


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Civil-Military Relations:
Control and Effectiveness
Across Regimes

edited by
Thomas C. Bruneau
and Aurel Croissant

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1

Civil-Military Relations: Why Control Is Not Enough

Thomas C. Bruneau and Aurel Croissant

Civil-military relations are a key feature of political life in all nation-states that maintain permanent military organizations, tasked with the defense of the state and its citizens. The fundamental issue in civil-military relations is how to create and preserve a military that is subordinate to political control but is also effective and efficient (Feaver 1999). This is at the core of what Feaver calls the “civil-military problematique—the ‘protection by the military and . . . protection from the military’” (1996, p. 149) or what McMahon and Slantchev (2015, p. 297) call the “guardianship dilemma” of modern polities.

However, Nielsen (2005) correctly notes that the field has mainly focused on the issue of civilian control. Civilian control is not the only relevant issue in civil-military relations. Bruneau and Matei (2008), for instance, have convincingly argued that the military’s ability to achieve the roles and missions assigned to it by political leaders (“effectiveness”) at an acceptable cost in lives and resources (“efficiency”)¹ is of fundamental importance for national security and the legitimacy of the political order and the military institution. While civilian control concerns one side of the civil-military problematique, military effectiveness concerns the other side.

Among the few existing works on military effectiveness, most study a military’s battlefield effectiveness. However, a military’s capability to win an armed conflict is perhaps not a useful measure of its effectiveness (see also Millet, Murray, and Watman 1986, p. 37). For one, the aims of contemporary military operations have changed from pursuing concrete objectives and victory to establishing certain conditions from which political outcomes can be decided (Smith 2005, p. 269). In addition, conventional war fighting is only one of the many roles and missions implemented by modern

militaries. As we elaborate below, for most of them—for instance, supporting the police in fighting crime or assisting civilian authorities in coping with the humanitarian fallout of natural disasters—it is not possible to identify a win or to declare victory.

While the conventional focus of research in the field of civil-military relations is either on the question of civilian control of the military in different political systems, or on the war-fighting capabilities of the armed forces, the contributors to this book chose a different approach. Our purpose here is to contribute to a better understanding of what we describe as the “civilian control and military effectiveness nexus” in civil-military relations. Therefore, the chapters in this volume do not focus exclusively on the issue of political or civilian control over the military, but investigate how civil-military relations are organized in individual countries and the consequences regarding the nature and strength of political control over the military and the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its various roles.

This book includes chapters on theory building, research methods, and challenges of data mining as well as case studies of civil-military relations, including control and effectiveness, in ten nations. To contrast and compare different structures and methods of civilian control and oversight of the military, and their impact on the effectiveness of armed forces in contexts that have important similarities and differences, this volume brings together case studies of civil-military relations in four categories of political regimes. The first category is established or “consolidated” democracies, including the United States, Japan, and Germany, that developed different, but arguably similarly effective, models of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. The second concerns civil-military relations in emerging democracies (Chile, Indonesia, and Tunisia), and the third in hybrid or semidemocratic political regimes (Russia and Turkey). The fourth category concerns civil-military relations in clearly nondemocratic political systems (Egypt and China). In all of these nation-states, the relationship between the state, society, and the armed forces is a key issue of political organization of state and nation. Yet the types or patterns of civil-military relations vary significantly between and within these four categories, and these differences do matter regarding the political outcomes of civil-military relations. To be able to speak to each other meaningfully and to allow for cross-country-level comparisons, however, each country chapter in this volume draws on a similar understanding of core terms and concepts.

Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations is a concept that encompasses the entire range of interactions between the military and civilian society at every level (Feaver 1999, p. 211). Studying civil-military relations is therefore an immensely

rich subfield of sociology, political science, and multidisciplinary security and military studies. However, the research in political science has typically taken a more narrow focus on the structures, processes, and outcomes of the interactions between the political system on the one hand and the armed forces on the other (Croissant and Kuehn 2015, p. 258).

Military Effectiveness

There is no generally agreed-on definition of military effectiveness, nor do general measures of an effective military exist. As Nielsen notes, “Since the characteristics of effective armed forces will vary with factors such as the resources they have, the missions they must accomplish, and other aspects of their environments . . . the effectiveness of military means can only be evaluated in relation to the political ends that these means are to serve” (2005, p. 65).

In the most general sense, (military) effectiveness is related to the capability of the military organization to attain a goal; that is, the ability of the military to achieve the (politically) desired outcomes of its military missions (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006). Military effectiveness is as much about preparedness and the “capacity to create military power from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size and human capital” (Brooks and Stanley 2007, p. 9) as it is about actual action.

Our understanding and operationalization of military effectiveness is based on works by Bruneau and collaborators (Bruneau 2006; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006; Bruneau and Matei 2008), who note that military effectiveness is as much about “preparedness” as about actual “action.” Military effectiveness means that the military understands its role and mission and is capable of transforming political guidance into effective action. It is able to successfully use allocated resources in developing military capabilities and is trained and ready to fulfill the roles and missions that the political echelon decides to assign to the military. Finally, an effective military is a military “that is capable of conducting operations within the expected or assigned time frame and with available resources, as well as successfully achieving military goals with minimum losses” (Furlan 2012, p. 438).

While the conceptualization of military effectiveness is not easy, its measurement is even more problematic. What are measurable are the so-called hard data such as the number of tanks or airplanes produced or the number of troops trained or equipped for a given cost. Yet obviously, such data tell us more about how much and in what ways a state is willing to invest in its military than about the outcome of such investments in terms of an effective military. War fighting is the one role that may have obvious benchmarks of success, and for which preparedness can be empirically evaluated, to some degree, through exercises (Furlan 2012, p. 437). However, when nations prepare to defend themselves or their allies against

external enemies, the greatest indicator of success will probably be the avoidance of armed combat, whether this is due to the perception that the defenders possess overwhelming force, to success in the use of diplomatic tools, or to the integration of an aggressor into an alliance that mitigates ambitions or grievances. The difficulty of proving effectiveness can be seen in the example of the Cold War, which never became particularly hot directly between the United States and the Soviet Union thanks to the mutual deterrence imposed by the two sides' nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the problem is particularly serious in attempting to show effectiveness when there are no credible empirical proofs of success in missions such as peacekeeping, fighting terrorism, dealing with crime and natural disasters, and collaborating with other militaries.

Consequently, we must be realistic about what is required for security measures to be effective, our ability to measure it, and how to explain success or failure. While there are perhaps cases in which effectiveness in implementing roles and missions can be demonstrated, Bruneau and Matei (2008, p. 917) argue that, generally, effectiveness is best determined by whether a state is prepared to fulfill any or all of the six roles enumerated below. Under these circumstances, three basic attributes can be employed to measure the military's effectiveness in fulfilling its role and mission (see Table 1.1). Only if all three attributes are in place can the military be expected to fulfill any or all of its missions and roles.

Table 1.1 Attributes and Indicators of Military Effectiveness

Attributes	Defined as
Defense planning	Is there a long-term plan, preferably involving several agencies of a civilian government and the armed forces, which defines goals, the means to achieve the goals, and a methodology to evaluate progress toward the goals? Examples include national security strategies, national military strategies, white papers on security and defense, and so forth.
Structures	Are there structures and processes to both formulate the plans and, mainly, to implement them? Examples include ministries of defense, national security councils, joint or general staffs, and other institutions facilitating cooperation between civilians and the military, or other means of interagency coordination and coordination models. Ensuring a sufficient degree of integration or jointness between the three services has especially been a point of dispute and debate in most countries.
Resources	Does a country commit sufficient financial, political, and personnel resources to ensure it is adequately (and appropriately) equipped and skilled to fulfill its assigned roles, implement missions, and achieve particular tasks? While most easily measured as a percentage of gross domestic product, in fact, resources must include sufficient personnel, equipment, and the necessary means (food, fuel, uniforms, etc.) for a nation to achieve the goals established through defense planning.

Source: Adapted from Bruneau (2017).

As noted before, there is a great variety of activities that incorporate different instruments of state security to deal with contemporary threats, opportunities, and challenges in national and international environments. This combination of activities and the resulting mixing of armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies are the issues that democratically elected (and autocratically self-selected) policymakers must deal with to meet domestic and, increasingly, global expectations and standards (Bruneau and Matei 2008, p. 910). What then are the current major roles and missions of armed forces? What should the services be effective in implementing? Based on a review of the extant literature, we identify the following six major categories (cf. Bruneau and Matei 2008, p. 917):

1. Fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars (conventional war fighting).
2. Fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies (counterinsurgency).
3. Fight global terrorism (counterterrorism).
4. Provide military support for police (fight crime).
5. Prepare for and execute peace support operations (PSO), including peacekeeping and stability and support operations, and humanitarian interventions.
6. Prepare for and execute humanitarian assistance, including disaster relief operations.

Yet there potentially are trade-offs between different missions in terms of military effectiveness. For example, militaries that have to prepare for and are engaging in internal missions such as policing, civic action, or internal security will of necessity incur an opportunity cost in terms of preparing for military action in external missions such as interstate war-fighting or peace-keeping operations.

The specific roles and missions of national armed forces vary between countries and within countries over time. However, it is clear that most of the literature on military effectiveness has focused on interstate warfare. Only a few studies have discussed effectiveness in other types of missions (Egnell 2008).

Interstate wars have been a rare phenomenon in the post–World War II world—both before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Much more relevant are domestic armed conflicts and—especially after 1990—transnational conflicts involving more than two states and nonstate actors: for example, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). For instance, the last interstate wars in Latin America were the Chaco War between Bolivia and Peru (1932–1935) and the so-called Football War, a brief war fought

between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969. In sub-Saharan Africa, there have been only four interstate wars since 1946.

While only in a few countries—including the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, India, Iran, Pakistan, Taiwan, and the two Koreas—the militaries are prepared to fight interstate wars, some 124 countries currently employ a total of 91,585 military and police personnel in peacekeeping missions (as of May 30, 2018). Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, from August 2003 to December 2014, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at its height was more than 130,000 strong, with troops from 51 NATO and partner nations. Since January 2015, the noncombat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) has been intended to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces and institutions with 13,576 troops from 39 NATO and partner nations (as of May 2017). Between June 2004 and October 2017, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) contained up to 3,707 uniformed military and police personnel, mostly from Brazil and other South American nations, who were engaged in various efforts in disaster recovery, crime fighting, reconstruction, and stabilization. In many other regions, especially in Central and South America and South and Southeast Asia, military forces either support or (currently in the case of Mexico, Bangladesh, and Timor-Leste) supplant police forces in operations combating drug trafficking and street crime. The militaries in other countries, including Algeria, France, India, Israel, and Turkey, are active in the fight against international terrorism or domestic insurgencies. Finally, virtually all militaries play some role in providing support to civilian authorities in the face of natural or man-made disasters. On the other hand, in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the police fulfill military functions. Furthermore, since threats span the spectrum from global terrorism and national and international drug cartels to street gangs, militaries and police forces rely heavily on intelligence agencies to identify threats and plan missions. Finally, especially in South and Southeast Asia, the militaries' roles and missions diversified and expanded over time. Although national defense formally remained the primary function of the armed forces and the depth of their involvement in political and civilian affairs varied from country to country, many Asian militaries took on a multitude of secondary roles, engaging in commercial activities, local administration, social development and civic action projects, and putting down internal insurrections (Croissant and Kuehn 2017a). In contrast, despite the fact that the US military has mainly been involved in irregular warfare since the end of World War II, its uncompromising focus on conventional war fighting has left the US military ill prepared for complex operations in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Egnell 2008, pp. 26–28).

Civilian Control


There is no agreement on what exactly civilian control over the military entails, nor is there a generally agreed-on definition of military effectiveness or how these concepts should be measured. However, in recent years, scholars have advanced conceptions that share two fundamental assumptions (cf. Trinkunas 2005; Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, and Wolf 2010; Pion-Berlin and Martinez 2017). First, civilian control is about the political power of the military relative to the nonmilitary political actors. Second, and related, political-military relations can best be understood as a continuum ranging from full civilian control to complete military dominance over the political system.

In this sense, *civilian control* is a particular form of distribution of power to make political decisions in which civilian leaders (either democratically elected or autocratically selected) have the authority to decide on national politics and their implementation. While civilians may delegate the implementation of certain policies to the military, the latter has no decisionmaking power outside of those areas specifically defined by governments. In contrast, if a government is subordinate to a military that retains the right to intervene when it perceives a crisis, a regime is in fact under military tutelage (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, and Wolf 2010; Croissant and Kuehn 2017b). Finally, in this book the term *military control* is reserved for situations in which the military controls government, either through collegial bodies representing the officer corps (military regime) or because decisionmaking power is concentrated in the hands of a single military officer (“military strongman rule”; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014, p. 154).

Building on this definition, we can distinguish five decisionmaking areas in civil-military relations: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, and Wolf 2010; see Figure 1.1). This disaggregation of decisionmaking areas allows for a differentiated and specified assessment as well as a comprehensive evaluation of the overall patterns of civilian control. Full-fledged civilian control, at least in principle, requires that civilian authorities enjoy uncontested decisionmaking power in all five areas, while in the ideal type military regime the men on horseback dominate all areas.

The area of *elite recruitment* in Figure 1.1 defines the rules, criteria, and processes of recruiting, selecting, and legitimizing political officeholders, whereas *public policy* comprises the rules and procedures of the processes of policymaking (agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption) and policy implementation regarding all national policies except the narrowly understood aspects of domestic security and defense policy. *Internal security* entails the decisions and concrete actions regarding the preservation and restoration of domestic law and order, including

Figure 1.1 Five Decisionmaking Areas of Civil-Military Relations



Source: Adapted from Croissant, Kuehn, Lorenz, and Chambers (2013).

counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism, and domestic intelligence gathering, routine law enforcement, and border control. *National defense* includes all aspects of defense policy, ranging from the development of security doctrines to the deployment of troops abroad and conduct of war. Finally, the area of *military organization* comprises decisions regarding all organizational aspects of the military institution, including the “hardware”—that is, the military’s institutional, financial, and technological resources—and the “software” of military organization—for instance, decisions on military doctrine, education, and personnel selection (cf. Croissant et al. 2013).

To achieve and preserve civilian control requires *civilian (political) institutions*—defined as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 936; Pion-Berlin 1997). That is, the degree of civilian control of the military in each of these five areas depends on the existence of institutions enabling civilians to exert real power to govern, control, and monitor the military. A key set of institutions—which are not necessarily sufficient, however—are civilian-led ministries of defense, parliamentary oversight committees, and civilian oversight of (military) intelligence.

Further, as the literature on military reform in democratizing countries has demonstrated, institutional development in civil-military relations tends to be path dependent (Agüero 1995, 1998; Croissant et al. 2013). But even in consolidated democracies, institutional change in civil-military relations

is challenging because institutional structures tend to become entrenched over time. In the field of comparative politics, historical institutionalists have applied the concept of path dependence to this tendency. The concept puts forth that, once a certain institutional choice has been made, “the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice” (Levi 1997, p. 28).

Historical institutionalists often invoke “critical junctures” (i.e., moments of significant exogenous change) to explain the termination of path dependence and to account for institutional change. Such critical junctures can be a result of exogenous shocks in civil-military relations—for example, regime change, military defeat in interstate war, catastrophic terrorist attacks (i.e., September 11), or natural disasters of unexpected dimensions (i.e., the devastating 2010 monsoon flooding in Pakistan; cf. Madiwale and Virk 2011). While critical junctures are the main mechanism in institutionalist theory to explain when path dependency “breaks,” institutional change can also be the outcome of an incremental process, such as the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, in which the US Congress, in the face of ongoing military disasters and the unwillingness of the Department of Defense and the armed forces to reform themselves, stepped in and legislated the reform of military decisionmaking and the education of officers (Bruneau 2013b; see Chapter 4 in this volume).

While *civilian control* of the military is the general term, *democratic control* over the military is a specific form of civilian control. Democratic control of the military requires that political authorities and organizations serving in government and exercising authority and oversight over the military must themselves be subject to the democratic process. As the China case study in this book demonstrates, there can be civilian control of the military without democracy. But China and several other countries under Communist Party rule do not seek the marginalization of the armed forces from political affairs. Rather, the military is political by definition, and the structures of the ruling political organization interpenetrate the armed forces, which serve as instruments of mobilization and regime security for the revolutionary political party (see Chapter 13).

Moreover, and evidenced by the case studies in this volume, the specific “structure” of democratic control is unique for each state and is shaped by factors including culture, historical tradition and experience, the internal and external threat environment, societal norms, and political institutions. Furthermore, civil-military relations are not static but evolve in tandem with and in response to different political and social dynamics. The institutional structures of civil-military relations in the United States differ from the control structures and institutions of defense politics in Germany, as well as Japan’s system of bureaucratically managed civil-military relations

where career civil servants set the national security agenda and oversee the Self-Defense Forces (SDF; see Chapter 5).

In addition, the notion of civilian control can never assume an apolitical military. Like any other organization, the military has organizational needs and interests, and it has a responsibility to advise policymakers on matters of national security. In fact, civil-military coordination and taking military expertise into account is crucial for military effectiveness. In other words, focusing solely on control is inadequate for “good” civil-military relations—at least if one accepts the idea that the only good reason for a society to spend a considerable share of its national economic resources on the military is because it can expect a reasonable amount of security in return. Rather, as Pion-Berlin argues, “if democracy is to survive and flourish in today’s world, it must strike a balance between controlling the armed forces and ensuring their effectiveness” (2006, p. ix).

The Nexus Between Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness

The key argument we make here, and find support in the case studies, is that there is a link between political control on the one hand and military effectiveness on the other. While few scholars would disagree regarding the importance of the civilian control aspects for military effectiveness, this consensus is not, however, matched by a corresponding body of work that seeks to increase our understanding of the relationship between the two (Nielsen 2005; Egnell 2008). Furthermore, a review of the scarce research on the control-effectiveness nexus suggests that there is also no generally accepted view on the interrelation between civilian control and military effectiveness. On the one hand, there is the opinion that the implementation of civilian control can negatively affect the military (Furlan 2012, p. 437).

For example, Huntington (1968) forcefully argues that political leadership should avoid any interference in military affairs for maximum military effectiveness. Furthermore, in her research on political-military relations and military effectiveness in the Arab countries, Brooks looked at the negative impact of political control mechanisms chosen by authoritarian leaders in the Middle East on their armies’ military effectiveness (1998, pp. 45–53). She contends that the highly centralized and rigid command structures of Arab regimes, the use of direct leadership, and the tinkering with the chains of command for political reasons negatively influence the effectiveness of Arab armies (1998, p. 46; see also Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Talmadge 2015). More generally, the flourishing scholarship on coup-proofing argues that coup-proofing² diminishes battlefield effectiveness as well as the ability of militaries to successfully fight conventional wars and counter insurgencies (Brooks 1998; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Talmadge 2015; Narang and Talmadge 2018).

On the other hand, some scholars argue that without civilian involvement, military organizations will stagnate and resist necessary innovation in response to changes in the strategic context. Military bureaucracies are famously resistant to change (Pion-Berlin 2006). While military organizations may need to change to remain relevant and effective over time (Posen 1984, pp. 24–29), it is therefore unlikely that such change can emerge from inside the armed forces. That is why several military theorists insist that civilian leaders must intervene to force change in the military (E. A. Cohen 2003). Moreover, civilian control can also promote what Posen (1984, p. 25) calls political-military integration, or “the knitting-together of political ends and military means,” which is vital for military effectiveness. Moreover, a lack of civilian monitoring is likely to lead to declining defense efficiency, especially if the military is also involved in economic ventures, which make militaries more prone to corruption and the wasting of resources (Posen 1984; Pion-Berlin 2006; Pion-Berlin and Martinez 2017). Similarly, Avant highlights the importance of low-cost civilian monitoring and strong civilian control of the armed forces for military effectiveness. Without such control, she argues, the military will resist necessary innovation as the strategic context changes (1994, p. 49). As she explains, civilian control also increases the effectiveness of the state by reducing bargaining costs. It takes time to reach an agreement, during which the bargainers have to be paid and the organization may lose focus on implementing the agreed policy. Bargaining always entails the risk of reaching a suboptimal agreement. Put simply, elite civil-military disagreement is costly and reduces the effectiveness of the state. Bargaining involves the possibility of military counterpunishment, which typically decreases the military effectiveness of the state. Hence, Avant concludes that “having more civilians control the army made it easier, not harder, for the army to maintain its focus” (2007, p. 87).

Bruneau and Matei (2008) also discuss the possibility of different levels of civilian control impacting military effectiveness. While there can be trade-offs between democratic control and military effectiveness, they conclude that at least increased *democratic* control can improve effectiveness in military, intelligence, and police forces: “While too much direction and oversight obviously can hamper security services’ capabilities or reveal sources and methods in intelligence, implementing ‘good’ control, i.e., instituting control and oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance, as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness” (Bruneau and Matei 2008, p. 921). Of course, good control includes not only the existence of institutions, democratic governance of the defense and security sector—that is, accountable, transparent, consultative, and responsive governance based on the rule of law—but also that civilians are willing to care about defense policy, security issues, and

military affairs. As shown below, some of the case studies in this book (i.e., Germany and Indonesia) suggest that the latter is not always a given.

Case Selection

The chapters in this volume provide in-depth and comparative case studies of the linkage between patterns of civil-military relations and military effectiveness in democracies and nondemocracies in six regions: North and South America (the United States and Chile), West Europe and postcommunist Eurasia (Germany and Russia), Asia Pacific (Japan, Indonesia, and China), and the Mediterranean (Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey). To draw robust inferences from the country case studies, the case selection aimed at maximizing variation along three dimensions: (1) regime types, (2) patterns of civil-military relations, and (3) military roles and missions. At the same time, the selection of country cases also took into account the importance of the individual countries, both in regional and geopolitical terms (anchor states) and concerning relevant aspects of the control-effectiveness nexus.

Regime Types

The case selection included consolidated liberal democracies such as Germany, Japan, and the United States, neodemocracies at various stages of consolidation and political fragility (Tunisia, Chile, and Indonesia), hybrid regimes in Turkey and Russia, as well as military rule in Egypt and civil-military relations in a socialist party state (China).

While Germany, Japan, and the United States represent some of the most advanced liberal democracies in their respective regions (and worldwide), Tunisia, Chile, and Indonesia represent three relative success stories of democratization in their respective regions. In Chile, which experienced a transition from military rule to democratic government in the late 1980s and early 1990s, civil-military relations reforms had to cope with the legacies of one of the most brutal military regimes in South America, including unresolved issues of transitional justice, strong military veto power, and military prerogative after the transition to democracy. In contrast to the security environment of Chile's civil-military relations, which are characterized by the absence of serious international or regional threats to the integrity of the nation-state, both Tunisia and Indonesia face challenges of domestic terrorism and insurgency. While the Indonesian military was closely associated with the dictatorship of President Suharto (1966–1998) and still is a relevant economic (and political) player after the transition to democracy in 1999, the Tunisian Armed Forces (TAF) under President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali (1987–2011) played a minor role in the authoritarian regime coalition. In fact, deprivation of the military relative to nonmilitary security services under Ben Ali has been seen by many scholars as one of

the reasons for the failure of the armed forces to defend the dictator against mass protests in 2010–2011. However, in both countries, the transition from authoritarianism to democracy saw the outbreak of transitional violence, partly as a result of interservice competition and rivalries and partly as a consequence of the (temporary?) erosion of state capacity.

The cases of Turkey and Russia were selected because they serve as examples for the reform of civil-military relations during situations of “failed” transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes. Russia and Turkey have seen far-reaching and deep-cutting military reforms and fundamental change in civil-military relations (from Communist Party control to personal supremacy over the military in Russia, and from military hegemony to personalized control in Turkey). Both political regimes suffered from a dramatic weakening of democracy in the hands of elected civilian leaders and, in each, democratic backsliding also solidified the transformation of the military into tools of regime security. Finally, Egypt and China represent two different types of clearly nondemocratic rule. Following the downfall of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 and the military coup d’état of 2013 that brought down popularly elected President Mohamed Morsi, Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi represents military rule in the form of a military strongman regime. The People’s Republic of China is one of only five socialist single-party regimes worldwide that survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the People’s Republic of China is today the main competitor of the United States in economic and security terms and has the largest, most powerful, and perhaps most effective military in Asia—next only to the United States.

Patterns of Civil-Military Relations

While Germany, Japan, and the United States represent the universe of advanced industrial democracies, their cases also stand for different models of civil-military relations: the separation model in the United States, the model of parliamentary army in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany before 1990), and the model of bureaucratic civilian control in Japan. In contrast, civil-military relations in Chile, Indonesia, and Tunisia are still in the process of transformation. Yet while most scholars seem to agree that Chile has been able to institutionalize democratic civilian control over its military since Augusto Pinochet vanished from the political scene in 2005, Indonesia and Tunisia are in search of a new model for their civil-military relations (Pion-Berlin and Martinez 2017; Chapters 8 and 9 in this volume). Both achieved a certain degree of civilian oversight and authority, but the military still enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy from the civilian institutions. And in recent years, the militaries in these two countries seem to have even gained political influence

because of the deepening troubles with transnational terrorism, cross-border crime, and conflicts in neighboring countries (Tunisia); or because former military officers founded or joined political parties and gained political representation at the provincial or national level through the ballot box (Indonesia). Finally, while Egypt stands for a pattern of civil-military relations in which military officers directly control national politics and reign over a multilayered and vast military business complex with wide-ranging influence and impacts on their national economies, China is one of the few existing cases of a communist-style system of party control.

Roles and Missions

Regarding roles and missions, the US military performs the full spectrum of roles, from training, preparing, and conducting war fighting, police support, and counterterrorism to human disaster relief. In contrast, the Self-Defense Force in Japan is trained and equipped for war fighting, although its main roles are disaster relief and contributing to the national security policy of “proactive contribution to peace” by engaging in international peace-supporting and peacekeeping operations, including UN peacekeeping (see Chapter 5). Not dissimilar to the SDF, the Bundeswehr (German armed forces) trains for international wars but is exclusively deployed in peacekeeping, peace-supporting, and antipiracy operations. However, in contrast to Japan’s SDF, the Bundeswehr is constitutionally banned from providing support for police operations in any form (at least during peace), has never been involved in counterinsurgency operations, and only indirectly plays a role in counterterrorism efforts, mostly through participation in nation building and stabilization operations (e.g., in Mali and Afghanistan; see Chapter 6). Though the Bundeswehr cannot initiate offensive actions constitutionally, since 1994 it has had a marked presence in European Union (EU), NATO, and UN endeavors. Yet contrary to foreign policy declarations, the federal government and the German public have remained distant and largely uninformed about defense and military policy.

Moving on to military roles and missions in emerging or consolidating democracies, it is important to note that in all three new democracies, the conventional war-fighting role of the armed forces is secondary or even of minor importance compared to other roles such as counterterrorism, anti-crime operations, counterinsurgency, and border security. For example, as Gledhill (2012) demonstrates, although Indonesia is the largest archipelago state worldwide, its navy de facto has only one role, that of a heavily armed coast guard, whereas the Tunisian military is almost exclusively focused on border security and counterterrorism operations. In contrast, the Chilean military is prepared for combat with neighbors and is engaged in peacekeeping, but its main role in recent times has been to support the state in emergency relief due mainly to earthquakes.

Finally, the military in Egypt is primarily engaged in economic and political roles, but has a dismal record in war. In contrast to Egypt, the Chinese government is determined to modernize and “professionalize” its military to prepare it for regional and international security threats (including the threat of a military confrontation with the United States). Finally, one aspect that is emblematic of the complex roles of some militaries in Asia and the Middle East, compared to their counterparts in Western democracies, is their role as “businessmen in arms” (Grewert and Abul-Magd 2016). What sets civil-military relations in Egypt, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent China (and other communist regimes such as Vietnam and Laos; cf. Croissant 2018) apart from armed forces in most other countries is that, in the post–World War II period, soldiers not only have been agents of socioeconomic modernization but also organized military business complexes.

The Chapters

The next two chapters of this book deal with challenges of theory building, data mining, and measurement strategies in the field of civil-military relations.

David Kuehn starts us out in Chapter 2 with a critical review of theoretical approaches on civilian control and military effectiveness. Building on a two-dimensional matrix of explanatory perspectives, Kuehn differentiates between structural, institutional, psychological, and ideational theories of civilian control and of military effectiveness. While his survey leads him to conclude that the field has produced several useful theories and explanatory arguments, he nevertheless identifies three substantive shortcomings in the current state of civil-military relations theory.

In Chapter 3, Tanja Eschenauer-Engler and Jil Kamerling provide a critical evaluation of existing data and methods of data analysis in the field of civil-military relations that concern the two core themes of this book: military effectiveness and political roles of the military. Similar to Kuehn’s findings in Chapter 2, Eschenauer-Engler and Kamerling find much to like about the current state of the art but also identify some critical shortcomings.

After that, Part 1 of this book addresses the control-effectiveness nexus in three established democracies. In Chapter 4, Thomas-Durell Young notes, often using the term *prevarication*, that democratic civilian control is not an issue in the United States which, since the founding of the republic in the late eighteenth century, has had a robust set of institutions whereby civilians control the military. He does, however, find major problems in the United States with military effectiveness and lays the blame squarely on the US Congress. Another prevarication is with regard to the command structure, and Young notes that the structures and processes of the US defense system were better attuned to the context of the Cold War than to the current global situation in which the the country finds itself. In sum, the United States is a

case wherein there is unquestioned democratic civilian control of relatively richly endowed armed forces, but where the domestic politics, in which separation of powers is key, do not allow reforming the defense system to achieve effectiveness. Chiyuki Aoi, in Chapter 5, begins with an analysis of the context of Japan's postwar system of civilian control by bureaucrats, which served to prevent the Self-Defense Forces from having autonomous decisionmaking powers over the use of the armed forces, but also worked to minimize the interface between the Japanese body politic and society at large. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the system has evolved, giving more power to politicians. As Aoi notes, the roles attributed to the SDF in its establishment were expanded beyond Japanese shores after 1992, and that expansion had an important impact on Japanese civil-military relations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Nonetheless, this did not alter the fundamental brakes placed on SDF authority and mandate. In addition, Aoi explores the operational implications of such tight civilian scrutiny imposed on SDF missions and evaluates the effectiveness of such control.

In Chapter 6, Sven Gareis investigates the relationship between the high degree of civilian control and low military effectiveness in Germany. While the political primacy over the military is unchallenged and is exercised in the form of a thorough democratic control of the Bundeswehr, severe deficits in military effectiveness are being tolerated in politics and society because immediate threats to Germany's territory have largely disappeared and the use of force in international relations is not a preferred approach in foreign and security policy. This—most probably—will not change in the foreseeable future.

Next, Part 2 of this book addresses civil-military relations in three countries in South America, Northern Africa, and Southeast Asia that underwent a transition from authoritarian to democratic government in the 1990s and 2000s.

In Chapter 7, Carlos Solar explores the existing patterns of civilian control and effectiveness in Chile in light of a changing and more intricate defense governance environment. His analysis focuses especially on how the Chilean armed forces respond to national and international strategies for assessing conflict and peace. Solar's study of the Chilean case evidences the struggle that decisionmakers experience when opening up new agendas for the military if cohesive policy frameworks for control and effectiveness are not used.

Noureddine Jebnoun provides, in Chapter 8, an empirically rich and in-depth study of political-military relations in Tunisia from the early years of independence until today. His study highlights the gradual institutionalization of the military at the periphery of Tunisia's postcolonial state and examines the deliberate process of marginalization and disempowerment of the Tunisian Armed Forces under President Ben Ali's "secu-

ritocracy” after 1987. Furthermore, he maps the gradual evolution of the military’s role and missions and provides an assessment of military effectiveness in the post-authoritarian era subsequent to the emergence of new security contingencies since 2011.

Aditya Batara Gunawan’s study of the case of Indonesia in Chapter 9 concludes Part 2. As Gunawan argues, one of the most important achievements of democratic reforms after the collapse of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998 concerns the transformation of the political roles of the Indonesian national armed forces, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Yet, after a period of roles retrenchment in the 2000s, the Indonesian military has recently seen a resurgence of its role in non-defense-related missions, which bears a resemblance to the military’s sociopolitical function under the authoritarian Suharto regime. He analyses the TNI’s involvement in the public food security program to show the impact of limited civilian control on military effectiveness in various missions.

Then, Part 3 of this book first addresses civil-military relations in Russia and Turkey. In Chapter 10, Ofer Fridman argues that the relationship between political and military leadership is a positive-sum relationship and that political leadership and military effectiveness are highly interdependent. His case study of Russian military engagement in Syria makes the point that the deployment of Russian troops, and their presence and actions abroad, can be classified as the application of hard power. However, the application of hard power in Syria is modest in extent and intensity, and the military campaign serves a dual political purpose of enhancing Russia’s soft power in international relations (international audience) and strengthening the political support of Russians for the Vladimir Putin government (domestic audience).

In Chapter 11, Zeynep Sentek provides a fascinating case study of the historical trajectories of and recent transformations in Turkey’s civil-military relations. With a particular focus on the developments since the failed military coup on July 15, 2016, she illustrates how the government of Prime Minister and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has followed a path of strengthening a very personalized political control without democratic oversight. Sentek’s assessment of military effectiveness, as well as the terrorism-fighting role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), utilizes the Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria as a case study.

The two final chapters in Part 3 provide crucial insights into the relationship between political control and military effectiveness in unambiguously autocratic political regimes. In Chapter 12, Robert Springborg offers a description and analysis of civil-military relations in Egypt. He states most emphatically that there is neither democratic civilian control of the armed forces nor military effectiveness. Indeed, since independence, Egypt has been ruled by military officers except for a brief period of less than two years, and Springborg provides rich details on how the

military, from the top to the bottom, controls the state. He also demonstrates in great detail that the military has not been effective in any role or mission that it chanced to undertake, from war fighting to border control and counterterrorism to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. He also highlights the huge role of the Egyptian military in all varieties of commercial activities.

On a very different note, in Chapter 13, Chinese scholar You Ji examines the politically and military transformation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) since the late 1990s. He includes incremental change in party-military relations, as well as military modernization. As Ji explains, the PLA's obedience to the Communist Party is still the essence of civilian control in China, but the party supports the deepening professionalization and modernization of the PLA because a powerful military serves the party's interests in boosting its legitimacy, promoting a state-centric patriotism, and lifting China's profile as a rising global superpower. This has been the foundation of the alliance between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA in meeting their shared vested interests. While professionalization is the foundation for military modernization and military effectiveness, Ji also notes that this can be at odds with political control, especially in authoritarian political contexts, where the military tends to be politicized.

Part 4 concludes this book with Chapter 14 by Thomas C. Bruneau and Aurel Croissant. The chapter summarizes the main findings with regard to civilian control, to military effectiveness, and the nexus between the two. In doing so, the authors argue against the conventional wisdom according to which democratic civilian control is a necessary condition for military effectiveness. They also emphasize the tremendous differences in the extent to which militaries in democracies are effective.

Notes

1. While Bruneau and Matei (2008) argue that "military efficiency is the third dimension of civil-military relations (in addition to control and effectiveness)," we treat *efficiency* in this framework as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for effectiveness.

2. *Coup-proofing* describes measures taken by governments to guard their rule against the threat of a military coup, such as ethnic staking, the creation of parallel armed organizations, and monitoring of the military through multiple internal security organizations.