


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Making a Life in  
Multiethnic Miami:  
Immigration and the  
Rise of a Global City

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# 1

## Immigration in the Age of Global Insecurity

Alejandra, a Colombian national, was born in 1954 in one of the country's main industrial cities. The daughter of an architect and a housewife, Alejandra enjoyed an upper-middle-class lifestyle growing up. Having earned a university degree in the late 1970s, she settled in Bogotá and worked as an executive in corporate sales. In spite of being divorced with two children, she was able to send them to good schools.

In 2001, when her children were ages sixteen and seventeen, Alejandra decided to move to Miami<sup>1</sup> with her mother, in search of a higher income and what she called *el sueño americano* (the American Dream). She had traveled to the United States many times since age thirteen and was familiar with Miami. Having been educated in Colombian bilingual schools, she also spoke English. To further make the change easier, she had a sister who lived in South Florida. Through her, Alejandra gained the necessary sponsorship to obtain a visa that allowed her to work in Miami.<sup>2</sup> After only four years of living in the United States, when asked if she regretted immigrating to this country, Alejandra answered, “Yes! (laughs) I have regretted it because first, leaving my children has been the most important factor. . . . [I]t has broken up a home, [and] it has broken up a family, because my children are twenty and twenty-one years old and studying at the university. I know they cannot come here because they are studying in the best universities there, and I don’t have the money for them to study here. So I cannot sacrifice that they come here and stop studying just to be with me. So I have sacrificed one thing for another.”

In discussions of global migration, the prevailing cultural assumption is that immigrants improve their lives (and those of their children) by moving from one country to another. In the case of immigrants to the United States, the notion of striving to achieve “el sueño americano” suggests that what lies ahead are positive outcomes, such as access to education, the opportu-

nity to make a better living, the possibilities for personal growth and esteem, and the idea that this new lifestyle can be sustainable, if not for oneself, then for one's children. We hear countless tales of immigrant success stories, from former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright, who moved as a teenager from Czechoslovakia, to former Miami Marlins manager Ozzie Guillén, who moved from Venezuela. In Alejandra's case, although she had only been in the United States for four years at the time of her interview, she did not exhibit the response predicted by the assumption that the benefits of migration outweigh its costs, and that mobility is natural and unproblematic.<sup>3</sup> Alejandra had moved with her elderly mother and settled in an area where she had a sister living nearby. Those factors that made her mobile (e.g., having grown children, a visa, and good English skills) and facilitated settlement (e.g., accessibility to kin) also divided her own family in the process as her children stayed behind.

Historian Susan Matt writes that "the idea that we can and should feel at home anywhere on the globe is based on a worldview that celebrates the solitary, mobile individual and envisions men and women as easily separated from family, from home and from the past."<sup>4</sup> Homesickness, a consequence of mobility, once a medical diagnosis in the United States, historically has been transformed into a taboo emotion to be suppressed by the modern individual, who was expected to unproblematically transfer loyalties from families, homes, and communities to employers and the government.<sup>5</sup> The enlightened individual (understood to be white men during colonial times) embraced mobility to maximize individual material happiness and "became less willing to submit to communal imperatives that dictated their location, and they manifested a new spirit of autonomy as they searched for contentment."<sup>6</sup> The assumptions guiding the mobility of early internal migrants in the United States have endured; only now mobile populations vary in origins, gender, and the scale of their mobility.

Thus, in modern times, a break with the past is expected not to deter the true "cosmopolitan" immigrant. Advances in technology, travel, and forms of communication suggest that the emotional costs of migration have been minimized since immigrants have more opportunities to maintain ties to loved ones than in the past. Yet, even when mobility decisions are freely made, they come at high emotional costs, particularly when families are separated.<sup>7</sup>

Typical tales of immigrant success do not often draw attention to these costs. Nor does the figure of the enlightened cosmopolitan migrant reflect the kind of experience that an immigrant such as Alejandra faced. Mobility *is* problematic for her. Emigrating at the age of forty-seven with her elderly mother, Alejandra was not just looking for a higher income. She felt strongly that in Colombia, "the bad thing about one's country is insecurity. The belief that once you are forty years old, you are worthless." Alejandra's

sense of job security was threatened by perceived age discrimination in Colombian society, compounded by a particular characteristic of gender inequality that imposes earlier retirement expectations on women.<sup>8</sup> In addition to her increasing sense of professional and social insecurity, Alejandra felt that as a divorced woman, her chances of finding a romantic partner in Colombia were limited. Research on Latin American women indicates that those whose future economic prospects are uncertain are at a disadvantage when it comes to forming a union.<sup>9</sup> And, in Bogotá, Alejandra felt lonely. Urban environments in Latin America diminish women's connections to kinship networks; thus, migration is used to achieve family and kinship objectives.<sup>10</sup> However, her hope that migration would bring to her more money, a stable job, and a partner had recently waned since her breakup with the man she had been dating in Miami. On the day we spoke, Alejandra suggested that in her efforts to fulfill her financial and social aspirations, she wrecked her family and felt as alone as she did in Bogotá.

As stigmatized emotions, loneliness and homesickness are related, and throughout history, they have been viewed as signs of immaturity and dependency.<sup>11</sup> As Matt argues, they threaten "individual and social progress" because they accompany "the temptation to return home." These feelings undermine the capitalist expectation that individuals are interchangeable, thereby affecting the fluidity of this economic system.<sup>12</sup> Regardless of the stigma attached to these emotions, like many immigrants, Alejandra pondered what returning to Colombia to reconstitute her family would take. She concluded that a well-remunerated job was vital, because if things did not work out, she could not reenter the United States because she had not yet secured permanent residency. When asked how she felt about these mobility constraints, she said, "Very bored, very depressed, very out of place, and that affects you a lot."

Like Alejandra, many immigrants come to Miami searching for various forms of security and stability in a rapidly changing world. A pervasive condition of modernity is the movement of people and their detachment from territorialized social relations.<sup>13</sup> Modernity requires individuals to accept the loss of the past and to learn the "habits of individualism" that ultimately support global capitalism.<sup>14</sup> For many we interviewed, however, the process and consequences of migration brought emotional costs that challenged the idea that breaks with the past are unproblematic; moreover, these costs called into question the assumption that the outcome of mobility is progress when one considers the psychic energy required to adapt to the ambivalence of migration or to "subordinate the desire to stay behind to the goal of getting ahead."<sup>15</sup>

The immigrants whose stories are told in these pages reported leaving behind communities in which they experienced threats to their individual fi-

nancial, physical, psychic (psychological), and social sustainability and that of their families. These threats resulted in perceptions of human insecurity from various sources that were undermining a “sustainable form of life.”<sup>16</sup> Their stories illustrate how economic globalization and regional geopolitics restructured social conditions across space, creating new forms of security and insecurity that immigrants embody in lived spaces that include their home countries and, as we will show, Miami.

## Why Miami?

Why is studying immigrants in Miami important? Saskia Sassen estimates at least seventy cities can be labeled as “global,” and that the number is growing because of the compatibility of their roles in the global economy. With weaker global connections than New York, London, or even “second-tier” global cities such as Chicago and Toronto, Miami is one of many rising “minor” or “third-tier” global cities that are less studied sites for the materialization of global processes.<sup>17</sup>

Miami articulates regionally organized patterns of globalization that are most intense on a hemispheric scale rather than a global one. Its rise to global city status by linking regions across the Americas distinguishes Miami’s global functions and highlights the specialized roles global cities play.<sup>18</sup> As Jan Aart Scholte notes, regionalization has occurred concurrently with globalization,<sup>19</sup> and regional nodes such as Miami, Dubai, Singapore, or Hong Kong play important roles in the global city system.<sup>20</sup> The social structures and cultural character of these cities are worthy of deeper study for what they can tell us about their residents’ on-the-ground experiences of globalization.

Miami’s particular multiethnic mix is another reason for studying the city. Miami is a “zone of contact”<sup>21</sup> for cultures from across the Americas, housing US natives and immigrants of many kinds. The city has been envisioned by Latinos/as as friendly to Spanish speakers and Latin American/Caribbean traditions, and also as a place where immigrants can “make it,” an idea propagated by the success stories of the first waves of Cuban immigrants.<sup>22</sup> Yet, at the same time Miami houses complex social hierarchies that sort immigrants’ life chances unequally and reflect Miami’s bimodal economic structure, US racial ideologies and geopolitical projections, and cultural norms transplanted from places of origin.

Another of the lessons drawn from Miami’s transformation is how the global city materializes transnational ideologies that have an impact on lives across multiple geographic sites. What we mean is that global Miami’s economic structure reflects hemisphere-wide consequences of the neoliberal economic turn in the 1980s and 1990s, and its residents embody these

effects in their social positions and life chances whether or not they are immigrants. Briefly, *neoliberalism* refers to a political and economic movement calling for a form of laissez-faire capitalism in which markets are deregulated, government social spending is curtailed, and state holdings are privatized, all in an effort to create export-based market economies to bring down foreign debt. In the process, although unevenly across countries, the initial results were increased impoverishment, slashed formal sector jobs, decreased real wages, and fewer social protections for citizens. When neoliberal economic restructuring after 1982 increased flows of direct foreign investment to and across Latin America and the Caribbean, much of it passed through Miami's expanding banking and trade infrastructure.<sup>23</sup> As the city became an interregional hub for "command and control" of financial and trade flows across the 1990s, demand increased for low-skilled laborers to service a growing international managerial class that in turn helped launch a real estate pricing boom and drove away portions of the middle class.

Concurrently, the implementation of neoliberal economic policies across Latin America created a pool of potential new immigrants by shrinking social safety nets, public security, and formal sector labor markets as states withdrew from economic production, disaster management, and social programs such as public education, health care, and pensions. Seeking greater human security (economic, physical, psychic, social), immigrants were drawn to Miami by jobs, social networks, and the city's geographic proximity and similarities to their places of origin. While the elite arrived with jobs in the new Miami offices of multinational corporations and specialized service firms, immigrants who had been caught in the squeeze of economic restructuring and rising insecurity of many kinds faced greater difficulties if they arrived in Miami without legal status or transferable professional credentials. In summary, global Miami reflects conditions stimulated by the implementation of the transnational economic ideology of neoliberalism and taking form within a particular set of historical-institutional structures associated with both US history and immigrants' places of origin.

How these dynamics play out in immigrant lives is the subject of this book. Miami is a rising global city that articulates regional flows most intensely, for three reasons: (1) it is multiethnic but predominately Latino/a and, within that, predominately Cuban; (2) it is polarized by wealth and other social disparities; and (3) its metropolitan area has the largest proportion of immigrants in the United States.<sup>24</sup> For all of these reasons, Miami is a case worthy of study, particularly since the last detailed account of the city was published in 1993 by Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick. Since then, the city, its inhabitants, and the world have all changed in many ways. Risk and human insecurity, as factors leading to global population movement and conditioning settlement, especially beckon further elaboration.

## Why Focus on Human Security?

In the 1990s, Anthony Giddens followed Ulrich Beck in conceptualizing the linkages among reflexivity, modernity, and risk.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps not coincidentally, within the system of global capitalism being manifested at that time, underemployment and labor “flexibility,” weak state capacity to prevent disaster, and the linkages between rising crime and failing social programs raised for many Latin Americans the specter of risk to the sustainability of their lives and lifestyles. Faced with these conditions, Miamians, as we show in this book, engaged in migration and transborder ways of belonging as strategies to relieve the negative effects of human insecurity in their original homes while attempting to create more secure lives in new destinations. Although strategic, manifestations of agency through immigration and settlement decisions remain conditioned by immigration policies, class, gender, and racial hierarchies. Thus, for those like Alejandra, feelings of insecurity in the place of origin compel migration decisions, while attempts to reestablish the emotional security of home elsewhere carry other challenges.

Giddens developed the concept of ontological security to refer to a sense of safety in the world and confidence that one’s reality is, in fact, what it appears to be. This sense of safety, sometimes experienced as feelings of comfort, is contingent on trust.<sup>26</sup> Whether we are talking about trust in individuals, groups, organizations, or institutions, trust acts as a mechanism that curbs existential anxiety and sustains ontological security. When trust in relationships, taken-for-granted social norms, and societal institutions erodes, ontological insecurity rises. We argue that, under these conditions, the need for ontological security, as much as other dimensions of human security such as physical safety and social security, influences choices about settlement and incorporation.

Ontological security also emanates from the reassurance of being embedded in stable and affirmative relationships.<sup>27</sup> These relationships, in turn, are uniquely related to particular places: built or natural spaces that are socially constructed and culturally imbued with meaning.<sup>28</sup> The desire to be physically present in the homeland, and particularly the hometown, is an emotional need we document across many migration experiences in this book. This phenomenon may come about because, as David Conradson and Deirdre McKay write, place plays “a major role in the ongoing constitution of identity.”<sup>29</sup> Migration, thus, represents a disembedding mechanism that can shock place-based identities. From this perspective, mobility is paradoxical because it represents a search for greater security in some domains but embodies greater insecurity in others.

For immigrants who have been exposed to the United States through travel or US cultural exports and, like Alejandra, have family already living



there, migration comes to represent a viable alternative to human insecurity. This familiarity diminishes, although does not erase, the uncertainties of mobility. In this book, we show, however, that once in Miami, immigrants find that migration acts as a prism through which prior forms of insecurity are refracted onto new experiences that carry new vulnerabilities. Some immigrants become (or continue to be) racialized actors, subject to growing levels of social scrutiny and state regulation in a city that is increasingly perceived to be for the “haves” and not for the “have-lesses.” Others perceive a loss of social status associated with downward occupational mobility and disruptions of class-based networks back home. Most obviously, some immigrants lack a political voice or are even forced to remain in the civic shadows because they lack formal legal authority to be present and heard in the United States.

Further, in the first decades of the twenty-first century, immigrants to the United States again were portrayed as suspect in key public arenas such as mass media or electoral politics.<sup>30</sup> In seeking greater human security, many of Miami’s immigrant residents arrived in yet another period of US insecurity, post–September 11, 2001, during which, to right-wing extremists or fearful natives, immigrants represented social, cultural, and national security threats to US society.<sup>31</sup> This shift in attitude has created insecure environments for immigrants, particularly those with temporary legal statuses or who are out of status altogether, resulting in contradictions whereby immigrants end up trading one source of insecurity for another.

Focusing on ontological security captures the range of contradictions that emerge when we consider that although mobility is expected to lead to positive outcomes for immigrants, the emotional costs, such as those we illustrate in Alejandra’s case, beg for problematization. Moreover, does migration have other hidden costs? The human need for ontological security and the sense of assurance it instills best capture the paradoxes immigrants confront as they traverse the web of global capitalism.

## **Central Argument and Conceptual Development of the Book**

The central argument that we present in this book is that migration in late modernity reflects the need to stabilize multiple dimensions of human security. Based on evidence from a wide sample of migration experiences from Greater Miami since the late 1980s, we argue that the immigration process often involves exchanging ontological security, as a form of emotional security anchored in relationships and worldviews formed at home, for other forms of security that are perceived as more immediately necessary for survival and that were threatened in our participants’ places of origin. A corollary to this argument, which emerges from an examination of the same mi-

gration experiences, is that immigrants exhibit agency when faced with emotional disruptions endemic to migration. We argue that immigrants combat threats to ontological security by embedding themselves in relationships with emotionally significant people and places that are territorially positioned in the country of origin and in Miami, which constitute two poles of a translocal space. They do so to extend the comfort and support of the natal home to the immigrant destination through what we call “translocal social citizenship.”

In most of the immigration stories we analyzed for this book, migration to Miami over the last thirty years involved exchanging forms of insecurity perceived as threatening to life projects in the home country for other forms of insecurity associated with the post-9/11 US national security state, the economic and political hierarchies of a global city, and the particular intraethnic and racial exclusions of a minority-majority (in this case, Latino and, more specifically, predominantly Cuban) city. These place-based conditions in Miami were experienced as immigrants dealt with separation from close social networks located in the place of origin. To confront the ambiguity of increased life chances (or the perception of those opportunities) with reshuffled social positions and potential detachment from supportive relationships, immigrants enacted a multisite mode of belonging that effectively merged places of significance with their individual and group identities into one cross-border *locality*, or translocal version of home. We argue that through reenactment, evocation, and direct social contact with their original homes and home lives, immigrants in Miami create a substantive form of citizenship that claims inclusion across territories based on participatory contributions to geographically separated social groups and communities rather than legal authorization from a state.<sup>32</sup> Miami’s facilitation of translocal social citizenship attracted Latin American and Caribbean immigrants who were uprooted from the support of hometown networks and comforts by structural economic change or the public insecurity often associated with it. Thus, immigrants’ experiences of life in Miami are negotiations of varied and overlapping forms of inclusion and exclusion within a place that is culturally inscribed by and socially constructed across multiple geographic locations.

In the remainder of this chapter, we present the basis of the arguments developed in the book. We address how neoliberalism reshuffled contexts of human insecurity that conditioned Miami immigrants’ decisions about departure and settlement. We address Miami’s transformation from a segregated southern US resort to the “Capital of Latin America” and the ensuing development of the city’s income structure, ethnic composition, and residential segregation patterns. We pay close attention to how earlier Cubans shaped the cultural and political institutions met by the immigrants in our study, and how media-inspired imaginings of the city as welcoming to im-

migrants and Latinos/as specifically structured migratory pathways. We lay the groundwork for discussions of discrimination in a minority-majority city with immigrants making up 51 percent of the population, but also in which Cuban and Cuban American culture prevails, even though Cubans and Cuban Americans are only one-third of the population.<sup>33</sup> Finally, we turn to immigrants' multilocal strategies for gaining ontological security and argue that cross-border yet local strategies of social participation and membership represent forms of substantive citizenship.

### **Globalization and the Creation of Neoliberal Environments of Insecurity**

The links between immigration and security have intensified in an era in which nation-states are shifting their economies toward greater integration. As Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone have shown, these currents are working against each other.<sup>34</sup> Integration projects such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) increased labor emigration pressures at the same time that US border enforcement efforts skyrocketed.

The heightened perception of physical insecurity in the United States after 2001 is a context familiar to many countries around the world.<sup>35</sup> From the 1980s until the 2000s, many of those in our sample experienced various forms of human insecurity in their countries of origin. But the prevalence of insecurity in countries such as the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Mexico did not just involve threats from external agents of violence or even enemies from within. Many immigrants faced insecurity rooted in neoliberal economic policies that had multiple effects over economic, social, and, ultimately, political life in their home countries, as well as in the receiving environment of Miami.

#### *Global Economic Integration and Structural Adjustment in Latin America*

US-led banking responses to the foreign debt crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s and 1990s pressured national governments to enact structural transformations and implement economic policies rooted in laissez-faire market economics. Many of these changes undermined formal sector employment with good wages and health benefits. Specifically, while slashing social programs, governments ended trade protections for domestic business and sold off state assets, ultimately encouraging market consolidation with fewer firms and, consequently, fewer well-paying jobs. These policies uprooted people in the middle economic sectors who had relied on

the state or domestic business for jobs. For those in rural areas, trade agreements lowered barriers to mass-produced corn and other grains from the United States, while cutting domestic crop subsidies. This loss of government protection stimulated large commercial agricultural production but destabilized small-farm economies.

Immigration as a family survival strategy resulted from lost employment or farm income, of course, but other causes were less obvious. First, employment in the urban informal sector grew; people had to work more hours for less pay and with fewer risk-diminishing benefits such as health insurance or pensions. Additionally, those with jobs saw their aspirations for career ascendancy put on hold or dashed. Perceptions of economic stagnation and worries about future economic security motivated a number of younger and midcareer people in our sample to emigrate to improve their current conditions and their chances for future security.

Second, debt increased while the ability to pay diminished. Alberto Mayol identifies a cultural component to indebtedness in his study of the Chilean student protests of 2011 that we noted as important to our study participants—social stigma and the equation of indebtedness to sin.<sup>36</sup> While we did not interview Chileans for our qualitative sample, Peruvians and Colombians in our study spoke of guilt and public humiliation associated with being late with payments.

An additional source of insecurity related to neoliberal transformations is that many families that were already stretched thin prior to the 1990s had little savings, crop insurance, or other support when faced with natural disaster or climate transformations, and this fragility was compounded by weakened state capacity for response, planning, and prevention in the face of budget cuts and deregulated farm markets. With little or no safety net, Central Americans headed to the United States in record numbers when neither state nor international responses could compensate for destroyed crops and business income after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and Hurricane Stan in 2005, and extended drought has become a source of immigration pressure from northern Mexico. A series of hurricanes prior to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti created conditions that drove many there to seek residence elsewhere. Finally, along with economic insecurity, public insecurity including crime and police abuses increased in urban areas across the region. Among some of the less recognized causes for emigration, experts identify military demobilization without adequate employment opportunities, youth gang members deported from the United States to home countries they barely knew, and worsening conditions for youths as parents took on two jobs and public school education deteriorated. A number of people in our study mentioned these forms of insecurity as contributing factors in their decisions to migrate. Not until the Chinese import commodity boom of the mid-2000s did many countries stabilize, but crime and public insecurity in urban areas

were still serious threats, the financial prospects of those in the middle economic sectors remained fragile thanks in part to unrelenting economic inequality, and the poor had lost a decade or more of social progress.

The social weaknesses of neoliberalism carried political implications that affected Miami's immigration stream. Mobilization of the increasingly detached poor, working class, and lower middle sectors affected conditions in a number of countries, each with their own particular political environments. In Haiti, which is particularly important to Miami, upper-class resentment against the increasing populism of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide resulted in a coup that removed him from power. In Venezuela, and a few years later in Ecuador, professionals faced a surge in populist policies and antirich rhetoric from elected presidents. In Colombia, Mexico, and more recently Puerto Rico, political and drug violence joined economic tightening, and in El Salvador and Honduras, violent youth gangs, many who were deported from the United States, complicated political and economic stabilization. All of these countries faced crime surges in the 1990s and early 2000s, compounding feelings of insecurity.

Macrolevel processes created "environments of insecurity"<sup>37</sup> in which potential emigrants and their families either accepted the instability and the ensuing threats to sustainability in their countries or left in search of more secure and stable environments. Some of the immigrants in our study were detached from their homeland economies and social contexts as the Cold War ended and countries with state-centered capitalist systems began to transition. Free market economies with electoral democracy emerged, but with concentrated wealth and economic opportunity, as well as deficits in democratic accountability, representation, and equal protection under the law. The model of deregulated markets, free trade, and elections without similar emphasis on social justice outcomes, which were assumed to be natural outcomes of liberalized states and markets, was supposed to solve the international debt crisis of the 1980s by tying the region to a form of laissez-faire capitalism that the United States and Western Europe had rarely experienced in their histories, but that dominated thinking in international financial organizations in the 1980s. Economic adjustment slashed support for human development, privatized state firms, and eventually balanced budgets in many countries. But, by the early 2000s, neoliberalism and elections that did not guarantee equal political representation, social opportunities, or the due process of law for poor majorities, women, or ethnic minorities had in most places led to greater wealth concentration with increased or stubbornly high inequality and opened the region to global financial shocks that produced the Tequila Effect in Mexico (1994), the Samba Effect in Brazil (1999), the Tango Effect in Argentina (2001), and other external jolts to real wages and dreams of economic well-being. Some countries made the economic transition better. However, neoliberalism ex-

acerbated a crisis of labor incorporation and fueled criminal violence into the 2000s by increasing underemployment and perpetuating inequality.<sup>38</sup> The public security apparatus of the region did not transition well, and human rights abuses and corruption were common. Latin America became one of the most violent regions in the world.<sup>39</sup>

Economic shifts eroded financial and social benefits as well as social rights, especially for the middle class.<sup>40</sup> Violence increased the sense of risk. These changes, in turn, led to the deterioration of life chances (to varying degrees, depending on the country), thereby creating environments of insecurity.<sup>41</sup>

### *"Environments of Insecurity" and Emigration*

Ibrahim Sirkeci argues that an environment of insecurity serves as an "opportunity framework for those who [have] existing migration 'plans.'"<sup>42</sup> We argue that neoliberalism's effects on social infrastructure and public safety nets across Latin America and the Caribbean engendered various forms of conflict and instability that affected the people living there and exacerbated insecurity. Two factors in particular contributed to the creation of environments of insecurity: material conditions characterized by poverty, deprivation, or conflict, and nonmaterial environments that generated fear of persecution or discriminatory practices.<sup>43</sup>

Protection of human rights and access to resources to meet basic needs are central to human security.<sup>44</sup> We see how neoliberal policies created environments of insecurity in the experiences of study participants who reported that their families experienced threats to their abilities to secure these rights and resources. Threats took the form of economic and social insecurity (e.g., job loss, downward mobility, and discrimination based on age, gender, race, and sexual orientation) and physical insecurity (e.g., exposure to crime, violence, and political unrest).

The conditions that created threats to human security also eroded the sustainability of kinship groups. Based on Giddens's work, scholars have argued that globalization and migration can undermine important relationships and result in feelings of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety.<sup>45</sup> As stated earlier, the ability to maintain trust and confidence in individuals and relationships as well as in institutions is essential to avoiding existential anxiety.<sup>46</sup> In Latin America, social trust is low and social exclusion has broadened outward from traditionally excluded minorities. The Inter-American Development Bank reported in 2007 that after twenty-five years of neoliberalism and advances in the procedures of electoral democracy, formal political inclusion in elections had increased, while social inclusion had "mixed results":

Who are the excluded in Latin America and the Caribbean today? Certainly they include members of traditionally stigmatized groups such as blacks, the indigenous and women. But they also include people who have been left on the sidelines as their societies speed along in the race to modern, globalized economies. . . . For instance, women have been included in some dimensions (formal political representation and education) but are still segregated in worse jobs than men. Contrastingly, entire sectors of the population have been excluded from formal jobs and their associated social insurance protection by slow growth and unemployment.<sup>47</sup>

In these particular contexts, the individuals and families in our study deliberated on the decision to emigrate. Migration decisions are multidimensional, often involving overlapping concerns reflecting a mix of structural constraints and individual and household considerations.<sup>48</sup> The formation of environments of insecurity shaped the context in which our participants' migration decisions were made. The initial goal of Miamians we interviewed who arrived after 1986 was to achieve forms of security for themselves and their spatially extended families.

In the mid-2000s, regional development shifted away from the United States and neoliberalism. Social democratic governments emerged and benefited from Chinese raw materials imports. Some Miamians returned to more institutionalized democracies in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Peru, where economic security seemed more attainable. Other governments espoused populism, socialism, and personalized presidential power, stimulating new flows of immigrants to Miami from Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombians, Nicaraguans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Hondurans, and Mexicans continued to come in search of greater security.

Although migration is undertaken to achieve a greater sense of human security along multiple measures, immigrants found their presence was sometimes seen as a threat to current US residents' perceived ontological security through multiculturalism and, more broadly, to US national security.

### *Securitization of US Immigration Policy*

Immigration has long threatened US residents' sense of cultural identity, challenging an Anglo, Protestant, English-speaking narrative of the nation with multicultural perspectives, experiences, and norms. The increase in the number of Spanish-speaking immigrants to the United States in recent decades has exacerbated these xenophobic fears.<sup>49</sup> In 2004, Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington gave a scientific stamp of approval to these perceived threats when he argued that Hispanics posed a challenge for the United States, in that a large number of immigrants could dominate cities such as Los Angeles and Miami, causing a "cultural division between His-



panics and Anglos,” which could become “the most serious cleavage in U.S. society.”<sup>50</sup>

Warnings of an immigrant takeover often cited Miami as the example the rest of the nation should avoid, as congressional representative Tom Tancredo did while seeking the 2008 Republican presidential nomination. Tancredo stated many times that a high immigrant-receiving area such as Miami “[had] become a Third World country.” According to Tancredo, “the sheer size and number of ethnic enclaves devoid of any English and dominated by foreign cultures is widespread,” and “until America gets serious about demanding assimilation, this problem will continue to spread.”<sup>51</sup> When then Florida governor Jeb Bush, a Republican who is married to a Mexican and lives in Miami, protested, Tancredo responded he was calling “attention to a real problem that [could not] be easily dismissed through politically correct happy talk.”<sup>52</sup>

Although Cubans and Cuban Americans are often considered to be among the most advantaged US Latino groups, these xenophobic fears target Latino and Cuban culture given how prevalent these groups are in Miami. As much as Cuban migration has been thought of as an “actively supported” population movement,<sup>53</sup> Cubans are not immune to Latino racialization, including perceptions of Latino (or Cuban) spaces as threats to the nation’s cultural identity.

John Tirman argues that “migration has long had security implications, but mostly linked to ‘social’ security—jobs, welfare, etc.”<sup>54</sup> Immigrants have been perceived as drains on local and state coffers, this perception resulting in proposals such as Proposition 187 in California (the “Save Our State” initiative) that aimed to bar undocumented immigrants from receiving public services (including public education). Immigrants were deemed to be “undeserving” of benefits, a theme that also surfaced in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which made undocumented immigrants ineligible for social security benefits even if they paid the required taxes. That same year, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 also passed, essentially barring undocumented immigrants from most federal, state, and local public benefits, in addition to denying federal assistance to millions of *legal* immigrants.<sup>55</sup> Some even called for sharp reductions to the number of legal immigrants to the United States during this time.<sup>56</sup>

Anthropologist Leo Chavez argues that anti-immigrant discourses in the 1990s targeted anyone who looked, acted, or spoke like a foreigner and expressed nativist anger about demographic changes that were viewed as a “threat to the ‘nation’ that is conceived of as a singular, predominantly Euro-American, English-speaking culture.” He continues, “By eliminating or reducing these stigmatized groups, immigration reform would, in theory, ‘do something’ about the source of the ‘problems’ facing US citizens, prob-



lems in the economy, education system, health care, and even the relations of local governments with the federal government.”<sup>57</sup>

If, in the mid-twentieth century, immigrants symbolized this country’s immigrant heritage, then by the latter part of the twentieth century, migration was linked to US residents’ increased sense of insecurity due to cultural and social changes, which were perceived as threats to the established order and ethnic worldview. By the early 2000s, though, unease from growing multiculturalism was compounded by “the threat of terrorism” that additionally framed the immigration debate.<sup>58</sup> Efforts to link immigration to national security efforts are not new,<sup>59</sup> dating all the way back to the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798.<sup>60</sup> In the current period, restrictive immigration measures enacted in the mid to late 1990s as a response to the identification of immigrants as cultural and social threats facilitated the creation of the legislative infrastructure that has recast immigrants after 9/11 as threats to US national security.<sup>61</sup>

In sum, nativism, xenophobia, and general hostility toward newcomers are not exclusively modern phenomena, nor are they particular to the United States.<sup>62</sup> But, just as fearful natives or calculating politicians have called Miami a multicultural nightmare, the city is understood quite differently in the context of the Americas as a whole.

### *Marketing Miami: Social Remittances and the (Latino) American Dream*

Portraits of comfortable lifestyles in the United States and the status symbols deployed in the marketing of US products and consumption practices are transmitted throughout the world through global media and the export of US cultural products. Miami, when viewed as a city of leisure friendly to immigrants, has its own place among these circulations. In recent decades, the promotional machinery that created a “Magic City” from a city of racial segregation and hurricanes has modernized and internationalized.<sup>63</sup> The glamour of Miami’s promotional past fused with a Latin American cultural ethos projected itself across the hemisphere through transnational media spectacles aimed at Latin America and the US Latino market. Global media representations of Miami exported the idea of the Latino American Dream, seen in high-profile showcases of Latinos such as Emilio and Gloria Estefan, the Latin Grammys, telenovelas filmed in Miami, and parades of Latino pop star weddings and childbirths featured in glossy magazines such as *¡Hola!* Once unhooked from homeland safety nets, some immigrants to Miami followed discourses that synthesized the promotional frames embedded in Miami’s “Magic City” and “Capital of Latin America” monikers.

The ideology of the American Dream and the marketing of this dream to Latin Americans are both cultural products and social remittances that,

along with visits from seemingly “successful” immigrants back home, are collectively thought to entice nonmigrants to enter into global mobility circuits.<sup>64</sup> Mediated or interpersonally transmitted stories of the successful Latino population have continued to lure immigrants to Miami in what is now considered to be a process of “cumulative causation” in which migratory flows are sustained regardless of whether the original motives for migration remain. This phenomenon helps to explain why the more members of different Latin American communities gain US migration experience, the more likely nonmigrants from those very communities will embark on their first trip.<sup>65</sup>

Though, for some, the repatriated American Dream is a misrepresentation of what life in the United States is like, the prevailing assumption prior to immigration is that hard work results in greater levels of economic and social security and material comfort. Moreover, potential immigrants are exposed to other US ideologies. Among these is the notion that, for women in particular, the United States offers opportunities that may not be available in their home countries. As Alejandra indicated, the idea that age might not hinder women’s opportunities in the United States to the same extent as in Colombia reinforces meritocratic and egalitarian ideals. Thus, information streams from media and immigrant relatives or friends can create hope that migration will yield higher levels of human security across its many dimensions.

Immigrants’ willingness to pursue the American Dream, which rests on assumptions of equal opportunity and perceived access to resources in the United States, suggests that immigrants place confidence in US meritocratic ideals. Thus, migration represents the embodiment of trust that immigrants’ efforts will be rewarded and of faith in a system of equal opportunity that is carried by social remittances and marketed through global media. This contrasts with their experiences of stagnated social mobility in their home countries.

As Giddens argues, this trust becomes a form of emotional inoculation against the existential anxieties that might develop from the process of contemplating migration and the experience of migration itself. This trust “allows the individual to sustain hope and courage in the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront.”<sup>66</sup> Alejandra’s comments about her expectations before migrating illustrate these expectations: “What was I expecting? That it would be easier to accomplish things; I was going to have a good income.” Overall, for immigrants headed to Miami, one of the appeals was the idea that success stories indeed existed in the city, with the Cuban success story in particular being held up as a model for other immigrants to emulate, and the city’s cultural diversity served as a magnet to populations who wished to follow in their footsteps.

To further understand the context that greets contemporary immigrants to Miami, however, we need to examine the city’s past and its evolution

into the multiethnic, global metropolis it is today. We look at the history of immigrant incorporation in the city and focus on its two largest national-origin populations to illustrate the different trajectories immigrants' experiences can take. These trajectories depend on various factors, among them, the countries from which they emigrate and the policies that receive them upon arrival.

## **Origins of Exclusion in Miami**

Most studies of immigrants and their modes of incorporation in Greater Miami have focused on Cubans and Cuban Americans, although others have contrasted the arrival of groups such as Haitians and Nicaraguans to the Cuban success story.<sup>67</sup> Immigrants arriving in Miami face the material and ideological legacies of a US racial project that outdates and, in some important ways, has outlived the Cuban transformation of the city. Miami's history includes material and ideological legacies of white supremacy that were fairly typical of many southern US cities, but with the distinction that civil rights era reforms, which politically empowered African Americans in urban areas across the South in the late twentieth century, had a different outcome in Miami: they helped to empower early waves of Cubans who arrived with high levels of human capital, entrepreneurial skills, and an ability to frame themselves socially as white.

### *Racial Segregation and Racial Projects*

Throughout its history, Miami has been among the most racially segregated cities in the United States, a condition that spanned two decades of riots (the 1960s and 1980s) and that lasted long after white supremacist doctrines were officially removed from federal and local law.<sup>68</sup> Through the majority of the twentieth century, African Americans in Miami were confined to overcrowded neighborhoods by legal statute, federal government housing policies, and real estate practices that drew a "red line" around areas in which blacks were allowed to purchase homes. The use of extreme violence against blacks to stop neighborhood desegregation prompted federal investigations as late as the 1950s. When Cubans arrived en masse in the 1960s, white elites had finally achieved a three-decade-long project of removing African Americans from the original "Colored Town" area west of the central business district to a "second ghetto" that was created with federal funds five miles away around a housing project called, ironically enough, Liberty Square.<sup>69</sup>

For years, local civic leaders wanted to remove blacks from the city's original black neighborhood, now called Overtown, so that Miami's busi-

ness district could expand. The construction of the interstate system in the county in the late 1960s gave them the opportunity, and an estimated 40,000 African Americans, Bahamians, and other black Miamians were displaced from the commercial and cultural heart of black life, also called “The Harlem of the South.” The first riots in black areas of Miami surged in the neighborhood of Liberty City in the 1960s. Many in both white and black elite circles blamed Cuban immigrants for labor force displacement, but later evidence cast doubt on this claim. Cubans built their own residential and economic enclaves in the 1960s and 1970s rather than displacing blacks, but the difference in treatment between repressed African Americans and government support for Cuban newcomers heightened the sense of injustice.<sup>70</sup>

Legacies of Miami’s legally enshrined white racism continue to be manifested in residential patterns, municipal boundaries, and electoral districts. We argue that these are the outward signs of racial projects of the state, or what Michael Omi and Howard Winant refer to as worldviews linking representations and significations of the human body with organizational structures and institutional forms that naturalize a social order based upon body characteristics.<sup>71</sup> Racial projects that guided Miami’s foundation in the early part of the twentieth century remain most visible in residential living patterns (where blacks live in more segregated areas compared to other groups), as well as court-ordered electoral districts based upon segregated neighborhoods as a way to ensure “minority” representation on governmental boards. As we will see in Chapter 5, redistricting produced districts that some politicians claimed for their own ethnicity over the years, whether as an “African American,” a “Cuban,” or an “American” (read: white) seat. This facilitated the political incorporation of Cubans and African Americans in local politics on a geographic basis but disadvantaged later immigrant groups. While in the 2000s, Cubans were overrepresented in relation to their percentage of the overall population, redistricting also pitted African American candidates against Haitian ones and may have contributed to the withdrawal of Anglos and Jews into small, newly incorporated municipalities, such as Aventura and Palmetto Bay (incorporated in 1995 and 2002, respectively).

The Cuban transformation of Miami occurred within this set of racialized political institutions, flowing through them rather than radically altering them.<sup>72</sup> In other words, US political, governmental, and educational institutions indeed became more populated with Cubans and Cuban Americans, and the percentage of African Americans in these organizations also greatly increased, but the racialized institutional structures themselves lived on.

Although US institutional structures remained intact in most cases, the Cuban transformation of Miami included cultural shifts with implications

for the feel of inclusiveness in the city compared to the rest of the country. Speaking Spanish or accented English no longer was a marker of *alienness* in Miami. Black-white dichotomies in US racial codes were also blurred, though never erased, and other forms of national-origin, class-based, and legal hierarchies supplemented them.

### *Immigrant Incorporation in a Racially Segregated City*

Cuban immigrants in Miami transformed from a refugee community into one that, over the years, eventually came to lead many arenas of local social, cultural, and political life.<sup>73</sup> As the seminal work on Miami, Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick's *City on the Edge* documents the rise of Cubans as a locally focused political and cultural force in the 1980s.<sup>74</sup> Through their opposition to xenophobic political initiatives, the educational and entrepreneurial experiences they brought from Cuba, the household structure of earlier waves, rates of female labor force participation, and the character loans received from coethnics in banks, Miami's Cubans developed an enclave where the culture and institutions of Cuban society were re-created in the United States.<sup>75</sup>

The geography of race in Miami was set when Cubans arrived. In a segregated city and county, they settled in an area south of Overtown, later known as Little Havana, and in the working-class white city of Hialeah. As their numbers grew, Cubans expanded around the perimeters of Overtown and Liberty City, where blacks had been legally confined until the 1950s and then extralegally corralled through violence when they tried to move "across the color line" into white neighborhoods.<sup>76</sup> While Cuban households came to mix with those of native-born whites as their income levels grew, they rarely entered black neighborhoods.<sup>77</sup>

At the same time, the new immigrants had to negotiate discourses among the native white population that oscillated between defining them as an alien invasion or as a hardworking, entrepreneurial group and "one of us." Referred to as the Golden Exiles, the initial waves of Cuban immigrants arrived in the early 1960s with education and entrepreneurial experience.<sup>78</sup> In contrast to immigrants from other countries, and to help boost entrepreneurial activities in the enclave, Cuban immigrants arriving prior to 1980 received unprecedented government aid to resettle with the intent of draining the Castro regime of human capital and creating a "symbolic showcase" to promote capitalist ideology in the Caribbean.<sup>79</sup>

Some elite members of Miami's business community worked to create a positive discourse about the new arrivals. White business elites benefited from the 1960s construction boom that occurred after the exiles' arrival and had acquaintances among the exiles because of Miami-Havana business dealings prior to the Cuban Revolution.<sup>80</sup> These factors and the exile com-

munity's business success convinced elite whites to define Cubans as one of "us." The white welcome suited Cuban immigrants who "wished for acceptance in a racially divided, color conscious society," a description that particularly fit Miami, which was at that time under court order to desegregate its schools after being found in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in 1969.<sup>81</sup>

Initial waves of Cubans in Miami also were contrasted with Afro-Cuban coethnics in Tampa and other Latin American and Caribbean groups (e.g., Mexicans and Puerto Ricans) across the United States, who had been legally racialized as black in other parts of the country.<sup>82</sup> Blackness became synonymous with being racially inassimilable, and in some cases, Latino groups such as Mexican Americans were considered "alien citizens."<sup>83</sup>

By the early 1980s, US relations with Cuba and the sociopolitical profile of Cuban immigrants had changed. In this period, about 125,000 Cubans, many considered to be poor and nonwhite, arrived via an exile-organized boat lift from the port of Mariel. Differences in demographics and political experience, as well as poor US press treatment linking them to crime and the emptying of Castro's jails, weakened the Cuban in-group solidarity that had helped create an enclave economy.<sup>84</sup> The negative press discourse also turned the entrepreneurial and political capacity of early Cubans toward politics in Miami through the process of reactive identity formation. The notion that ethnic identities intensify when individuals perceive prejudice and discrimination foreshadowed trends to come,<sup>85</sup> including Cubans' political transformation of Miami in the 1990s, remaking the city into a cultural pole of attraction for Spanish speakers.

Since 1995, the automatic legal status enjoyed by earlier groups of Cubans has been guaranteed only for a small group of visa seekers selected by lottery in Cuba and for those ingenious enough to make it to US soil. Public assistance also has been greatly reduced. Today, daily life in Miami, including for recent Cuban immigrants, involves navigating through the formal and informal mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in a city that remains anchored in US racial projects of the racist past and "colorblind" present. Later-arriving Cubans as well as non-Cuban immigrants often find the institutional support mechanisms that were extended to Cubans in previous decades lacking. The reception of Haitians, the second-largest immigrant group in Miami-Dade County, provides the starkest contrast.

Miami's Haitian community was small until deteriorating conditions in that country spawned a mass exodus by boat toward the Bahamas and South Florida in the late 1970s.<sup>86</sup> Special programs were set up to quickly deport the Haitians, and the Reagan administration deployed the Coast Guard to stop immigrant arrivals at sea for the first time in US history.<sup>87</sup> In a second wave of mass immigration during the political instability and violence that characterized the postdictatorship political transition in Haiti

from 1992 to 1995, 67,190 Haitians were intercepted at sea and returned to Haiti.<sup>88</sup>

Haitians met a cold US reception in the 1980s and 1990s, facing pervasive negative stereotypes, a stagnant economy, and a federal government resolved to block entry and settlement.<sup>89</sup> Trends continued into the 2000s, when after September 11, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft implied terrorists might pose as Haitians in order to sneak into the country by boat. He ordered Haitians who passed the standard “credible fear threshold” for political asylum to be detained until their court hearings, while immigrants from other countries in similar situations were typically paroled to the community.<sup>90</sup> Lawyers representing Haitians met restricted visitation hours and scarce visitation space.<sup>91</sup> More recently, with about 55,000 Haitians approved for family reunification visas but still facing up to seven years’ wait on the first anniversary of the devastating earthquake of January 2010, community advocates made the comparison to Cuban émigrés approved for expedited family reunification three years earlier based upon, among other things, urgent humanitarian reasons.

By the 2010s, Greater Miami’s Haitian community had created its own civic organizations, advocacy groups, and bloc of local officials. With professional and middle-income Haitians becoming more numerous, the Haitian community in Miami has set down deep roots and grown to be the largest community of Haitians in the United States. However, recent decades have seen the growth of other immigrant communities in Miami, an issue we turn to next.

### **Immigrant Diversification and Multiethnicity in Miami, 1990s–2000s**

The theoretical implications of *City on the Edge* suggest that an immigrant group (e.g., Cubans) could be successful in this country without having to acculturate to white, Anglo American society.<sup>92</sup> The analysis, however, uncovered troubled relations among whites, African Americans, and Cubans, questioning whether these groups would come together. Contemporary Miami is predominantly Latino, with Cubans making up the largest Latino group. The city overall, however, is increasingly multiethnic in its demographics. Table 1.1 shows how in 2012, Cubans were 35 percent of Miami-Dade’s population, non-Hispanic whites were 16 percent, and non-Hispanic blacks made up 17 percent. Thirty of the remaining 32 percent consisted of mostly non-Cuban Latinos.

Cubans as a percent of the Latino population in Miami-Dade County declined slightly from 1990 to 2000, rising again in 2012. At the same time, the Hispanic-origin population was 64 percent of the total Miami-Dade



**Table 1.1 Race and Hispanic Origin of Persons in Miami-Dade County and Rate of Change, 1990, 2000, and 2012 (percentage)**

Race/Ethnicity of Population	1990	% Change	2000	% Change	2012 <sup>a</sup>
Non-Hispanic whites	30.2	-31.5	20.7	-22.7	16.1
Non-Hispanic blacks	19.1	-0.5	19.0	-10.0	17.1
Hispanics	49.2	16.5	57.3	12.2	64.3
Cuban	29.1	-0.7	28.9	19.4	34.5
Non-Cuban Hispanic	20.1	41.3	28.4	4.9	29.8
Other	1.4	21.4	1.7	11.8	1.9
Multiracial	n.a.	n.a.	1.4	-57.1	0.6
Total <sup>b</sup>	100.0		100.0		100.0

*Sources:* US Census Bureau (1990, 2000, 2012).

*Notes:* a. Given that the difference between the 2010 Decennial Census and the 2012 ACS ethnic group proportions are very similar, the most recent data are reported in this table.

b. Totals may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

n.a. = not applicable.

County population in 2012, up from 49 percent in 1990 and 57 percent in 2000. As Cubans continued relocation to Miami, the non-Cuban Latino and Caribbean populations increased at a much faster pace during the 1990s, slowing considerably in the 2000s, but not without diversifying the area (see Table 1.2).<sup>93</sup> The diversification of Miami's immigrant community includes South American professionals seeking physical, economic, and social security; Haitians seeking political stability and economic security; and Mexicans and Central Americans fleeing both physical violence and economic insecurity. Venezuelans, some of whom describe themselves as political exiles, flee all of the above.<sup>94</sup> Puerto Ricans, though technically not immigrants, undergo similar transitions by crossing cultural, racial, and geopolitical borders.<sup>95</sup> Their experiences are included for these reasons, particularly given the acceleration of migration in the 2000s due to government layoffs, a drug-related crime wave, and US job recruitment targeting professional and service workers. In addition to these groups, the ultra-wealthy from all over the world have homes in Miami, as do celebrities seeking the city's glitzy media spotlight. By the 2000s, Miami was no longer an ethnic enclave in the sense of an economically and geographically bounded ethnic neighborhood, but rather an immigrant metropolis where Hispanics dominate and African Americans and other blacks are residually concentrated. White non-Hispanics also cluster but mix much more with Hispanics than blacks.<sup>96</sup>

In the mid-1990s, scholars debated the implications of increasing immigrant concentration because it appeared to be related to the acceleration of out-migration from the city of low-income and less-skilled domestic internal migrants, leading to what William Frey called a "demographic



balkanization” across many regions of the country.<sup>97</sup> Patricia Zavella researched how global economic restructuring led to similar characterizations of California’s demographic transition and a sense of “paradise lost” by white citizens in the 1990s.<sup>98</sup> “White flight” occurred in parts of California given the cultural anxieties caused by increasing Latin American populations. The patterns of emigration of whites from Miami mirror these dynamics.

Rather than use the term *balkanization*, which suggests the entrenchment of ethnic groups, we argue that Miami and perhaps other minority-majority cities instead have been *ghettoized* in the collective imagination of the US citizenry, leading to the racialization of places in the discourse of conservatives and others alarmed by demographic shifts. Thus, immigrants are not necessarily closing off their communities, but instead native whites and blacks who perceive the browning of Miami further reinforce patterns of out-migration from the city. What is “new” about this trend is, according to Frey, “its geographic scope.” In contrast to segregation patterns across neighborhoods or between cities and suburbs, “the emergence of entire metropolitan areas or labor market regions that are distinct from the rest of the country in their race, ethnic, and demographic makeup introduces a new dimension.”<sup>99</sup> Thus, particular regions of the country are becoming racialized spaces.

Miami’s cultural diversity and the political ascendancy of Cubans are not lost on immigrants who have come since the late 1980s. Immigrants we interviewed who had been in other areas of the United States reported many experiences of white racism prior to relocating to Miami.<sup>100</sup> Jaime, a forty-seven-year-old mortgage officer, traveled around the United States for ten years before settling in Miami in the early 2000s. The potential for greater cultural acceptance drew him to Miami: “People are more friendly here. It makes it easier to be in the United States. When you land in places like New England, the first day I arrived there and rented a car. . . . I put the date with the day before the month . . . [and] the woman said, ‘What did you put here?’ And I said, ‘In my country we put the day first.’ And then she tells me, ‘Now you are in America!’” In other parts of the country, Jaime believed, “They are always insulting you.” He continued, “When they see I look more American than Hispanic but I had an accent, they would ask, ‘Where are you from?’ And I [answered], ‘Dominican.’ Oh, you noted the difference, the rejection.” Jaime had lived in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Virginia. “And when I came here to Florida, Florida is cosmopolitan. People are from all over, from Peru, from Ecuador. We accept each other and exploit each other every day.”

The perceived acceptance of immigrant groups in Miami does not necessarily mean that one finds racial or ethnic mixing or even coethnic solidarity. The paradox that Jaime lays out is twofold: He rejects discrimination from whites, stating that, in Miami, he feels better. Yet the paradox is re-

**Table 1.2 Select Groups by National Origin in Miami-Dade County and Percent Change, 1990–2000 and 2000–2012**

Country of Origin	1990		2000		2012 <sup>a</sup>	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Cuba	561,868	29.0	650,601	28.9	894,168	34.5
Haiti	n.d.	n.d.	95,669	4.2	123,001	4.7
Dominican Republic	23,475	1.2	36,454	1.6	64,991	2.5
Puerto Rico	68,634	3.5	80,327	3.6	90,646	3.5
Mexico	23,193	1.2	38,095	1.7	58,291	2.2
Central America	119,534	6.2	128,903	5.7	222,992	8.6
Nicaragua	74,244	3.8	69,257	3.1	113,501	4.4
Honduras	18,102	0.9	26,829	1.2	53,691	2.1
El Salvador	7,339	0.4	9,115	0.4	21,218	0.8
Guatemala	8,242	0.4	9,676	0.4	18,035	0.7
Panama	6,729	0.3	5,863	0.3	8,235	0.3
Costa Rica	4,743	0.2	4,706	0.2	7,835	0.3
Other Central America	135	0.0	3,457	0.2	477	0.0
South America	108,498	5.6	164,228	7.3	314,640	12.1
Colombia	53,582	2.8	70,066	3.1	129,981	5.0
Venezuela	9,846	0.5	21,593	1.0	48,025	1.9
Peru	16,452	0.8	23,327	1.0	47,811	1.8
Argentina	8,585	0.4	13,341	0.6	27,312	1.1
Ecuador	7,986	0.4	10,560	0.5	21,554	0.8
Chile	7,928	0.4	7,910	0.4	10,632	0.4
Uruguay	1,482	0.1	1,829	0.1	6,432	0.2
Bolivia	2,309	0.1	2,418	0.1	5,997	0.2
Paraguay	166	0.0	434	0.0	1,109	0.0
Brazil	n.d.	n.d.	9,880	0.4	15,432	0.6
Other South America	161	0.0	2,870	0.1	355	0.0

(continues)

**Table 1.2 continued**

Country of Origin	1990		Change in Population (percentage)		2000		Change in Population (percentage)		2012 <sup>a</sup>	
	Number	Percentage			Number	Percentage			Number	Percentage
Other Hispanic	44,498	2.3	356.2		203,009	9.0	-82.2		36,232	1.4
Jamaica	n.d.	n.d.	n.a.		41,576	1.8	-5.7		39,217	1.5
Bahamas	n.d.	n.d.	n.a.		8,924	0.4	-5.0		8,477	0.3
Total Latin America and the Caribbean <sup>b</sup>	1,061,669	54.8	35.8		1,442,019	64.0	27.4		1,837,223	70.9
Total	1,937,094		16.3		2,253,362		15.0		2,591,035	

*Sources:* US Census Bureau (1990, 2000, 2012).

*Notes:* a. ACS data are based on estimates. As such, the total sum of the estimates for individual countries of origin may not match the estimate for the particular region in which the country is located.

b. Total numbers include countries of origin not included in this table (e.g., Virgin Islands).

n.d. = no data.

n.a. = not applicable.

vealed in his statement, “We accept each other and exploit each other every day,” a statement illustrative of the notion of inclusionary discrimination in which “racial and ethnic inclusion [exist] alongside discriminatory practices.”<sup>101</sup> The question is not so much about whether racial exclusion exists; the issue is, rather, that race sets the *terms* of inclusion.

In addition to immigrant diversification, since the late 1980s, many other national and global developments transpired, forming the contextual layers undergirding the contemporary experiences of US immigrants. On top of the immigration debates of recent decades, the city also reflects economic bifurcation and the compression of the US middle class.

### **Economic Polarization, Labor Market Segmentation, and Neoliberal City Policies**

As the gateway to the Americas, Miami’s economic and ethnic structures exhibit patterns associated with a global city, revealing a confluence of cultures and peoples that includes highly mobile executives and professionals earning high wages (who presumably have legal status) and others who are placebound as a result of their unauthorized status or lack of financial resources. The latter usually work in low-wage jobs and oftentimes cannot transfer their occupational statuses from their home countries, leading to a city of contrasts where class has multiple dimensions and where poverty rates are among the highest in the United States. In this context, finding a middle-class job is hard, although more than economic structures are at work. Economic troubles occur when immigrants cannot transfer professional credentials and educational degrees, or when language impedes passage of licensing requirements, in addition to the issue of whether one has the legal residency necessary to work in a professional job or seek higher education. In the case of women, who may come as dependents of their husbands recruited through occupational preference categories, they may not have work permits, rendering them confined to the domestic sphere of the home in spite of their former occupational statuses and levels of education. For those who do attain work permits, gendered occupations and inequality in pay result in greater levels of economic vulnerability among older women in particular, and this vulnerability most negatively affects women heading single-parent households.

Many immigrants in our sample felt that the United States was indeed a country where they could work; however, the nature of their jobs in low-skill service industries left no time or energy to focus on family or social relationships. In spite of full-time work, and in some cases due to barriers to finding jobs that would provide sufficient work hours, some felt misled by what they heard about the American Dream because their hard work did

not substantially raise their standard of living beyond the status of the working poor. Among others entering with high levels of human capital, many felt their material goals were seriously compromised by downward mobility in other interrelated statuses, including lost political status (denial of political voice, fear of incarceration, and threat of deportation), deteriorated economic and social class status (downward mobility for professionals or the homeland upper middle class), and a perception of lower racial standing when compared to mixed race societies of the Caribbean and regions farther south. Altogether, the downgrading of social statuses led to feelings of despair.

In this regard, while many immigrants fled environments of insecurity stemming from the effects of neoliberalism, they entered a global city that was also affected by economic globalization and was developing equally troubling sources of insecurity. As Jan Lin has argued, parallels exist between the neoliberal city of the global North and neoliberalism in other countries, including “devolution from public financing of urban infrastructure and services in favor of privatization and public-private partnerships.” He adds that this shift is “akin to the neoliberal economic strategies pursued by developing countries that invite foreign investment through tax holidays and free trade zones.”<sup>102</sup>

The toll that neoliberal policies have taken on the city and the visible signs of growing levels of income and wealth inequalities in Miami were noted by immigrants, particularly those who had established histories of periodically visiting Miami to see family members or as tourists prior to settlement. Even Alejandra, the Colombian immigrant whose narrative opened this chapter, noted the deterioration of the city’s infrastructure when comparing the current situation with her recollection of Miami in trips prior to emigration. It was “completely different. . . . Now I see a very poor city.”

In spite of being an immigrant herself, Alejandra and others in our sample often placed some of the blame for these negative changes on increased immigration to the area. “You did not see so many immigrants. . . . [I have witnessed] quite a lot of poverty and deterioration in Miami, a lot with respect to what it was before. . . . And [when I] speak to everyone about this so-called American Dream, [I hear] the struggles and the indecisions of all those who regret coming.”

Alejandra also highlighted the positive side of migration and life in the United States: “The only good thing is that there are opportunities to work and that here, you do not grow old as quickly as you do in our countries, and that is an advantage.” Although these quotes reveal the contradictions that Miami, and the United States in general, represent (e.g., struggle versus opportunity), they also illustrate feelings of ambivalence toward migration. Immigrants recognize how migration has brought greater security in some respects, but also how new forms of insecurity plague their lives in the

global city. For some, these insecurities are financial; for others, they are related to temporary or liminal legal statuses; and for still others, they are tied to new experiences as racial minorities in a land that is not their own.

As a result of barriers to full incorporation, recent decades have ushered in accounts of immigrants who work hard to maintain ties to their former countries. Although disagreement can be found about whether these ties are sustained mostly by those barred from opportunities to integrate into US society, or if those who maintain such ties do so because maintaining them becomes easier with full US incorporation, a consensus exists that many immigrant groups maintain cross-border linkages through remittances, contact with home country family members and friends, travel, and, in some cases, transnational businesses. What remains unclear is whether and how these transnational connections enhance the lived experiences of being an immigrant in a US global city.

### **Cross-Border Imagination, Adaptation, and Belonging**

Scholarly debates about the declining role of states in the lives of immigrants became popular in the 1990s. Arguing that immigrants bypassed national boundaries by maintaining linkages to their home societies, researchers showed how immigrants worked to sustain ties through visits, remittances, cross-border community development and involvement, and entrepreneurial activities. This research challenged scholars to depart from the “container” approach to immigrants’ lives toward a more dynamic view of immigrant communities and the processes through which immigrants engaged in transnationalism as an exercise of agency to combat sources of structural constraints in their lives in the United States.<sup>103</sup> Although since then many argued that transnational formations are not new,<sup>104</sup> others maintained that advances in technology, communications, and travel compressed time and space, leading to new social formations and patterns of adaptation.<sup>105</sup>

Subsequent years witnessed a surge in research on immigrant transnationalism leading to new conclusions about the nature of immigrant adaptation in a globalized world. Transnational perspectives were employed to further understand the situation of immigrants from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Puerto Rico, among many other areas.<sup>106</sup> More recently, Jorge Duany has argued that transnationalism takes shape based on the character of the sociopolitical ties between sending and receiving countries.<sup>107</sup> He argues that, although cultural border zones encompass both sending and receiving countries, legal boundaries entrench divisions among transnational families.<sup>108</sup> This complicated situation results in emotional experiences of transnationalism that, although sometimes overlooked, are garnering increasing attention.<sup>109</sup>

This point takes us back to Alejandra's story. The conditions under which she immigrated illustrate the costs of migration that are borne by transnational families and those who live with heavy hearts given the legal boundaries that separate kinship groups.<sup>110</sup> Alejandra left her two teenage children in Colombia so they could get a college education. As they embarked on the path of early adulthood, Alejandra was coming upon her fifties and faced life as an immigrant in a new country. Migration appears to be turning the normative stages of the life cycle on their heads, in particular, the way in which young adults, in contrast to their parents, experience these life stages. As Alejandra's children stayed close to home to further their educations rather than going abroad, as many do, Alejandra was the one who left the household to increase her status and fulfill her desire for independence, in contrast to many parents of adult immigrants, who remain in the home country when their children depart.

Just as experiences of life cycle stages are shifting, so too are the expectations of how to "accomplish" gendered social roles. Carlos, a Dominican immigrant, recounted in a focus group how migration changed the way he approached fatherhood: "I was raising my son and suddenly the decision is made to come here and there is a physical bond, a personal bond, that is going to break. . . . I did not want him to feel it. . . . So that is why I stay in touch. He is eight years old. . . . I call every day. I ask him, 'How are you? What did you do today? They said you did this or that thing at school. What did you have for supper? Did you eat your meat?'"

Although scholarship on transnationalism emphasizes the agency of actors over state controls, our research reveals that transnational families are subject to high levels of state regulation that (1) keep families apart because of legal restrictions on entry and reunification, (2) dissolve families' abilities to engage in face-to-face interactions and care work through restrictions on exit and reentry for certain kinds of visa holders and long delays in review of applications for family reunification visas, and (3) separate families through detention and deportation procedures, regardless if any member of the family has US citizenship. Similar to feminists' critiques of state efforts to control women's bodies, immigration policies are increasing state regulation of immigrant families.<sup>111</sup>

If we return to our opening discussion of homesickness and loneliness among migrants and consider how the lives of transnational families are increasingly subject to state restrictions, we see how the social, cultural, political, and economic trends we have discussed thus far come to weigh on the shoulders of immigrants and those they leave behind. In this book, we explore the nature of such struggles, particularly the emotional toll that ambivalence toward migration takes on immigrants and the strategies that immigrants employ to combat these dislocations. We illustrate how immigrants construct spaces of belonging that nurture lives that are embedded simulta-

neously within Miami and their places of origin. The richness of their trans-border experience varies, but their efforts clearly challenge conventional approaches to citizenship by weaving together practices of emplacement and belonging that blend the original and new home.

The strategies immigrants use to manage the emotional challenges of migration involve practices that make them feel as if they are socially and sensorially embedded in two places at the same time. These strategies enact a form of being and belonging, which we call *translocal social citizenship*, that claims simultaneous social membership in two local spaces.

Locality is a quality of place, or a "structure of feeling," associated with a locale. For geographer Doreen Massey, locality results from face-to-face encounters, or physical co-presence, in a place that is socially constructed and imbued with meaning through experience, the ongoing construction of social relations, and the shared feelings and understandings associated with those relationships. Another key thinker on space and place, anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, extends the notion of locality to include not only feelings associated with places that are socially constructed through face-to-face co-presence, but also virtual places created through the use of communications technologies or media that facilitate social immediacy and interaction in imaginary or virtual modes of co-presence. For Appadurai, locality has a variable quality that is constituted by social immediacy and interaction within a range of contexts that must be constantly "worked" to maintain their meaning.<sup>112</sup> Our research shows that immigrants' routine communicative and imaginative practices extend social relations and subjectivities from the place of origin to the place of settlement, creating a translocal place that fuses the relationships, emotions, and even bodily sensations associated with the original home with the immigrant destination.

Citizenship studies have recognized how immigrants make many claims for belonging beyond those of formal legal membership. Our use of social citizenship draws on notions of substantive citizenship, which bases claims to belonging on participation in the social life of a place rather than on a legal right.<sup>113</sup> Unlike formal citizenship claims, immigrants' substantive citizenship practices are usually translocal rather than transnational. Someone may be a formal citizen of Colombia living in the United States, but that person makes his or her strongest claims for social belonging and inclusion in intimate networks based in the Colombian hometown and Miami.

Translocal social citizenship thus emphasizes the lived condition of membership in intimate groups and cultural collectives that are emplaced in geographically separated locales that immigrants connect by engaging in everyday practices of belonging. The first set of practices we identify maintains immigrants' memberships in significant social groups from the place



of origin by finding ways to sustain and nurture relationships, in person or through mediated forms of communication. Media scholars have argued that consumption of television content about faraway places can extract viewers from their geographical locations, at least through the imagination.<sup>114</sup> We find that many immigrants in Miami use synchronous communications technologies (texting, telephone, Internet video conferencing, or any social interaction that occurs in real time), as well as ethnic community or transnational media from the country of origin, to *remain* embedded in homeland cultures and comforts while residing elsewhere. The second set of practices involves experiencing the comfort and security of the natal home in Miami by engaging in translocal placemaking. Immigrants create sensorial approximations of the original home by engaging in habitual practices and attitudes associated with the original home, and creating group memberships based on shared cultural understandings or practices. Moreover, for many, the built and natural environments of Miami, as well as the circulations of people, products, and information between Miami and their home countries, enhance feelings of comfort and social belonging because they remind immigrants of original homes where individual and group identities were formed.

Immigrants from a wide variety of backgrounds expressed that Miami felt like home, in spite of the mechanisms of exclusion that they faced. Thus, if legal citizenship includes formal citizenship rights, such as legally protected presence, a public voice, the possibility of naturalization, and the possession of voting rights, then translocal practices are attempts to compensate for the ontological consequences of the denial of these things through constructions of social embeddedness in two places merged as one translocal home.

In this book, we build each chapter on the previous, culminating in our argument that citizenship is a multidimensional status of membership with varying layers of inclusionary and exclusionary categories and practices.<sup>115</sup> When barred from legal citizenship, Miami's residents have staked claim to substantive citizenship through their mundane participation in cultural collectives grounded in Miami, as well as in translocal networks of comfort and caring. Miami's structurally excluded residents enact membership by seeking paths through which to overcome exclusion. Some have obtained legal residency or formal citizenship, well-paid and meaningful work, or political incorporation through substantive representation by elected officials. Many, however, have not obtained the illusive goal they still call "el sueño americano," which, in immigrants' constructions of Miami, bundles their hopes for security, well-being, and social inclusion in the place they live in and sometimes call home.

In the following pages, we examine the cases of immigrants to Miami by empirically supporting the interpretations and arguments that we have

laid out in this chapter and will develop throughout this book. The hierarchies, experiences, and strategies we identify should be viewed as a set of intersecting planes through which immigrants traverse. We hope that our research can shed light on immigrants' experiences of these journeys and the tools and strategies that they employ to navigate through the pockets of globalization, and in the process, seek and create meaningful lives in Miami and other global cities.

## Data and Methodology

*Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami* contains descriptions of life in Miami from the perspective of participants' perceptions and experiences, immigration research spanning several disciplines, and insights from unstructured participant observation over the course of ten years by the authors, who all live or have lived in Miami. By placing immigrants' lived experiences and expressed interpretations of reality within a sociohistorical framework, we can better understand what happened to these people and the city they helped invigorate and sustain. Grounding our analysis in a constructivist paradigm of social inquiry, we describe how immigrants seek, negotiate, and engage possibilities to assert agency as global and local forces prompt their departure from home and suggest that Miami offers possibilities of membership in a more economically and physically secure community. We hear in their voices how embeddedness in transborder social groups allows them not only to maintain identities and statuses that mitigate marginalization and feelings of exclusion in Miami but also to continue to search for a multidimensional condition of human security through a strategy of immigration.

We define participants in the qualitative sample of our study as those arriving after the immigrant amnesty and legalization programs of the mid-1980s, such as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and include in this sample interviews and focus groups with Miamians from Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, and Puerto Rico. Rather than selecting countries of origin based upon the size of a national-origin group in Miami, we selected this sample in order to compare conditions of departure and reception for a wide range of nationality groups holding varied social statuses (e.g., race, citizenship, maturity of the receiving immigrant community, and class of origin).

This research follows the philosophy and method Michael Burawoy developed as the extended case study.<sup>116</sup> In the extended case study method, researchers examine how external forces shape the social situations of individuals and groups yet also consider how the actions of these individuals and groups stabilize (and destabilize) macrostructures. Using participant

observation as well as in-depth interviews and survey data, the inquiry extends from the microexperiences and processes of immediate, intimate daily life to the macroforces of global economics, geopolitics, and many forms of nation-state regulation, recognizing, as Burawoy has stated, that “there can be no one-way determination between processes and forces.”<sup>117</sup> Burawoy explains that the extended case method allows researchers to “emphasize the way the external ‘system’ colonized the subject lifeworld and how the lifeworld, in turn, negotiated the terms of domination, created alternatives, or took to creative protest.”<sup>118</sup>

Our case study employs a mixed method design, in which unstructured observation and participation were sequentially overlaid with semistructured in-depth interviews, focus groups, and, ultimately, a random sample survey that allowed for statistical testing of some of the findings that emerged from our qualitative analysis, as well as census data. Rather than using this method as strict hypothesis testing, we use the quantitative study as a form of triangulation of the findings in the qualitative study, as well as a way to deepen the understanding that resulted from the overall inquiry and to confirm the extent to which qualitative findings could be generalizable. The validity of the study’s findings is based upon collection of rich data, triangulation of data sources, and peer checks of researcher interpretations. Study team members engaged in internal peer-checking processes that resulted in each of the researchers analyzing data separately. Analyses and interpretations of the rich qualitative data, which produced more than 1,000 pages of transcripts, were then jointly corroborated, revised, or refined in regular group meetings that spanned several years. Further, comparison across data sources allowed trends to be juxtaposed and anomalies to be identified, scrutinized, and used to refine theory.

The project draws from interdisciplinary scholarship and five sources of data, as well as participant observation during the three authors’ many years of living in Miami-Dade and Broward counties. Typical of interdisciplinary ethnographic work, this approach draws its strengths from the immersion of researchers in the cultural group under study, as well as the use of multiple sources of data.<sup>119</sup> One of the authors is a broadly trained anthropologist and sociologist, who is also a naturalized US citizen from Peru who initially migrated with an H-4, nonworking visa in 1985. Another is a sociologist and daughter of Puerto Rican return migrants to the island, who, in turn, left the island for a US undergraduate education in 1991 and stayed. The third is a bilingual Anglo who has lived in Mexico and is an interdisciplinary social scientist trained in Latin American studies. As a communications scholar, her work encompasses both ethnography and audience reception research.

The first two data sets were collected in a purposive, nonrandom, snowball sample of 101 in-depth interviews and fifteen focus groups with

**Table 1.3 Qualitative Interview Sample Descriptives**

	Colombia	Cuba	Dominican Republic	Haiti	Mexico	Peru	Puerto Rico	Total
Gender								
Male	8	2	5	9	9	9	8	50
Female	6	10	8	4	7	7	9	51
Mean age	45.6	41.5	42.6	39.3	40.2	49.3	45.4	43.4
Educational attainment <sup>a</sup>								
Some high school	0	2	0	3	6	1	2	14
High school diploma	0	0	2	1	0	3	0	6
Some college	4	5	8	4	5	2	2	30
College degree	4	4	3	2	1	6	5	25
Graduate	5	1	0	0	3	4	7	20
Country where highest educational degree was attained <sup>a</sup>								
Country of origin	10	5	5	5	9	9	6	49
United States	3	7	8	8	6	4	9	45
Preferred language <sup>a</sup>								
Spanish	13	10	12	0	13	16	9	73
Creole	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
English	1	2	1	3	2	0	8	17
Mean years in the United States	5.9	11.8	10.9	14.3	11.7	8.2	8.5	10.2
Marital status <sup>a</sup>								
Married	5	0	8	4	9	8	9	43
Single	7	6	4	9	5	6	4	41
Divorced	2	4	1	0	0	2	2	11
Widowed	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	3
Have children	6	5	10	5	9	10	10	55
Mean number of children	1.34	2.6	2.4	1.4	2	2.2	2.3	2
Total by country of origin	14	12	13	13	16	16	17	<i>N</i> = 101

*Note:* a. The *N* for some descriptives may not match up to the subsample *N* due to missing information.

recent immigrants in Miami carried out from 2003 to 2006. Herein referred to as the “qualitative sample,” open-ended questions and discussion rather than tests of a priori categories were used by researchers to understand immigrants’ experiences and perceptions. Table 1.3 breaks down individual characteristics of the interview sample and Table 1.4 breaks down characteristics of participants in the focus groups.<sup>120</sup>

To expand the only non-Latino-origin group, we drew from a second qualitative data set that Sallie Hughes designed and oversaw. It includes sixty-nine in-depth interviews and five focus groups with a purposive, non-random sample of self-identifying Haitians and Haitian Americans. The data include immigration histories, perceptions of belonging in Miami, and

**Table 1.4 Characteristics of Focus Group Participants**

Characteristics	Number
Gender	
Women	55
Men	55
Country of Origin <sup>a</sup>	
Colombia	23
Cuba	14
Dominican Republic	25
Mexico	15
Peru	21
Puerto Rico	11

*Notes:* a.  $N = 109$  in this section due to missing information from one focus group participant.  $N = 110$ .

patterns of consumption (choice, use, reaction, and interaction) of Haitian ethnic community media and mainstream US media in Miami in 2008 and 2009.<sup>121</sup>

The fourth data set is derived from a telephone survey administered by the Institute for Public Opinion Research at Florida International University in 2008 to a random sample of 1,268 South Florida immigrants about issues of immigrant adaptation, subjective well-being, discrimination, measures of assimilation, and transnational participation. With the support of the National Science Foundation and in collaboration with our colleague Elizabeth Vaquera, we created this survey, which we call the Immigrant Transnationalism and Modes of Incorporation (ITMI) Quantitative Survey,<sup>122</sup> to examine first-generation immigrants from over eighty countries (both long-established settlers and newcomers). The qualitative findings were used to develop the survey questions that tested whether the information gained through the qualitative study was supported by data from a larger random sample of immigrants.<sup>123</sup> Table 1.5 contains the demographic characteristics of the quantitative sample.

Last, we draw from the US Census of 1990, 2000, and 2010, and 2012.<sup>124</sup> Like all social scientific inquiry, our training, values, research paradigms, and choice of methodology have influenced the results, but through a multiauthored method and the validation checks mentioned above, we have tried to make our interpretations transparent and internally consistent, while basing them upon participants' stories of their lived experiences.

## Structure of the Book

We begin by discussing the globalization of environments of insecurity. In Chapter 2, we document why and how immigrant Miamians left their

**Table 1.5 Descriptive Characteristics of ITMI Quantitative Sample**

Characteristics	Percentage
Female	52.5
Age (mean)	48.6
Country/region of origin	
Cuba	35.8
Colombia	7.0
Haiti	7.4
Non-Spanish Caribbean	9.3
Spanish Caribbean	9.1
North/Central America	12.7
Other South America	12.2
Other non-Hispanic	6.5
Marital Status	
Married	59.7
Single	18.4
Widowed	6.5
Divorced	15.5
Education	
Less than high school	24.6
High school	29.2
Some college	22.3
College	15.7
Graduate school	7.6
Household annual income (US\$)	
19,999 or less	24.6
20,000–39,999	32.1
40,000–59,999	21.1
60,000–79,999	6.2
80,000 +	16.0
Years in the United States (mean)	21.9
US citizenship	54.0
Perceived English fluency	
Does not speak English well/at all	34.1
Speaks English well	30.4
Speaks English very well	36.0

*Source:* ITMI Quantitative Survey.

*Notes:*  $N = 1,268$ . Some measures have between 0 percent and 1 percent of missing values, except for citizenship ( $N = 1,194$ ) and income ( $N = 906$ ).

homelands in the 1990s and 2000s, driven away by varying forms of insecurity. Sometimes, study participants perceived themselves to be targets of violence in various forms. Other times, they personally embodied labor redundancy because they could not find secure employment, or their businesses failed during the economic restructuring associated with neoliberalism. At the same time, they were attracted to discourses of material well-being, individual freedom, and greater quality of life in Miami.

In Chapter 3, we examine the context of reception for immigrants with precarious, temporary, or no legal status. We argue that post-9/11 policies

have criminalized immigrant groups even as they are deployed according to the needs of capital. We show how their lives increasingly are regulated by the state and how state policies made their liminal statuses untenable to them despite their economic contributions to the US economy. We demonstrate how immigration enforcement policies of the last two decades enhanced threats of deportation, spawning intense feelings of psychological insecurity for some immigrants and their families.

In Chapter 4, we illustrate how globalization and neoliberal city politics have led to economic bifurcation and a demand for flexible immigrant labor. Changes in social class status upon migration are examined by comparing perceived class status before and after migration. In this chapter, we pay close attention to factors that both contribute to and detract from the likelihood for upward social mobility once immigrants are in the United States. Analyses are focused particularly on how mobility is experienced according to gender, country/region of origin, and legal status. They are also used to examine how perceived social status relates to immigrants' identities and esteem. We conclude with a discussion of how unionization drives in Miami can raise wages and uplift the lives of the city's low-wage workforce.

In the next part of the book, we show how Miami's legal, political, and racial structures configure mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that translate into the privileging of some immigrant subgroups and national cohorts. National origin, legal status, gender, race, and power provide the contours for the boundaries of groups, locating them into hierarchies that are sustained by global capitalism as well as local and state racial projects. In Chapter 5, we examine how formal citizenship shapes opportunities for legal inclusion by analyzing patterns of ethnic group political incorporation. We see how Cubans and Cuban Americans have mobilized their citizenship rights to obtain political representation beyond even what their comparatively large numbers would suggest, while first- and second-generation Haitians, Colombians, and Nicaraguans have even less formal representation than what their smaller numbers suggest. We show how non-Cuban immigrants perceive that political inequality sustains their economic and legal precariousness, as well as intrainmigrant social hierarchies.

In Chapter 6, we examine racial formations in Miami from a transnational perspective. Breaking open the category of Hispanic, we show how transnational racial meanings converge to privilege certain groups over others. Country of origin is a mechanism of stratification, but ethnocentrism reveals underlying racial dynamics rooted in Latin American and Caribbean racial hierarchies that reify the statuses of Afro-Latinos, Afro-Caribbeans, people of indigenous roots, and colonial subjects toward the bottom of the local ethnic and racial hierarchy. We also show how interethnic and interracial differences are exacerbated by inequalities coded into formal immigra-

tion law and into informal class and cultural distinctions and appraisals of race. We illustrate how legal status has become conflated with race, representing a contemporary US racial formation that is reproduced within Miami's immigrant population.

In the last part of the book, we look at how immigrants develop strategies in their daily lives to contend with emotional struggles of immigration including reshaped mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. In Chapter 7, we show how immigrants carve out ways of belonging to soften the effects of exclusion. Their search for belonging and inclusion results in strategies of transborder co-presence that contest dominant forms of citizenship grounded in formal membership in the nation-state. Translocal connections, including social participation in the hometown networks and relationships of care, occupy a central position among immigrants' strategies for belonging. Driven by affective dimensions of the human experience, we show how advances in technology and the expansion of transnational media and coethnic media in Miami have ushered in new ways for maintaining substantive forms of citizenship in a locality that crosses state boundaries.

In Chapter 8, we look at how immigrants construct belonging in Miami through sensory experience, memory, thoughts, and behaviors associated with their places of origin that allow them to reenact and reexperience the comforts of home in the geographic space of Miami. We argue that, along with co-presence practices, translocal placemaking is a better way to conceive of belonging in a mobile world. Through translocal social citizenship, immigrants seek to counteract formal mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination. In short, sustaining membership or social citizenship in the original home and the new home results in feelings of belonging that help compensate for experiences of marginalization within their daily lives in Miami.

In Chapter 9, we conclude with several narratives of immigrants—some who have remained in the United States and fought for social inclusion and others who, coming from different social class backgrounds, have returned to their countries of origin under very different circumstances.

At a broad level, the material in this book is used to illustrate that immigrants construct human security simultaneously in multiple dimensions and on multiple scales; the exclusions experienced in one domain or at one scale are compensated for by seeking belonging in others. Findings suggest that belonging is not structured by a global versus local logic; moreover, global mobility does not necessarily dislocate its subjects, rendering them homeless and without agency. Mobility with connectivity engenders forms of belonging that coexist but also challenge exclusionary structures in overlapping scales and domains on a daily and ongoing basis. Immigrants, and probably others living mobile lives, seek to shape these experiences with all



the emotional, material, and mental resources they can muster in the pursuit of the full experience of human security.

## Notes

1. When we refer to Miami in this book, we are talking about the geocultural region including Miami-Dade County and southern Broward County, rather than only the incorporated city of Miami. This practice follows vernacular uses in Latin America and the Caribbean and also follows local media markets and circulations for employment and residence. While most interviews are with Latin American and Caribbean immigrants who live in Miami-Dade County, some people work in Miami-Dade County but live in portions of southern Broward County.

2. Alejandra's interview did not reveal whether her sister arranged for her employer to sponsor Alejandra's migration or if she helped her to immigrate through other channels. What is clear from the interview was that Alejandra had a legal work permit; however, she stated that she could not leave the country because she lacked permanent residency.

3. Matt 2011, p. 4.

4. Matt 2012, p. A31.

5. Matt 2011.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. Dreby 2010; Matt 2011.

8. In the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the retirement age in Colombia for women in the public sector (which is lower than that for men) was age fifty, and in the private sector, age fifty-five (Clavijo 2009).

9. Parrado and Zenteno 2002.

10. Heaton, Forste, and Otterstrom 2002; Parrado and Zenteno 2002.

11. Matt 2011.

12. Ibid., p. 252.

13. Giddens 1990.

14. Matt 2011.

15. Ibid., p. 7.

16. Huysmans 2006, p. 7.

17. Sassen 2009. Abrahamson (2004) describes global cities as those that successfully recruit multinational corporations and specialized service firms while providing cultural attractions to draw international tourists. He layers global cities in tiers (first, second, and third) depending on their level of global connectivity in these domains. Sassen (2009), more interested in economic functions than cultural attributes, describes global cities as "major" or "minor" depending on the intensity and geographic diversity of the cross-border financial and business circuits they facilitate. Sassen (2011) describes Miami as an infrequently studied global city worthy of further investigation.

18. Sassen 2009.

19. Aart Scholte 2005.

20. Singapore and Dubai also pursued regionalized paths to the global economic and cultural arena (Sassen 2011), and as Hong Kong gained global city status, it attracted immigrants from the less-developed countries of the Asian Pacific region to work in low-wage jobs supporting finance and trade managers (Chui and Lui 2009; McKay 2006b).

21. Pratts (1991) developed the term *contact zones* to describe interaction in the multicultural classroom. She defines them as “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or the aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today” (p. 34).

22. Portes and Stepick 1993.

23. Sassen 2011.

24. Henderson 2003.

25. See particularly Giddens 1990 and 1991.

26. Giddens 1991.

27. Giddens 1990.

28. See Low (1994) for a parsimonious description of place:

Place is space made culturally meaningful, and in this context it provides the context and symbolic cues for our behavior. Place, however, is not just a setting for behavior but an integral part of social interaction and cultural processes. An understanding of place cannot be separated from how people live their lives or from the historical moment and sociopolitical institutions that structure those lives. Further, place links local identity and its specificity with the globalization and interdependency of the modern world. (p. 66)

29. Conradson and McKay 2007, p. 168.

30. Noriega and Iribarren 2011; Santa Ana and González de Bustamante 2012.

31. See García y Griego (1980) for cyclical accounts of inclusion and exclusion of immigrants.

32. See Glenn (2011) for a place-based discussion of substantive citizenship; see Glick Schiller and Caglar (2008) for a discussion of substantive citizenship on a transnational scale.

33. US Census Bureau 2012.

34. Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002.

35. Kinnvall and Lindén 2010.

36. Mayol 2012.

37. Sirkeci 2005.

38. Luna and Filgueira 2009; Massey, Sanchez R., and Behrman 2006.

39. Portes and Hoffman 2003, in Sanchez R. 2006.

40. Almeida 2007.

41. Sirkeci 2005.

42. Ibid., p. 199.

43. Sirkeci (2005) clarifies, however, that the option to exit is unlikely to be available to those who are in the most danger. Other research has identified women as a group that is particularly vulnerable to insecurity (Freedman 2003) and who have fewer options to exit such environments given that they may not have access to the same opportunities for labor migration as men and, thus, must rely on family reunification for migration and legal status.

44. Huysmans 2006.

45. Kinnvall and Lindén 2010; Giddens 1990, 1991.

46. Giddens 1991.

47. Inter-American Development Bank 2007, p. 1.

48. Aranda 2007; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991.

49. Tirman 2006.

50. Huntington 2004, p. 40.

51. Clark 2006, p. 1B.
52. CBS News/Associated Press 2009.
53. Portes and Rumbaut 2006.
54. Tirman 2006, p. 2.
55. Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002.
56. Chavez 1997.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
58. Tirman 2006, p. 2.
59. Martínez 2009.
60. See primary documents from the Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/r/r/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html> (accessed September 27, 2012).
61. We see this in the legislation known as Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act that added Section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act laying the groundwork for the “vertical” integration of local, state, and federal law enforcement (Marrow 2012). Through “memoranda of understandings” between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the federal level and state and local officials in the 2000s, these agencies were allowed to jointly pursue the apprehension of undocumented immigrants. These partnerships eventually would lead to the recruitment of local officials to carry out federal immigration enforcement.
62. See Duany 2006; Higham 2002 [1955]; Perea 1997; Perlmann 2005; Roediger 2005; Zolberg and Litt Woon 1999.
63. The Magic City was an invention by a railroad publicity agent at the end of the nineteenth century who hoped to combine the allure of technological spectacle, natural beauty, and a myth of abundance to attract visitors and investors to a “New South” city combining wealth and racial exclusion (see Bush 1999). Historian Ira de Augustine Reid quotes a Bahamian resident of Miami in 1939 as follows: “Colored Miami certainly was not the Miami of which I had heard. It was a filthy backyard to The Magic City” (quoted in Mohl 1989, p. 68).
64. See Lin (2011) on cultural products. Levitt (2001) describes social remittances as values, ideas, and cultural norms that immigrants transmit to kinship networks in home countries.
65. Fussell 2010.
66. Giddens 1991, p. 39.
67. García 1996; McHugh, Miyares, and Skop 1997; Portes and Stepick 1993; Stepick et al. 2003.
68. Mohl 1989; Moore 2004; Winsberg 1979.
69. Mohl 2001.
70. Croucher 1997; Stepick et al. 2003.
71. Omi and Winant 1994.
72. Stepick et al. 2003; Stowers and Vogel 1994; Warren and Moreno 2003.
73. This section is adapted from Hughes et al. 2012.
74. Portes and Stepick 1993.
75. *Ibid.*
76. Mohl 1989, 1990, 2001; Pérez 1990.
77. Winsberg 1979, 1983.
78. Portes 1969.
79. This aid included automatic legal immigration status and access to fast-track paths to citizenship; occupational training; scholarships for higher education and low-interest educational loans; English lessons and expedited entry into US medical professions for health-care workers; and hundreds of millions of dollars to establish

businesses (Pérez 2003). Also see Alberts (2005), Grosfoguel (2003), and Pedraza (2004).

80. Croucher 1997; Winsberg 1979.

81. Croucher 1997, pp. 182–183; see also Moore 2004.

82. Greenbaum 2002; Ngai 2004.

83. Ngai 2004, p. 8.

84. Alberts 2005.

85. Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Stepick 1993.

86. Brookings Institution 2004.

87. C. Charles 2007; Marcelin 2005.

88. C. Charles 2007.

89. The US Centers for Disease Control designated being Haitian a risk factor for contracting HIV and quarantined Haitians in hospitals (the phrase “three Hs” was coined to identify those with elevated risk of having the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)—hemophiliac, homosexual, and Haitian) (C. Charles 2007; Marcelin 2005). Even though they were fleeing a brutal dictatorial regime, only 11 out of 22,940 Haitians interdicted at sea from 1981 to 1990 were considered by US immigration officials to be qualified to apply for asylum (Wasem 2010).

90. Little and Newhouse al-Sahli 2004.

91. See Wasem 2010. Among the infamous detention centers is Krome in Miami-Dade County. Formerly a Cold War missile base, Krome Detention Center, in recent years, has been plagued by charges of abuse and human rights violations, which in one case led to the death of a detainee. The center currently only houses male detainees after two Immigration and Naturalization Services officers were indicted in 2001 on charges of sexual abuse of female detainees.

92. See also Stepick et al. 2003.

93. Advocates for Miami’s smaller ethnic communities argue US Census figures undercount undocumented immigrants and other disadvantaged groups. For example, the 2000 census counted about 96,000 Haitians in Greater Miami, but community organizers believe they undercounted Haitians due to language differences, poor outreach, and Haitians’ distrust of authorities. The 2010 census added Creole-speaking interviewers and Haitian media ads. We use the Census Bureau’s Decennial Census and American Community Surveys because they offer the only detailed, empirical picture of South Florida’s ethnic makeup.

94. Shumow 2010.

95. Aranda 2007; Duany 2002.

96. Moore 2004. See also Miami-Dade County, Department of Planning and Zoning (2010) for ethnic distribution maps from the 2010 census. For a historical view, see Winsberg (1979, 1983).

97. Frey 1996.

98. Zavella 1997.

99. Frey 1996, p. 742.

100. Feagin and Vera 1995.

101. Sawyer 2004, p. 19.

102. Lin 2011, p. 221.

103. Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994.

104. Foner 2000.

105. Morley 2004; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Vaquera and Aranda 2011.

106. On Haitian transnationalism, see Laguerre 1998; for Dominicans, see

Guarnizo 1997 and Levitt 2001; for Mexicans, see Smith 2006; for Puerto Ricans, see Duany 2002 and Aranda 2007.

107. Duany 2011.

108. Ibid.

109. Aranda 2007; Dreby 2010; Duany 2011.

110. Aranda 2007; Dreby 2010; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Parreñas 2001, 2005.

111. Marrow 2012; Naples 2007.

112. Appadurai 1995, 1996; Massey 1993, 1994. See McKay (2006a) for a succinct discussion.

113. Glenn 2011.

114. Morley 2004.

115. Holston and Appadurai 1999; Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008.

116. Burawoy 1991; Burawoy et al. 2000.

117. Burawoy et al. 2000, p. 28.

118. Ibid., p. 25.

119. Creswell 2007.

120. The individual interviews typically lasted approximately one to three hours, though some took longer. Focus groups were designed to take approximately ninety minutes but often exceeded this duration. The interviews combined life and migration histories with discussion of perceptions of individual and group relations in Miami. The focus groups discussed uses and reactions to mass media content as well as intergroup relations in the city. The language used in the individual interviews—either Spanish, Haitian Creole, or, in a few cases, English—was chosen by the participants. Transcripts of interviews carried out in Haitian Creole were subsequently translated into English. The authors translated excerpts of Spanish interviews used in this book. The focus groups were conducted in Spanish. They were organized by national-origin group, although several of them were diverse because respondents frequently brought guests from other backgrounds. We were not able to conduct focus groups with Haitians.

121. Half of the participants were male. Participants decided whether to be interviewed in English or Creole. This sample is the only one that includes the US-born second generation. Of the ninety-one participants in this data source, twenty-six were Haitian Americans. We take care to point out when we are drawing upon second-generation Haitian Americans, which happens infrequently. Participants in this group were recruited from at least a half dozen starting points around Miami, including through community churches, parks, universities, and relatives of Haitian interviewers. The sampling strategy sought sufficient numbers of Creole-speaking participants in addition to working toward gender, age, and occupational diversity.

122. Aranda, Vaquera, and Sabogal 2007. "Immigrant Transnationalism and Modes of Incorporation Study." Funded by National Science Foundation, Proposal No. 0752644.

123. The random digit dial sample included two components: one sample of land-line telephone numbers and a subsample of cell phone numbers. Out of the 1,268 completed phone interviews, 344 were conducted with cell phone users. The sample had an overall margin of error of plus or minus 2.8 percent. The survey was originally created in English, pretested, and translated into Spanish. It was pretested in Spanish, amended, and pretested a third time. It was also translated into Haitian Creole. The interviews were performed using computer-assisted telephone interviewing survey techniques. The cooperation rate was 87 percent—that is, of the

qualified respondents who heard the interviewer's introduction on the phone, 87 percent agreed to complete the survey. The response rate was 51 percent for land-lines and 49 percent for cell phones (American Association for Public Opinion Research response rate #4), which is comparable to studies using similar methods and populations (American Association for Public Opinion Research 2011; Kasinitz et al. 2008). Analyses reported are weighted by age, gender, education, and country of origin to represent the proportions of each immigrant population based on data from the American Community Survey (2005–2007). Multiple imputation techniques were employed to deal with missing values on covariates in the analytical models. The *proc mi* and *proc mianalyze* commands of the SAS software were also used to deal with missing data. These statistical tools predict values for missing data by incorporating information from other attributes of individuals with some randomness built into the imputed values in order to account for the uncertainty of estimates (Allison 2002).

124. When data broken down by ethnicity or ancestry were not available from the US Census Bureau's 2012 American Community Survey one-year estimates, we drew from American Community Survey data from previous years to fill in the gaps.