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Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping: International Cooperation at Work

Hiraku Yamashita

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
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1

What Is Global Peacekeeping Cooperation?

This book is an inquiry into the evolution of global peacekeeping cooperation. It asks what motivations drive such cooperation, what concrete forms it has taken, and what it means for the international community, especially its collective management of global instabilities and security challenges (i.e., global security governance).

Peacekeeping, of course, has been global from its inception, and has always been about international cooperation. Peacekeeping as we know it owes its origin and development mostly to the United Nations, an international organization whose membership covers most of the globe.[1] Indeed, since its first deployment as the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the wake of the first Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, UN peacekeeping operations have been multinational and authorized by one of the UN's two principal organs: either the Security Council or, in a few early cases, the General Assembly.

Global peacekeeping cooperation refers to a more specific development taking place in recent years: the emergence of new peacekeeping organizers and initiatives that create an increasingly active and dense web of cooperative relationships among contributing states and international and regional organizations. This development is premised on the phenomenon of institutional proliferation: several regional organizations and global policy frameworks started taking their own peacekeeping roles. Historically, peacekeeping has been the responsibility of the United Nations;[2] and yet the UN's long-held monopoly on peacekeeping has now been replaced by a global proliferation of peacekeeping actors.

Examples abound. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a peacekeeping mission in 1990, to Liberia, followed by missions to Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Ivory Coast, while the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed its peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan and Georgia in 1993 and 1994, respectively. The European Union and the African Union (AU) organized their first peacekeeping missions in 2003. The EU deployed police and military peacekeeping missions to Bosnia, FYR Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the same year, followed by a number of military, police, rule of law, and other missions in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. In 2003 the AU organized its first mission in Burundi, followed by missions to Darfur (Sudan), the Comoros, and Somalia. Moreover, subsequent African subregional efforts toward the creation of a regionwide African Standby Force (ASF) are gradually being organized around the division of labor envisaged in the ASF framework. It was also in 2003 that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose peacekeeping engagements had been limited to new states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the multinational forces in Afghanistan. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has also expressed interest in and made institutionalized efforts for deploying its peacekeeping missions.

But it was not only regional organizations that began serious engagement with peacekeeping. Individual states and coalitions of states conducted military missions that served in part as de facto peacekeeping missions. It is also notable that many such missions worked alongside peacekeeping missions organized by the UN or by regional organizations. Furthermore, several diplomatic initiatives have emerged that aim to facilitate policy consultations among peacekeeping contributors, generate wider consensus on key operational and doctrinal challenges, and encourage efforts by individual states. Most notable in this regard is the Group of Eight (G8), which began global peacekeeping capacity building in 2000, launching a capacity-building clearinghouse that held together mid-level to senior officials from donor and recipient states and organizations; it also enabled several G8 members to launch their own capacity-building programs. On policy and doctrinal debates the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (Challenges Forum), funded by several governments, has also served as a dialogue platform since 2006.

The emergence of new peacekeeping actors within a relatively short span of time is striking. Moreover, through these activities they interact with each other on multiple levels. For instance, the UN has worked with the AU to authorize and command their hybrid mission in Darfur and the mission thus created, the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), has also been supported by NATO's airlifts of African peacekeepers. In the DRC, two EU missions played crucial stabilizing roles for the larger but less militarily capable UN missions. The UN, the EU, and active individual states such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have launched programs to build the peacekeeping capacity of developing nations, especially in Africa. These activities inform and are informed by the G8 and other consultative frameworks. Collectively, these efforts have greatly intensified international cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.

How do we make sense of all this? There are three questions that may be useful in examining global peacekeeping cooperation. One concerns motivations. Why are peacekeeping states and organizations engaged in such cooperative endeavors? What explains this emerging phenomenon? To understand the drivers for increased peacekeeping cooperation one needs to examine the roles of peacekeeping and peacekeeping actors within the context of broader changes taking place in today's security environment.

A second question relates to forms of cooperation: How have peacekeeping actors cooperated in practice? I argue that there are three primary patterns of peacekeeping cooperation: joint decisionmaking, operational collaboration, and capacity building. Joint decisionmaking takes place between the appropriate organs of the mission organizers. It usually involves the sharing of command and mission management responsibilities and of funding arrangements. Along with these considerations joint decisionmaking also aims to bolster the legitimacy of the proposed mission internationally and vis-à-vis the host government, whose acceptance and cooperation constitute an essential element of successful peacekeeping. Operational collaboration consists of mission-to-mission collaboration on the ground in a given conflict setting. Arrangements for such collaboration are therefore generally ad hoc and situation specific, and yet some organizations, most notably the AU and the UN, have developed more formal cooperative arrangements. Capacity-building assistance is different from the former two in that it aims to assist the development of peacekeeping capability by newer peacekeeping actors over a longer term. Because of the gap between the enormous demands on peacekeeping on the continent and the still limited capacity of regional organizations, Africa has been the center of the effort.

A third analytical theme revolves around the implications of evolving peacekeeping cooperation for the international community as a whole. There are two dimensions to such implications: global security governance and international cooperation. With regard to the former, global peacekeeping cooperation may be seen as an emerging layer of global security governance. In what ways does this development contribute to our collective management of contemporary conflicts and related security threats and risks? The record of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool is decidedly mixed. While there are several prominent studies that point out the existence of successful peacekeeping missions,[3] analysts tend to draw attention to the fact that peacekeeping is prone to dilemmas, failures, and unintended consequences.[4] A fairer starting point may be to state that peacekeeping is constantly changing in response to these experiences, and, in that context, the development of global peacekeeping cooperation may be seen as a renewed effort to help overcome these difficulties. It is therefore relevant to ask whether increased interstate/interorganizational cooperation in peacekeeping represents an overall improvement in global security governance. The second dimension is related to the first but has a theoretical rather than institutional or policy focus as it considers global peacekeeping cooperation a new manifestation of international cooperation. What do the practices of cooperation in peacekeeping tell us about the nature of international cooperation in general?

What Is Peacekeeping?

Before embarking on answering the three questions outlined above, I want to make clear what is meant by peacekeeping in this book. This is in fact more complex than it seems because the proliferation of peacekeeping actors has steadily widened and diversified the scope of peacekeeping. In the 1990s UN peacekeeping missions were deployed with a growing number of tasks, including security sector reform, mine action, human rights promotion, protection of civilians, and so on. Diversification led to active debates within UN circles concerning the proper classification of the types of peacekeeping (traditional versus modern peacekeeping, and the notion of generations of peacekeeping)[5] and whether the trend toward a greater scope of peacekeeping activities constituted a justifiable or sustainable path for the UN.[6] While these debates have not entirely subsided, subsequent efforts by the UN Secretariat to rearticulate the concept of UN peacekeeping give us a reasonably good sense of what the UN means by *peacekeeping*.[7]

The global proliferation of peacekeeping actors gives the diversification of their activities an entirely new dimension. For example, NATO's ISAF operation was often described as bordering on counterinsurgency, which, in turn, was increasingly indistinguishable from counterterrorism.[8] More broadly, NATO has developed its own conception of peacekeeping, which forms part of the alliance's crisis response operation. The EU, for its part, has introduced new classes of peacekeeping operations in line with a broader vision of its role in regional and international security, which it calls comprehensive crisis management. The AU views peacekeeping "as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it," and stresses that its peace support operation (PSO) is accordingly more robust and less risk averse than the UN operation.[9] As a result, the seemingly simple question of what peacekeeping is has become increasingly ambiguous. Relatedly, an important trend is the proliferation of terms similar to peacekeeping—stabilization, PSO, operation other than war, state building, and nation building, to name but a few—that have been used mainly by non-UN bodies. Even the UN has used "stabilization" for its peacekeeping missions in Haiti, the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali. These terms are intended by some peacekeepers to make their actions separate from peacekeeping, but in some other contexts the terms are used almost interchangeably.

What all this suggests for our purposes is the need for a broad baseline concept of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping cooperation as defined at the outset includes all these peacekeeping endeavors by the UN as well as non-UN bodies; the term *peacekeeping* needs to be framed for this inquiry in such a way that it captures this diversity without undermining the essence of evolving practice. Clearly we need such a definition to consistently select data on operations.

One way to formulate a proper definition is to examine what peacekeeping is *not*. This question may be approached from two directions. On one side peacekeeping is not war fighting; they differ in that peacekeeping, however stretched in its meaning, is still directed toward the overall objective of international management and resolution of conflicts, while war fighting has the primal goal of defeating the enemy. This distinction, however, still raises the question of differences between peacekeeping on the one hand and peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention on the other: NATO's operation in Kosovo (1999), the US operations in Somalia (1992–1993), and the French operation during the Rwandan genocide (1994) are well-known cases that have already been extensively debated. Moreover, there are deployments by multinational and national forces whose activities appear to make them at least partly qualify as peacekeeping missions. Examples include the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements

(MISAB, 1997–1998, CAR), the Italian-led Operation Alba (1997, Albania), Britain's Operation Palliser (2000, Sierra Leone), the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET, 1999–2000), the International Stabilization Force (Operation Astute, 2006–) in Timor-Leste, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI, 2003–), France's Operation Licorne (2002–, Ivory Coast), and the US-led multinational forces in Haiti (1994–1995 and 2004). All these operations have served as international management of the conflict in one way or another (or at least their proponents have so claimed). The UN Security Council authorization to use "all necessary means" under Chapter VII has long ceased to be a criterion that distinguishes enforcement and peacekeeping, as many UN peacekeeping missions are now robust peacekeeping missions with such authorization.[10]

What we need, then, is a more discernible benchmark that reflects the nature of force employed in these operations. Even in cases where peacekeeping forces are resorting to the active use of force, it is not meant to be punitive toward enemies but to stabilize the situation by restoring general law and order, deterring and controlling the spoilers of the peace process, and/or creating conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The use of force by peacekeeping missions, even in a more robust mode, takes place at the tactical rather than the strategic level, and is generally more restrained than conventional military enforcement.[11] Put differently, whereas the logic of collective security as envisaged in the UN Charter hinges on the identification and defeat of states and other actors seen as a threat to the international community, peacekeeping hinges on the assessment and improvement of the overall situation on the ground so that peace can be kept and built in a sustainable manner. The logic of (eventual) inclusion rather than exclusion prevails in peacekeeping, for which reason its effectiveness and ultimate success depends not on force but on political negotiation.[12] Peacekeeping thus aims at nonpunitive (if not necessarily noncoercive) international conflict management. NATO's Kosovo intervention, the allied operation in the Gulf War, and more recently the AU-led multinational operation against the Lord's Resistance Army, the notorious rebel group in Uganda, are most properly described as military enforcement, while the shifting US and nebulous French strategic objectives give dubious credentials to their respective operations in Somalia and Rwanda. Many of the aforementioned multinational and national missions can, in contrast, be seen as peacekeeping in this broadest sense.

At the other end of the scale, there are a variety of small missions. They may conduct political mediation, monitor human rights or elections, or offer training or advice depending on the nature of their mandate. But these missions are characterized by the absence of military and police units within their organizational structures. There are numerous examples, including the UN-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH, 1993–2000), Commonwealth police mission to the Solomon Islands (1999–2000), EU and Commonwealth observer missions to Zimbabwe (2002), and missions organized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. Since 2003 the EU has deployed small missions for a diverse range of tasks (good offices/mediation; monitoring and provision of training; advice and assistance in the fields of border control, rule of law, and security sector reform) in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In Aceh, Indonesia, the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) jointly organized a monitoring mission between September 2005 and December 2006.[13] The AU's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), dispatched a total of eight observer missions to Rwanda (1991–1993), Burundi (1993–1996), the Comoros (1997–1998, 2001–2002), the DRC (1999–2000), and Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000–2008).[14] Ad hoc multinational formations were also created, such as monitoring missions in Papua New Guinea (1997–2003), Sri Lanka (2002–2008), and Mindanao in the Philippines (2004–).[15] The UN evolved its repertoire of field missions in the form of expanded political missions and peacebuilding missions; some such missions, such as the one in Nepal (2007–2011), have military observers. An increasingly diversified and sophisticated use of small missions with a tendency for larger field presence is an important development that may blur the definition of peacekeeping.[16] But these smaller missions are not generally seen as peacekeeping missions. Indeed, the important point about the current trend is that non-UN organizations have come to organize operations *beyond* these smaller missions. The fact that they have started to deploy missions with more teeth is a significant development that deserves examination.

I hope this brief discussion provides a basic working definition of peacekeeping to guide readers through the chapters that follow. Peacekeeping is a conflict management tool that takes the form of a field mission organized by agents of international society, equipped with security (military and/or police) components that may resort to nonpunitive, tactical uses of violence. The selection of missions and operations for this study will be based on this definition.

Plan for the Book

The following chapters seek to address the motivations behind, forms of, and implications for evolving global peacekeeping cooperation. Chapter 2 introduces the contextual factors behind the evolution of global peacekeeping cooperation. Identifying the context requires an examination of changes both in peacekeeping as well as in the broader strategic and political environment and structure of the post–Cold War period.

Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework for analyzing peacekeeping cooperation. This is a challenging task not only because of the embryonic nature of the phenomenon to which the framework is supposed to apply, but also because developing such a framework demands serious engagement with the rich tradition of cooperation theory. The chapter comprises a review of three prominent theories of international cooperation (instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism) and discusses how each of these theories may contribute to the investigation of peacekeeping cooperation. Drawing from all three theories, I conceptualize global peacekeeping cooperation as a multilateral security cooperation regime. Characterizing peacekeeping cooperation as an emerging regime has the heuristic benefits of identifying its components (patterns, rules, procedures, principles, and norms) as well as analyzing its potential effects on global security governance.

The subsequent three chapters look in detail at each of the three patterns of the peacekeeping cooperation regime: operational collaboration, joint decisionmaking, and capacity building. Chapters 4 (operational collaboration) and 5 (joint decisionmaking) start with an overview of trends, followed by an analysis of cases—the Darfur region of Sudan and the DRC in Chapter 4, and Macedonia, Afghanistan, and the DRC in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 focuses on capacity-building assistance for African peacekeeping because the level of attention and activity devoted to Africa in this context sets it apart from the other regions. I consider four major capacity-building initiatives by the Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), the UN, the EU, and the G8.

Analytically, these concrete examples will be studied from two perspectives. One relates to motivation. Motivation can arise out of normative commitment to the regime and its principles as well as from calculation of interests: In what ways does a pattern of peacekeeping cooperation help meet the interests and constitute the identity of the peacekeeping actors? The second perspective considers the security governance implications: What effects does such a pattern of cooperation have on global efforts to deal with instabilities and security challenges? As will be explained in Chapter 3, there are two types of effect. Regulative effects influence the calculation of actors' interests and control their behaviors in certain ways; constitutive effects shape or alter their identities, which in turn are expressed in their definitions of interest as well as their behaviors. These effects may collectively bolster global security governance, but cooperation is not without various complications and limitations. Along with the positive effects of the given pattern, the three chapters will identify what is hindering the evolution of peacekeeping cooperation.

The concluding chapter will summarize the key findings of the book, discuss the prospects of the peacekeeping cooperation regime and its implications for global security governance, and suggest how the analytical framework of this book might apply to other areas of international cooperation. The peacekeeping cooperation regime is—and may remain in the foreseeable future—largely informal and not as strong as more established regimes such as international trade. However, as the nature of conflicts and broader security threats to the international community continues to change and demands a flexible response, it may be that informal regimes hold greater promise.

Notes

1. It should be noted, however, that there are cases of peacekeeping missions that date back even to a pre-UN era: the interwar years, for instance, saw cases of what Norrie MacQueen called "plebiscite peacekeeping," mostly on the borders of Germany such as in the Saar region and Upper Silesia. These cases meet the baseline definition of peacekeeping articulated here. Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System* (London: Routledge, 2006), chap. 2.

2. The Agenda for Peace, published in 1992, for instance, defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving *United Nations* military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well" (emphasis added). This qualification to "a United Nations presence" disappears in the Brahimi report's definition published eight years later. UN General Assembly/Security Council, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992,

para. 20; and Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, Annex, para. 12.

3. James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); James Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); and James Dobbins et al., *Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).

4. See, e.g., Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001); Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).

5. See, e.g., Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, "Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor," in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Thakur and Schnabel, 3–25; UN, "History of Peacekeeping," www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml (accessed December 13, 2016).

6. Shashi Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?," *Survival* 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 52–64.

7. For the current UN definition of peacekeeping and related concepts, see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, January 2008, 17–19.

8. Ian Johnstone, "Normative Evolution at the UN: Impact on Operational Activities," in *Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S. Security Policy*, ed. Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman, and Richard Gowan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 206. See also Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone, "New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the 'War on Terror,'" Coping with Crises working paper, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007, 10.

9. AU Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, AU doc. PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), January 9, 2012, paras. 71, 100 (vii), 109. See also Chapter 4.

10. For discussions on robust peacekeeping, see Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force," Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York, December 2009; Patrice Sartre, "Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust: Protecting the Mission, Persuading the Actors," International Peace Institute, New York, July 2011; Thierry Tardy, "A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 2 (April 2011): 152–167.

11. DPKO/DFS, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 19.

12. Sartre, "Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust," 10.

13. For a good review of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, see Paul Kirwan, "From European to Global Security Actor: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in

Indonesia," in *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective*, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė, 128–142 (New York: Routledge, 2008).

14. This includes Neutral Military Observer Group I and II (Rwanda); OAU Mission in Burundi; OAU Mission in Comoros I, II, and III; Joint Monitoring Commission (DRC); and (O)AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea. With regard to the Burundi mission, the OAU initially planned to deploy a mission with a wider political mandate (Protection and Observation Mission for the Reestablishment of Confidence in Burundi). But this plan met domestic opposition and instead of the full deployment of its military component (180 officers), it was reconfigured into a small observer mission. Cedric de Coning, "Peace Operations in Africa: The Next Decade," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Working Paper 721, Oslo, June 2007, 12n41; David Francis and Thomas Kwasi Tieku, "The AU and the Search for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi and Comoros," Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 2011, 14; AU Commission, "Peace and Security Department at a Glance," n.d., www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-booklet.pdf (accessed December 13, 2016).

15. The Truce and Peace Monitoring Group was composed of unarmed monitors and support personnel from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was made up of civilian monitors from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The International Monitoring Team–Mindanao has consisted of personnel from countries including Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, as well as several members of the EU.

16. For instance, in the UN system the division between peacekeeping on the one hand and political and peacebuilding missions on the other was relatively clear with the former managed by the DPKO/DFS and the latter the Department of Political Affairs, but this line has since become blurred as some of the recent political/peacebuilding missions such as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UN Integrated Office in Burundi, and UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone are managed by the DPKO.