


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Brazilian Politics  
on Trial:  
Corruption and Reform  
Under Democracy

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# Contents

<i>List of Tables and Figures</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xi
<b>1</b> Scandal and Corruption in Brazil	1
<b>2</b> The Prevailing Elite Cartel Syndrome	13
<b>3</b> The Incremental Approach to Accountability, 1985–2014	47
<b>4</b> <i>Lava Jato</i> and the Big Push, 2014–2016	101
<b>5</b> The Unmaking of <i>Lava Jato</i> and Its Ramifications, 2016–2021	141
<b>6</b> Judicial Big Pushes in Large Democracies	179
<b>7</b> Learning from the Brazilian Experience	207
Appendix: Brazil’s Major Federal Corruption Scandals, 1985–2021	223
<i>References</i>	235
<i>Index</i>	271
<i>About the Book</i>	281

# 1

## Scandal and Corruption in Brazil

*The corrupt are animals similar to the non-corrupt. But the latter is a species that is nearly extinct because it is so easy to capture.*

—Millôr Fernandes, Brazilian satirist

In November 1992, a relatively unknown congressional staffer took his wife out for dinner in Brasília. On their way home, the couple was accosted by two men, and the woman, Ana Elizabeth Lofrano, was driven to a distant suburb and killed. Under pressure from police, her husband, José Carlos Alves dos Santos, claimed that the murder had been orchestrated by his congressional bosses to cover up a fraudulent budget scheme Lofrano had uncovered.

The ensuing budget scandal, referred to tactlessly as the *Anões do Orçamento* (budget dwarves) scandal because of the low rank and short height of the congressmen involved, absorbed all of Brazil during much of 1993. A comissão parlamentar de inquérito (congressional committee of inquiry, CPI) was called to order, and proceeded to find evidence of considerable wrongdoing. Members of the budget committee were found to have written fraudulent budget amendments, with help from Alves dos Santos, favoring construction firms, fraudulent social organizations, and relatives. They received kickbacks and laundered them, including by buying up and cashing winning lottery tickets. The chair of the budget committee, Congressman João Alves, claimed to have won the lottery more than 200 times, prompting incredulous jeers from the audience at the inquiry.

All told, the CPI investigated thirty-seven congressmen and recommended that eighteen be removed from Congress. Of these, six

were expelled by their peers, four resigned so as to preserve their political rights, and eight were absolved.<sup>1</sup> Staffer Alves dos Santos served four years of a twenty-year prison sentence for ordering his wife's murder and, twenty-one years later, another two and a half years of an eight-year sentence for his involvement in the budget wrongdoing (Brasília Assombrada 2017; Favero 2013).

The *Anões do Orçamento* scandal led to a review of the budget process and a number of reforms aimed at curbing the feasibility of fraudulent budget amendments. The budget committee chair's discretion was significantly curtailed, and a cap was put on the number and total value of individual representatives' amendments (Praça 2011, 2013).

Fast-forward three decades.

In early 2021, the *Estado de S. Paulo* newspaper revealed that the government was operating a "secret budget" of more than US\$560 million to build legislative support (Pires 2021a, 2021b). While investigations are ongoing and it is therefore too soon to declare conclusively that the secret budget was corrupt, several red flags suggested wrongdoing. Perhaps most importantly, most of the amendments allocated funds within the Ministry of Regional Development to purchase heavy equipment for sewage and road construction, and the equipment appeared to have been budgeted at prices substantially higher than the government's own reference price (Praça 2021; Carranço 2021; Valfre and Pires 2021).<sup>2</sup> One Brazilian anticorruption activist, Gil Castello Branco, opined that "this is a scandal that suggests—the investigation will be able to prove it or not—the explicit purchase of political support" (Carranço 2021). Tacitly acknowledging the issues raised by the secret budget, in May 2021 the Jair Bolsonaro administration changed the budget rules once again, formalizing the rapporteur's amendment power in the following year's budget (*O Estado de S. Paulo* 2021).

This pair of budget scandals, nearly thirty years apart, highlights the questions that will guide us in the pages ahead.

First, what explains the seeming constancy of corruption and scandal in democratic Brazil? A Brazilian in the 1990s with a passing acquaintance of the *Anões do Orçamento* scandal and its enormous public repercussion would be shocked to learn that history appears to be repeating itself thirty years later. Not only that, but the secret budget of 2021 would not be the first scandal to repeat a similar script. There had also been a major 2006 *Sanguessugas* (leeches) scandal, which implicated dozens of legislators who were using budget amendments to buy overpriced ambulances. And these are only the scandals that

traded *budgetary* side payments for legislative support, to say nothing of other forms of corruption. What are the conditions on the ground that provide constant incentives for corruption in politics and drive the abuse of the public trust for private ends, over and over again?

Second, why have reforms and anticorruption efforts not had the desired effect of lessening political corruption? The democratic regime that began in 1985 has been marked by seemingly continuous reform, including a variety of changes taken in response to specific corruption scandals like the budget troubles above. The country has seen ongoing improvements in the norms, procedures, and agents involved in controlling public sector corruption, whose gradual accumulation over time contributed by the early 2010s to a hopeful perception about the democratic regime's anticorruption progress. In recent years, there has also been a massive anticorruption push associated with the *Lava Jato* investigations, which directly targeted scores of federal politicians and their counterparts in business. *Lava Jato* has been deemed by a range of metrics—such as scope, length, sums involved, prominence of those investigated, and ramifications in other countries—one of the largest criminal investigations into high-level corruption in a democracy anywhere in the world. However, the overall picture is decidedly mixed. The *Lava Jato* case raised hopes that a new era of accountability was arriving, but within seven years the investigations had largely been shuttered and the overall accountability panorama appeared, in many respects, to have regressed. Not only had the *Lava Jato* investigation been pruned to insignificance, but the broader federal accountability infrastructure had also been significantly weakened. Why did these anticorruption efforts and reforms not have the expected dissuasive effect, why did they not accumulate over time into a significant change in the overall patterns of wrongdoing, and why has the pushback been so substantial?

Third, what are the implications of Brazil's experience for anticorruption reformers elsewhere around the world? As the tale of these two budget scandals demonstrates, the Brazilian case is a frustrating example of how anticorruption efforts sometimes fail to sum to an effective change in the overall patterns and prevalence of corruption. What explains this failure, and what can other reformers learn from Brazil's generation-long anticorruption experience?

In sum, this book is an attempt to make sense of Brazil's complex history of corruption and anticorruption since the return to democracy in 1985, and to evaluate its lessons for anticorruption reformers in Brazil and in other large democracies.<sup>3</sup> We evaluate the corruption scandals that erupted and the anticorruption reforms that

emerged to consider what it means for anticorruption efforts to succeed, the conditions under which they are more or less likely to prosper, and their multiple potentially sanitizing but also profoundly destabilizing effects on democracy. Throughout the book, we also seek to bring back some of the nuance that has been lost in the fire-hot debates that emerged around *Lava Jato*, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, and the election of right-wing provocateur Jair Bolsonaro.

## **Brazil's Relevance to the Study and Practice of Anticorruption**

The Brazilian experience with corruption and accountability is interesting in and of itself. Anticorruption has been one of the central points of contention in politics since the return to democracy in 1985, and the country's accountability trajectory has had consequential and lasting impacts on economic development, political performance, and citizen satisfaction with democracy in Latin America's largest nation. But Brazil's experience with corruption and accountability since 1985 is also extremely relevant to the international literature and practice of anticorruption for at least four reasons.

First, Brazil is a democracy. This is important, because so many of the reforms that are touted as anticorruption remedies emerged in countries that were undemocratic at the time, a fact that limits their broader applicability. For example, Hong Kong's oft-emulated Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), an influential precursor to anticorruption agencies worldwide, was created when Hong Kong was a British colony run from London without direct elections. Robert Klitgaard's (1988) pioneering book on corruption, similarly, derives its lessons predominantly from then nondemocratic nations, including the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1970s, South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, and an unnamed African province in the late 1970s that looked doubtfully democratic. Along similar lines, all five countries deemed "most improved" by Robert I. Rotberg (2017) do not look very democratic: four hybrid regimes and one seemingly authoritarian.<sup>4</sup> To a significant extent, the emphasis on nondemocratic nations is also present in Jon S. T. Quah's (2011) analysis of ten Asian countries and Melanie Manion's (2004) critical comparison of China and Hong Kong.

Unsurprisingly, "political will" or "leadership" often emerges from studies of authoritarian or hybrid regimes as a fundamental variable explaining anticorruption success (Klitgaard 1998; Quah

2010, 2011; Rotberg 2017). But given the choice of cases, this risks tautology: almost by definition, if an autocratic ruler decides to bust graft, his will is going to be crucial to success. The same conditions do not hold in a democracy. By definition, *democracy* is a regime that relies on competition between different wills and whose institutional arrangements are designed to fragment, rather than unify, political leadership. This means that almost by definition, anticorruption efforts in democracies must be a collective endeavor.

The political-electoral calculations of anticorruption reform are much reduced in authoritarian regimes, but this of course results from the fact that, as soon as meaningful investigations become a threat against the regime, they are quashed. In fact, an emerging body of literature in nondemocratic nations shows that anticorruption initiatives have been instrumental in reinforcing rulers' powers, rather than in reducing corruption proper. Additionally, the fact that autocracies are by various comparative accounts more corrupt than democracies (e.g., Treisman 2000, 2007, 2014; McMann et al. 2020), further suggests that the undemocratic nations that managed to reduce corruption are truly exceptional (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017). As a result, any broader anticorruption lessons derived from this group of nations should be read with extreme care.

Second, Brazil is a large democracy. There are democratic nations that have recently succeeded in reducing corruption. Some of the "contemporary achievers" discussed by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Michael Johnston (2017) include Botswana, Costa Rica, Estonia, Uruguay, and South Korea. Yet except for South Korea, with its population of 52 million, these success stories are small, with populations of fewer than 5 million. How can large Latin American nations such as Argentina (45 million), Colombia (50 million), Mexico (130 million), and Brazil (214 million) learn from the experiences of such small nations? Beyond Latin America, what lessons can other large democratic developing nations, including South Africa (60 million), Indonesia (275 million), and India (1.3 billion) draw from smaller democracies where achieving consensus about the need for reform and the content of reform may be exponentially easier, and where coordinating policy responses is an infinitely simpler task? Large countries may also lack the perception of vulnerability that may help generate political consensus for reform in small countries, especially small countries facing threatening neighbors. Many large democracies, furthermore, are federations, which fragment authority and create problems not often examined in the anticorruption literature, including differing regime types and varied patterns of accountability at the subnational level

(Macaulay 2011; Da Ros 2014; Giraudy, Moncada, and Snyder 2019). While our focus throughout the book is on the federal government, we draw attention to the differing performance of a variety of accountability bodies across the federation and the complications this multi-level diversity may present for a large country such as Brazil.

A third reason to focus on Brazil, especially in the wake of the roughly seven-year arc of *Lava Jato*, is that so much of the corruption literature falls into a classic trap of selection on the dependent variable. Scholars have relied predominantly on success stories to develop recipe-style lists of best practices. These include analyses of Nordic nations such as Sweden, Denmark, and Finland (Rothstein 2011; Johnston 2013; Salminen 2013; Rothstein and Teorell 2015; Teorell and Rothstein 2015); Asian countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore (Quah 2010; Manion 2004); and New Zealand (Gregory and Zirker 2013), as well as a relatively heterogeneous group of “contemporary achievers,” including Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Georgia, Qatar, Rwanda, South Korea, Taiwan, and Uruguay (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017) and “most improved” nations, including Liberia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and, again, Georgia and Rwanda (Rotberg 2017; Taylor 2018).

Trying to learn from success is a logical first move. There is, however, a fundamental problem with relying on success stories to learn what works in controlling corruption. “Selecting on the dependent variable” means that the examined cases lack significant variation in the outcome of interest, and therefore lead scholars to overestimate the impact of independent variables on the results of interest (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Geddes 2003). Said a bit differently, the conclusions of anticorruption research would likely have been somewhat different had the cases been subject to controlled comparisons between successes and failures. A focus on only successful cases may lead to lists of “best practices,” “often selected more because they are found in generally successful societies than for specific reasons why they should work in a given setting,” and without giving much thought to “why past reforms have faded or failed” (Johnston and Fritzen 2021: 124). There are some notable exceptions to this focus on success such as studies of *Mani Pulite* in Italy (Colazingari and Rose-Ackerman 1998; Della Porta and Vannucci 1997) and anticorruption reforms in Mexico in the early years of this century (Morris 2009). We hope that a case study of Brazilian democracy—which is at best a mixed case, alternating moments of success and others of failure—will at the very least serve to supply empirical data and generate new hypotheses for future cross-national comparative analyses.



The fourth and final reason to focus on Brazil has to do with the pace of reform, which moved at a slow and incremental pace for much of its first thirty years, before accelerating into a big push during the 2010s. Corruption scholars have devoted a great deal of thought to the pace of reform, in part because of the consensus that corruption is a strategic behavior. Because it is strategic—meaning that citizens’ behavior is contingent on how they believe others in society will behave in response to their actions—shifting the corruption equilibrium requires collective action that changes the incentives for a majority of citizens. Can enough people’s behavior be changed, and remain changed, so as to ensure that the prevailing equilibrium shifts? The question of pace therefore seems central to shifting from a vicious equilibrium “in which high corruption begets high corruption,” to a virtuous “low-corruption equilibrium . . . in which corruption’s rarity makes it easier to control” (Stephenson 2020: 193; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009).

Equilibria are by nature difficult to change: if politicians, business executives, and citizens are used to behaving in a particular way, in response to how they think others will act, it may be difficult to change their behavior in the short term. Further, because the corruption equilibrium is collectively determined, there is a constant danger of reversion: even successful reforms may fail to shift the equilibrium and old preferences or behaviors will reassert themselves. Politicians facing particular electoral incentives, such as high interparty competition, may have strong motivations to collect off-books campaign funds; business executives who face a strong regulatory state may “know” that campaign contributions are necessary to obtain favorable state policies; and citizens who believe the game is rigged may decide there is little reason to get involved in policing the ties between politicians and business interests because the likelihood of changing the system is minimal. Under such conditions, even successful one-off interventions, such as a spectacular jail sentence for a politician or the exemplary firing of a top CEO, may not lead to the changes in broader behavior that move a society out of its equilibrium.

Two prescriptions have vied for dominance in response to this challenge. One group advocates a *big bang* or *big push* (we use these terms interchangeably)—that is, a massive anticorruption effort that concentrates efforts in time and space—in a bid to quickly break equilibrium behaviors. The big push approach has broad goals, ambitious scope, and high visibility. Big push approaches often rely on campaigns, which usually have a “D-Day” for enactment, frequently carried out with some element of surprise. The pace is fast and often

abrupt, aimed at overturning the status quo through a massive package of ambitious legislative and administrative initiatives. Katherine Bersch (2019: 2) has referred to the prevailing mentality of such reforms as “powering.”

The big push approach, it is argued, may be politically effective in overcoming entrenched opposition because it surprises opponents, takes advantage of moments of political ascendancy, and pushes for quick changes in the equilibrium while the status quo is in flux. Big pushes tend to be legitimated by a shift in political winds such as the arrival of a new government after a period of crisis (e.g., war, revolution, or economic upheaval; Rothstein 2011). Perhaps as a consequence of their rarity, when such a window of opportunity opens, big push advocates are impatient, seeking quick returns and operating with an implicitly short time horizon such as midterm elections or the end of the presidential term. One such example comes from Mexico, where a big anticorruption push by Vicente Fox—the first president in seven decades elected from outside the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI)—adopted, as his first act in office, the creation of an intersecretarial committee that quickly moved to develop and implement a broad-based anticorruption program (Morris 2009, 4). Until recently, the anticorruption literature fell almost entirely into the big push camp, with the common assumption that without a big push, anticorruption reforms would be overwhelmed by perverse incentives that would pull citizens back into the vicious equilibrium.<sup>5</sup>

A second prescription is incrementalism, whereby small gradual gains are built up on top of each other, accumulating into significant change over the long haul. The pace of incrementalism is slow but ongoing, and reforms tend to be implemented bottom up, often without much coordination. There is no single big package of reforms and, oftentimes, even the road map of reform is unclear, with practitioner learning and problem-solving guiding the reform agenda’s various small steps (Bersch 2019). The incremental approach tends to proceed with narrow goals, restricted scope, and visibility only in the impacted policy arenas. Incremental approaches may have no time horizon. This is both their most valuable political feature and their greatest potential political flaw. By moving incrementally (which need not be slowly), they bite off small bits of the problem little by little. Often, having no time horizon goes hand in hand with having no clear long-term plan (or a plan that develops only stepwise, over time). Politically, this can be valuable because the ensuing reforms may not put the back up of entrenched interests and thus may not

raise concern among the potentially impacted parties about the long-term accumulation of policy losses. It may also become a flaw, of course, because reforms may be uncoordinated, nonstrategic, and untargeted, leading to expensive, wasteful, and undirected efforts that do not aggregate into long-term gains. But by virtue of its smaller focus, incrementalism does have the advantage of taking place below the radar of potential opposition groups, and it may be possible to make incrementalism more strategic through regular review and coordination. Further, incrementalism may ensure that reforms build on each other, taking into account the unintended consequences of previous changes (Lindblom 1959: 86). Ultimately, as a result of their ongoing nature, their capacity to proceed stepwise to address bottlenecks sequentially, and their narrow breadth, incremental reforms may more easily acquire “value and stability” over time—that is, become “institutionalized” (Huntington 1968: 12)—thereby making them harder to reverse in the future.<sup>6</sup> Further, recent work demonstrates that there is no reason to assume that over time, incremental change cannot produce as much of an equilibrium shift as big bang change (Stephenson 2020).

With regard to the pace of reform, Brazil presents a unique case study because its accountability reforms have followed two distinct strategies over time, one incremental and the other a big push. For nearly three decades, from the outset of democracy until the 2010s, the country adopted a piecemeal, gradual, small-bore reform strategy. This strategy, furthermore, did not become “strategic,” in the sense of having predefined and mapped out objectives, until the last decade of this period. Beginning in 2014, Brazil’s anticorruption efforts underwent a sea change as the task force of the *Lava Jato* investigation, and many of its allies across government and within civil society, rapidly accelerated the pace of anticorruption efforts, an effort that included investigations, prosecutions of a broad range of elites, public mobilization, and even legislative reforms, in a big push for accountability.

## Plan of the Book

The rest of the book turns to the meat of the matter: the Brazilian experience. Chapter 2 describes the prevalent syndrome of corruption in the country, which is marked by what Michael Johnston (2005: 43; 2014) has termed “elite cartel” corruption. We examine four prominent cases of grand corruption that took place in the pre-*Lava Jato* era, which, together, justify the use of the term *elite cartel*: this syndrome

has found a fertile home in what we term the *perilous combination* of coalitional presidentialism in a hyperfragmented party system, a large state with a developmentalist economic policy infrastructure, and a loose campaign finance system. These cases demonstrate recurring historical patterns of weak accountability, and begin to illustrate how past failures may have contributed to the emergence of *Lava Jato*.

Chapter 3 explains the heuristic model of accountability that we use as a diagnostic tool to evaluate distinct accountability equilibria at various moments in time. We chart Brazil's incremental progress from a fairly low accountability equilibrium toward a much-improved, if still intermediate, equilibrium over the course of three decades between the 1985 transition to democracy and the onset of *Lava Jato* in 2014. We then evaluate the substantial reforms in the accountability policy set that made these improvements possible, and discuss the paradox of reforms that were implemented by the very political elites who stood to suffer most from reforms' effects.

Chapter 4 assesses the big push represented by *Lava Jato*. Given Brazil's persistent bottleneck with elite impunity before the law, what conditions made *Lava Jato* possible? Our account of this historic event focuses on contingent and highly contextual factors, as well as longer-term institutional changes that had incrementally accumulated over the previous three decades in Brazil. We emphasize the various capacities enjoyed by accountability institutions in the country as a whole, and in *Lava Jato*'s headquarters in Curitiba in particular; the legal and political strategies deployed by the task force of prosecutors and investigators to help judicial cases move forward; and the context of severe political gridlock that prevented any credible threat of political interference in the investigations, especially during the operation's crucial first two years. We further highlight how the task force engaged in a big push, which combined not just legal action but a media push, broad public engagement, and a reform effort that sought ambitious changes in the statutory rules governing corruption prosecutions.

By contrast, Chapter 5 is about the unmaking of *Lava Jato* and its broader ramifications for the "web of accountability institutions" that had developed prior to that investigation.<sup>7</sup> Given its magnitude, it is perhaps unsurprising that *Lava Jato* engendered significant reaction once the political system realigned after President Rousseff's 2016 impeachment. Here, we detail the attempts to derail the investigation, as well as the instances in which such attempts succeeded. We describe the frontal reactions, the effects of political realignment and saturation, and the self-inflicted wounds by the investigators. Importantly, we also describe how, beginning in 2016 and continuing

under Bolsonaro after 2018, new governing coalitions targeted not only *Lava Jato*, but also diluted or reversed accountability improvements that had accumulated over the previous decades in Brazil, some of them unrelated to *Lava Jato* proper.

Chapter 6 explores the broader cross-national lessons of *Lava Jato*. Here, we examine three findings. First, although judicial independence has long been praised as an antidote to corruption, successful court-led attempts to engender a big push out of low accountability equilibria have been rare. The problem is that such efforts reproduce in a democracy the powering mentality of reforms that historically have succeeded almost exclusively in autocracies: that of the powerful autonomous anticorruption agency. We show that judicial pushes have not prospered in democracies, drawing on the examples of Italy and France in the 1990s and Indonesia since the 2000s. Second, we describe how one of the regrettable by-products of *Lava Jato* seems to have been a reversion to an equilibrium closer to—if somewhat different from—the old status quo ante before *Lava Jato*. The bottom line for corruption reformers elsewhere can be summarized as follows: big push attempts out of low accountability equilibria can easily lead to a perverse effect whereby the end result is worse than the initial condition. Finally, we argue that the big push approach is especially fraught in large democracies such as Brazil. Country size has a variety of effects, including a higher number of veto players, more difficult collective action, and the heterogeneity of corruption and accountability processes. Together, these make the big push approach less likely to succeed. In a large consolidating democracy like Brazil, big push efforts may also threaten the democratic regime by destabilizing the political system without restructuring the underlying incentives of political engagement that prompted the corruption in the first place.

Chapter 7 concludes with the lessons of the book for anticorruption reformers in Brazil and beyond. We home in on two particularly problematic and long-enduring bottlenecks to the accountability process in Brazil: the degree to which collusion between political and economic elites enabled them to push back against accountability policies and reduce the effectiveness of reform; and the weakness of the sanctioning process, which is plagued by recurring patterns of administrative lassitude and judicial inoperancy in grand corruption cases. Together, these two bottlenecks continue to slow Brazil's forward movement, and may even be contributing to regression. This experience provides a variety of lessons for reformers inside and outside of Brazil on the pace, content, and politics of accountability policies.

## Notes

1. Many of those implicated in the scandal later returned to politics, including Edison Lobão (who had not been charged) and Geddel Vieira Lima (who was absolved), both of whom later served as ministers in the Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer presidential administrations, when they were again touched by scandal. One of the congressmen who was expelled by his peers, Chamber president Ibsen Pinheiro, was cleared of wrongdoing by the courts in 2000 and returned to Congress in 2006.

2. Another red flag was that, relying on a 2019 change in the budget law, the amendments comprising the secret budget were proposed by the budget rapporteur, contravening practices in place since the mid-1990s. Albeit legal in principle, the rapporteur's amendment privilege was far less fiscally transparent and readily visible to the public than other ways of amending the budget, and unlike other types of budget amendment, the rapporteur amendments were not equally distributed among members of Congress, so they represented perks from the government to particular legislators (Rey 2021). Adding to suspicions, the volume of rapporteur amendments rose markedly in the 2020 budget, approved when the Bolsonaro administration was under great pressure from Congress for its failure to address the pandemic, at a moment when there were increasing calls for Bolsonaro's impeachment, and at a time when the executive branch feared that its allies would not be elected to lead the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

3. *Corruption* is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, and *public sector corruption* is the abuse or undue use of public office for the same end. Within public sector corruption, we may further distinguish between *grand corruption*, the abuse of high-level power by the few at the expense of the many, and *petty corruption*, whereby individual low-ranking bureaucrats seek private gain in their everyday interactions with citizens. Grand corruption often involves multiple actors acting in concert, and large sums of money; petty corruption typically involves only a few actors, acting individually or in small groups to perform relatively minor abuses. As the next chapter will demonstrate, while there are examples of both types of public sector corruption in Brazil, grand corruption appears to be the larger and more consequential of the two forms. We base our conceptual definitions around Transparency International's (TI) Anticorruption Glossary (<https://www.transparency.org/glossary>), although we break with TI in using political corruption and grand corruption interchangeably, in part because of the significant overlap between the two terms, as well as the blurriness of the distinctions between corruption committed for political and personal ends.

4. According to Economist Intelligence Unit (2018).

5. Stephenson (2020) cites, as representative of the big push approach, Collier (2006); Rose-Ackerman (1999); Mauro (2004); Rothstein (2011); Fisman and Golden (2017); Aidt (2003); Akerlof (2016); Bardhan (2006); Garri, Peternostro, and Rigolini (2003); Kingston (2008); Sparrow (2008). Recent work by Davis (forthcoming) is also representative of this approach.

6. This debate is also present in the literature on the politics of economic reform, as for example, in the discussions between gradualists (e.g., Dewatripont and Roland 1995) and shock therapists (e.g., Lipton and Sachs 1990). More generally, see Roland (2001).

7. The term "web of accountability," which we use freely, was coined by Mainwaring (2003: 29–30).