramatically broadening our view. The emphasis has shifted to war and society—the fate and vicissitudes of ordinary soldiers and civilians in wartime. The Anglo-Boer War is now seen as a total South African war in which all groups participated and which affected all the inhabitants of the country—hence the designation “South African War” by many modern historians.

The new approach places particular emphasis on the circumstances, role, and suffering of Africans during the war, showing that they saw the conflict as an opportunity to regain the territory lost to the Boers when the latter entered their territory and defeated them in the second half of the nineteenth century through such battles as the battle of Blood River.
In the first half of the twentieth century, Afrikaner historiography focused on the suffering of the Boer women and children in the concentration camps; this gave Afrikaner nationalist leaders in the period from 1930 to 1960 the opportunity to promote Afrikaner nationalism. Recent Afrikaner research is more balanced and tends to emphasize the social aspects of the Boer experience.

See also SOUTH AFRICA ACT; BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND SETTLER COLONIALISM (1870–1910); SOL PLAATJE; J. C. SMUTS

Bibliography


—Fransjohan Pretorius

Anglo-Zulu War

The Anglo-Zulu War was fought in 1879 between Great Britain and the Zulu Kingdom. While the origins of the war are many and complex, the outcome was the defeat of the Zulus, the end of the independent Zulu Kingdom, and its division into smaller tribal units that has had a lasting impact on the social and political landscape of the region that now comprises the KwaZulu-Natal Province.

By most accounts, the war was provoked by an unwarranted act of aggression on the part of the British. In the 1870s, Britain had adopted a forward policy in the region, aimed at uniting the entire territory, including British and Boer colonies as well as the independent Zulu Kingdom. British high commissioner Sir Henry Bartle Frere provoked a fight with Zulu king Cetshwayo, with the expectation that the Zulu army would be no match for the British. British troops invaded Zululand but were quickly defeated at Isandlwana Mountain. In one of the worst disasters of the colonial era, over 1,300 British troops and their African allies were killed. But, the success at Isandlwana exhausted the Zulu army, and they were unable to mount an effective defense against the invading British. The British army based in Natal regrouped with the help of troops from other British colonies and advanced toward the Zulu capital of Ulundi, the site of this war’s last great battle. The Zulu army was defeated, King Cetshwayo was captured and sent into exile in Cape Town, and Zululand was divided among thirteen pro-British chiefs, a move that led to a decade of destructive civil war and whose legacy continues to the present through ethnic and political tensions.

See also BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND SETTLER COLONIALISM (1870–1910); CETSHWAYO; NATAL; ZULU
Apartheid

An Afrikaans word, apartheid (apartness) (pronounced apart-hate) was the name given to the broad array of discriminatory laws and policies adopted by the National Party to secure white supremacy in South Africa after 1948. During the first two and a half decades of National Party rule, Prime Ministers D. F. Malan, Johannes G. Strijdom, Hendrik Verwoerd, and John Vorster constructed a vast edifice of apartheid laws and repressive mechanisms to contain antiapartheid opposition. In its final decade and a half in power, the National Party under P. W. Botha and F. W. de Klerk tried to dilute apartheid in order to counteract domestic and foreign criticisms. Ultimately, apartheid was abandoned under pressure from black resistance and hostile world opinion, both of which threatened to cripple South Africa’s economy.

Apartheid to 1948

Apartheid laws and policies were buttressed by an ideology with philosophical roots in Europe and by a long tradition of racist colonial attitudes. Although the word first gained notoriety as a National Party campaign slogan in the general election of May 1948, apartheid’s main ideological features took shape in the 1930s and 1940s as a by-product of emerging doctrines of Afrikaner nationalism. Nationalist intellectuals at that time were influenced by Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, eighteenth-century German nationalist thinkers, as well as by the nineteenth-century Dutch neo-Calvinist theologian Abraham Kuyper. Centered in the Afrikaner Broederbond, these intellectuals disseminated their ideas through the Dutch Reformed Church and the Afrikaans press and universities, popularizing the central concept of the volk (an ethnic group or a people) as the fundamental building block of all societies. Propounding a quasi-religious doctrine of Christian nationalism, they asserted that public rights and duties were not primarily an individual matter but belonged collectively to “peoples,” each of which was justified in seeking autonomy and political self-determination as its highest goal. Since individuals could find their highest fulfillment only as part of a volk, it followed that churches, schools, and families were duty bound to inculcate this sacred volk identity in each new generation.

Apartheid ideology held that the destiny willed by God for the Afrikaner volk was also the correct path for other peoples defined by common language, culture, and historical experience—including Africans. Contrary to the liberal belief that Africans should be encouraged to assimilate European culture, apartheid stood for the greatest possible segregation of Africans in order that they might pursue the unhindered development of their own God-given destinies as ethnic nations. As National Party policy unfolded after 1948, this idealistic do unto others vision convinced many Afrikaners that apartheid was grounded in moral principles, even if these might not be fully realized in practice.

In the two decades before 1948, apartheid ideology coexisted with an increasingly virulent racism among South African whites. Inspired by the rise of Nazism and fed by the pseudoscientific literature of eugenics then being produced in the United States and Britain, South African eugenicists popularized a theory of biological determinism that cast the Afrikaner volk as a special breed threatened by degradation through genetic mixing with other races. A pledge to prevent this degradation became an important plank in the National Party’s election platform from 1948 onward, with laws against interracial sex and marriage prioritized in the party’s legislative program of 1949–1950.

Academic Dan O’Meara has argued that, in embracing apartheid, the Nationalists united the Afrikaner electorate through appeals that aligned working-class voters with the economic interests of emerging Afrikaner capital. White workers, especially the many thousands of rural-born, low-skilled Afrikaners who had migrated to towns during the Great Depression and World War II, saw in apartheid a promise of expanded job reservation laws that would protect them against competition from cheaper African labor. Aspiring Afrikaner
businessmen could be confident that new laws controlling the mobility of African labor would guarantee a reliable stream of docile and low-paid workers to commerce and industry once the needs of white workers were met. Most importantly, white commercial farmers saw in apartheid a guarantee that tighter pass laws would control the townward movement of Africans, by requiring that all Africans carry a pass book and that only approved Africans could come to the urban areas for work, and thus ensure a steady supply of farm workers without any increase in wages. Academic Deborah Posel questions this picture of a party brought together around the interests of Afrikaner capital and points to fundamental contradictions between apartheid’s promises of political segregation, economic integration, and permanent white supremacy in “white” areas where blacks for practical reasons would always be a majority. Far from launching its new policy of apartheid as a coherent grand design for the future, Posel argues, the National Party proceeded from the start with an ambiguous plan that tried to straddle conflicting views about the future of African urbanization and migratory labor.

Apartheid Legislation

To give substance to the pledge that whites would be supreme in their own areas and that other people, under white direction, would be appropriately compartmentalized elsewhere, the South African Parliament in the 1950s passed a series of segregation laws, starting with the Population Registration and Group Areas Acts in 1950. The first of these laws required every citizen to have a racial classification, while the second required all towns and cities to be zoned by race, reserving the best residential and commercial areas for whites and pushing everyone else out to the peripheries. Particular attention was given to removing Indian shops from prime areas coveted by aspiring Afrikaner entrepreneurs. In inner-city Cape Town, the picturesque District Six, occupied mainly by Coloureds, was demolished block by block and rezoned for whites. The 1953 Separate Amenities Act provided legal sanction for the provision of separate (and better) facilities for whites in transport services, office buildings, elevators, museums, restaurants, and the like. Even park benches were inscribed with blankes (whites) and nie-blankes (nonwhites) signs. Sports teams and facilities were also rigidly segregated for almost three decades, despite South Africa’s exclusion from international competition as a consequence.

The Bantu Education Act (1953) brought all African schools under state control, clearing the way to impose dumbed-down curricula and to segregate school children according to language group, hypothetically to facilitate each group’s “separate development” as a volk. In 1959, the Extension of University Education Act restricted existing universities to whites only and launched the construction of ethnically segregated state universities (later dubbed “bush colleges”) for blacks. A decade later, these tightly controlled institutions spawned the South African Students’ Organisation with its militant antiapartheid ideology of solidarity among all nonwhites, who were now collectively rechristened “blacks.”

Apartheid laws of an overtly political kind were designed to weaken the National Party’s enemies, silence its critics, and bolster its parliamentary majority. The Suppression of Communism Act (1950) banned the South African Communist Party and established procedures for gagging and restricting individuals alleged to be furthering its aims. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress were similarly suppressed by the Unlawful Organizations Act (1960). When the ANC experimented with passive resistance in 1952, a new law was passed to make civil disobedience itself a crime punishable by imprisonment, fines, and/or flogging. The Senate Act of 1956 led to the removal of coloured voters in the Cape from the common voters’ roll, placing them on a segregated roll and depriving the opposition United Party of their votes. In 1968, the Liberal Party disbanded when the Prohibition of Political Interference Act banned multiracial political parties. The Affected Organizations Act (1974) enabled the minister of justice to prohibit any organization from receiving foreign funds.

From the early 1960s, a series of harsh security laws made imprisonment for political offenses increasingly common. Acts of sabotage
Sign in Durban that states the beach is for whites only under apartheid laws. The languages are English, Afrikaans, and Zulu.
brought stiff penalties after 1962, and, from the following year, torture became routine when a new measure was introduced enabling police to detain suspected political offenders or witnesses for up to ninety days without charge or access to a lawyer. Habeas corpus was dispensed with altogether when the Terrorism Act of 1967 provided for indefinite detention without charge. In the 1970s and 1980s, the state conducted hundreds of political trials. The accused of all races sat side by side in the dock, but, when convicted, they went to segregated prison cells and, when hung, to segregated cemeteries.

A further set of apartheid laws and policies addressed the administration and development of the various supposed “Bantu nations.” Whites of all ethnicities, under the leadership of the Afrikaner volk, were seen as one nation, but Africans were said to comprise ten nations, each with a designated geographical homeland, or BANTUSTAN. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 began the process of inventing these entities, and with the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, Hendrik Verwoerd put the world on notice that these emerging nations, as in the rest of Africa, were eventually to be “decolonized.” Starting with the Transkei in 1976, four were eventually granted nominal independence. The reality, however, was that the bantustans were never viable political entities and relied heavily on the apartheid government financially and otherwise. Rural Africans living on freehold farms purchased by their forebears before the 1913 NATIVES’ LAND ACT were systematically forced from these “black spots” into the bantustans as part of the nation-building exercise. In the meantime, coloureds and Indians, who had no territorial homelands, were nevertheless put on a path to racial self-determination through the establishment in the late 1960s of two national advisory bodies, the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council and the South African Indian Council. Like the bantustans, however, these achieved no more than paltry popular recognition inside South Africa and won no praise for apartheid abroad. Critics often pointed to the wasteful cost of employing thousands of bureaucrats to administer apartheid’s multifarious laws and regulations. For the National Party, however, these jobs were a valuable form of patronage, helping to secure the loyalty of thousands of Afrikaner voters.

Apartheid After 1976

Notwithstanding the National Party’s continuing electoral strength, the SOWETO STUDENT UPRISING of 1976–1977 caused verligte (enlightened) Afrikaners to question the government’s reliance on old-style apartheid in light of changing economic and political conditions. Radical academics like Dan O’Meara had long argued that apartheid and advanced industrial capitalism were compatible, while liberals like Merle Lipton maintained that capitalists would eventually find apartheid too inefficient and unwieldy. By the 1980s, the weight of evidence was tilting toward the latter view. African attitudes were hardening. POLITICAL VIOLENCE provoked growing pressure for international sanctions. As the bargaining power of skilled African workers increased, the logic of recognizing black trade unions became irrefutable. To dilute apartheid and win foreign approval, the National Party introduced separate coloured and Indian houses of parliament. Although conservative foreign governments hailed this as “a step in the right direction” by PRETORIA, opposition groups in South Africa, galvanized by the new multiracial UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT, seized on the first elections to the tricameral parliament in 1984 to mount a massive show of resistance.

Turmoil in the black townships, protest strikes, and industrial disputes built to a crescendo over the following two years, plunging the Botha government into a prolonged crisis of indecision. The pass laws became unenforceable and were repealed in 1986, along with the prohibition on mixed marriages. Shantytowns mushroomed as rural poverty accelerated the migration of Africans to towns. The National Party acquiesced as all-white universities accepted growing numbers of black students and private high schools began to integrate. Municipalities began to drop petty segregation in public places, and residentially integrated “grey areas” gradually spread in major cities in defiance of the Group Areas Act.
These derelictions from the old apartheid order were denounced by the Conservative Party, a 1982 right-wing breakaway of working-class Afrikaners from the National Party. The National Party, no longer bound by the outdated tenets and tactics of Afrikaner nationalism, held onto power by attracting English-speaking voters to whom there was nothing sacred about apartheid per se as long as white dominance was maintained. Eventually, however, P. W. Botha’s faltering leadership led his own cabinet to oust him in August 1989. Under his successor, F. W. de Klerk, a rapid change of course was effected, leading to the repeal of all but a handful of apartheid laws by 1991. Initially prepared to concede only that apartheid was a noble experiment that failed, de Klerk in later years has spoken for many whites in regretting the centuries of injustice suffered by blacks.

See also African National Congress; Afrikaner Nationalism; Appendix I; Bantu Education; Bantustans; F. W. de Klerk; Nelson Mandela; National Party; H. F. Verwoerd

Bibliography


—Gail Gerhart

Armed Struggle

The armed struggle that originated during the early 1960s by blacks against the apartheid regime arose from the long history of nonviolent opposition to injustice. In the decade before the turn to violent tactics, some within the African National Congress (ANC)—as well as many people outside of the organization—were beginning to doubt the effectiveness of nonviolent protest, particularly against a state willing to use deadly force to suppress peaceful opposition from the black majority. The 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, in which police killed at least sixty-nine people who had been protesting pass laws, reinforced an argument that had been gaining ground within the ANC and within the rival Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) that organized opposition movements would have to adopt the strategic use of violence to counter the state’s violence.

Strategic Use of Violence

Nonviolence was a tactic born out of the military conquest of African chiefdoms and kingdoms primarily by the British in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many Africans believed it would be futile to attempt further armed struggle and instead looked to the limited parliamentary means available to them to make their political voices heard.

By the late 1950s, however, politically engaged Africans were changing their analysis. The National Party state (first elected in 1948) had tightened existing segregationist legislation
and was enacting the more stringent laws that became apartheid. A new generation of African leaders who had come to power in the ANC was ideologically committed to a more activist stance. This activism initially led to a broader use of Gandhian passive resistance (*satyagraha*), but as the state refused to make concessions and instead stepped up its enforcement of segregationist laws (and then banned the ANC—the most important cause), some ANC leaders, including NELSON MANDELA, drew up plans for the limited use of violence. In addition, some ANC members, notably ROBERT SOBUKWE, earlier broke away from the ANC to form the rival PAC partly because of a growing frustration with what they characterized as the ANC’s “go-slow” tactics.

In the 1950s, antistate violence had already erupted in several BANTUSTANS of South Africa. Originating from the deteriorating economic and social conditions in the countryside, the insurrections were not controlled by either the ANC or the PAC. The organizations’ leaders, however, saw the rebellions as both a hopeful sign that people were willing to resist the state openly and that political organizations needed to prepare for some form of armed struggle to remain relevant to the larger African population. In 1960, the state banned the ANC and the PAC, making it illegal for them to pursue their objectives peacefully and making it necessary to develop underground networks.

Both the ANC and PAC launched quasi-autonomous wings to promote the armed struggle. The ANC’s wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), was better organized and better funded and unleashed its first sabotage campaign on December 16, 1961, with attacks on various state installations. PAC’s wing, Poqo (Ourselves Alone or Pure), initiated its campaign of violence with an attack on the police station in Paarl in November 1962, which resulted in the deaths of five Africans and two whites.

The South African state responded with legislation effectively categorizing all dissent—peaceful or not—as treason punishable by the death penalty and aggressively infiltrated African organizations. New laws granted sweeping powers to the police to detain and torture people suspected of promoting armed resistance. In 1963, most of the Umkhonto we Sizwe’s High Command were arrested in a raid and subsequently tried for making preparations for sabotage and guerrilla warfare, and furthering the aims of communism (the *Rivonia Trial*). By the late 1960s, most ANC and PAC leaders were either in exile or in prison serving life sentences.

Banned within South Africa, the ANC and PAC established training camps for guerrillas beyond South Africa’s borders. The ANC, relying on its alliance with the *SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY*, developed contacts with the Soviet Union, which provided guerrilla training and arms. The ANC later established training camps in MOZAMBIQUE and Angola after the Portuguese colonial regime collapsed in 1975. However, through the early 1970s, successful acts of sabotage were relatively few within South Africa. The apartheid state defined sabotage in such sweeping terms in the 1962 General Law Amendment Act (known as the Sabotage Act), however, that political activists continued to be convicted of sabotage even if they had not committed any acts of violence. By the late 1960s, the state’s repression had rendered the PAC’s armed wing, Poqo, and the ANC’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) largely irrelevant as significant threats within South Africa. MK guerrillas did, however, fight in conflicts in neighboring states, including the “bush war” in Southern Rhodesia (now ZIMBABWE) in which MK fighters operated alongside guerrillas from Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). This regional engagement of MK in independence struggles in other countries—which mirrored the actions of the apartheid state’s military in shoring up other white supremacist regimes in the region—posed a threat of military invasion into South Africa by armed and experienced guerrillas.

The 1970s saw the broader politicization of the South African population with the *BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT*, headed by STEVE BIKO. Politicization led to the creation of a number of organizations whose members expressed political opinions at odds with the apartheid regime, sometimes in very confrontational terms. The state responded to all criticism by Africans,
whether they were leading organized resistance or not, with harsh reprisals, including detention without trial, increasingly draconian legislation that criminalized all forms of dissent, and with the deployment of death squads, which in combination with infiltrators inside African organizations, kidnapped and murdered African resistance leaders inside and outside South Africa. The brutal suppression of the SOWETO STUDENT UPRISING in June 1976, in particular, pushed several thousand young South Africans into exile, many in search of guerrilla training.

The ANC initially found it difficult to integrate the large number of new recruits into their guerrilla training operations. There were numerous cases of abuse of recruits, some of whom were suspected of being informers for the South African security police and some of whom were merely critical of the ANC’s operational failures. CHRIS HANI, who became a charismatic leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the 1980s, was sentenced to death by Umkhonto’s High Command in 1969 for submitting one such critical report. The ANC political leaders quickly reversed his death sentence, but the episode was indicative of some of the problems faced by the organization in exile. Yet, despite operational problems, the number of successful acts of sabotage undertaken by Umkhonto increased over the years 1977–1983 with attacks on police stations, a state-owned oil refinery, and notably the Koeberg nuclear power plant outside CAPE TOWN.

Development of a Broader Armed Uprising

The founding of the UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT in South Africa in 1983 by political activists sympathetic to the ANC marked a turning point. The front, although committed to peaceful methods, developed political networks and created momentum for change. The uprising that flared in late 1984 and then spread into a conflagration through 1986 pitted African youths (many of whom were not trained guerrillas) against the well-armed state. Increasing numbers of trained guerrillas infiltrated from the neighboring FRONTLINE STATES into South Africa as well, and the number of clashes with the state’s armed forces soared. Violent resistance was no longer limited to acts of sabotage, as youths confronted armored personnel carriers and police with rifles, and guerrillas planted land mines on rural roads used by white commandos and attacked military bases and government offices. Violence also spread beyond urban areas and black townships into the countryside where the state found it difficult to maintain control. While the armed struggle never scored a decisive victory against the South African military, it contributed to fomenting resistance inside South Africa, and to destroying confidence in the state both at home and abroad.

Continuing Violence After Suspension of Armed Struggle

The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and their armed wings in February 1990 effectively suspended the formal armed struggle. Political violence continued, however, even after the first universal suffrage election in April 1994. Some of this violence was fomented by elements of the National Party government to raise questions about the ANC’s ability to control its cadres and ultimately to govern. Different political and ethnic groups within the African population also fought each other as they tried to position themselves for political advantage in the coming postapartheid state. With the election of the ANC to power in 1994, the postapartheid state was successful in defusing some of these conflicts and worked to integrate former antiapartheid guerrillas into the South African military.

See also AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS; CHRIS HANI; PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS; JOE SLOVO; TREASON TRIAL

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Azania

Azania was the name used in place of South Africa by members and supporters of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement. Historically, Azania referred to the East African Coast. From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, the term was popular among groups fighting apartheid and appeared in the names of groups such as the Azanian People’s Organization and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. At the time of the democratic transition in 1994, some proposed changing the name of the country from South Africa to Azania, but this never had broad support among the public, and the dominant African National Congress party identified the name with its rival party, the PAC.