## Contents

*Foreword, Andrea Bartoli*  ix

*Foreword, A. Edward Elmendorf*  xiii

*Preface*  xvii

1  A Citizens’ Movement for Founding the United Nations, 1938–1943  1

2  “We the Peoples,” 1944–1946  17

3  The American Association for the United Nations, 1947–1964  35

4  AAUN Internationalism and Domestic Political Disputes, 1947–1964  57


6  Citizen Advocacy: The UNA-USA and the US Government Since the 1970s  91

7  The Decline of Popular Support for the UN: UNA-USA in the 1970s  113

8  The UNA-USA Parallel Studies Program and Track II Talks, 1968–1992  123

9  Post–Cold War Openings: The UNA-USA Multilateral Studies, 1984–2000  137
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>UNA in the New Millennium, 1989–2010</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Leadership Dynamics Across the Decades</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>UNA’s National Constituency: Members and Allies</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Jeffrey Laurenti, with Tino Calabia</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Advocating for Human Rights and International Justice</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Engaging the Private Sector</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Reaching Out: UNA-USA and Education</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Doug Garr, with Tino Calabia</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Vista, <em>The InterDependent</em>, and Other Prominent Publications of UNA-USA, <em>Dulcie Leimbach</em></td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>UNA, the UN Foundation, and the Ways Ahead</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*List of Acronyms* 337
*Bibliography* 339
*Index* 345
*About the Book* 361
Two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered a radio address, saying, “There is no such thing as security for any nation—or any individual—in a world ruled by the principles of gangsterism. There is no such thing as impregnable defense against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning. . . . We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows. And in the dark hours of this day—and through dark days that may be yet to come—we will know that the vast majority of the members of the human race are on our side.”

The next day, FDR’s personal secretary received a letter from Clark Eichelberger, the director of the League of Nations Association, offering its services and those of related groups to help the president construct “the organization of the world for peace and justice.”

This was not a spontaneous idea born from shock of the attack. For more than twenty years, Eichelberger, the LNA, as it was known, and others had carried the banner for a “world organization” as declared by the League of Nations. And though the league itself was slipping into irrelevance through its inability to marshal effective global responses to the aggressions of the emerging Axis powers in the early 1930s and the Allied powers’ military reactions, the association that supported it still promoted the league’s ideals, calling for revisions of its covenant to make the world body both more effective and more acceptable to the United States. By the time World War II reached its bloodiest peak in the early 1940s, a consensus was finally reached among the Allies that a new organization for international security—not simply a victors’ peace—was necessary long before the shooting stopped, so that when peace came, the world would have a new strong foundation on which to build.

The LNA itself was an early grassroots base in the United States with an internationalist outlook. It was founded in 1923 through the
merger of the American Association for International Cooperation and the League of Nations Non-Partisan Committee, after the Paris Peace Treaty, which had set the terms of victory following World War I and which had included the creation of the League of Nations. Despite ultimate US congressional and popular rejection of the league, it continued to campaign for international US engagement abroad. Even as the LNA struggled to garner support over the decades, it nevertheless became the founding organization of the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN) in 1945 and later of the United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA) in 1964.

Eichelberger’s life paralleled the political history of the century. Born in 1896 in Illinois, he served as a US Army corporal in World War I, “loading boxcars,” as he said, in France. (His brother, Robert, had a military career of greater longevity, having been a West Point graduate and a four-star general in the Pacific theater during World War II.) In the early 1920s, Clark Eichelberger traveled to Geneva to study the League of Nations. His connection to the league began in 1927, when he became the director of its Chicago office. In 1933, he became the executive director, and in 1938, he was in Geneva for what was to be the last League Assembly, just as Britain and France fatally forced the cessation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia to Germany in the name of peace. Eichelberger was a member of the US State Department committee that wrote the first draft of the UN Charter and a consultant to the 1945 San Francisco Conference. After 1933, depending on the year, he was either the director or the executive director of LNA, AAUN, UNA, or related coalitions until his retirement in 1964. He then continued to serve in advisory capacities for UNA and the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), the research arm of the LNA, until his death in 1980.

The other important figure in global peace advocate circles during those decades was James T. Shotwell. Born in Canada in 1874 to US Quaker parents, Shotwell’s academic and political careers included milestones in international affairs. He was a US delegate to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and the author of the charter of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Shotwell was named president of the LNA in 1935. Four years later, he and Eichelberger founded CSOP. In his role on a State Department subcommittee, Shotwell was largely responsible for the working paper that formed the basis of the UN Charter (see below). Eichelberger and Shotwell complemented each other’s skills. Eichelberger was the detail-oriented organizer, and Shotwell, the intellectual, developing the next great idea.
It was Eichelberger who mobilized the grassroots base, and it was Shotwell who created the frameworks for international organizations, including the ILO and the UN. It was Eichelberger who lobbied presidents and congressional leaders; it was Shotwell who designed the building blocks of a new international security structure for the United States.

The single overarching obsession of these and other internationalists—starting with Franklin D. Roosevelt, himself—was to ensure that the multiple failures of the League of Nations would not be repeated. Globally, this meant creating an organization that had real authority and that was not created as a victors’ peace. In the United States, this meant engaging as broad a spectrum as possible of political (especially congressional) and popular opinion. Fewer than twenty years had passed between the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Adolf Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938; for most political and military leaders in the late 1930s, the Great War was living memory. Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and Eichelberger were soldiers in that war; FDR was a junior cabinet official at the time; Herbert Hoover was a relief worker in Belgium; FDR’s future secretary of state, Cordell Hull, and his first vice president, John Nance Garner, were members of the House of Representatives.

In her memoirs, This I Remember, Eleanor Roosevelt recalled the first UN General Assembly meeting in London in 1946, which brought...
up ghosts of previous failures. “So many of the Europeans were older men who had made the effort with the League of Nations and were a little doubtful about a second international effort to keep the world at peace,” she wrote. “The loss of a generation makes itself felt acutely twenty to twenty-five years later, when many men who would have been leaders are just not there to lead.”

Among the internationalists, there was no debate that the failure of 1919 had led directly to the next world war, and it certainly was not a question of hindsight. In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson said, “I can predict with absolute certainty that within a generation there will be another world war.” Paul Kennedy, in *The Parliament of Man*, reproduced a chilling political cartoon from 1919, titled “Peace and the Cannon Fodder,” from the London *Daily Herald*. It depicts the Great War victors strolling out of the Paris conference, while cowering behind a column is a small naked boy, labeled “1940 class.”

**A Horrible Summer, 1938**

Eichelberger traveled to Europe in the summer of 1938, first to attend the International Federation of League of Nations Societies in Copenhagen, followed by a trip to Prague in July for meetings with government officials, and then on to the annual Assembly of the League of Nations in September in Geneva. Before leaving the United States, he met with FDR on June 9 at the White House and broached his favorite policy proposal: an international conference to revise the League of Nations’ Covenant to make it more authoritative and more acceptable to the United States. Eichelberger quoted Roosevelt as saying, “That’s the thing. That’s good; I believe it’s about time for something to be done along that line.”

Europe was consumed by the crisis in Czechoslovakia. Hitler was demanding the annexation of the German-speaking portion of the country, called the Sudetenland. He had annexed Austria in March and was claiming to represent the “oppressed” ethnic Germans of western Czechoslovakia. The nineteenth session of the League of Nations Assembly met in Geneva beginning on September 12. Eichelberger described it as “an unreal Assembly,” in which the official agenda was taken up with routine matters and with only one mention of Czechoslovakia, while “outside the Assembly Hall very little was spoken of except the increasing threat of Germany to Czechoslovakia and the efforts of the British and French governments to force Czechoslovakia to a hideous surrender.” Eichelberger’s disdain for the political maneu-
vering was vehement. He clearly saw the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia as a betrayal of an ally behaving legally and undercutting the remaining authority of the league.

Edward R. Murrow, the CBS News chief correspondent in London, asked Eichelberger for radio reports from the assembly. In his radio broadcast commentary on September 11, Eichelberger, despite his anger, sounded an optimistic note. “We must not permit any catastrophe to destroy our faith,” he said. “No adversity should stop us for a moment from fulfilling the task of our generation, which is the outlawry of war and the establishment of the institutions of peaceful international society.”

On September 21, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain met with Hitler at his retreat at Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian Alps, where Chamberlain accepted Hitler’s claim to the Sudetenland. Eichelberger, in a September 26 radio address on CBS, was blunt, complaining that Britain and France “have maneuvered Prague into the position of a defeated power being presented with ultimatums from friends and enemies alike. There is universal resentment . . . that a law-abiding democratic state such as Czechoslovakia should be placed in this position.”

At the Munich summit with Germany and Italy on one side and Britain and France on the other, an agreement was signed (with no Czech officials present), ceding the Sudetenland to Germany on September 30. This was the infamous “peace is at hand” summit. A historic irony is that the League of Nations Assembly also ended on the same day. Eichelberger later wrote that while he was at a dinner with league leaders that evening, “[I] could hardly contain myself as I listened to the hypocritical tributes” as to how Munich was the road to peace. “I believed it was the beginning of the Second World War,” Eichelberger wrote. The assembly never met again.

Back in the United States, the LNA and other coalitions were organizing demonstrations and prayer meetings in support of Czechoslovakia. On September 25, thirty mass meetings were held around the country. At the Chicago rally, 65,000 people attended. An overflow crowd of 23,000 filled the meeting in Madison Square Garden in New York City. In a message to that rally, Eichelberger said, “The refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations twenty years ago and the abandonment of its principles by other great powers are finally bearing fruit.”

Despite Munich and the neutering of the league, the LNA continued to advocate for its role in international affairs, so its work was not officially over, despite the assembly’s collapse. However, after the league’s successive failures to defend Ethiopia against Italian aggression, as well
as Austria and Czechoslovakia against Germany, the LNA abandoned hope that it could play a part in political or security issues; it focused instead on strengthening its work in economic, social, and humanitarian affairs. This was not grasping at straws. Indeed, this work had already been relatively productive, particularly with the ILO, which was functioning as intended with US support. After its creation in 1919 from the ashes of the Great War, the ILO pursued fair, universal labor practices based on social justice. (Later, the ILO became the first specialized agency of the UN in 1946.) Moreover, the United States had actively supported the league’s efforts in this regard while staying out of the league itself. The LNA had not given up on international solutions to political issues, though; it had just given up on the league as the vehicle for those solutions.

The Rise of Internationalism

Internationalism was not the dominant school of thought throughout the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. The LNA soldiered on long after the bulk of US governmental and popular opinion gave up on it and returned to their traditional isolationism. Eichelberger, Shotwell, and company used their skills, nevertheless, to convince Americans that they needed to look outward; yet, the public debate on such foreign policy was won through the more powerful voices of William Randolph Hearst, the publisher; Father Charles Coughlin, the Detroit-based radio demagogue; and isolationist members of Congress. At the time, those members included the preponderance of the Republican Party and a large share of the Democratic Party.

By 1938, with the next war looming in Europe, Eichelberger and other LNA officials knew that FDR’s heart remained with them, but the Neutrality Acts, which prevented the United States from favoring one belligerent over another in wartime, and political realities strongly favored US cautious impartiality. Eichelberger met with FDR eight times from 1936 to 1944, seeking to gauge his feelings on creating an international organization and briefing him on LNA’s work. Although FDR was an advocate of international engagement, he could not always promote that position publicly. As president, however, he filled his State Department with Wilsonians: Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Under-secretary of State Sumner Welles, and Ambassador Joseph Davies, among others. In 1939, Roosevelt had instructed the State Department to start drafting the outlines for a world organization. FDR was content to feed ideas to Eichelberger, knowing that Eichelberger agreed with
him and that the president would not have to take responsibility for these trial balloons.11

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany, and World War II began in force. Although the United States was still officially neutral, official and public opinion generally favored the European democracies over the German dictatorship. But that sympathy did not include abandoning neutrality.

Two internationalist groups were established after the declaration of war in Europe: the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), founded in May 1940, and Fight for Freedom (FFF), founded in April 1941. The main difference between the two was that the CDAAA focused on maximizing aid to European allies (in policy terms, this meant repealing the Neutrality Acts), while the more militant FFF group wanted a declaration of war. Both opposed the isolationist America First Committee, and both refused to work with Communists. Eichelberger, Shotwell, and other LNA figures helped to create the CDAAA, as they shared offices. The Fight for Freedom entity was chaired by Ulric Bell, a former editor of the Courier-Journal in Louisville, Kentucky, who later ran Americans United for World Organization after Fight for Freedom folded. In 1943, he was named by Robert E. Sherwood to run the Los Angeles branch of the Office of War Information, acting as a liaison to the motion picture industry.

Both the CDAAA and the FFF adopted the strategy of putting on a nonpartisan and populist face. Drawing on the strategy of the LNA, both groups worked to build chapters across the country and enlist distinguished public figures. Demographically, this meant focusing on getting midwestern Republicans to counter the Democratic/East Coast–heavy boards and committees. From that perspective, the Committee to Defend America hit the trifecta with William Allen White, the publisher of the Emporia Gazette in Kansas, a Pulitzer Prize winner, a nationally known author (including the articles “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” and “Mary White,” about his daughter), and a dedicated Republican. But White was a “Teddy Roosevelt Republican,” meaning he supported the Bull Moose Party and the League of Nations and opposed isolationism and the Republican Party’s conservative wing. The Fight for Freedom’s honorary chairman were Henry W. Hobson, the Episcopal Church’s bishop for southern Ohio, and Senator Carter Glass, Democrat of Virginia.

Both Hobson and Glass succeeded in establishing chapters around the country, but the CDAAA did a better job. By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, the committee had more than 800 chapters, whereas the
The UN Association – USA

Fight for Freedom had 372. In an article analyzing the two groups, Andrew Johnstone, a lecturer at the University of Leicester in Britain, wrote that the purpose of the chapters was to demonstrate popular support and to counter the criticism of representing only the “elite Eastern Establishment.” He argued that the FFF had superior outreach to labor and African Americans (African American leaders in the group included A. Philip Randolph and Adam Clayton Powell). Both groups, through Eichberger and Bell, had the ear of the White House, but Eichberger could boast a closer personal relationship with FDR. In addition, FDR’s steps to aid the British, in particular the Lend-Lease Program, were more aligned with CDAAA thinking. “Despite its non-partisan nature and Republican Chairman, the CDAAA was clearly sympathetic to the foreign policy aims of the Roosevelt Administration. In fact, it often went out of its way to act as a propaganda agency for those policies,” Johnstone wrote.

Popularly known as the White Committee, the CDAAA was unveiled to the public on May 20, 1940. In his statement to the press, White said, “The time has come when the United States should throw its economic and moral weight on the side of the nations of western Europe. . . . It would be folly to hold this nation chained to a neutrality policy determined in the light of last year’s facts. The new situation requires a new attitude.” The group sought to attract support from leading public figures and chapters nationwide. Well-known endorsers included James B. Conant, the president of Harvard; Governor Herbert Lehman of New York; the boxer Gene Tunney; playwright Robert Sherwood; historian Henry Steele Commager; theologian Reinhold Niebuhr; and General John Pershing. “The genius of the Committee,” Eichberger wrote, “was to get information and suggestions for action out to the country and in turn channel expressions of opinion to Washington.”

The strategy of the committee in the period between the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 can be found in the Washington Office Information Letter. Published by CDAAA, starting in early 1941, it was a weekly mimeographed publication promoting the CDAAA’s agenda and examining practical matters such as industrial production. Written over the year alternately by Livingston Hartley, Donald C. Blaisdell, Frank S. Goodwin, Roger S. Greene, and E. Fred Cullen, the newsletter made the case of supporting Britain, Russia, and China in every way short of military force. In a July 24, 1941, article, titled “Hitler’s Objectives in Russia,” the committee argued that Hitler not only aimed for control of Russia’s wheat and oil but also “intends to use a defeated Russia as an instrument in his drive to dominate the world,” in which he would “gain invaluable strategic
positions for use against the British Empire.” The fall of Russia and the absolute isolation of Britain would lead to a “Germanized Europe.”

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the December 19 issue (#49) stated, “America’s entry into the war lays finally the specter of an appeasement peace. . . . Our country is now the central power house of the Allies, and our country is fighting for total victory.” The last newsletter in the Eichelberger archives, dated December 24, 1941 (#50), dealt with Winston Churchill’s arrival in Washington, DC, which the committee saw as the beginning of a formal alliance between the two countries. (It was: the Declaration by the United Nations by Roosevelt and Churchill was announced the next week.) The issue also analyzed the Pacific front and politics in Germany and provided a “Retrospect” on whether war could have been avoided. The short answer to that question was no—any appeasement of Japan and Germany “could have brought us peace, only temporarily. . . . The inevitable showdown with them both either would have come before now, or else would loom directly ahead. And that showdown would then have been a two-ocean war for survival, without any effective allies—a battle of America.”

Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 shook up political alliances. Ever since the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact (by which each pledged to remain neutral should either nation be attacked by a third party), American Communists had supported isolationism. After the invasion, however, they became interventionists and left the isolationist, pro-German America First Committee; but neither CDAAA nor FFF accepted them as members.

Another change at this time was that the committee shortened its name, dropping “by Aiding the Allies,” so that it was simply the Committee to Defend America (CDA). The July 4, 1941, issue of the Washington Office Information Letter was the last to use the full title. In the next issue, July 11, the committee was now Committee to Defend America, with a subhead: “By Aiding the Allies—By Defeating the Axis Powers—By Developing Means for Permanent Peace.” No explanation for the name change was given.

A New York Herald Tribune article on July 4, 1941, noted the change and quoted a CDA Executive Committee statement saying that the long title “was always too cumbersome” and that it was “limited as a complete definition of the committee’s aims.” The timing suggests that the committee did not want its name to imply an alliance with the Soviet Union, though that was not explicitly stated.

FDR and Churchill met on August 14, 1941, aboard the HMS Prince of Wales, where they agreed on a set of principles for interna-
Dubbed the Atlantic Charter, the nonbinding agreement was a declaration “of certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they based their hopes for a better future for the world.” Once the charter was released, the internationalists seized it as a rallying agenda for a global organization.

Eichelberger flew to Britain in September 1941 to seek a better sense of British political thinking after the signing of the charter. His agenda included meetings with US and British officials and governments-in-exile based in London, including the Czech foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, and the Free French leader, Charles de Gaulle. But Eichelberger’s main interest was meeting with the British Research Sub-Committee on International Organization, the politically kindred spirit to the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the LNA’s think tank. Eichelberger discovered from his talks with the British group that, other than the need for a postwar organization and a commitment to the disarmament and economic recovery of Germany, the two organizations had little in common. “One might say that the British were too close to the war to engage in postwar planning, whereas the Americans were too far removed from it to have a sense of reality about it,” he wrote.  

Eichelberger was also invited to a small private lunch at 10 Downing Street with Winston Churchill. After the meal, drinks, and a monologue by the prime minister, Eichelberger—true to form—asked Churchill one question: What would take the place of the League of Nations in the postwar world? Churchill was noncommittal, saying he was too old to think beyond the war itself; it was up to FDR to create such an entity. In a CBS radio broadcast soon after, on September 21 from London, Eichelberger said, “It would be a disaster if the war were so prolonged that at its close the victorious nations would be too tired to build or guarantee an adequate peace.” Foreshadowing the speech FDR would make on December 8 after Pearl Harbor, Eichelberger added, “Winning the war should be a job of a few years; winning the peace will require the best efforts of our generation.”

The December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended the isolationist/internationalist debate entirely. The Committee to Defend America, the Fight for Freedom, and America First all ceased to exist by early 1942. The LNA, CSOP, CDA, and other affiliated groups created a grand coalition called Citizens for Victory. “As a result, in addition to the vast effort to mobilize the American public against the fascist threat, further significance of such networks lay in their potential for years to come,” Johnstone wrote.
Winning the Peace

On December 8, 1941, Congress declared war on Japan, and on December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, and the United States reciprocated. World War II was now virtually global. The LNA, like the vast majority of Americans, mobilized for battle. Citizens for Victory, the LNA, and all the various permutations of acronyms, agendas, and personalities from the past two decades or so crystallized themselves through a two-prong goal: win the war and win the peace.

Churchill visited Washington on December 22. By January 1, 1942, he and FDR announced a sweeping alliance, called the Declaration by United Nations. The declaration, which was ultimately signed by twenty-six governments, reaffirmed “a common program of purposes and principles” set out in the Atlantic Charter, with each state pledging to “employ its full resources” in “the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.” (Its original name was merely Declaration, but after it was signed, the phrase “by United Nations” was added.22) The LNA’s goal of developing a world organization before the end of the war, dedicated to securing peace through international cooperation, played out in tandem with the official policy of the US government.

FDR continued to communicate with Eichelberger and the LNA, encouraging them to say what he could not yet declare openly. “I have read with interest of your plan to inform our people of the United Nations’ aspect of the struggle,” he wrote in an April 30, 1942, letter to Eichelberger. “Nothing could be more important than that the people of the United States and of the world should fully realize the magnitude of the united effort required in this fight.”23

Earlier, in February 1942, the CSOP published its long-planned report titled “The United Nations and the Organization of Peace,” which continued to refine the vision of both the CSOP and the LNA for the UN world body. This vision was based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations.

As long ago as 1939, Secretary of State Hull had assigned State Department officials to begin a discreet study of postwar peace and reconstruction through his advisory committee on problems of foreign relations. Hull stayed with this work throughout the war but had to face the imperatives of the war itself, as well as other agencies wanting “a piece of the United Nations action” and the potential wrath of isolationists.24 In September 1941, Hull and Welles, undersecretary of state, finally got approval from FDR for the State Department to become the
exclusive home for postwar planning. The new Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy met for the first time on February 12, 1942—two months after Pearl Harbor and five weeks after the publication of the Declaration by United Nations.

The postwar committee was chaired by Hull, with Welles as vice chair. But Welles was also the chair of the subcommittee on political problems, which put a world organization in his portfolio. (The other subcommittees were security, territorial problems, economics, political, and legal, as well as one on a possible European federation.) Welles and Leo Pasvolsky, Hull’s personal assistant and an economist, recruited outside experts (including Eichelberger and Shotwell) to begin creating a world body. This was the only time in his career that Eichelberger received a salary from the US government. At this point, the committee was still secret; so when Eichelberger toured the country visiting LNA chapters, he never revealed that their collective goal was now under serious consideration in the White House.

By March 1943, the subcommittee had a rough draft ready, presenting a major world organization. Although the paper was the product of the political subcommittee (the Welles Committee), there was some disagreement, no surprise, as to who deserved the most credit: in his book, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations*, historian Stephen C. Schlesinger said it was Pasvolsky; but Eichelberger credited Shotwell. Regardless, the fundamentals of what would become the UN Charter were apparent: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an International Court of Justice, an Economic and Social Council, and a Trusteeship Council. The exact membership and voting rights of the Security Council were still unsettled, but FDR’s one nonnegotiable point—that the four major powers (the United States, Britain, Russia, and China) would have special policing powers and responsibilities—was in place. The president signed off on the plan, and on June 15, 1943, he mentioned for the first time, publicly, that the government was working on a blueprint for an international organization.

The first draft of the UN Charter was complete.

The First UN Association

Despite the basic common interest in “winning the war/winning the peace,” there was still a plethora of internationalist organizations during the war years—many of them housed at LNA headquarters at 8 West 40th Street in New York City and with Eichelberger and/or Shotwell in leadership positions. As noted earlier, Citizens for Victory (also located
at 8 West 40th Street) served as the major umbrella organization starting in 1942. Hugh Moore, the founder and president of the Dixie Cup Company, was the executive director, and Eichelberger was vice chair. (Moore was on the executive committee of LNA and was a founding member of CDAAA. He founded the Hugh Moore Fund for International Peace in 1944 and remained involved in foreign policy and civic groups for the rest of his life.) The Free World Association was founded in 1941, also with Moore as the executive director. Yet there were attempts “to unite the internationalist movement under one banner,” Johnstone wrote, first with the Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace in 1943 and then Americans United for World Organization in 1944. Although the goal was coordination, Johnstone stated that “both merely added to public confusion and caused as much division within the movement as unity.” The Non-Partisan Council was based in Chicago; the other groups were housed at 8 West 40th Street, though, by 1942, the Free World Association had moved into its own building—Free World House on Bleecker Street in New York.

The first organization to be called the United Nations Association came into being in July 1943. As tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations, the LNA and the CSOP were legally barred from advocating for or against specific bills before Congress or from conducting campaigns targeting specific candidates. The UNA, however, was created as a taxable organization to launch such campaigns.

The UNA’s incorporation said that it had been established “for the declared purpose of carrying on an educational campaign throughout the country in support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the formation and participation therein by the United States of an international organization for the maintenance of security and justice throughout the world.” Shotwell, besides being the director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and chair of the CSOP, was also chair of the UNA board. Eichelberger was the executive director.

Eichelberger and Shotwell set out nationwide to garner support for House and Senate resolutions endorsing a world organization, praising members of Congress who backed the bills, and working against those who opposed them. Two congressional resolutions made up the heart of the campaign. Representative J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) offered a resolution in 1941 that simply said Congress favored “the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world.” The bipartisan Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill Senate resolution of 1943 (proposed by Joseph H. Ball, R-Minnesota; Harold H. Burton, R-Ohio; Carl A. Hatch,
The UN Association – USA

D–New Mexico; and Lister Hill, D-Alabama) was more detailed, calling on the United States to “take the initiative in calling meetings of representatives of the United Nations” to plan for postwar peace, including relief and assistance for countries liberated from the Axis powers, procedures “for the peaceful settlement of disputes and disagreements between nations,” and the establishment of “a United Nations military force” to suppress “any future attempt at military aggression by any nation.”

A UNA pamphlet sent to supporters cited the “urgency of writing the peace while the war still is being waged. . . . We support actual organization of the United Nations as quickly as possible; [there are] positive indications by the United States Congress and the Executive that the United States will join a world organization” that has police powers, has authority for the peaceful settlement of disputes, will cooperate to improve “the standard of living of all peoples,” and will establish democratic governments where UN aid is used in reconstruction.30

In other words, the goals of the UNA and LNA lined up identically, under the same leadership and same street address; the difference was the legal necessity of segregating the partisan and nonpartisan sides.

In meeting minutes from May 19, 1944, Eichelberger reported that in the summer of 1943, UNA had arranged tours for representatives and senators to twenty-nine states to speak on “the Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill resolution specifically, and on international organization generally.” The touring congressional members included Senators Harry Truman (D-Missouri) and Albert Gore (D-Tennessee), the father of the future vice president.31

The Fulbright resolution was adopted on September 21, 1943. The Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill resolution was opposed by the Senate majority leader, Tom Connally (D-Texas), so it never advanced from committee. Instead, Connally offered his own resolution that covered the same territory more generally. But before that vote was taken, the Moscow Declaration by the United States, Britain, and Russia was issued on November 1. In addition to committing themselves to seeing the war through to the end as a united group, the declaration said the powers “recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization.” Connally incorporated that language into his resolution, which was adopted on November 6. The White House now had Congress on record endorsing a world organization.32

In 1944, the UNA, “having achieved its stated purpose with the tours, was later folded into a coalition of organizations working toward American acceptance of membership in a future world organization,” Estelle Linzer, the manager of UNA, wrote.33 The hard part—establishing the
need for a world organization—appears to have been approved, with much of the credit going to Eichelberger and Shotwell and the rest of the LNA. Yet the real work in formulating that body was just beginning.

Notes

6. Ibid., 76.
7. Ibid., 79.
8. Ibid., 80.
13. Ibid., 35.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., box 45.
20. Ibid., 184–185.
23. NYPL Archives, box 56.
25. Ibid., 40.
26. Ibid., 47.
28. NYPL Archives, box 54.
29. Ibid., box 56.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.