# Growing Up Democratic: Does It Make a Difference?

edited by
David Denemark, Robert Mattes,
and Richard G. Niemi

Growing Up Democratic

DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

EDITED BY
DAVID DENEMARK,
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Growing Up Democratic?

Robert Mattes, David Denemark,
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Beginning with the Portuguese coup of 1974, and escalating in frequency after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, over 80 countries across the globe have successfully extricated themselves from various forms of autocratic rule and put in place either what Freedom House calls "electoral" or "liberal" democracy (Puddington 2013). Several dozen other countries have moved away from classic autocratic rule and implemented regular multiparty elections, though they have so far either failed to generate a sufficiently level electoral playing field or continued to impose such severe limits on democratic rights and liberties that they do not qualify as democracies (Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). All in all, however, the world has become a fundamentally more democratic place over the past four decades.

At least since the publication of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's (1963) classic, *The Civic Culture,* political scientists have seen public opinion and political culture as crucial forces in the consolidation and deepening of democracy. In particular, "congruence theory" would see the "third and fourth waves of democracy" that swept across the globe in the 30 years between 1975 and 2005[1] as the consequence of a disjuncture between the operating norms of the regimes and their constituent institutions, and those of the mass public (Eckstein 1961; Almond and Verba 1963). Thus, the key question motivating public opinion researchers of new democracies has been whether the value structures that questioned and delegitimated the former authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are sufficient to legitimate and consolidate new democracies.

This sort of approach is evident in a number of high-profile studies that sought to understand this new democratic impetus. Beginning with

analyses of third-wave democratization studies in southern Europe (Morlino and Montero 1995; Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997) and then Richard Rose and his colleagues' studies of the recently democratized states of central and eastern Europe (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Rose, Mishler, and Munro 2006), cross-national studies of public opinion have investigated the factors that lead people living in new, potentially fragile democracies, including Latin America (Lagos 2001; Moreno and Méndez 2002), Asia (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, and Shin 2008; deSouza, Palshikar, and Yadav 2008; Shin 2012a), and sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Bratton 2013), to prefer the new regime over the old or to accept and even support forms of authoritarian rule. Respondents in the surveys analyzed in these various studies, it should be noted, were almost all people who had lived some or even all of their adult lives under Marxist-Leninist one-party states, military dictatorships, or other forms of autocratic rule. Sensibly, therefore, researchers focused largely on discerning the balance of evaluations of economic and political performance, formal education and cognitive sophistication, and prodemocratic values that would lead them to see democracy as the preferable regime.

Now, however, we are two decades or more beyond many of these countries' transitions away from authoritarian rule. Memories of the old regime have dimmed, and postauthoritarian societies are populated with increasingly large proportions of young citizens who know only the new regime. And yet, as we will see, citizens' engagement with democracy remains tentative in many cases, with support for democracy often illusory and less based on principle than a day-to-day confidence in the ability of democratic government to "deliver" on key priorities, such as economic and physical security. At the same time, the rejection of authoritarian rule is often halfhearted, with many citizens still tempted by strong leaders, experts, and the military and their perceived ability to "get things done."

The chapters in this volume present evidence about citizen attitudes toward democracy drawn from regional surveys of public opinion across the globe conducted between 2004 and 2009. They demonstrate that, far from being strong and ubiquitous (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2011), popular support for democracy is equivocal and varies widely across and within regions. However, the data also demonstrate that the trajectories of public attitudes are moving in the "right" direction in all but one of the democratizing regions for which we have longitudinal data. Public support for democracy rose very rapidly in southern Europe in the 1980s, but support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian rule have also increased—though more modestly—in central and eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa. In East Asia, however,

support for democracy declined in four of the six countries for which we have two rounds of data. And, in contrast to concerns by some analysts that unrealistically high popular expectations of what democracy is able to deliver will lead to steadily declining levels of satisfaction with its performance (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Przeworski et al. 1995), the public opinion time series reviewed in this volume reveal an over-time increase in Latin America in satisfaction with democracy (albeit at relatively low levels), trendless variation in sub-Saharan Africa and central and eastern Europe, and a slight decline in East Asia.

Given the fact that a quarter of a century has passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall (the beginning of the "fourth wave of democracy") and four decades have elapsed since Portugal's "Carnation Revolution" (the start of the third wave), an apparently obvious explanation for the upward trends in public commitment to democracy is that mass publics are composed of increasingly large proportions of citizens who have "grown up democratic." As older citizens who grew up under autocratic rule age and die, they have been replaced by younger people who have grown up after the democratic transition and have experienced freedom as well as democratic procedures and institutions as "normal politics"—that is, as part and parcel of the package of facts and repertoire of skills they have acquired about governance. At minimum, it is clear these new democrats have not had to "unlearn" political attitudes acquired under the old authoritarian regime.[2] To the extent that growing up democratic does, in fact, produce these positive outcomes, democracy could be said, at least in part, to generate its own popular support. Thus, if the process of generational replacement is "normalizing democracy," we would expect sharply distinctive attitudes toward democracy between the generations that have lived under authoritarian rule and those that have been raised within an emerging democracy.

And yet, a number of interesting puzzles and questions pervade these dynamics. Far from being ubiquitous, as we suggest above, popular support for democracy in postauthoritarian societies is highly variable—a pattern that will be shown in the chapters that follow. The extent to which these societies are able to build a broader consensus supportive of democracy, especially as fewer and fewer people have explicit memories of the old regime, is one of the themes explored in this volume. Collectively, the authors ask whether there is evidence that the world's new democracies are beginning to produce younger generations of citizens who view democracy differently from their parents or grandparents and who support democracy not simply because their country is more prosperous but because they have grown up democratic. Alternatively, we ask, are fledgling democrats the product of the younger generations' exposure to increasingly universal public education, rising levels of affluence, free

access to news and information, and other factors conducive to active involvement in politics and support for open and democratic governance? And what about those living under authoritarian regimes or in political systems that have only tentatively crossed the threshold into democracy? Are democratic institutions and principles seen as important for them? How strong is the impetus to build democracy if it must emerge from the ranks of those who have no direct experience with its procedures, institutions, and values?

All told, explaining citizens' support for democratic governance in emerging democracies and the role that generations, political and economic conditions, and education play in those sentiments remains a multi-faceted analytic puzzle that has prompted the development of a number of perspectives designed to provide answers to the sorts of questions we ask above. The central impetus for this book is our desire to address this puzzle. We begin our analytic response by framing several alternative explanatory approaches, including the historically significant model of political socialization and generational learning, which we propose to test in the context of dozens of emerging democracies in the various regions of the world.

Adolescent Socialization and Generational Change

The argument that those who grew up under democratic governance see democracy differently than those who grew to adulthood under authoritarian rule has a distinguished precedent. Perhaps most famously, in his classic political anthropology of the early nineteenth-century United States, Alexis de Tocqueville (1873 [1835, 1840]) concluded that what made the Americans he observed so unique was that they had all grown up under conditions of freedom and equality and had not had to overthrow a despotic monarchy the way his fellow Frenchmen had. It set a theoretical stage on which a number of analyses have played important roles.

Almost certainly, it is Karl Mannheim (1952 [1928]) who has provided the most influential reasoning about generations, beginning with his work in the 1920s (which became available in English only in the 1950s). Mannheim argued that societies were characterized not only by the class distinctions emphasized by the Marxist scholars of his day but also by important generational distinctions. Memberships in classes or generations

> endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the so-
> cial and historical process, and thereby limit them to a specific range or

potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action. Any given location, then, excludes a large number of possible modes of thought, experience, feeling, and action, and restricts the range of self-expression open to the individual to certain circumscribed possibilities. This *negative* delimitation, however, does not exhaust the matter. Inherent in a *positive* sense in every location is a tendency pointing towards certain definite modes of behaviour, feeling, and thought. (1952: 291)

> The fact that people are born at the same time, or that their youth, adulthood, and old age coincide, does not in itself involve similarity of location; what does create a similar location is that they are in a position to experience the same events and data etc., and especially that these experiences impinge upon a similarly "stratified" consciousness. . . . Only where contemporaries definitely are in a position to participate as an integrated group in certain common experiences can we rightly speak of community of location of a generation. (1952: 297–298)

Generations are defined by the events of early lifetime, Mannheim reasoned, because early events leave far more indelible impressions on people than later ones. Taking on what would later become known as the "online processing" and "lifetime learning" models, he argued: "Early impressions tend to coalesce into a *natural view* of the world. All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set's verification and fulfilment or as its negation and antithesis" (1952: 298).

Mannheim's arguments have been supported by a long line of empirical research in political science. In this paradigm of adolescent political socialization, people develop their fundamental beliefs during their "impressionable years" through learning from parents and siblings and by internalizing prevailing norms from friends, social organizations, and mass media (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Jennings and Niemi 1974). They then tend to retain these attitudes as they age. Attitudes do change, especially in response to events, but basic values are established early in life and set the tone for understanding, interpreting, and evaluating situations, issues, and problems that individuals confront later in life (Kelley and De Graaf 1997; Myers 1996). Though, for a time, socialization researchers rejected the notion of long-term influence, a considerable amount of recent work has established the durability of early learning. This includes work such as Campbell's (2006) study of early influences on voting habits; Prior's (2010) work establishing the stability of people's levels of political interest; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler's (2002) work on the stability of partisanship in the United States; and a

range of studies of attitudes at varying points in people's lifetimes (e.g., Kroh 2014; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Zuckerman, Dasovi , and Fitzgerald 2007; Sears and Funk 1999; Dash and Niemi 1992; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991).

With regard to new democracies, various scholars of post–World War II Europe and Japan found rapid and significant increases in prodemocratic values and attitudes in West Germany (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981), Austria (Muller 1984), Italy (Sani 1980), and Japan (Richardson 1974; Flanagan and Richardson 1984; Ikeda and Kohno 2008) that took hold especially among the young. While explanations for these transformations tended to focus on considered efforts in the schools, they also pointed to the important effect of generalized exposure to democracy. Dalton's description of the Federal Republic of Germany is illustrative:

> Confronted by an uncertain public commitment to democracy, the government undertook a massive programme to re-educate the public. The schools, the media and political organizations were mobilized behind the effort. And the citizenry itself was changing—*older generations raised under authoritarian regimes were being replaced by younger generations socialized during the postwar democratic era*. These efforts created a political culture congruent with the new institutions and processes of the Federal Republic. *The West German public also learned democratic norms by continued exposure to the new political system. As a result, a popular consensus slowly developed in support of the democratic political system.* (1994a: 472, emphasis added)

The evidence of this kind of change in third- and fourth-wave democracies, however, is far more mixed. Richard Gunther and his colleagues found substantial increases in Spaniards' support for democracy, particularly among the young, in the years after that country's successful transition (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997; Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986). And William Mishler and Richard Rose (2007) found small but significant and consistent generational differences across a 14-year time span in Russians' attitudes toward their old and new regimes. However, a number of other studies have shown very little evidence of important generational differences in support for democracy (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, and Shin 2008; Bratton et al. 2005; Markowski 2005; Shin 1999).[3] Indeed, in a recent global analysis, Norris (2011: 174) has found that democratic aspirations (measured as the extent to which people think it is important to live in a democracy, on a scale of 1 to 10) actually *increase* with age. At the same time, what she calls the "democratic deficit" (the perceived extent of democracy subtracted from democratic aspirations, both measured on a 1 to 10 scale) is highest among the young.

Alternative Models of Support for Democracy

The primary task of the studies found in this book is to put the theory of adolescent learning and generational change to the test. Does growing up democratic matter? If this idea is correct, we should find that younger generations exhibit higher levels of support for democracy. Having learned about politics and government by experiencing it directly, they should better understand what democracy means and thus also reject non-democratic alternatives more frequently than their older compatriots.

However, the "direct learning" hypothesis of political socialization does not provide the only account of why mass publics may be becoming more supportive of democracy. An equally important alternative account is one of cognitive mobilization through the education and communication revolutions sweeping through the developing world, albeit at a different pace in different societies. As early as the pioneering work of Almond and Verba (1963) and other studies of that era, it was widely recognized that there were major attitudinal and behavioral differences across educational strata. Since then, education has repeatedly been shown to be an important predictor of voter turnout in the United States (Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 2004; Dee 2004; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972) as well as in many other Western countries (Dalton 2013a; Norris 2002; Lipset 1960) though there are exceptions, often in countries with strong socialist parties that mobilize less educated working class voters (Milligan et al. 2004; Norris 2002; Powell 1986). Education has also been confirmed as a strong predictor of other citizen qualities such as interest in politics, newspaper readership, political knowledge, interpersonal trust, tolerance of political opponents, and a wide range of forms of political participation such as contacting elected leaders, joining community associations, attending community meetings, political Internet activism, and protest both in the United States (Dalton 2013a; Dee 2004; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Brady et al. 1996; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Verba et al. 1995; Putnam 1995; Bobo and Licari 1989; Hyman and Wright 1979; Hyman, Wright, and Reed 1978) and other democracies in Europe (Milligan et al. 2004; Dalton 2013a, b; Milner 2002).

The impact of education is so regularly found that political scientist Philip Converse (1972) once called it the "universal solvent" of political participation. In a 1996 summary, Nie et al. (1996: 2) concluded:

> The notion that formal educational attainment is the primary mechanism behind citizenship characteristics is basically uncontested. . . . Formal education is almost without exception the strongest factor in explaining what citizens do in politics and how they think about politics.

While more limited, the existing literature in developing societies also bears out the importance of education. Education has been shown to increase voter turnout and civic engagement in several different developing world contexts (Magalhães 2007; Lam and Kuan 2008; Anderson and Dodd 2006; Bellucci, Maraffi, and Segatti 2007; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). More importantly for present purposes, education has proved to be a very strong predictor of popular support for democracy in places like Korea, Chile, eastern Europe, Russia, and sub-Saharan Africa (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Rose et al. 2006; Bratton et al. 2005; Markowski 2005; Shin 1999; Rose et al. 1998).

Overall, then, this literature points to education not only as having a significant, direct impact on support for democracy but, perhaps even more importantly, as playing an indirect, supportive role by imparting critical sensibilities, skills, and the perceived need for citizens to engage in the world of politics around them. If so, then the increasing proportions of democrats in postauthoritarian societies may simply reflect increasing levels of younger generations' exposure to increasingly universal public education, or free access to news and information and other factors conducive to active involvement in politics and support for open and democratic governance. Thus, we need to distinguish between the generational impact of political socialization and of education and political information in the survey analyses carried out in each of the regions reported in this volume. As will be shown, this is done by utilizing multivariate tests of support for democracy and its authoritarian alternatives that control for respondents' placement in various political socialization generations and their level of education, political interest, and access to political news and information, thus enabling us to distinguish between these two distinct if often covarying forms of generational effects.

Beyond the general impact of education, a third body of research has focused on the special case of democracy and civic education. In many if not most established democracies, the general school curriculum (particularly in social studies) is designed to teach a broader set of values such as individualism, tolerance, and mutual respect. But democracies often go further and require students to take specific classes in civic education that inculcate students with the workings of democracy and government, as well as the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship (Norris 2011; Milner 2002; Torney-Purta et al. 2001; Torney-Purta, Schwille, and Amadeo 1999; Callan 1997; Chesney and Feinstein 1997). Whether through direct instruction about democratic norms or more indirectly through imparting political knowledge (Fesnic forthcoming), or through the effects of open classrooms (Torney-Purta 2002) and active learning strategies (Dassonneville et al. 2012), civic education has been shown to foster greater understanding of and appreciation for democratic government.

While evidence of large-scale generational shifts has thus far been scant, other scholars have traced important effects among students exposed to small-scale experiments in school civic education programs in Poland and South Africa (Slomczynski and Shabad 1998; Finkel and Ernst 2005) as well as among adults participating in donor-supported adult civic education programs in the Dominican Republic, Poland, Senegal, and South Africa (Kuenzi 2005; Finkel 2002, 2003). At the same time, there is no evidence among the first generation of South Africans produced by South Africa's postapartheid school curriculum of increases in democratic support (Mattes 2012).

A fourth research perspective on the factors that promote or stymie change in political cultures focuses on citizens' expectations for fundamental improvements in the new order and the ability of a new, democratic regime to divorce itself from past failings and to "deliver," especially, economic and physical security that meets those expectations. In short, this perspective revolves around perceived governmental performance.

Younger citizens in fledgling democracies may well encounter a number of performance-based realities that can be expected to erode or perhaps undermine their support for democracy. As the transition from autocracy to democracy is unlikely to be decisive in supplanting the old order's social, economic, and political ways, new generations of citizens may find themselves living in a society with significant echoes of the autocratic past. Corruption and crime may continue to plague the new democracy, while attempts to effect economic modernization may continue to suffer from cronyism and inefficiencies long assured to be set aside under the new order (Diamond 2008). In short, the expectations placed on the new democratic system may regularly outpace the realities experienced by many citizens. If so, despite the attractions of the emerging democracy, citizens—and younger ones in particular—may become dissatisfied with the new democratic institutions (Norris 2011) or even come to view authoritarian alternatives of rule by a single party or the military as desirable. Thus, support for democracy in postauthoritarian societies may be constrained by citizens' views about the new system's ability to deliver, especially economic and physical security.

However, the impact of democracy's ability to deliver the goods may depend, at least to some extent, on the quality and age of that democracy. For instance, the combined effects of the regular holding of free and fair elections may, with the passage of time, lead people to lower their material expectations of democracy and develop a greater appreciation of the value of its procedures. Yet not all postauthoritarian countries have become full democracies, and people often experience imperfect, partial democracy. In many instances, while governments convene regular and even mostly free elections, political rights and civil liberties are routinely

limited. In still others, regular elections even with multiparty systems coexist with such severe manipulations of electoral processes and news media that neither elections nor broader political competition and debate are free or fair at all (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2006). Young South Koreans, one would suppose, surely draw different conclusions about democracy than young Albanians or young Thais. Thus, even if new generations in such countries express more democratic attitudes than their predecessors in the same country, they may be less democratic than citizens in freer and more democratic countries. Likewise, citizens (both old and young) in new democracies may express less democratic views than those in long-time democracies.

Finally, constituting a fifth perspective for our analysis, is Ronald Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism, which accepts the "socialization" hypothesis, but rather than focusing on key historical events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or Nelson Mandela's release from jail, combines the socialization hypothesis with a "scarcity" hypothesis that people value that which is in least supply. Based on Abraham Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs, the hypothesis predicts that people who come of age under conditions of relative abundance will value "higher order" needs such as democracy, self-expression, gender rights, and environmentalism, while people who grow up in destitution will not. Thus, while Inglehart would predict we will indeed uncover sharp generational differences, he would argue that these differences will be most evident in postauthoritarian societies that have undergone rapid economic and social modernization and where younger people have come of age among conditions of greater material welfare and physiological security than their parents or grandparents (Inglehart 1990; Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

In short, this book explores a variety of factors promoting and suppressing support for democracy in countries experiencing democratic institutions and governance for the first time. Central among these is the role of adolescent socialization and generational change. However, as we emphasize above, generationally distinctive patterns of political norms and values may reflect, in turn, a number of different realities for citizens in these countries, including adolescent socialization, rising educational levels, and the realization of material security amid rising affluence and employment. The regional analyses presented in this book are designed as considered tests of these various approaches and utilize broadly comparable explanatory models and measures (detailed below) in order to afford cross-regional variations in the results yielded by these tests.

The Definition of Generations

There seems to be little doubt that meaningful social or political generations exist—i.e., that there are groups of individuals of similar ages who have experienced a noteworthy historical event at the same time and who think or behave in a manner that is distinct from older (and perhaps younger) individuals.[4] Researchers readily acknowledge, of course, that not all age differences should be called generational. The classic (political) case is turnout at elections; for many decades now, young people around the world have turned out at lower rates than older people, indicating that this phenomenon has to do with their youth, not the specific period (or country) in which they are observed. But often it seems clear that differences are not caused by age; rather, US citizens who grew up and served in World War II have different views about patriotism and sacrifice from those who matured during the Vietnam War era (as expressed, say, in a survey in 2000), and those differences are much more likely to be considered a product of their differing experiences of war than of their respective ages.

For all its use, however, the term has never surrendered easily to precise definition. There are two crucial questions: What age groups form a generation? And what causes them to be distinctive?

Consider first the question of *who* (which age group) is most likely to form a generation. At least since the 1950s, with the English translation of Mannheim's (1952 [1928]) essay on "the problem of generations," there has been widespread agreement that adolescence and young adulthood are "formative years" during which individuals form worldviews that in one way or another affect them for the rest of their lives. Mannheim's work, as we noted above, perhaps most formatively laid out a number of vital assumptions about late adolescence and early adulthood as the key period for the formation of individuals' social and political views. It is a perspective that has been broadly accepted by most analysts of political socialization and citizenship education since then (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981; Torney-Purta et al. 2001; Sherrod, Torney-Purta, and Flanagan 2010; Campbell, Levinson, and Hess 2012).

Yet if we are to use this understanding in empirical analyses, we need a precise operationalization. Mannheim himself was aware of the difficulties of precise delineation of the relevant period. He noted that "the possibility of really questioning and reflecting on things only emerges at the point where personal experimentation with life begins—round about the age of 17, sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later" (1952: 300).[5] As for the upper end, he said in a lengthy footnote that "it is difficult

to decide just at what point this process is complete in an individual," but he pointed to age 25, using as an analogy when "the spoken language and dialect does not change" (1952: 299–300).

Subsequent researchers have largely echoed the ages identified by Mannheim, sometimes "rounding up" the lower bound to 18, we suspect, because this is commonly the legal age of adulthood and, coincidentally, the age of the youngest respondents in many surveys. Empirical work, however, as well as theoretical considerations, suggests that an earlier rather than later age may be a good starting point for the formative years. We know, for example, that young children learn about racial differences at a very early age and sometimes use that knowledge to guide their thoughts and actions (e.g., Sears and Levy 2003; Van Ausdale and Feagin 2001). Young children have a sense of nationality (Jahoda 1963a, 1963b), and they have a (sometimes highly implausible or mistaken) sense of political authority (e.g., Greenstein 1965; Carter and Teten 2002). Children develop loyalties relating to political parties as preadults (Campbell et al. 1960; Butler and Stokes 1969), and at least some recent evidence suggests very early formation of these impressions (Bartels and Jackman 2014). When asked to recall important national or world events over the past 50 years, Schuman and Scott's (1989) subjects often cited events from when they were 15 and 16 or even younger. As to when youths develop adult modes of thinking, Adelson and O'Neil's (1966) insightful study showed that youths develop a more abstract and community-centered as opposed to concrete and self-centered perspective at ages 13–15, or 2–4 years earlier than Mannheim's date.

Overall, these various strands of research suggest that for most youths meaningful political socialization is well under way by the mid-teens. Fourteen, rather than 17 or 18, seems to be the age at which the preponderance of young people begin to form their political selves. Some relevant ideas and knowledge develop before then, and of course there is individual variation in the speed of maturation. Nevertheless, when analysis requires a precise year, we think of 14 as the beginning of the formative years for political socialization.

Defining the end point for the socialization process is a more difficult enterprise, not the least because to some degree change is a lifelong process.[6] Again, then, the question is: What age shall we use when precision is required? When does the process of forming one's political self become stable enough that one can think of an end to major change? Mannheim, we observed, cited 25 as a likely candidate, and others have followed suit (e.g., Grasso 2014). There is, however, little theoretical basis and scant empirical evidence for such an age; while perhaps "convenient" in that it is exactly in the mid-20s, there is nothing that is compelling

about it. We, in fact, think that just as the age at which the socialization process begins should be lower than conventionally assumed, so too should the age at which it ends.

In this volume, we utilize 22 as the cutoff age for the measurement of political socialization's formative years, or the age at which the "attitudinal cement" begins to harden. By 22, most individuals have completed their education or at least have finished their initial years at university. Thus, they will have encountered a diversity of viewpoints that come with moving out of one's family and the surroundings in which one grew up from childhood, whether that is in the workplace or in institutions of higher education. And, in terms of practical experience with the political process, by 22, citizens in democratic polities will have had time during late adolescence or adulthood to observe at least one, often two, elections, thus having the opportunity, at least, to contemplate political ideas and candidacies and to form and articulate preferences.

Having specified beginning and ending points for the formative period, how do we distinguish one generation from another? For this, we need to confront the second crucial question: what single events or periods are politically relevant and sufficiently salient that they are likely to make a difference to individuals living through them? Here, of course, there is further room for ambiguity. Matters that are thought to distinguish one generation from another are not self-recognized and labeled, and they are rarely if ever precisely identified as to beginning and end.

Consider, however, a relatively clear-cut case, the fall of communism. We might identify this as having happened (in the Soviet bloc) in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell. Using this date and the numbers above, we can say that those who were 18 prior to 1989 were socialized during the communist period, as they would have spent more than half of their formative years (14–18 versus 19–22) under that regime. And, of course, anyone who turned 18 in 1989 or later was a part of the postcommunist generation.[7] If the crucial matter covers more than a single year, we can apply the same reasoning once we have identified beginning and ending years (see Table 1.1).[8]

The critical point, in this view, is the match between the years of the event and people's formative years—most importantly, identification of those individuals who spent a majority of their formative years before, during, or after the event. Often, however, as a matter of convenience we "translate" how old a person was during the years of the event to the years in which they were born (see the right-hand column of Table 1.1). This is convenient mainly because birth years are invariant across survey years; generation *XXXX* ages over time, but their birth years never change. Using birth year also allows a shorthand expression (especially, a

Table 1.1 Example Showing How to Identify Generations by Age at the Time of a Significant Political Event

| Age | Belongs to which generation?[a] | Years of the XXXX political event | | | | | | | | | Birth years |
		Pre-event 1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Post-event 1993	
Turned 18 before the event—i.e., in 1985 or before	Pre-XXXX generation										1967 and before
Turned 18 during the event—i.e., in 1986–1992	Generation XXXX										1968–1974
Turned 18 after the event—i.e., in 1993 or after	Post-XXXX generation										1975 and after

[a]Determined by whether an individual spent a majority of his or her formative years (14–22) before, during, or after the significant event.

14

"birth cohort"—people born in years *tttt* through year *uuuu*).[9] In addition, a generation is occasionally labeled by when its members were born, as with the Baby Boomer generation in the United States.[10]

Each of the chapters that follow employs generation as a central measurement concept, defining generations by the use of key sociopolitical periods in the nations covered. Each makes use of the idea of formative years in which individuals are most strongly influenced by political events. However, the precise operationalizations often vary in their details due to the author's sense of exactly who might have been most affected by the event(s) in question, or by boundaries that have been previously established in academic, journalistic, or popular accounts. This variability, we feel, does not weaken the basic analytic measures nor undermine the idea of generational change as a vital and innovative approach to the analysis of support for democracy. It does suggest that more efforts should be made to define generations precisely and to explore the impact of various operationalizations.

One final issue to consider is the fact that many transitions to democracy have been gradual and drawn out, and they have not always moved linearly in a progressive direction but often involved backsliding. And as we have indicated above, in many cases elements of authoritarian practice have endured and now coexist with multiparty democracy. Thus, the lack of a sharp, clean break between autocracy and democracy poses special challenges to identifying political generations. Yet in virtually every case, it is possible for our authors to identify a decisive moment when multiparty elections became entrenched, even if democracy did not, as well as other key thresholds between types of authoritarian regimes or qualitative breaks between lower- and higher-quality democracy.

Plan of the Book

In order to test our hypotheses about generational and other influences on views of democracy, the editors invited a team of experts familiar with the social, economic, and political dynamics of nations in a given region and asked them to develop analyses of the nations within their region. These studies were to be conducted in central and eastern Europe and Eurasia, Latin America, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. However, even if we were to find consistent results in these regions, we would not be sure that they are the consequences of the democratization process unless we are able to demonstrate that they are not visible, or take different forms, in countries and regions that are either established democracies or have not yet democratized. Thus we also initiated studies of established

democracies in North America and Western Europe and of regions or countries that have not yet democratized, including in the Middle East/North Africa region, parts of South Asia and Latin America, and China. In a sense, these chapters act as regional "controls" that allow us to draw sharper inferences and interpretations about our findings in the postauthoritarian regions.

But which attitudes to democracy are the relevant ones? We see popular commitment to democracy as a necessary though clearly insufficient condition for a stable democracy. How people feel toward Democracy in the abstract—the D-word as we have come to call it— is a starting point. Thus, we began by asking authors of the regional studies to consider first whether there was public support for democracy in general. Where possible, we have asked authors to use the Global Barometer Surveys (see below) question that forces respondents to make choices, rather than the World Values Survey (WVS) Likert-style items that simply ask people how much they like various forms of government. The WVS items do not force respondents to make choices between competing regime models. For instance, in the 2005–2007 World Values Survey, 90 percent of South Africans told World Values Survey interviewers that democracy was a "very good" or "fairly good" "way of governing this country" (Norris 2011: 93). Yet just 67 percent told Afrobarometer interviewers in 2008 that "democracy is preferable to any other kind of government" in response to a question that also gave them the option of saying that "in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable," or that "for someone like me it doesn't matter what kind of government we have"—a full 23 percentage points lower.[11] Indeed, across 57 postauthoritarian societies in which Global Barometer Surveys asked this question between 2004 and 2007, a quite modest average of just 55 percent said that "democracy is always preferable," with a staggering variation of 55 percentage points, ranging from a high of 79 percent (in Uruguay) to a low of 24 percent (in Pakistan). And in 15 of the 57 societies, less than a majority said they always preferred democracy.

But because people's understandings of what democracy means tend to vary (see Bratton et al. 2005; Shi and Lu 2010; Mattes et al. 2015), at least some people who say they support or even prefer a "democratic" regime may see no conflict with practices such as one-party rule. Thus, we also asked authors to assess individuals' rejection of nondemocratic, or authoritarian, forms of government.

As a third step, we asked authors if possible to identify questions that probe an even deeper level of support for specific democratic institutions or that indicate an embrace of democratic or liberal values. Fourth, we asked them to explore how people evaluate the performance of democracy,

using wherever possible the widely asked question on "satisfaction with democracy."

Most importantly, perhaps, we asked that each chapter contain a broad multivariate model that examines the potential impact of political generations, as defined individually with each country's history in mind, along with a respondent's level of attained education, while holding constant the respondents' perceptions of socioeconomic conditions in their countries, their exposure to political information, their level of political interest, and several demographic factors.

All told, then, authors have not only developed regionally or nationally specific demarcations of political generations but have also assembled measures of education, news media use, economic and political performance evaluations, and political interest, discussion and efficacy, plus standard controls for gender and age. At the same time, we asked the contributors to test the impact of any unique measures they felt had had special bearing on political attitudes in their regions. Without data from panel studies (which interview the same individuals across various points in time—and simply do not exist as yet in the developing world), these models will not fully sort out the statistical effects of age, period, and cohort, but they will go a long way toward testing whether respondents' views vary meaningfully by generation even after taking account of changing education levels, perceptions of economic conditions, levels of education and political interest, exposure to political news and information, and so on. All told, our fundamental goal in this volume, then, was to have sufficient comparability in the survey analysis across the regions of the world to enable cross-national comparisons while having enough measurement flexibility to allow the contributors to draw out distinctive factors in their regions.[12]

The Data

As far as possible, we have asked our contributors to use data from the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS). GBS is a consortium of regional cross-national and longitudinal survey projects in postauthoritarian societies in the developing world and constitutes an important addition to the globalization of public opinion research that took place in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Norris 2009). Compared with another major survey project, the World Values Survey, GBS surveys are cast at a lower order of abstraction and focus on measuring how people relate to the actual regimes, institutions, governments, and incumbents they have in front of them (Mattes 2007). To use Richard Rose's imagery (n.d.), they are

"transformation" surveys that use "realist" measures of how people in transitional societies experience rapid political change and react to imperfect multiparty systems, rather than "destination" surveys that assess how far a country has progressed toward some ideal model of democracy. Thus, rather than asking people about democracy through Likert-type statements about democracy in the abstract, the GBS questionnaires ask people to choose between democracy and authoritarianism in general and between democracy and specific forms of autocratic rule with which respondents have some experience.

The oldest of these projects, the Latinobarómetro, began in 1988 with a pilot survey in the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. In 1995 another round of surveys was conducted in eight countries, adding Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, and Paraguay. From 1996 to 2004, the project was expanded to include 17 countries (adding Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) covering the whole of continental Latin America. In 2005 the Dominican Republic was also included, bringing the total to 18 countries.[13]

Originally known as the New Democracies Barometer, the Eurasia Barometer dates back to 1991, with a first round of surveys in six post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia) as well as a comparison survey of democratic Austria. Thereafter, and until 2005, six additional rounds of surveys corresponded to the split between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and progressively added Croatia, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Russia, and Ukraine, bringing the total to 17 countries. From 2007, however, surveys came to an end in the new EU member states (which were now surveyed by Eurobarometer), but surveys continued in Belarus and Ukraine and added Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. In addition, there is a time series of 20 separate national surveys of Russia (New Russia Barometer) conducted between 1992 and 2012.[14]

Afrobarometer conducted its first surveys in 12 countries in southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), East Africa (Tanzania and Uganda), and West Africa (Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria) between 1999 and 2001. Round 2 was conducted in 16 countries between 2002 and 2004, adding Cabo Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal. Round 3 was done in 18 countries in 2005–2006, adding Benin and Madagascar. Finally Round 4 was conducted in 20 countries in 2008–2009, adding Burkina Faso and Liberia.[15]

Originally called the East Asia Barometer survey, the Asian Barometer Survey began with surveys in eight countries (China, Hong Kong,

Japan, Mongolia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) in 2002–2003. A second round of surveys was conducted in 13 countries in 2006–2007 (adding Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam). And a third round of surveys was completed in the same set of countries between 2009 and 2013.[16] As part of the Asian Barometer, a separate group of scholars also carried out a single wave of surveys in 2004–2005 in five countries on the subcontinent (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) that together are known as the South Asia Barometer.[17] Finally, the Arab Barometer carried out its first wave of surveys in seven North African and Middle East countries (Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen) in 2006–2007 and a second round in 11countries in 2010–2011 (adding Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan).[18]

Two of the chapters in our volume are on regions not covered by GBS projects. First, because the democratic transitions in Greece, Portugal, and Spain and the extensive democratization of Italy took place well before the start of these regional projects, Richard Gunther and José Ramón Montero's chapter on southern Europe uses other national surveys from those countries that ask either identical or—as far as possible—conceptually equivalent questions on support for and satisfaction with democracy. Second, because there are no dedicated democracy-oriented projects in North America or western Europe that ask the full range of desired questions, the chapter by David Denemark, Todd Donovan, and Richard Niemi makes use of conceptually equivalent items from the World Values Survey (but taking heed of the limitations imposed by WVS question formats that we have discussed above) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.

Cases and Chapters

While our chief goal is to examine opinion change in countries and regions that initiated transitions away from authoritarian rule since the beginning of the third wave in 1974, our use of data from Global Barometers and other related projects means that we are able to examine trends in public opinion in democracies such as Italy, Japan, and India whose origins stretch back to the late 1940s. Aside from these exceptions, Part 1 of this book presents a series of studies of democratization from the third and fourth waves in broadly chronological order. We begin with Portugal, Spain, Greece (and Italy) (Chapter 2), which democratized in the late 1970s, then move to Latin America (Chapter 3), where transitions occurred largely in the early to mid-1980s, and then on to East Asia (Chapter 4), and South Asia (Chapter 5), where political change came

both before and after 1989. Chapters 6 (central and eastern Europe) and 7 (sub-Saharan Africa) consist only of transitions that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In Part 2, we take advantage of the availability of comparable data from the advanced, postindustrial democracies (Chapter 8) as well as the Arab world (Chapter 9) and China (Chapter 10) to determine whether findings from the democratizing world also occur in long-standing democracies or in countries that are clearly not democratic.

Conclusion

All told, this book was designed to explore patterns in support for democracy and opposition to authoritarianism from a truly global perspective. It does so first and foremost by putting the theory of adolescent political socialization and generational change to the test, and subsequently by investigating the impact of cognitive mobilization, or economic and political performance evaluations as complementary or competing explanations. The volume pursues this analysis across the various regions of the world, most of which are characterized by rising levels of support for democracy, amid ongoing patterns of support for old authoritarian systems, doubts about new governments' ability to deliver economic and physical security, and fears that the principles of democratic rights and privileges will continue to be undermined by corruption and lawlessness. By using the Global Barometer Surveys, and because we have asked each team of authors to include comparable measures and analytic points of reference, the chapters enable the reader to gain insights not just from the factors unique to a region but also comparatively—across the regions as well as between old democracies, new democracies, and those nations yet to build democracy. The final chapter of the book attempts to distill those comparative insights into a set of the larger lessons that derive from the various chapters and, we hope, to provide at least some partial solutions—but also, perhaps, some new pieces—to the puzzle of democratization that inspired the book.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington (1991) argued that the world was passing through the "third wave" of democratization, which had begun in 1974 with a coup that eventually led to the successful democratization of Portugal. While many scholars of democratization continue to refer to this entire period as the third wave, we are persuaded by scholars who have argued that the frequency, speed, and types of transitions since 1989 have been sufficiently different to label this period as the fourth wave of democratization.

See Doreenspleet (2000), McFaul (2002), Berg-Schlosser (2007), and Markoff (2006).

2. We thank Russell Dalton for this point.

3. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) and Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994) reported, respectively, that support for political change was greater among young people in the Soviet Union in late 1989 and in post-Soviet states in 1990–1992, but most of the individual items were not specifically about democracy.

4. The term *cohort*—especially *birth cohort,* as we will note later—is sometimes used as a way of distinguishing socially or politically defined generations from family (blood-related) generations.

5. He also wrote that experience "absorbed . . . in *early* youth [emphasis added]" is "not easily destabilized," although it can be destabilized, more easily by youth than by "the older generation" (299–301).

6. We are not suggesting that change is limited to young people. Older people can and do change (Danigelis, Hardy, and Cutler 2007). What we are asserting is that attitudes learned early in life in many instances put a brake on later learning.

7. Given the inherent ambiguities, it seems pointless to push any further the question of exactly when an event occurred—i.e., what day and month. We implicitly assume that turning 18 in the year of the event means that an individual was 18 when the event occurred.

8. Assigning people to a generation based on the period in which they spent the majority of their formative years was used previously by Grasso (2014), though she used 15–25 as formative ages.

9. The term *age cohort* is sometimes used, but it is inherently ambiguous if one has surveys from more than one year because it could mean respondents of a given age at the time of the survey even though they might have been born in different years.

10. The terms *cohort* and *generation* are often used interchangeably, though *generations* are usually thought of as connected by some shared historical experience such as having grown up during the Great Depression or after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The boundaries of such events are often imprecise; nevertheless, for purposes of analysis, generations are often operationalized in terms of specific birth years.

11. With which one of these statements are you most in agreement? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. In some circumstances, a nondemocratic government can be preferable. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have. This question was originally designed by Leonardo Morlino and Juan Linz.

12. Fully sorting out age, period, and cohort/generational effects is an extraordinarily challenging task, one that ideally makes use of multiple kinds of data and complex statistical methodologies. While we cannot hope to do that in this volume, a number of steps described in the text go a long way toward testing whether respondents' views vary meaningfully by generation even after taking account of changing education levels, perceptions of economic conditions, degrees of political interest, exposure to political news and information, and so on, and therefore testing the alternative hypotheses. These steps include the following:

1. Relying on a precise delineation of the generations in question: Each chapter is written by experts in the part of the world under consideration; in each case, the authors discuss briefly the history of each country in the area in order to determine the beginning and end of each type of governing structure.
2. Identifying precisely who (in terms of birth years) belongs to each generation: We specified one's formative years (for political attitudes) as ages 14–22 and

identified members of a given generation as those who experienced a majority of their formative years under a given type of governing structure.

3. Identifying multiple democracy generations: While many countries have moved toward democracy quite recently, thus establishing a correlation between youthful age and being a member of a democratic generation, the fact that there were earlier periods of democracy in a number of countries reduces or eliminates this correlation.

4. Identifying multiple types of generations: Almost every country's history includes episodes of multiple kinds of authority structures—collectively including colonial rule, monarchy, military rule, indigenous one-person rule, communist party rule, multiparty elections, electoral democracy, and liberal democracy—thus allowing for the possibility that governing structures other than democracy lead citizens to adopt particular attitudes toward governance.

5. Considering both democratic "demand" and "supply": Each chapter uses questions about citizens' evaluations of democracy versus various kinds of authoritarian alternatives but also about their satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country, recognizing that people of different ages and generations may respond differently to these two aspects of governing.

6. Using multivariate statistical models: In each chapter, the authors use multivariate models (after showing simple differences across generations), including the respondent's education, evaluation of the economy (the specific measure dependent on the survey question available), level of political interest and exposure to mass media news and information sources, and other measures, and sometimes age itself.

13. For more information, see www.latinobarometro.org.

14. For more information, see www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog4_0.html and www.abdn.ac.uk/ecsr/research-projects.

15. For more information, see www.afrobarometer.org.

16. For more information, see www.asianbarometer.org.

17. For more information, see www.democracy-asia.org.

18. For more information, see www.arabbarometer.org.