


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of Intelligence
in Democracies:
Processes, Practices,
Cultures

edited by
Florina Cristiana Matei
and Carolyn Halladay

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1

The Role and Purpose of Intelligence in a Democracy

*Florina Cristiana Matei
and Carolyn Halladay*

*The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open society.
—John Fitzgerald Kennedy¹*

At the writing of this volume in early 2019, there are 146 democracies around the world—out of 195 states.² These countries have held free and fair elections, instituted market economies, and fostered the creation of civil societies. Some have endeavored to overhaul their intelligence agencies,³ converting repressive state security systems into democratic intelligence communities. Even the most successful democracies face a conundrum in regard to the intelligence function, however: whereas democracy calls for political neutrality, transparency, and accountability, effective intelligence agencies must operate in secrecy.

Democratic Systems

In general, the literature on democracy divides democratic systems into two ideal types: electoral democracies, which are characterized by free and fair elections, and liberal democracies, which involve free and fair elections as well as the protection of individual, civil, and political rights and freedoms of the citizenry.⁴ Moving from electoral to liberal democracies equates to achieving democratic consolidation,

whereas moving from liberal to electoral democracy status equates to democratic deconsolidation or erosion.⁵

One of the most comprehensive conceptual frameworks of democratic consolidation was advanced by scholars Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.⁶ In their view, democratic consolidation requires developing five complementary and interacting arenas, operating within a functioning state: (1) a free and lively civil society where citizens, groups, and movements, generally independent of the state, associate to convey shared ideas, concepts, interests, and values; (2) a relatively autonomous and valued political society, whereby the polity arranges itself to dispute the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and state apparatus, and which includes political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures; (3) rule of law, namely, a sense of constitutionalism and a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal culture in civil society; (4) a functioning state bureaucracy in which the democratically elected government wields its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory (command, regulate, extract) effectively to enforce law in order to protect citizens' rights and deliver other goods; and (5) institutionalized economic society, whereby sociopolitically crafted and sociopolitically agreed-on norms, institutions, and regulations exist to mediate between state and market.⁷ Countries that have successfully developed these arenas are called *consolidated democracies*. Examples include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Australia, Germany, and Japan, to name a few. Countries that have started creating these institutions and ideas but have not been able to develop them fully are called *consolidating democracies*. Examples include Romania, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia, among others. This volume discusses both consolidated and consolidating democracies in the context of democratic societies.

The Intelligence-and-Democracy Dilemma

Democratic societies seek liberty and security for their citizens. To achieve these goals, they heed freedoms, rights, diversity, transparency, accountability, and so on.⁸ They also craft intelligence agencies to protect their national security and, ultimately, to maintain their democratic trajectory.⁹

Paradoxically, however, to serve democracies, intelligence agencies must engage in clandestine activities or exploit secret sources and methods—measures that, on their face, do not comport with the open, free society that democracies seek to sustain. Indeed, such activities can pose a great danger to the democracy itself. Secrecy, for instance, may accommodate abuse and insulate the agencies from scrutiny, intrinsic or extrinsic. Problems of this sort have arisen in the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, or Romania, to name a few—states where intelligence agencies operated without a legal framework for decades.¹⁰ Secrecy and clandestine activities augment the intelligence agencies' power; they may refuse to serve policy in favor of pursuing their own objectives. In one example, Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND) provided the United States with intelligence during the war in Iraq in 2003, per existing agency-to-agency agreements, despite German policymakers' resolutely antiwar stance.¹¹

Conversely, secrecy and clandestine activities may encourage the politicization of the intelligence apparatus, which leads to misuse of intelligence agencies and their special privileges by the executive branch for its own political ends.¹² There is abundant literature on the politicization of intelligence in the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular with regard to the intelligence leading up to the second invasion of Iraq.¹³ An extreme case of politicization involves intelligence agencies acting as political police for the government du jour.¹⁴ There have been scattered instances of long-established democracies using intelligence agencies as political police, in particular in the 1970s—including the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) monitoring American citizens, abuses by Canada's Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) against the local population in Quebec, the United Kingdom's MI5 surveillance of British citizens during the Thatcher government, and India's intelligence agencies' arrest of tens of thousands of political opponents and minorities without due process.¹⁵

Such measures are regularly employed by developing democracies. In Indonesia, South Korea, Mongolia, Romania, Croatia, and Albania, for example, the domestic intelligence agencies (and sometimes the foreign or military intelligence agencies) have regularly conducted surveillance of members of the opposition and journalists—most frequently during elections—as directed by the respective ruling elites or intelligence leadership.¹⁶ In Albania in 1997,

National Intelligence Service (NIS) personnel even suppressed civilian demonstrations against corruption in the government.¹⁷

In Colombia, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) (1953–2011) leadership and rank and file were involved in assassinations, improper bargains with paramilitary and guerrilla groups, and electronic surveillance of political opposition and media representatives, which ultimately led to the dismantling of the agency in 2011.¹⁸ In Argentina, political police practices, which occurred virtually under each democratically elected administration but more so under the government led by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the Secretariat of Intelligence (SI) in 2015, after allegations of involvement in the assassination of a prosecutor who was investigating terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.¹⁹ Finally, in virtually all developing African democracies, the primary role of intelligence agencies is regime protection. Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Sudan are a few examples.²⁰

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence is crucial to the survival of the state. For this reason, all democracies have created at least one intelligence agency, albeit with different structures, sizes, capabilities, and competences depending on the state, its needs, and its history. Although there is no universally accepted definition of intelligence,²¹ in a democracy, the main function of intelligence is to help fulfill the legitimate tasks of government. Specifically, the purpose of intelligence is to serve, inform, assist, and support policymakers/decisionmakers in their work, and to provide support to security or military operations and organizations.²²

In this context, the role of intelligence in a democracy is three-fold: First, it is a *process*. Intelligence involves an enterprise by which certain types of information (e.g., security threats, strategic threat estimates, future capabilities projections, indication and warning, etc.) are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated to decisionmakers/policymakers. It also is how certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted.

Second, it is an *organization*. Intelligence consists of units that execute the intelligence functions (process and product). Such institutions are

- civilian domestic, with no law enforcement authorities (MI5 in the United Kingdom, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS] in Canada, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation [ASIO] in Australia, the Internal Security Organization [ISO] in Uganda, the BND in Germany, the National Intelligence Service in Albania, the Intelligence Agency [AR] in Macedonia);
- civilian foreign with no law-enforcement powers (the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] in the United States, MI6 in the United Kingdom, the National Assessment Bureau [NAB] in New Zealand, the Foreign Intelligence Service [SIE] in Romania);
- civilian intelligence with law-enforcement powers (the FBI in the United States; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Canada, the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police [DCPJ] in France, the Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection [DIPI] in Romania);
- domestic and foreign hybrid (the Brazilian Intelligence Agency [ABIN], the Federal Intelligence Agency [AFI] in Argentina, Indonesia State Intelligence Agency [BIN] in Indonesia, the National Intelligence Service [NIS] in Kenya); strategic foreign-domestic law-enforcement hybrid intelligence located under the military (the State Intelligence Service [SIS] in Sri Lanka, the Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] in Pakistan);
- military (the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] or the National Security Agency [NSA] in the United States, the Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ] in the United Kingdom, the General Directorate for External Security [DGSE] in France, and, respectively, in Mali, the General Directorate of the Armed Forces' Intelligence [DGIA] in Romania).

Such institutions also include interagency arrangements such as fusion centers—domestically (all seventy-eight centers in the United States, Spain's CITCO [Intelligence Center Against Terrorism and Organized Crime]) and/or internationally (INTCEN, the EU [European Union] Intelligence and Situation Centre). However, these units can be strategic (long-term intelligence in support of policymaking and military plans), operational (used by the armed forces, at either the battalion or expeditionary level), or tactical (near- or short-term intelligence, used by military units on the ground).²³

Finally, intelligence is a *product*. The end result of the roles, processes, and organizations is the intelligence product—a forecast

of short- and long-term national-security issues—which is distributed to policymakers in various forms (paper, video, PowerPoint, or a combination of all these, depending on the preferences of the policymakers/decisionmakers). In the United States, the product includes the President’s Daily Brief or a National Intelligence Estimate; in Romania, the product is the Daily Security Intelligence Bulletin, a ten-page document.

Although intelligence involves information—simplistically put, raw data—information does not equate to intelligence. Intelligence entails both information and response. Intelligence is information collected from a variety of sources, which undergoes elaborate examination and a thorough reasoning process by the analyst, who transforms it into a timely, tailored, useful, and digestible product for policymakers, decisionmakers, and operators, as well as—if needed—sharable reports to non-policymaking/decisionmaking entities (such as the private sector).

A comprehensive presentation of the place and role of intelligence agencies in safeguarding national security in a democracy includes, *inter alia*, the following efforts: identifying potential risks and threats to democratic security (state, citizens), as well as their motivation, objectives, and strategies; self-evaluating their readiness to neutralize potential risks and threats; consolidating their own capabilities of managing crises and crises’ consequences; rigorously and professionally selecting the most effective ways, means, and methods of preventing future security threats; identifying those nations/organizations with similar security interests that are instrumental in preventing and countering security threats; and identifying courses of action that secure the support of potential allies.²⁴

The function of intelligence involves two processes that may be separate or intertwined: inductively solving a puzzle, understood as a mosaic, the shape of which is by and large known and which could be solved with certainty through accessing a specific type of data or information (mostly classified, but generally easy to spot and most of the time, available);²⁵ and providing deductive intelligence—or mystery intelligence—which, unlike the puzzle intelligence, cannot be totally decoded, regardless of the available intelligence, as it entails relations, data, and references about people, attitudes, thinking, concepts, actions, non-actions, vulnerabilities, and so on, and not concrete things or objects.²⁶

All types of intelligence have at least seven main roles,²⁷ which include providing information to policymakers and operations on

1. fighting potential conflicts/international wars in which the state is involved
2. fighting potential conflicts/domestic wars
3. fighting terrorism
4. fighting crime, including organized crime
5. contributing to international coalition operations
6. ensuring support to humanitarian assistance efforts
7. contributing to security-related research and development

Challenges to the Intelligence Function

There are three categories of challenges to the intelligence function in a democracy; each category “intentionally or accidentally, through action or inaction” leads to failures of intelligence, in the words of Richard Betts.²⁸ The first category includes external challenges to intelligence, for instance, state and nonstate enemies that threaten a state’s national security. This category also includes political leadership within a state that intentionally denies and obstructs intelligence. Policymakers may discount or dismiss intelligence products that do not confirm the politicians’ pet policies—even (or especially) if the reports have the intelligence right.

The response, alarmingly often, is the creation of new intelligence agencies that use their information only to support the priorities of the partisan political leadership. French politicians, for instance, have occasionally created intelligence units to provide them with acceptable intelligence.²⁹ Against the background of the war in Iraq, then US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, unhappy with the intelligence provided by the intelligence community, ordered the creation of a separate office in the Pentagon in 2002—the Office of Special Plans, which lasted one year—to supply George W. Bush senior administration officials with raw intelligence (not previously vetted by the rest of the intelligence community) that supported their Iraq invasion policy.³⁰

The second category includes challenges that are not planned or expressly authored but inhibit the function of intelligence unintentionally. These types of challenges include: organizational constraints that lawfully prevent cooperation and sharing of intelligence among various agencies (democracies drawing various types of boundaries between intelligence and law enforcement, between domestic and foreign intelligence, and between public and private

intelligence), which makes cooperation difficult and results in failures of intelligence; examples include the failure of the intelligence agencies in the United States to prevent the terrorist attacks in Washington, DC, and New York City in September 2001, or of intelligence failures in Mumbai, India, in 2008, due to “walls” between various agencies);³¹ individual intelligence employees failing for medical or personal reasons; myopic leadership of intelligence agencies, which disrupts the intelligence cycle for bureaucratic or political reasons (the 2001 Phoenix memo that never reached the FBI headquarters, let alone the CIA);³² and intelligence outsiders who attempt to curb intelligence powers on the grounds of incompatibility with democratic norms (politicians or human-rights defenders in most democracies).

The third category consists of inherent challenges—defects in organizational design less manifest to external observers. This category includes an array of psychological limitations and constraints that affect the cognitive and deductive capabilities of intelligence professionals, as well as dichotomous intelligence priorities (averting crime versus fighting terrorism, timeliness of the intelligence product versus accuracy), interests (objectivity versus policy influence and persuasion), and needs (the need to know versus the need to share, centralization versus decentralization of agencies)—which impair proper judgment.

Such challenges cannot be entirely eliminated; they will exist as long as states exist. There is no panacea for them. Rather, democracies have to try to manage them as best they can. Ultimately, the very nature of the intelligence-and-democracy dilemma perpetuates them. In a democracy, intelligence agencies are bureaucracies, staffed with human beings who can make mistakes, and they operate in secret, within bigger bureaucracies, which are—paradoxically—required to be transparent and accountable.

Democratic Reform of Intelligence

Finding a suitable trade-off between intelligence and democracy translates into democratic reform of intelligence—or intelligence democratization. Democratic reform of intelligence is a combination of two requirements: democratic civilian control over and, respectively, effectiveness of the intelligence agencies.³³

Democratic civilian control of intelligence is conceptualized in terms of authority over institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms (although professional norms can also contribute to effectiveness). Institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the intelligence agencies, exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership to civilian-led organizations with professional staffs. These latter groups can include a ministry of defense for the military intelligence, a ministry of the interior for national police or local intelligence, and a civilian-led intelligence agency; one or more committees in the legislature that deal with policies and budgets; and a well-defined chain of authority for civilians to determine roles and missions, such as a National Security Council–type organization.

Oversight is exercised on a regular legal basis by the civilian leadership to keep track of what the intelligence agencies do and to ensure they are, in fact, following the direction and guidance they have received from the civilian elites. As such, the legal framework should clearly define the responsibilities and powers of the intelligence agencies as well as the types and mechanisms of control and oversight, including delineating what the intelligence agencies can and cannot do and who is in charge of intelligence, and who controls and oversees its activities, personnel, and funding; stipulating the circumstances for interagency coordination or international cooperation; and ensuring the intelligence personnel are responsible before the law in case of abuses, and/or benefit from legal protection if they observe legal guidance and directions. The legislation should also include regulations that allow openness and access to government information by a process that protects ongoing operations but also accommodates the maximum possible transparency.

Oversight is exercised not only by formal agencies within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches but also by the independent media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, and even such international organizations as courts of human rights. Professional norms are institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civilian leadership, thus internalizing the previous two control mechanisms.

Effectiveness in fulfilling roles and missions involves three necessary, yet perhaps not sufficient, requirements.³⁴ First, there must

be a plan in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine. Examples include national-security strategies, national military strategies, white papers on security and defense, strategies for disaster relief, strategies on organized crime, doctrines on intelligence, counterterrorism doctrines, and the like.

Second, there must be structures and processes to both formulate the plans and implement them. These include ministries of defense, ministries of interior, national security councils, or other means that facilitate interagency coordination and sharing, as well as international cooperation.

Third, a democracy must commit resources, in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained intelligence personnel, and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine how any state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions.³⁵

Challenges to Democratic Reform of Intelligence

In its essence, democratic reform of intelligence entails striking a reasonable balance between effective intelligence and transparency and accountability. There is more to this process, however, than swapping out a few intelligence leaders and declaring the intelligence agencies democratized. Several factors, both internal and external to the intelligence community—some of them inherent in the process of reform itself—can impede the progress of democratic reform of intelligence.

The Multifariousness of Reform

A first factor that hinders progress is the intricacy of intelligence reform itself. The democratization of intelligence is a complex process, integrated in a more comprehensive democratic transformation of the entire security sector, along with an overall economic, political, and societal reform. Such reforms often puzzle the civilian elites—particularly in new democracies, where freshly minted leaders often come with excellent dissident credentials but without experience in running a democratic state. In most cases, new democracies must develop new structures and processes that establish intelligence agencies and oversight. Even with institutions in place,

“authoritarianism and military politics may continue behind the formalities of civilian and democratic governance.”³⁶ The new institutions must establish sufficient legitimacy to be able to undertake a rigorous democratic reform of the intelligence services or execute a robust democratic control and oversight.

And even if the legitimacy issue is resolved, such pressing issues as economic development, health care, and education get higher priority on government agendas—and receive more resources and time, to the detriment of security/intelligence. Empirical evidence reveals that it takes new democracies throughout the world more than a decade to institute security and intelligence reforms, and there are still areas requiring improvement, either in terms of transparency and accountability (all new democracies) or effectiveness (Indonesia, South Africa, Kenya, Albania, Argentina, Brazil, the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru).³⁷

If democracies are incapable of providing basic human rights, freedoms, and liberties for their citizens, or if they fall short in attaining political freedom and pluralism, lack free-market economies, have no vigorous civil societies, and fail to institute effective defense and security governance, they, by definition, fail to democratize—even if they still hold elections.³⁸ As these countries remain moderately or strongly authoritarian, it is more likely that intelligence agencies remain unreformed and nondemocratic. Recent examples include Russia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus (early 1990s–present), Turkey (2016–present), Mali (2012–2013), the Maldives (2012–present) and Venezuela (2017–present), among others.³⁹

Resistance to Reform: The Intelligence Agencies

Resistance or reluctance to reform is another challenge. Intelligence agencies oppose democratic reform for a variety of bureaucratic, ideological, or political reasons. Intelligence agencies are bureaucracies, and bureaucracies are hard to reform even in a democratic country.⁴⁰ Amy Zegart’s account of the FBI’s opposition, before 9/11, to information technology—which was one of the many factors (along with other interagency and policy-related dynamics) that contributed to the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks—is a case in point.⁴¹ Intelligence agencies challenge democratic reform—particularly, democratic control—because they generally lack confidence in the political decisionmakers’ expertise in intelligence,

doubt that national security is a high priority on the politicians' agenda, and believe that too much transparency or democratic scrutiny will undermine their effectiveness.⁴² Robert Johnson's assessment of Pakistan's ISI, that the agency "regards civilian politicians with suspicion, if not contempt,"⁴³ applies to long-established and developing democracies equally.⁴⁴

In new democracies, this resistance to reform is even more unsettling. Because, under nondemocratic regimes, intelligence agencies serve a restricted and highly privileged political class and enjoy special benefits—including better remuneration and possibility to travel abroad—they are suspicious of any political change that would do away with these powers. Under democratic reform, intelligence agencies must lose these prerogatives, refrain from abusive practices and illegalities, and accept downsizing, vetting, and retrospective investigation of their past practices and actions—all of which they, not surprisingly, try to resist. In Chile, during the early years of transition, the armed forces torpedoed any civilian effort to reform the military intelligence services that had lingered since Augusto Pinochet's administration—most especially any suggestion of forming a civilian intelligence agency. What is more, after the creation of a civilian service—the National Intelligence Agency (ANI)—in 2004, the military regularly used its influence to obstruct any attempts to grant ANI collection powers.⁴⁵

Intelligence agencies in emerging democracies sometimes use their special powers and access to files or records to stall or influence the reform by blackmailing or coercing decisionmakers. The literature is rife with examples from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Asia.⁴⁶

Reluctance to Reform: The Civilian Elites

Not only intelligence agencies but also elected officials avoid or initially oppose reforming intelligence. One explanation is that intelligence does not bring in votes. In virtually all democracies, especially new ones, politicians have other reforms as top priority, which may bring in more votes—health, education, development—even if the democracy faces serious security threats. Trinidad and Tobago has been a democracy for decades, yet it lacks an intelligence agency that can tackle the increasing terrorist and organized crime threat in the country effectively; health, education, and the economy have been priorities instead.⁴⁷

Another explanation is that the civilian elites fear intelligence personnel have information that could be used against them. For instance, congressional investigations of allegations of intelligence wrongdoing in the United States in the early 1970s—and the ulterior reforms of the intelligence community—were possible, among other reasons, only after the death of J. Edgar Hoover, who had run the FBI for almost fifty years and whom many government officials had feared.⁴⁸

One additional explanation for the civilians' hands-off attitude toward intelligence in general and intelligence reform in particular stems from the limited trust in intelligence. This distrust is due to secrecy, on the one hand, and past abuses and transgressions, on the other. Not surprisingly, Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch note that “despite the nod towards oversight, Britain remains one of the most secretive states.”⁴⁹ In addition, some of the most ignominious intelligence activities have involved encroachments on individual liberties, sometimes without a real national-security reason. Essentially, then, in a democracy, what citizens know about intelligence usually emphasizes failures or scandals. Successes tend to stay secret—paradoxically, partly because intelligence agencies themselves want it that way, as a means to protect their sources and methods. As a result, intelligence becomes easily vilified or, as Philip Davies notes, “turned into a folk devil” and dreaded extremely or “subjected to media and political moral panic,” no matter how well they serve democracies.⁵⁰

In Canada, the intelligence community lost credibility because the RCMP failed to prevent the deportation to Syria by the US government in 2002—and the subsequent torturing by the Syrian government—of an innocent Canadian and Syrian citizen (Maher Arar), suspected by the United States of involvement in terrorism.⁵¹ In France, because, as one expert notes, the “intelligence culture has been marked by a preference for action, widespread secrecy, and political distance,” it has led to “disdain toward intelligence.”⁵² As such, the politicians have organized the intelligence community in France “so that there were in every Ministry at least two organizations performing similar tasks, and thus challenging the mission and legitimacy of each other.”⁵³ Additionally, very often in democracies, civilian elites deny knowledge of illegal operations in order to avoid any possible suspicion that they tolerate illegal activities and practices. In 2009, Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the House in the United States, denied that the CIA informed her in 2002 that it had used enhanced interrogation techniques on terrorist Abu Zubaydah.⁵⁴

Civilians' reluctance to engage democratic intelligence reform is even more prevalent in new democracies, because they fear either past exposure with the nondemocratic regimes' intelligence agencies or blackmail.⁵⁵ For the general public, then, the legacy agencies are the *bêtes noires* of the government. Indeed, as Stuart Farson et al. highlight, "In many transition regimes there is such a deep well of mistrust of security agencies that anyone dealing with them may find themselves under suspicion of being a 'spook' or an informer."⁵⁶

Citizens and political elites typically oppose creating new intelligence systems for fear of a return to a nondemocratic regime. Hence, in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, citizens actually favored "the destruction of intelligence apparatuses, not their reform," as Larry Watts notes.⁵⁷ In some new democracies, former guerrillas become the government; because they harbor deep antipathy toward their former enemies—intelligence rank and file—who had until recently persecuted them, they have minimal incentive to invest in actual intelligence and intelligence reform (Brazil, El Salvador).⁵⁸ Intelligence agencies in transition regimes lack—at least initially—both the organization and the expertise to develop the robust public relations and outreach needed to cleanse their image and gain popular support. In addition, in many transitional states, the media, which might theoretically have the means to promote the image of the intelligence agencies, fail to do so. More often than not, the newly liberated media in a young democracy prefer to discredit intelligence agencies as vestiges of the old regime.⁵⁹

Mistrust in intelligence has serious consequences for the effectiveness of intelligence agencies. Ultimately, lack of trust translates into decreasing the budget, personnel, equipment, education, and training, which in turn affects the capabilities of the agencies to perform their roles. In Belgium, for instance, from 1990 to 2015, the civilian elites kept decreasing the budget and personnel of the *Sûreté de l'État* one of Belgium's main intelligence services charged with antiterrorism—despite decades-long threats of terrorism and organized crime. In January 2015, Stéphane Lefebvre notes, the agency "was short not only of lawyers to work on the authorization of intrusive investigative measures, but also surveillance officers, strategic analysts with Middle East expertise, translators of foreign languages, terrorism and radicalization researchers, and operations managers."⁶⁰ Not surprisingly, then, Belgian intelligence was taken by surprise in

2015 and 2016 when both France and Belgium were the targets of successful terrorist attacks.

The Legacy of the Past in New Democracies

In virtually all newer democracies, the intelligence agencies bear a stigma of their nondemocratic past and misconduct. New democratic states typically build their post-authoritarian agencies on the ruins of the nondemocratic regime's ones, more or less of necessity.⁶¹ They either preserve—and expand as needed—the monolithic intelligence structure inherited from the nondemocratic regimes (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Uruguay) or divide the past intelligence services into multiple agencies—a few civilian, police, border guard, military, foreign, and domestic agencies (Romania, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia, South Korea, South Africa).⁶² Most of the time they retain personnel from the nondemocratic period in the new agencies and keep the buildings and other assets of the intelligence apparatuses of the nondemocratic institutions.

These practices perpetuate mistrust—and even hatred—of intelligence among citizens and policymakers alike,⁶³ with negative effects on the reform. On the one hand, hiring new personnel is rather difficult; the population's loathing of the intelligence agencies means that the best and the brightest likely will not apply for jobs in this sector, even if they have the requisite expertise. On the other hand, the recycled intelligence agency members may continue to operate as in the past for their own personal benefit or that of their political party—disregarding democratic principles of rule of law and respect for citizens' rights, freedoms, and private life. They may obstruct employment possibilities for a new generation of intelligence personnel or convey their best practices to the new agents. And if the legal framework and democratic control mechanisms are not robust enough to effectively question and reprimand intelligence officers, they can, essentially, do whatever they want. The literature is rife with examples of such incidents, which have occurred periodically in Romania, Albania, Serbia, South Africa, Indonesia, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru.⁶⁴ Frank Church's characterization of such agencies as "roque elephants" in the early 1970s remains relevant today.⁶⁵

As a corrective, some developing democracies seek to balance their citizens' dual demands for accountability of past transgressions and reconciliation. The avenues or mechanisms of such balancing are

known as *transitional justice*, which generally involves the following: prosecution of the perpetrators (Argentina); exposure of past abusers by opening the archives of the old regimes (Central and Eastern Europe); lustration, that is, banning past abusers from government positions (Central and Eastern Europe); and establishing committees of truth and reconciliation (South Africa, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras). The formal vetting (lustration) process, in particular, aims at cleansing the new services of the personnel compromised either by their actual contribution to repressive activities or by their membership in specific divisions of the past repressive intelligence agencies (Romania, former Czechoslovakia, Poland) paralleled by new personnel recruitment and professionalization procedures. By now, all third-wave democracies have gradually replaced their legacy personnel with younger generations. In some democracies, nonetheless, the younger generations are still seized with secrecy. In Moldova, for one, the intelligence agency within the Ministry of Defense still does not make public any information on current defense- and security-related meetings organized by the service.

Nevertheless, empirical evidence reveals that purging former nondemocratic intelligence personnel has a negative impact on the democratic consolidation. In some new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, former intelligence officials were often rehired by other institutions, with no vetting requirements, which allowed them to continue their old, dirty practices in the new institutions; they also opened their own private businesses, thus competing with the state agencies—as they had greater resources to procure modern equipment—or became involved in serious corruption and organized crime activities. At the same time, lustration was highly politicized. Statistics reveal that archives of the intelligence agencies in central and Eastern Europe become tools for humiliation, blackmail, revenge, and disgrace.⁶⁶

Incentives for the Democratic Reform of Intelligence

Despite these enormous challenges, there are a few catalysts for intelligence reform in a democracy, which incentivize elected or appointed officials to undertake intelligence democratization. The first incentive is personal prestige and recognition. Policymakers may seek to go down in history as pioneers of successful intelligence

reforms.⁶⁷ George Cristian Maior, in Romania, for one, remains associated with the successful transformation of the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Agency (SRI) in the 2000s.⁶⁸ A second possible incentive is awareness and understanding of the threats, as well as the importance of the role of policymakers in the cycle for successful security policies. For instance, politicians in Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda have always understood the need for effective intelligence because of the surrounding threats.⁶⁹ Other civilian elites may learn their role in intelligence in the context of an emerging or past security crisis or disaster. For example, the United States, France, Belgium, and India in the aftermath of the successful terrorist attacks of 2001, 2015, 2016, and 2008, respectively, have sought to strengthen intelligence capabilities to fight terrorism more effectively.⁷⁰

A third possible incentive is receiving financial support and assistance, to include education and training, from other countries. Colombia, for example, has augmented its intelligence capabilities to fight the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC), while also safeguarding human rights, as an effect of US security assistance. Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya have also strengthened their intelligence effectiveness, thanks to financial support from the United States.⁷¹ Related are the carrots and sticks of the membership requirements of various regional security cooperation agencies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU in Europe, and/or pressure by domestic and international media and public opinion.

Although intelligence and democracy may seem incompatible, they can reach a trade-off, or compromise, via democratic institution building. This compromise, however, is never definitive. It must be debated, reassessed, and readjusted constantly, in line with altering security and democracy demands. This process requires public education and outreach—a consistent attention to transparency and scrupulous accountability—from the intelligence sector; it also assumes a fairly constant conversation with and among the civilian political leadership.

Ultimately, as several chapters in this book reveal, numerous democracies have developed institutions to deal with this dilemma; the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States), France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Romania, and to a lesser extent India, South Africa, Chile, and Kenya, have been success stories. Nevertheless, balancing security with transparency remains a work in progress.

Structure of the Book

This book is organized into three sections, in which the authors—an array of intelligence practitioners and outsiders from all over the world—illustrate in great detail the dilemmas and trade-offs of intelligence in a democracy. Section 1 focuses on the intelligence process in a democracy. The authors assiduously examine the main components of this process—the intelligence cycle, collection, analysis, and counterintelligence—and illustrate how they interact to help policymakers devise policies and craft decisions. The authors in Section 2 explore the broader roles and missions of intelligence agencies and communities in the current security context. The authors explore covert operations, law enforcement and intelligence, intelligence sharing and intelligence fusion, intelligence and counterinsurgency, intelligence and peace operations, and public-versus-private issues—and their relationship with democracy. Section 3 focuses on intelligence accountability and culture in a democracy. These authors address such vital topics as oversight and the relationship between the media and intelligence, as well as the challenges and opportunities for institutionalizing an intelligence culture in a democracy.

Notes

1. John F. Kennedy, “The President and the Press,” address before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, April 27, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/american-newspaper-publishers-association-19610427>.

2. According to Freedom House, of the 146, eighty-eight are fully free; fifty-eight are electoral democracies that have free elections but weak institutions. See Freedom House, “Freedom in the World, 2018” (report, Freedom House, 2018), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2018_Final_SinglePage.pdf.

3. In general, American scholars of intelligence use the word *agency* when referring to an institution that carries out intelligence roles, whereas academics from other parts of the world prefer to use the word *service*. We use both in this volume.

4. See Andreas Schedler, “What Is Democratic Consolidation?” in *The Global Divergence of Democracies*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 149–164 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). Schedler notes that the liberal democracy includes an ideal subtype—the advanced democracy.

5. See *ibid.*

6. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

7. *Ibid.*, 1–60.

8. Robert Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

9. Democratic societies are not insulated from dangers. Traditional conflicts, weak institutions, political extremism, specific ideologies, and religious convictions

are but a few dangers to democracies today. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown, 2018).

10. For more information, see: Stuart Farson et al., eds., *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Loch K. Johnson, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

11. Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*.

12. Politicization can happen two ways: “down” (i.e., policymakers dictate to the intelligence professionals what product they want) and “up” (i.e., intelligence professionals willingly provide policymakers with the product they know the decision-makers want). Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 24, no. 4 (December 2011): 656–691.

13. Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, eds., *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007); Johnson, *Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*; Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, eds., *Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005); Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, eds., *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2009).

14. In a nondemocratic regime, intelligence agencies (which may be either political police or independent security states) are created to preserve the status quo of the governing regime. These intelligence agencies are characterized by extreme secrecy, deep penetration of society, no accountability, frequent violation of fundamental rights and liberties, and abuses against real and imaginary opponents of the regimes. Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” *Democratization* 18, no. 3 (2011): 602–630; Matei and Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform.”

When intelligence agencies act as political police in democracies, they either seek to intimidate political opponents of the existing government or to keep the government of the day in power sine die. Linz and Stepan introduce four different types of nondemocratic regimes: authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic. In their typology, authoritarian is a category of nondemocracies. Nonetheless, most academics use the term *authoritarian* to describe a nondemocratic regime in general, not necessarily to depict Linz and Stepan’s specific regime. Unless the authors in this volume specify that they refer to Linz and Stepan’s typology when they use the term *authoritarian*, this textbook uses *authoritarian* as a generic term for nondemocratic regimes. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*.

15. Bruneau and Boraz, *Reforming Intelligence*; Johnson, *Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; Ryan Shaffer, “Centralizing India’s Intelligence: The National Intelligence Grid’s Purpose, Status, and Problems,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 31, no. 1 (2018): 159–168.

16. For details, see Florina Cristiana Matei, Mimoza Xharo, and Eduart Bala, “Albania’s Intelligence After Hoxha: The Cat’s Grin and Hidden Claws,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 29, no. 2 (2016): 299–327; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; Jargalsaikhan Mendee and Adiya Tuvshintugs, “Consolidating Democracy: The Reform of Mongolian Intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 26, no. 2 (2013): 241–259; Peter Gill and Michael A. Andrej, eds., *Democratization of Intelligence* (London: Routledge, 2015); Shaffer, “Centralizing India’s Intelligence”; Stéphane Lefebvre, “Croatia and the Development of a Democratic Intelligence System (1990–2010),” *Democracy and Security* 8, no. 2 (2012): 115–163.

17. Matei, Xharo, and Bala, “Albania’s Intelligence After Hoxha.”

18. Carlos Maldonado Prieto, “Ethics and Intelligence: Review of European and North American Experience and Its Application in Latin America,” in *Intelligence Management in the Americas*, edited by Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane (Washington, DC: National Intelligence University, 2015), 95–96.

19. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Andrés de Castro García, and Darren Henfield, “Balancing Civilian Control with Intelligence Effectiveness in Latin America and the Caribbean: Current Trends and Lessons Learned,” *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence* 7, no. 1 (June 2016): 7–28.

20. See: Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, eds., *Intelligence: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013); Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; Peter Gill, *Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016); Lauren Hutton, “Secrets, Spies and Security: An Overview of the Issues,” in *To Spy or Not to Spy? Intelligence and Democracy in South Africa*, edited by Lauren Hutton (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 1–9; Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadijo, eds., *Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa* (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2009).

21. For various definitions of intelligence, see the following: Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2016); Carl J. Jensen III, David H. McElreath, and Melissa Graves, eds., *Introduction to Intelligence Studies* (Boca Raton, FL: CRS Press, 2013); Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, *Secret Intelligence*.

It should be noted that some democracies use information agencies for their intelligence institutions because of the legacy of the past and/or linguistic barriers. In Romania, as in France and many of the francophone countries, the word *intelligence* strictly refers to cleverness, and intelligence agencies have always been called “information agencies” or “secret services.” Romanian intelligence practitioners and policymakers are currently endeavoring to introduce *intelligence* into the vocabulary. In Brazil, *intelligence* replaced *information* immediately after the transition to democracy. In Portugal, however, the term during the nondemocratic regime was *intelligence*, so that the current acceptable term is *information*. Matei and Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform”; Matei and Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies.”

22. Policymakers/decisionmakers include a wider range of political and military leaders, police and public-order institution managers, ministry directors, and even managers of private companies—especially from the infrastructure field. See Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, eds., *National Intelligence Systems. Current Research and Future Prospects* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Loch K. Johnson, *Security Intelligence*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2017). Another way to describe intelligence is to consider it a cycle of various functions on behalf of national-security policymakers, reflecting their needs, requirements, and benefits. Antonio M. Díaz Fernández explores the intelligence cycle in Chapter 2 of this book.

23. Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, *Introduction to Intelligence Studies*.

24. Robert Kennedy, *Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Cristian Troncoță, *Nelinıştile insecurității* (Bucharest, Romania: Tritonic, 2005).

25. If unavailable at a certain stage of the intelligence activity, the missing information was often welcomed even after some time had passed.

26. Treverton and Agrell, *National Intelligence Systems*; Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror*.

27. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization* 15, no. 5 (2008): 909–929.

28. We use Betts's typology as a starting point for our discussion on challenges in the next paragraphs. Betts uses the term *enemy* of intelligence; we prefer to use *challenge*. We also acknowledge that sometimes it is not entirely the fault of intelligence agencies for failures to anticipate and avert threats to national security. Richard Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

29. Douglas Porch, class presentation, NS3155, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014; Bruneau and Boraz, *Reforming Intelligence*.

30. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*.

31. Treverton and Agrell, *National Intelligence System*; Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror*; Amy B. Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Shaffer, "Centralizing India's Intelligence."

32. Zegart, *Spying Blind*.

33. We use the framework of civil-military relations introduced by Matei and Bruneau in 2012. This framework also includes efficiency. Because of the peculiar characteristics of intelligence (including the secrecy that inevitably envelops intelligence activities and budgets and which prevents us from ensuring a credible cost-benefit analysis), our analysis does not include efficiency. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Civil–Military Relations* (London: Routledge, 2012).

34. *Ibid.*

35. Although it is rather difficult to assess effectiveness, it is important to have such institutions as a ministry of defense and a national security council.

36. Timothy Edmunds, "Intelligence Agencies and Democratization: Continuity and Change in Serbia After Milošević," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 1 (2008): 25–48.

37. For details, see Gill and Andregg, *Democratization of Intelligence*; Davies and Gustafson, *Intelligence: Spies and Espionage*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; Gill, *Intelligence Governance and Democratization*; Hutton, "Secrets, Spies and Security"; Africa and Kwadjo, *Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*; Bruneau and Boraz, *Reforming Intelligence*; Gregory Weeks, "A Preference for Deference: Reforming the Military's Intelligence Role in Argentina, Chile and Peru," *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2008): 45–61; Kevin Ginter, "Latin American Intelligence Services and the Transition to Democracy," *Journal of Intelligence History* 8, no. 1 (2008): 69–93; *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence* 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Larry L. Watts, "Intelligence Reform in Europe's Emerging Democracies," *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 1 (2004): 11–25.

38. In these types of regimes—which scholars call electoral democracies, or illiberal democracies, or competitive authoritarian regimes—elections are free but not fair. The incumbent government usually prevents the opposition parties from campaigning. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004); Fathali Moghaddam, *The Psychology of Dictatorship* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2013).

39. Levitsky and Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die*.

40. See, for example, Zegart, *Spying Blind*.

41. *Ibid.*

42. For details, see: Gill and Andregg, *Democratization of Intelligence*; Davies and Gustafson, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence* 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Watts, "Intelligence Reform in Europe's Emerging Democracies."

43. Robert Johnson, “Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence,” in *Intelligence: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, edited by Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 122.

44. See: Gill and Andregg, *Democratization of Intelligence*; Davies and Gustafson, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence* 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies.”

45. Florina Cristiana Matei and Andrés de Castro García, “Chilean Intelligence After Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 30, no. 2 (2017): 340–367.

46. Gill and Andregg, *Democratization of Intelligence*; Davies and Gustafson, *Intelligence: Spies and Espionage*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*.

47. Information provided by Trinidad and Tobago officers during class discussion, Naval Postgraduate School, July 2016.

48. F. A. O. Schwarz Jr., “The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence Oversight,” *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no. 2 (2007): 270–297. Hoover kept files on US presidents, legislators, and representatives of the judicial branch, human rights activists, as well as FBI and other intelligence community components’ rank and file.

49. Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, *Global Intelligence: The World’s Secret Services Today* (London: Zed Books, 2003), 102.

50. Philip H. J. Davies, “Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic Oversight in the Absence of Moral Panic,” in *Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services*, edited by Daniel Baldino, 133–157 (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2010).

51. Arar was detained in New York on terrorism grounds in 2002 and sent to Syria, where he was tortured. Official investigations later revealed RCMP improprieties: RCMP gave the US counterparts sensitive information on Arar, with no enclosed provisos about how to use the information; the RCMP liaison officer with the Department of Foreign Affairs was aware that Arar was sent to Syria but did not inform his leadership. Arar was exonerated in 2004. The Canadian government issued a formal apology and committed to pay damages. Davies and Gustafson, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; Daniel Baldino, ed., *Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services* (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2010); Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background*, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006).

52. Damien Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence Reform, Democratic Accountability, and the Media in France,” *Democracy and Security* 10, no. 3 (2014): 287–305.

53. Olivier Chopin, “Intelligence Reform and the Transformation of the State: The End of a French Exception,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no. 4 (2017): 532–553.

54. James Kirchick, “Is Pelosi a Liar or a Hypocrite?” *Politico*, May 19, 2009.

55. For details, see Bruneau and Boraz, *Reforming Intelligence*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence* 7, no.1 (June 2006); Davies and Gustafson, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage*; Marina Caparini and Hans Born, eds., *Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants* (London: Routledge, 2007).

56. Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*.

57. Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies.”

58. Thomas C. Bruneau, “Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, no. 3 (2001): 323–341.

59. Florina Cristiana Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 27, no. 1 (2014): 73–108.

60. Stéphane Lefebvre, "'The Belgians Just Aren't Up to It': Belgian Intelligence and Contemporary Terrorism," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 30, no. 1 (2017): 1–29.

61. Exceptions are those new democracies that have fortuitous geographic surroundings and/or enjoy outside security guarantees and, hence, can afford to completely overhaul the legacy agencies and remove all personnel from the past. Czechoslovakia is a suitable example. Watts, "Intelligence Reform in Europe's Emerging Democracies."

62. To avoid the monopolization of power by one single agency, as in the past.

63. Joannisval Brito Gonçalves, "The Spies Who Came from the Tropics: Intelligence Services and Democracy in Brazil," *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no. 4 (2014): 581–599.

64. For more information, see: Gill and Andregg, *Democratization of Intelligence*; Davies and Gustafson, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage*; Farson et al., *PSI Handbook*; *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence* 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Hutton, "Secrets, Spies and Security"; Africa and Kwadjo, *Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*; Matei, Xharo, and Bala, "Albania's Intelligence After Hoxha."

65. See Gerald K. Haines, "The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA: Looking for a Rogue Elephant," https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html#rft0, April 14, 2007.

66. Florina Cristiana Matei and Andrés de Castro Garcia, "Transitional Justice and Intelligence Democratization," paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Convention 2017, under review for publication by the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*.

67. It is difficult to find acknowledged successes in the field of intelligence; studies on intelligence failures, misperception, and military misfortunes are, however, common. A possible exception is the very telling memoir of the head of Israeli civilian intelligence. See Efraim Halevy, *Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006).

68. See George Cristian Maior, "Managing Change: The Romanian Intelligence Service in the 21st Century," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 25, no. 2 (2012): 217–239.

69. Alex Bwoma Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States: A Case Study of the Republic of Uganda" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2015); Henry Isoke, "The Dilemma of Porous Borders: Uganda's Experience in Combating Terrorism" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2015); Muhammad Nura Inuwa, "Oil Politics and National Security in Nigeria" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2010).

70. John Coyne and Peter Bell, eds., *The Role of Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: Policing Transnational Organized Crime in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Lefebvre, "The Belgians Just Aren't Up to It"; Shaffer, "Centralizing India's Intelligence," 159–168.

71. Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States"; Isoke, "The Dilemma of Porous Borders"; Inuwa, "Oil Politics and National Security in Nigeria."

