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This book documents the contributions that African actors—public officials, governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private citizens—have made to major norms currently shaping international peace and security politics, broadly defined. The book’s chapters collectively contribute to a more complete account of the emergence and growth of international norms, and they highlight the often understated agency of African actors in international politics. The book thus enhances scholarly understanding of two key aspects of international relations (IR).

Norms, defined broadly in social science scholarship as the way actors are expected to behave in a given social context (Bolsen, Leeper, and Shapiro 2014) and specifically by IR scholars as “standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 891), occupy a special position in IR research and discourse, public policy making, and diplomatic practices. For many IR scholars, norms are critically important in explaining social and political reality. Most global public policy makers, moreover, see norms as restraining egoistic impulses, inducing cooperation among self-interested actors, and providing a way around collective action problems in the international system (Green and Gerber 2010; Bolsen 2013).

Critically, international norms are not static. In fact, international perceptions of what types of behavior are permissible or reprehensible in the pursuit of national or international security are remarkably dynamic. Policies that have long been considered commonplace and unobjectionable can become subject to almost universal opprobrium, as the case of antipersonnel landmine use demonstrates (Price 1998). Debate over long-standing international prohibitions may be reopened as national interests and threat
perceptions evolve, as controversies over preventive military strikes and the use of torture indicate (Doyle 2011; McKeown 2009). Even the scope of what constitutes international security—and therefore what kinds of activity are relevant to international security—continues to evolve as international actors develop cyberspace and energy security policies and debate whether particular diseases (e.g., Ebola) or environmental issues (e.g., climate change) should be approached as international security issues.

The IR literature has enhanced our understanding of international peace and security norms by capturing, analyzing, and explaining the dynamic nature of these norms. Constructivist scholars, in particular, have provided important conceptualizations of norm emergence, change, diffusion, and contestation, which are central to the framing of this chapter. Yet while the tremendous scholarly and political interest in peace and security norms has led to an exponential growth of relevant research, few studies focus on the contributions of actors in the Global South to the creation and development of these norms. Most of the actors highlighted in the IR literature are either advanced industrialized states or based in such states. Thus “it is often assumed in this literature that global norms originate in materially powerful Northern countries” (Helleiner 2014a, p. 359). The few published studies that challenge this Western-centric approach to norm emergence, development, and diffusion tend to focus on the impact of the most powerful non-Western states, notably China (Black and Hwang 2012; Contessi 2010; Job and Shesterinina 2014). The contributions of states and actors from materially less endowed countries are understudied and poorly understood. The failure to adequately recognize contributions to the development of norms by actors in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Caribbean is deeply problematic, not simply on grounds of equity but also because it distorts the reality of how international norms are in fact created.

This book seeks to enrich the literature on international norms by providing an in-depth, theoretically informed analysis of African actors’ contributions to the development of contemporary international peace and security norms. It contends that African international organizations, governments, and nonstate actors have significantly shaped many prevailing international security norms, though these contributions are largely undocumented and unnoticed.¹ This neglect may be partly due to the fact that African contributions become fully apparent only when analysis is extended across the entire spectrum of pathways that affect international norms. It may also reflect the preponderant influence within the discipline of IR of Western scholars, whose expertise in African international politics is often limited (Hoffmann 1977; Waever 1998; Smith 2000).² By avoiding both pitfalls, we are able to highlight the agency of African actors in international norm development and by extension in international politics.
We explore four key pathways by which African international organizations, states, and nonstate actors have shaped contemporary international security norms: (1) participation in global norm creation; (2) the development of African-made norms that may or may not remain geographically confined to Africa; (3) the shaping of global norms through creative implementation; and (4) contestation of global norms. The case studies that illustrate each of these pathways substantiate our argument that African actors have profoundly influenced contemporary international norms while also providing a more complete account of the evolution of these norms. These case studies are written predominantly by African scholars, IR specialists, and practitioners, whose expertise is critical in uncovering the African dimension of international norm creation.

This chapter presents the conceptual framework adopted in the book. It showcases our understanding of the four pathways of African influence on international norms as analytically distinct, though they may overlap in practice. In addition, the chapter provides a justification of the book’s methodology, an overview of its structure, and a summary of the remaining chapters.

**Four Pathways of Influence**

IR scholars have developed a plethora of theories to explore international norm creation, development, and diffusion. The conceptual starting point for this book is that these theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The theoretical literature shows that international norms can emerge in multiple ways, including through argumentation (Risse 2000), social influence (Johnston 2001), acculturation (Brunnée and Toope 2012; Goodman and Jinks 2013), subsidiarity (Acharya 2011b), and bargaining (Moravcsik 2001, 2013; Coleman 2011). Norms can be developed either at the global level or through regional processes that may or may not be combined with diffusion dynamics. Moreover, norm creation is never a one-step or linear process. As Amitav Acharya has noted, “initially articulated universal norms are not only subject to contestation, but also to resistance and modification, whether at international or regional levels” (2014, p. 406).

Building on existing norm scholarship, we identify four key processes by which international norms are produced. We argue that each process offers an opportunity for African actors to influence international norm development: if African actors can participate in and affect the process, they will shape the international norm that results from it. Each process thus represents a potential pathway for African actors to influence international norms. Each pathway is analytically distinct, though in practice African actors may shape a given norm through multiple pathways over time. The following sections describe these pathways and identify the
major mechanisms associated with each by which African actors’ influence can be exerted.

**Pathway 1: Shaping Global Norm Creation Processes**

The first wave of norm scholarship envisioned global norms as emerging primarily through international persuasion efforts by nonstate actors. In their seminal article, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink contend that the “norm life cycle” begins when “norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms” (1998, p. 895). Once a norm has reached this “tipping point,” it may be rapidly adopted by most remaining states in the system (“cascade”) and may ultimately become internalized (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, pp. 895–905).

This conception of norm emergence built on previous work documenting the influence of nonstate actors as norm entrepreneurs (Nadellmann 1990) and has been complemented by numerous additional studies that advanced the norm development literature in three key areas. First, researchers have elaborated on the concept of persuasion, highlighting mechanisms such as grafting, framing, and arguing as critical to successful norm creation (Price 1998; Payne 2001; Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons 2015; Grobe 2010; Busby 2007; Deitelhoff 2009; Bower 2015). Second, norms scholars have expanded the concept of norm entrepreneurship to include not only NGOs but also transnational advocacy networks, officials within international organizations, states, and powerful individuals within states (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Johnstone 2007; Black and Hwang 2012; Orchard and Gillies 2015). Finally, several authors have argued that norm emergence is marked by negotiation as well as persuasion: states and nonstate actors “bargain over the content of the emerging norm and strike compromises about the scope, precision, ambition and rigidity of its demands” (Coleman 2011, p. 167).³

When international norm creation is initiated by norm entrepreneurs and accomplished through persuasion and negotiation at the global level, there are at least four key mechanisms by which African actors can impact the resulting norm. First, African individuals, NGOs, state officials, and international secretariat members can act as norm entrepreneurs, either independently or as parts of an international or transnational mobilization effort. African participation is likely to be especially critical where the proposed norm addresses an issue seen to be prevalent in African states, because local knowledge and allies are crucial to the credibility of international mobilization efforts (Sikkink 1993).

Second, African states can be important early adopters of a proposed norm, whose presence affects subsequent persuasion dynamics. Finnemore and Sikkink note that “some states are critical to a norm’s adoption” (1998, p. 901). If African states are disproportionately affected by a particular
issue, African governments’ early participation in international norm creation efforts is critical not only to avoid charges of neocolonial interference but also because persuasion is most likely to succeed when the potential persuadee views the persuader as having authoritative information (Johnston 2001, p. 497). Thus, other states considering whether to support a proposed norm may be especially swayed by the positions and arguments of the actors most affected by the issue at stake.

By the same token, African actors’ third potential avenue of influence is as norm skeptics, arguing against the adoption of a proposed norm. If African states are united in their opposition, they may be able to block progress toward norm creation altogether or force significant changes to the proposed norm before it can emerge.

Finally, African states may play critical roles in international negotiations of declarations or treaties that establish a new norm. Such negotiations may include “islands of persuasion” (Deitelhoff 2009) where African states can play the norm leader or norm skeptic roles. Equally important, African states often take advantage of their numerical strength and solidarity in international settings to exercise considerable bargaining power in global norm negotiations. They are able to do so because “the procedures for most major multilateral governing efforts are organized around universal participation. Every state gets a seat at the table” (Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014, p. 361). Africa’s fifty-four states represent the largest potential regional voting bloc in such settings, accounting for almost a quarter of all United Nations (UN) member states. Moreover, if an issue centrally concerns Africa, and many of the issues that dominate the international security landscape do, pragmatic negotiators will recognize that the support of African governments is key to a credible international norm creation effort on that issue. Skillful African diplomats can and do take advantage of the fact that many international security issues cannot be addressed without the cooperation of (most) African states to further enhance African agency in norm negotiation outcomes (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).

**Pathway 2: African Norms That May or May Not Diffuse Beyond the Continent**

Not all international norms originate outside of Africa: some are African-made. Critically, international norms are not a “global ‘oobleck’ that covers the planet and homogenizes us all” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p. 397). International norms can emerge in regions or subregions, sometimes—but not always—proceeding to diffuse to other regions and global international organizations. African actors may influence international norms by creating local norms that diffuse beyond the continent. There are also African-made norms that claim little applicability beyond continental Africa. These norms
shape only continental and regional African political and security landscapes, and they may even contradict established norms elsewhere in the world (Acharya 2011b). Nevertheless, they shape international politics among and within Africa’s fifty-four states. Whether they diffuse or not, therefore, African norms are significant international norms and important elements of the global normative framework.

African norms may be developed through at least four mechanisms. First, they may be formulated during continental or regional interstate negotiations to manage particular African security issues or a specific crisis, such as an ongoing civil war. These negotiations can take place within formal institutions, such as the African Union (AU) or one of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs), which have been major sources of African-focused security norms over the past three decades. Negotiations that create African norms can also occur in ad hoc institutional structures, such as the Great Lakes Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi (Tieku 2013). In both kinds of setting, negotiations are typically subject to consensual decisionmaking processes where every state wields a potential veto. The emphasis on consensual decisions promotes at least rhetorical affirmation of the negotiation outcomes—including normative statements—by all participants. Since the norms developed in these negotiations are formulated almost exclusively by African actors and tailored to suit the social context of the African region, they may not gain traction, or even significant attention, beyond the African continent.

Second, African norms may be developed through a deliberate continental or regional norm subsidiarity effort. Norm subsidiarity is “a process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (Acharya 2011b, p. 97). It is often led by formal institutions, and participants are typically explicit about their emancipatory goals. One major motivation for norm subsidiarity in Africa is to counter global norms viewed as damaging to African actors’ autonomy and sovereignty. African governments have developed regional security norms to protect themselves from what they perceive as overbearing or predatory behavior by former colonial states and other powerful actors in the international system. One example is the Pan-African solidarity norm, which emerged from the first grand intergovernmental negotiations of newly independent African states in the 1960s (see Chapter 5). The norm emerged to promote harmony among African political elites and to protect African ruling classes from abuse, exploitation, and manipulation by, and criticism from, powerful global actors. African governments have continued to mobilize this norm to protect political elites, including during recent efforts to shield Sudanese and Kenyan leaders from trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The distinctive feature of norm subsidiarity is its outward focus and the targeting of a norm that has developed at the global level but that is unevenly implemented or is per-
ceived as unfairly affecting less powerful states. Norm subsidiarity is often a response to “great power hypocrisy” (Acharya 2011b, p. 100).

Third, distinctive African norms may emerge through a “coalition of the willing” process, where like-minded African governments develop a norm to address shared needs. They may, for example, face similar security challenges or feel the need to contest existing regional norms. Since these norms are developed by and for coalition members, there is no immediate expectation that other states will respect them: the limited membership of the coalition limits the applicability of the norm that emerges from it. Take for instance the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), whose members commit to a number of governance norms including the requirement that civilian bodies must exercise oversight over security forces. Only the thirty-five African states that are APRM members are expected to follow these norms, leaving the remaining nineteen African states and Western Sahara formally unaffected.

Finally, continental or regional African norms may emerge through the agency of local nonstate actors. The NGO community and private individuals may work together to develop specific norms with a view to persuading African states to adopt them. For example, in the early 1990s a group of NGOs met in Kampala to adopt a set of human security norms, with the aim of redefining security and sovereignty in Africa and demanding certain standards of behavior from every African government (Obasanjo and Mosha 1992, p. 260). The mainstreaming of human security into the AU is largely credited to the advocacy work of these civil society groups.

All four of these mechanisms feature African actors developing norms for African purposes: the aim is not to develop global norms but to address perceived African challenges or threats to African interests. Such “purely” African norms inherently warrant attention and analysis as significant international norms as they shape the behavior of up to fifty-four states and Western Sahara.

In addition, however, some African norms diffuse beyond the continent. Norm diffusion may involve the full adoption and implementation of a regional norm in another region or at the global level, but more partial or incremental diffusion is also possible. Extra-regional actors may adopt only one part of the regional norm, such as a given behavior or a stated ideation, and recombine this with other norm components (Winston 2017). They may also accept a regional norm only in the sense of acknowledging its applicability in its region of origin. At minimum, this would mean supporting a regional norm as applying to regional actors, for example by praising or helping to implement a regional arms trade moratorium, transitional justice practice, or conflict management norm. In addition, extra-regional actors may accept a regional norm as applying to their own activities in the region, for example by allowing a regional conflict management norm such
as mediation by elder statespersons to shape the design of an international peace initiative in the region (see Chapter 6).

African norms may diffuse either because non-African actors adopt them on their own initiative or because African actors actively promote them. In the first scenario, the perceived relevance of African realities and experiences to non-African actors is the main driver of the norm diffusion. Garrett Brown (2014, p. 883) suggests that in fact many post–Cold War global security norms developed through “norm ‘up flow,’” where more local and regional innovations drove norm change at the global level. One example is Tanzania’s 1979 intervention in Uganda, which played a key role in the development of modern humanitarian intervention norms (Bellamy 2010). Normative change in these cases is usually a bottom-up process; it seems to be top-down because global powerful elites are often good at co-opting these local and regional norm creation processes as well as by redirecting the new norm back to the local setting or to other global institutions or domestic settings. If Brown is right, then the African region should be a major player in post–Cold War global security norm development given the number of contemporary security crises occurring in Africa and the plethora of conflict management activities and experiments in the region by both local and global actors. The interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the 1990s, for example, served as important markers in the development of norms around the appropriate relationship between the UN and regional bodies in peace operations that have since been mainstreamed into the international global security architecture. In short, global norm entrepreneurs may emulate, or at least choose to learn from, norms and practices developed in Africa.

By contrast, active promotion is characterized by a deliberate effort on the part of African actors to prompt others to adopt or endorse African norms. It can occur through teaching, argumentation, and persuasion. In this scenario, African actors convince their international counterparts of the intrinsic quality of an African norm through the power of “the better argument” and, potentially, by mobilizing authority “teachers” (Müller 2004, p. 411; Deitelhoff and Müller 2005, p. 172; Risse 2000; Finnemore 1993). Strategically positioned African individuals may be critical in this process. For example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali used his authority as UN Secretary-General to make African practices of conflict mediation and combatant demobilization and reintegration key elements in emerging global peace-building norms (Betts and Orchard 2014, p. 215). Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali’s successor, also used his position to introduce African values and norms to the international peace and security landscape, including the mobilization of elders as a conflict resolution mechanism (Tieku 2012). Africans called upon either as individuals or as state representatives to provide expertise to extra-regional bodies may also promote the diffusion of African norms.
by teaching and persuading. Their contributions may take the form of consultancy reports, background studies, and policy briefs, or these individuals may serve as members of an international commission or panel of experts. One illustration of how influential African actors can be in this capacity is the case of Mohamed Sahnoun, a former Algerian foreign minister, Kofi Annan’s adviser on Africa, and cochair with Gareth Evans of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, into which he helped carry the conception of sovereignty as responsibility promoted by the Kampala Movement (Obasanjo and Mosha 1992; Evans and Sahnoun 2001).

Where global interlocutors are not amenable to argumentation and persuasion, African actors can mobilize social pressure, challenging international norm entrepreneurs to add an African norm to the global repertoire for reasons of equity and representativeness (Epstein 2012). In this case, global norm entrepreneurs adopt and promote the African norm not because they are convinced of its inherent merit but because they feel it is appropriate to include African “ways of doing things” in the global system. Over time, the African practice may be routinized into the global normative structure and its African roots may be lost. Social pressure can be mobilized by states, as for instance, when African governments advocated for change in the global norm requiring regional organizations to inform the UN Security Council before rather than after an intervention (for more details, see Chapter 12). Public intellectuals can also mobilize social pressure, as Francis Deng, for example, did in both the UN and various US institutions to ensure recognition of his notion of “sovereignty as responsibility,” thus setting the stage for the emergence of the global norm of the responsibility to protect. Social pressure may be especially effective in informal encounters within formal institutions, where the more intimate, face-to-face setting makes it difficult for actors to refuse others’ principled claims. Even in highly formal institutions such as the UN Security Council, such informal interactions are often critical: a former Australian ambassador to the UN has estimated that private deliberations and decisionmaking consumed 98 percent of his time when he served on the Council (Butler 2012).

Finally, African actors may promote the diffusion of African norms through acculturation, a microprocess that makes actors conform to a position advocated by a perceived peer group as a result of real or imagined group pressure (Johnston 2001, p. 499; Brunnée and Toope 2012; Goodman and Jinks 2013). Acculturation differs from social pressure both in the nature of the reference group (a set of actors viewed as valued peers rather than society more broadly defined) and in the mechanism for producing norm acceptance (the threat of peer group sanction rather than activating norms of social inclusion). Peer pressures from African actors may encourage non-African actors to adopt the norms that regulate behavior on the African continent, not because they are convinced of the norms’ intrinsic
quality or the appropriateness of listening to African actors but because they fear ostracism from the Africa group or want to fit into the African reference group. Two factors make conditions propitious for acculturation by African actors. First, acculturation is especially likely if African actors are numerically dominant in the social relationship with the non-African actor or actors, at least during the initial phase of the encounter. The second factor is consistency; acculturation is more likely when African actors are unanimous in advocating for the norm and, ideally, practice the norm consistently during the period of encounter. The non-African actor or actors in the international system may then mimic that social practice, and over time other actors may also copy it either from the African group or from the non-African actor or actors.

Pathway 3: Shaping International Norms Through Creative Implementation

Conventional analyses of international norm creation often highlight dynamic processes of norm emergence and diffusion but take a static view of norm content. For many scholars, norms do not change as they undergo processes of diffusion and contestation. However, more recently researchers have begun to conceptualize “norms as processes [and to] theorize . . . that norms are subject to on-going attempts to reconstitute their meanings, even as they exert effects on patterns of social behaviour” (Krook and True 2012, p. 109). This pathway and the fourth, explored in the next section, reflect the latter view of international norms, positing that norm creation does not end after the first emergence of a norm but continues through a dynamic process of ongoing interpretation and contestation during which African actors can be highly influential.

This specific pathway recognizes that international norms emerging in global forums must be adopted and implemented by particular actors in order to progress from relatively abstract, often ambiguous commitments (Chayes and Chayes 1993, p. 189; Krook and True 2012, p. 109) to shaping actors’ actual behavior and international outcomes. In this process of adoption and implementation, norms are potentially subject to two major kinds of change.

The first is localization, a process in which strategic actors within a given state or region adapt international norms to render them more compatible with local norms and priorities. In Acharya’s seminal formulation, it is “the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices” (2004, p. 245). Going beyond previous findings that international norms are more likely to diffuse if they are already congruent with local priorities or have
local advocates (Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sundstrom 2005),
the concept of localization envisions local actors as actually modifying
the content of international norms as they are adopted locally. Such modifica-
tions may be relatively minor, supporting Acharya’s conception of localiza-
tion as merely a redefinition of norms that local actors already take as “gen-
erally good and desirable” (2011b, p. 98). In other instances, however,
localization may significantly alter the international norm. At the extreme,
as the next section explores further, localization can become a form of
resistance to global norms (Capie 2008; Prantl and Nakano 2011).

The second kind of norm change at the implementation stage is meaning-
in-practice, which refers to behavior enacting an international norm in a
specific instance. The concept builds on Antje Wiener’s notion of meaning-
in-use, sharing its basic assumption that “the meaning of norms . . . is
embedded in social practice,” so that “if the practice changes then so will
the meaning of the norm” (2004, pp. 191–192). However, the social prac-
tices Wiener focuses on are discursive interventions, through which actors
debate and contest the meaning of shared norms and thus contribute to their
evolution over time. By contrast, meaning-in-practice focuses on material
actions by states and other actors that are presented and accepted as imple-
menting an international norm or that shape understandings of how a norm
can (or cannot) be implemented. Critically, enacting an international norm
in a specific set of empirical circumstances requires translating general pre-
scriptions into a particular course of action.

In deciding on a course of behavior, actors may choose actions that
have already been accepted as enacting the relevant norm in other (similar)
circumstances, or they may select a new behavior and contend that it repre-
sents an appropriate—or the most appropriate—way to implement the norm
in the given circumstance. They may also prove by their actions that a glob-
ally accepted way of implementing a norm is futile or counterproductive. If
other actors accept this contention or learn this lesson, the new behavior
will become part of the empirical practices socially accepted as enacting the
norm. The norm’s meaning-in-practice—what counts as implementing the
norm—will evolve.6

In short, localization is a discursive redefinition of what an interna-
tional norm is understood to mean in a particular state or region, and meaning-in-practice is the translation of a norm’s general prescriptions into a
specific action deemed appropriate in a particular set of empirical circum-
stances. Theoretically, both processes could simply result in a proliferation
of distinctive local or situation-specific versions of a norm initially negoti-
ated at the international level (Brown 2014). However, they can also lead to
a redefinition of the “parent” international norm through feedback mecha-
nisms linking the local to the international level. For example, Jochen
Prantl and Ryoko Nakano (2011, p. 210) suggest that China first localized
the norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and then reintroduced its localized version into international negotiations, leading to a substantial softening of the international norm. For meaning-in-practice, the feedback mechanism is inherent in the idea that particular instances of purported implementation of a norm potentially affect the set of practices internationally understood to enact the norm. Empirically, Alana Tiemessen has argued that Rwanda’s specific enactment of transitional justice norms had significant “feedback effects on the normative structure over time, by redefining the meaning of transitional justice norms and retooling how they can be more effectively institutionalized” (2011, p. 67).

This discussion suggests two key ways in which African actors can influence international norms. First, they may localize global norms, redefining their content to render them more compatible with local interests and ideas. At a minimum, this would increase the diversity of existing international norms, offering a greater number of local variations on internationally generated norms. In the presence of local-to-global feedback effects, however, African localizations may transform the “parent” norms as well.

Second, African actors can shape the meaning-in-practice of international norms by engaging in innovative behaviors that alter prevailing understandings of what it means (or what is required) to enact a particular norm. It is worth noting that African actors need not engage in these behaviors solely or even primarily in order to alter the meaning-in-practice of existing norms. Actors opting for a particular course of action for non-normative, strategic, and even purely self-interested reasons may still become accidental norm entrepreneurs if their behavior is internationally perceived as implementing an existing norm in a particular way—or showing the inappropriateness of particular means of implementation.

Pathway 4: Direct Contestation of Global Norms

African actors may also influence global security norms through direct contestation of prevailing norms, forcing either their abandonment or their renegotiation. Such challenges may take at least five forms. First, African actors may argue that a global norm is “incongruent” (Stevenson 2009) with African conditions, and develop mechanisms to encourage African states not to comply with the norm. African international organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS may adopt treaties, charters, protocols, or declarations designed to facilitate noncompliance with an international norm their members find unacceptable. For instance, the AU developed supplementary rules to the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in part to fight the prevailing global norm of universal jurisdiction (Coombes 2011). African organizations typically make decisions on ignoring or discouraging compliance with the global norm by consensus. Such decisions do not always
express unanimously held views, but once the decision has been made, solidarity considerations may encourage even governments that originally supported the international norm to flout it. The AU decision to ask its members to ignore the ICC arrest warrant issued against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir is one example of this dynamic. This kind of contestation by African actors has the potential to encourage global norm entrepreneurs to reconsider the international norm. For instance, the AU’s protest over the application of universal jurisdiction and international criminal norms against African public officials has led to a global review of some aspects of these norms (see Chapter 11; Agwu 2014; Peskin 2009).

Second, African contestation and resistance to global norms may occur during negotiations with non-African states. African public officials may challenge the appropriateness of a particular global norm in their interactions with extra-regional actors. They can do so through multilateral channels, as when African states contested the norm of great power unanimity (otherwise known as the veto power) in the UN Security Council (Akufo-Addo 2017) or asked the Council to suspend the ICC warrant for the Sudanese president (du Plessis 2012; Peskin 2009). Contestation can also occur bilaterally, such as Rwanda’s fight against the application of the universal jurisdiction norm after its intelligence officer was arrested in London in 2015 (African Union 2015c). It can even occur through multiple unilateral public condemnations of an international norm or its application, as illustrated by the widespread condemnation by African leaders of the Security Council’s invocation of R2P during the Libyan crisis (Neethling 2012). Such contestation of global norms through public diplomacy and negotiation can lead to the development of new norms or facilitate the emergence of a modified version of the old norm.

Third, African states and their international organizations may “localize” the international norm to the extent that the norm loses its original meaning (Capie 2008). African actors may change the framing and content of an international norm in order to resist global forces or to subordinate the norm to an existing regional norm (Hirsch 2013). Thus, the AU’s decision to develop the norm of non-indifference may in part be an attempt by African states to preemptively undercut great power hypocrisy and interventionism after the end of the Cold War (Kioko 2003).

Fourth, African actors can use domestic tools to contest an international norm. Widespread domestic opposition will often force norm entrepreneurs to modify an existing international norm. For instance, Lauren Dunn, Peter Nyers, and Richard Stubbs (2010) show that widespread domestic opposition to prevailing humanitarian intervention norms, especially in East Asian states, contributed to the emergence of a much softer version of the norm. African states have many domestic weapons to counter international norms they view as objectionable. These include
enacting contrary domestic legislation, refusing to accede to the international instruments that promote the norm, and encouraging domestic non-state actors such as the media and civil society groups to publicly criticize and therefore delegitimize the international norm. Alternatively, some states may simply ignore international norms they have objections to.

Finally, African public intellectuals may challenge a particular international norm by pointing out deficiencies in its application through their writings, speeches, and other public engagements. They can also challenge the norm through their involvement in international committees, commissions, and expert panels. In some cases, they can use the contrast between the international norm and African realities to show the inappropriateness of the former. The discrepancy between the norm and actual experiences on the African continent may convince norm entrepreneurs that the norm should be modified, leading to the renegotiation of the norm or the development of new elements that take into account African realities.

Contestation by African actors can impact the subsequent development of the global norm. For instance, African opposition to interpretations of the norm of the responsibility to protect as justifying “regime change” in Libya in 2011 took virtually all the forms just described, and it has contributed significantly to the narrower and more circumscribed way the norm has been defined and applied in more recent years. Contestation of the regime change element has made the norm take a more pro-sovereignty turn. Indeed, “the backlash against that intervention, combined with growing assertiveness on the part of so-called rising powers that are suspicious of the West’s liberal agenda, is likely to circumscribe both the application and the implementation of the R2P in the decade ahead” (Welsh 2012, p. 291). Contestation may also prevent the establishment of new interpretations of existing norms, preserving existing ways of doing things that may be favored by African actors. Put differently, African opposition and contestation of new interpretations of existing norms may contribute to the maintenance of the normative status quo or limit new norm creation to incremental variations of existing norms (see Chapter 11).

Overlap of Pathways

The four pathways just described are analytically distinct, but not hermetically sealed from each other or mutually exclusive. Pathways may shade into each other, or African actors may use multiple pathways sequentially or simultaneously. Global norm creation efforts may present an opportunity for the active or passive diffusion of African norms, but if African perspectives are ignored they may give rise to localization or contestation efforts. Creative implementation and contestation can also be combined, as already indicated in the case of China and the R2P. Similarly, when
African actors challenge prevailing norms based on African experiences, they may become mediators allowing African meaning-in-practice to affect global norms. Meanwhile, Acharya’s (2011b) insight that some regional norms develop in opposition to global norms suggests an overlap of the second and fourth pathways. African contestation of existing norms can also have an impact on future norm negotiation. For example, vocal African criticism of the application of contemporary international criminal accountability norms is likely to impede international efforts to define additional international crimes, and this criticism may prevent the emergence of new norms enhancing international criminal prosecution.

For analytical clarity, however, it is important to identify and distinguish between the four pathways. Doing so helps capture the range of contributions African actors have made to prevailing international security norms. In addition, the delineation of the four pathways facilitates classification and comparison of distinctive strategies that Africans can employ to change international norms.

**Book Methodology and Structure**

The central aim of this book is to provide an in-depth, theoretically informed analysis of the various ways in which African actors have contributed to the development of international security norms. We define international security broadly to encompass issues ranging from conflict prevention to peacebuilding. Thus the chapters cover norms in such diverse areas as humanitarian intervention, conflict resources, coups, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and transitional justice in the wake of large-scale human rights abuses. We focus on this key subset of international norms to facilitate a sharply focused, detailed analysis of African actors’ influence. In our estimation, the benefits of close analysis of African contributions to international norm development in this area—showcasing the variety of ways in which a range of African actors have impacted, to greater or lesser degrees, key norms in this one area, with greater comparability between cases—outweigh the disadvantages of remaining silent on similar contributions in other important fields such as the economy or the environment.

**Methodology**

The four pathways discussed here provide the conceptual framework and structure for the remainder of this book. The empirical chapters are organized into four substantive parts, which illustrate the importance, key mechanisms, and limitations of each of the four pathways for African influence
on international norms in turn. Before summarizing the individual case studies, first we offer a brief justification of this book’s overall methodology.

This project is an enterprise in theory refinement and in improving the empirical record, not in grand theorizing or theory-testing. We do not contend that African actors influence all international security norms, or that focusing on African actors provides a complete explanation of a given norm’s creation. What we do argue is that accounts of the emergence and development of many key international norms are radically incomplete if we do not pay attention to African agency. We also contend that African actors shape international security norms in multiple important ways, so that a full understanding of their influence must acknowledge the whole spectrum of pathways for actors to exercise influence. The book is designed to substantiate these conceptual points.

This focus helps explain and renders appropriate the case study method adopted in the individual substantive chapters. The case study approach lends itself to highlighting the mechanisms through which African actors gained influence, analyzing the circumstances and strategies that made this influence possible, and assessing the extent and limitations of African actors’ influence. Each of the empirical chapters in this book presents a case study of African actors shaping one important international security norm, predominantly (but not always exclusively) through one particular pathway. Our case selection was shaped by both conceptual and substantive considerations. Conceptually, each chapter offers a “plausibility probe” (Eckstein 2000, pp. 140–141) for one of the four pathways identified here, though authors were free to also consider additional or overlapping pathways if warranted by the empirics of their case. Substantively, we sought to showcase the range of important international security norms affected by African actors. The cases cover “hard” security issues as well as security issues rooted in economics or social processes, all affecting thousands if not millions of contemporary lives. Our case selection is not exhaustive: even within the field of international security, and certainly beyond it, there are other cases of African influence along each of the pathways. However, our cases do thoroughly substantiate the plausibility of each of the four pathways and they highlight the diversity and importance of African actors’ contributions to international security norm development.

Collectively, moreover, the case study chapters offer the opportunity to draw lessons through comparisons both within each pathway and across pathways. Given our focus on establishing the relevance of each of the four pathways, the chapters do not include “negative” cases where African actors failed to shape global norms, but they do showcase considerable variation in the way African actors exert influence in the international system and the extent to which they impact prevailing norms. The final chapter in this book draws out these lessons and offers them for further research.
The remainder of this book comprises four substantive parts reflecting the four pathways of influence, plus a concluding chapter. The three case studies in the first part of the book illustrate African contributions to global norm creation processes. In Chapter 2, Linda Darkwa shows that African agency has been instrumental in the creation of global norms on humanitarian intervention. Offering a critical review of the long history and complex nature of humanitarian intervention norms, she concludes that both African thinkers and officials and evolving African practices shaped the emergence of current global humanitarian intervention norms in fundamental ways. In Chapter 3, John Pokoo draws insights from different international negotiation settings to argue that African governments and international organizations have contributed significantly to the creation of norms restricting the spread of small arms and light weapons. In particular, he highlights the participation of the Economic Community of West African States and of the Malian state in the creation of global norms to control the trade in and abuse of small arms. Completing our consideration of this pathway, J. Andrew Grant’s contribution in Chapter 4 highlights the critical role that African diamond-producing states and local NGOs played in the development and spread of the global norm of conflict-free diamonds as well as in proposing a conflict-free minerals norm. Somewhat paradoxically, he also shows that some of the same African states were instrumental in blocking attempts to expand the conflict-free diamond norm to cover human rights abuses.

The next three chapters illustrate pathway 2: the development of African-made norms that may or may not diffuse beyond the continent. In Chapter 5, Gerald Bareebe argues that although the Pan-African solidarity norm is largely confined to the continent of Africa, it remains the heartbeat of Africa’s international politics and significantly shapes the development of other norms on the continent, including the African Union’s emerging non-indifference norm. In Chapter 6, Gilbert Khadiagala contends that the concept of elder statespersons has been mainstreamed into conflict mediation, prevention, and management in Africa. He situates this evolution in a wider movement to foster indigenous approaches to African conflict resolution and to put to greater use the expertise, stature, and wisdom of statesmen and stateswomen in Africa. He notes that although some aspects of the norm have diffused to the global level (witness the creation of the Elders and some appointments of Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General), it remains largely within the confines of the African continent. Issaka Souaré continues the story of African-made norms in Chapter 7, contending that the reaction of non-African governments and international organizations to military coups since 2000 is driven in large part by the AU’s anti-coup norms and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. He notes that the norm, which
has contributed to the reduction of coups on the African continent and is widely respected in Africa, has spread to member states of the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF).

The next three case studies demonstrate the plausibility of pathway 3: African actors shaping international norms through creative implementation of those norms. In Chapter 8, W. R. Nadège Compaoré explores how Ghanaian actors used their participation and implementation of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to localize global norms, asserting both Ghana’s agency over the governance of its natural resources and its role as norm-maker rather than mere norm-taker. The chapter suggests that in establishing national ownership over EITI norm implementation, Ghanaian actors have significantly influenced ongoing reforms of the global EITI framework, including redefining key EITI requirements and standards. Similarly, in Chapter 9, Tim Murithi highlights how African actors have consistently asserted their right to determine what it means to implement the norms of transitional justice and reconciliation in particular political contexts. National actors selectively implement particular transitional justice mechanisms that they deem appropriate or beneficial in their specific context, and they have made a number of innovations to transitional justice. In Chapter 10, Annette Seegers rounds out our consideration of this pathway by focusing on the evolution of the protection of civilians norm. She highlights three conceptual additions African actors have made to the norm (retributive justice through regional courts, regional diplomacy to protect civilians, and implementation by counter-insurgency measures) and three aspects of the norm that African actors have destabilized: protecting civilians in partnership with local actors; by military force-of-numbers; and by political deterrence through the threat of retributive justice and intervention. Importantly, she notes that motivations of the African actors whose actions shaped the meaning-in-use of the global protection of civilians norm were often not primarily normative but instrumental and oriented toward immediate material interests.

Finally, we turn to pathway 4: the direct contestation of global norms by African actors. Bright Mando demonstrates in Chapter 11 that concerns about anti-African bias and misapplication of the universal jurisdiction norm led to the expansion in June 2014 of the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to include international crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity) and transnational crimes (trafficking in persons or drugs, terrorism, and piracy), as well as to the granting of immunity to senior African policymakers. The move allowed the African regional court to claim the legal space that certain European courts were carving for themselves over Africans and thereby undercut the misuse and abuse of universal jurisdiction by non-African entities. In Chapter 12, Walter Lotze highlights the emergence of a complex peace and secu-
rity regime in Africa, in which the UN has increasingly had to recognize and acknowledge African actors as indispensable partners in the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa. Within the space of a decade, African actors have come to directly challenge the prevailing international norm of the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security when it comes to the affairs of the African continent, and African actors are reshaping this norm from a logic of hierarchy to a logic of shared responsibility. The chapter traces this normative evolution, examining in particular the manner in which African actors, through various norm contestation processes, have been able to effectively influence and change a prevailing global security norm.

In the conclusion of the book, we highlight common themes and contrasting insights of African agency and norm development uncovered in the empirical chapters, return to the issue of overlap among pathways, and reflect on our contribution to the fields of international relations and African politics.

Notes

1. Rare exceptions include Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014; Helleiner 2014b; Sikkink 2014; Acharya 2014; Williams 2007; Souaré 2014.
2. For important exceptions, see DeLancey, Reed, Spyke, and Steen 1997.
3. See also Elgström 2000.
4. This echoes the distinction between “active” and “passive” EU influence on other regional actors in Lenz and Burilkov 2017.
5. These included the US Institute of Peace, the Brookings Institution, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Johns Hopkins University, and the Library of Congress.
6. Carla Winston (2017) links this dynamic to the emergence of “normative clusters.”
7. For an exposition of the advantages of case study design in international relations theory, see Bennett 2004.
8. In the initial stages of the project, some cases were moved from one pathway to another, as the empirics dictated.