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From late 1981 through 1986, Botswana endured six continuous years of inadequate and erratic rainfall. The severity and length of the drought left most rural Batswana without sufficient food. In early 1982, President Q.K. Masire declared Botswana drought-stricken and initiated a national relief program. Between 1982 and 1990, drought relief and recovery measures in Botswana involved three key components. The first was a system of food distribution to pre-school children, primary school children, pregnant and lactating mothers, TB patients, and individuals defined as Destitute or Remote Area Dwellers. The government decided not to extend free food to able-bodied adults. Instead, to avoid waste and to compensate the rural population for lost incomes, the second component of the relief program was a labor-intensive public works program, which provided “temporary employment on local development projects (e.g., road maintenance, small dams and general construction)” for a subsistence wage of P7.50 per week (or US$14.42 in 2005 terms). Works projects were identified by standing Village Development Committees (VDC) and then administered and implemented by a Drought Relief Technical Officer assigned to the VDC. The duration of works projects ranged from three weeks to a maximum of eight months.

As rain gradually began to return in 1986, the government added a third component, the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP), to its ongoing relief program. ARAP contained eight packages (ploughing, row planting, weeding, destumping, field fencing, fertilizer provision, seed purchasing, and water provision), under which farmers could benefit from government support during the recovery period. The government also made funds available to local authorities to administer
livestock relief, as well as provide temporary water supplies to affected segments of the population.

By the time President Masire declared that the drought had broken in 1988, the government had provided free food aid to over 556,000 Batswana each year, mitigated lost incomes for roughly 20 percent of the rural population through labor-based relief, and ploughed, destumped, planted, weeded, or fenced a combined 500,000 hectares of land under ARAP. The breadth of the drought relief and recovery program in Botswana cost P236 million (roughly US$261 million in 2005 terms) in the first six years and an additional P166 million (US$138 million in 2005 terms) over the period of recovery. Spending by the government of Botswana accounted for over 90 percent of the total cost of relief. Thus, government-initiated and funded action protected Botswana from what could have become famine.

Though it was effective, Botswana’s 1982-1990 drought relief program was not typical of responses initiated and funded by incumbents elsewhere in Africa in the early 1980s. During the same period, Zimbabwe and Kenya executed significantly different strategies. In the same year that Botswana faced the first year of its prolonged drought crisis, newly independent Zimbabwe confronted a similar drought-induced threat of famine. Like Botswana, drought relief measures in Zimbabwe were adopted “early in 1982, and given a high political and financial priority.” Zimbabwe’s program contained a supplementary feeding scheme for children under five and lactating mothers, a water supply scheme, cattle protection, and input provision for peasant farmers, as in Botswana. However, unlike Botswana, Zimbabwe’s response did not rely on labor-based relief as the primary form of assistance for able-bodied adults. Instead, the main element of Zimbabwe’s 1982-1984 response was the distribution of take-home food rations to the rural adult population.

The administrative structure used to implement relief in Zimbabwe was also different from Botswana’s. Whereas incumbents in Botswana delegated the implementation of drought relief to standing institutions, their counterparts in Zimbabwe used village and district members of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the newly elected ruling party, to identify districts, villages, and beneficiaries for inclusion in the food aid program for adults. Beyond the identification of districts, villages, and beneficiaries, ZANU party cadres were also responsible for the day-to-day distribution of rations to households. As a consequence, the distribution of relief rations took place at public gatherings led by local ZANU cadres, and often attended by incumbent ZANU members of government—essentially at ZANU political meetings or rallies.
Relief in Zimbabwe reached an average of 850,000 people a month in the first year and 1.46 million a month in the second and final year. At the peak of the program, in mid-1983, the government distributed free food to about 2.1 million able-bodied adults, or 37 percent of the rural population. To feed this many people, incumbents in Zimbabwe spent over Z$22 million (or US$39 million in 2005 terms) in the first year and Z$42 million (US$52 million in 2005 terms) in the last year of the relief program. Incumbents in Zimbabwe averted famine, but turned the relief program into a political tool while doing so.

In Kenya, the government of President Daniel arap Moi responded to the 1983-1984 drought, at the time the worst in its history, with a program that combined food aid to rural Kenyans with market controls (in the form of price controls and food movement restrictions) and government acquisition of food for the urban market. Administratively, Moi took direct control of the food aid component of the program by placing it under the Office of the President and ordering the Provincial Administration, which reported to him, to identify beneficiaries and distribute relief. As Mugabe had done with ZANU cadres at the local level, Moi gave Provincial Administration staff complete discretion to determine who qualified for free food aid. He also created several ad hoc institutions, which all likewise reported to him, to manage the other components of the relief program.

Food aid in Kenya reached over 930,000 rural Kenyans each month between August 1984 and October 1985. At its peak, in October 1984, the Office of the President distributed food aid to close to 10 percent of the rural population, or 1.6 million Kenyans. To feed this many people and provide food for the urban market, Moi’s government spent over US$150 million to import about 500,000 Mt of maize, about 77 percent of the maize imports during the relief effort.

Despite enduring similar covariant shocks to food security in the mid-1980s, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Kenya adopted very different drought relief programs to avert famine. Incumbents in Botswana choose labor-based relief, while those in Zimbabwe opted for free food aid to protect able-bodied adults from the production and income shocks produced by drought. In Kenya, the relief program combined food aid to rural Kenyans with market controls and government acquisition of food for the urban market.

Why did incumbents in these three countries offer able-bodied adults different aid packages? What determined the administrative structures and personnel used by governments to administer and implement relief programs? Explaining why programs of relief offered by governments in Africa differ across contexts requires a serious exami-
nation of the relationship between incumbency and forms of relief. When one pays attention to the strength or weakness of incumbency, the distinctive political interests that direct policy-making during food crises is revealed. It sheds light on why some African incumbents choose relief policies that stress free food aid to able-bodied adults, while others opt to generate employment through labor-based relief projects.

The Question

Among scholars, policy analysts, and journalists writing on disasters in Africa, the tendency is to assume that African countries lack both the technical administrative capacity and political will to respond to crises produced by drought. In explaining government failure to protect citizens from drought-induced threats of famine, scholars, analysts, and journalists alike converge on three seemingly distinct, but overlapping, explanations: bad policies, weak political institutions, and inhospitable social conditions. First, countries in Africa are argued to be vulnerable to drought-induced famine because of poorly conceived agricultural policies that force its most well-endowed farmers (i.e., commercial farmers) to disinvest from domestic food crops in favor of cash crops. Because commercial farmers across much of Africa turned to cash-crop production for the world market, the burden of domestic food production has fallen to rain-dependent peasant farmers. Thus, the incidence of drought has generally produced large domestic food deficits, with which governments have not been prepared to deal.

If some scholars have suggested that poorly conceived agricultural policies have structurally increased vulnerability to drought in Africa, others contend that bad politics turned this vulnerability into famine. Specifically, they zero in on weak political institutions in Africa as the major structural impediment to government responsiveness to disasters. According to these accounts, chronic state weaknesses together with few de jure or de facto constraints on executive power create an environment in which leaders are more interested in pursuing their own private goals than in providing for the citizens. Thus, the central claim is that governments in Africa are not likely to respond to threats of famine because politics and policy-making are personalized, not institutionalized. In such contexts, citizens survive or starve at the whim of the personal ruler. President Mobutu and the famine of 1977-1978 in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), or the Ethiopia famine of 1984-1985 under Mengistu’s military regime, are two notable examples.

The third explanation favored by scholars, policy analysts, and journalists situates the general problems of weak technical capacity (bad
policies and weak institutions) and the specific issue of poor governmental response to disasters in the overriding socio-political composition of post-colonial Africa; that is, its neopatrimonialism. The concept of neopatrimonialism draws heavily from Max Weber’s discussion of authority systems and their attendant bases of legitimacy. In Weber’s decidedly teleological typology, each authority system (traditional, transitional, or the modern state) is supported or associated with a justifying and legitimating order, which works to induce individuals to obey those who claim authority over them. Weber identified and linked traditional society with personal patrimonial authority, transitional society with charismatic authority, and the modern state with impersonal rational-legal or bureaucratic authority.

In trying to make sense of the patterns of political order (and disorder) that developed across Africa, scholars noted that although African countries gained independence with the trappings of a modern state (armies, bureaucracies, legislatures, judiciaries, political parties, etc.), the legitimation and exercise of that authority seemed quite far from Weber’s impersonal, rational-legal, bureaucratic, and corporatist order. As noted by Bratton and van de Walle, “contemporary African regimes do not display the formal governing coalitions between organized state and social interests or the collective bargaining over core public policies that characterize corporatism.” Instead, leaders legitimated their hold on power and authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law as Weber had imagined. Thus, highly personal relationships of loyalty and dependence, not professionalism and autonomy, are said to pervade the formal political and administrative system across Africa. It is this mismatch between the authority system (the post-colonial modern state) and its legitimating sub-structures and practices (personal patrimonial rule) that students of African politics sought to capture by the term neopatrimonialism.

The mismatch notwithstanding, neopatrimonial practices served a function. They enabled Africa’s new leaders to fashion some semblance of political order in the post-colonial period. But the order obtained by generating compliance and obedience through personal networks came at the price of the pathologies of neopatrimonialism: patterns of politics and policies that created opportunities for mismanagement, corruption, and ethnic rivalries and conflict. As a consequence, scholars suggest that while post-independence leaders solved the immediate problem of political order in the modern political system by resorting to elements of patrimonial legitimation, this anachronistic practice created many problems that hindered the normal operation of public institutions—including the will and capacity of political leaders to respond to disasters
such as drought. Due to the socio-political conditions of neopatri- 
monic, the African state is seen, at its best, as too weak to respond 
to drought or, at its worst, as so corrupt that leaders willfully used 
starvation as a political tool.23

The three arguments differ in important respects. The first argument 
privileges policies in the agricultural sector, the second account points to 
political institutions, while the third stresses the composition of society 
and its negative effect on politics in Africa. But they draw the same 
conclusion: African institutions and leadership are not up to the task of 
famine relief. The bias is not without justification. Since 1960, Africa 
has witnessed twenty-two famines (including the Somali famine of 
2011), some of them attributable to governmental failure to drought-
proof agriculture, weak political and economic capacity to respond, or 
the political manipulation by competing elites of access to food. Thus, 
the overriding image produced by scholars, analysts, and journalists 
writing on drought and famine in Africa is that of emaciated children 
from famines in Somalia, the Sudan, Nigeria, and Ethiopia requiring aid 
from abroad. This narrative highlights external intervention intended to 
make up for the inadequacies of domestic governments. 

Yet this should not be generalized. On the ground, the situation is 
more complicated. The blanket assessment of “apathy, incompetence, 
and corruption of African governments in the context of famine 
prevention” that some scholars and journalists trumpet is not suffi-
cient.24 Some governments have ignored drought-related threats of 
famine, including Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire. But numerous others 
have responded to similar crises by adopting national relief programs of 
various forms, including Cape Verde, Tanzania, Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
and Kenya. Droughts in these countries have produced government 
relief programs, but with notable variation across countries and even 
across time within the same country.25

In this book, I offer a framework that accounts for the different 
programs governments adopted during times of dearth, explaining why 
forms of relief to the adult population vary across and within countries 
over time. By drought relief, I mean those domestic government-
initiated and government-funded programs intended to provide segments 
of the population with temporary assistance for the duration of a 
drought. Drawing on sixteen months of fieldwork in Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, and Kenya, I develop my argument through a sustained exa-
mination of the relationship between the durability of political incum-
bency and the form of relief adopted. Examining the strength of political 
incumbency reveals the range of political and economic interests that
shape policy-making during dry times, while a focus on forms of relief highlights the way that each program is associated with a distinctive matrix of political and economic benefits and costs, which incumbents are keen to capture and avoid, respectively. Thus, this book reveals the political determinants of government responses to drought in Africa.

The Argument

I argue that variation in the form of drought relief programs is a result of differences in the vulnerability of responding incumbents. The conditions that strengthen or weaken the security of incumbents—the susceptibility of the regime to possible coups and subversive movements, the strength of the government’s institutional power, the robustness of governing coalitions, the size of the president’s legislative majority, and the frequency of political and economic protests—determine executives’ overriding political concerns when making decisions about relief programs. In other words, political interests influence their decisions in distinctive ways. Specifically, governments that suffer drought when incumbents are secure tend to adopt labor-based relief; but droughts in countries in which incumbents are insecure favor food aid programs for adults because of the immense patronage it puts at the disposal of vulnerable executives.

In responding to drought, incumbents must pick a relief program, determine access and eligibility, decide whether to intervene in the market for food, and establish administrative structures for implementing the program on the ground. Each choice has distributional consequences (which affect the immediate political support afforded to incumbents) and efficacy implications (which determine the long-term viability and sustainability of relief programs). Thus, examining the strength of incumbency reveals the political interests and motivations that guide incumbents in crafting drought-relief policy.

Two kinds of interests demand our attention here. First, instrumental or technocratic considerations pull policy towards comprehensive but cost-effective programs that maximize protection for the most needy while limiting waste (labor-based relief). Second, political considerations push tenure-seeking incumbents to search for relief programs that spread the coverage net as broadly as possible and are also fungible enough to be targeted for building support (free food aid).

I argue that incumbents’ expectations about their immediate and future prospects in power determine the hierarchy of interests that guides them when they must respond to drought. Specifically, incumbents’ expectations about holding on to power, and the discount rates
associated with them, dictate the extent to which policy choice is motivated by the desire for immediate political gain or by technocratic concerns for efficiency. Scholars agree that micro-political conditions affect incumbents’ interests, which in turn affect the policies they adopt. If political environments are unstable and insecure, “rational politicians in office … concentrate on activities that lead to quick results and immediate rewards.” If, conversely, political conditions are stable and secure, incumbents are afforded the political space to consider the medium and long-term effects of their policies. Under these conditions, incumbents are more likely to be concerned with efficacy and technical efficiency, and thus find adopting measures with limited immediate political pay-offs more palatable.

I extend this framework to government responses to drought in Africa to show that the policy choices adopted by governments reflects the rational political interests of the executives who control the state. The logic of behavior by politically (in)secure incumbents in other policy areas also operates in government-initiated and -funded drought-relief programs across Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, there are good reasons to expect that the logics of political (in)security will be magnified or amplified during dry times. As Schatzberg convincingly argues, maintaining food security under normal agricultural conditions has long been a central basis on which incumbent executives have been evaluated and gained legitimacy in African politics. When drought occurs across rain-dependent Africa, crops fail, households lose incomes, and the overall economy might slump. The consequences of drought amplify the basic survival, livelihood, and distributional effects of the decisions made by incumbents. Thus, droughts and the stresses they precipitate are “revelatory crises” that “disrupt conventional routine[s] sufficiently to allow actors (including government policy-makers as well as rural producers) to innovate with normative codes.” In other words, droughts and the threats of famine they produce are critical and highly visible political moments for incumbents. How they respond may bolster their claims to legitimate control of the state, or it may discredit them.

I argue that the strength of political incumbency has a distinctive imprint on the form of relief, the amount of money appropriated, the level of access, and the administrative structures that incumbents establish to implement relief in Africa. This explanation differs from the one offered by scholars who have tended to impute irrationality or a lack of knowledge on the part of African governments that adopt free food aid. A familiar claim is that the reliance on food aid across Africa “partly reflect[s] a widespread failure to perceive droughts as a serious
and potentially long-term economic problem.”

According to these scholars, too often drought-related crop failures are treated as though their impact were limited to food production, when in fact crop failure is also associated with significant income shocks for households. In their view, responding to drought by simply distributing free food might in fact not address all the needs of affected households. Scholars therefore conjecture that incumbents who continue to adopt free food aid do so because they are not fully aware of the diffuse effects of drought and the most appropriate way to respond to dearth. That is, they lack a key technical understanding of the situation they face.

While Benson and Clay are correct to stress that drought-induced crop failure is also associated with large income shocks for households, they are on shakier ground in attributing the persistence of food aid to ignorance of the wider effects of drought. In all three countries covered in this study, I found that bureaucrats in key government ministries were keenly aware of the income and economic shocks of drought. This recognition led them, in most cases, to propose relief programs that smoothed income fluctuations through labor-based relief instead of providing free food aid to able-bodied adults. Knowledgeable though they were of the wider effects of drought and the most efficacious way to respond, under certain conditions bureaucrats lost the internal policy debate with incumbent politicians.

This picture of the dynamics of drought relief policy-making suggests that what shapes the program of relief governments adopt is political not technical. In order to explain why food aid to adults persists, then, we need to understand better the circumstances that lead incumbents to accept or disregard recommendations from bureaucrats. I argue that prevailing political interests dictate when incumbents listen to bureaucrats (when they are secure) or disregard their policy proposals (when they are vulnerable). There is a rational explanation for the persistence of food aid to able-bodied adults: it is beneficial to insecure incumbents who use the immediate patronage and the mass mobilization that is characteristic of the direct delivery of food to consolidate their tenuous control over the state.

To illustrate how prevailing levels of incumbent vulnerability condition responses to drought, this book draws on the post-colonial experience of three African countries, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. Why these countries? Why have I not included Ethiopia, a country ever present in the minds of scholars, policy analysts, and journalists interested in drought and famine in Africa? Peter Gourevitch suggests that the incidence of covariant shocks provides unique opportunities for analysis across cases as such crises “provoke changes that reveal the
connections between particularities and the general. If the comparativist can find countries subject to the same stresses, it then becomes possible to see how countries differ or converge and thereby to learn something about cause and effect. Thus, first of all, I wished to examine a set of countries that experienced drought in roughly the same years. Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Botswana were all affected by the drought wave that swept across Africa from 1980 to 1985. Botswana and Zimbabwe experienced droughts again during the 1990 to 1993 and 1998 to 2005 waves. My choice of Kenya, Botswana, and Zimbabwe leverages the covariance in drought incidence as a way of controlling for world-historical time and the practices common in each period as an explanation of the variation in relief programs governments adopt.

There was a strong argument in favor of including Ethiopia in my analysis based on this factor; the country suffered a major drought between 1982 and 1984, a period that overlaps with my three cases. However, a second consideration disqualified it. Each of the three countries included in this book confronted famine threats by adopting pre-emptive, domestically-initiated and -funded relief programs. Ethiopia in the 1980s, however, is the poster case for government failure to pre-emptively address the threat of famine. When famine gripped Ethiopia between 1983 and 1985, international aid (popularized by Band Aid and Live Aid), rather than domestically-initiated action, gained prominence. Ethiopia is an interesting case in its own right, but not if you are interested in examining domestic programs of relief.

The three states were also selected to maximize variation on some variables and minimize variation on others. In other words, these three countries provide significant variation on the dependent variable, that is, the form of relief offered to adults, level of access set by government, the extent of government intervention in the market, and the administrative structures used to implement relief. As summarized in Table 1.1, of the eleven cases of government drought relief programs I examine, four involved free food aid (Botswana 1979-1980, Kenya 1984-1985, and Zimbabwe 1982-1984 and 2002-2005), six involved labor-based relief (Botswana 1982-1990, 1992-1994, 1996-1998, and 2002-2005, and Zimbabwe 1986-1987, 1992-1993) and one involved a grain loan scheme (Zimbabwe 1995-1999).

While looking for variation on some variables, I also chose these three states because of the lack of variation on others, most significantly on their colonial experience. All three countries were British colonies and their colonial administrations were strikingly similar in what they were willing to do: human relief was almost always limited to providing for the European population. Where it existed for Africans, colonial
governments administered relief more as a loan scheme than as a relief effort. Colonial officials also consulted closely with their counterparts in other colonies on drought relief strategies. For instance, colonial officials in Botswana were very keen to learn and copy drought relief policies adopted in colonial Zimbabwe. In this regard, it is clear that the post-independence programs of relief incumbents adopted were not a legacy of the colonial experience.

Table 1.1: Variations in Drought Relief Programs for Able-Bodied Adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Duration of Drought</th>
<th>Duration of Relief</th>
<th>Form of Drought Relief Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>Free Food Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1981-88</td>
<td>1982-90</td>
<td>Labor-Based Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>Labor-Based Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1995-97</td>
<td>1996-98</td>
<td>Labor-Based Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2001-04</td>
<td>2002-05</td>
<td>Labor-Based Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>Free Food Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1981-83</td>
<td>1982-84</td>
<td>Free Food Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>Labor-Based Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>Labor-Based Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1995-98</td>
<td>1996-98</td>
<td>Grain Loan Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2001-04</td>
<td>2002-05</td>
<td>Free Food Aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in Table 1.1, Botswana and Zimbabwe have responded to five major national droughts, although the trajectory followed by these programs has been different. Botswana’s post-independence response to drought relief began with an expansive food aid program for able-bodied adults between 1979 and 1980. Two years later, Botswana shifted its drought relief program to one predicated on cash-paying
works programs for all able-bodied adults. After the 1982-1990 relief program, the government took an unprecedented step by writing labor-based drought relief into its national development plans.\textsuperscript{36} During non-drought years, public works programs were to be used as a tool for generating employment in the rural areas. In drought years, the scale of these works programs would be increased to accommodate relief needs. Thus, when droughts struck again from 1991 to 1993, 1995 to 1997 and 2001 to 2004, Botswana’s responses were all aggressively predicated on labor-based relief for able-bodied adults.\textsuperscript{37} By writing labor-based relief into its national development plans, the government of Botswana signaled its standing commitment to respond to future droughts in the country. This administrative commitment both reassured the population by removing any uncertainty about what the government would do in response to future droughts and, significantly, took policy-making discretion away from future incumbents faced with a threat of famine.

Botswana’s move toward a standing administrative commitment to respond to drought, and to do so primarily through labor-based relief for able-bodied adults, is quite different from the drought relief policy trajectory in Zimbabwe, where responses continue to be ad hoc and therefore subject to greater manipulation by incumbents. Unlike Botswana, independent Zimbabwe’s first relief program in 1982 provided able-bodied adults with free food aid. After this program, Zimbabwe went through nearly a decade (between 1986 and 1995) when it responded to drought with food-for-work programs, labor-based projects that paid in food. From 1995 to 1999, Zimbabwe adopted a regressive grain loan scheme, which offered government relief to drought-affected households as a short-term loan to be repaid in subsequent agricultural seasons. Following Zimbabwe’s descent into political and economic crisis in 2000, incumbents once again championed a change in drought relief policy, and moved back to free food aid for able-bodied adults. As these changes reveal, Zimbabwe has no standing administrative commitment to respond to drought through a predetermined program of relief.

In Kenya, the government of President Moi responded to the 1983-1984 drought by adopting a relief program that was distinctive for combining food aid to the rural population with government takeover of the urban market. As in Zimbabwe, Kenya had no standing drought relief institutions or prior policy commitment. Nevertheless, the program of relief adopted between 1984 and 1985 was lauded for successfully addressing the threat of famine.

Looking across countries with similarities in the proximate cause of threats of famine, why have both free food aid and labor-based relief
programs (some paying in cash and others with food rations) been used to protect able-bodied adults from starvation? Specifically, why did incumbents in Botswana opt for labor-based relief in response to drought in the early 1980s, while incumbents in Zimbabwe and Kenya decided to rely on food-aid programs? Focusing within countries over time, why did Botswana adopt a food aid program in 1979 and then switch to labor-based relief in 1982? Why, a decade later, did incumbents in Botswana take the unprecedented step of institutionalizing labor-based relief? Finally, what explains Zimbabwe’s shifts from food aid to food-for-work to the grain loan scheme and then back to food aid after 2000?

By placing the interests of incumbents at the center of the explanation of policy choice, this book also offers an alternative account to that suggested by Bates, who argues that “public policies are not explained as the choices made by some reified single actor, called a government. … Rather, policy is the product of the interested actions of private parties who bring their resources to bear upon politically ambitious politicians and the political process.” Although Bates’s approach is useful insofar as it directs our attention to a broader and more complex explanation of policy outcomes, his excessive focus on ‘lobbying’ by organized interests fails to capture the nature of policy-making across much of Africa. In many of these governments, the policy-making process tends to be top down, with little space or opportunity for organized groups outside the state to exert pressure on incumbents. Thus, policy-making is closed and centered on the executive. Most citizens have their first encounter with policy when it is announced, rather than through involvement in its formulation. I show that during periods of dearth, government relief programs are not the product of lobbying by external agents; they are reducible to the interests and goals of incumbents who direct policy-making.

Because organized groups have a structurally weak position in the policy-making process in Africa, I focus my attention on the internal agents of the state (incumbent politicians and bureaucrats) in my explanation of drought relief policy formulation, and assume that incumbents have a great deal of autonomy in making policy. Along with other scholars, I understand state autonomy to describe contexts in which incumbent government officials are free or insulated from societal or external pressure in their decision-making. By assuming incumbents to be structurally insulated from society I do not imply that their actions lack coherence, but that the coherence comes from their desire to maximize or prolong their hold on power. That is, other things being equal, incumbents will be motivated to use government resources to solidify their hold on power by building governing coalitions through
the distribution of patronage, or otherwise using their institutional powers to weaken potential challengers.\textsuperscript{41} In this approach to explaining policy outcomes, “policy elites [are] less reactive to interest group pressures and more active in putting together supportive coalitions and using public resources to ‘buy’ support” even when (or perhaps, especially if) that policy is drought relief.\textsuperscript{42} The form of relief governments in Africa offer is a product of a rational decision-making process guided by incumbents’ political interests.

**Institutional and Structural Explanations**

In this book, I argue that variation in the vulnerability of responding incumbents explains why governments offer free food to able-bodied adults in some instances and ask the same adults to work for relief in other contexts. My argument builds on an idea well established in the political economy of policy choice in developing countries: that the interests that animate policy-making are determined by the non-trivial trade-offs between the political and instrumental goals held by incumbents. However, I challenge conventional views about the determinants of famine relief by insisting that the type of relief provided to able-bodied adults is a direct function of the strength or weakness of incumbency when governments are called upon to respond to dearth. I argue that incumbents provide free food to able-bodied adults not because it is the easiest form of relief to administer or because they are ignorant of the wider effects of drought, but because it is strategically beneficial for insecure incumbents to leverage free food to reward supporters and punish challengers.

Explaining why the common covariant shocks of drought have elicited different relief programs across countries or within countries over time in this way separates the form of relief from common institutional and structural accounts. The institutional argument, which draws heavily from Amartya Sen’s work on famines and responsiveness, contends that the form of relief is a function of each government’s regime type\textsuperscript{43}, and I label it the regime argument. To account for the form of drought relief, the regime argument focuses on the formal rules structuring the selection of political elites and the overall relationship this engenders between government and society. Substantively, the regime argument rests on two key institutional mechanisms to explain drought relief policy adoption: the credible threat of punishment provided by regular elections and the whistle-blowing function of a free press. Scholars contend that these two key features of
a democracy induce incumbents to adopt sound and efficacious drought relief programs. That is, the knowledge that their choice of policy will be reviewed and debated by the public and, more importantly, by potential challengers, prevents incumbents from picking wasteful and otherwise less effective responses. According to some versions of the regime argument, incumbents need not actually face public agitation, a vigilant press, or feisty challengers; the mere rational anticipation of potential electoral concerns leads them to the one program that is capable of forestalling many of these problems: labor-based relief.\textsuperscript{44}

The structural argument, what I call the \textit{agricultural sector position}, attributes variation in drought relief programs to agricultural performance in normal years. Significantly, this explanation jettisons the regime argument of policy adoption and contends that, even in democracies, the form of drought relief is conditioned by whether the country in question is a surplus or a deficit food producer. Along these lines, de Waal contends that countries that are normally surplus producers of food opt to remove the variability in food supply through free food aid, while countries that are typically net importers of food prefer to maintain rural incomes through labor-based relief programs that pay in cash.\textsuperscript{45}

In Figure 1.1, I use the generally accepted POLITY score to measure the extent of political democracy in my cases. Cases on the left of Figure 1.1, with a POLITY score of -10 to 0, can be considered to be deficient in most of the key features of democracy: free or fair elections to select leaders who then decide on policy; institutionalized constraints on the powers of the executive; and guarantees of civil liberties, including a free and open press.\textsuperscript{46} Five of the eleven drought relief programs covered in this book were adopted by governments judged to lack one or more of these institutional features of a political democracy: Kenya in 1984, with a POLITY score of -7; and Zimbabwe in 1986, 1992, 1996 and since 2000, with POLITY scores ranging from -4 to -6. Cases on the right, with a POLITY score ranging from 0 to +10, exhibit the institutional structures regime theorists insist lead democracies to adopt labor-based relief in response to threats of famine. They hold free and fair elections, have institutional constraints on the powers of the executive, and guarantee civil liberties. The six cases in which governments were judged to exhibit elements of a democratic system when they adopted a drought relief program include all of Botswana’s interventions between 1979 and 2002, with a POLITY score ranging from +6 to +8; and Zimbabwe in 1982, when it had a POLITY score of +4.\textsuperscript{47}

The vertical axis of Figure 1.1 represents the structural argument by measuring the per capita cereal surplus or deficit held by the government
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when incumbents had to respond to a threat of famine produced by drought. As with the institutional measure, my cases contain significant variation on this variable. At the top of the vertical axis, at a surplus of 120 kgs per capita of grain and above, are cases that possessed enough reserves to distribute as food aid to affected groups until the next harvest. This was the case for Zimbabwe in 1982, 1986, and 1992. A second set of cases, with positive stocks below 120kgs per capita, did not have reserves large enough to distribute to all drought-affected groups until the next harvest. Zimbabwe in 1992 and 1996 and Kenya in 1984 are examples of these cases. Finally, a third set of cases had no grain stocks to call upon when governments picked a drought relief program. In these cases, Zimbabwe after 2000 and Botswana in all of its relief programs, incumbents had to import all of the grain they used in their relief program.

As the first order matching in Figure 1.1 illustrates, neither the regime-institutional account, which focuses on the mechanisms associated with a democratic political system, nor the institutional story, which is rooted in the structure of the agricultural sector, offers a compelling explanation of the variation in drought relief programs across Africa. The regime argument cannot explain why sometimes democracies adopt food aid for adults, as Botswana did in 1979. Also, because the regime argument is not explicit about what we should expect from non-democracies (countries on the left end of the political openness continuum in Figure 1.1), it cannot explain why non-democracies (e.g., Zimbabwe between 1986 and 1992) were just as likely to adopt labor-based relief. Democracy, it seems, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the adoption of labor-based relief as the primary form of protection for able-bodied adults.

Similarly, the structural account of variation in relief programs falls well short of explaining why some food-deficit countries choose the expensive option of importing food for food aid programs (Botswana in 1979, Kenya in 1984, and Zimbabwe after 2000) or why some food-surplus countries choose non-food aid relief programs (Zimbabwe between 1986 and 1999). While thinking about the structure of the agricultural sector forces us to understand normal agricultural performance in drought-affected countries, it is not the only or the decisive factor in the selection of drought relief programs. This book demonstrates that the structure of the agricultural sector is only one of the factors that incumbents weigh when picking a program. I further illustrate that the salience of food stocks or deficits is a product of the larger political milieu.
Figure 1.1. First-Order Matching of Variables

Source: I used the POLITY score from the Polity IV dataset to measure regime type in these cases. The POLITY score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). See Marshall and Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007. To access the structure of the agricultural sector at the time of drought I used the Cereal Balance, which is calculated using the WFP and UNICEF adult-equivalent cereal requirement of approximately 150 kgs of grain per capita per year. Countries with a negative balance have to import food, while countries with a positive balance are potentially net-exporters of grain.
Although the regime argument provides a key building block from which I develop my argument—that is, the understanding that the policies adopted by incumbents are intended to be tenure-securing or tenure-prolonging—for a more comprehensive explanation of the cross-country and within-country variation in drought relief programs, we must look beneath regime type. By the same token, while attention should be paid to de Waal’s claim that the food resources available to governments matter when they have to decide on a program of relief—for instance, relying on domestic food stocks is certainly cheaper than importing the same amount of food—to understand drought relief policy selection we must look beyond the agricultural sector. To that end, I consider the strength or weakness of political incumbency as the main factor in shaping the form of relief a government chooses, not regime type or the agricultural sector. I will demonstrate in this book that the strength of political incumbency accounts for democratic Botswana’s adoption of food aid in 1979, its switch to labor-based relief in 1982, and its subsequent consolidation of labor-based relief in 1992. I also leverage incumbency to explain Zimbabwe’s particular drought relief trajectory, which saw the country start with food aid in 1982, switch to labor-based relief in 1986 and 1992, and move to a grain loan scheme in 1996, before returning to food aid after the collapse of secure incumbency in 2000. I demonstrate the uniform political determinants of drought relief programs in Africa across different regime types, economic conditions, and agricultural contexts.

Research Methods

In developing my argument, I simplify the dynamics of a much more complicated set of phenomena and decision-making processes in order to call out the most salient factors. I make no apology for this. My intention is not to offer the most complete account, but rather to highlight the primary connections in the politics of domestic government responses to disasters in Africa. As a result of this, I pay much less attention to external actors and offer an endogenous account of drought relief policy-making. While international aid agencies were present in the cases I examine, their role and activities were secondary to those of the domestic government.

I employ a number of qualitative research methods to investigate why governments facing similar drought-induced threats of famine adopt sometimes convergent and at other times divergent programs of relief. In describing the research methods used in this book, it is useful to highlight the contribution of each of these approaches to the deve-
development and testing of the argument of the book. My theory-generating analysis of Kenya most approximates what is commonly thought of as process tracing. I test the argument developed from Kenya using a wider set of cases (10 drought relief programs) drawn from Zimbabwe and Botswana. Zimbabwe and Botswana provide broadly different contexts in which to test whether the argument linking forms of relief to levels of political vulnerability is informative. The two countries suffered several roughly covariant droughts. Their regime type, economic standing, and agricultural capacity are quite different; yet each country responded to drought.

Zimbabwe is most similar to the theory-building case, Kenya, and I was reasonably confident that the basic incumbency model would explain its drought relief programs. Like Kenya, Zimbabwe was a British settler colony prior to independence. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, settler colonialism had a distinctive imprint on political and economic developments. Although separated by a decade and a half in achieving independence, the victorious nationalist party in both Kenya and Zimbabwe had a weak commitment to securing incumbency under multi-politics. Kenya became a de jure one-party state and Zimbabwe established a de facto one-party state. Like Kenya, Zimbabwe possessed, for a period, the agricultural capacity to produce food surpluses in non-drought years.

To provide a more rigorous test of the argument, I wanted to include a country in which one might not expect the causal relationship between incumbency and drought relief to exist. Botswana differs from Kenya and Zimbabwe in important respects. Unlike them, Botswana was a protectorate of Britain and became independent with the effects of benign neglect: weak modern state institutions. After independence in 1966, incumbents in Botswana managed to secure their position under regime conditions quite different from Kenya and Zimbabwe, in a multi-party democracy. Botswana is also different from Kenya and Zimbabwe in that its arid and semi-arid conditions limited the capacity of its agricultural sector. Structurally, Botswana is a net importer of food, even in non-drought years.

My analysis suggests that programs of relief adopted in all three countries were determined by prevailing micro-political conditions. I show that governments that endured drought when incumbents were insecure (Botswana in 1979, Kenya in 1984, and Zimbabwe in 1982 and again in 2000) favored relief programs associated with immediate mobilizational and tenure-enhancing benefits. I contend that political interests in favor of immediate mobilization and fungible patronage led insecure incumbents, even in democratic Botswana, to adopt food aid...
programs for able-bodied adults. In these cases, insecure incumbents offered universal food aid (Botswana in 1979) or otherwise sought to politically target free food rations (Kenya in 1984 and Zimbabwe in 1982 and after 2000). This book also demonstrates that secure incumbents (such as Botswana in 1982 and 1992, and Zimbabwe in 1986 and 1992) all expressed the desire to adopt programs that targeted relief to the most needy, avoided waste, and were sustainable. These considerations, I argue, led secure incumbents to adopt labor-based relief (paying in cash in Botswana and with food rations in Zimbabwe).

Organization of the Book

The remainder of the book develops the incumbency and drought relief model fully. Chapter 2 provides a description of the incidence of drought across Africa, examines in greater detail the core conceptual components of the book, such as the effects of drought, the policy options available to incumbents, and the challenges they face in responding to dearth. In analyzing the policy challenges facing drought-affected incumbents, the chapter situates the form of relief adopted between programs that stress short-term political benefits with those that value cost-effectiveness and sustainability. In responding to drought, incumbents must pick a relief program, determine access and eligibility, decide whether to intervene in the market for food, and establish administrative structures for implementing the program on the ground. Each choice is associated with a distinctive matrix of political and economic benefits and costs, which incumbents are keen to capture and avoid, respectively. Thus, the chapter advances a broader conception of the policy-making challenges during drought than that presented in the existing famine studies literature.

How do political vulnerability and the interests it generates affect drought relief policy-making? To answer this question, Chapter 3 examines the conditions that led to insecurity and autocracy in Kenya between 1978 and 1983, the year the country suffered its worst drought. The chapter suggests that the strength or weakness of political incumbency is subject to a number of factors, namely the susceptibility of the regime to possible coups and subversive movements, the strength of the government’s institutional power, the robustness of governing coalitions, the size of the president’s legislative majority, and the frequency of political and economic protests. With a clearer understanding of the conditions that made President Moi insecure, I turn to how political vulnerability affected his decision making in resolving the four drought-relief policy challenges discussed in Chapter 2. I show that prevailing
insecurity led a rationally self-interested Moi to favor relief programs that could assist him in addressing his immediate political problems. The chapter demonstrates that the interests produced by prevailing insecurity dictated which general relief policy Moi favored, they shaped the level of access to aid he established, they compelled him to aggressively intervene in the urban food market, and they determined the administrative institutions and personnel Moi trusted to implement his food aid program. Furthermore, the chapter shows how each element of the relief program contributed to his consolidation of power.

Chapters 4 and 5 consider whether my argument linking forms of relief to levels of political vulnerability explains choices about the form of relief in other countries, testing the argument in two quite different cases: Zimbabwe in Chapter 4 and Botswana in Chapter 5. Like Kenya, both Zimbabwe and Botswana demonstrate that the conditions that strengthen or weaken the security of incumbents determine programs of relief offered to able-bodied adults more so than regime type or agricultural performance.

Chapter 4 shows that since attaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has gone through roughly four distinct periods of political security, each afflicted with at least one drought, and each with distinct agricultural and economic circumstances under which incumbents had to respond to dearth. Although a number of important agricultural and economic changes occurred alongside changes in the political vulnerability of incumbents in Zimbabwe, this chapter demonstrates that these have, thus far, not affected drought relief policy selection. In Zimbabwe, as in Kenya, programs of relief offered to adults shifted in accordance with the interests generated by changes in President Robert Mugabe’s political vulnerability at the time of each drought.

Chapter 5 suggests that even under democracy, as in Botswana, the interests generated by political vulnerability dictate how incumbents responded to drought. The chapters also show that the way incumbents build security is consequential for the form and durability of subsequent programs of relief.

Chapter 6 summarizes the contribution of the book to political science, policy choice in Africa, and famine studies, an issue very much on the minds of scholars, policy analysts, and politicians in Africa today. The book argues that variation in drought-relief interventions, and other disasters more generally, cannot be understood with reference to the technical capacity of the state alone. Instead, I show that we need to pay closer attention to micro-political conditions and how they structure the interests that guide incumbents during policy selection. In short, politics matters. The political status of incumbents in charge of the state affects
how governments respond to the threat of famine and shapes the programs of relief they provide to citizens. The incumbency-led model of disaster response gives rise to clear hypotheses about the form, efficacy, and political manipulation of relief offered to the public across Africa.

Notes

1 Botswana Daily News (April 2, 1982).
2 Republic of Botswana, The Drought Situation in Botswana.
3 Boers, Botswana Drought Relief.
4 Amis, Financial Efficiencies in Drought Relief, p. 6.
7 Drèze, “Famine Prevention in Africa,” p. 147.
8 Leys, “Drought and Drought Relief in Southern Zimbabwe.”
16 According to de Waal, Famine Crimes, p. 2, responsiveness is dependent on the establishment of an anti-famine political contract involving “political commitment by government, recognition of famine as a political scandal by the people, and lines of accountability from government to people that enable this commitment to be enforced.” In his view, neither the nationalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s nor the recent wave of political liberalization beginning in the 1990s was able to forge this political contract in Africa.
17 The literature on neopatrimonialism as a critical or distinctive feature of post-independence African politics is quite expansive and rich, but also contested. For a theoretical treatment of neopatrimonialism and its likely effect on

18 For a broad reading of Max Weber, see Weber, Economy and Society.
20 The now classic statements on this were offered by Zolberg, Creating Political Order; Zolberg, “The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa,” pp. 70-87; Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa; Jackson and Rosberg, “Personal Rule,” pp. 421-42; Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle; Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State; Young, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Africa.
21 Bratton and van de Walle, Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” p. 458.
23 See Omaar and de Waal, “Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine and the Prospects for Peace in Somalia”; de Waal, Evil Days; de Waal, Famine That Kills; Pankhurst, The History of Famine and Epidemics in Ethiopia Prior to the Twentieth Century; Sen, Poverty and Famines, pp. 86-112; and Shepherd, The Politics of Starvation. See also Keen, The Benefits of Famine, on the political uses of famine.
25 I noted this variation in Munemo, “Political Incumbency and Drought Relief in Africa,” pp. 264-81, and sketched the framework for explaining it that I develop fully in this book.
26 Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma, p. 13.
27 See Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa.
30 Notably, the 1991-1992 drought in Zimbabwe resulted in a 9.5 percent decline in the manufacturing sector. See Benson and Clay, Understanding the Economic and Financial Impacts of Natural Disasters; Benson, “Drought and


33 See Chapter 2 for a fuller description of variation in programs for relief in these three countries.


37 Letter from the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture (April 21, 2005). A34/6XVII(32)PS.


41 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Ames, *Political Survival.*


43 For Sen’s explanation of famine causation, see “Famines as Failures of Exchange Entitlements”; “Starvation and Exchange Entitlements,” pp. 33-59; *Poverty and Famines.*Sen alludes to the determinants of government responsiveness in *Poverty and Famines,* and then develops this more fully in *Development as Freedom.*


45 de Waal, *Famine Crimes,* p. 58.


47 I show in Chapter 5 that this score for Zimbabwe following the independence elections in 1980 was overly generous. In addition to an election marred by clashes between the main contending parties, there were numerous assassination attempts on various candidates. Zimbabwe’s founding elections were neither free nor fair.

48 As described by George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,* process-tracing involves careful
examination of the micro-foundations of the causal chain between variables of interest.