Contents

Preface xi

1 Making Sense of International Relations Theory, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 1

2 Realist Approaches 15
   2.1 Realism, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 15
   2.2 Structural Realism: The Imperialism of Great Power, Karen Ruth Adams 21
   2.3 Neoclassical Realism: Domestic Opportunities for Great Power Intervention, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Robert W. Wishart 47

3 Liberal Approaches 67
   3.1 Liberalism, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 67
   3.2 Neoliberalism: Managing Collective Problems, Sean Kay 75
   3.3 Public Goods Liberalism: The Perils of Coalition Building, Michael J. Butler and Mark A. Boyer 91

4 Game Theory Approaches 109
   4.1 Game Theory, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 109
   4.2 Game Theory: Modeling Ethnic Violence, Brian Urlacher 114
5 Constructivist Approaches 127
5.1 Constructivism, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 127
5.2 Norm Constructivism: Contesting International Legal Norms, Matthew J. Hoffmann 136
5.3 Relational Constructivism: A War of Words, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson 152

6 Postmodern and Critical Theory Approaches 169
6.1 Postmodernism and Critical Theory, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 169
6.2 Postmodernism: Seducing Humanity, Rosemary E. Shinko 181
6.3 Critical Theory: Deliberating the Legitimacy of War, Rodger A. Payne 200

7 Historical Materialism and World System Theory Approaches 217
7.1 Historical Materialism and World System Theory, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 217
7.2 Historical Materialism: Imperialist Rivalry, Hegemony, and the Global Capitalist Order, Alan W. Cafruny and Timothy C. Lehmann 227
7.3 World System Theory: Status Decline and Collision Course, Annette Freyberg-Inan 246

8 Feminist Approaches 263
8.1 Feminism, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 263
8.2 Liberal Feminism: Valuing Local Narratives, Julie Mertus 272
8.3 Critical Feminism: Gender at Work in Waging War, Francine D’Amico 283

9 English School Approaches 299
9.1 The English School, Jennifer Sterling-Folker 299
9.2 The English School: International Society’s Constraints on Power Politics, Tonny Brems Knudsen 307
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Environmental Approaches</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1 Environmentalism, Jennifer Sterling-Folker</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2 Environmentalism: Cars, Farming, and Resource Insecurity, Simon Nicholson</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Applying International Relations Theory, Jennifer Sterling-Folker</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: A Brief Overview of Iraq</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Contributors</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Book</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This book is about making sense of international relations (IR) theory. It does so by making sense of a particular topic through the lens of IR theory. Rather than describe what IR theory is, then, the book demonstrates IR theory in tangible action and practice by revealing the core assumptions, differences, and similarities of various IR theoretical perspectives. This, in turn, provides an understanding of how IR theory can be applied to other historical and current events. By the time you have finished reading the book, you should be able to deduce what a variety of IR theoretical perspectives would have to say about any international or transnational topic or event. You will also understand why there are multiple and equally legitimate interpretations of and perspectives on the same topic or event. Thus by allowing IR scholars of various theoretical stripes to make sense of one subject, this book is ultimately about making sense of IR theory.

The topic addressed by each theorist involves the March 2003 preemptive invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the United States, the United Kingdom, and a handful of other allies. There had been ongoing conflict between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, since August 1990, when Iraq launched a surprise invasion of Kuwait, its oil-rich neighbor to the south. Flush with a newfound cooperative spirit as the Cold War came to an end, a multinational military coalition led by the United States and approved by the United Nations launched Operation Desert Storm in February 1991, which successfully liberated Kuwait. In the decade that followed the Gulf War, the United States and United Kingdom sought to contain Iraq’s potential military threat to the region through a variety of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mechanisms, including the imposition of no-fly zones, economic sanctions, and weapons inspections. The United States and United Kingdom also unilaterally launched a number
of air strikes throughout the decade at Iraqi military targets and weapons development facilities.

After the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9/11), US and UK foreign policy toward Iraq became even more uncompromising. The attacks were traced to al-Qaeda networks operating not in Iraq but in Afghanistan, under the protection of its fundamentalist Islamic Taliban regime. In October 2001, the United States and United Kingdom launched Operation Enduring Freedom, which quickly overthrew the Taliban and established a new Afghan government. But the 9/11 attacks were also used as a pretext by the administrations of US president George W. Bush and UK prime minister Tony Blair to insist throughout 2002 that alleged links to al-Qaeda, and purported stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), made Iraq a terrorist threat. Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, however, the idea of preemptively invading Iraq on these grounds was internationally unpopular, and
diplomatic efforts through the UN failed to garner significant international support. In March 2003, the United States and United Kingdom invaded Iraq with a comparatively smaller coalition and without UN approval in the Iraq War.

The Saddam Hussein regime fell relatively quickly, but the US-UK occupation proved to be difficult and dangerous. Poor postwar planning exacerbated historical animosities between Iraq’s three main ethnicities—Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds—and produced a complex political situation of factional infighting and regional differences. Prewar Iraq had been politically and economically dominated by Hussein’s Baath Party, which was ethnically Sunni. Yet the Shiites had the numerical advantage, while the Kurds had long advocated for an independent state of their own in northern Iraq, where many of the largest oil fields lie. These political, economic, and ethnic tensions contributed to deteriorating security conditions in the country. Between 2003 and 2007, the United States increased its military troop levels to deal with a growing guerrilla insurgency. Ongoing kidnappings, car bombings, shootings, and missile attacks took their toll on both military personnel and the civilian population.

Despite these security conditions, sovereignty was handed to an Iraqi interim government in 2004, and elections were held for a newly created federal democratic government in 2005 and 2010. While British troop levels had been reducing since 2007 and its combat mission ended in 2009, the Iraqi Parliament approved a security pact with the United States in which all US troops would leave the country by the end of 2011. US troop withdrawals began in 2009, as the administration of US president Barack Obama diverted troops to the ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, which had proved difficult to subdue. Meanwhile, numerous independent reports published after the 2003 Iraq invasion confirmed that no WMD were ever discovered in Iraq and that no operational links had existed between Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda.

These are the elements that make the 2003 Iraq War an event of interest to scholars of international relations (a more detailed overview of events related to Iraq is provided in the Appendix). It is an event that is ripe for multiple theoretical applications because it involves myriad topics of interest to IR scholars such as war, great power politics and geostrategic calculations, intervention and legitimacy, international institutions, ethnic violence, diplomacy and negotiations, international law, national sovereignty, democratization, and identity politics, to name only a few of the more obvious. As Steve Smith observes, “Iraq is instructive because it takes us back, in many ways, to the founding question of IR; namely, the sources of war and the conditions of peace” (2008: 307). In doing so, it allows for diversity in focus and emphasis. It is for this reason that contributors to the volume were asked simply to write “about the 2003 invasion of Iraq,” with no specific questions
or puzzles assigned, so that what they chose to focus on would be a reflection of their theoretical perspectives. And IR theorists, whose analytical perspectives are as divergent as those of game theorists and postmodernists, had something substantive to say about the invasion of Iraq. For most scholars it also appears to be a confinable event, with specific start and end dates as well as documents and memoirs now available for analysis that would not be accessible during the unfolding of a current event. Of course, as you will see, where one draws the boundaries of an event such as the invasion of Iraq, just how “confinable” it is, what aspects of it are puzzling, and what data are necessary to understand it, are all open to a great deal of interpretation and disagreement.

However, it is important to underscore that although the invasion of Iraq has some obvious pluses as a subject for comparative IR theoretical application, the subject of this book could just as easily have been another event or topic. Indeed, alternative events were considered as possible subjects for this second edition, including the terrorist attacks of 9/11, US and UK military activity in Afghanistan beginning in 2001, piracy off the Somali coast, developments in Israeli-Palestinian relations, the 2007 global recession, China’s increased economic and military clout, and genocide in Darfur. More general topics were also considered, such as terrorism, globalization, transnational crime, the UN system, and various aspects of international law.

Yet as the empirical focus of this book, the invasion of Iraq is actually secondary to its primary purpose, which is to demonstrate how IR theory makes sense of the world. In this regard, IR theory is not about any one particular event or topic. It is instead about what goes on in international and transnational realms, and involves placing any particular event within these larger contexts. In other words, it is not, as Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry observe, “a recipe” or “a replacement for strategy” (1997a: 10). Rather it is about contextualizing specific events or topics, revealing how they are part of larger patterns (with regard to both IR events and how we as IR scholars tend to explain them), and exposing the underlying factors that produce either events such as the invasion of Iraq or our interpretations of them.

### International Relations Theory: A Brief Overview

Before proceeding, it is important to address the question, What is IR theory? Because this book provides introductory material for each theoretical section and examples of most of the major theoretical perspectives in IR at present, an overview of those perspectives will not be provided here. Nor will a history of these perspectives and their disciplinary development in relation to each other be recounted, as excellent sources already exist on this subject (see Further Reading at the end of this chapter). Instead, we will
deal here with the more fundamental questions of what is meant by IR theory and why it is useful for understanding what goes on in world politics. Not unexpectedly, different scholars provide different answers to these questions.

James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff define theory as “systematic reflection on phenomena, designed to explain them and to show how they are related to each other in a meaningful, intelligent pattern, instead of being merely random items in an incoherent universe” (1997: 15). Similarly, Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi define theory “as a way of making the world or some part of it more intelligible or better understood,” by going “beyond mere description of [the] phenomenon observed and engag[ing] in causal explanation or prediction based on certain prior occurrences or conditions” (1999: 3). In both definitions there is a common assumption that there are patterns to international events and that IR theory is about revealing those patterns. This assumption is given expression in James Rosenau’s oft-quoted advice to students of IR: “To think theoretically one must be predisposed to ask about every event, every situation, or every observed phenomenon, ‘Of what is it an instance?’” As Rosenau goes on to observe, we often “have a hard time building up this habit,” due to an inclination “to probe for the special meaning of an event, to explore it for what sets it apart from all other events, rather than to treat it as an instance of a larger pattern” (1999: 33). International relations theorists are scholars who have broken this habit. While it is not the case that all IR theorists speak in terms of causality or prediction, all IR theorists do interpret particular events or subjects as instances of some larger pattern, phenomenon, or theoretical proposition and expression.

One way to think of IR theory is as a set of templates or prepackaged analytical structures for the multiple ways in which an event or activity that is international or transnational might be categorized, explained, or understood. These templates may be laid over the details of the event itself, allowing one to organize the details in such a way that the larger pattern is revealed and recognized within and through the event. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a jumble of collective and individual actions, decisions, and activities. Organizing all of these without the assistance of a template simply produces a timeline, which is useful for basic knowledge but does not provide deeper explanation or understanding of an event as an ongoing pattern in contemporary global affairs. As templates, IR theories direct the researcher’s attention to particular elements or aspects of the 2003 Iraq War, while ignoring or downplaying other elements. Some templates focus the researcher’s attention on the military-strategic calculations of great powers, others on their economic interests, and still others on the diplomatic efforts of leaders to avert the invasion or the lived experiences of Iraqis subjected to the invasion. In doing so, these templates demonstrate that the invasion of Iraq
was not an isolated event but actually fits into larger, ongoing patterns discernible in other current events.

Another useful analogy is to think of IR theory as a set of perspectives equivalent to the alternative lenses one might use with a high-end camera. The subject may be an elephant in grasslands, but an alternative lens will reveal different aspects and details of the elephant and its surroundings so that, as Barry Buzan says, “looking through it makes some features stand out more strongly while pushing others into the background” (1996: 56). The basic lens provides a shot of the elephant and its setting immediately to its front, back, and sides. A panoramic lens suddenly makes the elephant seem smaller in relation to its surroundings, which are now more expansive and more important to the image. A series of close-up lenses draws attention ever nearer to the elephant, enlarging it until its surroundings no longer seem relevant and details that had escaped attention before are noticeable. Tinted lenses of yellow, red, or blue highlight different shadows and features that had not seemed pertinent or particularly noteworthy with other lenses. And so on.

In much the same way, it is possible to see an IR topic or event from multiple perspectives and to view it as an instance of more than one pattern in world politics. Just as camera lenses are developed, produced, and prepackaged for use, so too are IR theoretical perspectives, many of which have rich analytical and interdisciplinary lineages. Each IR perspective consists of various assumptive building blocks, some of which are shared across perspectives but which are put together by each in specific ways to identity and highlight particular patterns in IR. Each perspective thereby illuminates slightly different elements of a given topic or event and hence patterns relevant to it, revealing aspects and details that were not obvious or particularly pertinent in other perspectives. The advantage of studying and understanding IR theory as an analytical domain distinct from any particular empirical event or topic is that it acquaints you with the multiple ways of seeing and understanding the various contexts for any particular event or topic, whether it is a historical, current, or future scenario. These contexts are the “bigger pictures” that, in the camera analogy, would involve an understanding of how cameras operate, the principles of photography (including color, lighting, and perspective), and the techniques of image development. While an amateur photographer does not need to know these things in order to take a picture, a professional photographer does.

It is important not to push the camera analogy too far, however, since one does not need to subscribe to a particular worldview, ideological perspective, or philosophical position in order to be a photographer or produce a zoom lens or use it in one’s own photography. While the type of camera lens you use might depend on why you are taking the elephant’s photo in the first place, whether you should use a zoom or panoramic lens to photograph
it is usually not a matter of heated debate or the source of sharp divisions among your colleagues. IR theory, however, is premised on alternative philosophical, ideological, and normative commitments, many of which are antithetical to one another and hence diverge sharply over how to understand IR. These commitments undergird the assumptive building blocks and analytical frameworks of IR theory. They typically involve disagreements over the nature of being (referred to as ontology), how we know and acquire knowledge about being (referred to as epistemology), and what methods we should adopt to study being (referred to as methodology).

- **Positivism and Postpositivism**

One of the most common ontological and epistemological divides you will encounter in the pages that follow is whether “a fact is a fact” and whether it can be objectively known and measured. A scholar’s judgment on this question determines how he or she will conceptualize, study, and write about a subject such as Iraq and what types of templates he or she will utilize to categorize it. Those scholars who insist that there is an objective state of being, an objective “reality,” that is relatively obvious and can be accurately known and measured, are commonly referred to as positivists. For most positivists, the primary activity of an IR theorist is to test IR theoretical perspectives against one another. This is done by collecting data and by devising methods that would be the equivalent of an experiment in the hard sciences (no easy feat in a subject area that does not allow for controlled experiments to isolate causal variables). The goal of the IR theorist from a positivist’s perspective is to weed out those theories and hypotheses that consistently fail to account for data, although one of the primary sources for diversity within particular theoretical perspectives is also theoretical revision in response to empirical anomalies. In undertaking such activity, the positivist hopes to produce more explanatory theories, which in an ideal world would make both prediction and better foreign policy making possible.

Positivists would tend to define the nature and purpose of IR theory in scientific terms as a result. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff claim, for example, that theory is “a series of propositions or hypotheses that specify relations among variables in order to present explanations and make predictions about the phenomena,” with its purpose being “the discovery of laws that govern how people and collectivities . . . act under specific circumstances” (1997: 21–22). Similarly, Viotti and Kauppi state that, “‘If $A$, then $B$’ as hypothesis may be subject to empirical test—that is tested against real-world or factual data,” so “the stage is set for making modest predictions about the nature and direction of change” (1999: 3). While positivists disagree among themselves over a variety of substantive theoretical issues, there is a
shared consensus among them regarding the objective accessibility of reality and our ability to discover universal laws that are amenable to causal explanations and prediction. This consensus also provides the basis for common methodological and analytical tools, with the best known of these being levels of analysis.

*Levels of analysis* refers to identifying potentially causal variables and then categorizing or locating them according to a micro-macro spectrum for the purposes of explanatory organization. Although there is variety in how many categorizing levels may be utilized, IR scholars have typically relied on three primary levels: the individual, the nation-state, and the system.4 The individual level is the most micro, where causality is traced to the individuals who make foreign policy and the psychology of human decision-making. The nation-state level is the middle level and involves the examination of government structures, bureaucratic politics, interest groups, media influences, and other internal factors that might influence or account for a nation-state’s foreign policy behavior and international activity. The systemic level is the most macro level, involving not only the examination of state-to-state relations but also shared environmental or structural factors, such as geography, relative power, or capitalist interdependence, that might influence or direct the behavior of all nation-states. Disagreements among positivists often involve which level of analysis, and particular factors therein, are responsible for and hence best explain a given outcome or event. Variants within a particular theoretical perspective often evolve as, in their quest to test and modify their theories against the empirical evidence, IR theorists pit levels of analysis against one another as if they were competing explanations (rather than useful heuristic, organizing tools).

Postpositivism, on the other hand, refers to IR scholars who are skeptical that “a fact is a fact” and that it can be objectively known and measured.5 Postpositivists observe that all events are subject to interpretation, with the interpreter’s own situation, context, and language often determining how an event is characterized and explained. Since neither language nor the act of communication is ever unproblematic or value-free, postpositivists challenge the notion that we could objectively know or access reality by relying on methods drawn from the hard sciences. Such methods are based on an erroneous conviction that, as Marysia Zalewska puts it, “what gets included and what gets excluded” in the theory and practice of IR is due to “‘natural’ or ‘obvious’ choices, determined by the ‘real’ world, whereas they are instead *judgments*” about what should be taken seriously and what can safely be ignored (1996: 34, emphasis in original).

Such judgments are never neutral or innocent. They are instead made by those who hold relative power, both among nation-states and within the IR discipline where positivism dominates. This means that certain equally important topics, perspectives, and choices are marginalized by the very
theories and methods to which positivist IR scholars subscribe. As S. Smith puts this, “some epistemological positions ‘see’ certain aspects of the political world as being a problem to be researched while others are kept out of view” (2008: 307–308). One result, as Smith goes on to note, is that “IR has consistently treated death by politics as being more visible than death by economics.” Similarly Zalewski observes that war has been a central concern of IR theorists and policymakers, yet it is poverty, which receives very little attention among IR scholars, that remains a leading cause of death in the world (1996: 351).

Postpositivists would define the nature and purpose of IR theory very differently in comparison to positivists. Testing competing hypotheses, developing causal explanations, and making predictions are seen as the dominant and relatively destructive ways in which we have come to interpret the world, impose meaning, and continually recreate particular patterns of knowledge and behavior in IR. According to Zalewski, whereas most positivists think of IR theory as merely a tool or critique, a postpositivist would define it as “everyday practice” in which “theorizing is a way of life, a form of life, something we all do, every day, all the time,” which means that “theorists are global actors and global actors are theorists” (1996: 346, 348). Similarly Smith argues about IR that “what we think about these events and possibilities, and what we think we can do about them, depends in a fundamental sense on how we think about them. In short, our thinking about the ‘real’ world, and hence our practices, is directly related to our theories” (1996: 1, emphasis in original). Although postpositivists eschew the notion that there are universal laws that are objectively discoverable with scientific methods, they do see patterns to the way positivists describe and theorize IR. Such patterns could derive from, for example, the values of eighteenth-century European Enlightenment (which promotes a faith in science) or the politics of identity within IR (which is dominated both in practice and in theory by men).

For most postpositivists, the primary activity of an IR theorist is to reveal how international events are described, whether by policymakers, positivist IR theorists, or within commonplace texts such as magazines, works of fiction, or military manuals. More specifically, the postpositivist is interested in how those descriptions are acted upon as if they were natural descriptions rather than constructions, and how those descriptions justify actions and arguments in a self-fulfilling cycle of codetermination. Revelation is accomplished by examining texts by, for example, policymakers or fellow IR theorists, with the goal being to reveal not only the philosophical commitments, biases, and commonly subscribed to social realities that ground the activity of IR (in both its policymaking and theoretical forms), but also what has been excluded or marginalized by such activity. Postpositivists do this by providing alternative readings and interpretations of
how policymakers and theorists have characterized and justified events and topics.

Critics often disparage postpositivist methodology as mere “interpretivism,” which lacks any standard of judgment and could lead to “a form of epistemological anarchy” in the discipline (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1997: 36). Postpositivists counter that positivism is no more capable of providing a neutral vehicle for assessing theoretical analysis, since it “merely presents what is unavoidably a political choice as if it was a technical application of a system of knowledge” (S. Smith 2008: 307). Counterinterpretations, however, whether they are of a policymaker’s speeches or of a fellow theorist’s articles, play an essential role in revealing the ideas that we take for granted, that shape the way we see the world, that we rely upon to justify the actions we take, and that reproduce the world we take for granted.

In addition, the patterns identified and “tested” by positivist IR theories are, postpositivists point out, drawn almost exclusively from the Western imperial experience. Yet many IR theories make sweeping universal claims that do not actually apply beyond the West and, due to the West’s cultural and intellectual hegemony, simultaneously marginalize alternative, non-Western ways of understanding. Hence many postpositivists eschew the categorization of knowledge into IR theory “isms” as reifying Western ways of seeing. They seek instead to explore alternative voices and non-Western perspectives. As B. Jones argues,

> What is needed is a broader and deeper form of critique that encompasses the discipline as a whole—its underlying assumptions, modes of thought and analysis, and its consciousness and very attitude—and that, moreover, is committed not only to critique but also to elaboration of more adequate accounts and explanations of international relations. (2006: 6, emphasis in original)

Without such a critique, postpositivists argue, existing IR theories will continue to misread and obscure the dynamics of contemporary global politics in ways that perpetuate existing inequities and subjugations.

### IR Theory in This Book

It might help to return briefly to the camera analogy to summarize the fundamental divide between positivists and postpositivists in the discipline of IR. If both were photographers, then positivists would be those who shared a dominant consensus that tinted lenses captured the reality, being, or essence of the elephant. The quarrel among them would be over which of the colors on the spectrum best revealed the true nature of the elephant. Much of their activity would be devoted to photographing the elephant with various shades of whichever color they preferred. Alternatively, postpositivists would be photographers who asked why positivists were so convinced that
tinted lenses best captured the nature of the elephant in the first place. They would be concerned with revealing both this shared preference for tinted lenses and how it ignored and denigrated other types of lenses that would be equally legitimate for capturing an image of the elephant. Both types of photographers would be engaged in revealing larger patterns and in answering Rosenau’s “of what is it an instance?” Yet positivist answers would involve a conviction that they were documenting the patterns of reality, while post-positivist answers would involve revealing, as a pattern in itself, the positivist’s erroneous conviction that reality was being documented.

While this book does not disparage positivism, neither does it make an attempt to evaluate alternative theoretical perspectives according to their explanatory abilities. Instead it reflects a belief that all IR theoretical perspectives capture a reality of sorts, that there are multiple realities to and readings of IR, and that all of them are “true” in the sense that they give us some purchase on and understanding of IR events and topics. This does not mean that no standards have been applied and that what is presented here is “epistemological anarchy.” The authors have revised their chapters in response to comments and suggestions from multiple readers of various epistemological persuasions. Empirical mistakes and deductive errors have been fixed, incomplete or unclear readings have been refined, and each author has striven to produce a chapter that is appropriate to the author’s own epistemological preferences, accessible to readers, and convincing as a means of explaining or understanding the 2003 Iraq War. Those revisions were not undertaken in a competitive spirit, and so they do not involve arguing whose theoretical perspective is the “correct” perspective for understanding the events. This may be implicit in some of the positivist selections, but it was not a goal of the book or the individual chapters. Instead, each author attempted to address more fundamental questions, such as why you, the reader, should be acquainted with their particular theoretical perspective and what it will help you see or understand that you had not been aware of before reading it.

Of course, as the reader, you are free to make judgments regarding what you find most and least compelling. As you do so, keep in mind that one of the most important intellectual steps you can take as an analyst of IR events and topics is to recognize your own philosophical and ideological commitments, about which you may be entirely unaware. Because the book has been designed to present IR theories impartially, it can assist you in discovering these commitments. As you read, consider which perspectives you find most compelling or convincing, which you find most repellent or least convincing, and why you have these responses. Answering such questions and identifying what it is specifically about an approach that you find convincing or offending should help you to recognize your own normative commitments and ideological biases. Such recognition is the first step in
gaining some distance from those commitments, which is necessary for fairly assessing alternatives you might otherwise initially dismiss or ignore. It is also necessary for seeing international events and topics other than Iraq in these larger contexts and theoretical patterns.

Of what is the 2003 invasion of Iraq an instance then? In the pages that follow, you will find differing interpretations, explanations, and understandings of the same basic events, as IR scholars attempt to answer this question according to their particular theoretical perspectives.

Further Reading

While there are a number of good IR theory overview texts to consult, four are particularly useful for providing detailed descriptions and discussions of the most popular IR theories. These include Burchill et al. 2009; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1997; Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2010; and Viotti and Kauppi 2011. Each of these texts has been revised and reprinted several times, with editions varying slightly depending on the perspectives covered and authors or writing selections included.

Burchill et al. and Dunne, Kurki, and Smith are edited volumes with different authors discussing different theoretical perspectives. Two other texts that provide original essays from scholars of different theoretical perspectives are Griffiths 2007 and Doyle and Ikenberry 1997b (with the latter focusing on the nature of change in IR). Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff provide detailed descriptions of each theory and their histories, while Viotti and Kauppi combine description with reprinted seminal texts representing particular theoretical perspectives. Reprints of “Thinking Theory Thoroughly” by Rosenau may be found in Viotti and Kauppi editions, and the piece was also developed into a 1995 book by Rosenau and Durfee.

Other texts that reprint seminal pieces for the purpose of juxtaposing alternative theories include Der Derian 1995a; Genest 2003; Mingst and Snyder 2010; and Vasquez 1995. Alternatively, Edkins and Vaughan-Williams 2009; Griffiths 2000; and Neumann and Wæver 1997 all summarize and analyze the writings of particularly seminal thinkers in the major theoretical perspectives.

Valuable introductory texts on IR theory include Brown and Ainley 2009; Daddow 2009; Griffiths 2007; Jackson and Sørensen 2010; Jørgensen 2010; Steans, Pettiford, Diez, and El-Anis 2010; and C. Weber 2009. Other texts that provide extended overviews of IR theory include Baylis and Smith 2011; Booth and Smith 1995; and Ferguson and Mansbach 2009. For a humorous exercise in applying IR theory to an alternative universe (we hope!) in which the world is populated by zombies, see Drezner 2011.

A number of texts concentrate on disciplinary history and the way in which theories developed in relation to one another, particular philosophers,


On the subject of positivism and postpositivism in IR theory, as well as on IR epistemological and methodological debates in general, early disciplinary discussions include Alker and Biersteker 1984 (also reprinted in Der Derian 1995a); George 1988, 1994; and a 1989 International Studies Quarterly issue that contains several articles devoted to an “Exchange on the Third Debate” (as it is sometimes called) by T. Biersteker 1989, K. Holsti 1989, and Y. Lapid 1989. Later texts on the subject include Smith, Booth, and Zalewski 1996 (Smith’s chapter provides numerous citations on positivism and post-positivism); Booth and Smith 1995; Chernoff 2007;elman and Eelman 2003; Hollis and Smith 1990; P. Jackson 2010; and Kurki 2008. Other citations are provided in the overview chapter on postmodernism and critical theory.

Notes

1. Given the lack of scholarly agreement and consistency for the terms used to indicate contemporary Gulf wars, we have decided to use the following terms throughout this text to indicate particular wars: Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Gulf War (1991), and the Iraq War for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

2. The spelling of Arabic words and names varies according to either standard Arabic or English spellings (with the latter also often varying). This text conforms to the most common English spellings and usages. In so doing, the use of apostrophes in the middle of words (such as Shi’a) and the definite article “al’ (such as al-Iraq) have been dropped except when in direct quotations.

3. The subject of an elephant in this analogy is intentional, as it recalls the story of the blind men who each touch a different part of an elephant and believe they have sufficiently grasped its reality, though none can grasp the whole. The analogy was used earlier by Robert North (1969) in a plea for greater tolerance and research pluralism in the discipline. The lens metaphor has also been utilized elsewhere; in particular see V. Spike Peterson and Anne S. Runyan (1999: 1–3).

4. Extended discussions of the levels-of-analysis issue in IR theorizing can be found in Buzan 1995; Singer 1960, 1969; and Waltz 1959. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
also provide a description of alternative levels of analysis beyond the standard three (1997: 26–33).

5. *Postpositivism* is an umbrella term for those theoretical perspectives that are skeptical of the positivist project in general. It should not be conflated with postmodernism, which is but one variant of this skepticism, and other postpositivist approaches represented in this book, such as critical theory and critical feminist theory. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff use the term *postempiricist* for postpositivism (1997: 35), and the terms *rationalism* and *reflectivism* are sometimes used for positivism and postpositivism, respectively, but the latter are more common in the literature (see S. Smith 1996).

6. Since this book seeks to impartially provide both positivist and postpositivist applications, it may give the misimpression that there is rapprochement between positivists and postpositivists within the discipline. In fact, however, the exchanges between scholars of these two perspectives can be heated and nasty. As Ole Wæver observes, “there is no such repressive tolerance” between them, because “they rather see each other as harmful, at times almost ‘evil,’ definitely not as a legitimate parallel enterprise.” This is because the postpositivists believe that “the mainstream is co-responsible for upholding a repressive order,” while the postpositivists are viewed by the positivist mainstream as “subversive, anti-scientific, and generally a bad influence on students” (1997: 22). For an example illustrating these tensions, see the exchange between Schmidt (2008) and S. Smith (2008).