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It is better that ten guilty escape than one innocent suffer.
—English jurist Sir William Blackstone (1723–1780)

It is hard to envision a criminal justice system that never produces erroneous convictions, yet for many years few questioned the US criminal justice system. When a wrongful conviction was detected, it was typically attributed to a failure of some of the actors within the system to carry out their assigned responsibilities correctly. After all, it was reasoned, because defendants are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, the system was more inclined to release guilty individuals than to convict innocent ones. This reasoning, however, ignores some very important facts. First, public defenders frequently believe that their clients are guilty, if not of this crime then of some other crime (Blumberg 1967; McIntyre 1987). Second, prosecutors share this view of the defendant’s guilt as do many jurors (Christianson 2004). Further complicating the problem is the financial inability of many defendants to afford adequate legal representation. Moreover, many defendants are not only destitute but disproportionately drawn from racial and ethnic minorities, because they frequently inhabit the areas of the city in which police surveillance is most heavily concentrated. To the extent that the dual stigma of poverty and minority status contributes to the stereotypic perception that they are criminals, receiving a verdict of not guilty becomes more problematic. And because many wrongfully convicted individuals have prior criminal records (whether justified or not), the presumption of innocence becomes more tenuous. Thus, wrongful convictions are a reality in the US criminal justice system. What remains open to debate is the relative frequency with which these miscarriages of justice occur.
The chapter begins with a succinct review of the study of wrongful convictions in the United States. This is followed by a discussion of the estimated prevalence and incidence of wrongful convictions as well as a critique of these estimates. The chapter then examines factors frequently attributed to wrongful convictions and the effect of race on the conviction of innocent persons. A discussion of the focus and scope of the study is found at the end of Chapter 1.

A Selective Overview of the Study of Wrongful Convictions

Empirical investigations of wrongful convictions in the United States can be traced back to 1932, when Edwin Borchard published *Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-five Actual Errors of Criminal Justice*. Since that time other books with similar themes followed, including *Court of Last Resort* (Gardner 1952), *Not Guilty* (Frank and Frank 1957), *The Innocents* (Radin 1964), and *Wrongful Imprisonment: Mistaken Convictions and Their Consequences* (Brandon and Davies 1973). What Richard Leo (2005, 204) describes as “the beginning of the modern era of the study of wrongful conviction[s]” began in 1987 with Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet’s seminal article in the *Stanford Law Review*. In “Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases,” Bedau and Radelet provide evidence that the problem of wrongful conviction is more prevalent than previously thought and raise the specter that wrongfully convicted individuals have been executed. They document at least 350 wrongful convictions that occurred in capital trials in the United States from 1900 to 1985. Although Stephen Markman and Paul Cassell (1988) have been critical of their findings, the sheer volume of erroneous convictions suggests that the problem is potentially much more serious than previously envisioned.

Interest in wrongful convictions was further piqued as a result of DNA testing. In 1989 Gary Dotson’s 1979 rape conviction was overturned after a DNA sample exonerated him of any wrongdoing. His case represents the first time that a convicted individual had been exonerated on the basis of DNA evidence (Gross et al. 2005). More cases of wrongful conviction were soon forthcoming. An early study by the United States Department of Justice (1996) identified twenty-eight cases in which convicted individuals were exonerated through DNA evidence. According to the Innocence Project (2011), the number of DNA exonerations for the United States currently stands at 267.

In addition to DNA testing, the problem of the wrongful conviction of innocents received substantial press coverage when in 2000 the governor
of the state of Illinois imposed a moratorium on executions, given the increasing number of wrongful convictions being discovered at that time (Huff 2002). At the time of the moratorium more death row inmates had been exonerated than had been executed since capital punishment was re-instated in Illinois during the 1970s (Leo 2005). Moreover, according to the Center on Wrongful Convictions (2009a),

In the quarter century between restoration of the Illinois death penalty and Governor George Ryan’s blanket clemency order, 298 men and women were sentenced to death in Illinois. Of those, 18 have been exonerated—a rate of 6%, the highest exoneration rate of the 38 states with death penalties on their books.¹

Innocence projects have furthered our understanding of the significance of the problem of wrongful convictions, although the data are fragmented and limited in scope. The earliest innocence project was initiated by Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld in 1992 at Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. According to their website, “The project is a national litigation and public policy organization dedicated to exonerating people through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice” (Innocence Project 2009b). The Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University’s School of Law also boasts a multifunctional innocence program. Structured around three components, the Center on Wrongful Convictions provides not only legal representation but research and community service to raise public awareness and to promote reform within the criminal justice system (Center on Wrongful Convictions 2009b). Today approximately forty law schools in the United States have programs that focus on the exoneration of innocent individuals (Zalman 2006).

Arguably, the most extensive body of information on wrongful convictions is available at Hans Sherrer’s Forejustice (2011) website. With an international list of over three thousand wrongfully convicted individuals, this database represents the largest enumeration of wrongful convictions. The website also provides the user with a link to Justice Denied, a magazine devoted exclusively to those who have been wrongfully convicted. Printed at least four times annually, Justice Denied is published by the Justice Institute, a nonprofit organization in Seattle, Washington.

A steady stream of recent books has further stimulated interest in the problem of the conviction of innocents. For example, Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted, by Martin Yant, was published in 1991. Michael Radelet, Hugo Bedau, and Constance Putnam in 1992 documented over four hundred wrongful convictions in potentially

**Estimating the Prevalence and Incidence of Wrongful Convictions**

Determining the frequency and number of cases in which individuals have been wrongly convicted is problematic at best. Because investigations of wrongful convictions in the United States typically concentrate on the most serious offenses, given the potential for severe sanctions (including the possibility of death in capital-eligible cases), less serious cases go largely undetected. To the extent that these less serious crimes may result in suspended sentences or probation, the wrongly convicted defendant may lack the incentive to pursue a legal remedy. The defendant’s limited financial resources may further result in an acceptance of an erroneous guilty verdict (Gross et al. 2005). And because wrongfully convicted defendants may possess a prior criminal record, there is often little outcry from the public. Nor can an estimate of wrongful convictions rely on statistics derived from successful appeals: innocence alone does not guarantee a successful appeal and a successful appeal does not necessarily demonstrate *factual innocence*, given that convictions may be overturned on the basis of procedural errors alone. Thus, estimates of wrongful convictions that rely on known cases of wrongful conviction will tend to understate the scope of the problem.

To avoid these pitfalls some researchers have derived their estimates by surveying individuals who work within the criminal justice system. These estimates, however, are based on perceptions that are of unknown
validity. There are few prosecutors, for example, willing to acknowledge that they have convicted innocent persons. It is therefore reasonable to assume that criminal justice personnel are conservative in their estimates of the number of cases of failed justice. With these caveats in mind, a brief review of research in this area follows.

The number of known wrongful convictions varies considerably from study to study. Many researchers have focused exclusively on wrongful capital convictions. While these are the most egregious miscarriages of justice, death sentences comprise only a miniscule amount of all felony sentences. As previously noted, Bedau and Radelet in 1987 identified 350 capital cases involving erroneous convictions. Their study, however, examined only a fraction of the 7,000-plus executions that occurred during the twentieth century. This figure was revised to at least 416 cases involving wrongful conviction in 1992 (Radelet et al.). Combining data from DNA exonerations, a sample of capital sentences, and information obtained from the Innocence Project, D. Michael Risinger (2007) estimates that between 3.3 percent and 5 percent of all capital rape-murder convictions in the 1980s involved innocent defendants. In an examination that includes capital cases from 1970 to 1992, William Holmes (2001) suggests that more than 106 individuals were erroneously convicted of capital crimes in the United States. Using more recent data, Samuel Gross and colleagues (2005) uncovered 340 convictions of innocents from 1989 through 2003.

Other researchers have concentrated on exonerations that resulted from DNA testing. As noted previously, the earliest of this research dates back to the 1996 Department of Justice study, which analyzed 28 wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence. Four years later, Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer (2000) documented 62 cases in which convicted individuals were later found to be innocent through DNA testing. Today there are 267 cases in which DNA evidence has culminated in the exoneration of convicted innocents (Innocence Project 2011).

Surveys of criminal justice professionals typically disclose a small percentage of cases that are thought to have resulted in the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. In *Wrongful Convictions in the United States*, Huff and colleagues (1996) report on the results of a questionnaire mailed to Ohio criminal justice personnel (judges, prosecutors, public defenders, sheriffs, and chiefs of police) and state attorneys general. Of those who responded, 72 percent believed that wrongful convictions constituted less than 1 percent of all criminal cases in the United States. An additional 20 percent of those surveyed felt that innocent individuals had been wrongly convicted 6 to 10 percent of the time. A more recent survey of judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and police from
Ohio suggests similar perceptions (Ramsey 2007). Inquiring about the frequency of system errors that result in wrongful conviction, Robert Ramsey found that his respondents believed that wrongful convictions occur at a rate of 0.5 to 1 percent in felony cases in their own jurisdictions and at a slightly higher rate (1 to 3 percent) for the United States as a whole. A replication of the Ohio survey using criminal justice personnel in Michigan revealed almost identical estimates (Zalman, Smith, and Kiger 2008). Respondents estimated a wrongful conviction rate of less than 0.5 percent in their own jurisdictions and a wrongful conviction rate of 1 to 3 percent for the country overall, although defense lawyers perceived more wrongful convictions than judges, prosecutors, and police officials. While these estimates suggest the perception that relatively few cases result in wrongful conviction, even if only 0.5 percent of all cases culminate in a wrongful conviction, in a given year there will be approximately five thousand wrongful felony convictions.

**Criminal Justice System Factors Associated with the Conviction of Innocents**

Although wrongful convictions are commonly the result of the coalescence of multiple factors, the most frequently cited contributor to false convictions is witness error. Since Edwin Borchard’s observation in 1932 that witness error was present in over half of his wrongful convictions, researchers have found that witness error is a prominent factor in the conviction of innocents. According to the Innocence Project (2009c), witness error is a factor in over three-fourths of DNA exonerations. Nor are individuals employed by the criminal justice system unaware of this problem. Witness error (primarily witness misidentification) was perceived to be the number one reason for wrongful conviction by 78.6 percent of the criminal justice personnel surveyed in a recent study (Huff et al. 1996, 67). While most witness error is not deliberate (Huff et al. 1996), a number of factors can contribute to misidentification. As Mitch Ruesink and Marvin Free (2005, 4–5) note:

> Psychological factors, including exposure time, amount of light, distance from observer, level of violence, and post-event factors (e.g., eyewitnesses given leading information) can influence the perceptions of eyewitnesses. Misidentification is also more likely when the observer and the observed are of different races. Empirical research demonstrates that cross-racial identifications are most problematic when white eyewitnesses are attempting to identify African American subjects (Rutledge
Systemic factors associated with misidentification include lineups that contain only one person who looks like the alleged perpetrator and lineups in which the suspect is of a different racial group than others in the lineup. Finally, societal and cultural factors such as personal prejudice, expectations based on past experience, and stereotypes may affect what we “see.”

Police and prosecutorial misconduct are present in a number of the known wrongful conviction cases as well. A study of DNA exonerations by the Innocence Project disclosed the presence of police misconduct in half of their cases. Similarly, prosecutorial misconduct was present in 42 percent of the wrongful convictions (Scheck et al. 2000, 246). Moreover, a recent national examination of the judicial system found that prosecutorial misconduct led to charge dismissals, conviction reversals, or reduced sentences in over two thousand cases. Yet a number of questionable prosecutorial practices did not result in any action being taken. According to Steve Weinberg (2003a), “In thousands more cases, judges labeled prosecutorial behavior inappropriate, but allowed the trial to continue or upheld convictions using a doctrine called ‘harmless error.’”

The organizational culture of the police and district attorney’s office can produce a climate in which the probability of wrongful convictions is enhanced if expediency and winning at all costs is emphasized. Perhaps nowhere was this more apparent than in the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office (DCDAO), where prosecutors are alleged to have stated, “Anyone can convict a guilty man; it takes a real prosecutor to convict an innocent one” (cited in Huff et al. 1996, 43). This climate of permissiveness has not gone unnoticed. Since Texas began allowing postconviction DNA testing in 2001, Dallas County has had the most exonerations of any county in the United States. Consequently, a conviction integrity unit has been established to review old conviction cases for prosecutorial misconduct, and District Attorney Craig Watkins, an African American, has been hired to oversee the process. Moreover, in 2008 CBS’s 60 Minutes featured a story on the DCDAO; and in 2009 Investigation Discovery, a sister station to the Discovery Channel, televised six episodes of Dallas DNA, which examined the convict integrity unit of the DCDAO and DNA exonerations in Dallas County (Barta 2008; Emily 2009).

Police and prosecutorial misconduct can manifest itself in a myriad of ways. Police, for example, may “coach” the witness during the lineup; use unscrupulous methods (e.g., brutality, threat, force, or deceit) to obtain a confession; “plant” evidence; mishandle physical evidence; or threaten potential witnesses for the suspect. Prosecutorial misconduct may involve improper behavior during the grand jury proceedings; dismissal of poten-
tial jurors because of their race, ethnicity, or gender; harassment or bias toward the defendant or defense attorney; use of known false or misleading evidence; suppression of exculpatory evidence; withholding information that the witness testifying against the accused was offered immunity (or other rewards) for testifying; and use of improper closing arguments (Gershaman 1991; Huff et al. 1996; Weinberg 2003a). Other examples of prosecutorial misconduct include the use of inappropriate or inflammatory comments during trial; the mischaracterization of the facts or evidence of the case; mishandling the evidence; and “threatening, badgering, or tampering with witnesses” (see Davis 2007, Chapter 7, for a more complete discussion). Additionally, the likelihood of a wrongful conviction is enhanced when the police and prosecutors fail to adequately investigate other possible perpetrators of the crime and ignore evidence that fails to support their views (Humphrey and Westervelt 2001).

False confessions represent another factor that is associated with the conviction of innocents. Duress, coercion, intoxication, diminished capacity, mental impairment, a misunderstanding of the law, fear of violence by the police, actual harm by the police, the threat of a harsh sentence if a confession is not given, and a misunderstanding of the situation have all been found to be associated with the admission of guilt by an innocent. The extent to which false confessions contribute to wrongful convictions varies in the research. The Innocence Project (2009d) reports that false confessions (in the form of an incriminating statement, confession of guilt, or a guilty plea) are a factor in one-fourth of all DNA exonerations. On the other hand, a 2003 report examining forty-two wrongful murder convictions in Illinois since 1970 noted that 59.5 percent of the convictions “rested in whole or part on false confessions” (Warden et al. 2003).

The use of informants/snitches is another leading contributor to wrongful convictions. In over 15 percent of all DNA exonerations, testimony from informants or jailhouse snitches was a factor in the erroneous conviction (Innocence Project 2009e). In many of these cases the jury was unaware that the informant/snitch had been paid to testify against the defendant or had been released from prison in exchange for the testimony and therefore had an incentive to lie. The Center on Wrongful Convictions suggests that the problem of using testimony from snitches is even more acute. An examination of 111 death row exonerations since the reinstatement of capital punishment in the 1970s revealed that 45.9 percent of the wrongful convictions were the result “in whole or part on the testimony of witnesses with incentives to lie—in the vernacular, snitches” (Warden 2004, 3), thus making the testimony of snitches the main cause of conviction in known wrongful conviction capital cases.
Moreover, racial disparity in drug enforcement may be exacerbated by the use of police informants in minority communities. According to Alexandra Natapoff (2009), a law professor at Loyola University in Los Angeles and expert on criminal snitching, because the police focus attention on the communities where their informants reside, high-crime urban communities, which are typically overrepresented by people of color, tend to come under closer scrutiny than their more affluent (and more white) suburban counterparts. And because police informants commonly have an incentive to lie, they are often unreliable sources of information. The over-exposure of urban minority inhabitants means that “false accusations, mistaken warrants, erroneous raids, and wrongful convictions associated with snitches will be more frequent in communities in which the practice is prevalent” (113).

Ineffective defense counsel represents yet another possible factor contributing to the conviction of innocents. Again, research is inconclusive regarding the extent to which this problem is responsible for wrongful convictions. Whereas ineffective defense counsel contributed to only 2.8 percent of the wrongful capital convictions examined by Bedau and Radelet in 1987, it was present in 27 percent of DNA exonerations (Scheck et al. 2000, 246). Ineffective defense counsel can be influenced by a number of factors, including insufficient funding, lack of mechanisms for monitoring the quality of legal representation provided to the defendant, an unmotivated defense counsel, the presumption of guilt that pervades the criminal justice system, and the difficulty of proving the presence of ineffective counsel on appeal (Bernhard 2001).

Unvalidated or improper forensic science is the second most common factor leading to the conviction of innocent defendants based on DNA exonerations (Innocence Project 2009f). Unvalidated or improper forensic science includes

the use of forensic disciplines or techniques that have not been tested to establish their validity and reliability; testimony about forensic evidence that presents inaccurate statistics, gives statements of probability or frequency (whether numerical or non-numerical) in the absence of valid empirical data, interprets nonprobative evidence as inculpatory, or concludes/suggests that evidence is uniquely connected to the defendant without empirical data to support such testimony; or misconduct, either by fabricating inculpatory data or failing to disclose exculpatory data. (Innocence Project 2009f)

In 2003 the US Department of Justice estimated skewed testimony, sloppy work, and tainted evidence by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
may have been present in three thousand cases tried prior to 1997 (“Errors at F.B.I.” 2003). Contaminated evidence, mislabeled blood samples, falsified DNA data, inflated statistical matches of DNA evidence, and questionable testimony by forensic experts or laboratory managers have been reported in several states as well (Tanner 2003). In 2008 the Wayne County, Michigan, prosecutor began a three-year investigation of cases that may have been tainted by inaccurate forensic evidence examined by the Detroit Police Department Forensic Services division. Although the investigation is focusing primarily on cases in which firearms evidence led to a conviction, the cases may number in the thousands (Lundberg 2008).

Nor is the military exempt from criticism regarding its crime laboratories. The US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, which examines over three thousand criminal cases annually, has recently come under scrutiny for its lax supervision and its failure to notify defendants when discrepancies were later detected. Particularly problematic is the work of one of its star laboratory analysts, Phillip Mills, who was employed there for almost thirty years. A three-year review of his cases revealed numerous problems. Because 83 percent of the evidence that he had examined had been destroyed in accordance with military policy at the time, only 388 cases were subject to retesting. However, reanalysis disclosed that in over half of the DNA cases that could be retested, the laboratory officials disagreed with Mills’s conclusions. As a result of Mills’s errors, 67 suspect files were subsequently withdrawn from the national DNA database. In 2008, when the study was finally concluded, the army was supposed to forward its findings to David Leta, a federal prosecutor, so that he could determine if Mills’s conduct was a violation of federal law. Although military officials claim to have forwarded this report as required, Leta apparently never received it and only learned about the report when investigative journalists from McClatchy newspapers contacted him in 2011 about the investigation. Since the $1.4 million spent on retesting Mills’s evidence, the US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory has implemented over 100 changes and modifications to its practices (Taylor and Doyle 2011).

Perhaps one of the least recognized factors in wrongful convictions is plea bargaining by innocent defendants. Plea bargains may look especially attractive to an innocent defendant with a prior criminal record or one who does not qualify for a public defender (Huff et al. 1996). Because innocence projects are more likely to devote their limited resources to cases involving extended sentences or the death penalty, plea-bargained cases are unlikely to receive much exposure.
Wrongful Convictions and African Americans

The effect of race in wrongful convictions has been investigated by some researchers. For instance, racial prejudice as a factor in wrongful convictions is emphasized in Chapters 5 and 6 of *In Spite of Innocence* (Radelet et al. 1992). Huff and colleagues (1996) note that African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately found among the wrongfully convicted. They suggest that witness misidentification (particularly in cases in which the witness and the accused are of different races) and prejudice by the police and prosecutors, along with a myriad of other factors, contribute to this disparity. An entire chapter in *Wrongly Convicted* (Westervelt and Humphrey 2001) is devoted to a discussion of racial bias and wrongful convictions. Talia Harmon (2004), after comparing eighty-two capital cases in which inmates were exonerated with a matched group of executed inmates, concludes that defendant race and victim race are predictive of case outcome. The regression models also suggested the possibility of an indirect relationship between the combination of defendant and victim race, strength of evidence, and case outcome. In their examination of exonerations from 1989 through 2003, Samuel Gross and colleagues (2005) document racial disparities, particularly in cases of rape and in cases involving individuals who committed the crime while a juvenile. Although their data do not permit a determination of the reasons for the observed disparity, they speculate that because many of the rape cases were interracial, cross-racial misidentification and racial bias and discrimination probably contributed to the miscarriages of justice. They further note the potential impact of “a dual system of juvenile justice in this country, one track for white adolescents, a separate and unequal one for black adolescents” (551). Additionally, a study of forty-two wrongfully convicted women by Ruesink and Free (2005) revealed numerous racial differences. Exonerated African American women were more likely to have been wrongly incarcerated for drug offenses and murder, whereas their white counterparts were more likely to have been wrongly incarcerated for child abuse. Geographical differences were also detected: two-thirds of the wrongful convictions of African American women were from southern jurisdictions. Further, the primary reason(s) for wrongful conviction varied by race. Perjury by criminal justice officials was present in 53 percent of the African American cases. In contrast, only 4 percent of the white cases involved perjury by criminal justice officials. Nevertheless, the authors caution against generalizing beyond their sample as the large number of cases from the Tulia (Texas) drug bust inevitably skewed some of the findings involving black women. Similarly, the Wenatchee (Washington) child-abuse
scandal accounted for seven of the fifteen child-abuse cases for white women, therefore disproportionately impacting that subsample.

It should be evident from this succinct overview that the literature has observed racial differences in studies of wrongful conviction. Typically, though, the discussion of race is subordinate to the discussion of other variables. As the literature suggests, marginalized groups come under greater scrutiny by the criminal justice system than nonmarginalized groups. In particular, individuals of lower socioeconomic status are more likely than others to become entrapped in the criminal justice system. According to Jeffrey Reiman and Paul Leighton (2010) in their now classic book, *The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice*, lower-class individuals are more likely than their middle- and upper-class counterparts to be arrested, charged, and convicted. They are additionally more likely to receive harsher sentences. Furthermore, the offenses typically attributed to the lower class are more likely than those attributed to the middle and lower class to be labeled as violations of the criminal statutes by society. While few scholars would dismiss the importance of socioeconomic status in any discussion of the criminal justice system, it is important to note that much of the data analyzed in the book uses race as a proxy for social class. In other words, their discussion of the significance of social class is at least partially influenced by race. Yet a computer-generated search of books failed to disclose any publications that exclusively focused on an enumeration of wrongfully convicted African American men.

**Why This Study Focuses on African American Men**

That minorities in general, and African Americans in particular, are overrepresented at every stage of the criminal justice system is irrefutable. Although approximately 12 percent of the US population is black, African Americans eighteen years of age and older accounted for 27.8 percent of all adults arrested in 2009 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010, Table 43C). For African Americans under the age of eighteen the disparity was even more pronounced. During that same year black juveniles represented 31.3 percent of all juvenile arrests (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010, Table 43B). And although the Uniform Crime Reports does not provide a race x gender breakdown, males were disproportionately arrested, accounting for 74.7 percent of all arrests in 2009 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010, Table 42). Gender disparity is even greater in the offense categories typically discussed in the wrongful conviction literature. Almost 90 percent of
all arrests for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, 98.7 percent of all arrests for forcible rape, and 88.2 percent of all arrests for robbery involved males (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010, Table 42).

African Americans are additionally overrepresented in other areas of the criminal justice system. Marc Mauer and Ryan King (2007) of the Washington, DC–based Sentencing Project report that blacks are 5.6 times more likely than whites to be incarcerated. More recently, Ashley Nellis and Ryan King (2009, 3) found that “racial and ethnic minorities serve a disproportionate share of life sentences.” Nationally, almost half of all inmates serving a life sentence are African American. Racial disparity is even more evident when life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences are examined. Blacks accounted for 56.4 percent of the LWOP population. Further, blacks constitute 42 percent of the inmates on death row and 35 percent of all executions since the reestablishment of capital punishment in 1976 (Death Penalty Information Center 2011).

Yet none of these disparities matters if the figures reflect actual differences in offending patterns. Studies that have investigated the extent to which the racial differences in offending can explain racial disparity have been unable to justify the higher rates for African Americans. An examination of national data for 1979, for example, revealed that 20 percent of the racial disparity could not be accounted for after controlling for racial differences in criminal activity (Blumstein 1982). This figure increased to 24 percent when 1991 prison data were utilized (Blumstein 1993). Even more troubling are the findings of Michael Tonry and Matthew Melewski (2008). Using 2004 incarceration data, they concluded that 39 percent of the incarceration rate for African Americans remains unexplained after racial differences in offending are considered. With a substantial amount of the racial disparity unexplained by legally relevant factors, an investigation of the false conviction of African American men represents a chance to further understand the dynamics involved in this area of the criminal justice system.

Focus and Scope of the Book

The research reported in this book has three objectives, the first of which is to enumerate the known cases of wrongful conviction involving African American men during a specified time period. Because earlier empirical investigations of wrongful convictions have not exclusively focused on this segment of the population, this research is largely exploratory in nature. A second objective of the study is to describe qualitatively and quan-
titatively the defining characteristics of these cases relying primarily on data available electronically and in print. The third objective is to go beyond citing mere statistics in examining the cases. Instead, the narratives attempt to portray (to the extent the data permit) those who have experienced a miscarriage of justice in a more personal light.

Chapter 2 commences a discussion of wrongfully convicted African American men. Factors contributing to wrongful convictions are enumerated and discussed. Table 2.1 discloses the names, charges, and jurisdiction of known cases of wrongfully convicted African American men since 1970 that appeared in the electronic and print media by 2008. This chapter also highlights some of the more flagrant miscarriages of justice that have recently been acknowledged.

Four chapters focus on wrongful convictions according to the most serious offense for which the defendant was charged. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on wrongful convictions involving violent offenses by analyzing wrongful convictions for murder/attempted murder and rape/sexual assault, respectively. The chapters examine the extent to which the previously identified factors in wrongful convictions are present in these cases. Further, the impact of victim characteristics (age, gender, and race) in the wrongful conviction of innocents is explored. Chapter 5 analyzes drug-related cases that resulted in erroneous conviction of innocent defendants. This chapter focuses on recent drug busts in Tulia, Texas; Hearne, Texas; and Mansfield, Ohio, in which African Americans were apparently singled out for differential treatment. Finally, Chapter 6 scrutinizes wrongful convictions in cases that involve robbery and other offenses not previously examined.

The book concludes in Chapter 7 with a summary of the results of this study. Suggestions for future research and a brief discussion of issues surrounding the topic of wrongful convictions are additionally examined in the last chapter. Two appendixes appear at the back of the book. Appendix A provides an elaboration of the methodology used in this research, and Appendix B provides the reader with a short narrative of each of the cases included in the investigation.

It is equally important to note the limitations of this investigation. Because many wrongful convictions are unknown, the cases identified in this study may not be representative of all wrongfully convicted black men. Consequently, only descriptive statistics are reported in this book. Nor is the book meant to theoretically examine the larger issues of institutional racism and marginalization. Because this would involve a sociological and historical overview of race relations in the United States and an examination of the development and enforcement of criminal statutes, it is beyond the scope of this book. It should further be acknowledged that because this
is an exploratory study, it should not be construed as the “final word” on the subject. Rather, the authors’ purpose in conducting this investigation is that the findings might inspire additional research in this area that will permit the use of inferential statistics and the testing of competing theoretical models.

Notes

1. The current number of states with capital punishment statutes is the fewest since 1978. On March 9, 2011, Illinois abolished the death penalty, making it the sixteenth state (plus the District of Columbia) to prohibit the death sentence. According to the Death Penalty Information Center (“Illinois Governor Signs Bill” 2011), other states are also considering this option. Currently thirty-four states, the US government, and the US military authorize the use of capital punishment for select offenses.

2. For example, in 2004 over one million adults were convicted of a felony in state courts. An additional 66,518 individuals were convicted in federal courts (US Department of Justice 2007, 1 and 2). Yet only 138 convicted felons were sentenced to death during 2004 (US Department of Justice 2006, 14).

3. Samuel Gross and colleagues (2005) suggest that whether misidentification is accidental or deliberate may vary by offense. Their examination of 340 contemporary wrongful convictions disclosed that false rape convictions were more likely the result of mistaken identity, whereas false murder convictions were more likely the result of deliberate misidentification.

4. A study of search warrants in San Diego found that these warrants were issued disproportionately for African American and Hispanic residents living in predominantly minority communities. Although these groups constitute less than one-third of the city’s population, they accounted for over 80 percent of all warrants and 98 percent of the warrants seeking cocaine. Further, the warrants targeting African Americans and Hispanics were less likely than those targeting whites to result in the discovery of contraband. Whereas two-thirds of the warrants involving whites were successful in locating contraband, most of the warrants involving African Americans and Hispanics failed to disclose the presence of contraband. According to Natapoff (2009, 113), “One reason for this disparity is that 80 percent of warrants were based on confidential informants.”

5. In 1984, in *Strickland v. Washington*, the US Supreme Court diminished the probability of appealing a decision on grounds of ineffective counsel. According to this decision, the appellate court must be convinced that a different verdict would have been rendered if the defense counsel had pursued the case more diligently. The difficulty associated with making this determination is alluded to by Justice Marshall in his dissent. “Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government’s evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer” (from *Strickland v. Washington* 1984, 710; cited in Bernhard 2001, 232–233).
6. Josh Bowers (2008) from the University of Virginia School of Law takes exception to the view that plea bargains are responsible for false convictions. He contends that false guilty pleas are the result of errors during arrest, charging, and/or trial rather than the result of plea bargaining itself. Bowers further asserts that most individuals who accept plea bargains are recidivists who engage in petty crimes and who therefore tend to have an advantage during plea-bargaining negotiations, given the potentially high pretrial process costs and the need for prosecutors to prioritize their workload. Although the criminal justice system is biased toward these individuals, Bowers argues that plea bargains often result in release, thereby mitigating the earlier discriminatory processes.

7. Richard Leo and Jon Gould (2009) are very critical of the use of the narrative method utilized in this research. They argue that “scholarship based on stories about wrongful conviction tends to oversimplify causation” (16). Leo and Gould further contend that this approach “tends to portray causation as unidimensional . . . even though we know that cases of wrongful conviction have multiple sources” (16). Although their concerns are valid if the purpose of the investigation is to ascertain dimensions of causality, this study has no such aspirations. While the cases are arranged throughout this book according to the role of a particular factor (e.g., eyewitness error) in the miscarriage of justice, the purpose is to highlight the importance of that factor in that particular instance. Further, a perusal of the accompanying discussion and relevant tables typically discloses that multiple factors are present in the false conviction. These factors, moreover, are referred to as contributing to, rather than causing, the wrongful conviction. Thus, the criticisms leveled at the narrative method in general by Leo and Gould appear to be irrelevant to this investigation.