


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Civil Wars in the
Democratic Republic of Congo,
1960–2010

Emizet François Kisangani

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1

The Context of Congo's Internal Wars

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC or Congo)¹ is a leading laboratory of civil wars. Since it became independent on 30 June 1960, secessions, insurrections, rebellions, mutinies, invasions (by Congolese with sanctuary in Angola), revolts, and ethnic wars have been part of the political landscape of the DRC. As used in this book, a civil war, or internal war, is any domestic armed conflict between at least two groups or “political organizations” (Levy and Thompson 2010, p. 5), one of which is perceived to be linked to the state, and during which the violence kills more than 1,000 people and internally displaces more than 2,000 persons in the first three months of the conflict.² This definition includes internally displaced persons who, unlike refugees, represent another major human dimension of civil war. The duration of civil war captures the length of intense violence from its initiation until one party is defeated or agrees to a peace settlement that lasts at least three months. As Table 1.1 records, and given these definitions, Congo has had seventeen civil wars from July 1960 to December 2010, ranging in duration from twenty-three days (Shaba war II) to 2,204 days (Hema-Lendu war). The average of Congo's internal wars is 538 days, or almost eighteen months. More than four million people have been killed in Congo wars.

Why have so many civil wars erupted in the DRC? What theoretical approach best captures both the micro- and the macro-processes of Congo's wars and their duration? Was there any effort to manage these conflicts? These are the questions that I attempt to answer in this book.

Scholars and practitioners have long been preoccupied with the question of why civil wars occur. Zartman (2005, p. 256) summarizes the literature in terms of greed or resources, grievance or basic needs, and creed or identity. However, I depart from the extant literature in several ways by contending that the politics of exclusion is a major trigger of most civil wars in Congo rather than tensions over resources, basic needs, or identity.³ The common greed, grievance, and creed approaches have highlighted a number of problems, which are also apparent in the history of Congo. As Lemarchand (2006, p. 29) has pointed out,

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Table 1.1 Internal Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Conflict	Beginning	Ending	Number of Deaths (IDPs) ^a	Days Duration
Katanga secession (South Katanga)	11 July 1960	14 Jan. 1963	65,000–92,000 (15,000–30,000)	917
South Kasai secession	8 Aug. 1960	2 Feb. 1962	2,500–6,500 (350,000)	543
North Katanga insurrection	5 Sept. 1960	19 Dec. 1961	65,000–80,000 (6,000–10,000)	470
Northwestern South Kasai insurrection	1 Oct. 1962	15 Apr. 1964	2,500–4,800 (6,000–12,000)	561
Kwilu rebellion	6 Jan. 1964	31 Dec. 1965	3,000–6,500 (7,000–15,000)	725
Eastern rebellion	15 Apr. 1964	1 July 1966	45,000–75,000 (150,000–200,000)	807
Mutiny of Baka Regiment	24 July 1966	25 Sept. 1966	1,100–4,200 (5,000–10,000)	63
Mercenaries' mutiny	5 July 1967	5 Nov. 1967	2,000–6,000 (7,000–18,000)	123
Shaba war I	8 Mar. 1977	27 May 1977	1,000–1,500 (5,000–9,000)	80
Shaba war II	11 May 1978	3 June 1978	1,600–3,500 (8,000–12,000)	23
Kivu ethnic war I	20 Mar. 1993	31 Aug. 1993	7,000–16,000 (200,000)	164
Kivu ethnic war II	17 July 1995	21 Dec. 1995	1,500–3,000 (150,000)	156
Kivu ethnic war III	17 Apr. 1996	12 Oct. 1996	25,000–30,000 (220,000)	178
Anti-Mobutu revolt	17 Oct. 1996	17 May 1997	236,000–237,000 ^b (100,000)	211
Mai Mai insurrection	5 Sept. 1997	26 July 1998	4,500–8,800 (15,000–25,000)	324
Anti-Kabila revolt	2 Aug. 1998	17 Dec. 2002	3,200,000–4,200,000 (1,457,000)	1,598
Hema-Lendu war	19 June 1999	1 July 2005	65,000–75,000 (42,000)	2,204

Notes: a. IDPs: internally displaced persons. b. This number also includes some 233,000 Hutu refugees who were killed by the Rwandan troops between October 1996 and May 1997 (see Kisangani 2000a, p. 179; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees cited in Human Rights Watch 1999).

frequent reference to confrontations among warring factions as “resource wars” points to a misconception. Although resources may sustain an internal war, rebel leaders are rarely political outcasts. Rather, they are often former members of the government or other elites excluded from power who are trying to (re)insert themselves into the state apparatus.

With regard to the grievance approach, it is also incorrect to characterize excluded elites as an impoverished or an uneducated grieved group. On the contrary, these elites not only tend to be among the best-educated members of society but almost by definition they have enough resources to challenge the incumbent regime. Once in power, they are likely to continue the same system of predation as their predecessors, setting an unending cycle of predation and conflict. Furthermore, excluded elites in many multiethnic societies may not care about their identities. More often than not, they will create coalitions of individuals from a variety of different cultural backgrounds in their quest to oust the government. Political violence provides these coalitions with a rationale for fighting, but their ambitions may not be to sustain societal welfare, to improve governance, or to foster national identity.

Of course, stating that the politics of exclusion triggered Congo's internal war still leaves a number of questions unanswered and a number of details to be explained. One of the most important details in this book is understanding why the masses or ethno-political constituencies follow excluded elites marching in or initiating civil war in Congo's multiethnic society. Three broad perspectives on ethnicity have attempted to answer this question. First is the primordialist perspective that takes ethnic identity as given (Smith 1986). As a consequence, conflict that emerges from ethnic differences does not necessarily need an explanation. The main criticism of this approach is its failure to account for the emergence of new identities or the transformation of existing identities as well as variations in the level of conflict over time and space (Lake and Rothchild 1998, p. 4).

The second is the instrumentalist approach that views ethnicity as a tool or a political instrument used by the elites for material goals (Brass 1985). Critics of this approach contend that ethnicity is not like any other social or political affiliation, which can be decided by individuals at will but can only be understood within a "relational framework" (Easman 1994, p. 13). As proponents of the third perspective, or constructivists, argue, ethnicity is not an individual attribute but a social phenomenon and the product of human actions and choices (Anderson 1983; Young 1993). Conflict emerges from pathological social systems that individuals cannot control. By itself, ethnicity is not a cause of violent conflict because most ethnic groups, most of the time, pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels (Lake and Rothchild 1998, p. 7). However, opponents of this approach contend that constructivists cannot elucidate how particular ethnic groups endure and why people are usually willing to die for their nations (Smith 1993). Furthermore, constructivists failed to account for the masses' motivations to follow the elites and for mechanisms that account for such following (Fearon and Laitin 2000).

This book takes a different perspective and argues that the masses are likely to follow excluded elites not because of primordial ethnic bonds or because of the social context in which such elites operate. Rather, they will follow such elites only if they believe the conflict is legitimate. As the remaining chapters

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will show, however, one tragedy in Congo's history lies in the fact that the mobilized masses often organize to support what they believe are wars of legitimacy only to discover later that their leaders are seeking nothing more than state spoils and are thus waging wars of replacement or convenience.

Because civil wars are not a cohesive class of events, the book refers to "a civil war of legitimacy" (Sobek and Payne 2010) as an attempt by political entrepreneurs to fundamentally alter the relationship between the state and society. A civil war of legitimacy is thus different from a war of replacement and a war of convenience. In a war of replacement, rebel leaders seek to remove the incumbent regime but intend to keep the state relatively unchanged. A war of convenience aims to suffocate or weaken the incumbent regime without replacing or altering it. The advantage of this categorization is that critical historical factors that help excluded elites to mobilize the masses for collective action may differ across civil wars even though the politics of exclusion remains the common trigger. Therefore, the duration of civil wars should also differ, and the expectation is that a civil war of legitimacy should be shorter than the other two because of its popular support to fundamentally transform the relationship between the state and society. Empirically, this book refers to any war that lasts more than the mean of 538 days as a long war, while a short war lasts less than the average. The advantage of this operational definition is to take the context into account rather than to rely on quantitative large N analysis that either considers a seven-year mean (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004) or a twelve-year mean (Fearon 2004).

Legitimacy alone is not sufficient to mobilize the masses, however. An opportunity must provide players with the expectation to gain from violence. This opportunity emerges only in a weak state as citizens interact strategically while competing for scarce resources. A weak state refers to a polity that lacks the capacity to penetrate society, to provide order, to protect groups, to arbitrate groups' issues, and to produce social goods. It thus supplies ample opportunities for civil war because it creates a fear of the future that excluded elites can bank on to mobilize the masses through violence in order to re(insert) themselves into the political system. In a sense, the nationalist discourse by political elites only provides the ideological legitimation of their strategy (Englebert and Hummel 2005). They often have no true desire to transform the state apparatus. Rather, political elites view government institutions as means to access or control the country's resources and tools that can be used to thwart political rivals. Political competition is perceived here as competition for power to control access to scarce resources by excluding potential contenders.

The book uses a process-tracing strategy to illustrate the utility of an approach focusing on the politics of exclusion for understanding Congo's many civil wars. This comparative historical method highlights the uniqueness and the commonality among Congo's internal wars. Because the process-tracing technique used in this book is relatively intricate, it must be outlined in detail. Gold-

stone (1991) refers to process-tracing as a critical mechanism that can illuminate the issue of confounding variables because many causes can have their own causes. Such “causes of causes” are what methodologists have in mind when they warn about infinite regress (every cause has a cause in its own right). To identify the process by which some causes are critical in explaining the outcome, or civil war, “researchers must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed in conjunction with *which simple principles* of the many that may be at work, would have *combined* to generate the observed sequence of events” (Goldstone 1991, p. 57, emphasis in the original). A detailed narrative or a story presented in the form of a chronicle provides the best way to understand the outcome of interest because it throws light on how an event came about. In essence, too little attention to history can hinder causal explanation of a social phenomenon.

The process-tracing approach used here links critical junctures to critical antecedents to explain the outcome of interest—civil wars. Critical juncture refers to a period “in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases onto divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory that diverges significantly from the old” (Slater and Simmons 2010, p. 888). As this book demonstrates, most critical junctures in Congolese history were episodes when the politics of exclusion came into particularly sharp focus.

Critical antecedents, on the other hand, are factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce a long-term divergence in outcomes.⁴ Critical antecedents thus combine with causal forces operative at a critical juncture in at least two ways (Slater and Simmons 2010, pp. 890–891). In one scenario, critical antecedents are successive causes and exhibit a direct effect on the causal force that emerges during the critical juncture. According to John Stuart Mill, a useful rule of thumb is to truncate historical analysis at the point when causes can be understood without being expressed (cited in Rigby 1995, p. 236). The issue is to limit oneself to nontrivial causes to avoid infinite regress. Moreover, the kind of successive causes that lead to infinite regress are usually background similarities, not critical antecedents. In another scenario, critical antecedents are conditioning causes that vary before a critical juncture and predispose (but do not predestine) cases to diverge as they ultimately do (Slater and Simmons 2010, p. 891). They usually help to determine the differential causal effect of the independent variable across cases when the critical juncture exogenously comes about (Slater and Simmons 2010). In sum, critical antecedents condition a critical juncture to explain the outcome of interest.

Having identified the politics of exclusion as a critical juncture that explains Congo's internal wars begs the question of what constitutes critical antecedents in the context of Congo. The book refers to critical antecedents as elements of continuity, or the colonial legacy, and elements of change, or the

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
postcolonial setting. As developed in more detail later in this chapter, elements of continuity include the state itself with its artificial colonial boundaries, the integration of Congo into the world economy as a supplier of raw materials, urbanization as a modernization process, and the coexistence of unwritten communal land tenure and colonial private land system. Elements of change are a weak army or a deinstitutionalized military and the institutionalization of a patronage system.

Figure 1.1 illustrates the theoretical model of the argument. The book thus focuses on specific aspects of social life in the DRC since colonial times to capture both continuity and change, including events, actions, symbols, rituals, and words that dramatize sociocultural and economic phenomena. It also examines the motives, reasons, and justifications for citizens' behavior in civil wars by concentrating on actions and sequences as well as by looking at time and process as essentials because people construct social reality through actions that occur over time. This procedure requires a sensitive analysis of the ever-present tension between agency and structure. The former describes the changing social reality, while the latter describes the fixed regularities and patterns that shape social actions or perceptions. Not only do people create and change social reality, but social reality also imposes restrictions on human choices.

The book's process-tracing approach is important and significant for a number of reasons:

- It helps disaggregate a civil war and allows for more detailed analyses of actors' conflict characteristics.
- It provides a way of evaluating how these characteristics influence prospects for settlement, the duration of the conflict, and the likelihood of specific outcomes.
- By using a process-tracing strategy that traces the behavior and interactions of subnational actors in individual conflicts, this microlevel analysis features a broader variety of within-country information sources.
- With a larger set of conflicts, such as in the DRC, the book makes multiple comparisons, and this helps identify the idiosyncrasies of individual conflicts and evaluate whether modal patterns exist across conflicts.
- Process-tracing allows a detailed analysis of aggregate data in historical perspective as well. Thus, a combination of both microlevel and macrolevel analyses provides a way of avoiding what Kalivas calls "reckless extrapolation from the micro to the macro level" (2008, p. 398).
- By highlighting why the politics of exclusion can lead to civil war in some settings (DRC and most of its neighbors) and not in others (Tanzania and Zambia, two other neighbors), process-tracing provides a handy framework that can help analysts develop a better understanding of civil wars in most polities. More than this advantage, process-tracing can also be a useful approach to explain within-country variations.

Figure 1.1 Process-Tracing Model of Civil Wars



The remainder of this chapter sets the stage for the book's analysis of the politics of exclusion and Congo's civil wars. The next section is a brief literature review and a quantitative analysis of Congo's civil wars in terms of broad trends and limitations of this approach to studying civil wars. The statistical analysis is followed by a brief historical background that highlights both elements of continuity and elements of change in Congo's history. The last section of this chapter provides the goals and a brief outline of the book.

A Brief Literature Review and Statistical Exercise

Three approaches dominate the literature on the causes of internal wars. As outlined earlier, they include greed, grievance, and creed analyses. However, most statistical studies have modeled civil wars in terms of structural, economic, and political approaches rather than in terms of creed, greed, and grievance because they tend to use creed or identity as an explanatory variable.

First, the structural approach considers the nature of the country and society. Correlates of civil wars are geographical features such as a country's size, population characteristics, renewable resources, and degree of cultural affinities (Homer-Dixon 1999). Large and populous countries with young and urbanized populations have an increased probability of experiencing internal wars and even potential separatism. Neo-Malthusians also contend that population pressure on natural renewable resources makes societies prone to conflict (Urdal 2005). Ethnic heterogeneity, as a measure of identity, is also important. The more heterogeneous a state is, the more likely it will experience conflict. Operational definitions of country size and its characteristics include the natural logarithm of population, logarithm of population per square kilometer, percentage of urban population, and the age dependency ratio (the percentage of working-age population). Arable land per capita measures pressures on renewable resources. Data used in the statistical analysis are from the World Bank (2010). The last variable is social fractionalization that measures societal heterogeneity (see following greed model).

Second, economic analyses of civil wars rely mostly on the idea of greed. Rebels resemble organized criminal groups rather than freedom fighters struggling against injustice. Because a civil war is a rational decision, it is determined by the financial viability of the organization and the opportunities that arise for high expected returns. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002) have popularized this greed approach in a series of quantitative analyses. Their model focuses on opportunities rather than motivations as the driving factor of civil war.

The first factor to influence opportunities is the availability of finances. Finances come from extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas (data unavailable for Congo), and subventions from hostile governments. Collier and Hoeffler used primary commodity exports as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) and a post–Cold War dummy to operationalize the first and third variables. The relationship between primary commodities and civil wars is not linear, however. The second factor to explain opportunity is the cost of rebellion because recruits must be paid, and their cost may be related to the income foregone by enlisting as rebels. The opportunity cost of a civil war tends to be low in states that have low economic growth rates, low income, and a high number of unemployed youth (male secondary school enrollment). Third, opportunity for civil war is likely where supply of military hardware, or conflict capital, is cheap (defined by peace years and previous wars) and in states where governments have difficulties expanding their reach throughout society (defined by population dispersion and forests or mountains as a share of the country's area). Finally, weak social cohesion is an antidote to civil wars, and its operational definition is social fractionalization (see Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Because the sample is small and given the issue of multicollinearity, the variable “peace years” is removed from the analysis. Another variable, mountains as a percentage of total area, is not included because it is constant for the case of Congo. Most data are from the World Bank (2010) and the variable “forests” is from the Food and Agriculture Organization (1965–2008, annual issues).

The third approach deals with the dynamics of the political system and process. It relies on the idea of grievance or motivations. First, intergroup hatreds tend to be stronger in fractionalized societies than in homogeneous societies. Thus, civil war is carried on by political entrepreneurs willing to redress past wrongdoing. The grievance approach uses social fractionalization, political repression (autocracy, from Marshall and Jagers 2010), ethnic dominance, and economic inequality (Gini coefficient of inequality and land inequality). Grievance may also increase with population size (logged population) to capture conflict-induced grievances. The measure of ethnic dominance is zero in Congo (there is no dominant group), and measures of economic inequality are nonexistent.

Still other scholars in the political science tradition argue that it is the instability of the political system or a political transition that weakens the state and drives states to separatism as ethnic identities are intensified (Laitin 2001). A variant of this argument is Posen's (1993) idea of internal security dilemmas.

From this perspective, the end of the Cold War (post–Cold War dummy) caused superpowers to gradually disengage from costly commitments in faraway places that did not immediately affect their national interest. This withdrawal allowed old ethnic animosities to resurface and old scores to be settled once and for all. Horowitz (1985, pp. 12–13) has also identified riots as forerunners of civil wars, especially secessionist wars. Data on riots are from Banks (2010). The dynamics affecting internal security dilemmas are upheld by living in a “bad neighborhood” (a region prone to conflicts), and external military intervention also affects the dilemma (Weiner 1996). Bad neighborhood is a constant because civil war has been endemic in Central Africa since the early 1960s. Data on military intervention are from Kisangani and Pickering (2008).

The statistical analysis uses data from 1959 to 2009. Most statistical studies on civil war operationalize it as a dummy variable, one coded as presence of civil war and zero otherwise. Because “intrastate war” is a dummy variable, the statistical model used is logit. The last methodological issue relates to the dependent variable and autocorrelated errors. Most studies that employ binary discrete dependent variables tend to assume that residuals are white noise. To deal with autocorrelated residuals, lagged civil war is used, which corrects for the inefficiency caused by autocorrelation. Table 1.2 provides the statistical results in a nonmathematical format to ease interpretation of the findings. *Positive* or *negative* expressions in parentheses below the variables suggest that this variable is likely to increase or lower the chance of civil war onset, holding other variables constant. Statistically significant (SS) means that this variable explains the onset of civil war, while SNS (statistically not significant) implies that the variable has no impact on the onset of civil war. In other words, significance relates to the probability that the given variable actually has no effect on civil wars.

The three models seem to fit the data well as illustrated by statistically significant chi-square statistics. Lagged civil war remained statistically insignificant in all models, and its removal did not affect the results. The structural model shows that only the age dependency ratio is likely to increase the chance of civil war, while population growth is negatively related to civil wars. The second model also highlights two statistically significant variables. The variable “previous wars” has the wrong sign, but geographic dispersion is positively related to civil wars as hypothesized. However, the most critical variable in the greed model—exports of primary commodities as a percentage of GDP—is not related to civil wars. Despite Congo’s mineral wealth, the statistical results suggest that the greed model does not help to explain its many civil wars. This finding reinforces a number of studies that have challenged the Collier-Hoeffler model (Fearon 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005).

The statistical analysis of the political model highlights the fact that the democratic transition and external military intervention were critical in initiating civil wars in the DRC. Civil wars may not have been carried out by political entrepreneurs willing to redress past wrongdoing. Although these findings

Table 1.2 Three Models of Civil Wars in Congo, 1959–2009

Structural Approach	Economic Approach	Political Approach
Lagged civil war (negative & SNS)	Lagged civil war (positive & SNS)	Lagged civil war (negative & SNS)
Population (positive & SNS)	Exports/GDP (negative & SNS)	Social fractionalization (positive & SNS)
Population density (negative & SNS)	Exports/GDP ² (negative & SNS)	Autocracy (positive & SNS)
Age dependency ratio** (positive & SS)	Post–Cold War dummy (positive & SNS)	Democratic transition* (positive & SS)
Arable land per capita (positive & SNS)	Secondary enrollment (positive & SNS)	Post–Cold War (positive & SNS)
Population growth** (negative & SS)	Economic growth (positive & SNS)	Forest (negative & SNS)
Urban population (positive and SNS)	GDP per capita (negative and SNS)	Riots (negative & SNS)
Social fractionalization (negative & SNS)	Economic growth (negative & SNS)	External military intervention** (positive & SS)
	Previous wars* (negative & SS)	
	Forests (negative & SNS)	
	Geographic dispersion* (positive & SS)	
	Social fractionalization (negative & SNS)	
Chi-square = 22.30*** Pseudo-R ² = 0.39	Chi-square = 25.19*** Pseudo-R ² = 0.44	Chi-square = 20.19*** Pseudo-R ² = 0.36

Notes: Constants are omitted.

* = less than 10 percent level of significance (two-tailed test)

** = less than 5 percent level of significance (two-tailed test)

*** = less than 1 percent level of significance (two-tailed test)

counter the role of ethnicity in spurring rebellion, they do not capture how ethnic entrepreneurs exacerbate ethnic tensions to mobilize their kin. These entrepreneurs can only ply their trade in an ethnically polarized society. The critical factor is whether the counterelites can overcome obstacles to recruit partisans, control them, and maintain discipline to achieve the group's goals.

Moreover, the statistical analysis highlights some useful insights to understand civil wars, although it also has limitations. As pointed out later in this chapter, each Congolese civil war reveals a different level of intensity, duration, casualties, internal group unity, and intergroup animosity that defies any generalization conforming to existing quantitative literature on the onset and duration of civil wars. For example, most studies on Congo's wars usually refer to the first secession in 1960 as the Katanga secession and overlook the fact that two-thirds of the Katanga Province was not under the control of the seceded government because northern Katanga citizens refused to recognize it. People of North Katanga challenged both the secession and its legitimacy. What extant literature hardly considers is that wars fought within ethnic groups may have different antecedents than wars fought across ethnic lines. The quantitative literature disregards this possibility because it treats civil war as an aggregate category, implicitly assuming that a typology that distinguishes, for example, a war of legitimacy from a war of convenience or a war of replacement would not be meaningful. Any analysis that treats civil wars as if they were homogenous is likely to lead to faulty inferences about the causal links among variables. Of course, such concern about proper methods is not merely an academic issue. The substantive impact resonates widely. If decisionmakers refer to the growing body of quantitative studies when crafting policy to deal with civil wars, the results could be disastrous. Thus, the next section provides a brief historical background of Congo's internal wars to set the stage for qualitative analysis.

Political and Socioeconomic Context of Congo's Internal Wars

The political history of the DRC started on 1 July 1885, or four months after the signatories of the Berlin Conference recognized King Leopold II of Belgium as the sovereign of the Congo Free State (CFS). The CFS became a Belgian colony on 15 November 1908 and the Republic of Congo on 30 June 1960. After the promulgation of the Luluabourg constitution, it became the DRC on 1 August 1964 and remained so until 27 October 1971 when President Mobutu Sese Seko named it Zaire. On 29 May 1997, President Laurent Kabila changed the name back to the DRC. Although these names indicate that the DRC has undergone many changes in terms of players and goals, change and continuity have coexisted, and both forces have simultaneously exerted their influence on the political landscape of Congo. This section briefly outlines the political history of Congo to provide the context necessary to understand the case chapters that follow.

From Formation to Consolidation of the Colonial State

Before the European scramble for Africa in the 1860s, both acephalous societies and hierarchical polities dominated the Congo basin or present-day DRC (Nday-

wel 1997). Although the precolonial Congo basin operated within essentially a subsistence economy, it was also an area of intense long-distance trade (Vansina 1962). By the mid-1870s, when agents of King Leopold II of Belgium entered the Congo basin to conquer it, four groups of alien forces dominated long-distance trade and had significantly altered the political landscape of the region: the Ovumbundu and the Cokwe (Tshokwe) from Angola, Tippo Tip and his Afro-Arabs from Zanzibar, and Ngelekwa Mwenda, or Msiri, and his Yeke from the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika (Miller 1970; Page 1976). In the mid-1880s, most empires and chieftaincies in the Congo basin were thus weakened or ruled by foreign traders except for a few principalities and kingdoms (Vansina 1966; Ntahokaja 1981). By the time the Berlin Conference ended on 26 February 1885, most major powers had recognized King Leopold as the sovereign of the International Association of Congo (IAC), which he created on 9 October 1882, not only because his agents, among them Henry Morton Stanley, had signed a number of treaties with local rulers, but also because Leopold II had guaranteed freedom from slavery in the IAC, freedom of navigation in the Congo basin, and freedom of trade in the area.

To rule his domain, the king set up an administrative apparatus that remained in Brussels. The administrator general, and later governor general, served as the king's chief agent in the CFS and resided in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). The decree of 1 August 1888 was the first to divide the CFS into eleven districts headed by district commissioners to make the CFS manageable. In 1895, the number of districts was increased to fifteen and remained at that number until 1910. King Leopold also established an army, called the Public Force (Force Publique), and its task was to occupy the Congo basin and to maintain law and order. Despite three mutinies in the early years of colonial state formation, the army remained an instrument to enforce authority (Flamant et al. 1952). Moreover, the king promulgated a decree on 1 July 1885 that allowed his administration to establish the state's right to dispose of all lands that were not effectively occupied by Africans by declaring them as vacant land. This expropriation of land meant that Africans were not allowed to undertake any activity outside subsistence production.

The final set of Leopold's policies was to secure resources. First, he used a mixed economic system and traditional authorities to exploit his domain.⁵ Second, he passed laws on taxation as a means to force natives to collect resources such as wild rubber and ivory. In 1904, export earnings from rubber stood at 43.48 million francs gold, or \$205 million in 2010 prices (2010 = 100),⁶ which represented about 83 percent of exports (Gann and Duignan 1984, p. 122). This mono-exporting economy would continue to dominate the economic history of Congo. As a personal domain of King Leopold, the CFS also had to sustain or pay for itself. This managerial style is similar to pillage or exploitation and is known in Marxist language as "primitive accumulation." The king's domain had to generate profits and pay for different types of costs to bring natural resources to the nearest seaports. Thus, to collect rubber and other products,

Africans were overworked, coerced, and underfed. Resistance to the CFS emerged almost everywhere. Millions of Africans were either killed by Leopold's agents or died from starvation, disease, forced labor, mutilations, and inhumane conditions while gathering wild rubber (Hochschild 1998; James 1943; Morel 1906).

Both external and internal pressures forced Leopold II to officially cede the CFS to Belgium on 15 November 1908. Article 1 of the Colonial Charter stated that the colony had a separate and distinct legal personality from Belgium and must be self-financing. The Belgian Congo was henceforth under the Ministry of Colonies, which had to carry out a number of reforms to make the Belgian rule more humane. Although some excesses of the Leopoldian state disappeared, most reforms were cosmetic because they only reproduced the same Leopoldian apparatus under a different label. In other words, Leopoldian legacies remained the pillars of the colonial rule "though certainly there was refinement of that component" (Anstey 1966, p. 262).

In fact, the first administrative reform after the annexation followed practices dating back to the CFS. The royal decree of 28 July 1914 reorganized the colony by incorporating the districts into four provinces: Congo-Kasai, Equateur, Orientale, and Katanga. The last reform occurred in 1933 when the administration established six provinces: Leopoldville, Equateur, Costermansville (later Kivu), Elisabethville (Katanga), Orientale, and Lusambo (later Kasai).

The second Leopoldian legacy relates to traditional authority and land tenure. After 1908, a halfhearted attempt was made to restore traditional authority by creating chieftaincies and subchieftaincies. Although Belgian administrators theoretically recognized the authority of traditional chiefs, in practice every effort was made to replace them with trustworthy elements whose only claim to chieftaincy was their personal loyalty to the colonial state. The colonial administration thus enacted a series of decrees in 1910 and 1933 that completely transformed the chiefs into subaltern functionaries of the colonial administration (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p. 35). Moreover, the system of land expropriation continued after the annexation.

A related legacy after 1908 was the nexus between the state and private enterprises to exploit the colony. In the late 1910s, Minister of Colonies Louis Franck realigned the Congolese franc to the Belgian franc to encourage foreign investment that increased from 3.85 million francs in 1909 to 101.02 billion francs in 1956 (Belgium 1958). This is an equivalent increase from \$544,169 to almost \$14.28 billion (2010 = 100). The share of mining averaged 25 percent of foreign investment and was second only to the banking and insurance sectors, which averaged 36 percent a year. Provincial division favored Katanga's copper. Just like rubber, copper came to represent more than 55 percent of total exports by 1928 (Peemans 1997a, p. 30).

Another Leopoldian legacy was a coercive state apparatus epitomized by political repression, compulsory or forced labor, and extorted individual tax. For example, legislation requiring sixty days per year (forty-five after 1955) of

forced labor (or other public works) was applied until 1957. Like its Leopoldian counterpart, the harsh colonial system provoked rebellions in many parts of the colony in the form of peasant revolts, messianic and syncretic movements, and strikes (Young 1965, pp. 281–290). Moreover, Belgians ruled their colony in a climate of authoritarianism coupled with a massive dose of racism under the “paternalistic” assumption that “Negroes have the souls of children, souls that mould themselves to the methods of the educator” (Moutouille 1946, p. 54). Unlike the Leopoldian state, however, paternalism encouraged strong state intervention in the social realm, especially in health care. A survey by the European Common Market indicated that, by 1958, the medical infrastructure in the Belgian Congo was “the best in Tropical Africa” (cited in Brausch 1961, p. 8).

The result of paternalism was also apparent in the economy. For example, Belgians isolated their colony from the world and isolated Congolese from one another. This policy was based upon the theory that the Belgian Congo could develop and eventually be transformed “from a backward and underdeveloped colony dependent upon Belgium to a fully industrialized modern state capable of running its own affairs” (Hoskyns 1962, p. 8). To some extent, this policy succeeded because the industrialization of the colony started as early as 1921. After World War II, the colony had an exceptional economic growth averaging 8 percent per year from 1946 to 1955 (Huybrechts 1970, p. 373). By the 1950s, the manufacturing industry grew at an exceptionally fast rate, averaging 14.5 percent a year; as a result, local industrial production of consumer goods covered by national production increased from virtually zero in the early 1920s to 36.5 percent of equivalent imports of similar goods by the mid-1950s (Lacroix 1967, p. 163). This percentage jumped to 44 percent in 1958 (Lacroix 1967, p. 309). As a number of scholars contended, the Belgian Congo was the most industrialized territory on the continent apart from South Africa (Lacroix 1967; Prunier 2009). For example, by 1958, more than 35 percent of all adults were in salaried employment, a proportion unknown elsewhere in Africa (Merlier 1962, p. 166).

This number may be deceptive given the fact that most of these salaried workers never finished middle school and were mostly unqualified workers, farm laborers, and petty clerks. In any case, the postwar boom ran out of steam in the late 1950s, and migrants to cities soon exceeded employment opportunities. Foreign enterprises, which represented the wealthiest sector of the economy, received a tax break and were even allowed to transfer their profits abroad rather than reinvesting them in the colony. This transfer averaged almost 9.1 billion francs per year between 1950 and 1959; the transportation and insurance sectors had the largest transfer, averaging 5 billion francs per year (Pee-mans 1975, p. 198). In brief, some 90.9 billion francs, or \$12.73 billion (in 2010 prices), were transferred to Belgium from 1950 to 1959, depriving Congo of needed investments to create jobs. As the demand for labor fell in the private sector and urban wages started declining, the colonial state had to step up, becoming the largest employer in urban areas. Salaries paid by the state jumped

from 10 percent of total salaries in 1950 to 25 percent in 1958 (Peemans 1975, pp. 198–199). At independence in June 1960, the state became a battleground because it was not only one of the main sources of employment but also remained the main access point for scarce resources.

The final effect of paternalism was in education. Until the University of Lovanium was created in 1954, the colonial system never allowed Congolese to continue schooling beyond high school. The sole avenue for secondary schooling and higher education was through the seminaries because the colonial state used the Catholic Church to create its colony (Young 1965, pp. 198–199). For example, the first African priest was ordained in 1917. At the time of independence, there were nearly 500 Congolese priests and four bishops (Young 1965, p. 199). However, the Belgian Catholic hierarchy forbade these priests or “university graduates” to accept any administrative role in the colony. Thus, from the time that Belgium took over the CFS in 1908 to the eve of independence in 1959, the vast area of the Belgian Congo was under effective and firm control exercised by the Belgian administration and supported by European investments and the Catholic Church.

Nonetheless, those few African university graduates who decided to take a different route than the priesthood and Africans who were granted education up to the middle school were the first to challenge the colonial system. This group was called *évolués*, or civilized Africans, and occupied mostly clerical jobs in the colonial system. Because the Belgian system prohibited organizations with political overtones, these *évolués* created cultural groups with strong ethnic connections. For example, the Alliance of Bakongo (Alliance des Bakongo or ABAKO) in Leopoldville was established in the early 1950s by Edmond Nzenza Nlandu as a social and cultural group to protect the interests and the language of the Kongo people. It later became a political party led by Joseph Kasavubu. Hundreds of other associations followed. The increasing number of African townships and the related rise of *évolués* made it imperative for the colonial state to think about political reforms.

One of these reforms occurred with the decree of 26 March 1957, allowing major urban centers to freely elect a council. In turn, elected council members had to nominate burgomasters from their members. The electoral system was based on single-member constituencies. In late 1957, the process took place in Leopoldville and Elisabethville and was extended in 1958 to other provincial capital cities. As expected, electoral results fell mostly along ethnic lines.

Politically, the reforms stimulated the growth of political parties because they invited competition among various contestants. After urban reforms, the formation of parties accelerated. Several political figures and parties emerged, among them Patrice Lumumba and his Congolese National Movement (Mouvement National Congolais, or MNC). Later the MNC split over leadership style into MNC/Lumumba (MNC/L) and MNC/Albert Kalonji (MNC/K). On 11 October 1958, a group of southern Katanga *évolués* created the Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga (Confédération des Associations Tribales du

Katanga, or CONAKAT). To counter the influence of CONAKAT in Katanga, the northern Luba created the Baluba of Katanga, or BALUBAKAT, in November 1959. Among many other political parties that emerged before 1960, only the MNC/L and the conservative National Party of Progress (Parti National du Progrès, or PNP) made a serious effort to organize nationally.

As the movement toward independence accelerated, political parties started seeking supporters from ethno-political constituencies. Urban areas were the first arena for competition, but urban mobilization became so tense that it produced a wave of riots among unemployed youths. The most important riot, in Leopoldville on 4 January 1959, shook the foundation of the model colony and presaged the inability of colonial structures to capture, direct, and channel youth dissatisfaction. The Belgian government responded to increasing political unrest in urban areas by convening a political roundtable conference on 20 January 1960, which most politicians attended, and a less-publicized economic roundtable that included most university graduates and a few politicians from the mining belt. On 20 February 1960, the participants in the former roundtable adopted sixteen resolutions, which represented a compromise between two fundamental issues: the timing of independence and the form of state organization afterward. The first issue positioned supporters of immediate independence against proponents of gradual independence, and the second issue pitted supporters of unitarism against proponents of federalism. From these two opposing issues emerged four political views: radical nationalism (immediate independence in a centralized structure), radical federalism (immediate independence in a federal structure), moderate nationalism (gradual independence in a unitarist structure), and moderate federalism (gradual independence in a federal structure). The essence of most political parties before independence can be reduced to these issues. For example, the MNC/L was radical and nationalist, while the ABAKO was radical and federalist; the PNP was moderate and nationalist, while the CONAKAT was moderate and federalist.

The Belgian legislature also adopted an electoral law, based on proportional representation, and a constitution, or the Fundamental Law, which created a parliamentary system. In the legislative elections, which took place in May 1960, some 250 political parties competed for seats in the lower house and provincial legislatures. Because no political party received an absolute majority in the lower house, political coalitions were necessary to form the first government. Legislators reached a compromise whereby Patrice Lumumba became prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu, the ABAKO leader, president. The new government also included Vice Premier Minister Antoine Gizenga. On 30 June 1960, the Belgian Congo became independent.

From Secessions to the Mercenaries' Mutiny

Four days after the new government took office on 4 July 1960, it confronted an army mutiny. African noncommissioned officers felt they were being left

out of the distribution of the fruits of independence. While civilians were taking political power, the last European military commander, General Emile Janssens, refused to promote Africans to senior positions, stating on 5 July 1960 that "before independence = after independence" (Gérard-Libois and Verhaegen 1961, p. 350). The result of the mutiny was to deprive the new state of its effective monopoly of force and to set in motion an environment favorable to perpetuating violence. In addition, most Belgian civil servants left behind, in panic, empty administrative chairs that would be filled by unknowledgeable and inexperienced Congolese clerks.

President Kasavubu, as commander in chief, and Prime Minister Lumumba, as minister of national defense, promoted a former master sergeant, Victor Lundula, to the rank of major general and placed him in command of the new Congolese National Army (*Armée Nationale Congolaise*, or ANC). Joseph Mobutu, a former sergeant in the colonial army, became a colonel and chief of staff and was ordered by Lumumba to promote noncommissioned officers to officer ranks in the ANC. Despite a quick Africanization, disorder in the army continued, and soldiers at Camp Massart in Elisabethville also mutinied on 9 July 1960. Moïse Tshombe, as the governor of Katanga, appealed to Brussels for troops to restore order. The next day, two Belgian companies from Kamina military base under Major Guy Weber occupied Camp Massart. Other Belgian troops were also dispatched to a number of major cities to protect Europeans. While the United Nations (UN) Security Council was debating the Congolese crisis, the Katanga Province seceded on 11 July 1960 with Tshombe as president. He immediately hired white mercenaries, and a few weeks later he created an army, the *Katanga Gendarmerie*, to defend the new state. Three days after the proclamation of the Katanga secession, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution S/4387 calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Congo and providing for UN assistance. The first UN military contingent, from Ghana, arrived in Kinshasa on 14 July 1960. Within four days there were some 4,000 UN troops in Congo.

While Lumumba was trying to assert his authority over Katanga, South Kasai (or Sud-Kasai), a region rich in diamonds, seceded on 8 August 1960. Its president was Albert Kalonji, the leader of MNC/Kalonji. Three days later, an insurrection in North Katanga (Nord-Katanga) broke out to oppose the Katanga secession. In early September 1960, tensions mounted between Lumumba and Kasavubu on the issue of defeating the Katanga secession. After UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld refused Lumumba's request to end the Katanga secession, Lumumba requested and received military aid from the Soviet Union. Lumumba's act alienated the United States, which pressured Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba and nominate Joseph Ileo as the new prime minister, on 5 September 1960. A legitimacy crisis ensued, resulting in a coup d'état by Colonel Mobutu on 14 September 1960 to neutralize Lumumba, who was perceived by the West as a communist sympathizer (Kalb 1982). Mobutu installed a Council of General Commissioners on 20 September 1960, mostly

composed of college graduates, to serve as a caretaker government. Mobutu's actions automatically excluded most pro-Lumumba followers or "nationalists" from power.

By early October, it became clear that Lumumba and his coalition were losing power, and the possibility of a negotiated reconciliation with President Kasavubu was more remote than ever. Lumumba's strategy was to form a counter-government in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) where he had a majority constituency. In mid-November 1960, his supporters started heading for the town, and in late November 1960, Gizenga, the former deputy prime minister, reached Stanleyville, where he immediately received the support of the provincial government. He quickly removed pro-Mobutu officers from army battalions and replaced them with trusted officers. Within a week a pro-Lumumba government controlled the whole Orientale Province. On 12 December 1960, Gizenga announced that Stanleyville had become the capital city of Congo. The new central government had 5,500 troops under General Lundula. On Christmas day, a handful of gendarmes from Stanleyville overturned the pro-Leopoldville government of Jean Miruho in Bukavu, Kivu. Gizenga's troops penetrated as far as Manono in North Katanga in support of the northern Katanga uprising against the Katanga secession.

While these events were unfolding, Lumumba was caught by Mobutu's soldiers in early December at Lodi on the left bank of the Sankuru River after escaping from Leopoldville and trying to reach Stanleyville. He was handed over to the deputy director of security services, Gilbert Pongo, at Port Francqui (now Ilebo). On 17 January 1961, Lumumba was transferred with Senate Vice President Joseph Okito and former Youth Minister Maurice Mpolo to Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), where the three men were assassinated a few hours after landing. The account of Lumumba's death has been developed elsewhere but suffice it to say that it was the result of a conspiracy that involved the United States, Great Britain, and Belgium (De Witte 2001; Hochschild 1998).

In early 1961, Mobutu handed power back to Kasavubu, who appointed the government of Joseph Ileo to replace the Council of Commissioners on 8 February 1961. Thirteen days later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution S/4741 that authorized its troops to use force if necessary to prevent a long civil war in Congo and called for the withdrawal from Congo of mercenaries, foreign troops, paramilitary personnel, and all political advisers not under the UN command.

The Ileo government remained in power until Cyrille Adoula took office on 2 August 1961. The Adoula administration included two prominent Lumumba followers as deputy prime ministers: Gizenga and Jason Sendwe. Their inclusion was a compromise of a parliamentary convention convened under UN pressures at Lovanium University. Six months later, on 2 February 1962, the Kasai secession was defeated by the UN and the army. With partial control of Congo secured, Adoula initiated constitutional reform with the promulgation of the law of 27 April 1962, which amended Article 7 of the Fundamental Law related to the num-

ber of provinces. By late 1963, the Congolese government had created twenty-one provinces in response to local demands for autonomy (see Map 1.1).

The creation of new provinces hardly solved the issue of political legitimacy. For example, the inauguration of a new provincial government in South Kasai ignited an insurrection in the northwestern part of the province on 1 October 1962 when a group of youths attacked unarmed civilians from the Bena Mutu wa Mukuna (people from highlands) region who were living in the Bena Tshibanda (people from lowlands) region. By mid-January 1963, nearly 4,800 people were killed, and 6,000 to 12,000 people were internally displaced (*Africa Diary* 1963, p. 973; Ilunga 1973). This insurrection coincided with the defeat of the Katanga secession by the UN on 14 January 1963. The mercenaries and most soldiers of the Katanga Gendarmerie disappeared with their arms, and many gendarmes became refugees in Angola.

Thus, the first phase of violence in Congo ended with the restoration of central authority in many parts of the country. A new political equilibrium

Map 1.1 Provinces of Congo, 1960 and 1963



emerged, and violence diminished to small-scale intraprovincial skirmishes. After a four-year mission, UN troops withdrew from Congo on 30 June 1964. Its strength of 19,828 troops from thirty-five countries cost \$400.1 million (Lefever and Joshua 1966, p. 431), or \$2.64 billion (2010 = 100).

As the UN was withdrawing from Congo, a new kind of warfare emerged in western and eastern Congo. A rebellion led by Pierre Mulele, the minister of education in the Lumumba government, broke out on 6 January 1964 in the Kwilu Province. Another rebellion in eastern Congo followed the Kwilu rebellion on 15 April 1964. By late 1964, the civil war in eastern Congo succeeded in eliminating government authority from Uélé (northeastern Congo) to North Katanga.

On 9 August 1964, President Kasavubu removed Prime Minister Adoula, who had been in office since August 1961. He then appointed the former president of the seceded Katanga state, Tshombe, as prime minister to quell the two rebellions. Tshombe called his former Katanga soldiers back from Angola and recruited white mercenaries to reinforce the flagging national army. Meanwhile, on 5 September 1964, the insurgents in eastern Congo declared the Popular Republic of Congo, with Stanleyville as its capital and Christopher Gbenye, former minister of interior in the Lumumba government, as its president.

In addition to quelling the two rebellions, Prime Minister Tshombe had to organize legislative elections according to Article 185 of the Luluabourg constitution promulgated on 1 August 1964. In early 1965, he renewed the Leopoldville branch of his political party, the CONAKAT, in anticipation of the upcoming elections. Some forty-nine tribal organizations also joined the party to form the Congolese National Convention (Convention Nationale Congolaise, or CONACO) on 20 February 1965 in Luluabourg. The second legislative elections, from 18 March to 30 April 1965, occurred without violence and without foreign observers. The CONACO received 122 legislative seats, or 73 percent, of the votes from most electoral districts (Gérard-Libois and Van Lierde 1966, pp. 222–223). Instead of letting Tshombe compose the government, President Kasavubu nominated Evariste Kimba from the minority coalition, the Congolese Democratic Front (Front Démocratique Congolais), on 13 October 1965 as the prime minister. This minority coalition was created by a group of politicians behind Victor Nendaka, security police chief, to oppose the CONACO. Nendaka was a member of the Binza Group, which worked closely with US, Belgian, and UN officials and imposed its will on President Kasavubu.⁷ Unfortunately, the CONACO's ascendancy led to tensions between Kasavubu and Tshombe. On 24 November 1965, Mobutu, now general, took power under this uncertainty. By this time, the Kwilu rebellion was winding down and ended in late December. The eastern rebellion continued afterward but was quite weak by July 1966 and posed no major threat to the central government. The two rebellions did, however, cost more than 60,000 lives and internally displaced more than 100,000 people (Verhaegen 1969).

In his quest to consolidate power, Mobutu decided in early 1966 to integrate both the mercenaries and former Katanga soldiers who had fought the eastern rebellion in the national army. As he was reforming the army, a mutiny broke out in Kisangani on 24 July 1966 that involved the Baka Regiment, a unit of the national army consisting of 2,000 Katangan soldiers under Colonel Ferdinand Tshipola (Gérard-Libois 1967, p. 346). The mutiny ended on 25 September 1966 after more than 3,000 deaths and the displacement of most people in the town (Gérard-Libois 1967, p. 356). Nine months later, on 5 July 1967, a mutiny instigated by eleven white mercenaries began in Kisangani. Within a week, the mutineers were joined by some 150 additional mercenaries, 600 Katangan soldiers, and 400 renegades from the former rebel army. When the mutiny ended on 5 November 1967, the death toll was 2,000 to 6,000 people (Gérard-Libois and Verhaegen 1969, pp. 349–407).

The Second Republic: From Consolidation to Collapse

For almost thirty-two years Mobutu remained the uncontested president of Congo. This political longevity was the result of many factors, among them the unintended consequence of the anti-Communist policies of the United States. In addition to US support, Mobutu used a number of key domestic strategies to remain in office. First was his quest for legitimacy after his second coup d'état in November 1965. Legitimacy is a belief by the ruled that the ruler has a right to exercise authority (Kisangani 2000b, p. 209). Habermas (1979) describes the distance between shared belief of the governors and the governed as a legitimacy gap. To bridge the gap, most leaders resort to “legitimation devices” that establish “how and why existing or recommended institutions are fit to employ power” (Habermas 1979, p. 183). Mobutu initiated five such devices to secure early legitimacy of his power and to create not only a sense of nationhood but also a strong state. First, he dealt with the collapse of the early political consensus by coopting some twenty-two civilians from different ethno-political constituencies and major political parties in his first government to give it a sense of national unity (Kisangani 2000b).

Second, he proclaimed Patrice Lumumba, the symbol of the 1964 rebellions, as a national hero and appropriated Lumumba's nationalist principles. More specifically, he promulgated the Bakajika Law in June 1966, which stipulated that “all public land was the domain of the Congolese nation-state, and formally extinguishing all grants and concessionary powers delegated by the colonial state” (Young and Turner 1985, p. 288). The Bakajika Law cleared the way for new mineral concessions by abolishing colonial arrangements and undeveloped colonial claims. The law also paved the way for the nationalization of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in January 1967 that became the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines). The Belgian government reacted quickly by imposing an embargo on copper exports to cripple the Congolese economy.

Third, five years later, Mobutu banned all Christian names. Colonial names

of cities, such as Leopoldville and Stanleyville, were changed to Congolese names, Kinshasa and Kisangani. This policy was known as “authenticity” and was also extended to lifestyle (Kisangani and Bobb 2010, pp. 35–36). These decisions were the first devices to create a sense of “belonging” to the state and the nation. Authenticity sought to create a truly national identity by developing indigenous institutions and national forms of expression in the nation’s political, economic, and cultural life.


Fourth, Mobutu sent a strong signal early on that opposition would not be tolerated. In early June 1966, he publicly hanged four former cabinet members before 50,000 spectators in what was called the “Pentecost Plot” to overthrow Mobutu (Kisangani 2000c, p. 261). Fifth, Mobutu began modernizing the army with new equipment to provide prestige to the military. He also accelerated the level of education and training of the officer corps by sending hundreds of military officers and high school graduates to the best military schools in the West (Kisangani 2000b). His efforts were intended to create a professional army that not only reflected the Congolese ethno-political constituencies but that was also capable of defending the nation.

Although Mobutu’s populist actions were a real start in the legitimacy process, they were not enough to help him develop strong state institutions. As a result, he created the Popular Movement of the Revolution party (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution, or MPR) to broaden his political support. Then, in December 1970, he amended the 1967 constitution to institutionalize the one-party state. All citizens, including the unborn, were all declared Mobutists or members of the single party. The MPR’s slogans projected a novel promise for a better and just society for the future. Meanwhile, Mobutu’s speeches also became force of law. He was thus able to develop a sense of Congolese (then Zairian) nationhood and strong institutions that helped maintain peace and order, supply public goods, penetrate society, and sustain economic growth for almost ten years. This quasi-strong state minimized most opportunities for civil wars.

In sum, the goal of Mobutu’s legitimation devices was to strengthen the state as an instrument of authority and to enhance its capabilities. However, by placing Mobutu above the law, state-building efforts to legitimize Mobutu’s rule were also the first mechanisms to weaken the state-building process. Institutionalized violence became common as state secret services and the military were used as instruments of terror against opponents of the Mobutu regime (Kisangani 2000c). His early nationalist rhetoric also turned out to be a way of accumulating resources to finance his patronage system. Mobutu was able to monopolize all sources of revenue and distribute them to his clients as he pleased. This strategy was, however, based on a weak economic foundation that precipitated the collapse of his regime. Thus, an analysis of the economy since the 1960s will help explain the emergence of a new round of civil wars.

Foundations of the Second Republic, Shaba wars, and beyond. Six major periods characterize the postcolonial economy up to 2010: 1960–1965, 1966–

Figure 1.2 Economic Growth, 1960–2009



Source: Data from World Bank 2010.

1973, 1974–1979, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the post-1990s. Figure 1.2 illustrates these periods. In the first era, the rate of economic growth oscillated between positive and negative, but the growth rate remained, on average, positive as the result of the growth impetus of the 1950s. Because prices and the trade deficit were on the rise, the government devalued the Congolese franc in 1961 and 1963. These policies failed because the central government had lost its major sources of revenue from Katanga, Kasai, Kivu, and Orientale provinces as the result of secessions and Gizenga's control of the last two provinces. Despite a few shocks from the demand side, economic growth averaged 3.68 percent per year in 1960–1965.

Economic growth also remained positive in the second period, 1966–1973, averaging 3.78 percent per year as inflationary pressures remained low. The economic model pursued by Congo seemed to work relatively well as the result of the economic reform of 24 June 1967 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which narrowed the gap between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. The centerpiece of the reform was a sharp devaluation of 300 percent that realigned the new currency, the zaire, to its parallel market value at the fixed exchange rate of 1.00 zaire per \$2.00. The net result of the 1967 monetary reform was positive because the economy benefited from favorable prices of copper in the world markets. Thus, from 1967 to 1970, the financial contribution of the state mining company, Gécamines, as a share of government revenue, represented 49 percent of the

national budget (Bézy, Peemans, and Wautelet 1981, p. 84). The mineral sector, especially copper, provided some 65 percent of export earnings.

The third period, from 1974 to 1979, began with supply side shocks. The economy weakened and averaged a negative growth rate of -1.88 percent a year. Recession also set in as inflationary pressures accelerated, averaging 67 percent a year. The economy deteriorated after 1973 for many reasons. First, the government nationalized foreign businesses on 30 November 1973, and the takeover by new owners (*acquéreurs*) occurred within a month of the announcement. Foreign businesses and plantations were handed over to the political ruling group, which ran them into the ground a few months later. The result was a breakdown of production as well as a decline in agricultural and manufacturing production. Not only did the nationalization deindustrialize Congo, but it also destroyed tradable agriculture. For example, official export earnings from agriculture declined drastically to 12 percent of total export earnings in 1974 from 40 percent in 1958–1959 (Bézy, Peemans, and Wautelet 1981, p. 84). This was the lowest percentage since the end of World War II. Despite some efforts in 1976 to revitalize agriculture, less than 4 percent of official export earnings originated from agriculture, which paradoxically employed more than 60 percent of the Congolese population.

Second, the economic crisis also reflected the collapse of copper prices in the world markets and the concomitant decline in foreign exchange. These prices plummeted from 98 cents a pound in 1973 to 59 cents in 1974 and remained on average below 70 cents a pound from 1974 to 1978. The result was a decline in export earnings despite the production of copper averaging more than 450,000 metric tons a year in 1974–1978. Meanwhile, the price of oil skyrocketed in the same period. As a result, foreign debt also increased, averaging some 30 percent of GDP from 1976 to 1979 (World Bank 2010). As a consequence of these macroeconomic imbalances, Mobutu was forced by the IMF to stabilize the economy in the second half of the 1970s, but all stabilization measures were unsuccessful. The result was a spiral of devaluation and inflation that reduced the value of the national currency from $\$1.00 = 0.86$ zaire in 1976 to $\$1.00 = 2.04$ zaires in 1979 (Kisangani 1987).

Despite this weak economy, Mobutu appeared firmly in control in the mid-1970s, although this control was more apparent than real. Economically, Mobutu's state ceased to penetrate the countryside from the mid-1970s on, as smuggling activities across borders largely escaped government control (Kisangani 1998; MacGaffey 1991). Politically, the state had no control in eastern Congo. For example, Congolese opponents of Mobutu's regime from the Front for the National Liberation of Congo (Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo, or FLNC), based in Angola, invaded Katanga on 8 March 1977, initiating a civil war called Shaba I. When the invasion ended on 27 May 1977, the death toll was between 1,000 and 1,500, with more than 5,000 people internally displaced. Another invasion, or Shaba II, occurred between 11 May 1978 and 3 June 1978. Although Shaba II was shorter than Shaba I, the number of casu-

alties was much higher, ranging between 1,600 and 3,500 deaths, with an average of 10,000 internally displaced persons. The Congolese rebels were driven back to their sanctuary in Angola by French and Belgian paratroopers. The United States also played a role, providing air transport and materials during the drop of paratroopers.

Economic troubles and the Shaba conflicts were only the most visible signs of the weakness of Mobutu's regime. A number of less conspicuous phenomena also wore away the foundations of the Mobutu state. One example is the growth of the public sector. As a consequence of uncontrolled government spending, inflation soared in the late 1970s as Mobutu was spending more than 32 percent of government outlays on himself (Kisangani 1997, p. 41). Meanwhile, state revenue plummeted as the result of copper price fluctuations, which forced the government to borrow massively from abroad. Foreign debt increased from less than 50 percent of GDP in the 1970s to more than 100 percent of GDP in the late 1980s. It averaged more than 200 percent of GDP a year in the first half of the 1990s (World Bank 2010).

Another symptom of state weakness was patronage, with the major source being a position in the executive branch. Mobutu's key strategy was frequent reshuffling of the government—more than forty times from 1966 to 1989 (Kisangani 2000c, p. 269). The result was frequent embezzlement and mismanagement in the public domain. Corruption became the “system” (Gould 1980, p. xvii) because, out of greed and fear for their survival, the elites institutionalized corruption and locked their subordinates into corrupt practices in a systematic way. By the early 1980s, kleptocracy emerged as the mode of governance.

Despite this, the 1980s, categorized here as the fourth period, were unique because they averaged a positive economic growth rate of 1.81 percent a year. This period also remained politically stable despite the presence of ample opportunities for civil war. Even one of Mobutu's opponents in exile titled his book *Le Pouvoir à la Portée du Peuple* or “The Power within People's Reach” (Kamitatu 1977). Congo thus remained relatively calm until the early 1990s, except in November 1984 when a group of dissidents labeled the Party of Popular Revolution (Parti de la Révolution Populaire, PRP) under Laurent Kabila confronted the regular army in Moba, North Katanga. The PRP held the town for two days before the army regained control. Because the conflict ended with less than seventy-eight casualties, it does not qualify as a civil war. The PRP attacked again in June 1985 without much success.

From Kivu ethnic wars to anti-Mobutu revolt. The end of the 1980s also marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the fifth economic period. Mobutu was compelled by the West and domestic political forces to announce the liberalization of his political system on 24 April 1990. Soon after, the euphoria of having a free press and multiparty political system developed into social agitation on campuses. The unrest rattled Mobutu and led to an overreaction

when soldiers killed 297 students on the campus of the University of Lubumbashi on 11–12 May 1990 (Kisangani 1997, p. 44). This act resulted in the suspension of foreign aid, except humanitarian aid, from his major aid donors—Belgium, France, and the United States. Overall levels of foreign aid consequently dropped from 7 percent of GDP in 1990 to 2 percent of GDP in 1992 (World Bank 2010). Meanwhile, economic growth also declined by 4.1 percent in 1991, with a major drop of 14 percent in 1993. This negative trend continued until 2001, except for a slight positive growth of 0.1 percent in 1996. The consumer price level, which had dropped by 81 percent from 1989 to 1990, jumped by 2,154 percent from 1990 to 1991, and then by 4,129 percent a year later, despite government efforts to control it (World Bank 2010). Although the increase in consumer prices from 1992 to 1993 was lower than the preceding year, or 1,986 percent, prices jumped again by almost 23,773 percent from 1993 to 1994, then dropped to almost 542 percent in 1995 and slightly in 1996. This inflationary period also coincided with political instability as the process of democratization was proceeding.

Despite Mobutu's efforts to stall the process, hundreds of political parties emerged in the early 1990s as the result of Law no. 90/009 of 18 December 1990. More specifically, pro-Mobutists, or “dinosaurs,” a term used by Braeckman (1992),⁸ created a plethora of parties to undermine the opposition. The number of political parties swelled from 43 in July 1990 to 382 in November 1993. A small group of these parties created a coalition called the Sacred Union (Union Sacrée) and insisted on the organization of a national conference to create new institutions. One major party in the coalition was Union for Democracy and Social Progress (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social, or UDPS), which was created in 1982 by a group of thirteen dissident legislators during the single-party regime.

The national conference opened on 7 August 1991, but Mobutu flooded it with his supporters, resulting in a walkout by the opposition. For several weeks, tensions mounted, and, on 23 September 1991, dissatisfied soldiers in Kinshasa mutinied, going on a looting spree that spread throughout the country, initiating a culture of “pillage” that would epitomize the economic history of Congo for the next two decades.

Under pressure from the West, Mobutu appointed Etienne Tshisekedi from the Sacred Union as the prime minister to deal with the crisis. A week later, Mobutu dismissed him because Tshisekedi refused to swear allegiance to the president. Then, in mid-January 1992, Prime Minister Nguza Karl-i-Bond called off the national conference indefinitely on the grounds that the dominance of the conference by the opposition was contributing to violence and the conference was costing the national treasury thousands of dollars a day. Pressures from the Catholic clergy, which organized the Christian March of Hope on 16 February 1992, and from the West forced Mobutu to reopen the proceedings on 6 April 1992. The conference, now called the sovereign national conference, declared its own status and its decisions binding on all citizens. The conference, which

was chaired by Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo of Kisangani, also elected Tshisekedi, a Luba from Kasai, as the prime minister of the transitional government, voting overwhelmingly for the resignation of Karl-i-Bond, a Lunda from Katanga. The nomination of Tshisekedi and the expulsion of Karl-i-Bond sparked ethnic conflict in early September in Katanga, where the Lunda targeted the Luba clans of Kasai for harassment. By the time the conflict ended, around 215 Luba and other non-Katanga people were killed by the Lunda (Kisangani 1997). Because this conflict does not meet the 1,000-death threshold, and does not thus qualify as a civil war, it will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that the causes of this conflict are rooted in the colonial period discussed in Chapter 2.

Mobutu was able to stall the democratization process even after the conference ended and officially elected Tshisekedi as the prime minister of the transition under a new legislature, the High Council of the Republic (Haut Conseil de la République, or HCR). On the economic front, Mobutu asked the governor of the central bank in January 1993 to introduce a five-million zaire banknote worth less than \$2 to cope with the country's hyperinflation. However, merchants and traders obeyed Tshisekedi's call to refuse the banknotes. Despite this popularly supported move, Mobutu decided to pay the military with the new banknotes, and when the merchants refused to honor them, the soldiers went on another rampage on 28 January 1993 with casualties of about a hundred people killed, including Philippe Bernard, the French ambassador to Congo.

Tshisekedi's popularity resulted in his dismissal in March 1993 by Mobutu, who also discharged the HCR and called on his supporters from the defunct national assembly for a "conclave of the last chance" (Kisangani 1997, p. 49). After two weeks, he appointed Faustin Birindwa, a former UDPS member, as the new prime minister. However, Birindwa was not recognized by the West and the opposition, resulting in a dual executive system. As Mobutu tried to reassert his authority, an ethnic conflict broke out in Nord-Kivu Province on 20 March 1993 in Walikale. A week later, the conflict spread to Masisi territory. By the end of August 1993, between 7,000 and 16,000 people were dead and 200,000 were internally displaced (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1994, p. 73).

While this ethnic conflict was unfolding, the national economy continued its nosedive in 1993 as inflation accelerated. To deal with hyperinflation, a presidential decree promulgated a new currency called the "new zaire" on 19 October 1993, equivalent to three million old zaires and worth only \$0.33. Four weeks after the reform, the new zaire dropped from 3.00 to 4.09 per dollar as the result of intense speculation. The government was also far behind in its debt payments with arrears estimated in 1994 at \$4.46 billion (Kisangani 1997). On 1 February 1994, the World Bank closed its offices in Congo, declared Congo insolvent, and canceled all credits allocated to Congolese projects. To say that the Birindwa administration failed to stabilize the economy is thus an understatement. As an example, the exchange rate plummeted from \$1.00 = 3.00 new zaire in mid-1993 to \$1.00 = 1,194.49 in October.

Meanwhile, the opposition and Mobutu's supporters signed political accords to create a unicameral legislature that merged the defunct national assembly and the HCR into HCR/Parliament of Transition, or HCR/PT. This parliament appointed Mobutu's protégé Léon Kengo wa Dondo as the new prime minister. His nomination also ended the dual executive system because the West approved it, given Kengo's previous cordial relations with Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980s as prime minister. Kengo promised to take appropriate measures to end the economic catastrophe that had plagued Congo since the early 1990s.

A few days after being nominated prime minister, Kengo wa Dondo was faced with the problem of nearly 1.2 million Hutu refugees from Rwanda who had abruptly entered eastern Congo on 18 June 1994 (Kisangani 2000a). The refugees were fleeing a Tutsi group called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the political wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which had seized power in Rwanda. These refugees were eventually relocated to Goma (850,000), Bukavu (200,000–300,000), and Uvira (62,000) (see Kisangani 2000a, p. 173). Among the refugees were some 20,000 to 25,000 former Rwandan soldiers and 30,000 to 40,000 Hutu militiamen who had committed genocide in Rwanda. These armed groups even attempted to create a Hutuland in Congo to serve as a sanctuary from which to launch massive attacks on Rwanda.

The fear of a Hutuland in Kivu prompted the transitional parliament on 28 April 1995 to adopt a resolution that stripped Congolese of Rwandan origin, known as Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, of their citizenship. The Banyamulenge are Congolese of Tutsi origin who migrated to Sud-Kivu in the late eighteenth century (Kabamba and Lanotte 1999, p. 126). The Banyarwanda include natives of Nord-Kivu (Banyabwisha), Rwandan subjects cut off from Rwanda in 1910 when the boundaries in the Great Lakes region were redrawn by the colonial powers, and Rwandan immigrants during the colonial period (see Chapter 6). The result of the parliamentary decision of April 1995 was a new wave of ethnic clashes in Nord-Kivu from 17 July 1995 to 21 December 1995 as local Congolese politicians used Hutu refugees to exploit the rivalry between the Tutsi and other groups in Nord-Kivu. The death toll reached 1,500 to 3,000 people, and some 150,000 people were internally displaced. After almost four months of relative calm, another ethnic conflict erupted in Nord-Kivu Province on 17 April 1996, and sporadic clashes continued until 12 October, with 25,000 to 30,000 deaths and more than 220,000 internally displaced people (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1997, p. 105).

While this new round of ethnic conflict was unfolding, the deputy governor of Sud-Kivu asked the Banyamulenge on 6 October 1996 to leave, in accordance with the April 1995 parliamentary resolution. However, they refused and turned to the Rwandan Tutsi government for help. On 17 October 1996, a full-scale war erupted in Sud-Kivu as the Banyamulenge confronted the regular national army. By the end of the year, some 3,000 people were dead, and more than 6,000 people were internally displaced (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1997, p. 105). Kabila emerged as the spokesperson of the rebel group known as

the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo, or AFDL) and he announced the group's intention to oust President Mobutu. The rebel forces, spearheaded by Mai Mai (or Mayi Mayi) militias as well as troops from Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda, entered the capital city on 17 May 1997. On 29 May 1997, Kabila became president (Braeckman 1997).

From Civil Wars Against Kabila to Hema-Lendu Ethnic War

The rise of Kabila marked a new period for Congo. As Kabila was consolidating his power, the Mai Mai groups that helped him during the anti-Mobutu war confronted the Banyamulenge battalion of the Congolese army and Rwandan troops on 5 September 1997. The Mai Mai accused Kabila of betraying them or "selling" the Kivus (Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu) to Rwanda. The conflict resulted in the death of 4,500 to 8,800 people, and more than 15,000 to 25,000 people were internally displaced in Kivu by the time the insurrection ended in late July 1998.

Despite political instability in eastern Congo, the Kabila government was able to restore the confidence of the international community in the Congolese economy by paying, in June 1998, some \$1.5 million of debt arrears to the IMF. This gesture marked the de facto resumption of relations between Congo and the IMF. Kabila also embarked on a major economic reform on 30 June 1998 when his government replaced the new zaire with the franc. The buying rate was fixed at 1.43 franc to a dollar and the selling rate at 1.38 franc to a dollar. Less than a month after this monetary reform, Kabila decided to free himself from the kingmakers, Rwanda and Uganda, by ordering all foreign troops to leave, thus ending the military cooperation that overthrew President Mobutu. Backed by Rwanda, an anti-Kabila revolt began on 2 August 1998. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent troops to the DRC and rescued the Kabila government. By the end of 1998, the war had cost the lives of more than 12,500 people and had displaced more than 250,000 (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1999, pp. 58–60).

The anti-Kabila revolt was mostly dominated by the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, or RCD) and its backer, the Rwandan government. Uganda also joined later as Rwanda's ally (Clark 2001), and other groups emerged, such as the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, or MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba. The rebels and the government met in Lusaka, Zambia, to conclude a cease-fire agreement in July 1999 called the Lusaka Peace Accord. Despite the agreement, the war against Kabila and other ethnic conflicts continued unabated. One example is the Hema-Lendu conflict in the Ituri region. It began on 19 June 1999 and continued until 31 December 1999 with 6,000 to 8,000 deaths and more than 25,000 internally displaced persons. The fighting resumed again in early 2000. A year later, on 16 January 2001, President Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard, Rashidi Kasereka (Prunier 2009, pp. 249–255).

Kabila left the DRC in total economic chaos, half-occupied by foreign troops and rebel groups. On 26 January 2001, Joseph Kabila succeeded his father. The only document that offered any hope for peace since the outbreak of the war was the Lusaka Peace Accord. It called for a UN peacekeeping operation and an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) of all Congolese belligerents and representatives of civil society, which effectively started in Sun City, South Africa, in February 2002. The dialogue ended with the signing on 17 December 2002, in Pretoria, of the Global and Inclusive Act of the Transition. Another peace agreement followed, on 2 April 2003 in Sun City, which sought to restore democracy in Congo after the deaths of 3.2 million to 4.2 million people and the internal displacement of some 1.5 million persons as the result of the war against Kabila (computation from diverse sources). The peace accord also resulted in a national transitional government in June 2003, which included Joseph Kabila as president, four vice presidents, and thirty-five ministers with their deputies. Two years later, the Hema-Lendu war officially ended.

After postponing elections once in 2005, the government sent a draft constitution to voters in late 2005. Some 84 percent of the registered electors voted for the new constitution, which was promulgated in February 2006. Free and fair legislative elections took place on 30 July 2006, the third since the country became independent. The first presidential elections through universal suffrage also occurred on the same day. After the second round of presidential elections, Kabila was sworn in as the fourth president of the DRC on 6 December 2006, ending the democratic transition to the Third Republic that started in April 1990.

However, by late 2010, political instability remained a major issue in eastern Congo as the result of a number of factors, including a government incapable of restoring peace, an undisciplined army terrorizing people throughout the country, and the existence of a number of peace spoilers,⁹ foreign rebels from Rwanda and Uganda with sanctuary in Congo, and autocrats in neighboring countries refusing to open up their own political processes, causing their own rebels to cross the borders. More specifically, the peace blueprint of the international community failed to bring peace in Congo because it required the hasty creation of a transitional government and the holding of “free elections” before all the warring parties were disarmed and demobilized. Political instability in eastern Congo also prompted the UN Security Council to unanimously adopt Resolution 1925 on 8 October 2010, calling for the establishment of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (*Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo*, or MONUSCO) under Chapter VII. The goal was to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel, and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment. Thus, continuing conflicts in eastern Congo by late 2010 and issues of governance prevented Joseph Kabila from delivering any form of peace dividend to the people.

Interplay of Continuity and Change in Congo's Civil Wars

As Figure 1.1 illustrates, this brief historical review highlights two sets of factors that help contextualize Congo's internal wars, including elements of continuity and change. The first element of continuity remains the state itself with its artificial and juridical boundaries. As a consequence, these boundaries have sustained ethno-political constituencies across borders with multiple national allegiances. Moreover, the colonial state was an idea in the mind of the colonized. This is line with Geertz's (1980, p. 13) contention that the state should be seen as "a legitimating idea and a teleological construct ingrained in the minds of people without which no legitimate existence of power relations would exist in society." Viewing the state as an idea helps explain the repressive and paternalist colonial state. In the mind of the colonized, it was a brutal and oppressive entity. They called it *Bula Matari* (*Bula Matadi*) or "he who breaks rocks" (Young 1965, p. 98). This metaphor came to describe an entity capable of crushing all resistance. Little changed with independence because the notion of an all-oppressive state was perpetuated by the Congolese leadership. Although the personnel at the top changed, the same repressive and exploitative structure remained.

The second element of continuity is the integration of Congo into the world economy. Initially, the colonial system drew Africans into production for the global economy. The six provinces or colonial administrative divisions reflected an economic structure characterized by a few dominant mineral commodities in total exports. This dominance has been perpetuated in the postcolonial period. Like the colonial apparatus, the postcolonial provinces represent clusters of economic markets that also include various ethnic groups under one roof. In other words, provincial markets have become battlegrounds to access state power and scarce resources rather than to administer the land and citizens.

Third is urbanization. Instead of being an agent of modernization, increased urbanization has only reinforced ethnic affinities. The politicization of ethnicity became salient in the early 1960s largely because the colonial state socialized Africans to grant ethnic identity more importance than any other type of affiliation. However, the elimination of overt electoral competition under Mobutu's rule did not diminish the role of ethnicity. On the contrary, ethnic affinities increased because he relied on a core group from his own province to rule. Post-Mobutu state managers have also reinforced ethnic affinities.

Traditional land tenure and traditional authority represent two other elements of continuity. Although the colonial state appropriated all native lands, it never destroyed customary land tenure and even upheld traditional authority as long as it did not interfere with colonial order and its economic exploitation of the Belgian Congo. Thus, traditional authorities were not only colonial representatives but also remained guardians of African traditions. This ambiguity has continued in the postcolonial period.

Congo became independent on 30 June 1960 and gained a new set of institutional arrangements. With these new rules of the game also emerged a new set of players. One major change in government functions was the deinstitutionalization of the army. The military collapsed briefly after independence in a mutiny that destroyed a number of old institutional arrangements and produced new tensions that prevented new institutions from developing. Since then, the army has remained not an instrument to keep law and order or to protect national borders but rather a self-perpetuating undisciplined corps that is incapable of defending national boundaries and an efficient instrument of terror preying on unarmed civilians.

A second change after independence was the institutionalization of patronage. Those in power developed clientelist networks to gain support from the elites, not the masses. In the mid-1960s, a new group of players appeared, mostly college and university graduates, who revolved around Mobutu. As early as 1974, kleptocracy was born and has perpetuated itself since. Although government pillage of Congolese resources seems to be an element of continuity dating back to the CFS in the nineteenth century, the postcolonial pillage differs from the colonial system in that reinvestment of a small portion of this pillage in basic social and physical infrastructure as well as in mines and agriculture completely vanished by the mid-1970s. Moreover, unlike the colonial leviathan with a strong superstructure able to penetrate society and extract both labor and taxes, the postcolonial state has remained extremely weak, except perhaps from 1967 to 1975. One consequence is that a politicized judicial system has developed a culture of impunity and allowed incessant grave human rights abuses by the government and its military.

The interaction between continuity and change provides a way of understanding the historical roots of Congo's civil wars and how the masses or ethno-political constituencies respond to elites' call to arms, although a major trigger of Congo's civil wars remains the politics of exclusion. So far, no study has tried to analyze these wars in the context of the interaction between continuity and change. Most qualitative studies in the context of grievance are, for example, limited to either one civil war (Katanga secession, anti-Mobutu civil war, or anti-Kabila conflict) or a few civil wars (rebellions, Shaba wars, or anti-Mobutu and anti-Kabila wars).

Goals and Structure of the Book

Several issues emerge from the statistical exercise and the brief historical context of Congo's wars, which provide the two major goals of this book. The first goal is empirical. By following a qualitative method, I subject extant theoretical research on civil wars to detailed historical investigation in one of the most war-torn countries of the postcolonial period. Although the book focuses on one country, an attempt is made to discover similarities and differences di-

achronically in the discussion of Congo's civil wars. I thus aim to explain the process by which Congo's wars occurred and why some lasted longer than others. I use data on individual actions and also macrolevel data to describe conditions under which individual decisionmaking takes place, helping to disentangle complicated multicausal relationships at the micro- and macrolevels. By doing so, the qualitative approach reconstructs the chronology of Congo's internal wars to identify interactions among explanatory variables that have been undertheorized in quantitative studies. By providing "richness," "thickness," and "depth," qualitative methods help to contextualize the material that is developed in quantitative studies (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Although the qualitative approach can also identify the causes that influence a particular outcome, as in the quantitative approach, its major hurdle is to specify a causal sequence that connects multiple causes and interactions with the outcome of interest. To deal with this hurdle, the book follows the process-tracing strategy (Figure 1.1), which hypothesized that the politics of exclusion is a critical juncture of most Congolese civil wars.

The historical context also highlighted a number of factors of continuity and change as critical antecedents to explain Congo's internal wars (Figure 1.1). The interaction between elements of continuity and change creates opportunities where ethno-political constituencies compete for state power because the state controls scarce resources and provides access to these resources and the income streams that flow from them. Individuals and groups that possess political power can often gain access to these resources and increase their own welfare (Hardin 1995, pp. 34–37). As subsequent chapters show, the politics of exclusion emerges as a promising option to access state power and scarce resources this access commands because its goal is to prevent political contenders from gaining power.

The second goal of the book relates to policies. Any statistical exercise is sometimes too abstract or complicated for policymakers. The statistical output, in particular, is largely incomprehensible to most policymakers and even to many academics. Sometimes statistical analyses provide unfeasible policies that deepen the skepticism of policymakers. For example, the greed approach contends that reducing economic dependence on primary commodities, improving development policies by reducing negative economic growth, and increasing income should make civil wars less likely. Other variables include secondary school enrollment and population control. Although a number of variables are not statistically significant, they constitute parts of policy proposals related to these models. However, using these variables as policy instruments to prevent civil wars is questionable. Most variables are structural and not easily manageable over the short term, and those that can be changed require long lead times. For example, the role of primary commodities requires a policy to diversify the economy. Usually, economic diversification takes time and resources. These resources may be beyond the means of most war-torn societies. Extant quantitative models also underline the importance of providing employment to young

males of military age, but they remain silent on how to achieve this noble goal. Reducing the population growth rate requires planned education in societies that culturally espouse large families. Also, leveling mountains or clearing forests to destroy rebels' hideouts remains impractical as a policy choice.

The grievance and structural approaches also have their problems. For example, the former highlights minimizing the source of need but overlooks the means to achieve it. The satisfaction of needs requires resources. In many societies, such resources are scarce and may not even exist. As history has repeatedly shown, transforming a society characterized by increasing resource scarcity and Malthusian pressures into a resource-abundant society is far easier said than done.

One final problem with the quantitative approach is that it cannot provide a fully satisfactory answer for why civil wars end. While some civil wars end with decisive outcomes on the battlefield, others end through a long process of political or diplomatic bargaining (Zartman 1995). Despite many studies on civil wars, little is yet known on how and under what conditions diplomatic efforts succeed in ending them (Licklider 1993; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002).

In the next chapter I analyze the first four cases of civil wars: the two secessions, Katanga and South Kasai, and the two early concomitant insurrections, North Katanga and northwestern South Kasai. Although the Kasai secession was shorter than the Katanga secession, both appear to have their roots in colonial history. Chapter 2 also explains how the two secessions endured and how key players attempted to manage them. Chapter 3 extends the analysis to the Kwilu and the eastern rebellions of 1964. There I attempt to identify similarities and differences with previous civil wars. The fourth chapter deals with the specter of Tshombe or the mutinies of the Baka Regiment and mercenaries in the second half of the 1960s as well as the Shaba wars of the 1970s. The Shaba wars were the first major challenges to the Mobutu regime. These four cases illustrate how inadequate disarmament processes can influence the recurrence of civil wars. In fact, for more than ten years, the specter of the Katanga secession haunted Congo. In both Shaba wars, Mobutu was rescued by the international community.

Chapter 5 starts with the anti-Mobutu war by first explaining the absence of civil wars for at least thirteen years, from 1979 to 1992. Then it analyzes the wars against President Kabila. The first war against Kabila was the Mai Mai insurrection in September 1997. The second war against Kabila, which started in August 1998, was the only war in the history of Congo to end through negotiations. Chapter 6 focuses on ethnic wars in Nord-Kivu and the Hema-Lendu conflict in Ituri in the 1990s. The book concludes with a summary of major findings as well as with suggested adjustments to existing paradigms and a set of policy proposals.

Notes

1. The DRC became independent on 30 June 1960 as the Republic of Congo. The DRC and Congo are used here interchangeably. The former French colony, today Republic of Congo, is herein referred to as Congo-Brazzaville.

2. This definition implies that at least 5 percent of this number are caused by the weakest side and at least 100 people die each year until the war ends. See Small and Singer (1982), pp. 214–215. For a discussion of operational definitions of civil wars, refer to Sambanis (2004).

3. See also Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød (2008).

4. Slater and Simmons (2010) distinguish critical antecedents from noncritical antecedents and argue that only critical antecedents help cause the outcome of interest.

5. One of the earliest companies to penetrate the Congo basin was the *Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie*, established in 1887. Later Leopold II created mixed companies to collect rubber, called concessionary companies.

6. The book uses US 2010 dollar equivalent because the time frame is 1960 to 2010. For conversion factors, refer to Sahr (2008).

7. Other members of the group included Joseph Mobutu (army commander), Justin Bomboko (perennial foreign minister), Albert Ndele (national bank president), and Damien Kandolo (interior minister). See Young (1965), pp. 379–380.

8. She used the term to describe Mobutu's power and wealth. Congolese now use the term to describe all pro-Mobutists who siphoned millions of dollars of taxpayers' money to Swiss bank accounts.

9. Spoilers include people and groups that have an interest in keeping the war going because it provides them with material advantages. See Stedman (1997).