


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Recycling Dictators
in Latin American
Elections:
Legacies of Military Rule

Brett J. Kyle

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1

“Recycled Dictators” and Elections in Latin America

General Hugo Banzer Suárez presided over a brutal seven-year military dictatorship (1971-1978) in Bolivia, stripping citizens of their rights, imprisoning tens of thousands, sending thousands more into exile, and having hundreds killed or disappeared.¹ Twenty years later, the former general returned to power via the ballot box, after standing for the presidency four times under the new democracy.² When old authoritarians find their way back into politics, the stark question comes into view: Did democratization change anything?

Bolivia is not alone in this experience. At many levels of government and in varying regions across the world, individuals associated with a previous authoritarian government have competed for public office.³ These “recycled dictators,” former authoritarian regime officials who run for elected office in a new democracy, are an important feature of the transitional political landscape. Present across Latin America in the wake of the Third Wave of democratization, these ex-regime candidates in new political processes provide a window into understanding the nature and strength of former regime elements in nascent democracies.

The Third Wave of democratization brought an end to more than 60 authoritarian regimes throughout the world.⁴ Authoritarian government experienced wholesale decline as political liberalization took hold in one state after another. The international triumph of democratic ideals, however, is neither absolute nor unidirectional. New democracies face challenges from their former oppressors and risk slipping into quasi-democratic practices or experiencing outright authoritarian reversal.⁵ The presence of ex-authoritarian leaders in the new system may herald the beginning of a new era in which candidates of all ideological perspectives have accepted the rules of the democratic game; or, their

continued influence in government may signify a renewal of authoritarian appeal.

In the years following Third Wave transitions to democracy in Latin America, citizens expressed disenchantment with democracy and nostalgia toward authoritarian rule.⁶ Public polling identified worrying trends, whereby 30 percent of the individuals surveyed in the region responded that they would “support a military government if the situation got very bad.”⁷ The return of high-profile ex-dictators, such as Bolivia’s General Hugo Banzer or Guatemala’s General Efraín Ríos Montt, to positions of power in the 1990s raised fears that new democracies across the region were at risk from both the persistence of old military elites and a popular preference for authoritarianism. I confront these two issues by systematically investigating former regime officials who ran for president (1978-2011) in the 12 countries in Central and South America that endured military rule and experienced Third Wave democratic transitions. I answer the questions: What explains varied rates of competition from recycled dictators? And, what explains variation in recycled dictators’ success at the polls? Assessing these unique candidates is crucial to understanding their role in the new system and their effect on democratic politics and government.

Studying recycled dictators in cross-national, comparative perspective provides a new and more complete understanding of the return of former authoritarians to politics than we have seen previously. Individual, high-profile winners of elections have drawn interest from scholars and activists, but the selective focus on winners has not fully captured the issue of recycled dictators and their role in new democracies. We previously did not know the extent of the phenomenon and whether the experience of such figures was the norm or the exception. In this book, I identify recycled dictators across the region, establish their cross-national variation, and explain their presence and performance in presidential elections. My approach offers new answers about the role of former authoritarians in post-transition politics by examining dynamic interaction among members of former military governments, civilian political leadership, and the voting public.

Recycled Dictators and Post-Transition Politics

Recycled dictators occupy a unique place in the post-transition political landscape. Across Latin America, as military dictatorship gave way to civilian democracy in the 1980s, armies made a return to the barracks. This sea change ushered in decades of democratic rule, but those individuals associated with the old regimes did not simply go away.

Former regime elites were not imprisoned, executed, nor sent into exile. Largely escaping initial punishment, many re-entered political life by running for public office, with a notable few making their way back to the highest office in the land via the democratic system.

Ex-regime elites may maintain a contentious relationship with political society, but by running for public office, recycled dictators have made an important step of buying into the rules of the new electoral game. Former Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico illustrates this pattern in Argentina. In the late 1980s, Rico staged a series of rebellions against the civilian government. The *carapintada* uprisings sought an end to government prosecution of military officials for human rights violations during the 1976-1983 dictatorship. Lt. Col. Rico and others had not given up on using their role and the military tools at their disposal to affect policy in the country. Engaging in politics from outside of the democratic system still worked for the Argentine military. By the time of the 1995 general election, the colonel had been briefly imprisoned, cashiered from the army, and eventually transformed himself into a presidential candidate, competing for power via the ballot box. He remained controversial in public life, but importantly, by moving into a traditional political role as a candidate for the presidency he reinforced the idea that electoral contests were the sole route to power.⁸ Ex-regime officials' electoral participation, itself, may be understood as an indicator that democracy has become "the only game in town."⁹

The Changing Context of Elite and Military Support for Authoritarianism

Recognizing the role of ex-regime candidates within the new democratic system elucidates an important prospective outcome: Their participation in politics is a positive development. A nation that allows its former dictators and non-democratic rulers to compete for power among other candidates of all political stripes in a free marketplace of ideas and votes them down will deliver the strongest, most definitive repudiation of authoritarianism possible. This rejection is not the only potential outcome, however. Some of these leaders have gained enough support to make their way back into positions of power. At the very least, though, their participation is an acceptance of the rules of the electoral game. If even those politicians with the most anti-democratic records have bought into the democratic system, this process represents a step in democratic integration of unparalleled importance. Political inclusion has been an important prerequisite historically to democracy in the

region. When popular actors have been excluded, as with many communist parties throughout the twentieth century, they have turned to violent insurrection.¹⁰ When elite actors have been excluded or have found that they could not compete within the democratic system, they have turned to the military to resolve institutional disputes.¹¹ For those leaders who literally have fought against political liberalism to choose an electoral contest as their pathway to power suggests the transformative nature of a strong, open democracy in the wake of a political transition.

Elite failure to commit to the rules of the game has diminished the potential for survival of civilian government in other democratic periods in Latin America.¹² Despite the view of militaries intervening in politics and making decisions on the form and leadership of government, civilian elites often have been the ones to urge a military reset of the political system when they have felt their position being threatened by the populist nature of democracy.¹³ This pattern has been evident in reactions to political liberalization in the early twentieth century in the countries of the Southern Cone. For example, the coups d'état from General José Uriburu in Argentina (1930), Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (1930), and General Arturo Puga in Chile (1932) all enjoyed the support of civilian elites, rather than actions being undertaken solely by or purely for the benefit of military institutions. Notably, these events also coincided with the collapse of the global economy and the beginning of the Great Depression, which placed further burdens on the stability of the political and economic arrangements in these countries. The overthrow of Juan Perón in Argentina in 1955 is another stark example of the potential result of civilian elites feeling threatened by their institutional rivals, in this case labor unions, gaining greater strength through democracy. The same rationale produced rightist civilian coalitions that backed the junta led by General Juan Carlos Onganía in 1966 and opposed redemocratization because the political right could not successfully compete electorally.¹⁴ Long-term military takeovers of government in the 1960s and 1970s famously involved alliances between the military, capital interests, and civilian technocrats all pursuing a course of rule that would push through the “bottlenecks” of import substitution industrialization (ISI)-based economic development.¹⁵ General Castelo Branco, the first president of the 1964-1985 military regime in Brazil, ruled with the endorsement of conservative political elites, who even supported the reorganization of the party system because it strengthened their position by reviving “defunct conservative parties.”¹⁶ Traditionally, military involvement in politics has not been an affair in which the institution is solely pursuing its own

self-interest or in which the armed forces are cleanly arrayed against a unified civilian opposition. Civilian elites, rather, have used military power against one another or against the masses when they stand to lose from democratic competition for power. Or, civilian elite rivals may attempt to "convince the extreme elements of a divided military to join them" instead of joining their opponents, eroding the potential for unfettered civilian democratic government to survive.¹⁷

Seymour Lipset and Aldo Solari define elites as "those positions in society, which are at the summits of key social structures, i.e. the higher positions in the economy, government, military, politics, religion, mass organizations, education, and the professions."¹⁸ Civilian elites, particularly those on the political right—"including, among others, holders of traditional wealth in land and minerals, anti-populist businessmen and economists, the conservative wing of the established church, anti-Communist international elites, and, in most countries, much of the military"—have not committed to the democratic game in earlier periods.¹⁹ The inclusion of former authoritarian leaders, and their willing participation in the new system, indicates a strengthening of democratic practice among previously ambivalent elite actors. This result is in part a consequence of the rupture between the military and supportive civilian elites born of the last round of military governments, themselves. Militaries demonstrated autonomy from the wishes of civilian elites in the long-term military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, which has made the military a less attractive political ally in the post-transition period.²⁰ Civilian elites could not rely on inclusion in the policymaking process during these regimes, outcomes were unpredictable, and policies did not necessarily reflect the original efforts of the coalition that brought the military to power.²¹ For example, leaders of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the Chilean Congress called on the military to intervene against President Allende in 1973, believing the armed forces would break the institutional deadlock between the president and congress, restore order, and hand the reins of government over to the PDC—instead they too found themselves locked out of power for the next 17 years.²²

The poor performance of many dictatorial regimes also weakened militaries and made them less useful as a political ally.²³ The civilian right is also now more accepting of democracy because there are no significant political threats against capitalism.²⁴ Coupled with the global victory of capitalism in the Cold War, the right's domestic success in the ideological and practical battle of making capitalism the only acceptable economic system in use, limits the potential changes that can be made to the socio-economic structure of a country, even when the left wins

power through elections. These commitments have made civilian elites less prone to seek military support in settling rivalries and has strengthened democratic practice overall.

Former military regime officials' commitment similarly represents part of this shift toward "consensus of political values and expectations" deemed necessary for successful democratization.²⁵ Their participation in the immediate transition period demonstrates this even more strongly. Holdouts may recognize that they must use democratic means to compete for power because "the more the game goes on, and the more actors practice it, the more costly it seems not to play it."²⁶ The immediate presence of former dictators in the new system may seem to be a troubling continuance of authoritarian domination of politics, but as Giuseppe Di Palma argues, "genuine democrats need not precede democracy."²⁷ The most crucial arrangement in the post-transition environment is agreement on the arena in which political rivalries will be fought, and former regime leaders' acceptance of the new system further validates the primacy of democratic institutions for handling political competition. Even if ideological support for democracy is not strong among recycled dictators initially, participation increases their stake in the system, making them hesitant to challenge the system or to defect from it.²⁸ From this perspective, democracy can be viewed as an "efficient way of defusing and regulating serious inherited conflict," and without the buy-in of all political actors, there is no guarantee that competition will take place within democratic institutions that allow for "coexistence in diversity."²⁹ Historically, political openings in countries in the region have involved political pluralization without institutionalization of democracy, resulting in the political space being closed once again. The dual shift from civilian elites reducing their reliance on the military as a political arbiter and former authoritarian figures buying into the new system demonstrates a significant change in Latin America's elite support for democracy. Concerns over popular support for democracy must be considered in context with this elite transformation.

Legacy of Military Rule in Latin America

This study investigates recycled dictators as a legacy of the military regimes that immediately preceded the Third Wave of democratization in Latin America. I define military government as an active-duty member of the armed forces serving as head of state.³⁰ An institution explicitly trained in the application of force and equipped to coerce, the unique position and power of a military sets it apart from other political

actors. How members of the institution and those who served in a military government respond to the new paradigm of political competition demands specialized inquiry. In historical context, repeated military intervention in politics and the dominance of military rule in the region prior to the Third Wave of democratization underscores the importance of understanding the legacies of this particular form of authoritarian government. As the Third Wave of democratization began, more than two-thirds of the states in Latin America were under military rule. The Cold War environment, the rise of National Security Doctrine, and pressure and support from the United States, steered militaries across the region to seize control of government in their countries. Civilian-led authoritarian government is not unknown in Latin America, but the overwhelming experience in the region has been that of military rule. Lack of elite commitment to democracy in previous eras has meant a tendency for civilian rivals to call upon military allies when conflicts cannot be resolved through fledgling democratic institutions.³¹ Or, democratic politics have been supplanted by oligarchic fear of losing economic and political power to the populist impulses of democracy. Thus, understanding the presence of former regime actors in electoral competition is crucial to understanding political behavior in contemporary democratic Latin America.³²

I investigate recycled dictators who served in government or in the armed forces during military rule in Latin America and who subsequently ran for president in their respective countries. Focusing on candidates from former military regimes provides analytical clarity and broad comparability. Militaries historically have been key actors in determining the form and composition of government. Blocking ideological rivals from attaining power, ensuring their own corporate interests, or embarking on nationalist development schemes have motivated military intervention in the political arena. Militaries have varied in their route to power and their conduct in office, but their rule is necessarily exclusionary and anti-democratic. The armed forces as an institution fundamentally lacks legitimacy to govern, and the presence of active-duty military officers in government is visually and symbolically unmistakable.³³ Only a handful of countries in the region—Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico—escaped the latter half of the twentieth century without the state being ruled directly by the armed forces. Thus, the legacies of military rule and the political conduct of those associated with these regimes have considerable impact across Latin America.³⁴ Table 1.1 introduces the 12 countries in the study—those which endured long-term military rule and transitioned to the

contemporary era of elected, civilian government in the Third Wave of democratization.³⁵

Latin America's historical cycles of democratization giving way to authoritarian rule demonstrates the potential fragility of the democratic system.³⁶ Presidential elections merit particular attention, given that the presidency is the highest office in the land, the nation's most visible representative to the international community, and an office imbued with executive powers such as issuing decrees and commanding the armed forces. For Latin America, in particular, the traditional strength of executives manifest in hyper-presidentialism intensifies the need to understand the role of ex-regime actors as potential democratic presidents.³⁷ The findings of this study apply beyond the region to other countries that have transitioned to democracy and face the challenge of integrating ex-authoritarians into the nascent political system.³⁸

Studying Recycled Dictators

This book grapples with the interrelated puzzles of political competition from those who once repressed political activity and the potential for citizens to exercise their right to vote in order to elect those who once stripped them of such rights. By investigating presidential elections in the contemporary post-transition era in Latin America, this project establishes the frequency of these candidates' presence and the intensity of their appeal. The study analyzes presidential campaigns and elections in 12 countries in Latin America from 1978 to 2011.³⁹ I develop a theory of presidential competition from former regime members and construct a typology of candidate viability. Through case studies of four countries—Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador—I elaborate divergent national experiences with recycled dictators and adjudicate between the causal mechanisms driving presence and performance under different conditions. The paired regional comparison of Chile and Argentina examines the return of dominant political parties that preceded military rule producing low recycled dictator presence yet diverging in form through “protest candidacies” in Argentina. Guatemala and El Salvador, the second pair, assesses conditions for high recycled dictator presence in both countries yet also demonstrates how a country with political circumstances favorable to former regime candidates can escape their influence in presidential politics.

Recycled dictators are distinguished by concrete factors such as service in the military government (whether as an active duty member of the military or as a civilian) or service in the armed forces during military government. Military dictatorships in Latin America routinely

Table 1.1. Recycled Dictator Country Cases

Country	Last Period of Military Rule	Inauguration of Uninterrupted Contemporary Civilian Rule	Presidential Elections under Consideration, Dates
Argentina	1976-1983	December 10, 1983	7 elections (1983-2011)
Bolivia	1964-1982	October 10, 1982	7 elections (1985-2009)
Brazil	1964-1985	March 15, 1982	6 elections (1989-2010)
Chile	1973-1990	March 11, 1990	5 elections (1989-2010)
Ecuador	1972-1979	August 10, 1979	9 elections (1978-2009)
El Salvador	1931-1980	December 22, 1980	6 elections (1984-2009)
Guatemala	1954-1986	January 14, 1986	7 elections (1986-2011)
Honduras	1963-1982	January 27, 1982	8 elections (1981-2009)
Panama	1968-1989	December 10, 1989	5 elections (1989-2009)
Paraguay	1954-1993	August 15, 1993	5 elections (1989-2008)
Peru	1968-1980	July 28, 1980	8 elections (1980-2011)
Uruguay	1973-1985	March 1, 1985	6 elections (1984-2010)

Note: See Appendix A for detailed consideration of dates of military rule and beginning of civilian rule.

have included civilians in the presidential cabinet and in other positions. Meanwhile, these dictatorships drew their coercive power from the armed forces themselves, including field officers in command of units capable of carrying out the central government's program of political repression. To use Guatemala as an example, the most acute manifestation of the recycled dictator phenomenon is that of a leader such as General Efraín Ríos Montt, who ruled the country as a military dictator in 1982 and ran for president, unsuccessfully, in 2003, thereby attempting to serve in the same role in two very different types of government. The expansive definition that includes civilian members of these military governments allows for the analysis of an individual such as Mario Sandoval Alarcón, a civilian who served as vice president in the military regime of General Kjell Laugerud, and who ran unsuccessfully for president in 1985. Considering those individuals who were part of the armed forces during military rule but who were not, themselves, in a position of government, incorporates such figures as General Otto Pérez Molina. He commanded combat forces during the civil war and was elected to the presidency in 2011. Those who were part of the power base of the military regime, whether in government or in the armed forces qualify as "recycled dictators."

Figure 1.1. Categories of Recycled Dictators

		Role in Government During Military Rule	
		Yes	No
Member of the Armed Forces	Yes	<u>Government, Military</u> Ex: Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt	<u>Non-government, Military</u> Ex: Gen. Otto Pérez Molina
	No	<u>Government, Civilian</u> Ex: Mario Sandoval Alarcón	<u>Non-Recycled Dictator</u> (Returned democratic actor, new politician)

Recycled dictators are defined by their entry into democratic politics. Ex-regime candidates may participate in the transitional elections themselves, but they are distinct from figures who attempt to remain in their current position through a transition. As a military government is giving up power *en masse*, members of the regime or of the armed forces may step into a campaign for president, but in the Latin American cases, it is rare for a sitting military president to run in the transitional election. For example, rather than seeing General Augusto Pinochet run for president in Chile in 1989, his minister of finance, Hernán Büchi Buc, (in part) picked up the mantle of the sitting government by promising a continuation of the economic success of the Pinochet regime under democratic auspices. Only General Andrés Rodríguez Pedotti, who unseated long-serving General Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay and began the transitional process, ran for president while serving in that role.⁴⁰ From outside the region, examples of individual attempts at outlasting a transition in power include Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf, Kenya's Daniel arap Moi, and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda. Musharraf, for example, ruled Pakistan as an active-duty military officer from 1999 to 2007. When he became a civilian leader, he did not relinquish power. He stood for election while still wielding the power to suspend the constitution and to declare states of emergency. These leaders already were in control of the reins of government when seeking election as democrats, which enabled them to shape the political environment and their respective contests as they saw fit. That level of control does not exist for the recycled dictator.

A recycled dictator candidate is included in the analysis only if he is on the ballot and thereby reported in the results of the election by the national electoral tribunal, court, or commission. An ex-military leader-turned-politician who does not see the campaign through to the election does not enter into the analysis. For example, in Paraguay, General Lino Oviedo first campaigned for the presidency in the 1998 elections, but his running mate, Raúl Cubas Grau, was eventually the one on the ballot, because Oviedo was charged for a 1996 coup attempt in which he had refused to resign as minister of defense under President Juan Carlos Wasmosy.⁴¹ He ran again in 2008, appeared on the ballot, winning 22 percent of the vote, and is included for that year, but not for 1998.⁴²

A transition from authoritarian rule to democracy can be marked in a number of different ways—the date of a first election, the date a new constitution is adopted, or the date that constitution is enacted, among others. I mark the transition date for each country on the date that the military formally ceded power to an uninterrupted civilian administration, as noted in Table 1.1. I also include "transitional"

elections in the analysis that took place under military rule, beginning with the first direct presidential elections held.

Additionally, I distinguish between candidates and candidacies. The numbers given for civilians, military personnel, and military personnel in government reflect variously, the individuals who ran in a presidential election (candidates) and attempts by recycled dictators in presidential elections (candidacies). Many of these recycled dictators have run in more than one contest. While there have been 50 recycled dictator candidates among the 12 countries, there have been 63 candidacies.⁴³

Findings of the Study

I find that recycled dictators have made up roughly 10 percent of the 600-plus presidential candidacies in post-transition elections in the dozen countries under investigation. Former regime candidates are more prevalent in the years closer to the transition, but their presence persists for decades after, albeit in fewer numbers. Despite this temporal trend, there is no notable pattern of higher or lower support based on the time since transition. Time alone does not explain viability of an ex-regime candidate.

Public polling from organizations such as the World Values Survey, Latinobarómetro, and the United Nations Development Program have suggested that significant percentages of citizens in the region are not necessarily committed to democracy in the wake of political, economic, and security challenges. The experience of recycled dictator candidates in presidential elections, however, provides a real-world test of this assertion, revealing that voters are committed to voting for democrats and for empowering the democratic system more consistently and in much larger numbers than cross-national polling may suggest. Scholars have interpreted responses on questions of support for military government as an indication that voters desire a return to the past. But, when voters have been presented with the reality of a former military regime official returning to power, they are largely rejected. Only 28 (of 63) recycled dictator candidacies have achieved over 10 percent vote share, while the remainder finished in the single digits. Of the 79 presidential elections held in the 12 countries in this study, seven have resulted in the election of a leader from the former authoritarian regime.

There is variation among ex-regime candidates at the presidential level. Of the candidates who served in government roles during military rule, 23 were civilian and eight were uniformed military. A further 19 recycled dictator candidates were members of the armed forces in non-governing roles in the period of military rule, as shown in Figure 1.2.⁴⁴

Figure 1.2. Presidential Candidates by Category of Role during Military Government

		Role in Government During Military Rule	
		Yes	No
Member of the Armed Forces	Yes	<u>Government, Military</u> (8)	<u>Non-government, Military</u> (19)
	No	<u>Government, Civilian</u> (23)	<u>Non-Recycled Dictator</u> (600+)

These recycled dictators and the roles they played are not evenly distributed across the region. As Table 1.2 illustrates, each country has a different experience with their former regime candidates. Guatemala stands out as having a particularly high number of recycled dictators in their contests, while Panama and Uruguay had only one member of a former military regime run for president. Similarly, the civilian versus military breakdown varies. Only civilian members of military governments ran in Chile and Honduras, while Ecuador is unique in the fact that all three of its recycled dictators were officers in the armed forces who did not directly serve in government during their country's military regime.

The military personnel who enter political life by running for president in the democratic era tend to be high-ranking officers, whether they were formally part of the military government or if they were a commander in the field. Table 1.3 shows that the largest number of recycled dictators by far are at the pinnacle of the military command, as generals in the army or air force or admirals in the navy. Many of these officers, from general down the chain of command, attended the United States' School of the Americas at one point in their careers.⁴⁵ The training ground for Cold War era cooperation among overseas military officers has long been the subject of criticism for instructing its students

Table 1.2. Recycled Dictator Candidates by Country and Role during Military Government

Country	Government, Civilian	Government, Military	Non-government, Military	Total
Bolivia	5	2	2	9
Ecuador	0	0	3	3
Peru	0	3	0	3
<i>Andean Region</i>	5	5	5	15
El Salvador	4	0	2	6
Guatemala	5	2	5	12
Honduras	4	0	0	4
Panama	1	0	0	1
<i>Central America</i>	14	2	7	23
Argentina	0	0	4	4
Brazil	1	0	2	3
Chile	2	0	0	2
Paraguay	1	0	1	2
Uruguay	0	1	0	1
<i>Southern Cone</i>	4	1	7	12
Latin America	23	8	19	50

**Table 1.3. Characteristics of Military Personnel
Recycled Dictator Candidates**

Rank	Government	Non- government	School of the Americas Attendees
General, Admiral ⁴⁶	6	10	8
Colone ⁴⁷	1	6	2
Major	0	1	1
Captain	1	2	0
Total	8	19	11

in practices antithetical to respect for human rights.⁴⁸ Thus, it is important to note this characteristic for those who served under the military government and subsequently mounted a campaign for president.

Table 1.3 also draws attention to an important comparative point regarding the recycled dictator phenomenon. These military officers served in high-ranking leadership positions within their institutions. Perhaps it is not surprising at all that they would make the personal transition from the armed forces to government. Indeed, history is replete with examples of former military leaders making their way into politics. Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley (the Duke of Wellington), famous for his victory against Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 13 years later. The United States has elected numerous former generals to the presidency—from George Washington to Dwight Eisenhower. Yet, the nature of these individuals' military past and the impact it had on their electoral positions is clearly quite different from that of a recycled dictator. They were not fighting against their own people nor were they serving in an anti-democratic government before deciding to run for office. Victorious in wars against foreign adversaries, these figures did not face the potential consequences of having transitional justice measures leveled against them. Nevertheless, in comparative perspective, the experience of these military leaders highlights the fact that the presence of former military officials in politics is not unique to recycled dictators. The significance

of their presence diverges, however, in those states with weak national civilian institutions, where the military has produced the country's leadership prior to democratization and routinely decided the form and composition of government through periodic intervention or by holding power directly. The longstanding recognition that militaries in Latin America have served a tutelary role in national politics, determining the limits of competition or deciding on government personnel reinforces this explanation for their presence.⁴⁹ Where there has been less opportunity for civilian political competition, recycled dictators are more likely to be major contenders in the new system, rather than being only marginal candidates, supplanted by the civilian leaders returning to power.

Chapter Outline

The book proceeds as follows. In Chapter Two, I develop a theory of recycled dictators' presence in presidential elections. I argue that cross-national variation in the rate of competition from recycled dictators in post-transition elections is explained by the level of democratic continuity in a country and the level of uncertainty posed to the interests of those associated with the former military government. States with little experience with democracy prior to the military regime are more vulnerable to the return of former regime members in electoral contests. A country such as Guatemala, which experienced only a brief democratic revolution in the 1940s—one brought about by and still dominated by the military—has had far more ex-authoritarian actors participate in the contemporary democratic system than a country like Chile, which had experienced uninterrupted civilian democracy for decades prior to the military takeover in 1973. I argue that the democratic continuity of civilian leaders returning to politics, parties being re-formed, and the momentum from the democratization movement play a pivotal role in shaping the post-transition electoral environment. Under such conditions, ex-dictators are not the only ones returning to politics. Recycled dictators do not run in a vacuum. It matters who the opposition is and how prepared they are to step into the political arena. In states like Guatemala and El Salvador, where militaries dominated the political sphere and there was almost no experience with democracy prior to the Third Wave transition, and a great deal of the pressure for military withdrawal from government came from the United States, more of those military leaders continued to play a role in the country's political life.

In Chapter Three, I build a typology of viable ex-regime candidates (those performing at a vote share of 10 percent or more) in order to theorize recycled dictator candidate performance. The typology of viable candidates has three distinct types: (1) Regime Heirs, (2) Rogue Officers, and (3) Caudillo Democrats. Regime Heirs are those candidates who uphold the mantle of the former regime and represent those interests in the early elections of the democratic era. Former Finance Minister Hernan Buchi in Chile best exemplifies this category as a candidate who sought to carry on the Pinochet regime without Gen. Pinochet.

Rogue officers are those who have staged uprisings while still in the armed forces and then enter politics. Thus, in addition to their status as ex-regime officials, they carry another identity as rebel officers with a particular political message—generally one of institutional defense of the military. Several of the candidates who perform at the +10 percent level are in this category, but being a rebel leader is not a guarantee of success. The *ex-carapintada* candidates in Argentina demonstrate this fact. Lt. Col. Aldo Rico, for example, formed the *Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia* (MODIN) and ran with the same message he carried when leading the barracks revolts that brought him to fame. He and others like him in Argentina were relegated to minimal showings in the vote, given the presence of major democratic parties.

Finally, Caudillo Democrats are those candidates who demonstrate a convergence of ex-military identity coupled with the behavior of more conventional politicians. These individuals establish a political career by winning and serving in lower level offices or in the national legislature first, building a constituency and party operations along the way, rather than attempting to run for president with no prior political experience. In this sense, Caudillo Democrats have more in common with traditional, major-party politicians in that they are not "amateur candidates" upon their run for the presidency.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, their military lineage is also an important part of their identity, and they promise to employ authoritarian solutions from the executive branch in the wake of institutional failures to address social and economic problems effectively. Gen. Otto Pérez Molina of Guatemala, for example, pledged an iron fist in dealing with crime and conflict in the country.⁵¹ Thus, the Caudillo Democrat represents a potentially troubling development among ex-regime actors (and, perhaps other politicians and large numbers of voters) of acceptance of the rules of the *electoral* game, but not necessarily acceptance of liberal democracy.⁵² The typology approach expands the discussion of recycled dictators and the variety of issues and conditions that explain their candidacies.⁵³

In Chapters Four through Seven, I present country case studies for Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador, with each one teasing out causal mechanisms explaining different national experiences with recycled dictators. Chile, having experienced decades of uninterrupted democratic government prior to the Pinochet regime, exhibits the signs of re-democratization that ensure politically sophisticated competition from democratic forces and few former regime candidates. Argentina, with its repeated cycles of political liberalization and authoritarian reversals has a rockier history with democracy than Chile, yet the mechanisms of party competition and the democratization movement are similar. The Argentine armed forces left power in disarray and the ruling juntas were subsequently prosecuted for human rights abuses in high-profile trials, making Argentina a least-likely case for members of the former regime to re-enter the political arena and to gain support from the population. Apart from the protest candidacies of the *carapintadas*, this maxim has held true at the presidential level. Guatemala, having essentially no democratic history, has seen many members of the former regime and of the armed forces stand for election in presidential contests. Meanwhile, El Salvador, also lacking democratic experience and making the transition to civilian rule under similar circumstances, saw recycled dictators leave the electoral arena more swiftly because of the nature of the competition between the ARENA party (representing conservative forces) and the FMLN—the guerrilla movement-turned-political-party. Together, these case studies develop a contextualized picture of the recycled dictator phenomenon as it played out in four distinct settings and provide a look at the identity of these candidates in their second act in national politics.

In Chapter Eight, I conclude the study, reflect on the implications of its findings for recent and ongoing transitions to democracy, and discuss future directions for the study of democratic habituation and integration after authoritarian government.

¹ Martín Sivak, *El Dictador Elegido: Biografía no Autorizada de Hugo Banzer Suárez* (La Paz: Plural editors, 2001); Javier Galván, *Latin American Dictators of the 20th Century: The Lives and Regimes of 15 Rulers* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2013); Malcolm Coad, “Dictator Banzer’s shadow hangs over Bolivia’s elections,” *The Guardian*, July 15, 1985; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia*, Judgment of September 1, 2010.

² Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia, http://www.cne.org.bo/proces_electoral/eg1997.aspx.

³ For example, in 1996, Mathieu Kérékou was elected to the presidency in Benin, returning after giving up power in 1991 following 17 years of military

rule. In 1999, former General Olesgun Obasanjo of Nigeria returned to the presidency via democratic elections long after he had given up the reins of power. And, in 2002, former General Amadou Toumani Touré of Mali did the same.

⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁵ States in Latin America have experienced several rounds of democratization and military intervention in the twentieth century. For example, Argentina established a democratic system in 1912 yet experienced military intervention essentially every decade from the 1930s to the 1980s. And, reformist factions of militaries in states such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and El Salvador periodically offered political openings only to see them reversed by hardliners within the institution. The long pattern of struggle between democratic and anti-democratic forces in the region underscores how potentially fragile the Third Wave transitions are and the long-standing uncertainty regarding their outcomes.

⁶ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Democracy in Latin America: Toward a Citizens' Democracy* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2004).

⁷ Latinobarómetro, "Informe Latinobarómetro: Diez Años de Opinión Pública" (Santiago: Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2005).

⁸ Lt. Col. Rico could no longer wield the power of his military position, yet in 1990, he had reminded the country that "it was only a matter of time before his comrades still in the service took over the high command." *Latin American Weekly Report*, March 8, 1990.

⁹ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 7.2 (1996): 14-33.

¹⁰ Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹¹ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development & Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

¹² Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Peter H. Smith, *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

¹³ On the issue of military concern for its own survival see Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents* (New York: Praeger, 1964). On the issue of civilian-military cooperation in the staging of a coup d'état see Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *The American Political Science Review* 60.3 (1966): 616-626. In Needler's words, "a military coup is not made by the military alone," p. 618.

¹⁴ Leonardo Senkman, "The Right and Civilian Regimes, 1955-1976," in *The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present*, eds. Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1993), 119-145.

¹⁵ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

¹⁶ Timothy Power, *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

¹⁷ Senkman, "The Right and Civilian Regimes, 1955-1976," 132.

¹⁸ Seymour Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., *Elites in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), vii.

¹⁹ Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, and Atilio A. Boron, eds., *The Right and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 2.

²⁰ Edward Gibson, "Conservative Electoral Movements and Democratic Politics: Core Constituencies, Coalition Building, and the Latin American Electoral Right," in *The Right and Democracy in Latin America*, eds. Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, and Atilio A. Boron (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 13-42.

²¹ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Substantive or Procedural Consensus? Notes on the Latin American Bourgeoisie," in *The Right and Democracy in Latin America*, eds. Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, and Atilio A. Boron (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 43-47.

²² Brian Loveman, "Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile 1973-1986," in *Chile: Dictatorship and the Struggle for Democracy*, eds. Grínor Rojo and John J. Hassett (Gaithersburg: Ediciones Hispamérica, 1988).

²³ Atilio A. Boron, "Becoming Democrats? Some Skeptical Considerations on the Right in Latin America," in *The Right and Democracy in Latin America*, eds. Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, and Atilio A. Boron (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 68-95.

²⁴ O'Donnell, "Substantive or Procedural Consensus?" 43-47; Boron, "Becoming Democrats?" 68-95.

²⁵ Robert E. Scott, "Political Elites and Political Modernization: The Crisis of Transition," in *Elites in Latin America*, eds. Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 117-145.

²⁶ Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 113.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

²⁸ Paola Cesarini and Katherine Hite, "Introducing the Concept of Authoritarian Legacies," in *Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe*, eds. Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 11.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

³⁰ Following the Military Intervention Score developed by Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics* 20:1 (1967): 83-110 and extended by Robert H. Dix, "Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America," *Armed Forces & Society* 20.3 (1994): 439-456 and by Robert E. Looney and Peter C. Frederiksen, "The Effect of Declining Military Influence on Defense Budgets in Latin America," *Armed Forces & Society* 26.3 (2000): 437-449, I consider that "military rule signifies rule directly by the military, or by a person or group of military origin, or by a clear puppet thereof." Dix, p. 442.

³¹ Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, *Capitalist Development & Democracy*, 195-197.

³² Peter Smith makes an eloquent case for analyzing the contemporary democratic period in the region through the lens of previous attempts at democracy. Smith, *Democracy in Latin America*, 12.

³³ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962).

³⁴ This study focuses on Latin American states that transitioned directly from military rule to democracy in the Third Wave of democratization—thus omitting Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. Nicaragua experienced a revolutionary political transition from the Somoza regime to the Sandinista government and eventual democratization. In the Dominican Republic, after the assassination of General Rafael Trujillo in 1961, the country experienced a long period of civilian authoritarianism under President Joaquín Balaguer before it transitioned into a more competitive civilian political system.

³⁵ I mark the transition as the date on which a new civilian head of state is inaugurated and the military formally leaves power. In some instances, the civilian head of state began prior to direct elections for president. For example, on December 22, 1980, José Napoleón Duarte became head of a new civil-military junta, and thus the appointed civilian president of El Salvador. Though active-duty officers remained in powerful positions (Col. Adolfo Arnoldo Majano retained the vice presidency, for example), this appointment marked the beginning of uninterrupted civilian government in the country. Jose Napoleon Duarte would later win the presidency through election in 1984. "Political and Internal Security Developments - Reorganization of Junta - Temporary Suspension of US Aid," *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (January 30, 1981), 30685.

³⁶ Smith, *Democracy in Latin America*; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America*.

³⁷ Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5.1 (1994): 55-69; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto and Natalia Volosin, "Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Philippines," *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 29.1 (2011): 246-333.

³⁸ Factors of political behavior important in other regional contexts such as ethnic voting, religious identity, or the impact of a more recent colonial past may complicate generalizability, but the breadth of the theory provides a good basis for understanding the phenomenon across varied political environments. Indeed, under conditions of strong ethnic voting, for example, theories of recycled dictator presence and performance may be applicable yet superseded by another explanation. That is, a recycled dictator, rather than being described by my typology of viability, might capture support on the basis of citizens voting for co-ethnics as they would for any candidate. Under this circumstance, his former authoritarian status may not be germane to explaining his electoral career.

³⁹ I mark the democratic election period beginning with the start of direct elections for president. Thus, many "foundational elections" are included—those contests which took place while the military still held power—while some states handed power over to civilian authorities before holding direct elections for president. For example, direct elections did not take place in El Salvador until after the 1982 swearing in of a civilian cabinet.

⁴⁰ Consequently, General Andrés Rodríguez is not considered a recycled dictator and not included in the analysis.

⁴¹ Alphonse Emanuiloff-Max, "General Oviedo and the 1998 Paraguayan Elections," in *Latin American Political Yearbook: 1998*, ed. Robert G. Breene, Jr. (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); "Biografía," *Lino Cesar Oviedo Silva: Sitio Oficial*, <http://www.oviedolinocesar.com/biograf.htm>.

⁴² Candidate names, parties, votes, and vote share compiled from cross-national databases of electoral information such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) Election Guide, the Georgetown University Political Database of the Americas (PDBA), and the Election Results Archive (ERA) from the Center on Democratic Performance at Binghamton University. Where these databases are limited in their coverage (for many elections prior to the 1990s, for example), they are complemented with information from the *Latin American Political Yearbook*, each country's national electoral court or electoral commission, and secondary scholarly sources.

⁴³ Author identification of recycled dictators as those who ran in a presidential race, having previously served as presidents, junta members, or cabinet ministers under military rule—data compiled from *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, and *The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who*—in the 12 countries in the study, and through biographical information from sources such as the *Centro de Estudios y Documentación Internacionales de Barcelona (CIDOB)* and candidate profiles from domestic and international newspapers, individual candidate websites, party websites, and a wealth of secondary academic sources. The 63 recycled dictator candidacies from 1980 to 2011 are elaborated through news digests, such as *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, the *Latin American Weekly Report*, and international and domestic newspapers covering the elections in which recycled dictators ran.

⁴⁴ All of the numbers provided in this section reflect the data for candidates, rather than candidacies. Many recycled dictators ran in more than one presidential election. In this count, however, they are considered only once.

⁴⁵ "SOA Graduates Database," *School of the Americas Watch*, <http://soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/13-soawhinsec-graduates/4281-soa-grads-database-online-ur>.

⁴⁶ Includes all grades of admiral or general officer.

⁴⁷ Includes colonel and lieutenant colonel.

⁴⁸ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

⁴⁹ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, eds. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986).

⁵⁰ For discussion of "amateur candidates" in the context of United States politics and a typology of their candidacies—ambitious, policy, and hopeless amateurs, see David Canon, *Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). These types pair with the caudillo democrat, rogue officer, and general recycled dictators, respectively.

⁵¹ "Guatemaltecos eligen a Otto Pérez Molina como Presidente," *Prensa Libre*, November 6, 2011; "El cambio viene!" *Partido Patriota*, <http://www.partidopatriota.com/>.

⁵² Guillermo O'Donnell identifies this concern as a broader problem of "delegative democracy" for leaders and voters across the political spectrum. O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," 55-69.

⁵³ For more on the use of typologies see David Collier, Jody LaPorte and Jason Seawright, "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor," *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (2012): 217-232.