


EXCERPTED FROM

Power Sharing and
Power Relations
After Civil War

edited by
Caroline A. Hartzell
and Andreas Mehler

Copyright © 2019
ISBN: 978-1-62637-767-7 hc



LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

1800 30th Street, Suite 314
Boulder, CO 80301 USA
telephone 303.444.6684
fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the
Lynne Rienner Publishers website
www.rienner.com

Contents

<i>List of Tables and Figures</i>	ix
1 Power Sharing and Power Relations in Postconflict States <i>Andreas Mehler and Caroline A. Hartzell</i>	1
Part 1 The Impact of Power Sharing on Power Relations	
2 Government-Rebel Relations in the Wake of Power-Sharing Peace Agreements <i>Martin Ottmann and Johannes Vüllers</i>	19
3 The Transformation of Armed Organizations into Political Parties <i>John Ishiyama</i>	47
4 The Consequences of Power Sharing at the Local Level <i>Andreas Mehler, Claudia Simons, Denis M. Tull, and Franzisca Zanker</i>	67
Part 2 Power-Sharing Mechanisms at Work	
5 Military Power Sharing: The Case of the Philippine Peace Agreement <i>Rosalie Arcala Hall</i>	89

6	Territorial Power Sharing: The Cohesion of Opposition Movements <i>Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham</i>	109
7	Economic Power Sharing: Potentially Potent . . . but Likely Limited <i>Caroline A. Hartzell</i>	125
Part 3 Power Sharing and the Quality of the Peace		
8	Government Respect for the Physical Security of Postconflict Populations <i>Matthew Hoddie</i>	149
9	Shifting Public Attitudes? Power Sharing and Intergroup Tolerance <i>Bernadette C. Hayes and John Nagle</i>	169
10	Transitional Justice: Promoting or Hijacking Elite Accountability? <i>Chandra Lekha Sriram</i>	191
Part 4 Conclusion		
11	The What, How, Where, and Who of Postconflict Power Sharing <i>Caroline A. Hartzell and Andreas Mehler</i>	215
	<i>Bibliography</i>	227
	<i>The Contributors</i>	245
	<i>Index</i>	247
	<i>About the Book</i>	257

Power Sharing and Power Relations in Postconflict States

Andreas Mehler and Caroline A. Hartzell

Power sharing in postwar countries has been the subject of growing attention by scholars and policymakers during the past two decades. Despite increased interest in power sharing as a means of ending intrastate conflicts, various dimensions of this complex set of institutional arrangements have yet to be well elucidated. Most scholarship focuses on the question of whether power sharing is able to help prevent war recurrence and achieve “peace” (Schneckener 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mukherjee 2006a; Joshi and Mason 2011). Although this is an important question, it is not the only one deserving of analysis. Furthermore, the responses to this question by different authors—who have employed varying concepts of power sharing and peace, indicators, selection of cases, and observation periods as well as differing statistical techniques—have been so diverse that it has become difficult to find any common ground (Binningsbø 2013).

Notwithstanding these differences, what few scholars would contest is that power sharing has both positive and negative effects, many of which are likely to have been unintended by the architects of these measures. Power sharing might, for example, strengthen an elitist approach to politics, or it might create incentives for new actors to take up arms, or it might prove an impediment to the process of healing the wounds of violent conflict as the perpetrators of atrocities gain positions of power and influence over government affairs (Mehler 2009; Cheeseman 2011; Wolff 2009; Sriram 2008). Alternately, power sharing might lead to the creation of new identities, enhance the capacities of some groups of actors in unexpected ways, or provide actors with incentives that enable them to participate more effectively in postconflict politics. One thing is sure: the failure to investigate these types of effects thoroughly means that it is difficult to determine whether outcomes such as the durability of the peace are attributable to the core dispositions of power-sharing pacts themselves, as has been claimed,

or are the product of heretofore unexplored changes in power relations engendered by power sharing.

Accordingly, a central goal of this book is to extend the analysis of power sharing beyond the role that power-sharing institutions play in the duration of the peace to the potential that they have to impact the balance of power within, between, and among actors, groups, and institutions in the postconflict state. Power-sharing institutions may, as one of their by-products, generate incentives that encourage adversaries to keep the peace. However, such institutions are, first and foremost, a set of rules designed to apportion state power among a number of actors. As such, power-sharing institutions have the ability to alter preexisting power balances. Power-sharing arrangements can change the relative strength or influence wielded by key actors in the postconflict environment as well as affect the means by which they exercise power or influence. These types of transformations in the balance of power among actors are likely to have consequences—some short term and others more durable in nature, some intended and others not—for relations among actors in the postconflict state. Some of these consequences may, as noted above, have an impact on the duration of the peace. Others will certainly have an influence on the quality of the peace.

Because power-sharing institutions are now one of the principal tools used in efforts to end civil wars, it is incumbent on those who work in the field of conflict management to know more about the consequences that follow from the use of these measures.¹ This book seeks to advance understanding of this issue by developing a framework for the analysis of power relations among a variety of actors in the period that follows a power-sharing agreement. The next three sections of this chapter lay the groundwork for this framework. First, we highlight gaps in current knowledge regarding the types of effects power sharing has on postconflict power relations. Second, we focus on the influence that the modalities of power sharing—what, how, with whom, and where power is shared—may have on power relations. Third, we outline the central components of the analytical framework. Finally, we conclude with an overview of the contents of the book.

Bridging the Gaps: Power Sharing and Postconflict Relations

As noted above, the extant literature on power sharing generally has neglected the potential that power sharing has to transform postconflict relations in various ways that could have an impact on war recurrence, the transition to democracy, or other important aspects of political life. In this section, we highlight major gaps in the research on power sharing and postconflict relations that this book seeks to bridge.

First, existing studies have focused on the design of only a few *formal postagreement institutions* such as electoral systems and government systems that are thought to help stabilize the country and facilitate a transition to democracy.² However, researchers of power sharing have largely neglected other formal postconflict institutions influenced by power-sharing arrangements. These institutions include the security sector (generally the focus of a more technical literature), justice (the subject of works on transitional justice and rarely related to other institutions), and party regulations and systems (Reilly 2013).³ We know little, for example, about the impact that former rebel parties have on the development of the party system. Postconflict election victories by rebel parties in Burundi and Nepal, both countries in which power-sharing arrangements were designed as part of the process of ending civil wars, illustrate the relevance of this topic. Accordingly, some of the chapters in this book seek to highlight the transformation of institutions in the wake of a postconflict power-sharing arrangement.

Second, there currently is virtually no information regarding how power-sharing agreements transform *power resources* or the means by which actors wield power and influence within a country. Two issues about which relatively little is known, for example, are the consequences that follow from military and economic forms of power sharing. Existing studies on military power sharing have highlighted the importance of military integration as a credible commitment or argued that economic opportunities offered by disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs explain the willingness of rebel groups to consent to military integration (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). They have not, however, considered the role of mid-level commanders who could spoil a DDR process or the consequences of failed implementation of power-sharing arrangements on the rank-and-file level.⁴ Research on economic power sharing, which is surprisingly limited in nature, has concentrated on the group level and the distribution of wealth with a special focus on resources (Binningsbø and Rustad 2012; Lujala and Rustad 2012). The possibility that actors who are given access to economic power as part of a power-sharing agreement may use it for patronage or for personal gain has hardly been discussed in the literature, nor has much attention been given to the implications such arrangements may pose for shifts in economic power from the political center to the regions of the country. As the chapters on military and economic power sharing in this book seek to make clear, understanding what benefits different actors believe they will derive from different forms of power sharing, as well as the extent to which such arrangements actually deliver on those expectations or not, is important for understanding the consequences that stem from the use of power sharing.

Third, the link between issues of *representation and inclusion*, both affected by power-sharing deals, has not yet been sufficiently explored.

Whether or not settlements make explicit reference to the matter, elites are included in power-sharing institutions in the name of representation of a group with grievances. This is particularly true where prominent members of a rebel movement are concerned. However, it is far from clear whether these individuals perform better than political parties and elected members of parliament in bringing the concerns of their constituents to the table. This raises an important question regarding the extent to which power sharing fosters group representation, a topic that has yet to be empirically explored. Another issue that merits analysis is power sharing's impacts on the inclusion of social groups in the political system. This mostly pertains to identity groups, some of them of rather recent origin, but not in all cases: sometimes social stratification and exclusion have ossified to a point where the inclusion of lower strata in the political system has become a main goal of rebel movements (e.g., Maoist rebels in Nepal) and, therefore, is high on the agenda of power-sharing negotiations. The process of selecting the movements that will sit at a negotiation table is one in which power is attributed to some groups, which most likely will be part of the power-sharing arrangement, and not others (Nilsson 2008). Inclusion of one group therefore may equate with the exclusion of another (Tull and Mehler 2005; Jarstad 2008). Power relations within rebel organizations or between rebel organizations and civilian political parties are affected by the scope of inclusiveness, which may indirectly affect the broader representation of group interests (Mehler 2011).

Fourth, we know little about the ways in which *actors themselves can be transformed* by power-sharing agreements. To the extent that existing studies have dealt with this issue at all, it has been to focus on the impact that spoilers have on peace processes or the duration of the peace (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovas 2011). One of the topics that may well have an impact on postconflict relations, for example, includes the degree of cohesion demonstrated by the conflict parties in the postwar period. That the fragmentation of rebel groups is of relevance during the course of conflicts is not an issue that is disputed (K. G. Cunningham 2011). However, the fragmentation of groups in postconflict periods and the influence that power-sharing arrangements may have on group cohesion following the end of civil wars are issues that have been subject to little theorizing or empirical analysis. Our knowledge regarding how and why these changes occur is minimal. Information regarding the potential for power-sharing arrangements to produce these types of transformation of actors is particularly important since such changes could produce new conflicts within the various parties as has been highlighted in other research (Kalyvas 2003; De Juan 2013).

Finally, more information is needed regarding the ways in which power-sharing agreements *transform the wider society*. The literature on postwar societies is broad ranging in nature and has not, to our knowledge,

theorized the impact that power-sharing arrangements have on changes in postconflict societies (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Topics worth studying include, for example, the possible creation of new identities (ethnic, regional) and of subgroups as a result of power-sharing arrangements. A thorough analysis of rebel-to-party transitions could also help to enhance our understanding of the development of new societal identities and social cleavages in postconflict countries. Yet another example of potential societal transformations that may be induced by power sharing is long-run conceptions of citizenship and empowerment.

The Modalities of Power Sharing and Changes in Power Relations

If power sharing really means the sharing of power, it is important to know exactly what is being shared, how it is shared, with whom, and where the locus of power sharing takes place.⁵ Each of these modalities of power sharing has the potential to produce a different type of effect on the balance of power among actors. Because conflict-ending settlements often differ in the manner in which they address each of these issues, it can be difficult to predict exactly what types of changes in power relations a settlement may produce. Nevertheless, an awareness of the types of changes in power relations that may stem from each of these aspects of a power-sharing agreement can help actors to better think through their consequences for power relations in the short, medium, and long term.

What

The question of “what” power consists of or what type of power is being shared is far from trivial. In numerous cases of contemporary political settlements, one may suspect that power sharing is principally about the sharing of spoils (and, hence, of material rewards), while power is commonly seen as something different—but what, exactly? *Power* may be a less-than-clear concept if we examine its Latin epistemology as well as social scientists’ use of the term. In our attempt to define the concept in what follows, particularly in relation to our contributors’ use of the term *power sharing*, we concentrate on those perspectives that speak to the ambition of this book.

The Latin word *potestas* stands for the legal and symbolic aspects of power (i.e., the formal entitlement to give out orders); the Latin word *potentia* refers to the disposal of means or instruments of power. While both understandings may resonate with what is meant by *power sharing*, it is probably the second aspect that is more important, particularly in a postconflict setting. Responding to the “security dilemma” with a power-sharing

deal should give all conflict parties enough instruments of power to be able to avoid risks to the survival of a group or of an organization.⁶

In early modern times, Niccolò Machiavelli developed a different connotation of power, abstracting from legal underpinnings and normative justifications and moving power to the center of the ambitions of all true politicians. This understanding may play a role in the zero-sum game thinking that is deeply inscribed in most power-sharing deals. Sharing power in a Machiavellian sense would have to be understood—from the perspective of *The Prince*—as losing power. Such an interpretation, however, abstracts from contextual conditions and habitual behavior. It might be perfectly rational and far from undesirable to share power as long as this can be interpreted as a deliberate act of delegation. In patrimonial systems, this sort of asymmetrical relationship between the top of the system and second-rank “barons” is even constitutive for the power position at the top. This understanding of power and its relation to power sharing may be of particular relevance given the fact many of the states engaging in power-sharing deals nowadays have a strongly patrimonial political culture (Bayart 1989; Chabal 1992).

German sociologist Max Weber made the influential distinction between power (*macht*) and authority (*Herrschaft*), with the latter referring to a form of power that consists of having legitimacy (in distinct ways), while *power* itself is defined as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”⁷ This definition stresses the relational aspect of power, a conceptualization of power that is obviously central to a book focusing on changes in power relations stemming from the use of power sharing. Implicitly, under Weber’s definition of *power*, those giving in may not be completely devoid of power resources even if the balance of power does not favor them in a given situation. This suggests that the ability of some actor to wield absolute power is highly unlikely, particularly as any form of resistance on the part of other actors implies that they are able to employ some element of power. Power relations change when an actor becomes involved in the comanagement of state affairs; they also change when resistance grows or diminishes. Although frequently juxtaposed, these Weberian elements of power are, it should be noted, quite compatible with Michel Foucault’s concept of power.⁸

How

How is power shared within political settlements? Most efforts to answer this question have focused on negotiated elite pacts, which are frequently facilitated by international mediators and become part of a written agreement. These pacts are formal in nature with signed texts committing all signatories to fulfill promises. Power-sharing measures that are part of such

agreements may even become enshrined in interim or permanent constitutions, thus further formalizing power sharing. However, the promises enshrined in these agreements are not always fulfilled. How much power is actually shared in the aftermath of a peace deal and following the enactment of a new constitution are empirical questions that cannot be answered solely by relying on the letter of the agreement or the constitution.

A second reflection regarding the manner in which power is shared pertains to the formality of power sharing: recurrent practices form informal institutions. This may link up best with the more radical understandings of power as omnipresent and not limited to state actions as stressed by Foucault (1978, 1991). According to Foucault, power is not confined to the field of politics and is exercised throughout the social body; many other sociological power theorists would be in conformity with this view. However, such a wide understanding of power may not help in detecting when informal power sharing aimed at achieving or consolidating peace takes place. Some working ethnic or religious quota arrangements may not have been spelled out, for example, but are respected and clearly constitute an institution. Additionally, it is also possible that informal power-sharing arrangements are at work at the subnational or local levels where fighting has taken place during wartime and where opposing camps have to live together again, even though a document has never been signed by the groups in question.

With Whom

Who shares power with whom is also an important question. A rebel movement's recognition as a party to a negotiation process confers some form of power on the group not only as veto players at the negotiation table, but also with respect to its relations with the constituency that it supposedly represents. However, all conflict parties do not always become part of a peace deal. Settlements that are not inclusive have consequences for the duration of the peace, but also for power relations between those actors involved in the pact as well as between those in and out of the pact. More intriguingly, power sharing may have impacts within organizations, altering power relations between those who sign a pact and profit from it, and those excluded from the deal. For instance, while the political wing of a movement is likely to gain power in peacetime, the military wing of the same organization may get sidelined during the implementation of a power-sharing deal. This has occurred quite often within rebel movements, prompting scholars to produce a distinct branch of research focusing on splits within such groups (K. G. Cunningham 2011; Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012).

The identity of the actors involved in power-sharing agreements has not always been fully elucidated in much of the literature. For example,

ethnic or religious groups frequently have been equated with parties or rebel movements even though the latter may only have usurped a certain identity marker. This raises an interesting question: Just what is or should be the relevant unit of analysis when focusing on power sharing? Is it individuals? Organizations (rebel movements vs. governments)? Groups? Much of the consociational literature has focused on the group level while most of the (data-driven) work on postconflict power sharing has employed an organizational level. Although each of these approaches may be justified, it should be made clear that these are different units of analysis and that each has different implications for postconflict power relations.

What are some of the ways in which the type of actor that is the focus of a settlement matters for power relations? In some peace negotiations, the elite nature of power sharing reigns supreme, with little or no attention given to group grievances. In these instances, the distribution of top positions becomes key, with the agreement specifying which individual gets what. In other cases, power-sharing constitutions (of consociational/corporatist or centripetalist/liberal forms) focus on group representation and minority rights, making the accommodation of group grievances and interests the primary goal of the arrangement.⁹ Finally, power sharing also has played a role in pacts that are supposed to help terminate an authoritarian system, with the balance of power between state and society strongly altered in favor of the latter.

Where

The question of where power is shared can be understood spatially or according to the levels of a government system. Spatially speaking, some agreements are meant to fix the composition of a governing elite in the capital of a given country, with minimal if any attention given to the periphery of the country.¹⁰ The texts of other peace agreements, however, go to some length to specify a quota for local government institutions, thereby aiming to have an impact on (local) peace as well as on local power relations (Simons et al. 2013).

More abstractly, power sharing also has been conceptualized as rules that allocate power on a sectoral basis. Four sectors or bases of state power have been identified as realms in which power can be distributed among actors. *Political power sharing* is concerned with proportionality in the distribution of central government authority, with collectivities guaranteed a degree of representation within state institutions as a function of their membership in a group. The strategies that can be used toward this goal are electoral proportional representation, administrative proportional representation, and proportional representation in the central government's executive branch. *Military power sharing* distributes authority within the state's coercive apparatus. This can be accomplished by bringing together adversaries'

armed forces within a unified state security force; by appointing members of the subordinate group or groups to leadership positions in the state's military; or, in rare cases, by letting opposing sides keep their weapons to maintain their own security forces. *Territorial power sharing* divides authority among levels of government by creating forms of decentralization based on territory.¹¹ Finally, *economic power sharing* provides groups in divided societies access to or control of state resources by distributing wealth, income, natural resources, or production facilities on the basis of group identity (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

Each of the foregoing types of power sharing has the potential to shape power relations in different ways. Power sharing that allocates positions at the political center to the representatives of groups that formerly have been excluded from power could succeed in producing a sense of inclusion based on a rough balance of political power between majority and minority groups. Political power sharing of this nature would not, however, necessarily be expected to alter power relations between elite representatives and their followers. Military power sharing that calls for integrating former rebel troops into the state security forces could serve as a check on the state's power to use coercive force against the population, thereby potentially altering power relations between the state and society. Economic power sharing could facilitate rent seeking by individuals placed in positions of control over state economic resources, thereby economically empowering certain elites. Alternately, some forms of economic power sharing, particularly if used in conjunction with territorial power sharing, could alter the balance of power between the central government and certain regions of the country.

Central Components of an Analytical Framework

This book seeks to move beyond the current debate on power sharing that focuses on whether or not power-sharing arrangements contribute to the peace. This question is so large in scope that even a definitive yes-or-no answer is likely to be of little help to those seeking advice on how to construct an effective and just power-sharing agreement. We believe that by asking, and answering, more specific questions regarding the nature of the power that is shared, how power is shared, who shares power with whom, and in what areas or sectors it is shared, we can learn more about the mechanics of how power sharing works. Once we have a better understanding of how power sharing alters power relations, we should be better able to comprehend the potential that power-sharing measures have to affect a variety of outcomes, including the duration and quality of the peace.

A key component of the analytical framework used in this book is the identification of the types of power sharing employed as part of the conflict

settlement (i.e., political, military, territorial, or economic). The authors of the chapters each focus on one or more of these forms of power sharing with the goal of understanding the effects that they have on changes in power relations.

The second central component of the analytical framework that we employ in this project is the use of levels of analysis. Power relations can be conceptualized in terms of the balance of power that exists within, between, or among actors. The particular levels of analysis used by each of the chapter authors vary depending on whether the author or authors seek to determine how power sharing affects:

- the balance of power within a unit—that is, a group (e.g., a religious community or an ethnic group), an organization (e.g., a rebel organization or political party), the government apparatus (e.g., the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; the levels of government from national to local), or a territorial unit; or
- the balance of power between/among groups (e.g., between religious confessions), organizations (e.g., the national government and rebel groups), state and societal actors, and the central government and subnational units of government.

While some of the contributors to this volume employed qualitative methods and others used quantitative tools, a common analytical framework as well as a set of central questions informs the research process in each chapter and helps to ensure that the works cohere around the issue of changes in power relations. Each chapter thus describes the actor or set of actors within or among which a relationship of power exists, noting why this type of power relation is important; identifies the mechanisms via which one or more forms of power sharing shape power relations within or between/among the actors in question; and discusses the short-term versus the long-term impact that power sharing has on the nature of and shifts in power relations within or among the actors.

Organization of the Book

We structured the book along the following lines. In Part 1, three chapters focus on the effects power sharing has on power relations between, among, and within groups and levels of government in countries that have experienced internal armed conflict. Part 2 consists of three chapters, each of which explores means by which one form of power sharing—military in the first chapter, territorial in the second, and economic in the third—has the potential to shape various aspects of power relations in postconflict coun-

tries.¹² In Part 3, three chapters bring together the book's foci on types of power sharing and their effects on power relations to explore how these factors influence rights, representation, and inclusion, each of which has the potential to affect the duration and the quality of the peace in states emerging from violent intrastate conflict. Part 4 concludes with a chapter in which we assess central findings, specify the contributions that the book makes to the study of power sharing's effects on power relations in post-conflict states, and consider potential policy implications.

Part 1: The Impact of Power Sharing on Power Relations

Part 1 of the book focuses on the potential that power-sharing institutions have for transforming power relations between and among a variety of groups in post-civil war states. In Chapter 2, Martin Ottmann and Johannes Vüllers examine the effects that the implementation of political and military forms of power sharing have on the balance of power between the government and rebel groups following the end of a civil war. Employing a cross-national dataset, they found that the implementation of some variants of power sharing, but not others, fosters more politically inclusive power relations by providing rebel groups with space in the political system. Although Ottmann and Vüllers conclude that power-sharing institutions can help to alter power relations between the government and rebels from ones characterized by a zero-sum logic to one that is positive-sum in nature, they also emphasize that not all power-sharing measures may generate the effects that they are intended to produce.

In Chapter 3, John Ishiyama analyzes the manner in which power sharing affects the balance of power within political parties established by former rebel groups. Different types of power-sharing measures, Ishiyama argues, generate different types of pressures for rebel groups transforming into political parties. One of the unanticipated effects that some types of power-sharing measures may have, he posits, is to aggravate potential fault lines that exist within rebel political parties in such a manner as to increase the likelihood that the parties will split. Ishiyama tested this proposition using data from fifty-three armed rebel organizations that transformed into political parties to contest elections following a civil conflict and found that territorial power-sharing arrangements in particular promote organizational splits in rebel parties in postconflict politics.

In Chapter 4, Andreas Mehler, Claudia Simons, Denis M. Tull, and Franzisca Zanker focus on the potential that power sharing has to reorder local power relations. Observing that power sharing is usually introduced in the form of a pact signed by national elites who are often distant from where conflicts originated or were fought, they argue that many features of elite-centered peace agreements will have unexpected impacts on local

power relations. Elites included in power-sharing agreements are frequently well anchored in the local arena and, thus, play a two-level power game: they gain influence locally from their position at the national level while drawing critical support from their area of origin. Nevertheless, note the authors, some local elites may stand to lose critical local influence if they accept positions in the national government. Based on their analysis of the cases of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Liberia, Mehler, Simons, Tull, and Zanker conclude that while some stakeholders gain locally from measures that call for sharing political power at the national level and territorial power sharing at the local level, others stand to lose influence.

Part 2: Power-Sharing Mechanisms at Work

The second part of the book investigates the means by which power-sharing measures shape power relations. Rosalie Arcala Hall's contribution, Chapter 5, employs a case study, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), to map the shifts in state-society relations that took place as a result of the agreement's provision for military power sharing. Military power sharing called for the absorption of 7,500 ex-rebels and their proxies into mixed units of the Philippine army and police, which were then deployed for internal security missions in Mindanao. Hall found that the merger enhanced the state's influence over Muslim communities by improving the army's performance in nation-building projects and symbolic inclusiveness as an institution. In turn, the MNLF's leadership initially was strengthened by its selective distribution of integration slots to loyal commanders, although that gain in power was later diluted by factional rivalries.

In Chapter 6, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham examines the effects that territorial power sharing has on opposition movements active within self-determination disputes. She argues that although conventional wisdom suggests that territorial concessions by governments to opposition movements are expected to produce splintering within the groups, territorial power sharing is actually likely to lead to a short-term increase, but longer-term decrease, in movement fragmentation. Using large-n statistical analysis, Cunningham found that territorial power sharing decreases fragmentation, an outcome she attributes to the fact that many groups, satisfied with concessions they have received, cease to press self-determination claims.

In Chapter 7, Caroline A. Hartzell explores the potential that economic power sharing has to alter power relations in states emerging from civil war. She posits that economic power sharing has the potential to induce three different types of shifts in power relations: it could change the balance of power between regions and the central government, it could alter

power relations horizontally or among identity groups, and it could affect the power of individual political elites. Hartzell observes that state actors have demonstrated a reluctance to use economic power sharing as a means of ending civil wars and, in those instances in which they have agreed to do so, often have been lackadaisical in its implementation. Additionally, global economic forces and the actions of international actors have frequently served to limit the economic power sharing measures' potential impact on power relations. Accordingly, Hartzell concludes that the type of change in power relations that economic power sharing is most likely to produce is to add to the power of individual elites.

Part 3: Power Sharing and the Quality of the Peace

Part 3 of the book examines the impact that power-sharing measures have on rights, representation, attitudes, and inclusion in postconflict states, factors that have the potential to shape the quality of the peace. In Chapter 8, Matthew Hoddie considers the relationship between the adoption of power sharing following civil war and a government's respect for the physical security of the population. In particular, he investigates the common expectation that power sharing diminishes a government's respect for the principle that individuals should be free from state aggression in the forms of extrajudicial killing, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances. Based on cross-national statistical analysis, Hoddie found that there is only limited and inconsistent support for the view that the adoption of power-sharing institutions diminishes a government's respect for physical integrity rights. Hoddie concludes that power sharing is only one factor among many that determine a postwar government's commitment to respect the rights of citizens to be free from these different forms of harm.

Bernadette C. Hayes and John Nagle examine the impact that power sharing has on the balance of power within and outside religious confessions in Chapter 9. Hayes and Nagle note that while some scholars believe consociational power-sharing arrangements can be effective in helping to manage identity conflicts, others contend that they entrench and perpetuate divisions as well as marginalizing or facilitating the targeting of minority groups outside the dominant cleavage. In an effort to engage with this debate, Hayes and Nagle concentrate on public attitudes toward intermarriage, long considered the most salient indicator of communal division, in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. Focusing on the implementation of two different forms of consociational power-sharing agreements—the “liberal” 1998 Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland and the “corporate” 1988 Taif Agreement in Lebanon—they found that the type of power-sharing arrangement has a differential impact on attitudes toward intermarriage. While public tolerance toward interfaith marriages is notably greater in Northern

Ireland than it is in Lebanon, it is also considerably higher than support for intermarriage across other identity groups.

In Chapter 10, Chandra Lekha Sriram considers the effects of transitional justice processes on power relations and, potentially, on power-sharing arrangements themselves in states emerging from violent conflict. In particular, Sriram seeks to assess the widespread assumption that transitional justice processes may alter power relations within a state by removing, delegitimizing, or otherwise changing the incentives faced by relevant political or military actors. Focusing on the use of international or internationalized criminal tribunals in African countries, Sriram found that while there is limited evidence that transitional justice can reshape power relations by removing key perpetrators, it may also fail to reshape power relations or may have unexpected consequences. Among the latter, transitional justice may create incentives for the accused to embed themselves further in political power, may be hijacked by political or military actors seeking to gain the upper hand, or may cause the latter actors to choose to engage selectively with it.

Part 4: Conclusion

In Chapter 11, the concluding chapter of the book, Caroline A. Hartzell and Andreas Mehler assess the central findings that emerge from the analyses, identifying how they contribute to the study of power sharing's effects on power relations in postconflict states. Hartzell and Mehler consider the utility and the limitations of the analytical framework employed in the book for the study of those effects on power relations and identify factors that appear to influence the manner in which power sharing shapes postconflict power relations. The chapter concludes with thoughts regarding policy implications stemming from the findings in the book.

Notes

1. Potential consequences include resistance by actors to the use of power sharing as a tool of peacebuilding. See, for example, Mehler (2016).

2. In the case of electoral systems, attention has centered primarily on shifts to more proportional electoral representation. See, for example, Bogaards (2013) and Horowitz (2008).

3. Efforts are currently being made to widen the approach to the study of postconflict institutions. The Institutions for Sustainable Peace (ISP), a network in which both editors of this volume are active, was created to pursue an integrated approach to institutional challenges in divided and postwar societies. For more information, see isp.giga-hamburg.de.

4. Recent exceptions include Themnér (2011) and Utas (2012).

5. Our focus on these questions echoes the approach popularized by Lasswell (1950).

6. A security dilemma exists in situations in which, lacking any effective central authority to enforce rules or contracts, groups seek to acquire more power and capabilities to gain an extra margin of safety, a process that can lead to a “vicious circle of security and power accumulation” (Herz 1950, 157).

7. Weber (1922) as translated in Weber (1978, 53). All translations of Weber’s text have trouble capturing the full meaning of the German original. Weber uses the term *chance* and not *Wahrscheinlichkeit*, which is literally the retranslation of probability. *Chance* contains a strong element of opportunity, which would have been a better translation. Dahl’s definition of *power* is similar to Weber’s: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, 202–203).

8. It is not easy to pin down Foucault’s understanding of power. In his *The History of Sexuality*, there are numerous explanations of what power is not, but not a clear definition of what it is. The most important notions of power in Foucault’s work, however, can be distilled from his writings, and may be summarized as follows: power is relational, omnipresent, and productive; builds on consent; and is also created from below. See Foucault (1978, 92–96). One may add that, according to Foucault, (disciplinary) power is invisible (1991, 194).

9. While the consociational subtype of power sharing, emphasizing elements of group autonomy, has arguably received more attention academically and in practice, there is a distinct school of thought that proposes centripetalism as an opposite form, emphasizing systematic incentives for cooperation across identity groups.

10. This general neglect of the periphery by many power-sharing agreements is notable since case studies suggest that power-sharing agreements have ramifications at the local level of a polity. See, for example, Heitz (2009).

11. Decentralization, federalism, and regional autonomy, it should be noted, have quite distinct mechanisms in terms of attributing power positions. For a discussion on the relative rarity of territorial autonomy in Africa, see Hartmann (2013).

12. Given the fact that political power sharing has been the central focus of the literature on power sharing, in this book we sought to include chapters on the three forms of power sharing—military, territorial, and economic—about which, comparatively speaking, less has been written.