


EXCERPTED FROM

The US Military in Africa:  
Enhancing Security  
and Development?

edited by  
Jessica Piombo

Copyright © 2015  
ISBN: 978-1-62637-196-5 hc



**FIRSTFORUMPRESS**

A DIVISION OF LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS, INC.

1800 30th Street, Suite 314  
Boulder, CO 80301 USA  
telephone 303.444.6684  
fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the  
Lynne Rienner Publishers website  
[www.rienner.com](http://www.rienner.com)

# Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	vii
<i>List of Acronyms</i>	ix
<i>Map of Africa</i>	xii
1 Addressing Security Threats in Africa <i>Jessica Piombo</i>	1
2 The Military's Role in Development <i>Andrea K. Talentino</i>	11
3 Evolving Civilian and Military Missions <i>Jessica Piombo</i>	37
4 Accountability: A Critical Link in the Security- Development Nexus <i>Dustin N. Sharp</i>	65
5 Security Sector Assistance in Africa, but Where Is the Reform? <i>Andrea M. Walther-Puri</i>	83
6 Civil-Military Operations in East Africa: Coordinated Approaches <i>Maureen Farrell and Jessica Lee</i>	103
7 Maritime Security: The Africa Partnership Station in Ghana <i>Alison Rimsky Vernon and Margaux Hoar</i>	121
8 Civil Society and the US Africa Command <i>Teresa Crawford and Trina Zwicker</i>	141
9 Toward More Effective Development Assistance <i>Clarence L. Bouchat</i>	161
10 Effectively Integrating Security and Development <i>G. William Anderson</i>	183

11 Pursuing Multidimensional Security	
<i>Jessica Piombo</i>	213
<i>Bibliography</i>	231
<i>The Contributors</i>	251
<i>Index</i>	255

# 1

## Addressing Security Threats in Africa

*Jessica Piombo*

How can a defense organization address security issues in an environment where insecurity often stems from challenges of governance and development? The traditional toolkits of defense institutions and actors are not designed or intended to address concerns related to governance and development, challenging these agents to devise novel approaches. The need to adapt is especially strong when military actors are tasked with addressing insecurities that stem from areas outside of traditional, interstate consideration: politically closed systems, state-dominated economic opportunities, and widespread poverty, food insecurity, and vulnerability. These unstable areas are often rife with multidimensional security challenges such as armed conflict, terrorism, illicit trafficking, communal violence, resource competition, and problems associated with significant population displacement. A true response that aims to resolve rather than manage these issues requires attention to governance and development, as much as it does to traditional security institutions like militaries and police forces. The relationship among governance, security, and development defies simple causality, and means that efforts to address any single side of the triangle must take into account the other two.

As has been widely argued by academics, international organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and even the US Department of State, Africa's security challenges largely relate to deficient levels of good governance (including effective democratic governance and the active inclusion of minority and marginalized ethnic

groups in the business of governance), as well as socioeconomic equality. Armed insurrection, lawlessness, and terrorism have predominantly emerged in Africa in response to this state of affairs.<sup>1</sup> To respond to these challenges, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has experimented with a wide range of approaches and programs to respond to the nature of the security environment in sub-Saharan Africa.

Particularly since 2001, these efforts have raised many questions and generated fierce debates about the proper role of the US military within the “whole of government” approach to security; whether the US military was attempting to assume a developmental role in Africa; and whether US foreign policies within Africa have become militarized and/or securitized. In this volume, we analyze the first two of these debates by asking what blend of civilian, military and private programs and activities can help to produce outcomes that work on all three aspects of the security-governance-development dynamic to reduce insecurities in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors in this volume interrogate the activities of the US military and the broader Department of Defense as they have experimented with novel approaches to dealing with nontraditional security challenges.

Collectively, this volume assesses the changing role of the US Department of Defense in sub-Saharan Africa as it has become involved in activities outside its traditional toolkit of military training and equipment programs, the two cornerstones of traditional theater security cooperation. The first question the authors investigate is how these programs operate, the degree to which they involve civil-military cooperation, and how the differential capabilities and resources of the various US government agencies affect programs that attempt to take a broad view of security. The second broader, and ultimately more important question, is what role the US military can play in helping to reduce the nonmilitary sources of insecurity and to create more stable and secure environments for the citizens of African countries?

The authors review a selection of US security programs in Africa, investigating a set of initiatives where government actors attempted to create programs that brought together a range of actors outside the normal military toolkit, addressed issues beyond military-training, and which considered both the causes and manifestations of complex security challenges. Most of these initiatives moved the US military out of its traditional roles such as kinetic operations (i.e., military action using lethal force) and military training, and brought the Defense Department into direct interaction with counterparts in the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and a range of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

## **The Complex Nature of Security Challenges in Africa**

The mutual relationship between state-based and human security problems in Africa, as in much of the global south, means that programs to counter insecurity must address both individual- and state-level drivers.<sup>2</sup> In these environments, not only must our conceptualization of security shift, but the focus and responses of states must also adapt to new realities. Traditional approaches in which human security issues are treated as distinct from physical (state) security ones are not sufficient to address and resolve security challenges at either level. “The state-based security architectures of the twentieth century cannot address twenty-first-century vulnerabilities. We need to make a core shift from focusing on traditional threats to focusing on conditions-based vulnerabilities.”<sup>3</sup> These “conditions-based vulnerabilities” often lie outside traditional national security considerations and defense capabilities, and have in turn led governments like that of the United States to adopt discourse and policy in which development issues should be considered part of the arena addressed by the national security establishment.<sup>4</sup>

Fundamentally, national security problems tend to emerge as a result of deeply rooted human security issues, including those that are economic or social in nature. Once those forces take hold, and an identifiable national security problem emerges, the effects of that national security problem are not limited to political or security-related concerns within a state government or governments. A national security concern can also, in turn, fuel insecurity at the group or individual level, particularly if the state can no longer provide security guarantees (assuming that it could ever provide them). These insecurities can be social or economic in nature. Therefore, a cyclical pattern can emerge where a local security challenge fuels a national security challenge, which then creates additional local security issues, and so-on.

As a brief example to demonstrate this relationship, consider the challenge of small arms and light weapons proliferation and use in Africa. Poverty, inequality, and lack of opportunity can lead to desperation. In this condition, if an opportunity to serve as a middleman in trafficking presents itself, individuals who would not normally engage in the activity would be more likely to do so in order to address their social and economic insecurities. Whether the trade is in small arms and light weapons, contraband goods, drugs, or humans, trafficking offers high payoffs and can, in certain contexts, help those who are otherwise desperate to gain status as others begin to view them as powerful and successful individuals. Thus, individuals or a group may engage in cross-border arms trafficking as a way to address personal insecurity.

Since trafficking networks generally involve multiple groups, individual attempts to address personal insecurity can feed into a complex and networked state-level security problem. Collectively, the members of a trafficking network can contribute to the movement of massive weapon supplies either within a country or across state borders, depending on the security situation at play. Systemic factors, such as the presence of closed, authoritarian, or corrupt political systems, can allow small-time trafficking activities to generate (or contribute to) increasingly insurmountable arms proliferation activities and perhaps facilitate a widespread sharp increase in violence, the emergence of cross-border conflicts, and civil wars.<sup>5</sup>

Of course, the emergence of war and conflict can also provide additional opportunities for arms trafficking operations to occur due to an increase in supply and demand of arms. Increasingly unstable economic and social security situations, resulting from the conflict, may make arms trafficking more enticing to other individuals whose lives have been shattered as a result of widespread violence and uncertainty. As trafficking operations grow and violence continues without an end in sight, nearby states, including those not directly impacted by the conflict, may soon become sites for violence, and their leaders may become increasingly concerned about the real potential for “conflict spillover.” This, in turn, impacts the nature of bilateral and multilateral relationships among the state governments. If a spillover occurs, it will cause additional human security concerns in a more widespread area, and the cycle of insecurity will linger but at a grander scale.

More than one security dynamic is likely to influence the security situation in a given area at any given time. In extending the small arms and light weapons example, it quickly becomes apparent that increasingly severe population displacement and health and food insecurity situations can emerge when conflict erupts. At the same time, these very factors may have contributed to the violent conflict in the first place, as Liberian refugees in northern Côte d'Ivoire did in the early 2000s (when a steady stream of refugees-turned-migrants later became a source of tension that fed into the outbreak of war in 2003). The dynamics are a causal analyst's tautological nightmare. Depending on the situation, terrorism and maritime security crises can manifest in situations of extended conflict, as they have in both the Niger Delta and Somalia. The confluence of these factors is nearly always complex and context-dependent, but understanding how they intersect with one another is imperative to gain a holistic picture of any security situation, particularly if one hopes to develop and execute engagement activities to address it (the focus of Chapters 9-11 of this book).

Working to promote security and stability goals in this type of environment means attempting to reduce the sources of insecurity,

addressing the cyclical relationship between different drivers, and operating at the individual, community, state, and interstate levels. Simply working to disrupt smuggling and trafficking networks will not eliminate the factors that drive individuals into these networks in the first place. Eliminating income from illicit trafficking without developing alternate livelihood and income opportunities may even make people *more* vulnerable and insecure. These dynamics necessitate a different approach to reduce insecurity than found in traditional interstate oriented security programs.

### **Multidimensional Responses to Complex Security Issues**

In the early 2000s, as the international security environment shifted and the United States began to prioritize issues of ungoverned spaces, vulnerable populations, and poverty as threats to national security, Africa and challenges to security in Africa became higher priorities for US foreign policy. The US government created multiple security programs that explicitly attempted to combine the efforts of agencies traditionally involved in foreign assistance with those of the US military. These programs have been variously described as “interagency,” “whole of government,” “3D” (diplomacy, development, and defense), and “smart power” approaches, and have been used across the globe to address multiple causes of security and insecurity. In Africa, three flagship initiatives attempted to build bridges between the security and development communities: the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and the Africa Partnership Station (APS).

Each of these blend civilian and military actors in different ways, and address specific development-security dynamics within the scope of their programs. The TSCTP, with a mission to counter violent extremism across the Sahel region, is the most comprehensive of the three. The Department of State coordinates all activities of the TSCTP to ensure that the programs of specific agencies complement each other. Concrete initiatives are undertaken by the Department of State (DoS) in the diplomatic and public information realms; USAID engages in education and development activities to counter extremism; and the DoD provides education and training to regional security forces to increase their ability to fight and eradicate extremist groups. In most circumstances the actors in the TSCTP do not work directly with each other, rather the coordination is high-level.

The CJTF-HOA is directly managed by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)—in 2002-2007 by the United States Central Command—and has fewer interagency partners directly involved in its structure and processes than does the TSCTP. CJTF-HOA does have a



significant focus on civil-military engagements throughout the Horn of Africa, utilizing naval engineers (the Seabees) and Civil Affairs groups to dig wells, and build and refurbish schools and healthcare facilities. There are a range of other activities that involve providing medical, dental and veterinary care, as well as more traditional military training activities. CJTF-HOA also provides fora and training programs to help regional militaries build their own civil-military and disaster response capabilities.

The management of the APS, like the CJTF-HOA, is also entirely within the military, as it is run by US Naval Forces, Africa (the Navy component command for Africa). APS focuses on enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, includes maritime civil affairs groups, and also works with nongovernmental organizations and other government organizations on education in the maritime realm (fisheries development, education for coastal management, and other nontraditional, development-oriented security activities). Within Africa, these three initiatives have raised a great deal of controversy about the role of the US military in promoting “developmental” solutions to security challenges.

Efforts to integrate security and development efforts peaked with the creation of AFRICOM in 2007. Based on experiences and lessons from the TSCTP, CJTF-HOA, and APS, the US government had come to realize the difficulties of adopting cohesive security strategies in Africa. The Bush administration initiated a reorganization within the DoD in February 2007, announcing plans to create a geographic combatant command dedicated to Africa that would organize all defense programs on the continent under a single command, rather than the existing three commands. Launched between February 2007 and October 2008, AFRICOM assumed responsibility for the design and execution of DoD programs on the African continent, taking over programs previously administered by US Pacific Command, US Central Command, and US European Command.

As it combined the administration of the DoD’s efforts in Africa under one structure, AFRICOM also announced that it intended to operate differently than traditional combatant commands.<sup>6</sup> The vision for AFRICOM reflected the nature of insecurity in Africa, where challenges stemming from problems of governance and development often posed indirect threats to the national security of the United States. Military solutions that focused on kinetic operations would do little to change the nature of the threat environment in most African countries. Therefore, working to protect US security interests within Africa meant attempting to reduce the sources of insecurity and helping to strengthen African security capabilities, as well as assisting vulnerable communities to protect themselves against threats.

Not only was AFRICOM's scope of activities conceived more broadly than that of other combatant commands, but also the manner in which it would operate differed from traditional notions of military operations. As originally planned, AFRICOM was meant to operate in a highly interactive manner with civilian government agencies such as the DoS and USAID. The initial vision reflected the emerging belief that in regions of the world like sub-Saharan Africa, an interagency approach was necessary to address complex security challenges and bridge work in development and security. AFRICOM had initially been conceived as a fundamentally interagency organization, with large numbers of non-DoD personnel in significant positions of responsibility, rather than as a defense organization to which a small group of interagency partners provided advice.

The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) had already adopted a similar approach to US security engagements in Latin America and the Caribbean, but SOUTHCOM had been designed and structured as a traditional command. Civilians could play advisory roles in SOUTHCOM, but not hold implementing posts. AFRICOM's planners attempted to design a military structure that would place civilians in important functional and decision-making positions. These civilians were to come from various government departments, such as the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Treasury. The purpose was to bring the insight of these organizations into the daily workings of AFRICOM and to orient it towards greater interagency cooperation.

On the ground, programs were designed to reflect this interagency perspective. As AFRICOM's mission and operating concept took shape, its scope of activities grew to include the three flagship programs previously discussed, as well as a range of more traditional military activities such as theater security cooperation (training and equipping African militaries) combined exercises, and peacekeeping training programs. Military efforts would work in tandem with governance programs, so that a security sector reform program would integrate defense reform with justice programs that focused on the rule of law. Security force capacity building would unfold in countries where democratic reforms had already been enacted, and where civilians had been teaching their African counterparts how to democratically and responsibly control and utilize their security agencies. Counterterrorism programs were meant to encompass educational and development initiatives, as well as skills training for military and police forces. Some of these programs were already underway, and AFRICOM was supposed to help push the coordination even deeper into the planning and implementation process.<sup>7</sup>

AFRICOM thus inherited a range of programs that include significant elements of capacity building, humanitarian and civic assistance, natural

disaster response, and “stabilization” activities. In 2007-8 AFRICOM’s proposed mission encompassed a significant number of projects and programs modeled on the civil-military development projects of the TSCTP and CJTF-HOA that looked like small-scale development programs (human capacity building, institutional reform, and economic assistance). AFRICOM’s transition team planned to build on these programs to help support and sustain African capacity for non-kinetic and limited military missions, emphasizing humanitarian assistance (HA), disaster relief, medical assistance, security cooperation, and capacity building. The command would prioritize theater security cooperation and be capable of only limited military operations; it had no dedicated forces and would require external support to launch any kinetic military operations.

AFRICOM has evolved significantly from this initial vision: the crucible of the Libyan intervention in 2011 led AFRICOM’s second commanding general (then, Carter Ham) to realize that the command’s operational structure was not suited to running a military campaign. Since 2011, AFRICOM has reduced its emphasis on the interagency approach and increased its focus on traditional military training, security sector reform, and other theater security cooperation activities. The nontraditional activities still exist across the continent, though traditional military engagements have assumed more prominence.

### **Scope and Plan of the Book**

It has been more than thirteen years since the establishment of the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti (2002), and eight since AFRICOM was created. There is now a significant record and set of experiences in the realm of nontraditional security initiatives in Africa. In this volume we assess these efforts to work across the development-security divide, examining their impacts on the African security environment, as well as the process and outcomes of US security engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. The contributions cover a range of programmatic areas and initiatives and consider the debates that these engagements have created.

Chapters 1-3 look at how US government agencies have evolved to operate in rapidly changing security environments where nontraditional security threats outnumber traditional threats. The authors analyze the military’s changing role in “nation building” and the development-security divide and situate the creation of AFRICOM within this context.

Chapters 4-7 focus on specific types of security challenges and how the US either works directly or with African partners to address them. Some of the chapters are conceptual, analyzing overall approaches, while others present case studies of particular initiatives, assessing how these programs

affect the security environment in Africa. These analyses also explicitly address coordination across multiple US and nongovernmental actors and consider the role of the US military in these programs. The authors evaluate programs that variously work to strengthen weak security sectors, address cultures of corruption that create insecurities, attempt to counter terrorism through civil-military affairs, or enhance the maritime security of partner countries. Each of the chapters asks a set of questions about the creation of the programs, the actors involved, and the effectiveness of both the interagency process and the efforts to improve the African security environment.

In Chapters 8-11, the authors assess the record of these whole of government efforts to address insecurity and promote a more stable and secure environment in sub-Saharan Africa. They also propose avenues for improvement.

## Notes

---

Note: All opinions expressed in this chapter are my own and do not reflect official positions of either the Naval Postgraduate School or the United States government.

<sup>1</sup> Lamb, "Parading US Security Interests as African Security Policy," 50-52.

<sup>2</sup> Beebe and Kaldor, *The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon*. The geographic reference in this volume is primarily sub-Saharan Africa; for convenience we will also refer to it as "Africa."

<sup>3</sup> Beebe and Kaldor, *The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon*, 4.

<sup>4</sup> For example, the 2001 National Security Strategy identified statelessness (a governance deficit) as a major national security consideration, and in 2010 President Barak Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development. "The directive recognizes that development is vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United States" and called for "the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and charts a course for development, diplomacy and defense to reinforce and complement one another in an integrated, comprehensive approach to national security." The first quote is from [www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy), accessed September 26, 2012; the second from [www.state.gov/ppd](http://www.state.gov/ppd), accessed December 15, 2014). These are discussed in more depth in Chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Hounnikpo, "Small Arms and Big Trouble," 165-186.

<sup>6</sup> For more on the history of these developments, see Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests*.

<sup>7</sup> Much of this information is derived from conversations with multiple officials at AFRICOM in November 2007 and over the course of 2008.