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In the March 2015 issue of *Atlantic Monthly*, Princeton scholar Bernard Haykel declared, “Muslims who call the Islamic State [ISIS] un-Islamic are typically . . . embarrassed and politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of their own religion ‘that neglects’ what their religion has historically and legally required.”¹ His words were a response—albeit simplified—to multiple declarations from clerics around the world who had condemned the caliphate as un-Islamic.² Haykel’s article drew scholars of Islam and politics into the public debate in an unprecedented way. Some agreed that ISIS is indeed Islamic, while others rejected this premise. Prominent political figures such as then secretary of state John Kerry added to the confusion by calling ISIS’s leaders apostates.³

This controversy encapsulates two contentious questions that run through most scholarship on Islam and politics. First, is political Islam in any way decipherable from the tenets of the Islamic tradition, or is it mostly about secular actors misusing religious references? Second, is political Islam an exclusively modern political phenomenon, or is it indebted to long-standing Islamic religious commitments?

Most political scientists either dodge these questions or downplay the Islamic dimension of political Islam. They see it as a
multifaceted social movement and focus on its modes of recruitment, mobilization, and strategy. They also emphasize opportunity structures such as the broader political context. For example, the growing influence of Islamic movements in the last three decades is usually attributed to the political liberalization of the 1990s. Although this scholarship has provided a wealth of information on how these movements gain political ground, the question of why they are more influential, compared to other social movements or political groups across Muslim countries, remains unanswered.

In this book, I take on this “why” question. Defining political Islam as a multifaceted religious nationalism, I begin with the premise that it has materialized due to the cultural and political specificities of the nation-states built on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Essentially, I shift the focus of the debate from professional Islamic political parties or groups to the shaping of modern political cultures.

My argument differs from the scholarly perspective dominant among religious and Islamic studies, which tends to pitch modern politics and the state as incompatible with the Islamic tradition. For example, in *The Impossible State*, Wael Hallaq argues that the “modern state is a bad fit for Muslims” due to the incompatibility and contradictions between “Islamic governance” and the “Western” modern state. In Hallaq’s view, the European invention of a sovereign modern state goes against the “Islamic state,” which is organized “organically” around God’s sovereignty with sharia as the moral code. Islamic politics is therefore solely confined to “executive rulers of rotating dynasties . . . external to the embryonic tight embrace between jurists and community.” The organizing principle of life is the individual Muslim’s “care of the self” and adherence to the sharia.

Historical reality, however, reveals a much more complicated dialectic between ideas and social contexts, rendering this incompatibility theory difficult to hold outside the realm of normative theories. In fact, political Islam is better defined as a political culture that cannot be read exclusively in light of the premodern Islamic tradition because it is the result of the Islamic tradition’s dual processes of nationalization and reformation/westernization. In this respect, I contend that there is no opposition between the
state and Islam, since the nation-state is the major structural element that made political Islam possible in the first place.

There is a solid scholarship describing both the nation-building processes in postcolonial Muslim countries and the reformation of Islamic thinking since the nineteenth century, especially the pioneering work of Bobby Sayyid and, most recently, Nathan Brown. However, at best, these two threads of knowledge do not inform each other; at worst, they conflict. In the pages that follow, I combine both threads of knowledge with the hope of overcoming the modern/traditional and secular/religious dichotomies. In discussing the doctrinal changes in Islamic thinking and how they are intertwined with the building of national identities and state institutions, I intend not to attribute all religious changes to the rise of the nation-state but to demonstrate how modern political conditions have altered religious concepts of community, law, and tradition.

It has been proven abundantly that most theories or concepts used in political science have been shaped by the Western experience and then applied to political situations in Muslim countries (or elsewhere). For this reason, the religion/politics and secular/religious divides inherited from the European and North American political experiences influence scholarly understanding of what is religious or Islamic. Hence, most scholars of politics dismiss the life experiences of Muslims in various contexts as “subjective” and therefore irrelevant to “objective” knowledge. By contrast, a second thread of scholarship, mostly in anthropology and sociology, has analyzed Western cultural influence as a tool of political imperialism and focused on the religious experiences of Muslims that stand at odds with the westernized political contexts in which they take place.

This book is not another attempt to objectify political Islam by dismissing the religious variable. Nor is it a project of restituting the “incommensurability” of political Islam because of its authentically Islamic dimension. While the exportation of nationalism and state is the direct outcome of the unequal relationship of power between the West and the other parts of the world, it is only one part of the story. The other part is the role of local actors in adapting and recreating these concepts. While Western concepts were indeed imposed during colonialism, they were neither totally
endorsed nor entirely rejected by local elites. Furthermore, the Western state was not merely an oppressive or annihilating force in the preexisting reality. In fact, the promoters of “indigenous” tradition often readapted it willingly and sometimes in opposition to the colonial powers in order to compete with foreign political concepts. To assume that the Islamic religion and local cultures remained authentic is to understand political Islam only as a reaction of “indigenous” actors to preserve their “untouched” heritage.

Similarly, the local champions of the Western culture did not simply duplicate it. It is therefore misleading to analyze the modus operandi of Muslim “liberal” “secular” states within the parameters of the ways European or North American counterparts behave. For example, in *Formations of the Secular*, Talal Asad draws a sharp distinction between Arab nationalism and Islamism. He argues that Arab nationalism is committed to the doctrine of separating law and citizenship from religious affiliation and confining Islamism, which seeks to restore Islam to its central social position, to the private domain.\(^\text{13}\)

In fact, as I show in this book, there was no such neat demarcation between “westernized” nationalists and “traditional” Islamist actors. Despite having opposing goals, these two groups were in continuous dialogue from the nineteenth century to the decolonization phase (at least). The effect of this cross-pollination on modern political understandings of religious terms such as *taqlid* (tradition), *ijtihad* (interpretation), and *ummah* (community) has been underestimated. Both groups, even if not in agreement, rely on these contemporary meanings.

Consider the renewed academic interest in Middle Eastern sectarianism in the wake of the Iraqi and Syrian crises. Some scholars such as Saba Mahmood and Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel see sectarianism as a reaction against the “imported” state or the Western influence on the region.\(^\text{14}\) Others—such as Melani Cammett, Ben White, Max Weiss, or Toby Matthiesen—see it as triggered by the incomplete or failed adoption of liberal governance.\(^\text{15}\) By addressing the legal and political conditions for sectarianists, these scholars take the role of the state seriously. Nonetheless, they neglect the changes brought by the state to preexisting religious communities and groups. As such, sectarian
divides are often seen as the remnants and/or exacerbation of the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire, when in fact they are a different beast entirely.\(^{16}\) The transition from Muslim empire to nation-state marked a decisive rupture, one that drastically changed the social and cultural conditions of the *millet* system.\(^{17}\)

The presence of religious communities and Islamic concepts within nation-states is due not simply to their resilience and unchanged nature. They are, in fact, unprecedented hybrid institutions, concepts, and ideas. They can be considered “vernacular modernities,” not because they are “untouched” indigenous alternatives to external Western modernity but because they are syncretic responses by local actors faced with new challenges.

Therefore, it is important to take into consideration the way all actors have played a decisive role in adapting/adopting external concepts, granting them specific meanings by using indigenous terminology and in the process changing or adding new connotations to these indigenous concepts. Political Islam is not the outcome of an impossible clash between Western modernity and authentic noncolonized Islam, as it is often presented by Islamist actors and (some) scholars alike. Rather, it results from grafting the concepts of religion, nationalism, and secularism in Muslim territories. It must be understood in terms of its own cultural premises and not as a mediation of forces from elsewhere, whether it is a transfer of economic grievances, a medium for old class politics, or a vehicle for new political identities.

Hence, it is necessary to go beyond groups’ interests and pay more attention to institutional projects. In this respect, political Islam derives as much from the institutional space it inhabits as from the social position of individuals who become Islamist. My investigation starts with the introduction of the concepts of nation and state, meaning the institutional architecture of social relations shared by all political actors, secular and Islamic. Consequently, the key to my argument is the assertion that a proper analysis of religious and political practice depends on a robust conceptualization of the modern nation-state.

State-centered approaches to religious mobilizations are undoubtedly significant.\(^{18}\) They usually emphasize the tensions created by the self-governing power of religious groups, particularly
religious institutions, in the face of state power. When it comes to Muslim countries, state actions are usually considered a key factor in the politicization of religion. More generally, state-centered scholarship examines control of religious activities by the state, as well as the state’s appropriation of religious symbols and functions. Some sociologists, such as Colin Beck, have argued that state-building activities, specifically a regime’s incorporation of religious institutions and symbolism, are the primary explanation for the variation in Islamic mobilization across the Middle East.

However, while the development of state policy is crucial, cultural processes cannot be reduced to state actions. As such, I prefer the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, which emphasizes the connection between techniques of the self (governing the self) and techniques of domination (governing others). Governmentality refers to different procedures for regulating human behaviors; it is not limited to state actions or policies. In fact, state actions are not decipherable outside the ingrained acceptance by citizens of these techniques, or what Norbert Elias calls habitus. Therefore, we cannot explain policies without analyzing the sets of acquired ideas, emotions, behavioral codes, and social etiquettes that people in a given territory associate with political power and community. Under these conditions, religion becomes a significant mode of power. Analyzing the politicization of religion in general, as well as Islam in particular, means paying attention to specific governmental apparatuses and relevant bodies of knowledge.

Religious traditions, organizations, discourses, and practices are a part of governmentality even when they have relative autonomy from the state. Notably, Islam was already an institutional space before the nation-state. Through a network of sacred sites and ritual spaces, community centers, associations, schools, hospitals, courts, and charities, Islam offered a social space from which to mobilize, as well as a concrete cosmos within which to imagine and prefigure an alternative vision of the social. At the same time, Islam remained independent from the political institutions of the caliphate. With the building of the nation-state, Islamic institutions became identified with the nation. Meanwhile, state rulers simultaneously restructured them to fit the
recomposition of the Islamic religion around the notions of private belief and individuality.

In sum, I argue that political Islam first emerged as a modern technique of governmentality with the adoption of the nation-state and the westernization/secularization of Islamic tradition. From this perspective, nationalism—that is, the loyalties organized through the state in the name of the political community—creates the nation, rather than the reverse. Nationalism is a program for the co-constitution of the state and the territorially bounded population whose name it speaks. In Roger Friedland’s words, “Nationalism is not simply an ideology: it is also a set of discursive practices by which the territorial identity of a state and the cultural identity of the people whose collective representation it claims are constituted in a singular fact.” While nationalism offers a form of representation, it does not determine the content of the representation or the identity of the represented collective subject, whether they are civic, liberal, ethnic, and/or religious.

One may contend that my linking of political Islam with religious nationalism is hardly new. Scholars who have made this argument before have emphasized that Islamism shares with Arab nationalism a strong anti-Western sentiment that has become more influential after the decline of secular nationalism. However, as I demonstrate in this book, political Islam is not simply a religious version of the national ideology, or rather, merely an ideology. More accurately, political Islam is the cultural bedrock on which both nationalist and Islamist ideologies are grounded.

In this respect, political Islam takes four main forms—coercive, hegemonic, civil, and transnational or global—which are at play today in both national and international contexts. To elaborate, first, political Islam is a technique of coercion and discipline exacted by the state on a given territory and population, creating cultural identities in which national and Islamic belongings become intertwined. In Chapter 2, I provide a conceptual history of key terms such as ummah (community) and taqlid (tradition), which are critical to the shaping of this modern political culture by “secular” and religious actors alike.

Chapter 3 presents the dominant form of religious nationalism, which I have called hegemonic in my previous research.
Building on this earlier work, I focus here on Egypt and Turkey, because they usually serve as exemplary cases of secular nationalism. In both Egypt and Turkey, religious hegemony occurred because Islamic institutions and religious authorities were absorbed into the state system, which made Islam central to national identity but also up for ideological competition. Based on the findings of my previous research, in this chapter I present the correlation between religious hegemony and low levels of democracy across countries. Hegemonic Islam has a direct influence on civil liberties and human rights ranging from freedom of speech to sexual liberties. I also discuss the inclusion-moderation paradigm and argue that the insertion of Islamic parties into political systems is not a sufficient condition for moderation. As attested by the evolution of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey since 2007, when the Islamic party reflects the majoritarian national culture and is a part of hegemonic Islam, there is less probability that it will moderate ideologically.

In Chapter 4, I discuss Indonesia and Senegal as two of the few Muslim countries not defined by hegemonic Islam (i.e., the state has not absorbed religious institutions, and religious diversity is acknowledged). In these two countries, can Islam be considered as a form of religious nationalism close to a civil religion? Robert Bellah’s decisive work has described civil religion as the nonsectarian religious beliefs shared by all citizens regarding the symbols and history of their nation. The cases of Indonesia and Senegal, however, are better explained by introducing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s original take on civil religion. Rousseau analyzes civil religion as a state-centered project aimed at securing the loyalties of citizens through rituals and symbols. Thus, in this chapter I look at civil Islam as a specific combination of social and state-centered approaches to religion and show how the social dimension of civil Islam in Senegal has superseded the state-centered project, while the opposite has taken place in Indonesia.

Chapter 5 addresses radical transnational Islamic movements as the most recent expressions of political Islam. Instead of interpreting these movements as the negation of the religious nationalism described in Chapters 3 and 4, I show that they operate under the political meanings infused into religious concepts at the time
of nation-building. In other words, global political Islam, especially in its radical forms, is the global dissemination and alteration of the national political cultures that see the ummah as a transnational imagined community. In this respect, the globalization of political Islam illustrates a broader trend, the globalization of nationalism, that underlies most international conflicts today.

Throughout the book, I present hegemonic, civil, and global political Islam as evolving categories that continuously interact and compete with each other, both nationally and internationally.

Notes


2. One of the rare religious authorities to do so was Shaikh Ibrahim Saleh al-Hussaini, who called on other Muslim leaders to declare ISIS “infidels” at a conference hosted by al-Azhar University. The shaikh continued to say that “a Muslim who fights another Muslim is an infidel.” See Ibrahim, Ayman S. “So ISIS Is Not Infidel—Are Christians?” First Things. December 16, 2014. https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2014/12/so-isis-is-not-infidel-christians.


10. For example, Esposito, John, and John Voll. Makers of Contemporary Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; for detailed bibliographical


17. The term *millet* refers to non-Muslim communities living in an Islamic state. During the Ottoman Empire, the word defined the autonomous religious communities led by separate leaders who connected their groups to the central government. See “Millet.” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. July 20, 1998. https://www.britannica.com/topic/millet-religious-group.


22. See, for example, the work of Nathan Brown on the Egyptian public space: Brown, *Arguing Islam*.


26. Ibid., 386.
