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Intelligence for Homeland Security: An Introduction

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There have been a number of intelligence successes and failures since 9/11 that deal with the issue of homeland security. The killing of Osama bin Laden was a success. The abandonment of Iraq in 2011 was a failure. When the last of the US troops were pulled out of Iraq, the Iraqi army and government were incapable of maintaining order or preventing the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the establishment of a caliphate that spread across northern Syria and Iraq and resulted in widespread destruction and death. Because of the great upheavals caused by the Arab Spring, this outcome was easily predicted by those who understood and studied the dynamics of the Islamic world; the US government and those following homeland security certainly did not. The result in the United States was an increase in domestic terrorist attacks by individuals who claimed allegiance to ISIS, such as the Pulse Nightclub shootings in Orlando, Florida; the San Bernardino, California, shootings; the attack on the Curtis Caldwell Center in Garland, Texas; and others.

More recently, in the United States and around the world, countries have experienced devastating loss of life and economic loss due to the advent of SARS-CoV-2 (aka the novel coronavirus or Covid-19) that originated in Wuhan, China, in 2019. Events and actions by the Chinese government in the fall of 2019 should have set off warning bells in the US national security and intelligence community, but it appears that they did not. The lack of diligence on the part of the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Chinese government’s delay or cover-up of truthful information regarding the human-to-human spread of the virus resulted in its being transported to countries around the world, with devastating results. There are different public opinions as to whether the virus originated from animals or from a lab that conducts research on dangerous diseases in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. US intelligence officials have not yet determined whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or if it was a result of a laboratory accident in Wuhan, but either way, China did nothing to contain the spread of the disease or to warn the rest of the world about what was coming their way. Even if Covid-19’s spread was the result of an accident, the question remains of why US intelligence failed to provide advance warning to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and President Trump before the beginning of 2020 and the first case made it to the United States.

Often answers to historical events only come in retrospect. Today, there remain more questions than answers. Trust in the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia, although not a part of Homeland Security, is at an all-time low. Being a part of Health and Human Services (HHS), the CDC had no authority to communicate directly with or share its information through DHS agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Intelligence agencies clearly failed to share information that might have prompted action as soon as the world became aware of the virus outbreak in Wuhan as early as November 2019, or when it was being discussed in online medical social media groups in December 2019.

This book is about the current state of domestic intelligence within the country, generally, and specifically within the agency officially charged with protecting the United States from all threats: the Department of Homeland Security. There exist several agencies at the federal level that are charged directly with that responsibility, including both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as many others at all levels that indirectly collect information necessary to the country’s safety. This book covers all agencies, particularly at the federal level, that obtain information relevant to any threat to the United States. Our discussion includes to whom (and under what conditions) the information/intelligence is sent, and who should receive it, in a homeland security intelligence system that (at some point, hopefully) works in a timely and efficient manner. The book is designed to teach students who are interested in what works and
what does not work in terms of domestic intelligence related to direct and indirect threats to the United States, at least at the present time within the homeland security enterprise and the intelligence community’s ability to support it.

Setting the Stage

From the end of World War II until the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the US government considered the primary threat to America to be Communist Soviet Union (and, of course, to a somewhat lesser extent Communist China). The Cold War enemy was well known, as were its capabilities. Its intentions were somewhat unknown, and for this the United States had the CIA and other intelligence agencies to keep the nation safe. Or, at least, to allow the illusion that US citizens were safe.

From about 1982 until 2001, the war on drugs gave the United States a new enemy to think about: drug cartels and smugglers. Several former US presidents told the nation that the number one menace to America was illegal drugs. As for the terrorist threat, prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001, the focus of the government and the intelligence community was primarily the threat from state-supported terrorism, not groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. The United States was worried that nations such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran were giving aid and support to people who wanted to do it harm. And, of course, the mainstays of the Cold War, Russia and China, were still around and worrisome to a greater or lesser extent depending on the situation and circumstances.

On February 26, 1993, the World Trade Center in New York City was attacked by a terrorist group with links to a local radical mosque. Members of the group drove a rental van with approximately 1,200 pounds of explosives to an underground parking garage at the base of the Twin Towers. The explosion killed six people and injured over a thousand. This attack, however, did not focus the attention of the nation on the threat from international terrorist groups, to include al-Qaeda and similar nonstate actors. It is hard to comprehend why the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center didn’t direct the focus of the intelligence community, FBI, CIA, and other federal agencies to the threat posed by international terrorism. Perhaps it was the swift apprehension of the perpetrators followed by their conviction and incarceration that gave a false sense of security. It took the eventual attack on 9/11 to alert the
government, the intelligence community, and law enforcement to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and his followers.

The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (also known as the Kean/Hamilton Commission and the 9/11 Commission) was issued on July 23, 2004. Basically, the 9/11 Commission faulted the intelligence community for failing to connect the dots; for the absence of big-picture, long-range strategic intelligence; and for a lack of imagination. The report specifically noted the lack of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001 and implied that if an NIE on terrorism had been produced, it might have helped the intelligence community and FBI to prevent the 9/11 attack. The 9/11 Commission lays most of the blame for the failure of 9/11 on the intelligence community and on the lack of a strategic warning about groups such as al-Qaeda.

From both a historical and a societal perspective, it is imperative to understand what changes were brought about within this country and worldwide as a result of 9/11. The United States was not the same country it had been on September 10, 2001. US culture also changed, much as it did on December 7, 1941, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, only without any established goal or measure of conclusion for Americans to achieve.

On October 11, 2001, as he announced the upcoming invasion of Afghanistan, President Bush declared a war on terror, also known as the global war on terrorism, against all those who seek to export terror anywhere they might be. This resulted in a war that is still ongoing in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, followed by the deployment of US forces to fight terrorism in the Philippines and Africa. The war on terror was a multidimensional campaign that involved major wars and covert operations in Yemen and elsewhere, and a semiglobal program of killing suspected terrorists or capturing them for imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay or rendition to other undisclosed sites. Instead of having specific enemies to target and defeat, the United States faced an elusive, dispersed, evolving enemy that spanned continents, ethnicities, languages, political motivations, religions, and cultures.

Domestically the war on terror resulted in new antiterror legislation (the USA PATRIOT Act), a new security agency (DHS), new surveillance programs by the National Security Agency and the FBI, and increased security measures at airports, borders, and public events.

By the end of Bush’s second term, public opinion had turned negative concerning aspects of his handling of the Iraq War and some other national security concerns, including the indefinite detention without
trial of accused enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, the use of torture against those detainees in an effort to extract intelligence, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to target and kill suspected enemies in countries not directly associated with combat areas in Iraq and Afghanistan. Barack Obama, a critic of Bush’s foreign policy, won the presidency in 2008, and the expression “war on terrorism” quickly disappeared from official communications. In a 2013 speech, Obama stated that the vaguely defined global war on terror would be replaced by more focused actions against hostile groups. With that said, though, there were foreign policy continuities between the two administrations, including using UAVs for targeted killings, deploying special operations forces, and utilizing US security agencies for wide-ranging surveillance of US citizens.

The war on terror became unlike any war the United States had fought in the past: “There’s no specific battlefield and the enemy isn’t an army.” ¹ Political theorist Richard Jackson used a slightly more expansive definition when he described the war on terror as “simultaneously a set of actual practices—wars, covert operations, agencies, and institutions—and an accompanying series of assumptions, beliefs, justifications, and narratives—it is an entire language or discourse.” ² To attempt to define it is to understand that, for all practical (governmental agency) purposes, this general fluidity is designed to provide government agencies with the most flexibility and funding necessary to meet elusive goals. This artificial government-established paradigm allows agencies the latitude to act without adherence to previously court-upheld restraints regarding surveillance. The so-called war on terror has fundamentally, and for all current intents and purposes, seemingly reversed the inherent foundation of the Bill of Rights: that individuals are assumed innocent until proven guilty. The new paradigm is that all are presumed guilty until evidence (or surveillance) indicates subjectively or objectively that they are low-level threats and, therefore, of little immediate concern to the reputations of the government agencies that surveil them. Absolutely no one inside or outside the government—elected, appointed, or civil service—seems to be completely sure what the evidentiary level is to indicate a suspect or citizen is a viable threat that needs to be addressed.

In 2020, an ongoing global disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) became the Covid-19 pandemic, also known as the coronavirus pandemic. According to the WHO, the disease is primarily spread between people by direct, indirect, or close contact with infected people via mouth or nose secretions.
Authorities worldwide have responded by attempting to implement travel restrictions, lockdowns, workplace controls, and facility closures and by limiting the number of people who can gather for any given event or activity. The pandemic has resulted in global social and economic disruption. It has also led to global widespread supply shortages. Lasting damage was done to the US population and economy.

On January 21, 2020, the first known case of Covid-19 in the United States was announced in Snohomish County, Washington, in a thirty-five-year-old man who had visited family in Wuhan, China. At that point the DHS and the CDC should have requested a shutdown of all incoming international travel from China and set a quarantine of all people who came into contact with this individual. This did not happen. There was no DHS Pandemic Response Plan to implement. There was no validated and tested CDC plan for any type of pandemic. Individual states, counties, cities, and agencies tried to prevent the spread of the disease on their own, often applying flu pandemic response plans in the process. This didn’t work for the prevention of Covid-19 and resulted in a significant number of deaths among patients in nursing homes for the elderly. From January 2020 to March 2021 there were over 29 million cases diagnosed in the United States by positive tests with over 533,000 deaths from the disease according to the CDC website. Over 119 million cases were reported worldwide by Johns Hopkins University with over 2 million deaths at mid-March 2021. The jury is still out on whether the recent pandemic experience will result in improved medical intelligence and a cohesive pandemic response plan.

Defining Terrorism

Every country that has been subjected to terrorism has defined it in a unique way. Even terrorism experts such as Bruce Hoffman and David Whittaker proffer differing definitions. In fact, in the United States, there are many competing definitions of what constitutes terrorism, based on the philosophies of different agencies. Martin consolidates several definitions of terrorism and produces a composite American definition:

Premeditated and unlawful acts in which groups or agents of some principal engage in a threatened or actual use of force or violence against human or property targets. These groups or agents engage in this behavior intending the purposeful intimidation of governments or people to affect policy or behavior with an underlying political objective.
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once wrote that “hard-core pornography” was hard to define, “but I know it when I see it.” So it is with terrorism. There may not be an internationally accepted and consolidated definition of what does and does not constitute terrorism, but you probably know it when you see it (hopefully, not directly as a witness). The reason such a bold statement can be made is that terrorism is not an ideology, form of warfare, or sociological construct. It is a military tactic often employed by small reactionary groups against much larger, better equipped and trained military forces and their associated governments and populations. Anybody at any time can plan and carry out an act of terrorism. Why? Because the ultimate purpose of terrorism is to cause the targeted community to be terrified that they might also be subjected to similar unjustified, indiscriminate, violent acts. If the recipient population becomes terrified that they too may be the victims of such an attack, then the terrorist tactic has succeeded.

The phrase “one person’s terrorist may be another person’s freedom fighter” has become commonplace. Semantically speaking, the terms terrorist and extremist are value-laden statements about actions and actors. Consider the events that led to the separation of the United States from Great Britain in the late 1700s. Did the Boston Tea Party participants, on December 16, 1773, represent extremism to the British loyalists or government? What issue regarding parliamentary representation became the alleged proximate cause for the symbolic actions taken by the colonists? Were the actions damaging to the British government and the monopolistic East India Company upon their refusal to return the tea to the company docks overseas? Why would the colonists object to the Tea Act and its associated taxes? What were the Coercive Acts passed by the British parliament in 1774, and what was the ultimate result? These are the kinds of questions that must be asked when looking into the subjects of extremism and terrorism.

Terrorists justify their causes as noble. Yet, ultimately, what is and is not terrorism is a matter of perception. That perception is driven by politics, religion, culture, upbringing, and any number of other considerations. The Declaration of Independence is essentially a revolt against perceived tyranny in the eyes of its authors and signatories, and yet the British government viewed it as a statement of treason against the Crown. Also, from the perspective of the British, the Boston Tea Party, Stamp Act Revolt, and other colonial offenses were seen as acts of open rebellion against lawful authority. This concept, the idea that perception colors interpretation, is the single greatest reason that terrorism has been so difficult to define.
The Palestinians and British view the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi paramilitary forces as terrorists while the Jews living in Israel see them as heroes and martyrs without whom there would be no Jewish nation today. Members of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria saw themselves as revolutionaries and are seen today by the Algerian people as heroes and martyrs while the Harkis, which supported French forces during the Algerian revolt, are seen as traitors. The French obviously have a different perspective of the FLN and the Harkis. Yet the French dissident paramilitary Organisation Armée Secrète is viewed exactly oppositely by both sides. Which are terrorists? Nationalists? Revolutionaries? Heroes? It is a matter of perspective that will always depend on whether you are on the side that won or the side that lost. Thus, today there is still a great deal of disagreement worldwide as to how terrorism should be defined.

Types of Terrorism

Before moving into the issue of intelligence for homeland security, it is important to establish a common basis and comprehension of the categories of terrorism. Generally, there are four typologies of terrorism: state-sponsored, dissident, religious, and international. From the perspective of homeland security, the concept of criminal terrorism should be considered here as well. Table 1.1 shows a consolidated list of terrorism typologies.

Why create a typology of criminal terrorism? The simple answer is that DHS agencies deal with a wide range of activities: from apprehending Mexican drug cartels and human traffickers to crimes involving counterfeiting and child pornography; from searching for weapons of mass destruction while concurrently expediting normal trade between other countries and the United States to providing maritime and aviation security. All of these are activities may be used by criminals to advance their illicit business enterprises, but they are not actually encompassed by other definitions of terrorism. As such, the terrorist violence used by these criminal enterprises is also being addressed by DHS agents.

Defining Homeland Security

The concept of homeland security is amorphous at best. While the term was used prior to the 9/11 attacks, it didn’t enter into the national vocabulary until afterward. The subsequent creation of a Department of
Homeland Security, with its associated cabinet secretary position, led to a period of time during which the new agency has had to learn and grow, consolidating functions of different components and realigning responsibilities elsewhere. Ultimately, this is an ongoing process for the organization and the nation.

Defining homeland security is difficult as it incorporates so much that a single focused definition is virtually impossible. More than a decade after the formation of DHS, the agency’s educators at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, a component of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, could not produce a comprehensive or accepted definition. This poses a problem not only for DHS but for the nation as a whole.

The solution may be to stop thinking of homeland security from the perspective of national security. There is a misconception that homeland security and national security are synonymous terms. Concurrent with this view is that the intelligence for each would be the same with the same focus and outcomes. Neither of these perceptions could be further from the truth. While the concepts frequently overlap in their specific areas of focus, they are not the same. USLegal.com notes that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-sponsored</td>
<td>Terrorism “from above” committed by governments against perceived enemies</td>
<td>Al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissident</td>
<td>Terrorism “from below” committed by nonstate movements and groups against governments, ethnonational groups, religious groups, and many other perceived enemies</td>
<td>Red Brigades FARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Terrorism motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned it</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo Army of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>Terrorism motivated by sheer profit, or some amalgam of profit and politics</td>
<td>Los Zetas cartel Tamil Tigers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Terrorism that spills over on the world’s stage</td>
<td>al-Qaeda ISIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National security is a corporate term covering both national defense and foreign relations of the U.S. It refers to the protection of a nation from attack or other danger by holding adequate armed forces and guarding state secrets. The term national security encompasses within it economic security, monetary security, energy security, environmental security, military security, political security and security of energy and natural resources. Specifically, national security means a circumstance that exists as a result of a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or a friendly foreign relations position, or a defense position capable of successfully protesting hostile or destructive action.5

USLegal.com goes on to cite Cole v. Young, where the US Supreme Court observed that the term national security is used in a definite and limited sense relating only to those activities directly concerned with the nation’s safety and not relating to the general welfare.6

The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007) defines the concept as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”7 This is the definition of homeland security we use for the purposes of this text. The national strategy is intended to guide, organize, and unify efforts to secure the homeland through use of a common framework to accomplish four goals:

- prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;
- protect the American people, critical infrastructure, and key resources;
- respond to and recover from incidents that come to fruition; and
- continually strengthen the foundations of homeland security to ensure long-term success.8

Fundamental to the above goals is the concept of risk reduction, where “we accept that risk—a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—is a permanent condition [requiring application of] a risk-based framework across all homeland security efforts in order to identify and assess potential hazards.”9

Another concept that is key to the success of the homeland security endeavor is the recognition and acceptance that citizens, communities, the private sector, and faith-based and nonprofit organizations all perform a central role in the process in addition to those federal agencies specifically tasked with securing the homeland. Thus, the government
institutes such programs as Ready.gov and See Something, Say Something. What is interesting among all of the homeland security management options is that there is no required function of intelligence.\textsuperscript{10}

For the first few years after 9/11, terrorism was at the heart of both of the definitions, but over time that changed. The definition of homeland security was broadened to include other national threats, in addition to terrorism:

- a unified national effort to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect and respond to hazards, and to secure the nation’s borders.\textsuperscript{11}
- a seamless coordination among federal, state, and local governments to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats and natural disasters.\textsuperscript{12}
- a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and ways of life can thrive.\textsuperscript{13}

With the maturation of the DHS in 2010, the definition of homeland security took on an institutional flavor. That is, homeland security became everything that DHS is responsible for and includes specific areas of responsibility (bureaucratic turf) of the major DHS subcomponents, including the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs, and others: preventing terrorism, responding to and recovering from natural disasters, enforcing customs and collecting customs revenue, administering legal immigration services, and maintaining the safety and stewardship of the nation’s waterways and marine transportation system, as well as other legacy missions of the various components of DHS.\textsuperscript{14}

In 2011, in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the White House simply defined homeland security as “defensive efforts to counter terrorist threats.”\textsuperscript{15} And, in 2012, DHS defined it in its strategic plan as efforts “to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.”\textsuperscript{16}

Then for the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, homeland security became a concerted national effort that involves a widely distributed and diverse group of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, territorial, and private-sector partners as well as individuals, families, and communities.\textsuperscript{17}

As Christopher Bellavita noted in June 2008, the problem with defining homeland security resides in the fact that there are seven areas of focus that all, based on an individual’s perspective, drive the definition:
1. Terrorism: this includes actions by federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial actors to address all sources of terrorism, to prevent such acts or at least minimize the damage from terrorist attacks.

2. All hazards: the approach must include man-made and natural disasters of all types, not just terrorism.

3. Terrorism and catastrophes: the conceptual goal is to prevent when possible, respond when prevention fails, and recover from events that are terroristic or catastrophic natural disasters. (Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was a catastrophe for the city of New Orleans.)

4. Jurisdictional hazards: Every jurisdiction has a different measure of what threats and hazards are going to be significant to that location, so the level of preparation and response needs to be proportionate, thus each jurisdiction has to prepare for what is appropriate to its region of the country. Inland states usually have less to fear from hurricanes than coastal ones, for example.

5. Meta hazards: These are social threats that can disrupt the long-term stability of the way of life people expect to experience. The massive homeless populations in Los Angeles County and the city of San Francisco are examples of how a social issue can impact a community’s way of life.

6. National security: here the perspective is to address national-level threats to sovereignty, territorial integrity, the entirety of the domestic population (such as the threat posed by Covid-19), and the national-level critical infrastructure.

7. Security above all: This is the ultimate threat to the country. Consider that when security takes priority above everything else, then everything else (civil liberties) can be infringed upon at will by government in the name of providing security for all.\textsuperscript{18}

So, what is homeland security? That raises another question: Is DHS securing the homeland or defending the homeland? Homeland defense is easily defined and can be best stated as the military protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. If that’s the case, then isn’t homeland security the effort extended by all government agencies at all levels to protect the United States, its population, and critical infrastructure from all hazards, natural or man-made? The efforts to address and protect against all hazards, both natural and man-made, result in wholly different means of intelligence gathering for different purposes and outcomes.
Homeland security differs from national security in that national security is addressed by foreign policy as implemented by the US State Department, US Department of Defense, and US Commerce Department (trade relations) as well as the Environmental Protection Agency. Homeland security is a matter of internal protection against terrorism such that terrorist attacks and their effects are minimized, and recovery is swift and assured. Thus, homeland security falls under the responsibility of the DHS, US Department of Energy, US Department of Justice, and US Commerce Department (data collection and analysis including by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). Other government agencies provide concurrent support and overlapping responsibilities associated with both national and homeland security.

Defining Intelligence

There are many definitions of intelligence. Mark Lowenthal defines it as “the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.” A solid, practical definition, although somewhat generic, since it includes a process, a product, safeguarding, and operations. A phrase such as “information important to national security” can really mean anything, at any time, under any circumstances. And, of course, as circumstances change, over time, then “needs” change, too. And intelligence is time-dependent, as well. What is valuable right now, or today, may not be tomorrow, or next week, or next month. As of 2004 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), all intelligence is defined as national intelligence, and there exist three subsets: foreign, domestic, and homeland security. Foreign intelligence is fairly straightforward, but the delineation between domestic and homeland security intelligence is sometimes blurred.

There are various types of intelligence, at least in terms of types of collection. These include HUMINT (human intelligence), OSINT (open-source intelligence), GEOINT (geospatial intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), image intelligence (IMINT), and MASINT (measurement and signatures intelligence). This book covers the above types of intelligence, as they relate to homeland security intelligence.
Defining Homeland Security Intelligence

Homeland security intelligence is what this book is about. A consolidated definition of homeland security intelligence is presented from multiple statements in the DHS’s 2012 strategic plan: homeland security intelligence (as a product) is any relevant, timely information related to efforts to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other threats. The focus is on relevant, timely, practical intelligence related to assisting those responsible for America’s safety, including first responders.

The information-sharing environment, formalized in IRTPA in December 2004, was intended to ensure that not only was terrorism-related intelligence to be shared widely and acted upon federally and locally, but that the sharing of “all relevant and appropriate information throughout [all] levels of government and with private and non-profit sectors and our foreign partners on the full range of homeland security issues” was essential to ensuring the four goals of the national strategy functioned as the American people expected. Of course, events in Parkland (2018), Orlando (2016), San Bernardino (2015), Charleston (2015), and Boston (2013), among many others, demonstrate that this most important aspect of successful homeland security, the sharing of pertinent intelligence from federal to local and community-based organizations, has been woefully inadequate.

Structure of the Book

The materials are presented in a series of chapters related to specific concepts appropriate for extensive discussion and analysis. We begin with foundational materials so that subsequent concepts can be tied to a common understanding of the origins and lexicon of the topics. In Chapter 2 we take a look at the origins of homeland security and its relationship to domestic terrorism, including abolitionist John Brown and the raid at Harpers Ferry, the creation and rise of the Ku Klux Klan, and the labor riots at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Chapter 3 we examine the two attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City, almost a decade apart, and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, including the creation of the DHS, along with a look at the Tsarnaev brothers and the Boston Marathon bombing. In Chapter 4 we explain the role of the intelligence community in the context of national security. We then examine the roles played by homeland security agencies in Chapter 5 and that of
other federal agencies in Chapter 6 before addressing the issue of counterintelligence in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 we present a detailed analysis of domestic threats and how they impact national and homeland security. This is followed by an examination and investigation of the differences between homeland, national, and practical intelligence in Chapter 9, and how different agencies use different terms for similar concepts. An example of a functioning intelligence system within the DHS is examined in detail in Chapter 10, where we discuss FEMA planning, response, recovery, and mitigation as if it were a functioning intelligence agency. We conclude with Chapter 11 and our proposal of what we see as essential for bringing homeland security intelligence into the twenty-first century.

Notes

2. R. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005).
court/text/378/184.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 41.
10. Ibid., p. 44.