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Virtually any list of the most significant and dangerous changes in the world would find Turkey center stage. Its Middle Eastern neighbors Iraq and Syria are convulsed in upheaval and civil war, spilling more than 3 million refugees over its borders. The nuclear weapons program of Iran and the struggle for regional dominance between the Islamic Republic and Sunni powers in the Arab world often put the Turkish government’s actions—or inactions—into intense focus. Its powerful northern Black Sea neighbor, Russia, is reasserting its influence in the eastern Mediterranean and in what it considers a zone of “privileged interest,” to the detriment of the sovereignty of Turkey’s neighbors Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine (see Figure 1.1). Ankara’s long-standing aim to recover its European heritage by joining the European Union (EU) has withered close to the point of disappearing. But as the once preferred paramour—itself home to more than 4 million Turks—turns to Turkey to help it deal with its energy dependence on Russia and an unprecedented wave of human migration, the “new” Turkey is more volatile both economically and militarily.

At the same time, Turkey has joined the ranks of states that are moving away from, rather than toward, greater democratic governance. Under the firm grip of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, first elected in 2002, Turkey appears headed on an unwavering path toward personalist authoritarian government. The once broad social support that was eager to remove the heavy hand of Kemalist elites and the military has been narrowed by the regime’s preference for those with a more religious orientation, nationalist inclinations, and, above all, loyalty to Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP).1 Starting with the Gezi Park protests in 2013 in Istanbul and the corruption scandals in the same year,
Ronald H. Linden and Gürkan Çelik

and especially since the coup attempt of 2016, Erdoğan and the ruling AKP seem determined to purge opponents, both potential and real, from political and state institutions, including the police, army, and judiciary, from national and local agencies, and also from the business world and the educational structure. Genuine political competition, along with hard-won gains in Turkish society (i.e., for Kurds, women, and liberal-oriented political forces) and in the economy and investments, are under siege. The power of the ruling AKP and especially of Erdoğan himself has been strengthened through constitutional changes and ratified in public ballots.

Understanding these dynamics is daunting and challenges our common—and often Western-skewed—view of what is happening in and around Turkey. To help observers understand both these changes and their significance, this volume has several aims. First, as much as possible, it brings up to date our analysis of developments in both domestic politics in Turkey and the country’s external relations, as well as their mutual interactions. The book focuses on the AKP era—roughly since 2002—and especially on the most momentous changes of recent years, including the attempted coup of July 2016 and the voting that preceded and followed that pivotal event. Second, across a range of academic disciplines, the
authors identify the key actors and factors that are the determinants of these developments. In their chapters, our authors address the question: What are the driving institutions, individuals, or principles that explain what has occurred in Turkey in recent times? On this basis, the volume aims to describe and comprehend the likely path of Turkey’s future within specific realms—for example, the economy, society, the political system, and relations with the United States and the EU—as part of a more comprehensive picture of Turkey’s present and future.

The aim of this volume is not to predict the future—a Quixotic task even in a region less turbulent—but to help readers achieve a clearer picture of how this large, dynamic, centrally located country came to its present state and what factors will determine its future. At the same time, it offers guideposts for our expectations as to what will happen in and to a country whose actions directly affect—and are affected by—the policies and dynamics of the United States, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Most broadly, it offers an in-depth examination of the causes and possible courses of development in one of the most important “illiberal democracies” to have (re)emerged in Europe and Asia. As such, the volume can stand as an informed “thick” description of what domestic, international, and human factors contributed to this direction in the Turkish case and, in doing so, offer clues as to what underlies the troubling spread of this democratic backsliding.

**Background to Contemporary Turkey:**

**Domestic and International**

**A New State in Europe**

In 1923 the Turkish Republic created itself out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and against the wishes of the British and French empires. After defeat in World War I, the sultan had been forced to sign the Treaty of Sevres, which would have carved up what was then called “Asia Minor” and created a weak and dependent Turkish rump state. Instead, a nationalist movement, led by Mustafa Kemal, successfully resisted this fate and forcibly prevented occupation by Western forces, including those of Greece. The new state that emerged was ratified by the great powers in the Treaty of Lausanne. Not surprisingly, during the interwar period, the new Turkish Republic remained fearful and protective of its very existence and suspicious of numerous external powers and their designs on Turkey.

During this time, at least one historical enemy, Russia, underwent revolution and civil war and then was convulsed in domestic political and economic strife. While real danger to Turkey was thus reduced, Turkish fear of Soviet communism and the reemergence of historical claims, such
as in the Bosporus, remained strong. A modus vivendi was reached with Greece—though at the cost of massive upheaval and deprivation caused by an agreed population swap.\textsuperscript{5} As a defeated power in the global Great War, Turkey was not invited to join the League of Nations and remained on alert lest the great powers of the time, especially Great Britain and France, make territorial arrangements in the region to suit themselves, without consideration of Turkish interests or claims.\textsuperscript{6}

The most serious dangers to Turkish integrity during the interwar period involved Italy and, later, Germany. Especially when Western powers and the Soviet Union proved unwilling to stop Adolph Hitler and made their own deals, such as the Munich Agreement of 1938 or the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty of 1939, Turkey had to rely on its own careful diplomacy and cautious action. Diplomatic and economic ties with all powers continued right up and into the hostilities of World War II. A nominal declaration of war against Germany very late in the conflict allowed Ankara to be included among the founding members of the United Nations. Overall, in the interwar period, Turkey was successful in establishing and defending its presence, aided by strong domestic government and weak and distracted global powers. Its signal diplomatic achievement was the multilateral Montreux Convention of 1936, which guaranteed free merchant passage but limited military traffic through the Bosporus and, most importantly, Turkish control of that strategic waterway.

\textit{Single-Party State}

From the founding of the Turkish Republic, only one party was allowed: the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk, the founder of the republic and the CHP, was installed as the first president of Turkey. As the leader of the founding group, he focused on modernizing Turkey along Western lines. There was a weak parliament and a Council of Ministers. Western-style democracy was not established, but a revolutionary course brought the country effective secular laws and state institutions, equal rights for women, and a general Europeanization on the cultural level. The Republican government allowed little opposition, and civic initiatives were subordinated to the state agenda. Essentially the CHP ruled the country by itself from 1923 to the 1950s. The radical secularism of Atatürk also meant that the role of Islam was drastically reduced.\textsuperscript{7} To replace it, Kemalism, in combination with Turkish nationalism, was imposed from above as the guiding philosophy of the new state. As a result, two large groups in Turkish society—religious Muslims and the Kurds, the largest ethnic minority—were marginalized, even forcibly suppressed at times. They remained underrepresented in central state bodies such as the army, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary\textsuperscript{8} in favor of a new Republican elite of persuaded Kemalists, supporters of Atatürk, who lived mostly in
Turkey’s cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir. Their families originated almost entirely from the Balkans, the Aegean coast, and Istanbul itself. In the vast Anatolian countryside, however, many of the old traditions in which Islam had a central place continued to play an essential role in everyday life.

The Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes

In 1950, twelve years after the death of Atatürk and four years after the multiparty period formally began, the country held its first truly free parliamentary elections. The Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) of Adnan Menderes won an overwhelming majority in the new parliament. The DP was a center-right party mainly supported by voters outside the large cities and committed to gradually eliminating the curtailment of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. Although the DP did not fundamentally deviate from the secular views of Atatürk and the CHP, it was less hostile to a larger public role for Islam. That view soon led to accusations by the army and Kemalist intellectuals that the DP was undermining the secular character of the Turkish state and encouraging religious fundamentalism. Both the military and the bureaucracy, the key pillars of the Turkish Republic, were closely linked to the CHP and saw the DP as a dangerous intruder. Despite this, the DP won the elections again in 1954 and 1957. In the second half of the 1950s, however, the DP lost popularity as its policy of forced economic liberalization led to severe problems (inflation, unemployment) and Menderes emerged as an autocratic ruler intent on limiting democratic freedoms.

Military Coups

In May 1960, the army intervened against the elected government. Menderes and two of his ministers were hanged after a show trial, and under a new constitution, a National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) was established, dominated by the military. It developed into a guardian of Turkish politics, checking the alignment of civil government policies with the Kemalist principles of the republic. Nevertheless, political instability and social unrest marked the 1960s. Subsequent elections were held, but the
army intervened two more times. In 1971 it moved against the center-right government of Süleyman Demirel, which had obtained more than 50 percent of the vote in 1965. In 1980 it acted as a result of seriously deteriorating economic conditions and government mismanagement. This time the consequences of a military regime for Turkish politics and society were much more radical. Leftist parties lost their legal standing; hundreds of activists were killed, and many thousands fled abroad, mainly to Europe. The cruel oppression of Kurdish nationalists in Diyarbakir prison led to the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), the guerrilla movement under Abdullah Öcalan, which forcefully demanded Kurdish rights. Another new constitution was crafted by the generals in 1982, and the positions of the parliament and the government were weakened, while the army, the bureaucracy, and newly created management bodies were strengthened. An electoral threshold of 10 percent for entry into parliament was introduced to keep smaller leftist, Kurdish, and Islamist parties out of parliament. While some religious-oriented movements, including that for Islamic education, were given more room to maneuver, a state-controlled and depoliticized interpretation of Islam was used against leftist—including secular—groups.

**Liberalization Under Turgut Özal**

In 1983, to the displeasure of the army, a new center-right party, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) of Turgut Özal, won the elections. For almost ten years, Özal, first as prime minister and later as president, made his mark on Turkish politics. As a passionate defender of the free market, Özal used the support of the Turkish business community to open up Turkey’s economy. National monopolies based in the Istanbul area and strongly associated with the Kemalist state elite were broken up, while new entrepreneurs from Anatolia were now able to serve both the internal Turkish and the attractive external European markets. Many of those who would later be called the “Anatolian Tigers” were—like Özal himself—conservative businessmen who combined a preference for liberal economics with conservative social views firmly rooted in Islam. More than the economy was liberalized under Özal; from the early 1990s on, the media became more diverse, with conservative Muslims permitted to establish newspapers and TV stations. A few years later, the first private schools and universities followed.

Domestic repression against the Left and fear of Soviet communism riveted Turkey solidly in the Western camp during the entire Cold War (i.e., into the 1990s). Turkey sent troops to fight communist forces in Korea (1950–1953) and Vietnam (1959–1973), provided a base from which overflights and listening posts could be utilized against the USSR, and maintained the second-largest land force in NATO. Until the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was largely circumscribed. Oriented toward
western Europe and the United States and fiercely anticommunist, successive governments—whether democratically elected or the product of coups d’état—were rarely out of step with the Western camp.

One exception was relations with Greece, which were from time to time tense and conflictual, mostly over territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea. Most significant were differences over the nature of government in Cyprus, whose population was roughly three-quarters Greek and one-quarter Turkish. Cypriot independence from Britain in 1960 produced a shared government structure that broke down almost immediately. In 1974, in response to an attempt by the Greek military government at the time to force enosis, or union, with Greece, Turkey sent in 40,000 troops in two separate operations and effectively divided the island republic.

For a time, this hurt Turkish-NATO and Turkish-US relations, with Washington even imposing an arms embargo on Turkey for using NATO-supplied weapons in its invasion. However, a severe worsening in Cold War tensions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, combined with the outbreak of war between Iraq and a new Islamic regime in Iran, reminded the West of the geostrategic value of Turkey. Though Cyprus remained (and still is) divided,\textsuperscript{13} normal ties with the United States resumed, the arms embargo ended, and the use of NATO bases in Turkey intensified.

Despite the Cold War, Turkey occasionally explored improving ties with the USSR and with various Middle Eastern states on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. With complementary strategic concerns in the region, Turkey and Israel were able to forge a strong—if somewhat muted—economic and even military relationship. Shared Islamic identity, plus the need for oil, facilitated some movement as well with most of Turkey’s Arab neighbors.\textsuperscript{14}

Postmodern Coup in 1997
After Özal’s sudden death in 1993, unstable coalition governments and personal feuds between party leaders led to a growing dissatisfaction with the established center parties of both the Right and the Left. Consistently high inflation rates disaffected many low- and middle-income citizens and the violent confrontation between the Turkish army and the PKK cost tens of thousands of lives. A consequence of the disorder in Ankara and the stagnating economy was the rise of Islamist parties based on an ideology holding that both state and society should be organized along Islamic principles. In 1994, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), led by the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, won the municipal elections in Istanbul and Ankara. The party managed to draw the votes of both the middle class and the impoverished residents in the new slums that were a consequence of massive migration from the Turkish countryside to the big cities. A promising young man in the party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, would become mayor of Istanbul and do well in that role, contrary to the expectations of many.\textsuperscript{15}
A year later, Erbakan won the parliamentary elections and in 1996 became the first Islamist prime minister in modern Turkish history. At the beginning of 1997, discontent grew among secularists regarding Erbakan’s sometimes provocative Islamist choices. For example, he proposed a socioeconomic order based on Islamic norms, including abolition of the ban on wearing headscarves in public institutions, and favored shifting Turkey from the West toward the Islamic world. On February 28, 1997, the military presented a long list of demands to put an end to the increasing influence of Islamists in education and other parts of the state apparatus. The military leadership organized broad social and media opposition to what they saw as a threat to the secular nature of the Turkish state.

In June 1997, Erbakan resigned in accordance with the military’s will. Without the use of deadly force, through a “postmodern coup,” the army had succeeded again, with the help of other pillars of the secular elite, in bringing down a government that threatened to step outside the norms dictated by the military. What the 1980 coup had been for Kurds and left-wing Turks, the 1997 action proved to be for many religious Turks: a dramatic setback in their political development and influence. Some lost their jobs or had to close their businesses, and some were branded as fundamentalists and excluded from politics. In 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court banned Erbakan’s RP, and Erdoğan was sentenced to ten months in prison for citing an Islamist poem.

The events of 1997 and 1998 led to a fundamental debate among Islamists about the course of their party. The chief reformers within the RP, among them Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, concluded that Turkey needed a broad center-right party that could move beyond Islamist rhetoric. The domestic context allowed them enough space to bring this to life. In August 2001, they founded the Justice and Development Party, which presented itself as a conservative-democratic and explicitly non-Islamist party. The AKP won the November 2002 parliamentary elections, replacing a coalition government led by the left-wing leader Bülent Ecevit that had been plagued by mutual distrust, corruption scandals, and a financial crisis. Since then, Turkey has been ruled by the AKP and entered a new era.

The fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War, while wobbling a bit, had been solidly framed by domestic politics that favored a conservative anticommunist posture and by regional and bipolar global politics. This left Turkey little room for broad maneuver. With the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the communist threat, the disintegration of order in the Middle East, and the rise of Islamic power, both new opportunities and new dangers emerged for Turkey.

At first, the Turkish response was limited. A modest effort was made—and abandoned—to exploit Turkic ties in the newly independent states of Central Asia. Turkey’s relations with key neighbors such as Iran and Syria
remained tense—and, in the latter case, confrontational—over the presence of the PKK. But Turkey’s involvement in the Balkans was spurred by its participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions, while agreements and trade with Russia—including in natural gas—began to grow. Relations with Greece gradually improved, despite the lack of a settlement on Cyprus, and were spurred by a mutual provision of aid after earthquakes hit the two countries in 1999.

In the first post–Cold War decade, Turkey was eager to complete its movement to join the new and expanding European Union. Already linked, since 1963, to the predecessor European Economic Community (EEC) by an association agreement, Turkey formally applied for membership in 1987 but was turned down two years later. To its great disappointment, Turkey watched as several countries—including all the states of formerly communist Eastern Europe—were granted candidacy, engaged in negotiations, and became members. Negotiations did not begin for Turkey until 2005. The foundations of NATO membership were reiterated but damaged in the lead-up to the US-led war in Iraq in 2003.

**Turkey Under Erdoğan**

As the chapters in this volume detail, under Recep Erdoğan Turkey has moved from a fundamentally democratic, if imperfect, state on a slow but evident path toward the European Union to one in which a single party, worldview, and—increasingly—person dominate and determine the nature of Turkish government actions at home and abroad. Erdoğan and the AKP have skillfully stimulated and exploited support from a conservative, Islamic-oriented constituency while at times enjoying strong, if grudging, backing from those in the country who are more secular but want to see the long-standing role of the military and bureaucratic elites reduced. He has alternated between overtures toward the disaffected Kurds and Arab states in the Middle East and appeals to Turkish nationalist sentiments and military actions to gather public and political support.

Domestically, the governing system in Turkey has been changed dramatically under Erdoğan. He and the AKP have used elections and referenda to strengthen and legitimize their increasingly autocratic hold on politics in Turkey. The constitution of 1980 was changed in 2010 to weaken bureaucratic and military control and modified again in April 2017 to create a more powerful presidential system. The military has been brought under firmer civilian control, and political Islam has come to dominate. Changes were ratified through presidential elections and referenda, while local and parliamentary elections gave strong, if not overwhelming, backing to the ruling party. When the AKP lost its majority in the parliamentary elections of 2015, a renewed campaign against the Kurds strengthened the government’s hand and allowed for victory in new elections later that same year.
The coup attempt in July 2016, put down with substantial public support from all sectors of society, gave the ruling AKP greater opportunity to tighten its hold on politics, the state, the media, academia, civil society, and the business world. The aim of many emergency and other measures has been to suppress opposition, real or potential. A state of emergency, declared by the government after the coup attempt, lasted for two years. The government embarked on a massive cleansing operation of state institutions, sacking over 150,000 people in the army, schools, universities, and judicial institutions, and as of March 2019 more than 500,000 people have been detained. In their relentless search for opponents, governing authorities imprisoned people, closed media outlets, and arrested many journalists critical of the government. After its redesign and reappointments by the AKP, the judiciary does not operate independently. In June 2018, snap presidential and parliamentary elections were held in an atmosphere described by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election observers as unequal, giving Erdoğan a “notable advantage.” The leader of the Kurdish party was imprisoned, TV for opposition candidates was sharply restricted, and a variety of vote-manipulation techniques were allegedly utilized.

After these elections, Turkey’s national government was transformed into a presidential system giving the president virtually unlimited powers. As it stands now, almost every decision and all state organs are tied to Erdoğan. The country’s first directly elected president has joined the world’s club of “elected dictators.”

In the new system, the prime minister’s office has been abolished, and there are only ministers appointed by the president. Cabinet ministers—and, in fact, most appointments—no longer require parliamentary approval, for example, Erdoğan’s appointment of his son-in-law as treasury and finance minister. The president can dismiss parliament and call new elections at will. This is a small but significant shift of power from the government to the presidency. The president appoints the head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı, MİT), the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and the Central Bank, as well as ambassadors, governors, and university rectors, among other top bureaucrats. This vast accumulation of power to the new presidency was narrowly approved by voters in a referendum in 2017.

In addition to these domestic developments, externally, over the past five years, Turkey’s statements and actions have carved out a policy that is ever more distinctively Turkish and Islamic. Ankara has been more active in the Balkans and the Middle East, less interested in joining the EU or keeping Washington happy, and not shy about using both “soft” and “hard” power (including military force) to advance its interests. Given both its distant and its more recent history, Turkish leaders see the
Turkey at a Turbulent Time

Outline of the Book and a Review of Factors

Turkey is experiencing turbulent times. The present is hardly reflective of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s hope for the country: “peace at home, peace in the world.” In such a situation, with dramatic transformations both at home and abroad and changes in government actions and social responses to them, it is reasonable—indeed obligatory—for us to try to offer analyses of these dynamics. This volume does so by dividing up the landscape first into domestic and international arenas, then into key sectors such as the economy, religion, and foreign policy in the Middle East. Such divisions are, to some extent, arbitrary, but these analyses will be conscious of real-world connections and take note of ties between these spheres.

In Chapter 2, Gürkan Çelik focuses on the most important dynamics and developments of Turkish domestic politics in the post-2000 period. A key theme is the emergence of the growing power of the leader of the AKP, Recep Erdoğan. Çelik analyzes the mechanisms that have been used by the AKP to secure power and the consequences, including economic ramifications. For example, declining confidence in the Turkish economy has hurt external investment and spurred capital flight. In Chapter 3, Gürkan Çelik and Elvan Aktaş address the domestic and international fluctuations in the economy and discuss the analytic question of whether Turkey can get rich before it grows old. In addition to the Turkish economy’s dynamics and its structural realities, Mustafa Demir, in Chapter 4, analyzes the internal and external factors determining Turkey’s role in energy geopolitics and reviews Turkey’s energy strategy in light of the changing dynamics of global energy supply and distribution.

Joost Jongerden, in Chapter 5, addresses one of the most pressing issues facing the Turkish political establishment: the status of the country’s 20 million Kurds. He argues that Turkish actions have framed this dynamic—complicated by the war in Syria—as a terror and security problem, producing a return to violence, hostilities, and continuing gross human rights violations. Nico Landman uses Chapter 6 to discuss the growing role of Islam as a social and political force under AKP rule, with a focus on the changing role of the Diyanet as a political surrogate for the Turkish government. Landman also describes the position of other religious groups and institutions, and Gürkan Çelik and Paul Dekker, in Chapter 7, examine the role and the fragmentation of the civil society more broadly in light of recent events. They question whether or not civil society has the potential...
to play a key role in today’s Turkey, in particular in its democratic developments. In Chapter 8, Jenny White discusses the position of women. She considers their current precarious position in the new Turkey and how this relates to the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Her chapter asks what the measures and proposals of the present government’s orientation will mean for the future societal position of women.

Turkey, of course, is not alone in this world. Quite the opposite. Its geographic position and size give it a centrality that instills in its domestic and international actions an importance and an impact that is both an advantage (for bargaining) and a curse (for often unwanted attention). Ronald H. Linden begins Part 2 of the volume by describing the regional and global changes that have created a dangerous milieu for this strategic “middle power.” He demonstrates how Ankara asserts its policy preferences in a way that serves its needs but not always those of its partners. Among those partners, the United States stands as the one with the most enduring—if also the most tested—relationship. Henri J. Barkey’s approach to Turkish foreign policy in Chapter 10 focuses not on a particular partner but on the factor he sees as key to understanding the changes in Turkish policy: the power, personality, and especially the perceptions of Recep Erdoğan, once prime minister, now president. It is his worldview—and the accumulation of power enabling him to act on it—that is the key variable in Turkey’s international interactions.

Aaron Stein, in Chapter 11, shows that the current conflict in Turkey’s neighbors, especially Syria and Iraq, has put Washington and Ankara at loggerheads as never before, even to the point where force has been threatened between these longtime NATO allies. Bill Park’s discussion in Chapter 12 of Turkey’s policies in the Middle East reinforces this view and complements it by including the perspective of former foreign and prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

To this tightly framed focus on the role of individuals, Joris Van Bladel in Chapter 13 adds the broad sweep of history. He argues that Turkish-Russian relations are essentially a replay of the multisided battle among powers for influence in the Middle East, one in which the central conflict was between the declining but still dangerous Russian and Ottoman empires. While the twenty-first-century world is not that of the nineteenth, this comparison obliges us to consider long-standing factors (such as the role of Western powers) that affected the previous outcome and might play a role in its modern analog.

For a time, the Western power most in focus for Turkish foreign policy was the European Union. Turkey first applied to join the European Community even before there was an EU. Years later, after eight western and seven postcommunist eastern European countries joined, Turkey is still waiting. In Chapter 14 Hanna-Lisa Hauge, Funda Tekin, and Wolfgang Wessels approach in a unique way a topic that has drawn a great deal of scholarly attention. They sketch out three scenarios that illustrate the possible future course of Turkish-EU relations and then explain what develop-
ments and “drivers” will most likely hold sway. Thus, while Joris Van Bladel draws on comparisons with the past, Hauge, Tekin, and Wessels cast possible futures and then illustrate how this helps understand the present.

In Chapter 15, Juliette Tolay shows how Turkish views of how to handle migration across political boundaries have been—and continue to be—an instrument of foreign policy. More significantly, Tolay shows that, as it tries to protect its own borders, and with nearly 4 million refugees from the war in neighboring Syria, Ankara is forced into a philosophical trade. It abandons its own model of migration control to reinforce the EU’s orientation in return for pledges from Brussels to bring it closer to the EU.

Taken together, the chapters of this volume offer us a range of factors that we can keep in mind in our analysis of Turkey’s past, present, and future. Table 1.1 provides a list of the key factors and actors the authors identify as operating in the spheres they cover. While such a list is of necessity incomplete, it may nevertheless serve as a guide both to the emphases of our authors and to future examination of a complex country, its people, and its interactions with the world. How all of these may interact and with what effect is tackled by Gürkan Çelik and Ronald H. Linden in the concluding chapter. At the end of the book, a chronology of key events in the history of modern Turkey provides pointers for Turkey’s turbulent journey.

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External Developments

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Notes

1. Authors in this volume use the terms AKP and AK Party interchangeably for the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi.
2. The seminal article on this concept is Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” For a contemporary use of the term focusing on Turkey, see Öktem and Karabekir, “Exit from Democracy: Illiberal Governance in Turkey and Beyond.”

4. For more details on Turkey’s modern history, see Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History; Karpat, Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey; Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey.

5. Clark, Twice a Stranger.

6. An example being the infamous British-French Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which secretly divided much of the Arab territory then under Ottoman rule.

7. Religious organizations and institutions were terminated, and a central administrative body (the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) was created to oversee Islamic education and affairs.

8. Lagendijk, “Erdoğan en de AKP in perspectief.”

9. Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy.


12. The PKK was formed as a Marxist Leninist organization using violence as a means to achieve its political objectives (see Marcus, Blood and Belief).

13. In 1983 Turkish Cypriots declared independence and formed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti). It has been recognized only by Turkey, which maintains some 30,000 troops there.

14. Tocci and Walker, “From Confrontation to Engagement.”


17. Such an economic order (adil düzen) refers to Erbakan’s idea of a mechanism that operates on a separate economic system based on the principle of Islam. He introduced this as an alternative to the systems of capitalism and socialism.

18. In 1923 the first constitution prepared by the official establishment of the Republic of Turkey did not include a ban, but then there were no employees with headscarves in public institutions. The headscarf discussion began with the increase in the number of headscarved university students in the first half of the 1960s after the victory of Menderes’s Democratic Party.

19. The 1997 military memorandum refers to decisions issued by the Turkish military leadership at a National Security Council meeting on February 28. This memorandum initiated the process that led to the resignation of Erbakan’s Welfare Party and the end of his coalition government.

20. Linden, “Battles, Barrels and Belonging.”

21. Evin, “Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey.”

22. The government’s declaration used the term “state of emergency” (olağanüstü hâl, or OHAL, in Turkish, which literally means “extraordinary situation”). It has also been referred to as a “state of exception,” which means in the Turkish context, that even after the order expires the Turkish government or presidency continues to apply similar policies and regulations for fighting terrorism. In the situation of the latter, the balance of the relationship among individual rights and freedoms and the authority of state organs is significantly altered, and executive organs gain more power; human rights and freedom of enterprise, as a consequence, have come under pressure.

23. This number includes state officials, teachers, bureaucrats, and academics who were dismissed by the government’s decrees. See Turkey Purge (www.turkeypurge.com).


26. The MİT is the Turkish equivalent of the CIA and serves as the government’s intelligence-gathering organization. It operates directly under the president of Turkey in the new governmental system.

28. ISIL is the abbreviation for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS); it is also referred to by its official name, the Islamic State (IS), and by its Arabic language acronym Daesh.