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In 1787 James Madison decried the “mischiefs of faction” in “Federalist 10,” saying that factions, which he defined as parochial conglomerations of interests averse to the rights of others or the interest of the community, produce the “mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished” (1787: 10). Madison’s concern—derived from his analysis of the Athenian and Roman experiments with democracy—was prescient. Some 220 years later, the US Political Instability Task Force (PITF), combining senior scholars and policymakers, published its Phase IV findings on the causes of political instability (i.e., civil war, revolution, genocide) in the 2010 volume of the influential American Journal of Political Science (Goldstone et al. 2010). In a distinct echo of Madison’s warning, the PITF found that a single condition, factionalism, derived from Madison’s definition and coded in the Polity IV data series, was by far the most important predictor of political instability events around the world since the 1940s.

The PITF’s Phase IV findings, which confirmed the results of its previous analyses, spurred significant research into the problem of factionalism, including a 6-year study by me and a research team at the Center for Systemic Peace led by Monty G. Marshall, reviewing every change in governance for 167 states (all countries with populations greater than 500,000), back to 1955 and, in some cases, independence.¹ In addition to more than 100 country reports, this study also produced a body of research, conference papers, and publications by me, alone and in collaboration with Marshall and others, situating factionalism in the context of governance more broadly and analyzing the relationships between factionalism and related phenomena.² The results of these
analyses confirm both Madison’s warnings and the PITF’s findings: factionalism is a distinct condition of state-society interaction that is endemic to the democratization experience, and it is one of the most mortal diseases faced by government.

Madison called for any “friend of popular government” to “provide a proper cure” for the factional condition, preferably without violating liberty and diversity (1787: 10). I have written this book to that end. In these pages I seek to show within the myriad experiences of democratizing states, common factors, policies, and strategies that may point toward smart practices for managing (or even avoiding) overt factionalism in the democratic transition process as well as those policies and strategies that states should avoid. Before that, however, I need to define our terms and place factionalism into a theoretical framework, mindful of its position vis-à-vis other, more established bodies of scholarship. Thus, I organized this book into three key parts: (1) defining factionalism and situating the condition within a broader theoretical framework of state-society relations (this chapter and the Appendix); (2) investigating the nature of factionalism from a global (macrocomparative) perspective, describing all cases of factionalism from 1946 to 2015 (Chapter 2); and (3) analyzing the experiences of 14 countries in a panel of most-different systems (MDS) analyses to distill smart practices for avoiding or managing factionalism in the democratization process (Chapters 3 through 6). In the conclusion (Chapter 7), I synthesize the book’s findings and briefly consider ramifications for mature democracies, including the United States.

I begin this introductory chapter by defining factionalism, then briefly situate the concept of factionalism in the context of recent research into polarization and democratization across the social sciences. After that, I concisely introduce a theoretical framework for conceptualizing factionalism (a full theoretical treatment can be found in the Appendix) before concluding with an outline of the book.

**Defining Factionalism**

_Factionalism_ is a naturally occurring condition of political participation, common to but latent in autocratic regimes, characterized by persistent systemic polarization of political society, which frequently emerges during the political liberalization process associated with the initial stages of democratization. While the definition of factionalism used here is based on Madison’s concept of _faction_ from “Federalist 10,” Madison’s defini-
tion is problematic in that it could also apply to interest groups or, indeed, political parties, in a conventional mode of political participation. Who decides when a party’s, interest group’s, or labor union’s activities have become averse to the rights of the community?

The definition of *factionalism* used here (and operationalized in Polity IV) avoids these problems by describing a distinct *systemic* condition of political participation and state-society interaction, which reflects patterns of political behavior that are both systemic and sustained, characterized by extreme polarization (beginning with elites but including, typically, mass mobilization), antisystem rhetoric, disruptive political behavior, coercive behavior by the state, and parallel and reinforcing identity-based, economic, and political cleavages. A *faction*, in turn, is a conglomeration of individuals, groups, and often political parties, organized around a common goal of controlling the polity and removing the opposition faction from the political landscape, without regard for the effects of their efforts on the political system or the welfare of the society as a whole. While an interest group, political party, or identity group may form part of a faction, and may often serve as the most visible and identifying leadership within a faction, such a group cannot, itself, be a faction in this sense. Indeed, it is typical for factions to fracture if they are successful in eliminating the opposition faction, as they often include groups that otherwise possess distinct, competing, and incompatible interests.

While recognition of the importance of this kind of factionalism has only recently reemerged, the concept itself is old. Among political philosophers, Madison’s definition of faction was quite common in the late eighteenth century, and can be seen in George Washington’s Farewell Address (drafted by Alexander Hamilton) and in the work of Thomas Jefferson (Sartori 1976). Henry Bolingbroke, David Hume, Edmund Burke, and Voltaire engaged in a vigorous debate over the meaning and import of the terms *party* and *faction*, decades before the protagonists of the American Revolution adopted the vernacular of the argument (Bolingbroke 1734; Burke 1770; Hume 1742). Epitomized by Voltaire, “the term party is not, in itself, loathsome; the term faction always is” (1764: 765). Intriguingly, as the term *party* came into common use and was developed theoretically by party theorists such as Moisey Ostrogorski, Robert Michels, and Harvey Mansfield, the term *faction*, as used by Madison and refined here, gradually left the vocabulary of most political scientists. Giovanni Sartori, in Parties and Party Systems, traces the evolution of the term *party* and its meaning as distinct from this older concept of faction:
Parties are not factions; that is, unless a party is different from a faction, it is not a party (but a faction). . . . Parties are often criticized, but they are not an evil by definition . . . factions are an evil. . . . To be sure, party members are not altruists, and the existence of parties by no means eliminates selfish and unscrupulous motivations. . . . The difference is, then, that parties are instrumental to collective benefits, to an end that is not merely the private benefit of the contestants. Parties link people to a government, while factions do not. Parties enhance a set of system capabilities, while factions do not. . . . Parties are functional agencies . . . while factions are not. . . . (1976: 22)

Unfortunately, Sartori’s plea that the distinction between parties and factions “should be kept conceptually firm” went unheeded, and the term factionalism evolved to describe a distinct subgroup or caucus within a political party. In the US case, for example, political scientists might refer to the libertarian faction of the Republican Party. However, the mischief of Madisonian faction—systemic sustained polarization of political society, organized around parallel and reinforcing identity, economic, and social cleavages, employing antisystem rhetoric and disruptive or coercive political tactics, with factions pursuing each other’s destruction without regard for the cost to the welfare of the community—certainly did not fade away, and neither have its deleterious effects on politics.

Indeed, the recent “waves” of democratization have made factionalism all the more common in the past century, affecting nearly every case of democratization. Empirical work on defining and understanding these different experiences associated with factionalism has continued across multiple academic fields, in many ways as the central problem of the post–World War II era, although this scholarship has not typically used the terms faction or factionalism. In political science and sociology, studies of ethnic violence, political polarization, and sectarian violence have emerged to analyze and explain parts of this broader concept, but in isolated and disaggregated fashion. In social psychology, studies of in-group and out-group dynamics have focused on the same phenomenon from a different lens, offering explanations for how factions form, again without using the term. Substantial portions of the fields of peace studies and conflict analysis and resolution are dedicated to the problem of factionalism, without using the term. These studies have all approached a single phenomenon, factionalism, but in searching for the cause have identified a particular aspect (e.g., ethnicity or religious identification) of the factions involved—the symbolic issue
that appears to divide the polarized groups, the effects of polarization in political behavior, or the process by which groups form—without recognizing that all may in fact have been researching a common phenomenon: factionalism. *Factionalism*, as discussed here, is thus not a new term or concept, but reflects the original meaning of the term *faction*. It is, I hypothesize, a common phenomenon behind the apparent social cleavages, polarization, and sectarian violence, among other outcomes, that have been well researched (separately) by generations of scholars from different subfields using different terms.

Of these, the most important for this analysis of factionalism is the study of sociopolitical polarization—the study of how and why societies separate into two groups with distinct, and opposing, interests, goals, and often identity constructs. The process that drives political polarization, the nature of the polarized political state, and the methods used to manage it are all essential to the study of factionalism. Indeed, the particular concept of factionalism explored here has sometimes, especially in European political science scholarship, been called “polarization” and found to be a critical predictor of political violence.

The effect of political polarization on economic growth has been a particularly productive research topic in recent years. Timothy Frye (2002) addresses the effects of extreme polarization between communist and postcommunist groups that he calls “factions” on economic growth in Central and Eastern European countries. Frye borrows significantly from Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, who use antisystem parties, which they describe as “left and populist parties that have historically mobilized around anti-capitalist or anti-oligarchic protests,” to measure political polarization (1995: 167). Frye uses the term *faction* to depict these groups, which he identifies as polarized over sociopolitical and economic ideology, although Frye does not address systemic conditions created by the contention among his factions, nor the etymology of the word “faction.”

Although Frye does not stop to consider the meaning of the term *faction* that he applies to these groups, he does identify an important correlate of intense polarization, which is also a key part of our definition of factionalism: conflation of policy debates with identity politics associated with merging social, economic, and political cleavages. Originally identified by Alberto Alesina and Allen Drazen (1991), refined by Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal (1995), and further examined by Morris Fiorina (1996), this conflation results in a war of attrition between factions whereby no policy consensus can emerge until one group “wins” by marginalizing its opponent. Only when one faction
wins the political struggle (e.g., after an election allows the victor to subjugate the loser) should we expect coherent government policy, a productive response by the private sector, and improved economic performance. The consolidation of political forces around a roughly similar policy ends the war of attrition and allows the winners to shift the costs of transformation onto the losers (Frye 2002).

This result of polarization, a war of attrition over policy, has been identified in many other studies of polarization, across different types of cleavages. William Easterly and Ross Levine (1997), for example, developed indexes of ethnic fractionalization to measure the effect of polarization along ethnic cleavages on economic growth in Africa. Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack, of the World Bank, conducted a similar study of ethnic polarization, also incorporating economic inequality, finding similar results (2000, 2002). In situations where political systems are highly polarized, regardless of the nature of the social cleavage (e.g., religious, ethnic, ideological), political stalemate between the two groups develops and, unless a force emerges that encourages cooperation, will prevent the development of coherent policy until one group emerges victorious or until the divisions shake the polity apart. This tendency is one of the reasons why factionalism, which incorporates this combination of polarization along parallel and reinforcing cleavages (regardless of cleavage type), is so dangerous.

The emergence of polarization is particularly common in democratizing states and young democracies, which tend to be characterized by political and social divisions between supporters and opponents of the preceding autocratic regime who often benefited from and suffered under that regime, respectively. Adrienne Lebas (2006), for example, argues that polarization in new democracies is caused not by preexisting ethnic, religious, or ideological cleavages themselves, but as the result of mobilization strategies of social movements and political parties against the autocrat, which often reflect patterns of social and political activism along those cleavages. Her case study of Zimbabwean politics demonstrates that political groups (generally, parties) purposefully polarized society to build and mobilize particular constituencies. Once set in motion, however, the polarization took on a life of its own, exceeding its instigators’ realm of control. Lebas’s work identifies an important element in our conceptualization of factionalism: elites seeking greater political power will use polarization and mass mobilization as strategies to build their organizations and mobilize their constituents against the opposing faction. A similar dynamic is identified in the cases of Egypt and Thailand in Chapter 6 of this book.
Sometimes, however, factionalism seems to occur endogenously, without an instrumental cause. Studies of such natural causes of polarization are numerous. Murat Somer (2001) addresses a phenomenon in Yugoslavia similar to that studied by Lebas in Zimbabwe, using cascade theory to examine how polarization became self-propagating along ethnic lines as divisive political questions were associated with ethnic identity (Somer 2001). Why ethnicity becomes salient, however, is left unclear. Several studies on polarization in Venezuela have highlighted the combined effects of natural polarization and strategic polarization, especially as used by Hugo Chávez in his rise to power (Corrales 2005; Garcia-Guadilla 2003; Lopez Maya 2004). Sook-Jong Lee (2005) argues that a combination of economic forces and divisive elite groups in South Korea, including political leaders, the media, and leaders of civic movement organizations, has caused polarization along socio-economic cleavages. The model that I employ builds on this work, assuming that autocratic governments inherently create divisive conditions among economic and political elites who, upon liberalization, frequently then mobilize the population along existing identity cleavages to garner their support in a bid to seize control of the polity and right the collective wrongs inflicted or proposed by the opposition. This also means that overt factionalism, in theory, could be avoided through strategies that minimize elite incentives to mobilize the population such as through a guided transition that incorporates opposition elites into the polity, or by co-optation of opposition elites by the autocratic regime.

Avoiding the polarization associated with factionalism has been rare, and managing polarization and stopping polarization from leading to strife is particularly difficult for young democracies. Such states are particularly vulnerable because they are obligated to allow manifestations of factionalism (e.g., mass protests and electoral boycotts) to proceed, but lack the conflict resolution institutions (e.g., independent judiciary, legislative checks on executive authority, participatory local and regional governments, rule of law) needed to manage and depolarize an intensely polarized society. Polarization (and its consequent political attrition) will continue to worsen until such institutions are implemented or, as in so many cases, political violence erupts to resolve the polarization. In proposing solutions for young democracies some, especially those writing on economic consequences of political polarization, have argued in favor of improving systems of property rights (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Frye 2002; Keefer and Knack 2000, 2002) while others have focused on the role a strong judiciary can play in managing polarization-related conflict (Garcia-Guadilla 2003; Corrales
2005). However, given the weak judiciaries, strong executives, and nascent legal systems in many young democracies, it is difficult to see either solution having a significant impact on the reduction of polarization. These strategies may be more effective, however, among consolidated democracies, as suggested for example by studies of Malta (Cini 2002) and the United States (Layman, Carsey, and Menasce Horowitz 2006). In this book, I look to such institutional and structural forces as possible factors for mitigating factionalism in Chapters 3 through 6. The example case study of Belgium in Chapter 2 confirms the findings of Michelle Cini and Geoffrey Layman, Thomas Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz that polarization in mature democracies can indeed be intensified by structural rules or institutional reforms that inhibit self-correcting mechanisms in the democratic system. In general, polarization studies make a significant contribution to our understanding of how the advanced state of polarization characteristic of factionalism occurs, and offer suggestions into where we should look to determine how polarization might be managed to avoid strife.

Studies of sectarian and ethnic conflict offer analyses of a specific type of societal polarization, with factions divided by religious and ethnic identity, or both. As factionalism is, by definition, a condition characterized by highly polarized political participation that has taken on parallel and reinforcing cleavages along identity lines (in addition to other factors), these two areas of research are quite relevant to a complete understanding of the factionalism problem. Polarization matters, and identity cleavages matter, but they are individual pieces of the broader and more fundamental problem of factionalism. The term sect, like faction, has developed a pejorative meaning in its recent usage. Studies of sectarian conflict usually refer to conflict between religious groups, including groups within a larger religious orientation (e.g., Catholic and Protestant Christians in Northern Ireland, or Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Iraq) or between different religions (e.g., Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs in India). Ethnic conflict studies, in contrast, analyze conflict between competing groups of people who identify with each other on the basis of a presumed common genealogy or ancestry, or because of recognition by others as a separate ethnic group. These identity groups are often intersectional, as in the case of Sri Lanka with the Tamil/Sinhalese ethnic cleavage overlapping a religious Hindu/Buddhist cleavage, or in Myanmar where the Burmese/Rohingya cleavage overlaps a religious Buddhist/Muslim cleavage; both cases also feature distinct geographic, economic, and linguistic cleavages parallel to these identity lines. In cases of factionalism, such intersectional cleavages are
parallel and reinforcing, and often are made salient by elites through political rhetoric and mass mobilization.

Understanding how groups form their identities has been the subject of considerable theoretical development, particularly but not exclusively in social psychology. Ted Robert Gurr has described groups as “psychological communities whose core members share a distinctive and collective identity based on cultural traits and life ways that matter to them or to others with which they interact” (Gurr 1993: 3). While Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif have identified tendencies of the group to pressure members to conform to group norms and goals to achieve cohesion, individuals also have a natural incentive to associate with an identity group (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Kawachi and Berkman 2000). Being part of a group offers security and a sense of meaning, and provides an individual a cohort with which to associate (J. Ross 1993). The mutually beneficial relationship between identity group and member, documented in social science as early as 1906, leads to in-group identification and intergroup differentiation (Summer 1906). When an individual’s group is the center of his or her frame of reference, fellow group members are perceived as being intrinsically closer than out-group individuals who are perceived as outsiders (Levine and Campbell 1972).

Many scholars have applied identity group theory to both sectarian and ethnic conflicts. Simon Haddad (2000) analyzed sectarian polarization in Lebanon, measuring each faction’s strength of group consciousness in terms of group cohesion, group solidarity, and satisfaction with group membership. He found high degrees of group consciousness and was able to conclude that, because of a lack of a strong national identity, individuals were more likely to associate themselves with their sect (faction) than with the Lebanese state. Caroline Nagel (2002) also applied group consciousness theory to government attempts to develop a common national group consciousness that would supersede that of its religious factions, and came to conclusions that were similar to Haddad’s despite his focus on spatial identity effects.

Many similar studies linking ethnic, sectarian, and ethnosectarian conflict to identity mobilization and group consciousness theory have surfaced recently. Peter Shirlow (2003), John Alderdice (2007), and Sheena McGrellis (2005) have produced substantial work on group consciousness and identity formation in Ireland. Vali R. Nasr, Mariam Abdou Zahab, and Muhammed Makki, Saleem Ali, and Kitty Van Vuuren have done similar work in Pakistan, and Manochehr Dorraj has applied identity mobilization theory to Iranian politics (Dorraj 2006; Nasr 2000, 2002; Zahab 2002; Makki, Ali, and Van Vuuren 2015). The
Arab Spring revolutions have produced significant bodies of literature on the development of polarization around identity groups across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Like the work of Haddad and Nagel, these studies of polarization in diverse countries have found that high group consciousness within polarized groups is correlated with the lack of a strong national identity and, perhaps not surprisingly, a strong tendency toward conflict and instability.

These studies, from multiple disciplines and subfields, point to several key findings that underlie a common pattern associated with democratization. Factionalism is latent in most, if not all, societies under repressive regimes because repression effectively divides society into supporters and opponents of the repressors. And it often distributes resources down those lines as well, encouraging group formation and creating parallel and reinforcing cleavages along, frequently, identity lines. Authoritarian governance strategies—suppression and repression, in practice variations on martial law—keep factionalism from manifesting in its overt form. However, when an autocratic state initiates political liberalization, whether due to international pressure, domestic pressure, or, more rarely, out of the benevolence of the autocrat, the latent factionalism is able to manifest. Factions emerge along the lines of one or more major existing cleavages, which become parallel with and reinforce other social, economic, political, or identity cleavages (due in part to instrumental efforts by elites), and display different characteristics depending on institutional, historical, and cultural settings. These factions (or, more accurately, the elites leading them) employ antisystem rhetoric and utilize disruptive political tactics, often in the form of organizing electoral boycotts, mass demonstrations, or political riots, while the faction in power responds coercively but typically within certain bounds short of violence or repression (e.g., electoral manipulation rather than forced disappearances). Factions claim that control over the polity, marginalization of the opposite faction, and often wholesale reform of the political system constitute the only remedy for contention and, sometimes, survival. As these large groups become institutionalized and gain power, they often act to limit the ability of the opposite contender to act and to co-opt moderates into their groups (or, in the worst cases, kill them). The polarization of these groups thus becomes sustained; leaders cultivate in-group status by focusing on identity rather than policy cleavages, in part to minimize the often quite significant policy divisions among their component organizations, and thereby form a more cohesive unit. This in turn aggravates political contention since any political disagreements become associated with
symbolic group identity rather than questions of policy. As the system polarizes, the number of main factions approaches two, and political issues become increasingly identity based, which intensifies group identity coherence and reinforces incentives for group formation.

Liberalizing governments are then faced with a dilemma: factionalism is dangerous and damages political institutions, but cracking down on the increasingly raucous political participation means reverting to a more authoritarian governing strategy and effectively forces factionalism back underground. To stay the course means to take what might seem like an enormous risk and allow the factional political dynamic to play out on the national stage, with potentially destabilizing effects. Historically, factionalism in and following democratic transitions was dealt with by one of three strategies: (1) gradual, although often violent, resolution of polarizing questions within the polity; (2) territorial expansion delaying resolution of polarizing questions or allowing, encouraging, or forcing relocation of polarized identity groups; and (3) by marginalizing or disenfranchising politically significant factions.

Today, however, political elites are much less patient, are generally unable to rely on territorial expansion to delay the resolution of factionalism, and are much more closely watched than the American founders. The modern world anticipates that developing democracies will undergo immediate elections, guarantee universal franchise, and protect civil liberties and political rights, expectations that can be difficult and even dangerous to meet while the factionalism condition is manifest. Japan and Germany each waited years before holding their first national elections for a chief executive after World War II, despite boasting nearly every positive precondition of successful democratization known to social science—strong economies; experience with democracy in the past; large middle classes; homogenous religious, ethnic, and national identities. Yet the Western world expected Iraq, with a political society and neighborhood much less conducive to liberalization, to hold free and fair elections with universal suffrage in a much faster time while simultaneously warding off civil war. Perhaps not surprisingly, of those societies that have become outwardly factional, which include most democratizing states, more than half have experienced a failed democratic transition or a major armed conflict. It is no coincidence that these crises tend to come during, or immediately following, a national election, as elections explicitly ask members of the population to mobilize in support of opposing elites.

While autocratic systems can maintain stability by coercively preventing opposition organization and political discourse in general—this
is the autocratic modus operandi—young democracies are particularly vulnerable to factionalism. That is because, in addition to inheriting a factional legacy left by autocratic predecessors, young or incomplete democracies are expected to manage the factional condition peacefully, but lack the institutions and experience required to effectively manage polarization within conventional deliberative norms. Thus, while only one autocracy (Nepal, 2002–2005) has been coded as openly factional during the contemporary period, factionalism in anocracies is nearly endemic and occurs even in relatively institutionalized democracies.

The concept of factionalism offers a conceptual reimagining of the preeminent problem facing young democracies, but is not new. Employed here, factionalism reflects the central problem underlying studies of political polarization (predominantly sociological studies of group formation, and studies of ethnic and sectarian conflict), all of which have identified independent aspects of the problem of factionalism, as defined here, as driving forces behind political instability, autocratic backsliding, and failed transitions.

**Operationalizing Factionalism**

This book operationalizes factionalism using the definition provided in the Polity IV users’ manual (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010: 25). In the Polity scheme, factional is the middling (code 3) category, of five categories on the ordinal competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP) indicator, which categorizes political competitiveness and, to a degree, regulation of competitiveness by the states, and ranges from 1 (repressed) to 5 (competitive). PARCOMP is one of six indicators used to characterize a regime’s pattern of authority in the Polity IV scheme, and one of two variables (with PARREG [regulation of participation]) used to characterize the political competition (POLCOMP) component variable. PARCOMP measures the extent to which “alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena” (Marshall et al. 2004: 25). In factional polities, measured as PARCOMP = 3, parochial “factions compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas” (Marshall et al. 2004: 25).

In practice, Polity IV coders identify and code the factional condition based on its manifestations in political society in ways that are systemic and sustained, and coding occurs with a high degree of intercoder reliability due in part to the extensive training required of Polity coders.
Factionalism onsets are typically dated to a major act of liberalization that allowed the factional condition to manifest, such as the lifting of martial law or promulgation of a new constitution. Alternatively, factionalism onsets may be dated to an event or process that is associated with major manifestations of factionalism, such as a national election. Coders are trained to identify indicators of polarized politics, including the emergence of antisystem rhetoric, the formation of unnatural alliances among groups with conflicting interests, incidents of mass mobilization (e.g., mass demonstrations, protests), coercive behavior by government (e.g., extrajudicial detentions, election manipulation), and disruptive political tactics (e.g., electoral boycotts, widespread strikes), any of which may indicate polarized politics and the potential for the existence of factionalism. Factionalism, however, is typically coded only when most or all of these indicators are present on a sustained and systemic basis. Polity IV is coded annually, with news events archived throughout the year and analyzed at year’s end for evidence of changes to any of the indicators that comprise the Polity framework, including PARCOMP (and, thus, factionalism). Any of the indicators of factionalism, but particularly disruptive tactics with evidence of mass mobilization (e.g., election boycotts, mass demonstrations), coercion by the state (e.g., illegal detentions, election postponement), and emergence of antisystem rhetoric or action, cue coders to research a case more thoroughly. To do so, they must investigate whether additional indicators of factionalism exist and, if so, whether there is evidence of sustained factionalism, or whether a case would be more accurately coded using a different value (e.g., PARCOMP = 2 for suppression; PARCOMP = 5 for competitive).

It is particularly difficult for the Polity coder to differentiate between mass mobilization and disruptive political tactics that occur in the context of conventional politics (e.g., strikes are normal in French political behavior) and such tactics that are truly indicative of the factional condition, which features similar forms of apparently disruptive political behavior. Although student strikes that shut down all universities and public transportation are normal in Paris or Dakar, the same would be an indicator of significant political polarization in London or Accra (and, thus, a cue to look for additional factionalism indicators). The difference is often in the distinct nature of rhetoric, in political tactics and their apparent purposes, and in the nature of factional alliances because under factionalism the political system polarizes into two distinct political poles vying for control of the polity and marginalization of the opposing faction, and frequently displays state coercion and antisystem rhetoric and tactics. Because factionalism is a middling
condition on an ordinal variable, coders carefully consider borderline cases and generally prefer to maintain the code applied the previous year in the event of significant uncertainty. Coders also discuss and debate such cases at length, looking for evidence in the historical record to inform a coding decision. Coders keep a log of the events that caused them to assign a coding change and these logs, as well as the logs from the original Polity coding archive, are available from the Center for Systemic Peace on request. I strongly recommend that readers interested in the details of Polity’s structure or coding practices consult the Polity IV user’s manual (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010).

After the Political Instability Task Force published its Phase IV findings highlighting the importance of factionalism in predictive models of democratic backsliding and in political instability, I worked with Monty G. Marshall, director of the Polity project and president of the Center for Systemic Peace, to conduct a comprehensive review of the Polity data series. Our emphasis was on review of factionalism onsets and periods, partly to investigate criticism by Vreeland (2008) that the Polity scheme conflated political violence with the coding of factionalism. We reviewed every change in governance in every country in the world back to 1946 (or in some cases independence), verifying that Polity code changes were valid, accurately dated, and detailed in the logs, and we altered the dataset in those few cases where codes were demonstrated to be erroneous (primarily among mature democracies whose complex histories were often neglected by the original coders). This review, which took 6 years to complete and analyze, resulted in the production of more than 100 country reports noting every change in governance in every country ever coded as factional in the Polity scheme. This body of reports—the source of much of the data for this book—describe, for every episode of factionalism in the world between 1955 and the completion of the reports in 2010, the identities of the core factions, the background information on, and the nature of, the onset event, and the results of the factionalism experience. I then led a review and coding exercise of those country reports with a team of graduate and undergraduate research assistants at Simmons College in 2013 and 2015, coding these country reports and, where country reports were missing or needed updating, the historical record as maintained by the Keesing’s World News Archive (Keesing’s 2017) and the BBC Monitoring: International Reports archive available through Lexis-Nexis (BBC Monitoring 2017). Summaries of these results are presented in Chapter 2.

While factionalism certainly has the potential to be destructive, this review project and our subsequent analysis demonstrated that fac-
tionalism is distinct from, and not conflated with, political violence or instability. Factionalism is nearly universal among democratizing states, and many factional states avoid political violence and major episodes of political instability altogether. Furthermore, violence by the state, or widespread political violence in the population, in most cases actually disqualifies a case from being coded factional, as political violence typically indicates suppression (2) or repression (1) to be more appropriate PARCOMP values. State repression precludes the occurrence of factionalism whereas effective resistance to state authority (e.g., revolution or civil war) also precludes factionalism by fragmenting the polity and establishing a rival separatist polity, which is distinctly coded in the Polity scheme. This review also dramatically strengthened our confidence in the specific details of factionalism episodes between 1946 and 2015 (and the Polity data series more generally) by confirming the accuracy of those coding decisions (and changing the codes when they were inaccurate), tying every coding change to a specific event, and documenting patterns of state and societal behavior during every factionalism episode.

This inductive enterprise to verify validity within the Polity scheme was accompanied by a deductive effort, primarily by Marshall, to situate factionalism (and political competition generally) in a theoretical framework, briefly discussed here and explained in substantially more detail in the Appendix for those interested in a longer theoretical treatment. Marshall’s societal-systems process (SSP) model conceives of democratic and autocratic regimes as independent from, but existing at natural equilibrium points along, a continuum characterized by different types of political participation and contention within a polity. These types range from conventional politics to open warfare. Factionalism is a distinct middling condition on this continuum, as well as the equilibrium point at which autocracies are most common, primarily due to the polarizing nature of autocratic governance (Marshall and Cole 2008, 2012; Marshall 2014). Factionalism under autocratic governance is latent due to the repressive tactics employed by autocratic regimes to maintain order. Liberalization (in terms of deregulation and increasing density of complexity, defined here as social and political participation in the polity) and militancy both undermine autocratic authority. Democratic systems, in contrast, are at an equilibrium point in conventional politics. And democratic institutions weaken as political energy in the system increases, causing political tensions to escalate and driving the political process toward contentious politics and issue factionalism modes, which with further polarization and cleavage alignment can lead
to the condition of factionalism being studied here, called “polar factionalism” in the SSP model. In the worst cases, intensification can lead to probing militancy and even open warfare. In this model established democratic systems are generally self-correcting, so migration along the continuum past contentious politics is typically rare, while autocratic systems can rely on force to restore equilibrium. Anocracies and young democracies are particularly vulnerable to migration rightward along the SSP continuum since they lack the institutions and experience necessary to self-correct and are inhibited from using force to resolve contention and stop escalating tensions. So too, established democratic systems might cease to be self-correcting if democratic institutions are altered or undermined, as I show in this book has occurred in Belgium, and potentially the United States, in recent years.

Figure 1.1 presents Marshall’s general SSP model (Marshall and Cole 2012), which takes the form of a schematic including six conditions from conventional politics through open warfare. These conditions are distinguished by the nature of political participation and regulation of political affairs in the polity, which manifest in the degree of polarization, the rhetoric used in political discourse (especially identity-based symbolism and rhetoric), the nature and degree of mass mobiliza-

Figure 1.1 The Societal-Systems Process Model

Note: Monty G. Marshall, in Marshall and Cole (2008) first developed the societal-systems process (SSP) model and the diagram on which this revised figure is based. It is also discussed at length in the Appendix, and in Marshall’s various works on societal-systems analysis (Marshall 2011, 2014).
tion and disruptive political tactics, the nature of political alliances and coalitions (particularly the emergence of unnatural alliances and parallel social cleavages), and the scope and organization of extreme or antisystem rhetoric and behavior. Note that the SSP model is not a model of regime type—many of these already exist in the political science literature—but rather the nature of state-society interaction, which helps to contextualize patterns of authority in different regime types and to explain common trajectories of regime transition. A more thorough discussion of this model and descriptions of each of these conditions are provided in the Appendix.

Although any given state-society system may exhibit characteristics of any of the conditions on the continuum in Figure 1.1, most mature democracies exhibit political competition characteristic of the conventional politics condition, with a tendency to occasionally migrate rightward as problems emerge that escalate tensions, particularly when political cleavages align (either naturally or through instrumental behavior by elites) with identity, wealth, power, discrimination, or status. In general, though, for mature democracies, migration into nonconventional political conditions should be rare and typically temporary, as self-correcting institutions and political culture should disincentivize disruptive tactics, encourage cross-cutting cleavages, and create incentive structures that favor returning to conventional political dynamics. Furthermore, the degree to which politically salient cleavages are parallel and reinforcing in a factionalism episode should be inversely correlated to the probability of peacefully resolving a factionalism episode. Formally, I hypothesize the following:

**Hypothesis 1:** As the number of parallel and reinforcing cleavages increases, the probability of achieving a peaceful resolution of the factionalism episode decreases.

Autocracies, in contrast, should cluster in the polar factionalism condition since such regimes generate the polarization underlying factionalism as they award spoils to their supporters and repress their opponents, although factionalism in such cases is latent due to repression of mass political participation. Unlike democratic systems, autocracies are generally not self-correcting, but rather rely on instrumental coercion, repression, and military force to return to their equilibrium point. For those autocracies that do not utilize force to restore order and repress manifestations of factionalism, liberalization allows open factionalism that will drive some state-societal systems leftward, with factions typically
demanding more open liberal political participation. Many such states do respond with force, and either open factionalism is successfully repressed, or the state-societal system migrates rightward, degenerating into militancy and warfare. This can lead the most unfortunate cases, such as Central African Republic (explored in Chapter 6), to experience near-total collapse of central authority (state failure).

For a state-societal system to move along the SSP model, there must be a change in its energy state. Conventional politics in a democracy is a complex system, requiring substantial ongoing energy inputs to maintain. Self-correcting mechanisms such as institutions and political culture in mature democracies, however, pose an obstacle to rightward migration in the process model that requires additional energy to overcome. Democracies thus exhibit characteristics of metastability; they exist at equilibrium under conventional politics but, with sufficient additional energy, they can move to a temporarily higher state of energy. Under the right circumstances, and depending on central government choices, state-societal systems can migrate to higher or lower energy states. A state-societal system migrating rightward reaches an alternative equilibrium point at factionalism where, if it has adopted coercive tactics associated with autocratic states, it can repress interaction at a relatively low energy cost that minimizes complexity in the system. At this point, which for an autocratic state is its natural point of equilibrium, a state-societal system is again metastable—maintaining equilibrium through minor systemic perturbations.

We might make an analogy of the state-societal system to a ball on a curving slope, with democratic and autocratic equilibrium points analogous to valleys in the slope. Generally, it requires less energy to move rightward than it requires to move leftward in the model since complexity, which we might operationalize as the density of politically significant interaction among people and organizations, increases moving leftward on the model and decreases moving rightward. This is modeled in Figure 1.1. In practice, of course, democratization and autocratization are not linear processes, and some state-societal systems may effectively jump from one condition to another.

For both autocratization and democratization, deviation from the equilibrium points in Figure 1.1. should generally be self-limiting, and thus migration should be rare. For autocracies, such migration is generally associated with transitions in regime or loss of the monopoly on the use of force (enabling militancy and open warfare). The societal, economic, and political disturbance associated with migration consumes tremendous energy and resources and, particularly in movement
toward militancy, damages the social and economic networks that are essential for society to function. Those polities that transition through militancy toward open warfare risk fragmentation of the polity as the system collapses or fragments. The concept of state failure from the literature is also compatible with this model, with state failure or state collapse reflecting a transition into militancy, open warfare, and, typically between the two conditions, polity fragmentation.6

The PITF Phase IV findings indicate a strong statistical relationship without a strong a priori theoretical causal mechanism, making the factionalism research endeavor initially a largely inductive one. In the absence of a complete theoretical framework, and despite our detailed 6-year review of the data and coding decisions, some readers might still be concerned that the relationships between factionalism and democratization, and factionalism and political instability events, are tautological. Thus, while perhaps tedious for many readers, some may desire a more thorough treatment of the SSP model we use to conceptualize factionalism. The Appendix describes in full Marshall’s societal-systems process model (Marshall and Cole 2008, 2012; Marshall 2014), as well as my modifications, to situate factionalism as one among several modes of political behavior in complex societal-systems ranging from conventional politics to open warfare, and describes each of these modes (e.g., issue factionalism, probing militancy) in detail. Again, note that in theory and in coding practice, regime type is separate from this model of political behavior, although coding results demonstrate that regime types cluster around certain types of political behavior. I have slightly revised the SSP model by explicitly including concepts that were implicit in previous iterations of the model, specifically concepts related to social complexity such as metastability of societal-systems at the model’s equilibrium points. The SSP model allows us to situate factionalism theoretically to construct deductive hypotheses about factionalism and factionalism management strategies.

In all, two-thirds of independent countries in the world—107 out of 167 in the Polity dataset—experienced factionalism in at least 1 year between 1946 and 2015, and some experienced multiple episodes of factionalism, for a total of 172 discrete onsets of factionalism.7 Of these episodes, approximately half ended in either a major episode of political instability (as defined by the PITF) or an incident of autocratization. The other half includes cases that moved from factional to more conventional forms of participation in a process of democratic consolidation as well as cases that continue to endure factionalism. A few other states managed to transition to democratic governance while avoiding
factionalism. Determining how states can successfully manage factionalism short of political violence or autocratization or, better, avoid factionalism altogether, is the central goal of this book, as we respond to Madison’s call for a “proper cure” to the mischief of faction (1787: 10).

In this book, I focus on explaining how to manage and mitigate the worst impacts of factionalism, which is a major impediment to democratization, but I do not set out to thoroughly explain democratic transition. Nonetheless, as an analysis and reimagining of the central problem facing democratizing states, this book builds on and engages with the work of multiple generations of scholars who have dedicated their careers to explaining divergent democratization outcomes. Democratization scholarship has focused on a wide array of causes of transition outcomes, including among others identity (e.g., culture, ethnicity, religion), economic development, resource rents, elite behavior, popular values related to democracy, neighborhood effects, international pressure and support, institutions and the timing of their development, and path dependence (especially of a pretransition regime type). This body of work is theoretically rich, featuring enduring debates and a substantial body of (often contradictory) empirical findings. It would require an entire volume to review thoroughly, although for readers unfamiliar with this body of work Barbara Geddes (2007) offers an excellent article-length meta-analysis of democratization to that date. My analysis in this book supports the importance of some of these factors in explaining democratization outcomes (e.g., elite behavior, international pressure, institutional development and timing), not as individual competing explanations of democratization as they have often emerged in the literature, but as smart practices that prevent or mitigate the excesses of a common problem of factionalism. As I discuss in more detail in the chapters that follow, factionalism thus explains multiple competing findings from the democratization literature, unified in a single holistic approach.

In this book I identify these smart practices for managing or mitigating factionalism, and reach points of engagement with the existing literature on democratization, through a combination of deductive reasoning and inductive analysis. My methods include a hypothesis-testing macrocomparative analysis of the country reports and data collected over the course of this project, and an inductive analysis utilizing a panel of four most-different systems analyses of factional outcomes. In Chapter 2, I tell the story of factionalism uncovered by our review of the historical record, including data for all factionalism episodes from 1946 to 2015 presented in multiple tables organized by region, with information gleaned from the Polity IV dataset, more than 100 country
reports, and news archives. This includes dates of factionalism onsets and endings, changes in governance structure during factionalism episodes, as well as information about the nature of factionalism onset events; primary, secondary, and tertiary factionalism cleavage types; and factionalism episode ending events. The utility of this information is illustrated with brief vignettes: descriptions of political history in Burundi, Peru, and Belgium, which help readers contextualize the tables of data, put the story back into the numbers, and allow them to find the stories of their own cases, regions, and events in the data tables, and then compare those stories to other cases systematically. I conclude the chapter with a macrocomparative analysis of factionalism onset events and factionalism cleavage types.

Chapters 3 through 6 offer a panel of four most-different systems comparative case study analyses, organized by factionalism outcome, to investigate any practices or circumstances that could explain their common outcomes. In Chapter 3, I examine cases that avoided factionalism in their democratic transitions (to date), including Senegal, Taiwan, and Uruguay. In Chapter 4, I analyze cases that experienced persistent factionalism (episodes of long duration that were still ongoing at the end of 2015), including Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Zimbabwe. In Chapter 5, I investigate cases where factionalism episodes ended in democratization, including Chile, Comoros, Estonia, and Tunisia. However, it should be noted that successful factionalism management does not necessarily mean that these cases are fully consolidated, and backsliding or a return to factional politics is always a threat to democratic polities. Tunisia, for example, has experienced democratic governance for a much shorter period than Chile had prior to the 1973 coup, but is included here not because we assume its democratic transition is complete, but rather because it is one of the only states in its region to have survived a factionalism episode and transitioned to democracy (even if that democracy, against hope, turns out to be fleeting). Finally, in Chapter 6, I investigate cases where factionalism episodes ended in autocratization or the collapse of central government, including Belarus, Central African Republic, Egypt, and Thailand.

Conducting multiple MDS analyses allows us to explore the factionalism phenomenon in great breadth at the cost of depth, which may disappoint regional experts accustomed to case studies or small-n comparative case study analyses. It has an added benefit, however, of building into the analysis sets of cases across chapters that control for region and, in some cases, economic, ethnic, and social indicators as well. Thus, Tunisia and Estonia pair with Egypt and Belarus, in Chapters 5
and 6, respectively, offering a most-similar systems (MSS) controlled comparison built into the research design across those chapters. Indeed, Chapters 5 and 6 include four case studies instead of three to make these comparisons possible, and to include cases from the Latin American and MENA regions. Similarly, Bolivia (Chapter 4) and Chile (Chapter 5) offer an MSS analysis inside Andean South America, and the more methodologically adventurous might include Uruguay (Chapter 3) in that MSS comparison as well. The sub-Saharan African and Asian cases are so distinct from one another that an MSS comparison is implausible. Central African Republic is included specifically to include a case where factionalism management resulted in autocratization, which then gave way to state collapse. While uncommon, this factionalism outcome is one of the most dangerous and destructive and, as such, deserves special attention.

Table 1.1 describes this panel of analyses, organized by chapter and region, and includes in parentheses the Polity institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) score for each case at the end of 2015. DEMOC is an ordinal 1–10 scale, where 1 denotes no substantial democratic institutions and 10 denotes substantial consolidated democratic institutions. Reflecting the MDS design, cases have similar DEMOC scores within chapters (organized by common outcomes): factionalism avoidance and democratiza-

### Table 1.1 Most-Different Systems Design Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4 Avoidance</th>
<th>Chapter 5 Persistence</th>
<th>Chapter 6 Democratization</th>
<th>Chapter 7 Autocratization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Saharan Africa</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (7)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe (5)</td>
<td>Comoros (9)</td>
<td>Central African Republic (−77: collapse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (10)</td>
<td>Bolivia (7)</td>
<td>Chile (10)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (10)</td>
<td>Bangladesh (3)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Thailand (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (0)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East and North Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (7)</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
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*Note: Numbers in parentheses are the Polity institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) score for each case at the end of 2015; DEMOC is an ordinal 1–10 scale, where 1 denotes no substantial democratic institutions and 10 denotes substantial consolidated democratic institutions.*
tion cases were democratic at the end of 2015, as indicated by DEMOC scores between 7 and 10; persistence cases were generally anocratic with DEMOC scores between 3 and 7; and autocratization cases had minimal democratic institutions at the end of 2015, tending to be anocratic or autocratic with DEMOC scores of 0, or in the case of Central African Republic −77 indicating the collapse of central authority in that polity.

These case studies are largely qualitative, detailing the political history of these state-societal systems from 1946 to 2015, paying particular attention to periods of factionalism and accounting for all events recorded as governance changes in the Polity IV dataset and in the set of country reports prepared during our extensive review of Polity IV. Most of these country reports were completed by 2010, and thus are missing developments between then and 2015, and some country reports missed events that were later captured in changes to the Polity IV record (sometimes as a result of the review project). I thus have updated the record for these cases through 2015 and where required in the historical record. In the case of Thailand, its country report was prepared as part of the review project’s pilot study before review and report-writing procedures were standardized, particularly with regard to the method of identifying factional identities and onset events; I substantially overhauled this and similar reports. I prepared these updates and overhauls using the same methodology as the original reports, relying primarily on media coverage of news events as compiled and recorded in news archives, in particular Keesing’s World News Archive and the BBC Monitoring: International Reports news archive available through LexisNexis, and for election results Adam Carr’s Psephos archive (Carr 2017; Keesing’s 2017; BBC Monitoring 2017).17 This methodology is described in more detail in Chapter 2, and the Polity IV review and country report–writing process is described in detail in Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole (2012). I rereviewed all country reports for the 14 cases included as part of this analysis.

In Chapter 7, I synthesize results from Chapters 3 through 6 and consider the MSS comparisons across those chapters, looking for evidence of smart practices for countries embarking on democratic transition that try to avoid or mitigate the effects of factionalism. Of the many circumstances and practices associated with factionalism episodes, I identified five factors from the comparative analyses as particularly important in explaining divergent factionalism outcomes:

1. Gradual or guided democratization experiences may allow states with favorable conditions to avoid factionalism altogether.
2. Guaranteeing a substantial role for opposition elites inside the new political system incentivizes conventional political participation and disincentivizes disruptive and antisystem behavior, undermining factionalism.

3. Individual leaders and their choices matter.

4. Pressure from the international community can change the incentive structures underlying policy choices by leadership, encouraging more liberal and inclusive policies that expand participation and undermine factionalism.

5. And states that enter factionalism episodes with professional, rather than politicized, militaries are much more likely to survive factionalism without political violence and democratize.

In Chapter 7, I compare these findings to the existing democratization literature and the macrocomparative analysis of Chapter 2, which points toward directions for future quantitative research of factionalism episodes. As the case of Belgium (described in a brief vignette in Chapter 2) illustrates, these findings are also relevant for the “old” democracies in the world. Chapter 7 concludes by considering what these findings mean for countries like the United States, which was coded factional in November 2016 for only the second time since the American Civil War.

Notes

1. This team was led by Monty G. Marshall, director of Polity IV and the Center for Systemic Peace, and in addition to me included Center for Systemic Peace researchers Min Zaw Oo, Eliot Elzinga, and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall. This research (and much of the work for this book) was funded by Societal-Systems Research Inc., with support from the US Political Instability Task Force.


3. Polity was developed by Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall, and its current version, Polity IV, has become one of the most commonly used datasets for differentiating systems of governance in the political science literature, covering all countries with more than 500,000 people back to 1800 or independence. The dataset has been reviewed extensively, and is generally praised for its intercoder reliability, parsimonious design, and high degree of cross-national reliability (Munck and
Verkuilen 2002). Like most large-n datasets describing governance patterns, however, Polity IV preferences reliability over validity, and as such has been subject to criticism by country experts, frequently in cases of borderline coding decisions. Polity is also relatively poor at distinguishing among levels and styles of democratic governance among mature democracies, in part due to its creation in 1973 when autocratic governments were the norm and distinguishing among democratic governments was a low priority for researchers. See the Polity IV handbook (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010) for more detail on the Polity IV coding scheme and practices, and Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Marshall and Jaggers (2002) for a review of Polity in the context of alternative measurement schemes.

4. Countries coded factional (PARCOMP = 3) are nearly always also coded on the regulation of participation (PARREG) variable as either PARREG = 2 (multiple identity politics) or PARREG = 3 (sectarian politics). The PARREG = 2 multiple identity coding describes competition characterized by “relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level . . . but there are few recognized overlapping interests” (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010: 30). The PARREG = 3 sectarian politics coding describes a landscape where “political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing . . . when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups’ political activities . . . [or where] political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded” (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010: 30). PARCOMP and PARREG combine to form the component variable political competition (POLCOMP) variable, a 10-point ordinal scale of political competition ranging from 1 (suppressed competition) to 10 (institutional electoral competition). States coded with PARCOMP = 3 (factional) and PARREG = 2 (multiple identity) are described as POLCOMP = 6 (factional/restricted), and states coded with PARCOMP = 3 (factional) and PARREG = 2 (sectarian) are described as POLCOMP = 7 (factional). Because these sets of codes nearly always occur together, and these combinations are unique, beginning Polity coders often code PARCOMP and PARREG simultaneously using the POLCOMP variable, which was introduced in 2004 with the rollout of Polity IV, rather than coding its indicators independently.

5. For a brief overview of metastability in complex social systems, see Cioffi-Revilla (2014: 167−168), Moffat (2003), or Winder (2007).

6. See Marshall and Cole (2017) for a comprehensive review of state failure and state fragility research, including an extensive discussion of changes in preferred terminology and conceptual definitions in the literature over time.

7. These figures are accurate as of the 2015 edition of Polity IV. Note that historical revisions by the Polity coding team may result in fluctuations to these numbers, as Polity IV is a living dataset.

8. Banfield’s Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1958) was one of the first to pose a link between culture or values and democratic governance and economic development, and his work in Italy was followed by many others. Following in his line of reasoning, scholars have pointed to Roman Catholicism (Wiarda 1972; Lipset 1991), Islam (Inglehart 2003; Lafoff 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2006), Arab ethnicity (Stepan and Robertson 2004), and Confucianism (Fukuyama 1995) as being incompatible with democracy, often in contrast to Protestantism. These arguments hold that because the population of a state is predominantly Catholic, Muslim, or Confucian, and because these religions are structured hierarchically (or, in the case of Confucianism, espousing patriarchal values), its people will be more likely to accept similar authoritarian rule by government. Protestantism in Europe,
it is argued, places value on individualism and secular government, and features a more democratic structure with an equitable relationship between pastor and congregation. Furthermore, the assumption that people will submit to authoritarianism because they were raised in patriarchal religions is unwarranted and generally left undefended. The logic that a person, let alone an entire population, would be willing to accept repression and human rights violations because their religion is governed hierarchically is weak at best. Moreover, while it is possible that Latin American democracies have struggled because of their Roman Catholic heritage, it seems more likely that they have struggled because of repeated US interventions during the Cold War, a history of tension between indigenous peoples and European imperialism, economies heavy on resource extraction and drug production, and extreme sustained income inequality. Indeed, it was not uncommon for Catholic religious leaders in Latin America to lead the fight against repressive governments during the 1980s. Similarly, the link between Islam and autocracy has been difficult to establish empirically because of confounding factors, including economic dependence on oil exports, historical tensions between religious and ethnic groups in the Middle East (often initiated and maintained by European powers), the overlap of Arab and Muslim populations, and the relatively successful transitions of Muslim democracies in Southeast Asia. This critique of cultural determinism does not mean that culture is unimportant and, indeed, some aspects of culture are critical to democratic development such as gender roles. For example, if a society is traditionally patriarchal and gender biased, implementing universal suffrage may disrupt cultural norms significantly.

9. The relationship between development and democratization was one of the first recognized in the literature, and remains one of the most contested. Lipset (1959) was one of the first to articulate a theoretical explanation for the strong correlation between wealth and democratization, which has been repeatedly confirmed in the literature (see, e.g., Lipset 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Moore 1995; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). This phenomenon has many different explanations, but most focus on the role of economic development in changing the values of the population, increasing the size of the middle class, and encouraging urban migration. Recent works have refined Lipset’s analysis, discovering that the correlation is not linear but rather there exists a transition zone, within which transitions are the most likely and above which increases in wealth do not translate into likelihood of transition. Some, such as Przeworski and Limongi, have argued that this is because the increased wealth acts as a stabilizing force once the transition zone is passed, allowing authoritarian regimes that survived to endure (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). That economic development leads to changes in class structure and consciousness, demographics, and even popular and elite values, is uncontested. These changes are critical for a society, and particularly societal elites, to accept democratic institutions but it has been extremely rare for successful democratic transitions to have been caused by concerted class action. Importantly, many middle-income countries during the third wave experienced the changes in social structure that modernization theorists predict (indeed, China is doing so now), without concurrent transitions to democratic governance. The populations of South Korea and Taiwan, for example, certainly became more accepting of democratic norms during their economic development periods in the 1970s and 1980s, but it took some other agency to cause leaders to pursue democratic transition. Changes in social structure cannot themselves be responsible for the decision to implement democratic institutions.

10. States with economies based on resource extraction, and oil in particular, struggle with democratization and with maintaining democratic institutions, although
a few highly developed mature democracies pose exceptions to this rule such as Norway, Canada, and the United Kingdom. See, for example, M. L. Ross (2001).

11. Various models have been proposed focusing on behavior by political and economic elites to explain divergent democratization outcomes. Among the more important of these have focused on elite pact formation, most notably the seminal Transitions from Authoritarian Rule anthology (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986), which was refined and extended in a rich body of more recent scholarship (see, e.g., Hagopian 1990; Karl 1990; Threlfall 2008; Hinnebusch 2015).

12. Recent work using public opinion surveys has been particularly insightful in this regard, finding distinct cross-cultural conceptualizations of terms like democracy or liberal, which in turn may affect democratization potential. See, for example, a special issue (no. 4) in the 2010 volume of Journal of Democracy for a strong set of case studies in this regard (Braizat 2010; Bratton 2010; Chu and Huang 2010).

13. Some have found regional effects to be quite profound on democratic transition probability, as well as instability, war, and other outcomes, although a weak theoretical basis and concerns about spuriousness have led to these findings being contested (see, e.g., Cederman, Hug, and Wegner 2008; Tolstrup 2009; Freyburg et al. 2011).

14. International pressure on autocratic governments to democratize and international support of democratizing states are both known to correlate with democratic transition probability, although major actors that promote democratization abroad, such as the United States, also have a long history of undermining democracy, particularly during the Cold War era. Scholars disagree about what types of aid, pressure, or both work better than others; however, distinguishing between nongovernmental organization–based aid (Landolt 2007; Kamstra and Knippenberg 2014), official development or democratization aid from states (Bader 2010), negative reinforcement (Hovdenak 2009; Wobig 2015), coerced or internationally managed transitions (Nenadovic 2010; Lemay-Hebert 2012), and international democracy promotion regimes (Ulfelder 2008; Legler and Tieku 2010). The journal Democratization has also dedicated several special issues to these topics; see its 2010 volume, issue 6, and 2012 volume, issue 3, for example. Studies have also found regionally distinct patterns with regard to democracy promotion and democratization outcomes. See, for example, McCoy (2006) on Latin America, Bader (2010) on Eastern Europe, and Cavatorta (2005) and Abbott (2018) on the Middle East and North Africa.

15. The key debate in this area has been between supporters of sequencing, the idea that democratic institutions must be established, or at least taking root, before mass participation and electoral competition is encouraged, and supporters of gradualism who argue that necessary institutions can be developed at the same time that people are learning to participate in elections. Leading the sequencing argument in recent years have been Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, who built on the work of Dankwart A. Rustow (Rustow 1970; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005, 2007). They argue that a strong legal system, representative government institutions, and a free press are critical preconditions for democratic transition, often but not necessarily established by liberal-minded autocrats, sometimes through pact formation with moderate opposition groups, and with international support. Once institutions are either established or taking root, depending on one’s interpretation of the sequencing argument, the authoritarian government will use these institutions to liberalize, by opening up some areas for public debate and guaranteeing certain rights (e.g., habeas corpus, press freedom, limited civil liberties), consistent with the ideas of O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) and Huntington (1991). Importantly, sequencing scholars argue that premature transitions (i.e., those initiated without established impartial institutions) result in “birth defects” in
institutions that haunt the democracy for the rest of its life, and which actually decrease the likelihood of another transition to occur successfully. However, even within Western Europe smooth sequencing−based transitions have been rare, as Berman (2007b) and Carothers (2007b) note. Many Western European democracies achieved stability only after significant conflict, false starts, and temporary periods of autocratic backsliding. The United States, Great Britain, and Spain all suffered bloody civil wars after attempts at democratic transition, before they achieved stability (and universal suffrage many years later). Similarly, France’s democracy did not stabilize until the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, 160 years after the French Revolution. Even South Korea, an oft-cited example of the sequencing story, had a failed democratic experiment in the Second Republic, leading to Park Chung-hee’s dictatorship, apparently without damning the now-democratic Sixth Republic with birth defects.

In contrast, gradualists, led by Sheri Berman and Thomas Carothers, argue that the vulnerability associated with democratic transition is constant and universal, regardless of the sequence in which the transition occurs (Berman 2007a, 2007b; Carothers 2007a, 2007b). Institution building should occur simultaneously with encouragement of mass participation and competitive elections. Preconditions that are supportive of democracy (i.e., economic development, rule of law) are great, but they are not necessary for the transition to be successful. The greatest flaw in the gradualist argument is a tendency to ignore Snyder and Mansfield’s arguments about the destabilizing effects of competitive elections. Without agreement on the rules of the game, elections can encourage violence and create incentives for government manipulation of the system. Without preexisting institutions, respected by all parties, to oversee and judge the election, there can be no guarantee of fairness and thus no incentive to participate fairly. The victors in a democracy must also be willing to respect the rights of the minority and govern the entire population, a norm that seems unlikely to be developed immediately, especially in the tumultuous and often divisive atmosphere surrounding the disintegration of an autocratic regime and the formation of new institutions.

Gradualism and sequencing claim some empirical support, but both theories also have serious flaws and the arguments of each seem to capture only a small part of the democratic transition story. Importantly, both generally ignore civil society, focusing instead on institutional development (i.e., rule of law, free press, representative institutions) and competitive elections as critical factors. While sequencing relies on the role of the liberal autocrat and a moderate opposition, and gradualism the radical democratic reformer, neither of these groups can consistently be relied on to bring about transition. Philosopher kings are rare, opposition to a repressive regime is rarely moderate if it exists openly, and radical democrats are just as likely to bring about their own destruction as they are a successful revolution. While Frederik Willem de Klerk and the moderate leaders of the Africa National Congress were busy negotiating a democratic transition in South Africa, radical reformers in the Inkatha Freedom Party, Pan-African Congress, and reactionaries in the Conservative Party nearly brought the country into civil war.

16. For example, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Geddes (1999) have developed and refined theories of democratization based on the nature of the autocratic regime type prior to the onset of transition, finding that party-based autocratic regimes are more likely to endure. Building on this work, Marshall and Cole (2008) found that party-based autocratic regimes are also more likely to withstand factionalism during democratic transition without falling into civil war.
17. The search term for Keesing’s World News Archive is simply the country name, restricted by the study period plus 2 years before and after the study period, due to compilations in Keesing’s sometimes appearing months after (and sometimes before) an event occurs; hits for relevant years are then reviewed based on headline relevance. The search term set for LexisNexis, once in the BBC Monitoring: International Reports search engine, is the following: {((country_name) and [(#ST000160#) OR (#N921190MM#) OR (#ST000563#) OR (#ST001917#) OR (#ST000239#) OR (#ST000CTCO#) OR (#ST0001129#) OR (#ST001371#) OR (#ST001377#) OR (#ST001510#) OR (#ST0009ZGJ#) OR (#ST00097CY#) OR (#ST001812#) OR (#ST000CQJE#) OR (#ST0001345#) OR (#N813940MM#) OR (#ST000D33D#) OR (#ST000CTIY#) OR (#ST000459#) OR (#ST001136#) OR (#N922120QM#) OR (#ST0008X9C#) OR (#ST0009EOQ#) OR (#ST0009ZVD#) OR (#N9221120CC#) OR (#ST0009G89#) OR (#N8133111MM#) OR (#ST001218#) OR (#ST001220#) OR (#N813940GM#) OR (#ST0009FA#) OR (#ST000271#) OR (#ST000CUW5#) OR (#ST000302#) OR (#ST001149#) OR (#ST000CYCH#) OR (#ST000D170#) OR (#ST000827#) OR (#ST000CUTM#) OR (#ST001498#) OR (#ST001566#) OR (#ST000119#) OR (#ST000CNTG#) OR (#ST000420#) OR (#ST000430#) OR (#ST0008WX0#) OR (#ST001304#) OR (#ST001456#) OR (#ST001551#)] and Date[geq(XX/XX/XXXX)]}. 

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