Security in South America: The Role of States and Regional Organizations

Rodrigo Tavares

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures ix
Foreword, Javier Solana xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Map of South America xv

1 South America: An Island of Peace? 1
2 South American Security: An Overview 17

Part 1 Regional Security Issues
3 Traditional Security Threats 43
4 Human Security Threats 63

Part 2 State Actors
5 Argentina 87
6 Brazil 105
7 Chile 131
8 Colombia 145
9 Venezuela 159

Part 3 Regional Actors
10 Regionalism 175
11 The Andean Community of Nations 181
12 The Organization of American States 195
13 The Union of South American Nations 217
14 The Ibero-American Summit 235
15 The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 243

Part 4 Conclusion
16 The Dynamics of South American Security 257

Bibliography 269
Index 289
South America: An Island of Peace?

The end of the Cold War remains endlessly attractive as a turning point in international relations. As the world changed when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell, so did South America.\(^1\) Until the late 1980s, the region was characterized by militarism, hyperinflation and slow development. Although by international standards it has been relatively free from interstate violence, some armed conflicts such as the Chaco War (1932-1935) and the wars between Ecuador and Peru (1941 and 1981) caused thousands of deaths. This bleak picture was accentuated by the emergence of military regimes in the 1960s, most of which were unparalleled in their brutality and suppression of civil society and political movements. The United States’ support to these right-wing authoritarian regimes contributed further to the emergence of conflict, guerrilla movements, death squads, and polarization.

The end of the Cold War was a breaking point. Authoritarianism was replaced by democratic regimes and the “evil of inflation” was exorcized. The end of military regimes in the 1980s enabled rapprochements processes and marked a new trend towards democratization and economic stability. The United States also had to overhaul its posture vis-à-vis the region in the post-Cold War and establish new relations of power with its southern neighbors.

This new context brought about a metamorphosis in security. Gradually, the focus expanded from traditional security concerns – with the stress on the state’s ability to deter or defeat an attack – to include also human security. Urban criminality, drug trafficking or environmental degradation started to be regarded and studied as major threats. Human security does not obviate state security, however, nor does it encompass all of the security agenda. It does not imply that the military must dilute its focus on defense and melt into the purveyor of
primary education, hospital building, and drug control. In fact, both traditional and human security are valid, and in some way they are complementary. Both develop systematic, comprehensive, durable, and coordinated institutional responses to selected threats. Collaboration with state security forces could be essential to human security at the national level. States are critical in providing opportunities for people, creating and supporting a stable environment so that livelihoods can be pursued with confidence, and offering measures to protect people when livelihoods contract. Human security may be an opportune extension of the state security framework, one that explores the newer issues that are already on the boundaries of the security agenda.

This comprehensive perspective of security is, however, not the rule. The exclusive focus on traditional security, as often seen in political discourse and some academic work, has often led us to believe that South America is an island of peace. For instance, the heads of state of the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) together at an ordinary session in 2013 in Paramaribo, Suriname, emphasized their “determination” to build a South American identity based on the “consolidation of South America as a zone of peace.” In some way they are right. If we look at security in a conventional way, it is fair to observe that the last open conflict between two South American countries was in 1995 (Ecuador and Peru). But the region is still affected by critical and pervasive threats to the vital core of people’s lives. Presently, the homicide rate is more than twice the world’s average, and public security is considered by South Americans to be the most important problem in their countries, ahead of unemployment, poverty or poor education (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2011:65).

In this environment of insecurity, it is also inevitable that we discuss which players are better suited to handle threats to security. The assumption of traditional security postulates that when conflicts do emerge, it is up to states to resolve them. The state operates solely to ensure its own survival. Decision-making power is centralized in the government, and the execution of strategies rarely involves the public. Traditional security also assumes that a sovereign state is operating in an anarchical international environment, in which there is no world governing body to enforce international rules of conduct. By this token, since South America is primarily a state-driven region and issues of national sovereignty still rank high in the political agenda, international organizations should play a slim role in conflict management.

But this view is far from universal. The realization of human security involves not only governments but also a broader participation of different actors. Indeed, some traditional and nontraditional threats in
South America do not respect geographical demarcations and have a regional outreach, calling for a reexamination of the state as the sole and effective agent in security management. The end of the Cold War unleashed powerful forces of political liberalization and democratization and sparked the emergence or the reform of regionalist projects. Several states in the region no longer benefited to the same extent from superpower protection and had to develop collective capacities to respond to a challenging new environment. Consequently, international organizations gained new clout in the political game.

The metamorphosis in security triggered by the end of the Cold War meant, all in all, the expansion of threats (traditional plus human security threats) and the expansion of security providers (states plus international organizations). This is the most relevant mutation in the security profile of South America since the end of colonialism in the nineteenth century. To grasp this reconceptualization of the meaning and practice of security, the book is guided by two questions:

- What type of threats and violence affect South America?
- What role do states and international organizations play to ensure the security of South American citizens?

**Debate 1: Is South America a Secure Region?**

As mentioned in the introduction, South American heads of state are eager to portray the region as peaceful and secure. Gathered in Guayaquil, Ecuador, on the occasion of the Second Meeting of Presidents of South America in July 2002, they adopted a declaration proclaiming “South America to be a Zone of Peace and Cooperation, a historical event that reflects the best traditions of understanding and peaceful coexistence among the peoples of the region.” This assumption is also reflected in some academic work. In a well-received volume on geopolitics in the Southern Cone published in 1988, most authors believed that the region was moving toward “a harmony of national interests” (Kelly and Child, 1988:4). Others claimed that the region “no longer represents a global threat in terms of security” (Narich 2003:1) and it “contributes to international peace and security” (Aravena, 2005:209). These views derive from the fact that the continent enjoys considerable religious and ethnic homogeneity. Other authors have depicted the region as a “pluralistic security community” – a transnational region composed of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Kacowicz, 2000:216; Kacowicz, 1998:121; Domínguez, 2007:111-112; Jervis,
2002:9; Hurrell, 1998; Oelsner, 2003). Even Simón Bolívar, leader of the independence movements in South America, had appealed to the region’s common cultural heritage to seek the union of American states in 1826.

This view is far from being unanimous. As Mares and Bernstein pointed out, “Contrary to common belief, the use of force in Latin American relations has occurred throughout the region’s history” (Mares and Bernstein, 1998:29). The military culture fostered by the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s to 1980s put a stress on military expenses and war preparations. Although it has subsided, it has not been fully eliminated (Hirst, 1996:156). By the same token, Saavedra argues that the region’s relatively favorable context has not meant that “confidence among neighbors is a hallmark of international relations between and among Latin American states. The region is traditionally one of considerable distrust and the fact that this lack of confidence does not break out into open conflict more often should not lead us to the conclusion that this is a zone of peace” (Saavedra, 2004:158).

Several statistics covering traditional threats back this argument. Solís argues that between 1945 and 1990, eleven international armed conflicts and thirty-eight internal armed conflicts have occurred in Latin America: fourteen of which were in Central America, thirteen in the Caribbean, and twenty-two in South America (Solís, 1990:98). Morris and Millan (1983:2) identified more than thirty conflicts in the region during the 1980s concerned with ideology, hegemony, territory, resources, and migration. Child (1984:25) identified twenty interstate conflicts in the 1980s, most of which concerned territory, borders, resources, or migration. Huth (1996) lists eighteen territorial conflicts between 1950 and 1990 in the region, many of which have resource and ethnic dimensions. According to Mares, between 1990 and 2001, there were close to seventy militarized conflicts in Latin America, all occurring between countries with border disputes. In five conflicts, there was only one threat of use of force. In thirty-one cases the verbal threat turned into military deployment. The use of force (an exchange of fire along the border, capture of people or goods) took place on twenty five occasions. Only one militarized conflict ended in war, in 1995, between Ecuador and Peru (Mares 2003: 67-69). In the same vein, Thompson’s (2001) classification of strategic rivalry finds sixty-six rivalries between Latin American states (Thies, 2008).

This dichotomy in academic views – leading towards a more positive or negative vision of the security profile of the region – should not overshadow the fact that both are predicated on a traditional concept of security. What it is looked at are classical military threats to the state,
perpetrated generally by other states or by internal guerrilla groups. This view is not necessarily erroneous, but it is certainly insufficient. As stressed by Kaldor, there is a real security gap today, but “our security conceptions, drawn from the dominant experience of the Second World War, do not reduce that insecurity” (Kaldor, 2007:10). This book claims that it is also important to incorporate the well-being of individuals and hence to include nontraditional threats into any analysis. Human security has surpassed conventional notions of security, which are generally thought of as being geographically confined by a nation’s frontiers. Because nontraditional threats are not limited to military activity, sheer force is not enough to contain them (see Table 1.1).

Urban criminality presents a good illustration of the importance of adding a human perspective to the security equation. The homicide rate in South America is 20 per year per 100,000 inhabitants, the fifth largest in the world after Southern Africa (30.5), Central America (28.5), Eastern Africa (21.9), and Middle Africa (20.8). As a comparison, the world’s rate was 6.9 intentional homicides per 100,000 populations in 2011, more than two times lower (UNODC, 2013). According to the UN, between 2000 and 2010, the murder rate in Latin America grew by 11 percent, whereas it fell or stabilized in most other regions in the world. In the last decade, more than one million people have died in Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of criminal violence (UNDP, 2013). Drug trafficking, organized crime, and the legacy of political violence are the principal factors behind rising criminality levels in the subregion. Although it is neither directed at states nor military in nature, urban criminality still affects the well-being of South American citizens.

This broader definition of security first emerged in the 1980s (see Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982; Ullman, 1983) and was soon highlighted by scholars congregating around what was loosely labeled critical security studies (Tickner, 1995; Krause and Williams, 1996, 1997), who argued that narrow definitions of security had proven insufficient for analyzing the post-Cold War security concerns of states, regions and even the global system, let alone the concerns of nonstate actors such as nations, minorities and individuals (Oelsner, 2009: 196). The focus of human security is squarely on human lives. But in order to protect human lives effectively, actors must deliberately identify and prepare for distinct threats. Threats to human security are critical – that is, they threaten to cut into the core activities and functions of human lives (Alkire, 2003). This vision of security has become mainstream in the 1990s with a flurry of publications sustaining its validity and its distinctiveness vis-à-vis...

Table 1.1: The Distinction Between Traditional and Human Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security for whom (referent object)</th>
<th>Traditional National Security</th>
<th>Human Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security for whom (referent object)</strong></td>
<td>Primarily states</td>
<td>Primarily individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security by whom</strong></td>
<td>Exclusively states</td>
<td>States, international organizations, NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values at stake</strong></td>
<td>Territorial integrity and national independence</td>
<td>Personal safety and individual freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security from what (threats)</strong></td>
<td>Traditional threats (military threats, border disputes, coups and civil unrest)</td>
<td>Nontraditional (urban crime, environmental hazards, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security by what means</strong></td>
<td>Force as the fundamental instrument of security. Balance of power also plays an important role. Cooperation between states is tenuous beyond alliance relations.</td>
<td>Human development and humane governance as key instruments of individual-centered security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At policy level most countries tend to make a conceptual and even institutional distinction between these types of threats. Traditional threats and violence are generally handled by the military establishment, whereas threats to human security are normally confronted by the police. This generally leads to a duality of strategies, timings, concepts and institutions. Although it is conceptually necessary to make a distinction between traditional and nontraditional means of security, in
reality, they are intricate and mutually reinforcing. Drug trafficking illustrates this view. In Colombia and Peru, the guerilla groups that threaten the authority of the state and use violence to implement a new revolutionary order have largely fed on revenues originated in drug trafficking to sustain the armed conflict. In urban areas, drug trafficking also fuels violent criminality. In the major cities of Brazil, Colombia or Venezuela, criminal organizations have developed with the primary purpose of promoting and controlling drug trafficking operations. They range from loosely managed agreements among various drug traffickers to formalized commercial enterprises. In addition to drug trafficking, these cartels have been tied to both human and arms trafficking, assassinations, auto theft, and kidnapping. They form urban guerillas whose violent operations defy classical demarcations between civil war and urban violence.

The book assesses these two types of threats singly, but acknowledges the ties between both whenever necessary. At the same time that it looks at armed and nonarmed conflicts, it also assimilates the nontraditional outlook by examining such threats as drug trafficking, urban criminality, illegal small-arms trade, Islamic terrorism, and environmental threats. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in security, but “to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reorientation” (Krause and Williams, 1997: xvi). The referent object is transported back to the individual and the emphasis is put on his/her emancipation. Human security does not negate traditional security. Naturally, extreme stressing of one of them leads us to exposing conceptual differences. But the right of the state and the right of the individual somehow coexist in the security environment and influence each other.

To refine its analytical capacity, the book also makes a fine distinction between security and peace. In the arena of international relations, where the lingua franca is often marked by buzz words and capturing messages, both concepts are sometimes used interchangeably without proper investigation on their adequate meaning. Even the United Nations Charter, probably inspired by the Preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations Charter, uses these terms almost synonymously, as a unified formula, without pausing for reflection on their substantive conceptual value. However, no matter how symbiotically linked they may be, they reflect a basic distinction. Security is primarily about the management of threats, whereas peace is about the management of violence. The first is associated with a statement of intention, a menace. It involves a cognitive and subjective interpretation derived from a latent and potential action. Peace, on the other hand deals with the absence of
physical violence, i.e., it presupposes absence of real damage or adverse effect. Whereas threat is related to the expression of an intention, violence is the observable materialization of that threat. Very often, the literature selects only peace (or absence of violence) as a benchmark to examine the region, leading to the natural conclusion that South America is fairly peaceful. This book adds to its analysis the idea that the intention or the threat is equally decisive to people’s welfare. Therefore, beyond armed conflicts, where violence is manifestly used, we will also examine non-armed conflicts such as territorial disputes and domestic political crises. Illustratively, it is as important to assess the five times the Peru-Ecuador border conflict built up to violence (1828-1829, 1857-1860, 1941, 1981, 1995), as it is to examine the dormant periods when there was only a menace to act bellicosely. Both feed into each other and both generate a negative impact on the welfare of the population.

Debate 2: Who Are the Security Providers in the Region?

Agents of peace and security are actors who may provide a voluntary or involuntary contribution to the successful transformation of violence and insecurity. Their role derives from their shared commitment to a set of overarching shared values and principles, the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies, and the capacity to effectively negotiate with other actors in the international system (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999:38). The book will examine two actors: states and international organizations.

In traditional security discourse the state is the most instrumental agent in promoting external peace in a world of anarchy, and in guaranteeing internal order and security to its citizens. National security refers, hence, to the public policy of maintaining the integrity and survival of the state through the use of political, economic and military power and the exercise of diplomacy, in times of peace and war. The operative capacity of the state in peace and security is therefore twofold:

Externally, the state maneuvers to maximize its national interests by resorting primarily to balances of power, nuclear deterrence, alliances, and war. In an anarchical world war can indeed be regarded as an instrument of state policy to shape the international system by carving international order and stability. To neorealists, survival is presupposed to be the single and most fundamental goal of states (Waltz, 1979: 92/134). In contrast to classical security studies, liberal institutionalism appoints to the state the external capacity to foster norms, values, and identities that would provide its citizens with peace and security. This
would be achieved by participating in international regimes or institutions. And unlike realist theories that emphasize the competitive nature of state behavior, states can serve, for instance, as mediators in international disputes or as stabilizers in regional arenas.

Internally, the state is still believed to be the main entity responsible for granting security and peace to its population. Although in a globalized world punctuated by failed states and breaches in sovereignty this is a disputed postulation, it is nonetheless still a commanding principle in international relations. The thought is, to some extent, inspired by the social contract. In Rousseau’s view, the people agreed to cede authority to some group in order to gain the benefits of community and safety. If those in power refused to guarantee community and safety, the governed were free to disobey and establish a new political contract.

According to Giddens, the modern nation-state can be characterized by fixed borders, extended administrative control of the population and the permanent existence of class conflict as a result of the relation between capital and wage-labor. Relative to pre-modern states, the state form in modernity displays a massive concentration of power: increased surveillance, control by the state power, monopoly of the means of violence via control of the army and police, intensified industrialization often subsidized by the state and the expansion of capitalism (Giddens, 1987). The state Westphalian order, epitomized by Richelieu’s notion of raison d’état or Metternich’s and Bismark’s concept of real politik, is thus based on the territorial equality of states, on the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs as result of respect for sovereignty and on the polarized idea that the hierarchical internal composition of a state is opposed by anarchy in the external sphere (Miller, 1990).

But this traditional view is under dispute. In a globalized world punctuated by failed states and breaches in sovereignty on the one hand, and by drug trafficking-related violence carried out by substate forces (criminal gangs and guerrillas) on the other, the conflict management instruments traditionally available to states – ranging from balances of power to cooperative security – are irrelevant (Dominguez, 1988:17). Autarchy leads to marginalization and an increase in vulnerability. Indeed, the proliferation of security concerns at all levels of national and international life and obvious institutional failures to cope with them has led to a new focus on the obligations of the state and on the role of other security players. In the words of Centeno (2002: 6-7):

“With regard to the maintenance of social or civil order, citizens living in any Latin American city increasingly find themselves victims
to crime and are turning to some form of privatized protection…. In some cities, where the safety of even the most powerful political figures is not assured, daily life has assumed an almost predatory quality. Nowhere, again with the possible exception of Chile, can one rely on the state to provide a reasonable assurance of protection.”

Public surveys reflect this view. In 2011, only 61 percent of South Americans believed the state could fix the problem of criminality and only 57 percent were confident about its capacity to handle the problem of drug trafficking (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2011:91).

International organizations may offer complementary options. As argued by Keohane, “Globalization has occurred within the context of the dramatic institutionalization of foreign policy” (Keohane, 2001:211). Unlike twenty years ago, one cannot talk about foreign policy without talking about international institutions. Due to their cultural and geographical proximity to the conflict, regional organizations are deemed more likely to understand the factual background of disputes and to share the applicable norms and procedures. In fact, for more than two decades now the UN has shown a strong proclivity to empower regional and other intergovernmental organizations to handle political crises within their regions – as enshrined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the words of Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, “Regional actors are often better positioned to detect potential crises early and to mobilize coordinated international responses. They have unique influence on, leverage over and access to crisis situations in their respective regions.” He added that international organizations are well equipped to confront transnational threats “such as organized crime, pandemics, terrorism and the effects of climate change.”

Currently, there are thirty-eight organizations worldwide with a security mandate (Tavares, 2010:5). In Africa, Australasia, Central Asia, Central America and Europe regional organizations play a valuable role in the security field (Tavares, 2010; Graham and Felicio, 2006; Diehl and Lepgold, 2003; Pugh and Sidhu, 2003; Boulden, 2003; Alagappa and Inoguchi, 1999; Weiss, 1998).

But if the role of international organizations in managing traditional disputes has been amply acknowledged, their capacity to handle non-traditional threats still needs to be better assessed. Indeed, most of the critical issues today – from transnational crime to drug trafficking – are indeed transnational and regional problems that cannot be successfully solved except through cooperative regional efforts. This is not an easy task, however. Susan Strange alerted that the chances of an international regime for the management of containment of transnational crime are
likely to be poor because it would strike at the “very heart of national sovereignty – the responsibility for maintaining law and order and administering criminal justice” (Strange, 1996:20). Even so, international organizations have been able to adopt common programs and strategies to disrupt transnational criminal organizations or drug trafficking. The OAS, for instance, adopted in 1997 the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. It was the first multilateral treaty designed to prevent, combat, and eradicate illegal transnational trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and explosives.

But what do we mean by international organizations? They are of two kinds: agencies and arrangements. The distinction between them concerns the degree of formality of the entity in question. A regional agency is a recognized organization with legal personality and an organizational structure (i.e., secretariat) located in a member country. A regional arrangement, on the other hand, is a mere grouping of states united under a common purpose often without a permanent secretariat or a constitutional treaty. Presently, South American states are member of twelve international agencies and six arrangements (see Table 1.2.). Nowhere else in the world is the institutionalization web so thick. There are more organizations than countries in the region.

Some of them have been strictly formed around economic or political objectives (mostly during the Cold War) and have, thus, neglected hardcore security issues. Also, after the fall of the military regimes the focus of South American countries was put on economic development (and democratization) and therefore the organizations that were established also reflected this objective. That notwithstanding, other organizations – such as the Organization of American States, the Andean Community of Nations, the Union of South American Nations and others – have exercised their legal mandate to handle traditional and/or nontraditional security threats.

Selection of Cases
South America is currently composed of twelve sovereign states and eighteen international organizations (agencies and arrangements) have South American states as members (see Table 1.2.). Out of these twelve states, the book concentrates its analysis on five: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. Economic and political factors have dictated this selection. It can be argued that these are the countries that
Table 1.2: Hemispheric Organizations with South American Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Total Number of Members / South American Members</th>
<th>Legal Capacity in Security Issues</th>
<th>Operational Experience In Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO)</td>
<td>1978 (treaty signed), 1995 (ACTO established)</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Community of Nations (CAN)</td>
<td>1969 (as Andean Pact) and 1996 (as CAN)</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Caribbean States (ACS)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>25/4</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Community (CARICOM)</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>15/2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Prata Basin Treaty</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>28/12</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC)</td>
<td>2008 (it was replaced by CELAC in 2011)</td>
<td>33/12</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>12/10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American Parliament (Parlatino)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>22/11</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization of American States (OAS)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>35/12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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continues
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No/Yes</th>
<th>No/Yes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Alliance</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5/3</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Common Market (Mercosur)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>12/12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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### INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrangement</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No/Yes</th>
<th>No/Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa-South American Summit (ASA)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>65/12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8/3</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibero-American Summit</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>22/10</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Group</td>
<td>1986 (it was replaced by CELAC in 2011)</td>
<td>23/11</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>33/12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit of South American-Arab Countries (ASPA)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>34/12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit of the Americas</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>34/12</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The first ASA Summit ended with the adoption of the Abuja Declaration and the Plan of Action, which left no doubt about the aspirations of regional leaders to discuss security issues. The Nueva Esparta Declaration, adopted at the Second Summit, is a bolder document spread over twenty-eight pages and containing ninety-six points, twelve of which are specifically on peace and security. But despite this legal capacity, ASA has not made any intervention in the security field.

² The juridical basis of ASPA lies upon the Brasilia Declaration, a document approved at the First ASPA Summit. It is divided into thirteen chapters, the most important being the one on biregional cooperation, peace, and security. Three years later the Declaration adopted by the Foreign Ministers of ASPA gathered in Buenos Aires included a loyal reproduction of the same principles included in the Brasilia Declaration. The Doha Declaration, adopted at the end of the Second ASPA Summit (March 2009) did the same. It is actually surprising that the wording of these three declarations – regarding the political and security dimensions – are fairly the same. Several sentences are even repeated. But despite this legal framework, APSA has not had any operational experience in the security field.
primarily mold the South American regional cluster or security complex. They represent not only the five largest economies in the region (led by Brazil and followed by Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Chile) but they are deeply involved with the security issues in the region. Brazil is the traditional contender for regional leadership, whereas Argentina plays a fundamental role in the Southern Cone. They are the main actors in the security festival of the Southern Cone, with their animosity oscillating from a nuclear race and military tension (up until the late 1970s), to commercial disputes or mere football hostility (present days). Chile has equally been equipped to play a larger role due to its steady growth since 1990 and to its democratic credentials – the most solid in the region. Colombia is also an interesting case study because it has battled its drug problem without much international support (except from the U.S.) and has been locked in a bilateral security contention with Ecuador and mainly Venezuela for at least one decade now. The latter would have wished to play a more decisive role in the region, but its frail domestic economy in recent years has frustrated that ambition. Part III of the book assesses the foreign policy patterns of each country since the end of the Cold War before zooming in on their specific contributions to traditional and human security.

Of the eighteen existing hemispheric agencies and arrangements that include South American states, eight have legal capacity to undertake security-related activities: the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Organization of American States (OAS), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Africa-South American Summit (ASA), Ibero-American Summit, and the Summit of South American-Arab Countries (ASPA). All of them, with the exception of ASA and ASPA, have exercised their legal capacity to operate in the security field. The book assesses the contribution of all these organizations that have operational experience in security, except for CARICOM, given that its operational focus is dominated by Caribbean affairs (and not South American). These five organizations vary widely in terms of institutional capacity and represent varying levels of power, influence and capacity. Therefore, we will look at the legal capacity, organizational capacity and operational experience of each to assess their real contribution to peace and security.

**Book Structure**

To be able to determine the security profile of South America and to identify the actors that may provide a contribution to regional order, the
book is divided in five parts. The first places the book vis-à-vis the current theoretical debate. It assesses the academic debates by putting its focus on the dichotomy between traditional and human security. The chapter also provides an introductory overview of the region by pinpointing the rationale behind conflicts and peace and by describing the important impact the end of the Cold War had on the region. The second part concentrates on the regional security profile. It identifies the traditional security threats (armed and nonarmed conflicts) and the human-security ones, which include drug trafficking, urban criminality, illegal small arms trade, Islamic terrorism and environmental threats. Parts III and IV of the book examine the providers of peace and security. Firstly, they look at the foreign policies and the contributions to the security of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela in the post-Cold War era, and then they progress to determining the legal and organizational capacity and the operational experience of five international bodies: the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Ibero-American Summit, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Part V presents the final conclusion.

Notes

1 It includes twelve countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela) and three dependencies – Falklands/Malvinas (United Kingdom), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (United Kingdom) and French Guiana (France).

2 “Declaration of Paramaribo” (30 August 2013), Preamble.

3 28 percent of the 19,000 people surveyed replied that public security was the most important problem in their countries, whereas 16 percent replied that it was unemployment.

4 See Consensus of Guayaquil on Integration, Security, and Infrastructure for Development, adopted in 2002. This notion was preceded by the signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967), and the formation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (1986).

5 Using a different methodology, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development states that South America’s average homicide rate from 2004 to 2009 (17.95 per 100,000) is the fifth highest in the world after Central America (29.03), Southern Africa (27.37), the Caribbean (22.37), and Middle Africa (19.16) (Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2011).

6 There are some exceptions to it. Sometimes the scope and scale of illegal activities are so far beyond local authorities’ capabilities that the armed forces
must assist. That assistance may take the form of logistics support to police who have no way to get to distant sites, intelligence support, training and other types of collaborative efforts (Hayes, 2003:47).

7 In the aftermath of the Second World War, it was arguably E.H.Carr who pioneered this idea. He argued for a “shift in emphasis from the rights and well-being of the national group to the rights and well-being of the individual man and woman” with “security for the individual” (1945: 71, 58).

8 Defined as actions that convey a conditional commitment to punish unless one’s demands are met (see Baldwin, 1997:15).

9 Violence is regarded broadly, as any action, performed as a link in a method of struggle, which involves the intentional infliction of death, physical injury, or other type of harm, upon an unwilling victim. For a monumental study of “violence” see Pontara (1978).

10 Secretary-General’s message to Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (7 December 2011).

11 In second place comes Africa with fifteen organizations (Tavares and Tang, 2011: 223).