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Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is now a mature subfield of international relations (IR), arguably having been in existence for well over fifty years. Over the past ten years, it has moved from the margins of IR, possessing now such markers of maturity as its own Web of Science-ranked journal, *Foreign Policy Analysis*; at least a half dozen textbooks; increasing inclusion in both the undergraduate and graduate curricula of departments of political science and international relations; dedicated monograph series by high-profile academic publishers; and status as one of the two largest sections of IR’s professional organization, the International Studies Association (ISA). There are now academic job ads that specifically seek scholars working in foreign policy analysis. We write this volume at a time when FPA is arguably experiencing a true renaissance.

As I have explicated in my own survey of the field, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory* (Hudson 2013: 3), foreign policy analysis is that subfield of international relations that takes as its theoretical focus those human beings who make and implement the foreign policy of a collective, usually, but not always, a nation-state. Those decisionmakers stand at the point of intersection between forces external to and internal to the nation-state that bears on the choice at hand.

One hallmark of FPA scholarship is that the subfield views the explanation of foreign policy decisionmaking as of necessity being multifactorial and multilevel. Explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most micro to the most macro, are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they affect decisionmaking. As a result, insights from
many intellectual disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, anthropology, and economics, are useful for the foreign policy analyst in efforts to explain foreign policy decisionmaking, making multi/interdisciplinarity a second hallmark of FPA. Thus, of all subfields of IR, FPA is the most radically integrative theoretical enterprise, which is its third hallmark, for it integrates a variety of information across levels of analysis and spanning numerous disciplines of human knowledge.

Our focus on human decisionmakers leads FPA toward an emphasis on agent-oriented theory, this being a fourth hallmark of FPA. States are not agents, because they are abstractions and thus have no agency. Only human beings can be true agents. Going further, FPA theory is also profoundly actor specific in its orientation (to use a term coined by Alexander George [1993]), unwilling to “black box” the human decisionmakers under study. The humans involved in the Cuban missile crisis, for example, were not interchangeable generic rational utility maximizers and were not equivalent to the states that they served. Not just general and abstract information, but specific and concrete information about the decisionmakers in all three countries involved (the Soviet Union, the United States, and Cuba) would be necessary to explain that crisis. Actor specificity, then, is FPA’s fifth hallmark. The perspective of FPA is that the source of all international politics and all change in international politics is specific human beings using their agency and acting individually or in groups.

The primary levels of analysis used by FPA scholars range from examination of cognitive and personal characteristics of leaders, small group dynamics, organizational process, bureaucratic politics, domestic political contestation, national culture, and economic considerations, to broader regional and international systemic forces. The explanandum, foreign policy, can be examined from a variety of perspectives as well, with possible emphases on choice, process, outcome, or implementation.

It is also true that FPA has, as part of its historical legacy, generally placed a premium on comparison as a means of theory development. While FPA abounds in single case studies, comparative case studies and even statistical analyses of compiled foreign policy events or content-analyzed texts are also common in FPA literature. Last but not least, there has frequently been a normative element to FPA studies where particular decisions are analyzed with an eye to what went wrong (or, less frequently, right) in that case.
A North American Enterprise?

Despite its avowedly global purview, foreign policy analysis is still predominantly seen as a North American enterprise by many non–North Americans. This view has perhaps been most eloquently and consistently expressed by FPA scholars from developing countries. There have been a few volumes—though limited in number—that focus specifically on FPA in contexts of the Global South. Each opens with a lament over the “US-ness” of the field of FPA, which manifests itself in two ways: (1) the proliferation of studies of US foreign policy decisionmaking in FPA in contrast to those of other nations, particularly those of the Global South; and (2) the nature of the theories, assumptions, and methods used in FPA. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder if the paucity of volumes about FPA in the context of the Global South is not, in some sense, an outgrowth of the ethnocentric nature of the subfield. Is it possible that ethnocentrism has actually stymied the theoretical and empirical progression of an entire academic field of study?

To begin the exploration of this question, I note that there are several works that might also be considered (including some written by Southern scholars and some written by US scholars about Southern foreign policy, e.g., Clapham 1977; Korany and Dessouki 1984; Hey 1995; East 1973; Van Klaveren 1984; Moon 1983; Richardson and Kegley 1980; Ismael and Ismael 1986; Ferris and Lincoln 1981; Brecher 1972). But the two volumes that I examine here are How Foreign Policy Decisions Are Made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis (Korany 1986a) and The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks (Braveboy-Wagner 2003a).

In the mid-1980s, when FPA was a little over two decades old and most definitely US centric, Bahgat Korany created a working group at the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the purpose of which was to gather non-US FPA scholars to discuss the application of FPA theory and techniques to what was then known as the third world. His edited volume How Foreign Policy Decisions Are Made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis (1986a) was the outcome of those discussions.

Korany’s opening chapter in that volume “Foreign Policy Decision-Making Theory and the Third World: Payoffs and Pitfalls” is, in his words, a review of “the barren state of Third World foreign policy studies” and a demonstration of “the limited help that established foreign policy theory can offer” (1986b: 39). Indeed, Korany states that “some
authors think there is nothing worthwhile in the literature to build upon” (1986b: 41).

One of the authors that he cites in this regard is Tim Shaw, a longtime analyst of the foreign policies of African states. Korany quotes Shaw as commenting in 1983 on “the inappropriateness, bordering at times on the irrelevance, of the subfield . . . symptomatic of the deficiencies and mistakenness of much (most) of the field as defined by the prevailing paradigm” (Korany 1986b: 41). For example, notes Korany, the bureaucratic politics framework as adumbrated by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin is of little use in analyzing the nonindustrialized countries of that time period: “The model is . . . culture-bound. In other words, this model of discrete decisions leading to disjointed incrementalism is inspired only by, and mainly applicable to, the US decision making process” (Korany 1986b: 56).

Korany also figuratively shakes his head over the assumption by North American FPA scholars that governmental archives and accurate news reports will naturally be available to the foreign policy analyst. He provides the example of how the Western press reported that sixty countries attended the Non-Aligned Summit in Algeria in 1973 when in fact seventy-five did so, and it was also reported that Saudi Arabia did not attend even though the Saudi delegation was headed by King Faisal himself (Korany 1986b: 41). Korany further notes that the then ascendant psychological-perceptual model in FPA encountered several data issues when repurposed for the examination of third world countries, not the least of which was flagrant lying as a common practice among leaders in those countries, making content analysis fruitless. Furthermore, there were such deep data requirements for the model that an analyst would have to “live several days and nights with the head of state, his family, his secretary, and perhaps other members of the immediate entourage” (1986b: 57). Indeed, Korany concludes that FPA scholars in the third world often came to the conclusion that they would simply be “unable to collect the needed data” (1986b: 57).

Korany suggests that the data issues mask a more profound set of concerns: “The problems, then, are related not only to accessibility of data; they go much deeper to the epistemological level” (1986b: 41). In his view, “To counter the serious deficiencies plaguing the established model, analysts of Third World foreign policy decisionmaking must turn to other schools of social analysis for inspiration” (1986b: 59). The remainder of his volume is dedicated to a discussion of what Korany terms the “state-societal” and the “global-systemic” levels of analysis, which he feels are underestimated in the North American FPA paradigm.
Fast-forward almost twenty years after Korany’s volume, at a time when FPA was over forty years in age, and we find a eerily similar set of complaints in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner’s edited volume *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks* (2003a). In her introduction to the volume, Braveboy-Wagner notes that FPA “has arguably had an inherent bias toward the study of ‘developed Western states.’” Rather than this bias being ameliorated over time, Braveboy-Wagner asserts that “scholars are less likely than before to consider third world countries as having theoretical relevance to the foreign policy . . . enterprise” (2003b: 1; emphasis added). FPA as a field of study has progressed according to Braveboy-Wagner and her co-author of the chapter “Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches”: “But in contemplating this rich body of research, one is struck by how little work has been done on the global south states. Theoretically oriented, as opposed to descriptive, decision making research remains heavily focused on the behavior of the global north developed countries, in particular the United States . . . studies focusing on or incorporating decision making in the global south are few” (Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr 2003: 19–20). However, Braveboy-Wagner is fairly optimistic that this situation can be rectified compared to other scholars represented in her volume such as Siba Grovogui, who contributed a chapter entitled “Postcoloniality in Global South Foreign Policy: A Perspective”:

Either by benign neglect or sheer intellectual hubris, the vast majority of Western theorists have forsaken the idea of an alternative conceptualization of foreign policy that might differ in both substance and ethos from that which emerged from modern Europe. This neglect may be explained by the fact that theorists have predicated the study of international relations and foreign policy on ontological foundations that uncritically assume that postcolonial states will inevitably converge with Western states in their formulation of “interest,” “value,” and “power.” Thus the prevailing models of foreign policy are derived from extrapolations on selective Western experiences and posited as immutable traditions. This being the case, the fields of foreign policy studies, and international relations generally, depend upon a combined historiography, hermeneutic, and ethnography that precludes the possibility of non-Western political imaginaries as a basis for any coherent set of values and norms that may be generalized. (Grovogui 2003: 31)

What Grovogui is asserting is that FPA, like all theoretical approaches originating in a hegemonic state, seeks to reproduce that hegemony: “It can be reasonably argued that foreign policy studies, as a field of inquiry,
purposefully justifies parochial institutions of politics, law, economics, and morality as inherent and legitimate” (2003: 38). In particular, the idea that there are “universal categories” applicable across Northern and Southern nation-states is critiqued. Grovogui issues a plea that “analysts seek to understand . . . the foreign policies of the global south on its own terms, that is, in light of a historiography and hermeneutics that may be unique to it” (2003: 47). For example, Grovogui notes that “the study of foreign policy has construed international politics in such a manner as to exclude the cultural, economic, spiritual, and social instantiations of foreign policy from its purview” (2003: 47), and he calls for “new forms of knowledge and a reconfiguration of the objects of the field of foreign policy” which he hopes will incorporate more “appropriate methodologies, historiographies, and ethics” (2003: 48).

Randolph Persaud of American University, a third contributor to Braveboy-Wagner’s volume, echoes the theme that “there is too much of an unproblematic acceptance of the models developed for, and out of, the experiences of the Western states” (Persaud 2003: 49). More specifically, Persaud is skeptical of the idea of “classes” of nation-states that would have similar characteristics and be under the influence of similar forces (such as was postulated by James Rosenau [1966] in his article “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” which articulated the concept of a “genotype” of nations). This positivism, with its search for law-like generalizations, may be, he believes, an ideological commitment tied to FPA’s North American roots. Paul Adogame of the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, a fourth contributor, agrees and goes further in suggesting with reference to those who study African foreign policy:

As a result of their educational and intellectual backgrounds, most African scholars have tended to borrow from Western social science theories and concepts to help formulate theoretical paradigms and models that are adaptable to the African context, even though these concepts and theories are recognized as culture-bound and rooted in Western social values. These modified models and approaches sometimes pose serious methodological problems, partly because they were developed to explain international relations in the industrialized world, and partly because the data needed to make them applicable to the African environment are simply not available. (Adogame 2003: 80–81)

It is important to note that these views of the US-ness of FPA are not confined to those from the Global South. For example, in a recent essay, the eminent UK scholar A. J. R. Groom asserts that the US view of FPA is overly narrow: “It was essentially an American agenda with disturb-
ing elements of parochialism that ignored emerging global problems. In short, it was a research agenda fitted for a particular actor, not for FPA or more generally” (2007: 210). In this critique, US visions of the corpus of FPA scholarship focus almost exclusively on North American scholars or those writing in North American journals. Groom feels that “foreign policy [study] was originally conceived in terms of changing the world and responding to a changing world to make it better, whatever that might mean,” with an emphasis on the study of diplomacy (2007: 214).

Groom is particularly dismayed at the continued state-centric focus of US FPA: “In the evolution of foreign policy studies, now more grandly known as FPA, over the last century or so, we find that it has become a more limited tranche of a much more complicated world” (2007: 214). Consider also this statement by three British scholars, Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, in their edited textbook Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (2008a: 4): “To treat FPA as the only approach to the study of foreign policy would limit our discussions. . . . [R]educing the study of foreign policy to be only FPA-related is inaccurate, since many more theories are involved than those covered by FPA.” What is implied is that these limitations have been imposed by the particular North American character of FPA.

Are these views of the profoundly ethnocentric character of FPA on target? One way of addressing this question is to examine the authorship of articles published in the flagship journal of FPA, Foreign Policy Analysis, sponsored by the ISA. Approximately 60 percent of the articles in the 2012 volume do not have an author or coauthor from a non-US institution. But this figure must be placed in context: the inaugural year of that journal found 82 percent of the articles authored by scholars at US institutions (affiliation was used since it is difficult to say what country each scholar was born in). There has been a profound shift in this subfield that we feel has not been recognized for what it is: the de-North Americanization of this field of inquiry. Some of the best and most innovative work in foreign policy analysis is now being penned by scholars located in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and other areas.

And yet the perception that FPA is still largely a North American scholarly enterprise persists. We attribute this primarily to two phenomena. The first is that, when graduate students are introduced to FPA, they are usually exposed to the “classic works” in the field, which are virtually all North American in origin. The second is that much of the literature produced outside of North America is not easily available to FPA scholars throughout the world. For example, the best work in Chi-
nese FPA may not be available in any form to FPA scholars in the Middle East, the West, or other areas of the world. However, North American work may be more readily available to non–North American scholars through the preeminent journal outlets and publishers in the field, their preeminence clearly colored by the hegemony of the United States in the world system for over half a century.

This volume aims to lower some of these challenging obstacles by providing an overview of current FPA work from areas outside of North America. As Margaret G. Hermann notes,

To date, models of foreign policy decision-making have had a distinctly US flavor. As a result, the models have not fared as well when extended to non-US settings, particularly to nondemocratic, transitional, and less developed polities. Indeed, the “US bias” in the decisionmaking literature has made it difficult to generalize to other countries and has given researchers blind spots regarding how decisions are made in government and cultures not like the American. (2001: 49)

Let us examine Hermann’s observation before turning to a road map of this volume: we need to step back and ask ourselves how to discern and mitigate ethnocentrism in an academic discipline of study.

Ethnocentrism’s Effects on FPA Scholarship

In what ways may the spatiotemporal origins of a body of social science scholarship limit its applicability outside of those scope conditions? While I am a North American, from my own standpoint as a female scholar I have had the occasion to ponder this question. As a female social scientist, I have observed that the production of knowledge by those who occupy a particularist and privileged standpoint does indeed affect theorizing and knowledge production in several ways. The questions we ask, the assumptions and concepts we use, the methods we deem most rigorous, the stance we take toward that which we study, the motivations behind knowledge-seeking, and perhaps even the very nature of our reasoning bear the mark of that hegemonic “ethnicity,” if you will.

For example, from a position of power and privilege, one’s own circumstances are the obvious norm from which all others who are different depart. At the same time, one is able to classify and categorize those different others because one is the norm, the standpoint from which all difference is calculated. Difference may also take on the connotation of “inferior,” such that we consider nations unlike the United States to be
in a subordinate position—not only in the material world, but also in the theoretical work of our discipline. Thus, we might be tempted to believe that any new theoretical breakthroughs in FPA would originate through an analysis of the United States, and not other countries. We might also believe that certain levels of analysis, such as bureaucratic politics, are not worth analyzing in countries that are not like the United States such as Saudi Arabia.

Likewise, certain phenomena may become invisible to us because of our standpoint. That dictatorships might experience robust domestic political contestation was not originally understood in the early days of foreign policy decisionmaking theorizing, for example. Similarly, the refusal of the United States to accede to many multilateral treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), due to sovereignty concerns may mask the importance of a new intermestic level of analysis to US FPA scholars. The dominance of the United States in entities such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may occlude from the view of US scholars that other areas are developing institutions that may have agency that is not identical to the largest partner in the institution. In related fashion, the US emphasis on military force may blind us to the fact that some of the most important foreign policy behaviors taking place in the world are nonmilitary in nature. This, in fact, may be an explanation for the relative lack of integration between the subfields of FPA and international political economy (IPE) in the United States. There may also be seen a strong tendency to impose a voice of interpretation rather than emancipate the subject’s voice. How Peruvians, for example, find meaning in their foreign policy may seem of little relevance to a US scholar studying Peru’s foreign policy.

There also may be methodological strictures emanating from the North American origins of FPA. An obvious example would be the generation of events data, which relies, in the first place, on predominantly Western media sources and Western chronologies. But there may be more subtle constraints at work. For example, while I was teaching a class on political psychology many years ago, one of my students, performing just such a word count content analysis, announced that François Mitterand was extremely lacking in self-confidence! Knowing just a little about Mitterand, I pronounced that impossible. On looking at the coded text, it became apparent that Mitterand always used the “royal we.” That is, he referred to himself in the plural to denote that he was representing the nation, as did the French kings of old. Thus, Mitterand would say, for instance, “This is our plan; this is what we believe
would work best,” even though he was referring to himself. When we adjusted for this cultural tradition, the recoding showed Mitterand to be possessed of abundant self-confidence.

Even the foundational notion that comparison across nations will yield generalizable knowledge may be more easily justifiable when one’s position is hegemonic and central. Superficial instrumental use of “types” of nations to fit a comparative case study design in FPA is too common a practice, for example. Filling in the required cases for such a design by asking the question, What small, economically underdeveloped, closed society could I find to fill this position in my design? betrays an ethnocentric view of other entities as fairly easily interchangeable because only a limited set of dimensions is actually important to note. In sum, we can trace the effects of a privileged standpoint on both theorizing and empirical work in FPA.

**Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America**

As a result, we assert that FPA’s promise as a theoretical enterprise can be realized only as it is made capable of moving beyond the confines of its North American origins. Seen in this light, surveying the work of non–North American FPA scholars, as the contributors to this volume do, alerts us to what might be some of the most important new work being done in the field today.

The volume presents literature reviews of FPA work by non–North American scholars (some of whom are expatriates living in the United States). Since most of the work of non–North American scholars is published in languages or in fora to which North American scholars might not have ready access, these essays are a treasure trove of analysis that circumvents the problem of North Americans defining non–North American foreign policy.

Huiyun Feng takes us first to FPA scholarship in China. Feng argues that FPA is still in its embryonic stage within the Chinese community of international relations scholars; for example, she asserts that the first FPA article concerning China was written in 1998, and Chinese scholars have concentrated on introducing FPA to a community of scholars unfamiliar with this subfield of work. The first academic conference on FPA was held in Beijing only in 2010. Nevertheless, Feng notes there is a small body of FPA work extant, written by scholars such as Zhang Qingmin, Wang Mingming, Zhang Lili, and Feng Yujun. One of the most interesting problems faced by FPA scholars in China is that
it is much easier—politically—to study the foreign policies of nations other than China, given the political sensitivities of the ruling regime.

Yukiko Miyagi then discusses FPA work in Japan, noting that there is a considerable literature in this tradition already. A debate that has gripped this scholarly community has been over whether Japan’s foreign policy is realist or not. Is Japan a different type of state than the types envisioned by Western scholars in the realist tradition—could it be a trading state (shoninkokka)? Could Japan’s unique norm set illustrate the degree to which unique ideational elements are crucial to understanding Japanese foreign policy? In addition to these interesting discussions, Miyagi highlights the many fine case studies focused on bureaucratic politics and domestic political contestation conducted and reported on by Japanese scholars about their nation.

Next, Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi note the relative absence of FPA-style scholarship among the international studies community of scholars in India. They argue that IR theorizing in general is woefully underdeveloped, but that the almost complete lack of FPA work is in part due to the thirty-year time period required for declassification of government documents. As a result they say, “No Indian scholar has written major books or articles using social psychology or the vast literature on bureaucratic politics.” On the other hand, expatriate scholars, such as Ganguly himself, have penned FPA works on Indian foreign policy (see, for example, Ganguly 2010). Furthermore, Ganguly and Pardesi argue that there are some indigenous foreign policy conceptualizations that have significantly influenced Indian foreign policy, including Panchsheel (the five principles of peaceful coexistence), which must be taken into account in any FPA account of that nation.

Raymond Hinnebusch then surveys the FPA literature of the Arab world, which is more highly developed than that in other regions or nations surveyed such as India. In part this is due to the pioneering work of Bahgat Korany and Adeed Dawisha over the past several decades, and in part this is due to the pressing need of the United States to understand the foreign policy of Middle Eastern nations with which it often finds itself at odds. Israel, of course, is also a Middle Eastern power, and its foreign policy decisionmaking has been extensively investigated by scholars, most notably Michael Brecher (1972). Questions of national or transnational identity (such as pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism) are themes with which the foreign policy literature of this region is becoming ever more concerned, especially in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011–2012.
After that, Korwa G. Adar reviews the FPA literature in sub-Saharan Africa. Adar discusses how the growing importance of entities such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been a theoretically crucial development in that region. Foreign policy is becoming more and more a product of these regional intergovernmental institutions. At the same time, opposition parties are also becoming stronger institutions across the region, and this limits the ability of African leaders to make foreign policy by fiat. The state-centric approach of North American FPA may be less well suited to understanding African foreign policy. Indeed, Adar opines, “The non–North American circumstances of foreign policy making are thus crucibles for a new round of FPA theory-building, and the African case could play an important role in that exercise.”

Rita Giacalone then brings us back to the Western Hemisphere by examining FPA scholarship in Latin America. Dependency theory shaped Latin American theorizing about Latin American foreign policy decisionmaking since the 1970s. Over the succeeding decades, Latin American scholars began carving out a “peripheral realist” and “peripheral idealist” position, again with a focus on the degree of autonomy wielded by Latin American nations in the construction of their foreign policy. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, constructivism became a real force in the analysis of Latin American foreign policy decisionmaking, with an emphasis on national identity formation and civil society’s role in this. It is clear to Giacalone that “these ideas do not necessarily come from the United States or produce the same results than in mainstream FPA.”

Finally, Amelia Hadfield, a European FPA scholar, and Valerie Hudson, a North American FPA scholar, examine whether there is a cross-Atlantic divide concerning FPA. Indeed, they assert that North American FPA may be distinguished along a variety of dimensions from European analysis of foreign policy (AFP), including explanatory objectives, theoretical proclivities, methodological tendencies, forms of theoretical ethnocentrism, and differing forms of community building. European FPA scholars are much more engaged, for example, with IR theory more broadly construed than are their North American counterparts, for example. The rise of the European Union (EU), much like regional intergovernmental organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, has created a clear need to move beyond the state-centric paradigm in European AFP. Importantly, European scholars are skeptical of the covering law type of explanation preferred by North American scholars, and
favor explanations that explore the historical contingency surrounding foreign policy decisionmaking.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, then, we hope that this volume will find its way onto the shelves of both North American and non–North American FPA scholars. We believe it will prove invaluable, not only in providing a survey of literature by scholars whose work may be largely inaccessible otherwise, but also by serving as a starting point to identify and mitigate those elements of North American FPA theory and methodology that remain too tightly linked to that standpoint and perspective. It is to be hoped that such reflections will occasion the desire to question what we have always done in FPA because, in this way, FPA theory can move beyond its current limits to a new more encompassing, more appropriate, and more useful wave of theorizing foreign policy and foreign policy decisionmaking. In doing so, we do not deprecate FPA’s roots, but rather honor them.