


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Comparative Politics of the Global South: Linking Concepts and Cases

FOURTH EDITION

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Chapter 1

Comparing and Defining a Complex World

No human culture is inaccessible to someone who makes the effort to understand, to learn, to inhabit another world. —Henry Louis Gates, *historian*¹

In this book we take a comparative approach to the study of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. How should we refer to this immense collection of countries, people, and cultures composing approximately 80 percent of the world's population? As you'll see, we are not the first to struggle with what's in a name. In fact, in this fourth edition of the book, we have changed the title from *Comparative Politics of the "Third World"* to *Comparative Politics of the Global South*. Some may argue this change was long overdue. This shift in terminology reflects not only our ongoing discomfort with the "three worlds" terminology, but also a heightened recognition—by scholars, practitioners, citizens, and activists alike—that, despite its drawbacks, the concept of the "global south" is the least offensive and most value-neutral label (despite some obvious geographic inaccuracies).² To understand a bit of the controversy, let's begin with a short review of some of the terminology and disputes surrounding characterizations of the majority of the world's population.

There are numerous labels we may employ. One of the most common (and indeed the most provocative) is "third world." Why? The term "third world" (*tiers monde*) was coined by French demographer Alfred Sauvy. In a 1952 article, Sauvy borrowed from eighteenth-century writer Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès to compare relatively poor countries of the world to the "third estate" (the people) at the time of the French Revolution. Sieyès characterized the third estate as ignored, exploited, and scorned. Sauvy characterized the third world similarly, but pointed out that it, like the third estate, has the power to overcome its status.³

So what's so off-putting, then, about the term "third world"? First and foremost, it is objectionable for both logical and emotional reasons. WORLD BANK* director

*Terms appearing in small capital letters are defined in the Glossary, which begins on p. 515.

Robert Zoellick has declared that there is no longer a third world.⁴ Not only do critics of the term disdain the concept as unwieldy and obsolete, but they also fault it as distorting reality in attempting to geopolitically and economically classify a diverse group of countries.

And let's face it, "third world" can be fighting words. The phrase carries a lot of negative baggage. Many people cringe at hearing the term and avoid using it because, at the very least, it sounds condescending and quaintly racist. It is not unusual for "third world" to be flung as an insult. For some, the term suggests backwardness. Third world countries are often thought to play a peripheral role in the world, having no voice and little weight or relevance. That is certainly not the case, as this book will demonstrate.

The geopolitical use of the term "third world" dates back to the COLD WAR, the period of US-Soviet rivalry from approximately 1947 to 1989, reflecting the ideological conflict that dominated international relations. For decades following World War II, the rich, economically advanced, industrialized countries, also known as the "first world," were pitted against the Soviet-led, communist "second world." In this rivalry, each side described what it was doing as self-defense, and both the first and second worlds claimed to be fighting to "save" the planet from the treachery of the other. Much of this battle was over who would control the nonaligned "third world," which served as the theater for many Cold War conflicts and whose countries were treated as pawns in this chess game. Defined simply as the remainder of the planet—being neither first nor second—the concept of the third world has always been unwieldy, often bringing to mind countries that are poor, agricultural, and overpopulated.

Yet consider the stunning diversity that exists among the countries of every region of the world: surely they cannot all be lumped into a single category and characterized as such today. For example, how do we categorize China? It is clearly led by a communist regime (and therefore may be considered second world), but during the Cold War it viewed itself as the leader of the third world. What about Israel or South Africa? Because of the dramatic disparities within these countries, they can be categorized as third world or first, depending on where we look. The same can even be said for the United States. Visit parts of its cities, the rural south, or Appalachia, and you will find the so-called third world. And now, with the Cold War long over, why aren't the former republics of the Soviet Union included in most studies of the third world? Certainly the poorest of them are more third world than first.

The fact is, many countries fall between the cracks when we use the three-worlds typology. Some of the countries labeled third world are oil-rich, while others have been industrializing for so long that even the term "NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES" (NICs) is dated (it is still used, but has largely been replaced by "emerging economies"). Therefore, in appreciation of the diversity contained within the third world, perhaps it is useful to subdivide it, to allow for specificity by adding more categories. Under this schema, the emerging countries and a few others that are most appropriately termed "developing countries" are labeled "third world" (e.g., China, India, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico). "Fourth world" countries become those that are not industrializing, but have some resources to sell on the world market (e.g., Ghana, Bolivia, Egypt), or some strategic value that wins them a bit of foreign assistance. The label "less developed country" (LDC) is the best fit in most of these

cases, since it simply describes their situation and implies little in terms of their prospects for DEVELOPMENT. And finally, we have the “fifth world,” which Henry Kissinger once callously characterized as “the basket cases of the world.” These are the world’s poorest countries. Sometimes known as “least–less developed countries” (LLDCs), they are very clearly under-developing. With little to sell on the world market, they are eclipsed by it. The poorest in the world, with the worst ratings for virtually every marker of human development, these countries are marginalized and utterly dependent on what little foreign assistance they receive.

Today it is more common to hear the STATES of these regions variously referred to as “developing countries,” “less developed countries,” or “under-developed countries.” Currently in vogue are also the stripped-down, minimalist terms “low-income countries” (LICs), “high-income countries” (HICs), and even “low- and lower-middle-income countries” (LMICs). These are just a few of the labels used to refer to a huge expanse of territories and peoples, and none are entirely satisfactory. First, our subject—comprising four major world regions—is so vast and so heterogeneous that it is difficult to speak of it as a single entity. Second, each name has its own political implications and each insinuates a political message. For example, although some countries contained within these regions are better off than others, only an optimist would label all of them as “developing countries.” Some of the countries we’ll be looking at are simply not developing. They are under-developing—losing ground, becoming worse off.⁵

Those who prefer the term “developing countries” tend to support the idea that the capitalist path of free markets will eventually lead to peace and prosperity for all. Capitalism is associated with rising prosperity in some countries such as South Korea and Mexico, but even in these countries the majority of people have yet to share in many of its benefits. However, the relative term “less developed countries” prompts the question: Less developed than whom—or what? The answer, inevitably, is what we arbitrarily label “developed countries”: the rich, industrialized states of Western Europe, Canada, and the United States, also known as “the West” (a term that, interestingly enough, includes Japan but excludes most of the countries of the Western Hemisphere).

Although the people who talk about such things often throw about the terms “developed” or “less developed” as a shorthand measure of economic advancement, often such names are resented because they imply that “less developed” countries are somehow lacking in other, broader measures of political, social, or cultural development. Use of the term “developing,” or any of these terms for that matter, suggests that countries can be ranked along a continuum. Such terms can be used to imply that the West is best, that the rest of the world is comparatively “backward,” and that the most the citizens of the rest of the world can hope for is to “develop” using the West as a model.

In the 2015 annual letter of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the famed investors turned philanthropists contended that such terminology has outlived its utility—why, for example, should Mozambique and Mexico be grouped together?⁶ Critics contend that the terminology is intellectually lazy, outdated, and judgmental. The World Bank got rid of the “developing countries” terminology in 2016, in part to highlight measures of economic success, and in part to point out the importance of differences that exist within countries.⁷ Ranking countries more precisely

on income data and other measures, the World Bank grouped Mexico, China, and Brazil each as “upper-middle-income countries,” placing India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and others in the category of “lower-middle-income,” while Malawi remains “low-income” (prior to this change, all of these countries were framed as “developing”).⁸ The World Bank, as it phases out use of “developing” or “developed” world from within its databases, focuses less on general characterization and more on the priority of promoting sustainable development, our focus in Chapter 6.

Geography is the point of reference for some, including those who argue that the West developed only at the expense of the rest of the world. For these analysts, under-development is no natural event or coincidence. Rather, it is the outcome of hundreds of years of active under-development by today’s developed countries. Some have captured this dynamic as the all-inclusive “non-Western world.” As others have demonstrated, it is probably more honest to speak of “the West and the rest” if we are to use this kind of term, since there are many non-Wests rather than a single non-Western world.⁹ At least “the West and the rest” is blatantly straightforward in its Eurocentric center of reference, dismissing 80 percent of the world’s population and treating “the rest” as “other.” In the same manner that the term “nonwhite” is demeaning, “non-Western” implies that something is missing. Our subject becomes defined only through its relationship to a more central “West.”

Resistance to such treatment, and efforts to change situations, are sometimes referred to as the North-South conflict, or the war between the haves and the have-nots of the world. The names “North” and “South” are useful because they are seemingly stripped of the value judgments contained within most of the terms already described. However, they are as imprecise as the term “West,” since “North” refers to developed countries, which mostly fall north of the equator, and “South” is another name for less developed countries, which mostly fall south of the equator. Similar to any dichotomy, this terminology invites illusions of superiority and “otherness,” homogenizing differences and elevating one’s own culture or lifestyle.

So, why has the phraseology of “global south” seemingly come into vogue? Some argue that it has long been the preferred term for what used to be called the third world, even if it must be “used elastically.”¹⁰ Used with increasing frequency within the United Nations in the 1970s, “global south” has, in many circles, replaced a three-worlds construct that became increasingly irrelevant after the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹¹ Even if today the metaphor is used to highlight both the empowerment and shared circumstances of many around the world, its origins, traced to the Brandt Commission reports of the early 1980s, are now viewed as patronizing in their call for the financial support of the “North” for modernization efforts undertaken within the “South.”¹² Similar to each of the constructs just discussed, its lines are fuzzy, and we must recognize it for the created construct that it is. To the extent that it helps us grasp some of the common challenges and innovations of people and governments, and how some of these issues are viewed differently than from the vantage point of the developed north, the term “global south” may be useful, albeit imperfect.

Clearly none of the names we use to describe the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East are satisfactory, and any generalization is going to be limited. Even the terms “Latin America” and “Middle East” are problematic. Not all of Latin America is “Latin” in the sense of being Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking. Yet we will use this term as shorthand for the entire region south of the US bor-

der, including the Caribbean. And the idea of a region being “Middle East” only makes sense if one’s perspective is distinctly European—otherwise, what is it “middle” to? The point is that most of our labels reflect some bias, and none of them are fully satisfactory. These names are all ideologically loaded in one way or another. Because there is no simple, clearly most appropriate identifier available, we will use each and all of them as markers of the varying worldviews presented in this text. Ultimately, we leave it to the reader to sift through the material presented here, consider the debates, and decide which arguments—and therefore which terminologies—are most representative of the world and therefore most useful.

What’s to Compare?

In this introduction to the COMPARATIVE STUDIES of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, we take a different spin on the traditional approach in order to discuss much more than politics as it is often narrowly defined. As one of the social sciences, political science has traditionally focused on the study of formal political institutions and behavior. In this book, we choose not to put the spotlight on governments and voting patterns, party politics, and so on. Rather, we turn our attention to all manner of political behavior, which we consider to include just about any aspect of life. Of interest to us is not only how people are governed, but also how they live, how they govern themselves, and what they see as their most urgent concerns.

We employ a political interaction approach. It is an eclectic method that presents ideas from a variety of contemporary thinkers and theories. Our approach is multidisciplinary. We divide our attention among history, politics, society, and economics in order to convey more fully the complexity of human experience.¹³ Instead of artificially confining ourselves to one narrow discipline, we recognize that each discipline offers another layer or dimension, which adds immeasurably to our understanding of the “essence” of politics.¹⁴

Comparative politics, then, is much more than simply a subject of study—it is also a means of study. It employs what is known as the comparative method. Through the use of the comparative method we seek to describe, identify, and explain trends—in some cases, even predict human behavior. Those who adopt this approach, known as comparativists, are interested in identifying relationships and patterns of behavior and interactions between individuals and groups. Focusing on one or more countries, comparativists examine case studies alongside one another. They search for similarities and differences between and among the elements selected for comparison. For example, one might compare patterns of female employment and fertility rates in one country in relation to those patterns in other countries. Using the comparative method, analysts make explicit or implicit comparisons, searching for common and contrasting features. Some do a “most similar systems” analysis, looking for differences between cases that appear to have a great deal in common (e.g., Canada and the United States). Others prefer a “most different” approach, looking for commonalities between cases that appear diametrically opposed in experience (e.g., Bolivia and India).¹⁵ What is particularly exciting about this type of analysis is stumbling upon unexpected parallels between ostensibly different cases. Just as satisfying is beginning to understand the significance and consequences of the differences that exist between cases assumed to have much in common.

Most comparative studies textbooks take one of two roads. Either they offer case studies, which provide loads of intricate detail on a handful of states (often the classics: Mexico, Nigeria, China, and India; curiously, the Middle East is frequently ignored), or they provide a CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS that purports to generalize about much larger expanses of territory. Those who take the cross-national approach are interested in getting at the big picture. Texts that employ it focus on theory and concepts to broaden our scope of understanding beyond a handful of cases. They often end up making fairly sweeping generalizations. The authors of these books may reference any number of countries as illustration, but at the loss of detail and context that come only through the use of case studies.

We provide both cross-national analysis and case studies, because we don't want to lose the strengths of either approach. We present broad themes and concepts, while including attention to the variations that exist in reality. In adopting this hybrid approach, we have set for ourselves a more ambitious task. However, as teachers, we recognize the need for both approaches to be presented. We have worked hard to show how cross-national analysis and case studies can work in tandem, how each complements the other. By looking at similar phenomena in several contexts (i.e., histories, politics, societies, economics, and international relations of the third world, more generally), we can apply our cases and compare them, illustrating the similarities and differences experienced in different settings.

Therefore, in addition to the cross-national analysis that composes the bulk of each chapter, we offer eight case studies, two from each of the major regions of the third world. For each region we include the "classics" offered in virtually every text that applies the case method to the non-Western experience: Mexico, Nigeria, China, and Iran. We offer these cases for the same reasons that so many others see fit to include them. However, we go further. To temper the tendency to view these cases as somehow representative of their regions, and to enhance the basis for comparison, we submit alongside the classics other, less predictable case studies from each region. These additional cases are equally interesting and important in their own regard; they are countries that are rarely (if ever) included as case studies in introductory textbooks: Peru, Zimbabwe, Egypt, and Indonesia. (See the maps and country profiles in Figures 1.2 to 1.9 at the end of this chapter.)

Through detailed case studies, we learn what is distinctive about the many peoples of the world, and get a chance to begin to see the world from a perspective other than our own. We can begin doing comparative analysis by thinking about what makes the people of the world alike and what makes us different. We should ask ourselves how and why such differences exist, and consider the various constraints under which we all operate. We study comparative politics not only to understand the way other people view the world, but also to make better sense of our own understanding of it. We have much to learn from how similar problems are approached by different groups of people. To do this we must consider the variety of factors that serve as context, to get a better idea of why things happen and why events unfold as they do.¹⁶ The better we get at this, the better idea we will have of what to expect in the future. And we will get a better sense of what works and what doesn't work so well—in the cases under examination, but also in other countries. You may be tempted to compare the cases under review with the situation in your country. And that's to be encouraged, since the study of how others approach problems may offer us ideas on how to improve our own lives.

Comparativists argue that drawing from the experience of others is really the only way to understand our own systems. Seeing beyond the experience of developed countries and what is immediately familiar to us expands our minds, allows us to see the wider range of alternatives, and offers new insights into the challenges we face at the local, national, and international levels.

The greatest insight, however, comes with the inclusion of a larger circle of voices—beyond those of the leaders and policymakers. Although you will certainly hear the arguments of leaders in the chapters that follow, you will also hear the voices of those who are not often represented in texts such as this. You will hear stories of domination and the struggle against it. You will hear not only how people have been oppressed, but also how they have liberated themselves.¹⁷ Throughout the following chapters, we have worked to include the standpoints and perspectives of the ostensibly “powerless”: the poor, youth, and women. Although these people are often ignored by their governments, including the US government, hearing their voices is a necessity if we are to fully comprehend the complexity of the challenges all of us face. Until these populations are included and encouraged to participate to their fullest potential, development will be distorted and delayed. Throughout this book, in a variety of ways, we will give attention to these groups and their interests within our discussions of history, economics, society, politics, and international relations.

Cross-National Comparison: Recurrent Themes

As mentioned earlier, we believe that any introductory study of the global south should include both the specificity of CASE STUDY as well as the breadth of the cross-national approach. Throughout the chapters that follow, you will find several recurring themes (GLOBALIZATION, human rights, the environment, and disease), which will be approached from a number of angles and will serve as a basis for cross-national comparison. For example, not only is it interesting and important to understand the difference in the experience of AIDS in Zimbabwe as opposed to Iran, it is just as important to understand how religion, poverty, and war may contribute to the spread of the disease. In addition, in trying to understand the challenges of disease in the global south, we should be aware of its impact on development, how ordinary people are attempting to cope with it, and what they (with or without world leaders) are prepared to do to fight it.

In a variety of ways and to varying degrees, globalization, human rights abuse, environmental degradation, the emergence of new and deadly diseases, international migration, and the drug trade are all indicative of a growing world INTERDEPENDENCE. By interdependence we are referring to a relationship of mutual (although not equal) vulnerability and sensitivity that exists between the world’s peoples. This shared dependence has grown out of a rapidly expanding web of interactions that tie us closer together. Most Americans understand that what we do as a nation often affects others—for better or worse. On the other hand, it is more of a stretch to get the average American to understand why we should care and why we need to understand what is happening in the world around us—even in far-off “powerless” countries. However, whether we choose to recognize it or not, it is becoming more and more difficult to escape the fact that our relationship with the world is a reciprocal one. What happens on the other side of the planet, even in seemingly less powerful countries, does affect us—whether we like it or not.

Figure 1.1 Global Village of 1,000 People

Imagine that the world is a village of 1,000 people. Who are its inhabitants?

600 Asians
150 Africans
110 Europeans
90 Latin Americans and residents from across the Caribbean
50 North Americans

Within this population, a total of 67 have earned a college degree.

The people of the village have considerable difficulty in communicating:

120 speak Mandarin Chinese
50 speak Spanish
50 speak English
30 speak Arabic
30 speak Hindi
30 speak Bengali
30 speak Portuguese
20 speak Russian
20 speak Japanese
620 speak other languages

Within this village, 860 are able to read and write (88 percent of males and 79 percent of females); 140 are considered illiterate; 220 own or share a computer; and 750 are cell phone users.

In this village of 1,000 there are

330 Christians
220 Muslims
140 Hindus
70 Buddhists
120 who do not believe in other religions
120 who are not religious or do not identify themselves as being aligned with a particular faith.

One-third of these 1,000 people in the world village are children, and only 80 are over the age of sixty-five. Half of the children are undernourished. Just under half of the married women in the vil-

lage have access to and use modern contraceptives. This year 28 babies will be born; 10 people will die, 3 of them from lack of food, 1 from cancer, and 2 of the deaths are of babies born within the year. With the 28 births and 10 deaths, the population of the village next year will be 1,018.

In this 1,000-person community, 200 people receive 75 percent of the income; another 200 receive only 2 percent of the income. Only 70 people own an automobile (although some of the 70 own more than one automobile). Of these 1,000 people, 870 have access to safe drinking water, 650 have access to improved sanitation (160 have no access to toilets), and 780 have access to electricity.

The village has 6 acres of land per person:

700 acres are cropland
1,400 acres are pasture
1,900 acres are woodland
2,000 acres are desert, tundra, pavement, and wasteland

Of this land, the woodland is declining rapidly; the wasteland is increasing. The other land categories are roughly stable. The village allocates 83 percent of its fertilizer to 40 percent of its cropland—which is owned by the richest and best-fed 270 people. Excess fertilizer running off this land causes pollution in lakes and wells. The remaining 60 percent of the land, with its 17 percent of the fertilizer, produces 28 percent of the food grains and feeds 73 percent of the people. The average grain yield of that land is one-third the harvest achieved by the richer villagers.

In this village of 1,000 people there are

5 soldiers
7 teachers
1 doctor
4 refugees driven from their homes by war or drought

Sources: Adapted from Donella H. Meadows, "If the World Were a Village of One Thousand People," <https://populationpress.org>, 2014; "100 People: A World Portrait," <http://100people.org>; and North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, "If the World Were a Village of One Thousand People," <http://nscentre.org>.

Globalization

The end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity that has resulted not only in some dramatic political changes, but also in a closer INTEGRATION of the world's economies than ever before. As a result, the world is becoming increasingly interconnected by a single, global economy. This transformative process is commonly described as globalization, and it is supported and driven by the full force of capitalism, seemingly unimpeded until now because of the absence of virtually any competing economic ideology. The world has experienced periods of corporate globalization before (the last was associated with European imperialism). What is unique about the current cycle is the unprecedented speed with which globalization has torn down barriers to trade. It has also increased mobility, or cross-border flows of not only trade, but also capital, technology, information—and people. As it has before, technology has driven this wave. The Internet is as symbolic of this era as the Berlin Wall was of the Cold War. Because of their mobility and global reach, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNCs) have been key actors (but hardly the only actors) in this globalization. This is a process that has rapidly unfolded and has been under no one's control. In fact, even some of its advocates have maintained that globalization may be out of control.¹⁸

For those who embrace globalization, its dynamism and power are part of its appeal. They consider globalization to be a largely benevolent process. They see it as the surest route to development and prosperity—it is even credited with sowing the seeds of DEMOCRACY worldwide. Because of globalization, no corner of the world remains isolated; new values are being spread that challenge traditional belief systems such as fatalism, elitism, and AUTHORITARIANISM. Poverty is alleviated as trade is increased and jobs are created; as the lines of communication are opened, we learn from and begin to accept one another. Ideally, globalization will help to make us more aware of our common interests, our mutual dependence. Among other things, it has brought people together to form the basis of the international environmental movement; it has enhanced scientific cooperation and raised human rights as a universal concern (which some refer to as “moral globalization” or the “globalization of dissent”).¹⁹

According to its admirers, globalization is spilling over into a variety of areas, creating a “world village” based in cultural and political globalization. As it works to overcome the barriers between us, globalization enhances interdependence. It tightens the web of interrelationships that link the world's peoples. Social media no doubt facilitated the wave of protests, widely known as the Arab Spring, that swept much of North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. Thanks to globalization, this deepening interdependence is fostering a sense of community and sharing over the IDENTITY politics that once divided us by religion, ethnicity, language, and so on. (Although interestingly, some analysts who generally favor globalization argue that being wired for a free flow of information can actually produce hostility and anger. Much of this “shared” information promotes stereotyping and reinforces divisions.)²⁰

Some analysts go even so far as to suggest that we are moving toward a “post-cultural” world, increasingly blurring the boundaries marking where one culture ends and another begins. They contend that globalization is not promoting homogenization and that it is not the same thing as Westernization; rather, globalization is promoting eclecticism and advancing our recognition of the world's diversity. So-called traditional cultures aren't so traditional. None of the world's cultures have developed in a

vacuum, unaffected by outside forces. Even those concerned about globalization's impact acknowledge that cultures aren't static. They are always changing—globalization is just hurrying the process along.²¹

In this sense, perhaps it can be said that globalization is producing a more homogeneous world. Then again, antiglobalists maintain that a more homogeneous world means cultural devastation for many. Globalization is a cultural bulldozer. Already the dollar has become the de facto global currency, and English has become the de facto global language. One of the most visible signs of this is the spread of Western consumer culture. While this is something proglobalists generally celebrate, critics despise it as “coca-colonization.”²²

Critics argue that globalization isn't so much about interdependence as it is about furthering dependence. Dependence is a form of international interdependence—except that dependence is marked by an extreme power imbalance. On the left, antiglobalists point out that economic globalization is capitalist globalization, which means that corporations and the rich are being privileged over other social actors. The result isn't anything new. Poverty, the exploitation of the underdog, the erosion of labor and environmental standards, and the abuse of human rights all predate globalization. The difference is that globalization has accelerated and intensified these trends. Antiglobalists on the right embrace capitalism but condemn globalization for the harms they attribute to free trade, multiculturalism, and the loss of sovereignty. For them, globalization has contributed to bad trade deals that have exported jobs to “other” countries. Protectionist measures, even if they devolve into trade wars, are the solution.

Globalization's critics on the right and left condemn it for contributing to income inequality. And even the proponents of globalization acknowledge that it does create winners and losers; globalization brings profits but also problems. They also recognize that globalization is not a uniform process, and that its effects are more evident in some places than in others. Certainly, aspects of globalization such as deregulation or disappearing trade barriers are more obvious in some places than in others (e.g., the creation of trading blocs within Europe and North America). Thus far, globalization is uneven: it appears to have hardly touched the most economically underdeveloped countries in the world, such as those in the Sahel.²³ Yet this is increasingly the exception, and the rapid economic, sociocultural, and political change associated with globalization is the rule worldwide.

Its boosters argue that for better or worse, globalization is inexorable and inevitable; the integration of the world's peoples has gone so far that we can never go back. However, history shows us that even this massive force could be reversed by international events. NATIONALISM and economic downturns have in the past contributed to the end of previous cycles of globalization.²⁴

Human Rights

The idea that humans share certain natural, universal, and inherent rights—simply because they are human—dates at least as far back as John Locke's *Two Treatises of Civil Government* (1690). The view that abusers should be held accountable for their wrongs, or that others should interfere with how a government treats its own citizens, has more recent origins. It was not until the systematic murder of millions under Adolf Hitler's Third Reich that the world became willing to challenge two domi-

nant principles of international relations: NONINTERVENTION, or the legal obligation to refrain from involvement in the internal affairs of other states, and sovereignty, the widely shared belief that states are the principal actors in international relations and as such are subject to no higher political authority.²⁵

However, the Holocaust served as a catalyst to the development of what is now recognized as an international human rights movement. The Holocaust ostensibly taught us that in some cases the world must intervene against abusers and that state sovereignty must not always be held as sacrosanct. How a government treats its own people does affect the rest of us—and it is being increasingly recognized across the POLITICAL SPECTRUM that the persistent denial of human rights around the world must be reconceptualized as a security issue. If nothing else, respect for human rights is widely recognized as essential to international peace and stability. At least in theory, the international community accepts that it has a moral mandate to prevent the kinds of abuses associated with the genocide in Europe.

Over the first five decades following the Holocaust, the world community set out to develop a variety of international norms to promote human rights and to institutionalize safeguards against the recurrence of atrocities. Prominent in this effort was the creation of the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (UDHR) in 1948, which is widely recognized as the most authoritative and comprehensive of all international statements on human rights. Composed of thirty articles addressing a broad range of issues, the UDHR is accepted as setting the standards to which all states should aspire. The UDHR includes attention to what are sometimes known as “first-generation” or “blue” rights: civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from torture or cruel and unusual punishment, the right to DUE PROCESS, the right to SELF-DETERMINATION, and so on. These rights are based on the assumption that the individual should be protected against state actions that are unusual, arbitrary, or excessive. As long as the right to challenge the government’s misuse of authority is permitted, other rights (such as freedom from torture) will be safeguarded. First-generation rights are considered by many people to be key to the enjoyment of all other rights. Yet the UDHR also recognizes the importance of “second-generation” or “red” rights: economic, social, and cultural rights, such as access to food, shelter, work, education, and healthcare. This conception of human rights, sometimes known as the “human-needs” approach, considers the aspects of existence necessary to secure the basic development of the person as primary. Proponents of second-generation rights maintain that a government’s denial of basic needs is as much a violation of human rights as torture of dissidents.²⁶

Although the governments of virtually every country in the world use the language of human rights and claim to believe in the inherent dignity of human beings, for many years the world has been divided over how most appropriately to define human rights. The governments of most developed countries, especially the United States, have traditionally argued that political and civil rights should be prioritized. They contend that these rights, which place an emphasis on liberty, should come first, because the enjoyment of such freedoms will enable the individual to ensure for him- or herself the provision of subsistence or red rights. Yet who cares about freedom of expression and the other blue rights when one’s children are dying of hunger? As the former president of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, put it, “Human rights begin

with breakfast.” He and others argue that those who seek to exclude red rights have it all wrong, since until people’s basic rights, or certain minimal physical needs, are met, there can be no development—let alone enjoyment—of more ambitious rights, such as liberties. (Others point out that for low-income countries, government guarantees of food and housing are actually much more ambitious than the relatively “cost-free” guarantees of freedoms, such as expression and assembly. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen maintains that the right to freedom of speech is a precondition for all other rights, since famine, torture, and other abuses rarely occur in countries with democratic governments and a relatively free press.)²⁷

The UDHR, whose drafters included Westerners and non-Westerners, attempts to get around this debate by proclaiming that human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, and that all are necessary for the full realization of human potential. Not everyone agrees. According to the proponents of CULTURAL RELATIVISM, including those who support the “Asian values” argument, human rights (or moral claims) should be defined as the product of a particular society’s cultural and historical experience. Therefore, according to the cultural relativists, the proponents of UNIVERSALISM are imposing their conception of human rights on others. For cultural relativists, political and civil rights are based in Western Enlightenment values, which have little appeal or relevance in Confucian cultures, wherein higher value is placed on order and discipline. Blue rights also uphold the rights of the individual over those of the community. This idea is unacceptable in many non-Western cultures, which often hold that the rights of the individual should be subordinated to those of the group, since the individual has no meaning apart from the community to which he or she belongs.²⁸

Critics of the “Asian values” argument point to the complexity not only of Confucianism, which is not as conservative as many think, but also of Asian cultures themselves, of which there are a great variety and diversity. Asian cultures draw from many different influences, including Buddhism, which emphasizes individual freedoms and tolerance. Millions of non-Westerners, led by people such as Aung San Suu Kyi and Shirin Ebadi, reject arguments that political and civil rights or freedoms (such as freedom from torture) are uniquely Western. Many non-Western traditions view the individual and community as inseparable, and the relationship between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community as one of mutual obligation. While group rights can be used to restrict individuals, they can also exist to protect individual rights.²⁹

As you might imagine, this and other debates over how best to define human rights have hamstrung international efforts to promote such rights. However, there is new momentum behind the human rights movement. Just as the Holocaust once spurred a concern with human rights, perhaps it was the specter of ethnic cleansing, its mass killing and systematic rapes, and the “too little, too late” responses in Bosnia and Rwanda, that have propelled this renewed interest. Once again, the human rights movement is developing—and not only toward finding other ways of holding accountable those responsible for such atrocities. The challenges associated with globalization have led to calls for expanding and refining the scope of human rights and including a third generation of “new” human rights. Debate has begun over whether other important values, such as rights to peace, development, and a safe and healthy environment (or “green” rights), qualify as human rights. Are rights to clean drink-

ing water and to live in safety legally enforceable claims, or merely “wishes”? The third generation of rights remains the subject of heated debate. Yet even for the older generations of rights, there remain enormous differences among the governments of the world over how to define human rights, how and when human rights law should apply, and what priority should be given to different categories of rights. While this highly politicized debate continues, it is increasingly common for analysts to return to the argument that is at the core of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: that the distinction between human rights and human needs is an artificial one. Rather, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights are best understood as part of a “seamless web”—indivisible and interdependent.³⁰ In other words, all the rights discussed here are important because it is difficult to fully enjoy one category of rights without the security offered by the others.

The Environment

Along with globalization and human rights, the health of the planet is another issue of interdependence (and also one that is arguably everyone’s business). Environmental issues will turn up in nearly all of the following chapters because the growing body of scientific evidence is becoming more difficult to refute. Development as it is currently being pursued, in both developed and less developed countries, is contributing to a morass of environmental problems that transcend national borders and whose management will require global cooperation. Climate change, rising sea levels, deforestation, desertification, loss of biodiversity, depletion of fisheries and destruction of coral reefs, toxic dumping, water shortages—these are just a few of the problems that will require international solutions.

Take, for example, the issue of deforestation. Even though the rate of global deforestation has slowed since the 1990s, it remains high, with a net loss of approximately 13 million hectares (an area about the size of Costa Rica) lost each year.³¹ Put another way, the world has lost the equivalent of 1,000 football fields of forest per hour for the past twenty-five years.³² However, thanks to local and international efforts, the rate of deforestation has actually decreased (from 16 million hectares destroyed annually in the 1990s). Indonesia and Brazil (which had the highest rates of loss a few years ago) have made particularly impressive efforts to slow the destruction of their forests. But deforestation is still a problem and it is most extensive in South America and Africa, where forests are hot spots for biodiversity (they contain hundreds of species within a single hectare, whereas the average hectare of forest typically contains a handful of species). With a loss of 70 percent of the natural cover protecting them in the past several decades, many of these species have become endangered or extinct. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), species are becoming extinct at the fastest rate known in geological history, and this is directly tied to human activities.³³

Related to deforestation and of similar cataclysmic impact is the threat posed by climate change. According to former UN SECRETARY-GENERAL Ban Ki-moon, it is the major, overriding environmental issue of our time, a growing crisis that will have economic repercussions but also consequences for human health, safety, food production, and security.³⁴ Others, such as Bill and Melinda Gates, question whether the relative progress we’ve achieved in recent decades could all be stifled by climate change.³⁵ Of central concern is the GREENHOUSE EFFECT, which is produced by the emission of what

have come to be known as greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide released by the burning of fossil fuels, as well as naturally occurring methane and nitrogen. Industrialization and economic GROWTH fueled by hydrocarbon-based energy systems (coal, oil, and natural gas) have contributed to the release of these gases, which have reached record highs. These greenhouse gases collect in the upper atmosphere, covering the planet in a blanket of sorts. Incoming heat from the sun penetrates this blanket but is then trapped by it. The effect is likened to a greenhouse, which traps heat indoors. In this sense, the growth of economies based on the consumption of fossil fuels has contributed substantially to global warming over the past fifty years.

While some scientists and politicians argue that global warming is not a human-made event, but naturally occurring and inevitable—part of a long cycle of alternating ice ages and periods of extreme heat—this is the minority view. The majority of the world's scientists agree that we are experiencing a global warming; the main issue under debate is how severe it will be—and how soon it will come. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Nobel Peace Prize-winning group of more than 2,000 scientists from a hundred countries, claims to have amassed convincing evidence that climate change is already happening. The first years of the twenty-first century have been the hottest since records have been kept, and concentrations of greenhouse gases have reached unprecedented levels. The planet has warmed by 1.7 degrees Celsius between 1880 (when records were first kept) and 2015, and the heat is accumulating.³⁶ According to these scientists, there is overwhelming evidence that Earth's climate is undergoing dramatic transformation because of human activities. They call this "anthropogenic warming" and warn that it may continue for decades even if human-made emissions can be curbed.³⁷ If fossil fuel combustion continues even at twentieth-century levels, virtually every natural system and human economy will be at risk. Higher temperatures will mean rising seas from melting glaciers and ice sheets, more frequent and severe storms, and more intense droughts. These changes will alter every ecosystem on the planet, as pests and diseases will spread to areas where they were previously unknown. There is alarming evidence that we may have reached or surpassed tipping points that could lead to irreversible changes in major ecosystems. Nowhere have scientists observed greater immediate impacts of global warming than the Arctic Ocean, where temperatures have risen as high as 20 degrees Celsius above average, and sea ice has declined 28.5 percent below average—the lowest levels since records were first kept in 1979. No one knows the impact these changes may bring—due to the heat, dramatically higher levels of algae are being produced, impacting the food chain of the region (and beyond).³⁸ Climate change is exacerbating the misery of already poor areas, creating a vicious cycle in which poverty and environmental degradation co-exist and accelerate through globalization.³⁹

In a variety of ways, the globalization of the past few decades is just hastening processes that were already well under way. However, because of its speed, globalization is putting unprecedented pressure on the planet's capacities. Displaced rural populations are migrating into cities in search of livelihood, or into forests in search of new resources. This only contributes to the greenhouse effect, not just because the burning of forests releases more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, but also because the loss of these forests means the loss of "pollution sponges," since forests absorb carbon dioxide and slow global warming. As low-income countries embrace

the developed-country model, pursuing growth at any cost, they will add to these problems. However, as it currently stands, the 20 percent of the world's population living in developed countries consumes 80 percent of the world's resources. In 2006 China surpassed the United States as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (producing 22 percent of the world's total), but the United States is close behind, producing just under 20 percent of the emissions associated with global warming (India and Russia each contribute about 5 percent).⁴⁰ It is less developed countries (those who contribute the lowest levels of carbon dioxide and other gases) that are likely to feel the most severe impact of environmental devastation. Not only are they more vulnerable to many of its effects, but these low- and middle-income countries also are likely to lack access to the technologies that might ameliorate its impact. Over the past few years, a number of creative solutions based on cooperative efforts have been proposed for dealing with the environmental problems that we share. Unfortunately, finger-pointing and recriminations between advanced and emerging economies, and efforts by each to shift the burden of responsibility to the other, suggest that the international leadership (and funding) so desperately needed to address these problems will remain sorely lacking. Even progress achieved with the Paris agreement of 2015, as we discuss in Chapter 17, seems as though it may now be in peril, although the world community is likely closer to a consensus and shared responsibility than perhaps ever before.

Disease and Public Health

Just as environmental degradation is taking an increasing toll on all of us, so is disease. Yet again, it will be the poorest who are hit hardest and have the least capacity to cope with the challenge. Not only is there an income gap between developed and less developed countries, but there is also a health gap. A variety of threats come together to explain why mortality rates remain higher in low-income countries and why life expectancy is still relatively short in so many of them, even if we can note some progress in recent years: undernutrition, infectious diseases, and chronic debilitating diseases—are all associated with poverty. For example, the global mortality rate plummeted by 28 percent between 1990 and 2015, in large part because of efforts to increase maternal and newborn health, as well as to prevent and treat infectious diseases. Between 2005 and 2015, deaths attributed to malaria declined by 40 percent, and maternal mortality declined globally by 30 percent.⁴¹ The challenge, though, is in maintaining these hard-won advances, especially in areas of deep insecurity. Observers note that public health is impacted by factors far beyond the purview of healthcare systems: war, natural disasters, economic downturns, influx of migrants—each can have a dramatic impact on the quality of life and the ability to manage disease in a given environment.⁴²

It is well known that cardiovascular diseases are the biggest killers of adults worldwide, yet infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS, kill millions every year. HIV is a leading cause of death for women of reproductive age in low- and middle-income countries. The good news is that after four decades of fighting HIV/AIDS, it appears that the epidemic peaked in 1999 and the world has since begun to halt and reverse its spread. Between 2000 and 2015, new HIV infections fell by 35 percent; it is estimated that nearly 8 million lives were saved by awareness campaigns and international efforts to mitigate the impact of the disease.⁴³

Of those needing treatment, more people than ever, 18 million, are receiving the medicines that can dramatically prolong and improve quality of life. And it is now possible to virtually eliminate mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS. In many ways, our global investment in prevention and treatment is working. However, approximately 37 million people worldwide are living with HIV/AIDS, and a significant portion of them, 19 million, or close to 40 percent, don't know their status or are denied access to these medicines because of their cost. In 2009, for the first time, global funding for programs to treat and prevent HIV/AIDS flattened. It continued to decline, by 13 percent, between 2014 and 2015. If this trend continues and money dries up, clinics will close, people who need testing and treatment will be turned away, and the fragile progress that the world has made in dealing with this disease will be undermined.⁴⁴

HIV/AIDS is by no means a problem unique to the global south, and the challenges associated with it vary by region. However, most people living with HIV/AIDS reside in lower-income countries (sub-Saharan Africa accounts for most of the global total of new HIV infections, though it is important to note that some regions of Africa, such as western Africa in general, are not as seriously affected as others, such as southern and eastern Africa).⁴⁵ Each country and region has its own particular mix of circumstances reflected by patterns of transmission. As we will see in Chapter 6, poverty is a major factor contributing to the spread of the disease.

The global health community faces increasingly complex tasks, as health challenges are compounded by environmental, political, and other weaknesses within the system. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that nearly one in four global deaths today is attributed to air, water, and soil pollution, or to effects from climate change.⁴⁶ As you might expect, environmental risks take an especially harsh toll on young children and older people. Additionally, low- and middle-income countries in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific face an increased rate of deaths attributable to indoor and outdoor air pollution.⁴⁷ WHO data indicate that 92 percent of the world's population lives in places where air pollution exceeds recommended limits; the regions with the highest air pollution are Southeast Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific.⁴⁸ Concern is so great that the UN has declared air pollution a public health emergency with "untold effects on future generations." The UN estimates that 3.3 million people around the world die prematurely due to the effects of air pollution every year—mostly in China, India, and Pakistan.⁴⁹

Much of the challenge before us is in preparing to deal with the unknown: when Ebola burst onto the scene in 2014, there were very few scientists who were actively conducting research on responses to the hemorrhagic fever (even though the first case had been diagnosed in 1976). The WHO was slow in its response (waiting nearly eight months after it was clear the disease was resurfacing in large numbers before declaring a public health emergency).⁵⁰ The spread of this and other communicable diseases stresses already strained local (and international) systems. This stress extends to the medicines with which we treat such diseases: antibiotic resistance, which according to the UN is responsible for 700,000 deaths each year, is making some diseases untreatable. If this trend continues, such resistance will challenge human health, development, and even security, demanding a coordinated response across the medical, pharmaceutical, manufacturing, and even agricultural communities—especially in densely populated areas where livestock and humans have very close interaction.

The risk is that diseases with known remedies, such as the sexually transmitted disease gonorrhea, are increasingly unresponsive to traditional treatments.⁵¹ As we sit on the cusp of the possible formal eradication of polio (as this book goes to press, Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only two countries reporting naturally occurring polio),⁵² such a slide is indeed a haunting possibility.

Conclusion: It Depends on Whom You Ask

Let's put it flatly: there will be no simple answers to many of the questions we have raised here or will raise throughout the chapters that follow. The best we can do is to present you with a wide range of thinking and alternative perspectives on many of the challenges faced to some degree by all of us—but most directly by people living in low- and low-middle-income countries. In this book we will be looking at a series of issues of interdependence, such as the drug trade, migration, and arms transfers, from a number of angles. Before you make up your mind about any of the contending theories we present here, we ask that you judge each on its merits. We firmly believe that reflecting on another's point of view and considering more than one side of any story is the only way to begin to understand the complex social phenomena we now set out to discuss.

Linking Concepts and Cases

The information in this section is provided as a primer for the case studies we will be discussing throughout the rest of the book. Figures 1.2 through 1.9 should serve as a point of reference as you read about the histories, economies, and politics of the eight case studies introduced here. Throughout the book, we will return to the same countries, applying the ideas introduced in the conceptual chapters to the reality of their experiences.

Now It's Your Turn

From a simple examination of the statistical information that follows, what would you expect to be the key issue, or the most pressing problem, each country faces? What can a sketch such as this tell you about life in each of these eight countries? Which ones appear most similar, and in what ways? What are some of the most striking differences between these countries? What other information not included here do you consider deserving of attention? Why?

Notes

1. Henry Louis Gates, "'Authenticity' or the Lesson of Little Tree," *New York Times Review of Books*, November 24, 1991, p. 30.

2. For some examples of the lively terminological debate, see the special 25th anniversary issue of the *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004); the special issue of *The Global South* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2011); Marc Silver, "If You Shouldn't Call It the Third World, What Should You Call It?," National Public Radio, *Goats and Soda*, January 14, 2015, www.npr.org; Dayo Olopade, "The End of the 'Developing World,'" *New York Times*, February 28, 2014.

3. Alfred Sauvy, "Three Worlds, One Planet," *L'Observateur*, August 14, 1952.


Figure 1.2 Mexico: Profile and Map



Formal name:	United Mexican States
Area, km ² :	1.97 million
Comparative area:	Slightly less than three times the size of Texas
Capital:	Mexico City
Establishment of present state:	September 18, 1810
Population:	123 million (2016)
Age under 15 years:	27%
Population growth rate:	1.2%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	2.3
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	12
Life expectancy:	76
HIV prevalence (adult):	0.2%
Ethnic groups:	Mestizo 62%, predominantly Amerindian 21%, Amerindian 7%, other 10%
Literacy rate:	95%
Religions:	Roman Catholic 83%, Protestant 8%, other 9%
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$17,500
GDP growth rate:	2.5%
Labor, major sectors:	Services 62%, industrial 23%, agriculture 13%
Population in poverty:	52%
Unemployment rate:	4.4% (with extensive underemployment)
Export commodities:	Manufactured goods, oil and oil products, silver, fruits, vegetables, coffee, cotton
External debt:	\$441.6 billion

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), World Factbook 2016.


Figure 1.3 Peru: Profile and Map



Formal name:	Republic of Peru
Area, km ² :	1.28 million
Comparative area:	Almost twice the size of Texas; slightly smaller than Alaska
Capital:	Lima
Establishment of present state:	July 28, 1821
Population:	31 million (2016)
Age under 15 years:	27%
Population growth rate:	1%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	2.2
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	19
Life expectancy:	74
HIV prevalence (adult):	0.3%
Ethnic groups:	Amerindian 45%, mestizo 37%, white 15%, other 3%
Literacy rate:	95%
Religions:	Roman Catholic 81%, Evangelical 12.5%, other 3.3%, none 2.9% (2007)
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$12,200
GDP growth rate:	3.3%
Labor, major sectors:	Services 57%, agricultural 26%, industrial 17% (2011)
Population in poverty:	26%
Unemployment rate:	5.2% (data for metropolitan Lima; with extensive underemployment)
Export commodities:	Copper, zinc, gold, crude petroleum, petroleum products
External debt:	\$68 billion

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2016.


Figure 1.4 Nigeria: Profile and Map



Formal name:	Federal Republic of Nigeria
Area, km ² :	923,768
Comparative area:	About six times the size of Georgia; slightly more than twice the size of California
Capital:	Abuja
Establishment of present state:	October 1, 1960
Population:	186 million
Age under 15 years:	43%
Population growth rate:	2.4%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	5.1
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	71
Life expectancy:	53
HIV prevalence (adult):	3.2% (2014)
Ethnic groups:	(More than 250 groups) Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Ibo 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%
Literacy rate:	60%
Religions:	Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$6,100
GDP growth rate:	2.7%
Labor, major sectors:	Agriculture 70%, services 20%, industrial 10% (1999)
Population in poverty:	70%
Unemployment rate:	24% (2011)
Export commodities:	Petroleum and petroleum products, cocoa, rubber
External debt:	\$32 billion

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2016.


Figure 1.5 Zimbabwe: Profile and Map



Formal name:	Republic of Zimbabwe
Area, km ² :	390,757
Comparative area:	Slightly larger than Montana
Capital:	Harare
Establishment of present state:	April 18, 1980
Population:	15 million
Age under 15 years:	38%
Population growth rate:	2.2%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	4
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	26
Life expectancy:	58
HIV prevalence (adult):	15%
Ethnic groups:	African 99.4% (Shona and Ndebele), other 0.4%, unspecified 0.2%
Literacy rate:	87%
Religions:	Protestant 76%, Roman Catholic 8%, other Christian 8%, other 7%
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$2,100
GDP growth rate:	1.5%
Labor, major sectors:	Agriculture 66%, services 24%, industrial 10% (1996)
Population in poverty:	72% (2012)
Unemployment rate:	95% (2009)
Export commodities:	Platinum, cotton, tobacco, gold, ferroalloys, textiles/clothing
External debt:	\$11 billion

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2016.

Figure 1.6 Egypt: Profile and Map



Formal name:	Arab Republic of Egypt
Area, km ² :	1 million
Comparative area:	More than eight times the size of Ohio; slightly more than three times the size of New Mexico
Capital:	Cairo
Establishment of present state:	July 23, 1952
Population:	95 million
Age under 15 years:	33%
Population growth rate:	2.5%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	3.5
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	20
Life expectancy:	73
HIV prevalence (adult):	0.02%
Ethnic groups:	Egyptian 99.6%, other 0.4% (2006)
Literacy rate:	74%
Religions:	Muslim 90%, Christian 10%
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$11,800
GDP growth rate:	4.2%
Labor, major sectors:	Services 47%, agriculture 29%, industrial 24%
Population in poverty:	25%
Unemployment rate:	12.8%
Export commodities:	Crude oil and petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton, textiles, metal products, chemicals, processed food
External debt:	\$45 billion

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2016.


Figure 1.7 Iran: Profile and Map



Formal name:	Islamic Republic of Iran
Area, km ² :	1.65 million
Comparative area:	Almost 2.5 times the size of Texas; slightly smaller than Alaska
Capital:	Tehran
Establishment of present state:	April 1, 1979
Population:	83 million
Age under 15 years:	24%
Population growth rate:	1.2%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	1.8
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	37
Life expectancy:	71
HIV prevalence (adult):	0.1%
Ethnic groups:	Persian, Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch, Arab, Turkmen and Turkic tribes
Literacy rate:	87%
Religions:	Shia Muslim 90–95%, Sunni Muslim 5–10%, other 0.3%, unspecified 0.4%
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$17,300
GDP growth rate:	0%
Labor, major sectors:	Services 49%, industrial 35%, agriculture 16% (2013)
Population in poverty:	19% (2007)
Unemployment rate:	10.5%
Export commodities:	Petroleum, chemical and petrochemical products, fruits and nuts, carpets, cement, ore
External debt:	\$5 billion

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2016.


Figure 1.8 China: Profile and Map



Formal name:	People's Republic of China
Area, km ² :	9.60 million
Comparative area:	Slightly smaller than the United States
Capital:	Beijing
Establishment of present state:	October 1, 1949
Population:	1.37 billion
Age under 15 years:	17%
Population growth rate:	0.43%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	1.6
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	12.2
Life expectancy:	76
HIV prevalence (adult):	0.1% (2012)
Ethnic groups:	Han 92%, Zhuang 1%, other (including Hui, Manchu, Uighur, Miao, Yi, Tibetan, Mongol, Dong, Buyei, Yao, Bai) 7%
Literacy rate:	96%
Religions:	(Officially atheist), Buddhist 18%, Christian 5%, Muslim 2%, folk religion 22%, other 1%, unaffiliated 52%
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$14,100
GDP growth rate:	6.9%
Labor, major sectors:	Services 36%, agriculture 34%, industrial 30% (2012)
Population in poverty:	6.1% (2013)
Unemployment rate:	4% (urban; substantial in rural areas)
Export commodities:	Electrical and other machinery, including data processing equipment, apparel, furniture, textiles, integrated circuits
External debt:	\$958 billion

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2016.

Figure 1.9 Indonesia: Profile and Map



Formal name:	Republic of Indonesia
Area, km ² :	1.9 million
Comparative area:	Slightly less than three times the size of Texas
Capital:	Jakarta
Establishment of present state:	August 17, 1945
Population:	258 million
Age under 15 years:	25%
Population growth rate:	0.9%
Fertility rate (children per woman):	2.1
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births):	24
Life expectancy:	73
HIV prevalence (adult):	0.5%
Ethnic groups:	Javanese 40%, Sundanese 16%, Malay 4%, Batak 4%, Madurese 3%, Betawi 3%, Minangkabau 3%, Buginese 3%, Bantenese 2%, Banjarese 2%, Balinese 2%, Acehnese 1%, Dayak 1%, Sasak 1%, Chinese 1%, other 15% (2010)
Literacy rate:	94%
Religions:	Muslim 87%, Christian 7%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, other 1%
GDP per capita (PPP):	\$11,100
GDP growth rate:	4.8%
Labor, major sectors:	Services 48%, agriculture 39%, industrial 13% (2012)
Population in poverty:	11% (2014)
Unemployment rate:	6%
Export commodities:	Mineral fuels, boilers, machinery and mechanical parts, electric machinery, iron and steel, foodstuffs
External debt:	\$316 billion

Source: CIA, World Factbook 2016.

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