The New Politics of Aid:
Emerging Donors &
Conflict-Affected States

edited by
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
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Emerging Donors and Conflict-Affected States

Agnieszka Paczyńska

Over the past two decades, there have been significant shifts in international economic dynamics and a gradual restructuring of global political relationships and collaborations. Emerging donors such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Gulf states have become more important investors and diplomatic and trading partners for countries affected by fragility, violence, and conflict.[1] They are also playing a more prominent role in international peacekeeping and in providing development and humanitarian assistance to countries in the Global South. Despite the recent slowdown of economic growth in China, Russia, and South Africa, the political and economic crisis in Brazil, and the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016, there is every reason to expect that their importance will continue in the long term.

The rising importance of emerging donors came at a particular historical juncture. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Russia and the United States within the UN Security Council improved, making the UN organization more willing and able to expand its peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and peacebuilding activities. The scope of the international community's interventions in domestic conflicts implied a redefining of state sovereignty norms and an expansion of the domain for legitimate external intervention. As Michael W. Doyle points out, "Member states endorsed a radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention. Matters once legally preserved from UN intervention such as civil conflicts and humanitarian emergencies within sovereign states became legitimate issues of UN concern."[2] Traditional donors crafted these interventions around a number of principles and, in particular, promoted the development of market economies and democratic governance as the most effective mechanisms to peacefully resolve conflicts that inevitably

arise in any society and accordingly ensure stability following the cessation of armed conflict. This liberal peacebuilding model prioritized constructing transparent and accountable state institutions, developing participatory political processes (including supporting the capacity development of political parties and civil society organizations), establishing the rule of law, and promoting economic reforms that would allow the private sector (including foreign direct investment) to thrive. Security sector reforms, including the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and transitional justice initiatives, were also key components of reconstruction and peacebuilding processes.[3] As discussed further below, an extensive critical literature has developed around the concept and application of the liberal peacebuilding model.

Recent studies have increasingly acknowledged the growing role of emerging donors in development and humanitarian assistance.[4] However, far less scholarship has systematically examined how emerging donors conceptualize and pursue assistance to conflict-affected states, how they conceptualize postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, and the relationship between development and security in fragile environments.[5] With a few exceptions, comparative volumes that focus on postconflict reconstruction and assistance to fragile states have paid scant attention to emerging donors.[6] Furthermore, until quite recently in much of the literature, there has been an underlying assumption that the "international community is composed of like-minded actors with global leverage and legitimacy in the countries in which they intervene."[7] Although this likely overstates the commonalities and similarities among traditional donors, with the growing prominence of emerging donors this assumption is even weaker and the development and humanitarian assistance landscape has become even more complex.

This book adds to these discussions by examining emerging donors' engagement with conflict-affected states, exploring how their approaches differ from those of traditional donors, and investigating the policies of individual emerging donors. In particular, the volume's contributors investigated two overarching questions: (1) how emerging donors conceptualize the relationship between security and development; and (2) whether the policies they pursue in conflict-affected states differ from the liberal peacebuilding model of traditional donors.

The emerging donors are a diverse group and include economic powerhouses such as China and relatively poor countries such as South Africa. This book examines in detail the engagements of seven emerging donors—Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Qatar—with conflict-affected states. While the cases were chosen to reflect the differences among emerging donors in terms of the size of their economies, the global reach of their policies, and their type of regime, it is important to underscore that

these seven cases are only some of the growing number of new actors who are providing development assistance to countries affected by conflict.

The contributors to this book paint a picture of an increasingly complicated and complex landscape of donors' engagement with conflict-affected states. They point out that the emerging donors share some commonalities in their policies vis-à-vis conflict-affected states that differentiate them in important ways from traditional donors. Despite these similarities, however, the contributors show that there is no unified emerging donor model, but rather a diversity of approaches, philosophies, and strategic objectives. How these emerging donors approach their engagements with conflict-affected states differs considerably in terms of areas of focus of assistance, how issues of peacebuilding and reconstruction are conceptualized (if conceptualized at all), whether there is a willingness to shape political dynamics in recipient countries, and the extent of the global reach of these engagements. In other words, rather than introducing an alternative to the liberal peacebuilding model, the growing prominence of emerging donors is creating a more complex landscape of international assistance to conflict-affected and postconflict states.

A number of key conclusions emerge from the case studies in this volume. Despite their differences, discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the emerging donors share important principles in how they engage with conflict-affected states that differentiate them from the traditional donors. These differences between emerging and traditional donors are shaped by their distinct historical experiences with development as well as their very different positions within the global political economy. Most important, legacies of colonialism and experience with internal violent conflict shape how emerging donors approach their engagements with conflict-affected states. In particular, emerging donors frame these relationships in terms of South-South collaboration, mutual benefit, and reciprocity, emphasizing partnerships rather than hierarchical relationships. They also place strong emphasis on national ownership and demand-driven assistance, responding to the needs articulated by the conflict-affected states themselves. Unlike traditional donors, emerging donors place importance on the principles of nonintervention and nonconditionality of aid, seeing these as violating norms of state sovereignty. This concern with respecting state sovereignty reflects not just particular historical experiences with external interventions but also continued experiences with internal violent conflict such as the Kashmir conflict in the case of India and the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish state. Because of these experiences, emerging donors are concerned about the potential continued interference of global actors in their domestic affairs.

The norms that underpin how emerging donors frame their engagements with conflict-affected states can be traced to the 1955 Bandung conference, which brought together newly independent states primarily from Asia and Africa and was the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement.[8]

During the conference, participants developed ten principles to underpin their relationships; these included respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, recognition of equality of all nations, nonintervention and noninterference in the international affairs of other nations, and respect for justice and international obligations.[9]

However, the contributors to this book find that the policies pursued in practice often differ from these normative aspirations. In particular, policies that emerging donors pursue in their immediate neighborhoods tend to place greater premiums on strategic and security goals while those pursued further abroad tend to prioritize commercial and business interests. Furthermore, as emerging donors come to aspire to more global roles, strict adherence to principles of noninterference becomes more difficult to sustain. Likewise, these norms become strained as emerging donors find their commercial and strategic interests threatened by violent conflict. Finally, the contributors also find that, despite a rhetoric of partnership, implicit conditionalities are sometimes tied to the assistance provided and, in some cases, coercive conditionalities underpin these relationships. These themes are explored in more detail below.

A Note About Vocabulary

Before proceeding, a note about the terminology used in this book is needed. A number of the terms are problematic. First is the term *emerging donor*. The donors themselves are uncomfortable with this term. Moreover, emerging donors' assistance provision, of course, is not new and can be traced to the early 1960s and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement.[10] An alternative term, *rising donors,* while avoiding the problem of characterizing these donors as new, is also imprecise and does not acknowledge that some of them, such as China, Russia, and India, have been significant global powers for some time.

Equally problematic are the terms *development assistance, aid,* and *recipient*. Emerging donors, because of their own experiences with external interference in domestic affairs, unlike traditional donors conceptualize their relationships in collaborative nonhierarchical ways and couch them in a language of solidarity, experience sharing, and mutual support and benefits. Therefore, they avoid using terms such as *assistance, aid,* and *recipient* as these imply hierarchies and power differentials. In other words, although we use these terms throughout the book, it is important to keep in mind that they are contested. Finally, while this is not the focus of this volume, it is important to note that traditional donors, although they abide by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) principles and principles of engagement with fragile states and that support the liberal peacebuilding model approach to addressing challenges of conflict-affected states, nonetheless differ in their

approaches and emphasize different mixes of policies. Therefore, traditional donors are also not a homogenous group.

Emergence of New Donors

Over the past couple of decades, development and humanitarian assistance from emerging donors has rapidly expanded, and it is clear that the global development funding landscape is changing significantly. By some estimates, it is likely that by 2020 emerging donors may account for close to 20 percent of total foreign aid, thus doubling their contributions since 2012.[11] Despite clear growth in the importance of emerging donors, it is challenging to provide exact amounts of aid that they disburse.[12]

One challenge in assessing the level of emerging donors' assistance, including assistance to conflict-affected states, is that the way that emerging donors define, disburse, and report aid is significantly different from traditional donors. Unlike traditional donors, most emerging donors do not share information through OECD DAC mechanisms, and do not follow Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards of aid provision or guidelines for providing assistance to fragile states. In fact, a significant part of the assistance they provide falls outside what would be considered aid under DAC mechanisms and includes loans, lines of credit, trade, and investments, often in energy, natural resources, and agricultural sectors.[13] In other words, the cooperative ventures that emerging donors establish with recipient countries often do not conform to how development assistance is measured by DAC donors, raising questions about what should be considered development assistance. Furthermore, many of the emerging donors do not funnel assistance through a single agency but rather through multiple institutions, making it more difficult to track allocated funds. Consequently, various sources report somewhat different levels of aid flows from emerging donors. Despite these limitations, however, available data as illustrated in Figure 1.1 clearly show the growing footprint of emerging donors.

Data that contributors to this book have compiled also indicate that, with the exception of South Africa and more recently Brazil (each of which has struggled with domestic economic and political crises), the amount of emerging donors' assistance has risen significantly. Chinese aid dominates among emerging donors, reaching by some estimates $5.4 billion in 2015, and in 2016 China pledged $1 billion to UN peace support programs (Chapter 2). In 2017, India's development assistance totaled $1.16 billion, which was four times higher than just a decade earlier (Chapter 4). Russia's official development assistance (ODA) has grown since 2005 when it transitioned from being a recipient to a donor, reaching $714 million in 2014 and $1 billion just two years later (Chapter 6). Turkey's development assistance between 2011 and 2012 alone rose by 98.7 percent, and it increased from a mere $85 million in 2002 to $6.2 billion in 2016 (Chapter 7). Finally, Qatar

Figure 1.1 Aid Flows from Emerging Bilateral Donors, 2010–2015 (in billions of US dollars)

averaged $540 million in foreign aid between 2007 and 2011 and its humanitarian assistance, while fluctuating from year to year, has increased from $72 million in 2005 to $162 million in 2014 (Chapter 8).

As the levels of their assistance have grown, emerging donors have also been forging partnerships outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) frameworks. In 2004, for instance, the India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum established the IBSA Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund) aimed at strengthening South-South cooperation and disseminating best practices in promoting development and fighting poverty.[14] More recently, with the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), emerging donors are focusing on provid-ing alternative sources of development and infrastructure financing to those available through Western-dominated financial institutions. The NDB is operated by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and is set up "to foster greater financial and development cooperation" between the five. Although voting power is weighed according to the capital share of each member, the initial subscription capital is distributed equally among the five founding member states.[15] The BRICS see this bank as providing an alternative source of financing so that countries do not need to rely on only the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.[16]

The Failure of Liberal Peacebuilding

The liberal peacebuilding and state-building model became dominant in the early 1990s as the international community expanded its interventions in countries emerging out of civil wars. Over time, the model has faced growing criticism from practitioners and scholars alike. These critiques include, but are not limited to, the excessive focus on top-down state building, neglect of grassroots input into the peacebuilding and reconstruction projects, and insufficient local ownership that has had negative impact on sustainability of the efforts.[17] The marginalization and exclusion of some actors and narratives has meant that many of the projects were inappropriate, irrelevant, and not seen as legitimate by those who had been excluded from participation in their design.[18] The model has also been criticized for making assumptions about the processes of political and economic change and, in particular, that it has been based on Western experiences without taking into account the specificity of postconflict contexts.[19] Critics have also argued that the nature of the policies that were promoted as part of the liberal peacebuilding model often contributed to aggravating social conflicts rather than facilitating their resolution. As Roland Paris points out, for instance, "The process of political and economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous. It can exacerbate social tensions and undermine the prospects for stable peace in the fragile conditions that typically exist in countries emerging from civil war."[20] Others have gone further and argued that the liberal peacebuilding project simply represented a new form of hegemonic control and neocolonialism that sought to reinforce global hierarchies.[21]

A recent effort by the Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development[22] sees the traditional donors' approaches to addressing challenges of conflict-affected and fragile states as a failure that necessitates a fundamental rethinking of how to move these countries toward sustainable development and peacebuilding and ensure that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in general, and Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, in particular, can be achieved.[23] The commission posits that "international actors have radically overreached their competence in addressing the challenges of state fragility," that fragile states have been asked to do too many things at once while "domestic actors have been marginalized," that local specificities have not been taken into account, and that a "strategy for the escape from fragility [has been inferred] from the *current* characteristics of Western democracies."[24] Most emerging donors would agree with many of the commission's critiques. They also have offered alternative approaches to the liberal peacebuilding model that has dominated traditional donors' thinking about engagements with conflict-affected and fragile states.

Although South Africa, as Gilbert M. Khadiagala argues in Chapter 4, has been largely supportive of liberal peacebuilding, advocating democratic

and economic reforms as well as political reconciliation in countries where it has engaged in peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations, other emerging donors have taken a different approach toward their engagements with conflict-affected states. China, Chris Alden and Yixiao Zheng argue in Chapter 2, views liberal peacebuilding with skepticism, seeing it as offering little more than a palliative to conflict and often contributing to exacerbating the very conflicts that it was designed to address. However, this skepticism is less ideological than practical. From China's perspective, liberal peacebuilding has simply not been effective. This lack of success in its view is a consequence of the ideological attachments of its practitioners who pay too little attention to the results and impacts of the policies they advocate. Consequently, interventions push for the adoption of liberal institutions while disregarding local contexts and conditions. In other words, traditional donors promote a one-size-fits-all model that draws on the Western world's experiences with political and economic development, which is therefore bound to fail in environments that are fundamentally different. More broadly, Alden and Zheng posit, China views traditional donors as paying insufficient attention to economic development and political stability. They point to the UN Peacebuilding Fund as exemplifying the overall problems with liberal peacebuilding—only a small fraction of the fund's assistance goes to programs supporting socioeconomic development that China views as essential to sustainable peace.

India, Urvashi Aneja argues in Chapter 3, sees effective governing institutions as underpinning sustainable peace. While it views state stability as an important component of international peace and security, unlike the liberal peacebuilding model it does not see any particular form of governance as preferable as long as it is locally rooted and inclusive of all stakeholders. Because international interventions promote democratic governance institutions regardless of context, India views such interventions as typically destabilizing states and eroding national institutions rather than building peace. In other words, like China, India's critique of liberal peacebuilding is embedded in pragmatic rather than ideological assessments.

Turkish critiques of the liberal peacebuilding model have emerged over time. In the 1990s, when Turkey sought to counterbalance Russian and Iranian influence in Turkic states, Pinar Tank argues in Chapter 7, it focused on promoting democratization, free-market economies, and Westernization. With the defeat of the long-dominant secular political elite, however, Turkey's foreign policies shifted, becoming more activist and more critical of liberal peacebuilding as a result of what it viewed as the approach's failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The alternative "humanitarian diplomacy" that it pursued in its engagements with conflict-affected states did not try to re-create failed states in the image of the donor country, but rather focused on supporting key indigenous institutions needed to

ensure sustainable economic development and efficient governance. Turkey explicitly contrasted its policies with those of traditional donors, pointing to the distinct historical, cultural, and social roots of its approach and, in particular, its grounding in Islamic values.

Qatar similarly roots its humanitarian assistance and its critique of liberal peacebuilding in Islamic values. It has, as Sultan Barakat and Sansom Milton point out in Chapter 8, long rejected interventionist policies that push liberal political and economic reforms. In part this is because Qatar recognizes that as a nondemocratic state it would be hypocritical to promote democratization, but primarily it is because Qatar sees its humanitarian assistance as rooted in Islamic principles of charity and sovereignty of recipient governments and communities. That being said, recently Qatar has been shifting its strategies and deepening its collaborations with traditional donors and aligning more closely with global aid norms. In 2016, it joined OECD DAC as a participant and has come out in support of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and SDG 16.

Emerging Donors Assistance

As discussed earlier in this chapter, how emerging donors define, disburse, and report aid is significantly different from traditional donors. At the same time, because they maintain that they follow the Bandung Principles developed in the heyday of the Non-Aligned Movement, emerging donors frame their assistance in terms that prioritize solidarity, cooperation, and mutual support and the principle of noninterference in internal affairs of other states. Consequently, they largely eschew the language of conditionalities used by traditional donors preferring to frame these relationships in collaborative and cooperative terms.[25] Emerging donors also claim that they do not interfere in domestic politics of recipient states as that would violate norms of state sovereignty, and that the projects they support are demand driven and emerge from government plans of recipient states.[26]

Nonetheless, as studies of development assistance have found, the public rhetoric of emerging donors masks more complex rationales for aid provision and the modalities of assistance program implementation.[27] It also masks the diversity of emerging donors' policies and strategic objectives, economic interests, and assistance provision philosophies and priorities.[28] The contributors to this volume found that similar patterns can be discerned when looking at emerging donors' engagement with conflict-affected states. The chapter authors reveal a more nuanced picture and point to the existence of multiple agendas and interests driving emerging donors' policies. They also highlight that there often are implicit conditionalities attached to the assistance provided and, in the case of Russia, coercive conditionalities that tie support from Russia to political concessions from recipient states.

Legacies of Colonialism and Domestic Violence

Emerging donors share certain commonalities that differentiate them from traditional donors. One of the key differences that the chapter authors found between traditional and emerging donors relates to issues that emerging donors view as affecting state sovereignty. Most, though not all as discussed in the case studies, are deeply wary of what they view as interventionist policies pursued by traditional donors who seek to influence domestic politics—for instance, through democracy promotion and through conditionalities attached to assistance provided, whether relating to human rights, environmental standards, or gender policies. These differences between traditional and emerging donors are a reflection of their different histories and experiences with their own development trajectories. Many emerging donors have known colonial and other forms of domination by more hegemonic global powers and try—at least rhetorically—to avoid replicating such hierarchical relationships when establishing collaborations with conflict-affected states. This is why they tend to frame these relationships in collaborative and cooperative terms, largely eschewing the language of assistance and conditionalities used by traditional donors.

At the same time, many emerging donors have been in the past or continue to be conflict-affected states themselves, and many have neighbors that have experienced or continue to struggle with violent conflict. South Africa experienced protracted conflict during the apartheid era. Russia has dealt with internal conflicts in Chechnya and neighboring Caucasus and Central Asian states. In the latter, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, in particular, have seen periods of violence and instability. India has experienced political assassinations and electoral violence, and has struggled with conflict in Kashmir and sometimes violent confrontations in Gujarat. Civil wars have affected neighboring Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, raising concerns about possible spillover of these conflicts into India. Turkey has had a history of military coups and not only has faced domestic conflict with its Kurdish population but, since the Arab uprisings of 2011, has had to worry about the impact of the Syrian civil war on its own as well as regional stability. China has experienced conflicts with the Uighurs and with Tibet. These encounters with emerging donors' internal, often violent, conflicts also shape how they conceptualize relationships with states affected by violence. This is why they are wary of interventionist policies that are a core component of the liberal peacebuilding model, viewing such policies as potentially threatening to their own sovereignty.

Emerging Donors, Conflict, and Development

Experiences with colonialism, hegemonic power domination, and internal violent conflict color how emerging donors conceptualize the challenges posed by conflict and insecurity to development. The principles of noninter-

ference and at least rhetorical opposition to conditionalities, along with particular understandings of the relationship between development and conflict, the book's contributors argue, have translated into a focus by most emerging donors on economic rather than political interventions in conflict-affected states. Much of this assistance has prioritized direct investments, trade deals, infrastructure construction, training of civil servants, and apolitical humanitarian assistance as well as a greater focus on peacekeeping than peacebuilding.

However, as the contributors also underscore, while the emerging donors do share commonalities, there are significant differences in how these donors are engaging with conflict-affected states with respect to the modalities of assistance and the policies they pursue, including how interventionist they are prepared to be. This is not surprising since emerging donors are a deeply varied group, including economic powerhouses and rising global powers (e.g., China), aspiring global powers (e.g., Brazil and India), regional hegemons (e.g., Russia), smaller regional powers (e.g., Turkey and South Africa), and small states (e.g., Qatar) who, thanks to financial resources, can project their influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Some are democracies; others are authoritarian regimes that include one-party states as well as monarchies.

In Chapter 2, Alden and Zheng argue that China's engagement with conflict-affected states focuses primarily on promoting economic development regardless of the domestic political context in the recipient state. China sees poverty and economic underdevelopment as the root cause of conflict and, therefore, understands development as key to ensuring security, stability, and long-term peace. These policies and the conceptualization of the relationship between development and security emerge out of China's own experience with national development and its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which guide its foreign policy by placing particular importance on achieving national self-reliance. Consequently, the bulk of Chinese assistance to conflict-affected countries focuses on infrastructure construction and industrial development, including investments in the mining industries, with some funds channeled toward general budget support, education, and health.

In recent years, as Aneja notes in Chapter 3, India has significantly expanded its development cooperation, focusing on grants, loans, and training programs. However, India does not have a policy framework that articulates how engagements with conflict-affected states should be structured despite its extensive involvement in peacekeeping operations. It also avoids using the term *fragile,* which it views as externally imposing notions of what legitimate statehood looks like. Nonetheless, Aneja argues, in its geographic neighborhood (most prominently in Afghanistan), India's policies do link issues of political stability, security, and development. Here, because of India's concerns with the rise of extremism in the region, it supports projects that bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government, improve economic

development, and stabilize the country and help it achieve self-sufficiency.[29] India's assistance is demand driven and responds to requests from governments, reflecting its priorities and thus supporting nationally defined development goals. Consequently, India does not provide direct support to civil society groups or communities, even though it does fund programs in agricultural and vocational training, public health, and education, among others.

Indian investments in Africa, on the other hand, are driven primarily by commercial and economic interests, in particular access to raw materials and new markets for Indian exports, and are channeled primarily through lines of credit, although the engagements are framed in terms of South-South cooperation principles. Here, Aneja argues in Chapter 3, India takes a risk-averse approach to conflicts and, in contrast to traditional donors, has not articulated a clear philosophy linking security and development. Thus, India tends to work around rather than directly engaging with "sources of political fragility."[30] The exceptions are Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya where India's investments came under threat due to renewed conflict. Here, like China, the shifting political context has pushed India to more directly articulate the relationship between security and development and to argue for a holistic approach promoting state stability as the prerequisite for international peace and security. In particular, India points to rapid economic growth as essential to ensuring sustainable development and durable peace.

For Brazil, Paulo Esteves argues in Chapter 5, developmentalism has been a way of ensuring the country's autonomy, reducing external dependencies and reshaping its socioeconomic structure. Like China and India, Brazil has believed that addressing root causes of conflict necessitates ensuring sustainable development. At the same time, Brazil sees insecurity and conflict not only as stemming from internal dynamics within states that traditional donors emphasize but also as influenced by the position of conflict-affected states within the political economy and global security architecture, with the major Western powers being the source of much global instability, insecurity, and conflict. As Brazilian ambassador to the United Nations Antonio de Aguiar Patriota noted in 2015:

> The relationship between security and development cannot be understood from a simplistic perspective. We should clearly reject any notion that poverty itself might constitute a threat to peace. One should not lose sight of the fact that the gravest threats to international peace and security, including world wars, have historically risen from tensions between developed industrial nations. Militaristic agendas and the unilateral use of force are far more significant sources of instability than poverty per se.[31]

Russia, Christoph Zürcher argues in Chapter 6, also sees a link between security and development. However, unlike China, India, and Brazil, its focus on addressing security threats through development is largely limited to its near

abroad. Here, aid is very much securitized and aims at addressing various forms of violence—communal violence, state-society violence, and violence that results from transborder drug trafficking and crime. These types of violence that can spill across international boundaries are seen by Russia as a direct threat to its own security. Assistance to the near abroad is provided primarily through bilateral channels and focuses on direct budget support, concessionary loans, and grants. As Zürcher highlights, the 2014 Concept statement links Russian development assistance to its national interests and argues that "active and target policies in the field of international development assistance that take into account the national interests of Russia contribute to the stabilization of the socioeconomic and political situation in its partner countries."

Qatar, unlike the other emerging donors analyzed in this book, has benefited from internal stability and prosperity, although that stability was strained in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt, among others, imposed a blockade on the country. On the other hand, its prosperity has allowed it to "punch above its weight," as Barakat and Milton argue in Chapter 8, with the small state becoming involved in mediation and postconflict reconstruction efforts as part of its interest in branding itself as a global player as well as pursuing geostrategic and economic interests that are tied to regional stability. Qatar tends to provide development and humanitarian assistance to those countries where it has served as a conflict mediator, and has often used its financial resources to nudge parties to a conflict to a negotiated settlement. Although it has been accused of pursuing checkbook diplomacy, Qatar's financial ability to support transitions out of civil war has been crucial for reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, Darfur, and Gaza in particular, where it supported education and infrastructure and housing reconstruction.

South Africa prioritizes support to other African states—reflecting its resources that are more limited than those available to Qatar, India, or China—through its African Agenda that focuses on the link between peace, security, and development and seeks to enhance security and development. South Africa, as Khadiagala argues in Chapter 4, has drawn on its own experience with reconciliation and stabilization when providing support to conflict-affected states. This concern is reflected in the African National Congress (ANC) Foreign Policy Platform, which posits that "socioeconomic development cannot take place without political peace and stability."[32] Unlike India and China, South Africa has explicitly supported democracy promotion, even if in practice it often has maintained close relationships with authoritarian states; for instance, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. The ANC platform underscores its "belief in and preoccupation with human rights . . . just and long-lasting solutions to the problems of the world can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide."[33] In other words, in South Africa's view, democracy and socioeconomic development go hand in hand.

Proximity to the Donor

Additionally, emerging donors' policies vis-à-vis conflict-affected states in their immediate geographic neighborhood and those farther removed often differ, thus underscoring that despite the language of solidarity, collaboration, and mutual benefit, national security and geostrategic interests also significantly shape emerging donors' policies toward conflict-affected states. Consequently, as Aneja notes in Chapter 3, how India engages with Afghanistan, where its primary concern is fostering stability, is very different from how it structures its relationships with states in Africa where commercial interests loom large. In other words, India wants to ensure that states in its neighborhood are stable and friendly, as this is seen as necessary for India's security and economic growth. Consequently, Aneja found that India's "commitment to principles of sovereign equality and noninterference in the region have been selective"(p. 57). When India has believed that its interests are threatened, it has not shied away from exerting political pressure to change domestic politics or military intervention into neighboring states. At other times, it has remained silent on domestic politics of neighboring states—for instance, on the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar—less out of commitment to noninterference and more as a consequence of its regional rivalry with China and desire to retain influence.

Likewise, Tank argues in Chapter 7, in Somalia, Turkey pursues humanitarian diplomacy that draws on Islamic principles and sets out to offer a clear alternative to the liberal peacebuilding model, which Turkey views as a failed approach in light of experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Its humanitarian diplomacy, undertaken for the "love of God and with no hidden agendas" (p. 130), focuses on reconstructing needed state infrastructure to ensure that economic development and efficient governance can take place, promoting peace and the reconciliation process. However, in Syria whose conflict, unlike those in Somalia, presents an immediate threat, Turkey's policies have shifted to reflect those concerns. After attempting to mediate the conflict in 2011, Turkey became increasingly concerned about the impact of growing Kurdish autonomy in war-torn Syria on its own Kurdish population, so it abandoned its normative principle of noninterference and began to support Sunni groups that are seeking to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime.

Similarly, Zürcher argues in Chapter 6 that Russia's policies vis-à-vis states in its near abroad are very different than toward conflict-affected states more geographically removed. Its policies toward the latter predominantly take the form of modest contributions to multilateral organizations. In the near abroad, development assistance is clearly an instrument for promotion of Russia's national and security interests. This aid is provided primarily on a bilateral basis and is characterized by coercive conditionalities with an eye toward promoting Russia's geostrategic interests and aimed at ensuring stability and managing potential transnational threats that could spill over into Russia.

Nonintervention in a Changing Context and Growing Global Aspirations

In practice, as suggested by the discussion above, many of this book's contributors note that maintaining principles of solidarity and noninterference in political affairs of recipient states is harder when confronted with realities on the ground, particularly when they find their nationals, investments, and commercial as well as security interests directly affected by conflict and violence. At the same time, emerging donors also find it more challenging to maintain these principles as they move into more prominent global roles. Finally, domestic political changes in Turkey and Brazil remind us of the links between local political imperatives and foreign policy.

China's emergence as an economic powerhouse with an increasingly prominent international role has resulted, Alden and Zheng argue in Chapter 2, in growing pressure on the country, especially from developing countries, to translate that new prominence into a more active role in providing support (both financial and political) to peace and security provision. At the same time, the West has also been exerting pressure on China to take on more responsibilities in these areas. These dual pressures, as well as China's desire to protect its international reputation as a responsible power, have translated into greater engagement in peacekeeping operations and mediation of international conflicts and a decline in its opposition to the Responsibility to Protect.

At the same time as China's economic and security interests have come under direct threat from violence in places such as Libya and Sudan, maintaining a policy of noninterference has come to be seen as increasingly difficult and potentially counterproductive as it would threaten to undermine these commercial and strategic interests and potentially open up space for Western powers to reshape political dynamics in these areas without Chinese input. As a consequence, China has become more directly involved in conflict mediation and has begun to reevaluate its assessment of the R2P principle adopted by the United Nations in 2005.[34] While China's and traditional donors' views on the application of R2P continue to diverge, Alden and Zheng show in Chapter 2 that there is also a clear convergence of these views under way.

Thus, Alden and Zheng point out, China has become engaged in mediation of conflicts in Libya and Sudan as its investments in the oil sector have come under threat. On the other hand, Turkey, Tank argues in Chapter 7, has found that its provision of development and humanitarian assistance to Somalia with its emphasis on being on the ground, close to the beneficiaries, inevitably has drawn it into internal Somali politics. For instance, Turkey's engagement has been criticized for concentrating resources primarily on Mogadishu while neglecting more distant regions.

Brazil's 1988 Constitution, Esteves points out in Chapter 5, states that the country's foreign policy must be "guided by the principles of non-interference,

equity among state, the peaceful resolution of conflicts" as well as commitment to human rights norms. Throughout the 1990s, the country maintained this position and frequently voiced concerns about international interventions and the unilateral use of force. Although Brazil was supportive of UN peacekeeping operations, it was opposed to more enhanced missions that focused on peace enforcement as well as humanitarian intervention. In particular, Esteves argues, Brazil was staunchly opposed to the Agenda for Peace and perceived the document as a "reinterpretation of the Security Council's mandate toward a more militarized direction" (p. 95). It viewed it as an invitation to an expanded scope for future military interventions and coercive measures, especially by major powers, replacing diplomacy and negotiations as a mechanism for addressing international conflicts and security challenges. Brazil argued that the responsibility for peace and security should be the purview of sovereign states and consent for deployment of any peacekeeping operation was essential.

In the 2000s, Brazil has begun shifting its long-held position on noninterference. In Latin America, and especially in its policies vis-à-vis Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, Brazil has sought to balance its preference for noninterference with a policy of nonindifference. At the global level, it reduced its opposition to the Agenda for Peace and skepticism regarding the R2P when it became involved in the UN mission in Haiti. Nonetheless, Esteves argues, while Brazil supported efforts to promote human and political rights and development, and has placed reconciliation and fighting poverty at the center of its mission in Haiti, it continued to be wary of what it views as possible expansion of militarizing development. However, the traditional lines of Brazilian foreign policy have been challenged with the election of far-right leader Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, changing both its direction and content. The agenda of human rights and democratic development has been weakened in preference for narrow national self-interest; there is a preference for bilateral over multilateral relations, and there is a clear pivot toward the United States and Israel with a weakening of relations with the Global South. The Bolsonaro government's decision in February 2019 to support the opposition candidate in Venezuela, Juan Guaido, can thus be seen through the prism of self-interest, due to concern over refugee flows across the border; ideology—in opposition to Venezuela's left-wing populist president Nicolás Maduro; and alliances, following US president Donald Trump's lead in intervening in Venezuelan affairs.

In 2002 when the secular political elite that long held sway in Turkey lost power and was replaced by the Justice and Development Party, there also was a shift in Turkey's global engagements. In particular, the new government saw an opportunity to carve out a new role for the country as a "Muslim democracy" both regionally and globally, Tank argues in Chapter 7. At the same time the changing regional context, and particularly the

intensifying conflict in neighboring Syria, shifted Turkey's policy from one that emphasized noninterference and respect for state sovereignty to one of direct engagement with the parties to the conflict. In Syria, Turkey began to support Sunni factions opposed to the al-Assad regime and moved from the early attempts to mediate a peaceful resolution of the conflict to openly backing the removal of al-Assad.

Qatar also shifted toward a more interventionist stance following the Arab uprisings in 2011. In particular, as Barakat and Milton point out in Chapter 8, it explicitly backed rebels in both Libya and Syria. In Syria alone, between 2011 and 2014, Qatar committed $3 billion to the opposition forces. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Qatar also followed an interventionist path; for instance, by financially supporting Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, this shifting stance created a political backlash, leading Qatar to temporarily scale back its external engagements and, after the imposition of the 2017 blockade, to focus on managing its internal conflict. However, by 2018 Qatar was once again expanding its international mediation efforts, including hosting US-Taliban negotiations in Doha in the winter of 2019. Thus, as in the case of other emerging donors, the policies Qatar has pursued regarding intervention have evolved over time and been shaped by changing global priorities as well as changing regional dynamics.

Although, as Aneja argues in Chapter 3, India does not have a "sense of global purpose or ambition with regard to conflict-affected states" (p. 54), in large part because it continues to be preoccupied with its immense domestic challenges, nonetheless like China it has begun to shift its approach to peacekeeping as part of its interest in being seen on the global stage as a responsible power. Its contributions to the UN Democracy Fund, Aneja posits, also need to be seen as a reflection of India's quest for great-power standing rather than support for democracy promotion per se. Despite these shifts as well as its recognition of the R2P doctrine in 2009, India remains deeply skeptical about the effectiveness of external interventions in conflict-affected states. The country argues that the primary responsibility for building sustainable peace ultimately rests with conflict-affected states, with the international community playing only a supportive role. India believes that external intervention rather than facilitating the reconstruction of conflict-affected states may in fact exacerbate the very problems it was designed to solve if it is conducted "from the outside through unitary force."[35]

Approaches to Peacekeeping

Although some emerging donors such as India have long provided significant numbers of peacekeeping troops, over the past decade one of the key changes has been their growing involvement in UN peace operations. For instance, between 2001 and 2010, Brazil, China, India, and South Africa's

share of deployed personnel in these operations has increased from 5 percent to 15 percent.[36] They also have increasingly participated in operations outside their immediate geographic region.[37] In other words, they have become active in shaping the peacebuilding and peacekeeping policies and in the UN Peacebuilding Commission.[38]

Until recently, China has maintained a low profile in international peace and security issues and has been reluctant to take on more of a leadership role. This relatively low profile, Alden and Zheng argue in Chapter 2, is a reflection of the relatively limited interests and capacity that China has historically had beyond its immediate neighborhood. This began to change after 2000 with China increasingly taking on a more prominent role in UN peacekeeping operations, and by 2004 emerging as the largest troop and police contributor to these missions among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. China also began to contribute combat troops, first in Mali and later in South Sudan. In 2016, President Xi Jinping further expanded China's commitment to and engagement with peace and security programs when he announced a $1 billion commitment to UN programs supporting peace initiatives.

China has also expanded its support to the African Union (AU), African Standby Force, and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and pledged to provide support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). However, despite the expansion of its engagement, China's focus remains more on support of peacekeeping rather than peacebuilding, and the country makes only a minor contribution to the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

India has historically been one of the leading contributors to UN peacekeeping missions and since 2005 it has also been a member of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, viewing both as opportunities for its greatpower aspirations. Despite this long history of engagement, the recent evolution of the way that UN peacekeeping missions are organized, in particular the shift from peacekeeping operations to more robust mixed-mandate operations that also focus on peacebuilding, has presented a challenge to India and its principles of noninterference, local consent, neutrality, and the use of force only in self-defense during peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, India tends to avoid engagement in missions to states where others have strategic interests and are therefore willing to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. However, in practice, Aneja argues in Chapter 3, there have been numerous occasions where India has participated in mixedmandate missions and contributed combat forces, although it continues to participate in them on an ad hoc basis, underscoring that in practice noninterference principles can prove to be malleable.

South Africa, too, contributes troops to UN and AU peacekeeping operations, although it does so exclusively in Africa. Unlike India, it has not hesitated to participate in mixed-mandate missions and has been willing to con-

tribute directly to combat operations—for instance, when jointly with Tanzania and Malawi it formed the Force Intervention Brigade to deal with rebels in eastern Congo during the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). However, overall South Africa's role has been relatively modest as it is itself a postconflict country with meager resources. It has thus preferred to work within multilateral institutions and international partnerships and to leverage its soft power as a trusted mediator to advance its objectives.

Brazil, up to 2004 when it agreed to lead the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), was opposed to the increasingly complex UN operations that went beyond deploying peacekeeping troops and turned into multidimensional operations without (in its view) a well-defined mandate, thus politicizing activities in ways that Brazil viewed as interference in the affairs of member states. Until MINUSTAH, Brazil had preferred to engage in cooperative means that addressed the root causes of conflict and opposed the liberal peacebuilding agenda. This shift reflected Brazil's growing interest in playing a more prominent global role. By providing peacekeeping troops and humanitarian assistance to Haiti, Brazil could show itself to be an important partner in providing international peace and security.[39]

Russia wants to be seen as a respectable global power. Consequently, Zürcher argues in Chapter 6, it engages in a balancing game, attempting to act as a "normal donor while at the same time instrumentalizing aid for narrowly defined national interests in its neighborhood." At the same time, Russia does not participate in multilateral peacekeeping missions and it does not provide much aid to countries hosting such missions. According to Zürcher however, this does not mean that Russia is not involved in conflict management and peacebuilding. Rather, Russia does so in its near abroad and within its own territory in what may be viewed as "domestic peacebuilding," where it is also party to the conflicts that it seeks to manage. Seeing itself as a regional hegemon, Russia seeks to reintegrate former Soviet states—with the exception of the Baltic states that are now part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—as a way to ensure its own security and stability.

A Role in Conflict Mediation

South Africa, as Khadiagala discusses in Chapter 4, and Qatar, as Barakat and Milton argue in Chapter 8, have different approaches to engagements with conflict-affected states, with South Africa pursuing policies that are more in line with the liberal peacebuilding model and Qatar focusing on conflict mediation as a way to bolster its global position, pursue its economic and geostrategic interests, and differentiate itself from neighboring Gulf states. South Africa, drawing on its own experience with transition from apartheid to democracy, is especially interested in accelerating socioeconomic

development and promoting reconciliation. It has primarily supported, with mixed results, postconflict peacebuilding and mediation in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and the Comoros. In Burundi, South Africa emerged as a key peacemaker, when in 1998 former president Nelson Mandela became involved in mediating an agreement among the warring factions and helped negotiate the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000. In the DRC, on the other hand, President Thabo Mbeki's government guided warring Congolese parties toward signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria in 2011. Unlike other emerging donors, South Africa has not shied away from promoting democracy and political reforms.

Like South Africa, Qatar has focused on playing the role of a regional mediator. In Lebanon, its mediation efforts resulted in the signing of the Doha agreement between rival political factions in 2008, while in Darfur mediation between the government of Sudan and rebel factions helped usher in the 2010 cease-fire agreement. Qatar has also led efforts to end conflict in Yemen, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Syria, among others.

As Barakat and Milton argue in Chapter 8, there has been a widespread perception that Qatar relies on financial inducements as a tool for bringing together parties in conflict. While this no doubt has been the case in some circumstances, they argue that other motivations also drive Qatar's engagements and mediation efforts, and "reflect a desire to uphold ethical standards, rooted in deep religious conviction and a commitment to peace," (p. 143) as well as its interest in raising its global profile through the application of soft power. In other words, like Turkey, Qatar draws on its Islamic identity in the way that it conceptualizes its engagement in mediation and peacebuilding. Additionally, as Western powers have become more constrained in their ability to become involved in mediation efforts as a consequence of counterterrorism legislation, Qatar has been able to play an important role in mediations of armed conflicts. Despite its successes, Qatar's mediation efforts nonetheless have been constrained by the lack of capacity and institutional knowledge to oversee the postsettlement implementation, although it has been deepening the professionalization of the institutions that lead its foreign engagements.

As China has emerged as a global power, Alden and Zheng argue in Chapter 2, it has begun to reexamine the noninterference norm. This reexamination has also been driven by the difficulty of maintaining political neutrality in contexts where there are security concerns when China's investments and nationals come under threat as violent conflict erupts and spreads, as was the case in Libya and in Sudan. As a consequence, China has begun to appoint special representatives to various unstable regions, including the Middle East, Africa, the Korean Peninsula, Asia with a particular focus on Myanmar, and Syria, and to engage in international mediation efforts. In

Darfur, for instance, China's role was key in persuading the government in Khartoum to accept a joint United Nations–African Union (UN-AU) peacekeeping force. It also has promoted political dialogue on the Iranian nuclear issue, has been involved in the South Sudan domestic reconciliation process, has supported the Afghanistan political transition, has been engaged with interethnic reconciliation efforts in Myanmar, and has been involved in putting forward proposals on the political process in Syria. At the same time, China has expanded its security cooperation in Africa through, for instance, the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security (ICACPPS) that aims to bolster indigenous capacities.

India, like China, became engaged in mediation processes in Sudan and South Sudan when its investments were threatened. Though unlike China, Aneja argues in Chapter 3, India continues to prefer to support international mediation efforts from the sidelines. Turkey, Tank notes in Chapter 7, has also played a role in facilitating reconciliation efforts by providing political support to the peace process in Somalia. Intentionally framing its mediation efforts in opposition to the Western initiatives that focused on bringing together the leaders of the warring factions, in 2012 Turkey gathered in Istanbul representatives of Somali clans, politicians, and representatives of civil society to facilitate a locally owned reconciliation process. Turkey has continued to support political dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia. On the other hand, its attempt to mediate a peaceful end to the Syrian conflict in 2011 was a failure, one that, Tank argues, contributed to Turkey's reevaluation of its mode of engagement with Syria and shifted it toward a more direct involvement in the conflict.

Conclusion

The chapters that follow explore these key themes in detail, drawing out the nuances and evolution of policies of individual emerging donors toward conflict-affected states. In particular, the contributors to this volume explore the ways in which emerging powers conceptualize notions of peacebuilding and the relationship between security and development, and how these ideas are influenced by their particular historical experiences with external interference in their domestic affairs and internal violent conflicts. They also investigate how the shared rhetoric of noninterference, nonconditionalities, partnerships, and mutual benefits measures up against the actual policies that emerging donors pursue, and how these policies are shaped by their political and strategic objectives, the changing contexts in which they are engaged, and their shifting global aspirations. Taken together, these case studies show the divergences in the ways that different emerging donors shape their relationships with conflict-affected states and paint a picture of an increasingly complex landscape of assistance to conflict-affected states.

Notes

1. World Bank, *Conflict, Security and Development: 2011 World Development Report.* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).

2. Michael W. Doyle, "War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations' Post–Cold War Record," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 529.

3. Mats Berdal, *Building Peace After Civil War* (London: Routledge, 2009); Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

4. See, for example, Paul Amar, "Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries," *Globalizations* 9, no. 1 (2012): 1–13; Cedric de Coning and Chander Prakash, *Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report: Rising Powers and Peace Operations* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016).

5. Benjamin de Carvalho and Cedric de Coning, *Rising Powers and the Future of Peacebuilding,* Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center (NOREF) Report (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, November 2013); Oliver P. Richmond and Ioannis Tellidis, *The BRICS and International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,* NOREF Report (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, January 2013); Jake Sherman, Megan M. Gleason, W. P. S. Sidhu, and Bruce Jones, eds., *Engagement on Development and Security: New Actors, New Debates* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, September 2011); Sultan Barakat and Steven A. Zyck, *Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments* (London: Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, 2010).

6. See, for example, Roger MacGinty, ed., *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding* (London: Routledge, 2015); Tobias Debiel, Thomas Held, and Ulrich Schneckener, eds., *Peacebuilding in Crisis: Rethinking Paradigms and Practices of Transnational Cooperation* (London: Routledge, 2016). To my knowledge, one comparative volume explores the role of emerging donors in peacebuilding: Charles T. Call and Cedric de Coning, eds., *Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Breaking the Mold?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). However, Call and de Coning's book pays less attention to how emerging donors conceptualize the relationship between security and development, an issue that is explored here.

7. Ivan Campbell, Thomas Wheeler, Larry Attree, Dell Marie Butler, and Bernardo Mariani, *China and Conflict-Affected States: Between Principle and Pragmatism* (London: Saferworld, 2012), p. 7.

8. For a discussion of the Non-Aligned Movement and its influence on today's South-South collaborations, see, for example, Peter Kragelund, *South-South Development* (London: Routledge, 2019).

9. For all the principles see, for example, *Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung,* April 24, 1955*,* http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf. The ten Bandung Principles, adopted at the 1955 Asian-African Conference are (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small; (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; (7)

Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; (8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (9) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; and (10) Respect for justice and international obligation.

10. Led by countries such as Egypt, India, and Indonesia, the Non-Aligned Movement sought to chart an independent path for countries emerging from colonialism that did not want to align with either the United States or the Soviet Union in the intensifying Cold War between the two superpowers.

11. Devex, *Emerging Donors,* Devex Reports, 2017, https://pages.devex.com /rs/devex/images/Devex_Reports_Emerging_Donors.pdf?aliId=1803737004.

12. Research by Devex estimates that funds from various new donors, including emerging state donors such as Turkey and South Africa, but also new entities such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Green Climate Fund have been contributing to a rapid expansion of available financial aid "and filling the gaps as traditional donors shrink and shift priorities . . . funding from these donors has increased by a staggering 47 percent in just five years—from $5.7 billion in 2010 to $8.4 billion in 2015." Devex, *Funding Insights: Emerging Donors. A Devex Business Webinar*, July 18, 2018, https://pages.devex.com/funding-insights-emerging-donors.html#CM.

13. OECD et al., *African Economic Outlook 2011: Africa and Its Emerging Partners* (Paris: OECD, 2011), p. 52.

14. The IBSA Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund). See "UN Office for South-South Cooperation IBSA Facility," https://www.unsouthsouth .org/partner-with-us/ibsa/.

15. New Development Bank, https://www.ndb.int.

16. As Kundapur Vaman Kamath, director of NDP, puts it, "Our objective is not to challenge the existing system as it is but to improve and complement the system in our own way." *BBC News,* July 21, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/33605230.

17. Roger MacGinty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus Liberal Peace," *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no. 2 (2008): 139–163; Kristoffer Linden, "Building Peace Between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peace-building," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 5 (2009): 616–634; Oliver Richmond, *Peace Formation and Political Order in Conflict Affected Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

18. See, for example, Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

19. Astri Suhrke, "Reconstruction as Modernization: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007): 1292.

20. Roland Paris, *At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. ix.

21. See, for example, Mark Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007); Peter Uvin, "Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in Rwanda After the Genocide," *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (2001): 177–189.

22. The commission is chaired by David Cameron, former UK prime minister, and cochaired by Donald Kabenka, special envoy of Africa Union Peace Fund and former president of the African Development Bank, and Adnan Khan, research and policy director of International Growth Centre, London School of Economics.

23. The Sustainable Development Goals were adopted by the UN in September 2015.

24. Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, *Escaping the Fragility Trap*. (London: London School of Economics, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, International Growth Centre, April 2018), p. 9.

25. Dane Rowlands, *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis Report* (Ottawa, ON, Canada: International Development Research Centre/Centre de recherches pur le développement international, Partnership and Business Development Division, January 2008).

26. Gerda Asmus, Andreas Fuchs, and Angelika Muller, "BRICS and Foreign Aid," Working Paper No. 43 (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, August 2017).

27. Emma Mawdsley, "The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation: Contributions from Gift Theory," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 37, no. 2 (2012): 256–272.

28. See Susan White, *Emerging Donors, Emerging Powers: Teasing Out Developing Patterns* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2011); Julie Waltz and V. Ramachandran, "Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Direct Assistance," Working Paper No. 273 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, November 2010).

29. Most of the projects support rebuilding Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions as well as long-term investment in natural resources, support for expanding exports to India, and technical cooperation.

30. Urvashi Aneja, *India's Response to State Fragility in Africa,* Issue Brief No. 204 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, October 1, 2017), p. 1.

31. Statement by Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota at the 7561st meeting of the UN Security Council, November 17, 2015.

32. African National Congress (ANC) Foreign Policy Platform, quoted in Chris Landsberg, "Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine," *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (2000): 107.

33. Ibid., p. 108.

34. R2P sought to allow the international community to respond more effectively and prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. See UN Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/.

35. Statement by prime minister of India Manmohan Singh at the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2011, http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/IN_en.pdf.

36. Sharon Wiharta, Neil Melvin, and Xenia Avezov, *The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: Mapping the Emerging Landscape* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2012). In 2015, these increased commitment levels continued. The BRICS contributed over 13 percent of police, UN military experts, and troops to peacekeeping operations. See UN Peacekeeping, Troop and Police Contributors, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

37. Ibid., p. 11.

38. Laurence Chandy, *New in Town: A Look at the Role of Emerging Donors in an Evolving Aid System* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, April 16, 2012); de Coning and Pradash, *Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report*.

39. John Miller Beauvoir, "In Post-Conflict Haiti, Brazil Consolidates Its Status as a Regional Actor," in Agnieszka Paczyńska, ed., *Changing Landscapes of Assistance to Conflict-Affected States: Emerging and Traditional Donors and Opportunities for Collaboration,* Policy Brief Series, Brief No. 6 (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, February 2017), pp. 1–11.