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Renegotiating the Liberal Order: Evidence from the UN Security Council



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The Security Council and the Liberal Order

ON MARCH 24, 1999, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) began air strikes in Kosovo, and the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting. The Albanian and Muslim majority in Kosovo had begun an independence movement within Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav military responded with brutal violence, killing more than 2,000 people and generating more than 600,000 refugees. The Security Council had already authorized economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Yugoslavia for violence against civilians.[1] It had demanded a cease-fire and a military withdrawal from Kosovo. It had threatened "additional measures" if Yugoslavia refused to comply.[2] Negotiations had failed, Yugoslavia did not comply with the Security Council, and the violence continued. Yugoslavia had also refused to allow human rights monitors or war crimes prosecutors into Kosovo. Despite the noncompliance, Russia and China would not approve a Security Council use of force authorization. Given the inaction on the Security Council, NATO authorized air strikes to stop the war crimes and human rights violations.

Russia issued blistering criticisms at the March 24 meeting, arguing that the NATO operation in Kosovo violated the UN Charter.

> RUSSIA: Those who are involved in this unilateral use of force against the sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—carried out in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and without the authorization of the Security Council—must realize the heavy responsibility they bear for subverting the Charter and other norms of international law and for attempting to establish in the world, de facto, the primacy of force and unilateral diktat. The members of NATO are not entitled to decide the fate of other sovereign and independent States. They must not forget that they are not only members of their alliance, but also Members of the United Nations, and that it is their obligation to be guided by the United Nations Charter.[3]

China agreed, calling the NATO action "a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the accepted norms of international law."[4] Russia and China argued that NATO violated principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, self-determination, and noninterference in domestic affairs. The UN Charter established only two legitimate uses of force: self-defense and force authorized by the Security Council. Neither applied to the NATO air strikes in Kosovo.

NATO members argued that the use of force was justified by the ongoing human rights violations, an impending humanitarian disaster, and the Security Council's unwillingness to enforce its own resolutions. They argued that they were pursuing the spirit, if not the letter, of the UN Charter.

> FRANCE: We cannot abandon [Kosovo] to violent repression. What is at stake today is peace, peace in Europe—but human rights are also at stake. The actions that have been decided upon are a response to the violation by Belgrade of its international obligations, which stem in particular from the Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.[5]

> UNITED KINGDOM: Belgrade has rejected all of the Security Council's demands, and continues to act in defiance of the expressed will of the Council. In these circumstances, when diplomacy has failed, do we react just with further words? . . . [W]e face a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO has been forced to take military action because all other means of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe have been frustrated by Serb behavior. We have taken this action with regret, in order to save lives. . . . The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.[6]

Russia and China submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council two days later asserting that the NATO operation constituted a threat to global security by violating the UN Charter and Yugoslav sovereignty. Only three states voted in favor of the resolution—twelve voted no. The vast majority of members did not condemn NATO for going beyond the letter of the UN Charter. An independent international commission concluded that the NATO operation in Kosovo was "illegal, but legitimate."[7] While NATO technically violated the Charter, most considered its attempt to enforce war crimes and human rights rules as legitimate. This is an example of the "liberal order"—rules and institutions that pursue global security through trade, human rights, democracy, international organizations, and international law—altering the understanding of the UN Charter and expanding the scope of legitimate global security practices.[8]

Many now argue that the liberal order is in decline. In this book, I analyze post–Cold War Security Council practices to interrogate the "decline narrative." I hope to complicate and problematize that narrative by provid-

ing an alternative understanding that suggests a greater resiliency for the liberal order. This alternative begins with the assertion that the liberal order is constituted by two bargains. Each bargain provides a different form of legitimacy within the liberal order, and each must influence the other to perpetuate the liberal order. The first is the "Charter bargain" established by the UN Charter between the Permanent Five of the Security Council (P5) and all UN member states:

1. The P5 agrees to provide for global security.
2. The P5 agrees to act according to the rules in the UN Charter.
3. UN member states agree to comply with Security Council resolutions.

The Charter bargain has a procedural legitimacy within the liberal order—practices authorized by the Security Council are legitimate. The second bargain is the "hegemonic bargain" between the United States and its allies developed during and after World War II.[9] The hegemonic bargain is structurally similar to, but substantively distinct from, the Charter bargain:

1. The United States agrees to provide for global security in liberal ways.
2. The United States agrees to restrain itself and act through international organizations.
3. The allies agree to support US leadership.

The hegemonic bargain has a substantive legitimacy within the liberal order—global security practices driven by human rights, democracy, trade, and international law are legitimate.

The Security Council debates over Kosovo perfectly illustrated the tensions between these two bargains. Russia and China invoked the Charter bargain, arguing that the NATO use of force was illegitimate because the Security Council did not authorize it. The NATO allies invoked the hegemonic bargain, arguing that the use of force to protect human rights was a legitimate way to pursue global security. The letter of the Charter bargain was often inconsistent with the spirit of the hegemonic bargain. The 12–3 vote on the resolution condemning the NATO use of force not only prioritized the hegemonic bargain over the Charter bargain; it also implicitly criticized the Security Council for not fulfilling the Charter bargain by authorizing enforcement measures in Kosovo. During the post–Cold War era, the legitimacy of the Security Council often required the authorization of explicitly liberal practices. The hegemonic bargain often altered the requirements of the Charter bargain.

In this chapter, I argue that understanding the liberal order as constituted by the interaction of these two bargains suggests an alternative to the

decline narrative. First, I discuss how liberal orders are distinct from other types of global orders. States consistently make "sovereignty bargains," and the various dimensions of sovereignty show how the two bargains constituting the liberal order are distinct from other bargains. Then, I discuss the current narrative that the liberal order is in decline. If the liberal order is constituted by both the Charter and hegemonic bargains, then the decline narrative suggests that nonliberal bargains should be emerging and contesting both bargains. We can therefore analyze Security Council practices to evaluate the decline narrative. The Security Council is at the heart of the interaction between the two bargains. It is the institutional manifestation of the Charter bargain, and it has undoubtedly been influenced by the hegemonic bargain. If the liberal order is in decline, then the Security Council should be authorizing fewer practices consistent with both bargains.

Finally, I summarize four arguments about what post–Cold War Security Council practices can tell us about the liberal order. First, the hegemonic bargain has often influenced the Charter bargain. Second, the Charter bargain has also limited the scope of the hegemonic bargain. Third, post–Cold War Security Council practices do not show a liberal order in decline. Fourth, if we understand the liberal order as the interaction between these two bargains, then post–Cold War Security Council practices suggest an alternative to the decline narrative. What many call a decline in the liberal order may instead be a renegotiation between the Charter bargain and the hegemonic bargain. The liberal order may be changing so that the Charter bargain has more influence and the hegemonic bargain has less influence, but that is distinct from a decline (and implied possible fall) of the liberal order. Post–Cold War Security Council practices provide an alternative to the decline narrative by illustrating the dynamics between these two bargains and suggesting a greater resiliency for the liberal order.

Global Orders

The *liberal order* refers to rules and institutions grounded in five Enlightenment arguments about how to achieve global security.[10] First, the liberal order presumes that trade not only leads to economic growth, but also reduces the likelihood of conflict and war.[11] Second, the liberal order presumes the "democratic peace thesis" that democracies do not go to war with each other.[12] Third, the liberal order presumes that countries with good human rights records are less likely to suffer civil wars or engage in armed conflict with each other.[13] Fourth, the liberal order presumes that international law and adherence to common rules, particularly humanitarian rules about war crimes, helps reduce conflict.[14] Finally, the liberal order pre-

sumes that multilateral cooperation through international organizations contributes to global security.[15] The liberal order presumes the legitimacy of these five Enlightenment paths to global security: trade, democracy, human rights, international law, and international organizations.

The liberal order also emphasizes interdependence. It presumes that the main threats to global security are transnational issues such as climate change, disease, economic instability, refugees, weapons proliferation, terrorism, crime, and ideologies such as authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism. These transnational threats create security interdependence—all states have common security interests, and no one state can achieve security against these threats through its own efforts. Even the most powerful countries cannot rely on military capability alone to achieve security against these transnational threats. Even the most powerful countries must cooperate with others to address them. Therefore, the solution to security interdependence is global governance. Within the liberal order, states recognize that they need to create institutions and follow rules to address interdependence and manage transnational security threats.

The liberal order includes organizations committed to maintaining an open economy such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. It includes a myriad of international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It includes important principles of international law such as freedom of navigation and the protection of civilians during armed conflicts. It includes human rights treaties and norms about "the Responsibility to Protect." It includes agreed-on rules regarding the environment, aviation, the internet, disease, terrorism, financial stability, weapons of mass destruction, transnational crime, and many other areas of world politics. It provides states with dispute resolution mechanisms, security guarantees, shared knowledge, and resources in times of crisis.[16]

Advocates of the liberal order argue that it has been spectacularly successful.[17] It contained Soviet expansionism and managed a peaceful end to the Cold War. It integrated former enemies Germany and Japan during the Cold War and expanded dramatically after the Cold War ended. The number of interstate wars declined. There have been no wars between great powers. Western Europe ended centuries of rivalry and forged the European Union. Economic growth, global trade, and financial flows skyrocketed. Colonial empires in Africa and Asia ended for the most part. The number of democracies, treaties, and international organizations greatly increased. Human rights norms strengthened. Global poverty dramatically decreased, and the education and health of citizens around the world increased. The post–World War II liberal order has led to dramatically improved indicators of human progress, clearly decreasing conflict, poverty, and authoritarianism

since 1945. The countries with the most conflict, poverty, and authoritarianism remain those that have not fully embraced the liberal order.

The liberal order, however, is not the only order in world politics. World politics is constituted by multiple orders that reconcile sovereignty (emphasized by realist theories), interdependence (emphasized by liberal theories), and hierarchy (emphasized by critical theories). A particular order privileges one over the others, but all three remain within each order. For example, the liberal order privileges interdependence, but elements of sovereignty remain in the Charter bargain and elements of hierarchy remain in the hegemonic bargain. The liberal order was built on existing Westphalian orders that privileged sovereignty and imperial orders that privileged hierarchy. The liberal order may have displaced the prominence of sovereignty and hierarchy, of Westphalia and empire, but those orders both helped shape the liberal order and remain important alternatives to it.

Westphalian orders emphasize sovereignty and the existence of modern states. While *sovereignty* generally refers to the exclusive authority of a state over a population within specified territorial boundaries, it has multiple dimensions. While scholars differ on the most salient dimensions,[18] I focus on four: (1) recognition, (2) control, (3) autonomy, and (4) legitimacy. First, sovereignty refers to states mutually recognizing each other as equals, enabling states to make agreements with each other. Sovereign states sign—and refuse to sign—treaties. Second, sovereignty refers to the ability of a state to control what goes on within its borders. Sovereign states protect themselves from foreign threats, maintain domestic order, regulate their economies, provide public goods, and decide what crosses their borders. Third, sovereignty refers to the capacity of states to exclude others from interfering in domestic and foreign policy making. Sovereign states are autonomous because no external actors exercise authority within their borders. Fourth, sovereignty refers to states having some form of legitimacy. This may be internal, where the people within the territory consider the leaders to have rightful authority. Or it may be external, where recognition and support from others grant a state legitimacy.

States rarely achieve all four dimensions of sovereignty because they are at odds with interdependence and hierarchy. There are countless examples. Hierarchy can prevent recognition for some groups that aspire to sovereign statehood (Palestinians, Kurds, etc.). Interdependence can prevent control over what goes on within borders (carbon emissions and climate change, global financial markets and currency values, global pandemics and public health, technology and unemployment rates, etc.). Hierarchy can prevent autonomy over decisionmaking (the Warsaw Pact, peace agreements forced on defeated countries, conditional IMF loans, etc.). Interdependence can prevent legitimacy (the diffusion of liberal human rights norms, the designation of states as "rogues," etc.).

Interdependence and hierarchy also pit the dimensions of sovereignty against each other. For example, to increase control over environmental outcomes within their borders, states may sacrifice autonomy and agree to climate change rules. States may increase control within their borders with police and military practices that reduce their legitimacy. States may increase their legitimacy by reducing their autonomy and agreeing to human rights norms. States may surrender control over foreign direct investment or the establishment of a military base within their borders to gain external recognition or legitimacy. Given such inherent tensions within the dimensions of sovereignty, states must make "sovereignty bargains" within all global orders.[19] These bargains increase some dimensions of sovereignty and decrease others. We can distinguish Westphalian, liberal, and imperial global orders by the nature of their sovereignty bargains.

Westphalian orders have sovereignty bargains that privilege autonomy. Realist arguments that states pursue "self-help" foreign policies to maintain security in an anarchical world also privilege the autonomy dimension of sovereignty.[20] The other dimensions of sovereignty remain important, but in Westphalian orders states are willing to sacrifice them when necessary to maximize autonomy. The autonomous pursuit of national security may lead to conflict to such an extent that others pull their ambassadors and withhold recognition. The autonomous pursuit of national security may preclude agreements with others that would help states control transnational forces within their borders. The autonomous pursuit of national security may lead states to ignore what external actors or domestic publics say is legitimate. In Westphalian orders, domestic political authorities are the only arbiters of legitimate behavior. The emphasis on autonomy means that there are no authority structures beyond territorial states. The most important rules are noninterference in domestic affairs and territorial integrity. Westphalian orders require low levels of interdependence, the predominance of authoritarian governments, cultural and economic diversity that prevents cooperation, and a cost-benefit analysis that makes periodic resort to wars tolerable.[21]

In liberal orders, states recognize the extent to which increasing interdependence reduces control over what goes on within their borders. They are unable to deal with issues such as climate change, terrorism, economic instability, and disease by acting autonomously. States are therefore willing to decrease autonomy to increase control over political, economic, and environmental outcomes within their borders. Cooperation to manage interdependence and increase control by definition reduces autonomy. Liberal orders alter the meanings of "nonintervention" and "domestic affairs." What states do within their borders (harbor terrorists, build nuclear weapons, commit genocide and create refugees, emit carbon, etc.) reduces the ability of other states to control what happens within their borders. Liberal orders

therefore violate Westphalian autonomy by creating authority structures beyond territorial states—they sacrifice autonomy for control.[22]

Liberal orders also shift recognition practices. In nonliberal orders, recognition of others is not necessarily universal. Within spheres of influence, great-power concerts, protectorates, or empires, not all states are equal.[23] Powerful states coerce others into certain arrangements—this aspect of recognition overlaps with autonomy. In liberal orders, recognition approaches universality. All states enjoy a legal notion of sovereign equality—they can join international organizations, vote in the UN General Assembly, sign treaties, engage in open economic markets, receive foreign aid, and make claims in international courts. The Charter bargain institutionalizes universal recognition—when states join the United Nations, they benefit from the Security Council obligation to protect their territorial integrity.

Liberal orders also shift legitimacy practices. In Westphalian orders, legitimacy is often limited to internal notions of top-down, traditional absolutism. Sovereignty resides with the "sovereign." In liberal orders, legitimacy shifts in two important ways.[24] First, internal legitimacy tends to reside in bottom-up notions of popular sovereignty. Legitimacy may be reconfigured by domestic groups that insist sovereignty include not just rights, but also responsibilities toward the environment or human rights. Liberal orders are partially extensions of the modern democratic state—as states become more liberal, then what counts as a legitimate sovereignty bargain changes.[25] Liberal states bandwagon with, rather than balance—let alone go to war—against other democracies. They cooperate through international organizations. They may even pursue "pooled sovereignty" over certain issue areas, as in the EU. The second important shift is that external factors are often sources of legitimacy. Liberal norms diffuse and influence others. States agree to international monitoring to show compliance with global rules and avoid sanctions. Recognition from other states is partially contingent on following legitimate rules. States want others to interpret them as responsible and civilized, not a rogue. All of this, of course, reduces autonomy—but it also reduces levels of interstate conflict.[26]

Imperial orders emphasize hierarchy. They lead to coercive sovereignty bargains that have different recognition, control, autonomy, and legitimacy rules for superordinate and subordinate states. Some bargains are neither mutually beneficial nor consensual. Some bargains do not recognize every state as equal. Some bargains increase the control and autonomy of superordinate states and reduce the control and autonomy of subordinate states. In imperial orders, superordinate states impose policies and institutions on subordinate states. They may even impose personnel and engage in regime change. At the extreme, an empire may establish only one authority structure. From a Westphalian perspective, it is difficult to characterize subordinate states within an imperial order as "sovereign." This hierarchical

arrangement leads to different legitimacy practices for superordinate and subordinate states. For those at the top of the hierarchy, legitimate practices pursue order and attempt to perpetuate the hierarchy. For those at the bottom of the hierarchy, legitimate practices pursue justice and attempt to undermine the hierarchy. This tension between order and justice creates inherent sources of instability and conflict in all imperial orders.

The postwar liberal order included two sovereignty bargains. The Charter bargain established one form of liberal order. It presumed the centrality of interdependence. States agreed to reduce their autonomy to increase recognition and control. States agreed to alter legitimacy toward bottom-up notions of popular sovereignty. The central Charter agreement was to cooperate through a collective security organization rather than alliance systems to provide for global security. The major powers reduced their autonomy by accepting an obligation to maintain global security and abide by Charter rules. In return, the Charter bargain provided the major powers with more control over global security and a privileged place within a legitimate international organization. Similarly, UN member states reduced their autonomy by agreeing to comply with Security Council resolutions. In return, the Charter bargain provided member states with a security guarantee that increased their recognition, control, and legitimacy. Within the logic of liberal orders—sacrifice autonomy for more control—this was a win-win sovereignty bargain cementing the (procedural) legitimacy of the Security Council. The Charter bargain institutionalized consent for one liberal form of order.

While the Charter bargain was a form of liberal order, it also included Westphalian content. Its explicit purpose was to protect the territorial integrity of states. It recognized noninterference in domestic affairs as an important principle. It did not explicitly recognize a plethora of transnational security threats. It allowed for uses of force in self-defense and the formation of alliances. It did not require any automaticity to trigger Security Council action; authorizing collective security practices was a political judgment rather than a legal requirement. It included the veto, which protected great-power autonomy and prevented the Charter bargain from imposing unwanted obligations on them. (The veto was also a form of hierarchy—the Charter bargain, while prioritizing interdependence, had elements of sovereignty and hierarchy embedded within it.) If the Charter bargain had constituted the entire liberal order, then it would have been a thin one that often resembled a Westphalian order.

However, a second bargain also partially constituted the liberal order and ultimately influenced states' interpretation of what the Charter bargain required. The hegemonic bargain was first struck by the United States and its immediate allies during and after World War II. Similar to the Charter bargain, both the United States and its allies sacrificed autonomy to gain

more control, recognition, and legitimacy. The United States agreed to provide for security through free trade, democracy, human rights, international law, and international organizations. In return, the United States gained many hegemonic privileges within the liberal order. The allies agreed to support US policies, and in return gained a security guarantee from the liberal hegemon. The hegemonic bargain differed from the Charter bargain regarding the source of legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Charter bargain stemmed from a procedural notion of fairness—Security Council practices protected the territorial integrity of all states. The legitimacy of the hegemonic bargain stemmed from a substantive consensus that states should achieve global security through explicitly liberal paths to order. The hegemonic bargain often influenced the Charter bargain, and this substantive notion of legitimacy often required the Security Council to fulfill its mandate by authorizing explicitly liberal practices.

The interactions between these two bargains constituted the liberal order, and Security Council practices illustrated this dynamic.[27] Security Council practices were procedurally fair and substantively liberal. States perpetuated the liberal order by accepting the legitimacy of those practices. The P5 perpetuated the liberal order by authorizing Security Council practices because doing so maintained their privileged status within the liberal order. These bargains limited the autonomy of the P5. UN member states could hold the P5 accountable if they violated the bargains by withholding their consent and threatening to end the bargains. The P5 thus acted with restraint in anticipation of resistance if they violated the bargains. The P5 routinely argued that Security Council practices were consistent with UN Charter principles and international law.[28] They engaged in public deliberations and provided public reasons for their actions.[29] Their agendas addressed the most significant conflicts that generated more deaths and refugees.[30] The P5 knew that if states interpreted Security Council practices as pursuing their narrow national interests, then they risked losing their privileged position within the liberal order.[31]

The differences between the two bargains, however, created many tensions within the liberal order. The Charter bargain obligated the P5 to provide for global security, and the hegemonic bargain obligated the United States to do so. The Charter bargain was universal, and the hegemonic bargain was limited to those who embraced it. The Charter bargain did not obligate the Security Council to authorize explicitly liberal paths to security. Of course, two P5 members were authoritarian states skeptical of liberal solutions to global conflict. States could therefore reconcile the tensions between these bargains in three different ways:

1. Emphasize the Charter bargain over the hegemonic bargain and limit the scope of the liberal order. If this consistently occurred, then the

liberal order would increasingly resemble a Westphalian order. This is the decline narrative. In this scenario, the Security Council would authorize fewer liberal practices over time.

2. Implement the Charter bargain in ways consistent with the hegemonic bargain. If this consistently occurred, then such practices would perpetuate the liberal order. In this scenario, the Security Council would routinely authorize liberal practices over time.
3. Emphasize the hegemonic bargain over the Charter bargain and enforce the liberal order outside the procedures of the UN. If this consistently occurred, then the liberal order would increasingly resemble an imperial order. In this scenario, the Security Council would also authorize fewer liberal practices over time.

The interaction of these two bargains is the key to understanding the possibilities of change within the liberal order.[32] The two bargains must influence each other to perpetuate the liberal order. What we call the "liberal order" is the combination of the hegemonic bargain expanding the scope of the Charter bargain, and the Charter bargain limiting the scope of the hegemonic bargain. When the hegemonic bargain does not influence the Charter bargain, world politics resembles realist rivalry—this is the decline narrative. When the hegemonic bargain acts unchecked by the Charter bargain, world politics resembles empire. When the Security Council consistently and routinely authorizes liberal policies, we have evidence that the two bargains are indeed influencing each other. Analyzing Security Council practices is therefore one way to evaluate the health of the liberal order and the plausibility of the decline narrative.

Evaluating the Decline Narrative

Many scholars argue that the liberal order is in decline.[33] They argue that the decline spans all five aspects of the liberal order. The number of democracies around the world has started to fall. The amount of trade as a percentage of the global economy has declined. Human rights levels around the world are, at best, stagnant. Powerful countries seem more willing to ignore international law and leave international organizations when necessary to maximize autonomy and pursue their national interests. China has increased its authoritarianism, asserted itself regionally, and offered an alternative nonliberal bargain to developing countries. Russia has invaded neighbors, poisoned dissidents, undermined Western democracies, and engaged in cyberwarfare against critical Western infrastructure. The decline struck the heart of the liberal order, with the United Kingdom leaving the EU and the United States electing a president openly hostile to that order.

Donald Trump's America First policies of trade wars, weakened alliances, and broken agreements clearly undermined the liberal order. The decline narrative asserts that we may be entering an era in which some combination of sovereignty and regional hierarchies replace interdependence as the dominant source of global order.

The decline narrative cites four general sources of crisis within the liberal order. The first source is liberal economic policy, which has led to painful transitions and rising inequality.[34] The financial crisis of 2008 illustrated the inherent economic instability within the liberal order and exposed the United States as the source of that instability. After decades of wage stagnation, many Western citizens have concluded that the liberal order has not benefited them. The second source is the rise of nationalism and populism around the world.[35] These movements prioritize national over international law; undermine human rights with criticisms of minorities, refugees, and foreigners; cooperate with authoritarian regimes and violate democratic norms; and withdraw from free-trade agreements. The third source is the shift in economic and military power from West to East.[36] The liberal order cannot survive the erosion of US hegemonic power and the rise of China.[37] China will increasingly assert "vital interests" in its neighborhood and attempt to alter the rules of global order—enabling mercantilist economic policies, weakening the promotion of democracy and human rights, and resisting humanitarian intervention. The fourth source is a "crisis of authority" from the US failure to support the liberal order.[38] The United States has violated the liberal order in numerous ways—waging an aggressive war in Iraq, rejecting numerous treaties, criticizing the International Criminal Court, protecting Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, and violating international law in its global war on terrorism. Trump openly preferred a Westphalian order—the primacy of the nation-state, praise for authoritarians, economic nationalism, and weakening US commitments to democratic allies.[39]

Realist theorists of world politics argue that the liberal order was destined to fail.[40] Realists advocate the pursuit of order through a global balance of power. Realists criticize liberal institutions as ineffective because they expect states to emphasize autonomy in their pursuit of national interests. They do not expect states to act collectively and address common security threats, let alone enforce liberal rules such as democracy, war crimes, and human rights. For realists, the liberal order was ripe for a nationalist backlash. All liberal orders sacrifice autonomy for more control, but the populist critique is that the current liberal order has not delivered more control. Despite delegating state autonomy to international organizations, the result has been less control over economic outcomes and an inability to prevent the flow of goods, refugees, and immigrants across borders. The liberal order has also facilitated the rise of nonliberal challengers such as China who do not follow many basic rules. For many realists, states

have no choice but to abandon the liberal order and strategically balance against nonliberal challengers such as China and Russia. They expect an eventual return to a Westphalian order.

Critical theorists argue that hierarchy is the most important form of global order. For critical theorists, the liberal order is fundamentally hierarchical, the most recent form of colonialism and empire.[41] Liberal rules about trade and markets favor the interests of the rich. Liberal rules about democracy and human rights favor the West and represent "cultural imperialism" toward the non-Western world. The liberal order justifies powerful states engaging in regime change against nonliberal states and putting compliant leaders in power. For critical theorists, liberal institutions coerce subordinate states, and their illegitimacy opens a path to alternative global orders. They expect states to withhold their consent from the liberal order and criticize it as coercive, unjust, and hypocritical. While they also expect the decline of the liberal order, it is unclear what is likely to replace it.[42]

In this book, I evaluate the decline narrative by analyzing the post–Cold War practices of the Security Council.[43] The Security Council is an excellent indicator for the extent to which the two bargains constitute the liberal order. It is the institutional manifestation of the Charter bargain. Its practices are legitimate because the Charter bargain is procedurally legitimate within the liberal order. However, the Security Council has also invoked the hegemonic bargain and relied on international law, human rights, and democracy to resolve post–Cold War conflicts. To maintain its legitimacy within the post–Cold War liberal order, the Security Council has increasingly authorized explicitly liberal practices regarding war crimes, human rights, and democracy. We can therefore evaluate the health of the liberal order by analyzing Security Council practices. How often has the Security Council authorized practices consistent with each bargain? Has the Security Council authorized fewer liberal practices in recent years? Have states increasingly criticized the authorization of liberal practices in recent years? If the liberal order is in decline, then the Security Council should provide evidence for that decline.

I looked for that evidence in two ways. First, I developed the Collective Security Dataset (CSD), an original dataset of Security Council practices for 1990–2020, to evaluate whether the number of liberal practices authorized by the Security Council have decreased. How often did it uphold the Charter bargain and authorize practices to maintain global security? How often did it authorize the pursuit of global security through Enlightenment paths to order such as democracy, human rights, and international law? If the liberal order was in decline, then the number of liberal practices authorized by the Security Council should have decreased. Second, I analyzed every speech given by a Security Council member during 1990–2020 justifying an abstention or a no vote to evaluate whether the number of realist and critical theory objections to

liberal practices have increased. How often did UN member states criticize proposed liberal practices with nonliberal arguments? If the liberal order was in decline, then the percentage of nonliberal arguments on the Security Council should have increased.

What are the liberal practices of the Security Council? What is evidence that the Security Council has perpetuated the liberal order? There are two forms of liberal global governance—collective security and capacity building—and the Security Council engages in both. Collective security punishes agents who break important rules. It engages in three types of practices: (1) prohibit, (2) monitor, and (3) enforce. Capacity building encourages agents to follow important rules. It also engages in three types of practices: (1) establish a norm, (2) monitor, and (3) support. Most Security Council practices are either capacity building or collective security and are thus liberal. When it creates a commission of inquiry, condemns a terrorist attack, or mediates a conflict, the Security Council engages in liberal practices. When the Security Council fulfills the Charter bargain to maintain global security, it authorizes liberal practices. One way to evaluate the decline narrative is to analyze whether the Security Council has authorized fewer liberal practices in recent years.

Sometimes the Security Council engages in "core liberal practices" that go beyond the Charter bargain and invoke the explicitly liberal rules consistent with the hegemonic bargain. Two distinctions constitute core liberal practices. One is collective security versus capacity building, with collective security as the core liberal practice. The other is the assertion of explicitly liberal rules to resolve conflicts. Sometimes the Security Council asserts that agents must stop shooting at each other, or stop harboring terrorists, or stop building nuclear weapons. These are important collective security practices addressing threats to global security, but they do not assert explicitly liberal rules. Sometimes, though, the Security Council asserts that parties to an armed conflict must stop using child soldiers. It authorizes peacekeeping missions to monitor human rights violations. It encourages states to strengthen democratic institutions and respect election results. It authorizes the use of force to protect civilians during an armed conflict. The Security Council engages in core liberal practices, then, when it pursues collective security to prohibit, monitor, and enforce rules about democracy, human rights, and war crimes. When the Security Council authorizes core liberal practices, it goes beyond the Charter bargain and instead invokes the liberal aspects of the hegemonic bargain. The authorization of core liberal practices is evidence that the hegemonic bargain has influenced the Charter bargain, and the Security Council has perpetuated the liberal order. One way to evaluate the decline narrative is to analyze whether the Security Council has authorized fewer core liberal practices in recent years.

A second way to evaluate the decline narrative is to analyze Security Council debates. When states object to a Security Council resolution, how often do they provide nonliberal reasons? Consistent with realism, how often do they assert that the Security Council should not authorize a liberal practice because states prefer autonomy and have a right to pursue their national security interests? Consistent with critical theory, how often do they assert that the Security Council should not authorize a liberal practice because it is an unjust, imperial coercion? States, however, could also object for a liberal reason—they may prefer capacity building to collective security, or they may prefer to authorize an alternative collective security practice. Security Council debates are important sites of rule construction and contestation. Saying no to a resolution may or may not undermine the liberal order. One way to evaluate the decline narrative is to analyze whether states have increasingly made nonliberal criticisms of Security Council practices in recent years.

The Arguments

Understanding the liberal order as the interaction between two bargains is consistent with a constructivist approach to world politics. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical framework for this project. Chapter 2 discusses a constructivist approach that focuses on rules and language. It argues that we can analyze speech acts to evaluate whether states have invoked liberal or nonliberal rules on the Security Council. It provides a constructivist understanding of liberalism, realism, and critical theory as competing theories of world politics asserting the importance of different "security arrangements." A linguistic analysis of Security Council speeches can tell us whether states have invoked realist rules of rivalry, critical theory rules of empire, or liberal rules of collective security and capacity building. Chapter 3 explores liberal, realist, and critical theory arguments about Security Council collective security practices and generates specific coding rules for the speech act analyses of Security Council debates.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide the bulk of the data used to evaluate the decline narrative. Chapter 4 explores the CSD results about Security Council practices during 1990–2020. The CSD identifies certain practices as "liberal" and "core liberal" to evaluate whether the Security Council has authorized fewer liberal practices over time. The summary results show the great extent to which the Security Council authorized liberal practices throughout the post–Cold War period. This chapter also analyzes the CSD results over time and argues that they do not support the decline narrative. Chapter 5 presents the results of the speech act analysis of every Security Council member justifying an abstention or a no vote for 1990–2020.

Once again, neither the overall results nor the trends over time support the decline narrative. While some of the results reflect the warning signs cited by the advocates of the decline narrative, the bulk of the results do not clearly show that the influence of the hegemonic bargain on the Charter bargain is dropping precipitously.

Chapters 6 through 8 each focus on a fundamental aspect of the liberal order—war crimes, human rights, and democracy. The empirical results in Chapters 4 and 5 show different trends across these categories, and Chapters 6 through 8 explain those variations. Security Council practices regarding war crimes provide the strongest evidence for the continued resiliency of the liberal order, and Chapter 6 explains those results by analyzing use of force mandates to protect civilians during the post–Cold War era. The protection of civilians is not inherent to the Charter bargain—the Security Council could address the territorial integrity of states without such mandates. More generally, the Security Council could deal with armed conflict without addressing war crimes or trying to enforce international humanitarian law. However, the protection of civilians is now a taken-for-granted norm. No one says that addressing war crimes is beyond the jurisdiction of the Security Council. The liberal aspects of the hegemonic bargain have influenced the Charter bargain. The Security Council has routinely pursued this liberal path to peace, and those practices have not decreased in recent years.

Chapter 7 addresses human rights. The Security Council asserted more human rights violations during 1990–2020 than terrorism and weapons of mass destruction violations combined. This is perhaps the most surprising CSD finding—why would Russia and China agree to so many assertions of human rights violations? This seems to provide additional evidence of the hegemonic bargain influencing the Charter bargain. Chapter 7 provides a nuanced explanation of those results. The answer is that the Security Council has increasingly applied human rights rules to armed conflicts. This is an excellent example of the interaction between the two bargains. Russia and China have indeed kept the classic liberal notion of human rights off the Security Council agenda. The Security Council has not asserted human rights violations in a typical domestic situation outside the context of an armed conflict. It has not authorized sanctions against states that tortured political prisoners or discriminated against religious minorities. This is an important example of the Charter bargain limiting the scope of the liberal order. However, Russia and China have also agreed to assert human rights violations during armed conflicts to buttress the protection of civilians norm, as discussed in Chapter 6. The power of the civilian protection norm has led to an innovative use of human rights law. Russia and China have not disputed the legitimacy of that liberal practice.

Chapter 8 addresses democracy. The CSD results for democracy practices provide possible evidence for the decline narrative. Security Council

collective security practices asserting democracy violations were not routine. It did so on only seven agenda items, and they have dwindled to zero in recent years. Perhaps we should compartmentalize our evaluation of the decline narrative into different issue areas. However, Chapter 8 focuses on the distinction between collective security and capacity building practices to promote democracy. The Security Council has pursued capacity building practices regarding democracy more often, and those practices have not declined in recent years. The chapter discusses the continued use of democracy promotion mandates in peacekeeping operations and argues that capacity building is the more appropriate form of global governance for democracy promotion. Since capacity building practices have not declined, then perhaps a decline in collective security practices regarding democracy is not strong evidence for the decline narrative.

Chapter 9 discusses the roles of Russia and China in undermining the liberal order. The CSD results show that Russia and China have increasingly voted against Security Council practices in recent years. The speech act results show that both have increasingly used nonliberal justifications for their objections. The chapter includes the examples of Syria and Ukraine, the post–Cold War cases that most easily support the decline narrative because Russia and China directly challenged the liberal order and prevented the authorization of any significant liberal practices by the Security Council. The debates over Syria and Ukraine were not about the tensions between the two bargains. They were about whether to invoke any form of liberal order at all. During those debates, however, Russia and China had little support on the Security Council. When they challenged the legitimacy of the liberal order, most Council members defended that order.

Chapter 10 discusses the three ways that the United States could undermine the liberal order. First, the United States could violate its commitment within the hegemonic bargain to act with restraint through multilateral institutions, as in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Second, the United States could protect others when they violate the liberal order, as in its Security Council vetoes protecting Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. Third, the United States could violate its commitment to provide for global security and simply walk away from the liberal order, as in the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal. The chapter explores all three cases, but also focuses on how other states reacted to the United States. The Security Council debates show that states rarely supported the United States with realist arguments; the few states that did support the United States made liberal arguments. Importantly, even those that criticized the United States were also more likely to use liberal arguments, imploring the United States to remain within the Charter bargain. Overall, the cases illustrated the resiliency of the liberal order.

When the United States acted in nonliberal ways, most states responded with a defense of the liberal order.

The analysis of post–Cold War Security Council practices presented in these chapters support four arguments. First, *the hegemonic bargain has often influenced the Charter bargain.* The Security Council has gone far beyond the original Charter bargain to act as a traditional collective security system to protect the territorial integrity of states. Many of its practices were consistent with liberal arguments about how to achieve security in an interdependent world.[44] It has recognized numerous transnational threats to global security. It has asserted rules obligating all states beyond the circumstances of any one conflict. It has dealt with civil wars and armed conflict using explicitly liberal approaches to global order, asserting more violations of war crimes, human rights, and democracy rules than other rules (Chapter 4). Resolutions that authorized higher numbers of liberal and core liberal practices were significantly more likely to pass. When the Security Council asserted violations of core liberal rules, it was significantly more likely to authorize enforcement measures. It has altered peacekeeping norms of consent, self-defense, and neutrality to enhance the protection of civilians during armed conflict (Chapter 6). It has applied human rights law to armed conflict to further bolster the protection of civilians (Chapter 7). It has mandated peacekeeping missions to monitor democratic governance as a routine postwar conflict resolution strategy (Chapter 8). Even states that criticized these practices were more likely to use liberal than nonliberal reasons for doing so (Chapter 5).

These practices were not necessary to fulfill the Charter bargain. However, the Security Council often invoked the liberal rules consistent with the hegemonic bargain and expanded its set of legitimate practices to pursue global security.[45] The Security Council has routinely responded to criticisms of its practices by strengthening the liberal nature of those practices. There are many examples: expanding its agenda into transnational security threats; imposing general obligations unrelated to a particular conflict regarding terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; authorizing war crimes tribunals; using "smart sanctions" rather than comprehensive trade embargoes to avoid humanitarian crises;[46] emphasizing proportionality so that sanctions do not violate human rights protections;[47] using sunset clauses on sanctions so that one veto power cannot keep sanctions going indefinitely; improving due process standards for individuals targeted by sanctions;[48] and improving the transparency of its working methods.[49] The Security Council perpetuated the liberal order when the hegemonic bargain influenced the Charter bargain, and the Security Council routinely did so during the post–Cold War era.

Second, *the Charter bargain has also limited the scope of the hegemonic bargain*. The influence of the Charter bargain on the hegemonic bar-

gain is also necessary to perpetuate the liberal order. The logic of the hegemonic bargain is potentially coercive; the hegemonic bargain unchecked by the Charter bargain can resemble an imperial order. Nonliberal states have sometimes used the Charter bargain to prevent the Security Council from pursuing liberal practices. For example, the Security Council has not pursued classic liberal arguments about human rights and authorized enforcement measures against authoritarian states due only to oppressive policies against their own citizens (Chapter 7). It also has not followed the logic of the democratic peace and authorized enforcement measures against authoritarian states for the sole reason of preventing free elections and peaceful transfers of power (Chapter 8). Most importantly, the Charter bargain's emphasis on state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in domestic affairs has prevented the legitimization of regime change. This part of the interaction between the two bargains is essential to the perpetuation of the liberal order. The logic of the hegemonic bargain can lead to the pursuit of regime change without Security Council authorization. The liberal order cannot consistently prefer the hegemonic bargain over the Charter bargain without resembling empire.

Chapters 6 through 8 also include case studies on Darfur, Libya, and Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate these dynamics between the bargains. In Darfur, the Charter bargain limited the scope of the hegemonic bargain when states invoked capacity building practices to deal with the long-standing civil war in Sudan rather than collective security practices to deal with war crimes in Darfur. When a comprehensive peace agreement ended the civil war, the Security Council then increased its collective security practices regarding Darfur. In Libya, the hegemonic bargain influenced the Charter bargain, and a concern for human rights led the Security Council to authorize the use of force to protect civilians. The ensuing NATO operation stretched its use of force mandate and facilitated regime change, leading Russia and China to conclude that in this case the Charter bargain had failed to limit the imperial potential of the liberal order. Determined to prevent future Western practices that resembled empire, they prevented even Charter authorization for liberal practices in Syria. In Côte d'Ivoire, the hegemonic bargain influenced the Charter bargain, and the Security Council intervened to ensure that an authoritarian leader did not steal an election. Once again, the logic of the hegemonic bargain can lead to regime change. But in this rare example, the Charter bargain provided its procedural legitimacy, leaving much less space to criticize those practices as hierarchical.

Third, *post–Cold War Security Council practices do not clearly show a liberal order in decline*. Some of the evidence presented here could be consistent with the decline narrative. Russia and China have increasingly objected to Security Council practices and used nonliberal reasons for doing so. Collective security enforcement of democracy rules has dwindled.

There is no plausible way to argue that the liberal order survived the Trump years unscathed. However, thirty years of data show upward slopes for many liberal practices, including asserted war crimes violations, asserted human rights violations, enforcement measures, and liberal peacekeeping mandates (Chapter 4). Thirty years of speeches by states not consenting to resolutions show that they had liberal reasons most of the time, including in recent years (Chapter 5). When powerful states such as Russia (Chapter 8) or the United States (Chapter 9) have challenged the liberal order—whether in Syria, Ukraine, or Iraq—most states on the Security Council have defended its legitimacy. The bulk of the data suggests the continued resiliency of the liberal order.

Finally, *these arguments suggest an alternative to the decline narrative.* We can understand contemporary world politics not as a decline in the liberal order, but as a process of renegotiation between the two bargains. After the hegemonic bargain dramatically expanded the scope of the Charter bargain throughout much of the post–Cold War era, the pendulum is starting to swing in the other direction. A narrative about a renegotiated liberal order with a more prominent place for the Charter bargain (and its Westphalian content) may not seem much different from the decline narrative. However, the narratives are distinct in what they suggest about the scope and nature of the ongoing changes and the range of possible destinations. Simply put, the decline narrative suggests that fundamental changes are occurring, including the possible end of the liberal order and the emergence of nonliberal orders. The renegotiation narrative suggests that the ongoing changes are squarely within the normal politics of the liberal order. In this book, I argue that we have good reasons to problematize the decline narrative and consider the renegotiation narrative.

A renegotiated liberal order in which the Charter bargain plays a larger role is still a liberal order. The Charter bargain remains a form of liberal order with a sovereignty bargain unlike Westphalian and imperial orders. Within the Charter bargain, states sacrifice autonomy to pursue more control over interdependence—the fundamental characteristic of all liberal orders. The Charter bargain engages in both capacity building and collective security practices. Most importantly, a renegotiated liberal order is not the same thing as an order in which the hegemonic bargain no longer influences the Charter bargain. As the Security Council practices analyzed in this book suggest, the hegemonic bargain continues to influence the Charter bargain. Many liberal arguments remain taken for granted, including the interdependent nature of our gravest security threats, the necessity of cooperation to address those threats, the moral imperative to punish war crimes and protect civilians during armed conflicts, and encouraging democracy in post-conflict situations. Few states advocate a nonliberal order based on either great-power rivalry or empire. All of this complicates the decline narrative.[50]

The renegotiation narrative also provides for a possibility not considered by the decline narrative. Earlier in this chapter, I listed three ways that states could reconcile the tensions between the two bargains: (1) by emphasizing the Charter bargain over the hegemonic bargain; (2) by reinterpreting the Charter bargain in ways consistent with the hegemonic bargain; and (3) by enforcing the hegemonic bargain outside the Charter bargain. The first option, over time, would resemble a Westphalian order. The second option, over time, would perpetuate the liberal order. The third option, over time, would resemble an imperial order. The decline narrative suggests significant movement from (2) to (1). One way to understand the renegotiation narrative is that the movement from (2) to (1) is not as significant as the decline narrative suggests. However, another possibility is that the movement could be from (3) to (2). That is, what many interpret as a decline in the liberal order could be a correction within the liberal order after too many attempts at imperial overreach outside the Charter bargain. Many non-Western states have this understanding of the contemporary world order.[51]

A final reason to complicate the decline narrative is normative. Sometimes a dominant narrative leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy. If enough agents believe in the inevitability of the end of the liberal order, they will adapt in ways that make the end even more likely. An end to the liberal order would mean that geopolitical power balancing or regional hierarchies would replace the pursuit of trade, democracy, human rights, and international law. It would mean not understanding interdependence as the essence of world politics. It would mean the end of multilateral cooperation to address transnational security threats such as climate change, disease, humanitarian disasters, and economic instability. It would mean the hollowing out of collective security organizations such as the WTO and the ICC. It would mean that Security Council practices return to Cold War patterns—vetoes, gridlock, a narrow agenda, and routine irrelevance. It would mean an increase in conflict, authoritarianism, and poverty. We should want to prevent that future. The renegotiation narrative suggests a greater resiliency for the liberal order. It creates more space for defending and perpetuating the liberal order. If we want to live in a decent world, then we need some form of a liberal order. Understanding our current situation as a renegotiation rather than a decline suggests that such a future is still more likely than not.

Renegotiations are linguistic debates about rules. Understanding our current situation as a renegotiation of the liberal order presumes that language and rules are central to world politics. The next chapter describes one type of constructivist approach to world politics that emphasizes the importance of language and rules. It provides the framework to justify why analyzing the Security Council can provide evidence about the state of the liberal order. Security Council practices directly illustrate when the hegemonic bargain has increased the scope of the Charter bargain and when the Charter bargain has

limited the scope of the hegemonic bargain. We are living through the current iteration of an ongoing renegotiation over the rules of world politics.

Notes

1. UN Security Council, Resolution 1160 (March 31, 1998).
2. UN Security Council, Resolution 1199 (September 23, 1998).
3. UN, Security Council, Meeting 3988 (March 24, 1999), 2–3.
4. UN, Security Council, Meeting 3988 (March 24, 1999), 12.
5. UN, Security Council, Meeting 3988 (March 24, 1999), 8–9.
6. UN, Security Council, Meeting 3988 (March 24, 1999), 11–12.
7. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report*.
8. The word "liberal" sometimes refers to a particular type of global order; sometimes to a theory of world politics; sometimes to a form of the modern democratic state. I hope the distinctions are clear given the context.
9. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*.
10. Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*.
11. McDonald, *The Invisible Hand of Peace;* Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace."
12. Gleditsch and Hegre, "Peace and Democracy."
13. Doyle, "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace."
14. Russett and O'Neal, *Triangulating Peace*.
15. Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory."
16. Ikenberry, "The Future of the Liberal World Order"; Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?"
17. Pinker, *Enlightenment Now*.
18. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," cites territory and autonomy; Litfin, "Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics," cites control, authority, and legitimacy; Caporaso, "Changes in the Westphalian Order," cites authority, territoriality, and citizenship.
19. Litfin, "Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics."
20. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.
21. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple."
22. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia."
23. Donnelly, "Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy."
24. Inoguchi and Bacon, "Sovereignties."
25. Navari, "States and State Systems."
26. Gill-Tiney, "A Liberal Peace?"
27. Scholars of legitimacy point to three sources: providing a stable order, using fair procedures, and acting according to shared norms. See Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society;* Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations;* Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations"; Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature"; Hurd, *After Anarchy*.
28. Beardsley and Schmidt, "Following the Flag or Following the Charter?"
29. Johnstone, "Security Council Deliberations."
30. Frederking and Patane, "Legitimacy and the UN Security Council Agenda."
31. Cronin and Hurd, *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority;* Johnstone, "Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council."
32. Caporaso, "Changes in the Westphalian Order."
33. Griffith, *Is This the End of the Liberal International Order?*; Haas, *A World in Disarray;* Maull, *The Rise and Decline of the Post–Cold War International*

Order; Cooley and Nexon, *Exit from Hegemony;* Mastanduno, "Liberal Hegemony, International Order, and US Foreign Policy"; Kacowicz, "The Problem of Peaceful Change Revisited"; Davis and Slobodchikoff, *Cultural Imperialism and the Decline of the Liberal Order;* Hendrickson, *Republic in Peril;* Mullerson, *Dawn of a New Order;* Acharya, *The End of American World Order*.

34. Colgan and Keohane, "The Liberal Order Is Rigged."

35. Cooley and Nexon, "The Real Crisis of Global Order," 103–118.

36. Walt, "The End of the American Era."

37. Layne, "The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana."

38. Rampton and Nadaraja, "A Long View of the Liberal Peace and Its Crisis"; Niblett, "Liberalism in Retreat"; Jahn, "Liberal Internationalism."

39. Stokes, "Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of Liberal International Order."

40. Mearsheimer, "Bound to Fail," 7–50; Glaser, "A Flawed Framework," 51–87.

41. R. W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order;* Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change*.

42. Babic, "Let's Talk About the Interregnum."

43. Excellent accounts of the Security Council include: Bosco*, Five to Rule Them All;* Luck, *UN Security Council*; Malone, *Decision Making in the UN Security Council;* Fenton, *Understanding the UN Security Council;* von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte, *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century;* Wilson, *The United Nations and Collective Security*.

44. Westra, "Cumulative Legitimation, Prudential Restraint, and the Maintenance of International Order."

45. Reus-Smit, "International Crises of Legitimacy." For a rationalist approach to the legitimacy of the Security Council, see Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force."

46. Cortright and Lopez, "Are Sanctions Just?"

47. Jayakody, "Refining United Nations Security Council Targeted Sanctions."

48. Gehring and Dörfler, "Division of Labor and Rule-Based Decision-Making"; Heupel, "Multilateral Sanctions Against Terror Suspects."

49. Harrington, "The Working Methods of the United Nations Security Council."

50. Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?"; Duncombe and Dunne, "After Liberal World Order."

51. Clunan, "Russia and the Liberal World Order."