


EXCERPTED FROM

Asia-Pacific
Small States:
Political Economies
of Resilience

edited by
Stephen Noakes and
Alexander C. Tan

Copyright © 2023
ISBN: 978-1-955055-97-0 hc



LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

1800 30th Street, Suite 314
Boulder, CO 80301 USA
telephone 303.444.6684
fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the
Lynne Rienner Publishers website
www.rienner.com

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
1 Small States in Asia Pacific: Challenges Amid Great Power Competition <i>Stephen Noakes and Alexander C. Tan</i>	1
PART 1 NATIONAL EXPERIENCES	
2 Singapore: Relearning, Recovery, and Resilience <i>Benjamin Ho Tze Ern</i>	19
3 Aotearoa/New Zealand: Contentious Trade Relations with the PRC <i>Jason Young</i>	35
4 The Pacific Island States: Social and Solidarity-Based Economies <i>Steven Ratuva</i>	53
5 Taiwan: State and Private-Sector Cooperation <i>Frank Siedlok, Natasha Hamilton-Hart, and Hsiao-Chen Shen</i>	69
PART 2 PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY	
6 East Asia's Green Economic Recovery: A Path Out of the Coronacession <i>Sung-Young Kim</i>	97

7	Reforming the Global Supply Chain: A Taiwanese Perspective <i>Roy Lee</i>	117
8	Multilateralism and US Engagement: Generating New Pressures and Incentives <i>Charles Finny with Neel Vanvari</i>	149
9	Digital Regional Economic Integration: New Trade Agreements and Opportunities <i>Stephanie Honey</i>	171
PART 3 CONCLUSION		
10	Together, Alone: Economic Cooperation After the Pandemic <i>Stephen Noakes and Alexander C. Tan</i>	193
	<i>Bibliography</i>	201
	<i>The Contributors</i>	229
	<i>Index</i>	231
	<i>About the Book</i>	245

1

Small States in Asia Pacific: Challenges Amid Great Power Competition

Stephen Noakes and Alexander C. Tan

We can't afford to seal our borders off. For Singapore, you need food, you need fuel, you need people moving in and out . . . to the extent that you can while keeping ourselves safe.

—Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong, 2021

As we prepare for the postpandemic era, we need to continue to strengthen the partnership between government and business.

—Aotearoa/New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern, APEC Summit, 2021

As we battle Covid-19, I've had productive talks with @ScottMorrisonMP, President Xi, PM Suga, @jacindaardern, and my fellow Pacific leaders in support of Fiji's mission to save lives, sustain livelihoods, and spur an economic recovery alongside the rest of the world—not after.

—Fijian PM Vorque “Frank” Bainamarama, Twitter, 2021

We are focused on saving lives and saving livelihoods, and this new support package will provide much-needed care and help to so many Australians facing hardship at no fault of their own.

—Australian PM Scott Morrison, 2020

We have compiled these measures to maintain employment, sustain business, and restore the economy and open a way to achieve new growth in green and digital areas, so as to protect people's lives and livelihoods.

—Japanese PM Yoshihide Suga, 2020

THE WORLD IS STILL IN THE EARLY STAGES OF RECOVERING FROM THE Covid-19 pandemic. Since first surfacing in late 2019 in Wuhan, capital of the Chinese province of Hubei, the virus has gone global many times over, with successive mutations causing more than 6.7 million deaths and a total case count of approximately 650 million by the end of 2022.¹ Just as the Delta and Omicron waves appear to have crested and case numbers have begun to fall, health experts have warned that the pandemic is not over and that new variants may yet emerge with the potential to spread faster or lead to greater illness. As Ashley Bloomfield, Aotearoa/New Zealand's Director-General of Health, remarked: "Globally, it's likely there will continue to be further waves of Omicron, and likewise there will be new variants of concern, with unknown severity. And we will face those as other countries will. . . . All of this shows that while our current Omicron wave is receding, we clearly need to keep our wits about us."²

Disruptions caused by the pandemic extend well beyond the field of public health, however. All of the countries considered in this volume have experienced broader political concatenations, some of them severe, over issues such as mask mandates, whether immunization ought to be required to go out in public or in certain professions, the question of which vaccine ought to be used, the allocation of resources to fighting Covid-19 at the expense of illnesses with higher mortality rates, and the cancelation of major events (including in some cases the temporary postponement of national elections). Then there are the economic effects. These include major disruptions in national and international supply chains, damage to industries and sectors due to international border closures and falling revenue, and, for individuals and households, a spike in living costs resulting from steeply rising inflation.

This book examines these and other economic impacts of the still-unfolding Covid-19 pandemic in various national contexts across the Asia-Pacific region. It is motivated by three core questions: How have Asia-Pacific economies been affected by the pandemic, what were their coping strategies, and what are the prospects and problems confronting economic recovery and cooperation across the region? Our aim is to highlight consistencies and points of variation within and among small states of Asia Pacific, as well as to explore the potential for deepening post-pandemic integration.

We propose that Covid-19 has introduced fresh complications to economic recovery and cooperation in Asia Pacific in a variety of ways. Most important, the pandemic has stirred debate within states across the region as to what that recovery ought to look like, and what the most viable or desirable pathway to recovery might be. A key factor contributing to those debates is that while Covid-19 has brought economic hardship nearly everywhere, it has not been experienced the same way or to the same degree, within or among Asia-Pacific states. Nor did all states and peoples

within the region first encounter the pandemic on equitable economic footing. As a consequence, plans for recovery vary widely and are contested nearly everywhere, as the chapters of this volume show well.

These debates over post-pandemic recovery plans are occurring against the backdrop of a significant shift in regional geopolitics, namely the rise of China as a preeminent economic and strategic player and competitor with the United States. As the contributions included here demonstrate, great power competition generates pressures for small states and middle powers that fuel political discussions about recovery and shape the menu of policy options available. In some cases, the choices resulting from these debates have implications for national identity, with ripple effects that may have far-reaching diplomatic consequences. In other words, state-level conversations over resilience, recovery, and cooperation after Covid-19 are in essence domestic debates about international politics. Almost by default, this book is an examination of the interplay between the two.

We understand the contribution here as one small part of a wider debate over the nature and direction of globalization, one that is still far from resolved. Both Covid-19 and United States–China rivalry could be taken as signs that globalization is now in retreat. A still-fresh but growing body of scholarship has emerged on the issue of whether the pandemic, with all its disruptions to the free flow of people and goods across borders, may mean the end of economic globalization as we know it.³ Likewise, United States–China rivalry may for some signal the end of the unipolar order in place since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the reemergence of a bipolarity reminiscent of its preglobalization counterpart. In the past, major geopolitical shifts—such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or Deng Xiaoping’s initial reform and opening up of China—were accelerants to globalization. Might new developments in geopolitics (i.e., the ascendance of China to global power status), combined with conditions created by the pandemic, bring about its end, or at least slow it down, thus limiting near-term prospects for deepening Asia-Pacific cooperation?

One notable current of thought is that Covid-19 has been a catalyst for advancing trends already under way in the global economy.⁴ Much of this work specifically notes China’s growing economic importance and rivalry with the United States as a key long-term trend. Some also draw comparisons to the 2008 global financial crisis and speculate that Covid-19 is likely to have similarly delegitimizing effects on global capitalism.⁵ In this formulation, the pandemic, which arose relatively quickly and unexpectedly, meaningfully shapes and constrains post-pandemic recovery trajectories, but does not undo coincidental trends already in motion. It is an intervening variable, rather than a turning point. We too see the pandemic as a critical juncture in the evolution of Asia-Pacific economies, but one that

adds complexity to the preexisting pressures of United States–China strategic competition in the region, was already driving the calculus of small states, and would likely have done so whether the pandemic happened or not. Put another way, the pandemic is a moment of causal importance, though not a uniquely sufficient condition for many of the state behaviors and outcomes documented in the chapters that follow to have eventuated.

The experiences of countries captured in this book have the potential to inform discussion about the future of economic integration and the future of globalization more broadly. In particular, the ways in which smaller states navigate United States–China strategic competition have implications for how we think about regional order and deepening multilateral cooperation.⁶ The economic effects of the pandemic, combined with strategic pressures induced by bipolarity, have encouraged a view of recovery aligned more with local or national priorities than something to be affected through concerted pan-regional multilateral action. International supply-route disruptions, tightened border security, the imposition of travel “bubbles,” and commodity scarcity are all contributing factors. The upshot is a wedge driven between would-be collaborative partners, and the encouragement of more self-interested state-level behavior that has the potential to undermine hopes for cooperation.⁷ This is an issue that has long plagued multilateralism in Asia Pacific. As John Ravenhill remarked in his 2001 landmark study of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, “trade continues to be a mixed motive game, one that contains powerful incentives to defect.”⁸ Indeed, this may be part of the reason multilateral institutions have emerged somewhat more slowly in Asia Pacific than in some other parts of the world, as many scholars have noted.⁹

Beyond multilateral cooperation, there is also the question of more serious consequences, such as the bifurcation of Asia Pacific into factions resembling a new Cold War, the potential for which has been noted in other parts of the world.¹⁰ This possibility, though seemingly remote at present, stems from the theoretically uncertain relationship of economics to security concerns.

As Ravenhill elsewhere explains, any issue can become “securitized” when deemed to be contrary to national interests. “For instance, matters that were once considered primarily non-controversial issues of international trade may become ‘securitized’ if the global balance of power changes or one or more states take action that has the potential to disrupt access to and/or engineer a substantial increase in the price of commodities perceived as significant for national security.”¹¹ In principle, therefore, the reconfiguration of regional power politics and promotion of self-serving/inward-looking economic policies could do much more than disrupt trade cooperation. It may cause a spillover of difficulties into other areas of multilateral engagement in Asia Pacific.

Our approach is driven by the underappreciated role of small states in regional geopolitics, and the domestic processes that animate them. Precisely how individual countries walk the line between the superpowers, amid the economic turmoil of the pandemic, is a key focus of this book. While we acknowledge the importance of regional economic powerhouses such as Japan, India, and Australia, we also show that the region's smaller economies are sites of significant strategic competition between the United States and China, and thus are vital to the future of the post-Covid economic order of Asia Pacific. Included among our chapters are case studies of Singapore, New Zealand, Taiwan, Korea, and several Pacific Island countries (PICs). By examining how states like these learned from the pandemic and crafted plans for economic reopening, we gain an appreciation of their geostrategic value, and a more nuanced, variegated picture of national interests and economic thinking in a vast and diverse region of the world. However, we also come to more fully appreciate the challenges of forging economic cooperation—or indeed, pan-regional institutions in general—when the strategic designs of more dominant powers incentivize smaller ones to align themselves with one over the other. While we do not dispute the magnitude of United States–China rivalry or the importance of their allies and treaty partners, our focus on smaller states distinguishes the book among works that give greater weight to bipolar competition at the expense of middle and marginal state perspectives.

Timeliness is another important aspect of the book's central objective. We contend that details of economic resilience and recovery in Asia Pacific are available yet fresh—rich enough after nearly two years to furnish a meaty, well-detailed account of Covid-19's impacts, but not yet fully set upon by analysts and scholars.


Covid-19 Economics in Regional Perspective

The World Health Organization (WHO) reported that by January 2023 there were more than 111 million confirmed cases and 300,000 deaths resulting from Covid-19 in the Western Pacific. For Southeast Asia, the figures were approximately 61 million cases and 800,000 deaths.¹² While these figures pale in comparison to the harder-hit parts of the world, such as Europe or North America, they far surpass those seen in Africa or the Eastern Mediterranean and translate to enormous human and economic cost. They also fail to do justice to different experiences of hardship resulting from the pandemic within and across countries and regions. Covid-19 has brought increased material hardship nearly everywhere, but it has also exposed disparities and structural inequalities in the ability of some countries to respond as effectively as others, something bound to exercise deep influence on economic

resilience and leading to a scattershot picture of recovery plans. This is also why many analysts argue that post-pandemic recovery constitutes a human security concern under the definition offered by the United Nations (UN), which extends to development issues and the provision of basic human needs, including medicines and access to quality healthcare.¹³ As the UN Framework for the Immediate Socio-Economic Response to Covid-19 states: “The COVID-19 pandemic is far more than a health crisis: it is affecting societies and economies at their core. . . . Without urgent socio-economic responses, global suffering will escalate, jeopardizing lives and livelihoods for years to come.”¹⁴


While variation in national and subnational effects remain at top-of-mind, it is worth pointing out some larger economic trends. As indicated in Figure 1.1, gross domestic product (GDP) across the region took a pronounced dip in early 2020 with the onset and spread of the original Covid-19 strain before recovering in 2021. The effects of the Delta and Omicron variants then prompted a second decline, with outputs projected to settle near pre-pandemic levels in 2023. Figure 1.2 contrasts the GDP trend in Asia with the world, showing a more pronounced downturn in 2021 but more signs of recovery in 2022. Table 1.1 provides a breakdown of the economic damage in selected countries, with across-the-board declines (nearly, China is the one exception) in 2020, with upticks of varied magnitude following in 2021–2022.

Figure 1.1 GDP Growth per Capita, Asia Pacific, 2017–2027 (percentages)



Source: International Monetary Fund, Asia and the Pacific Economic Outlook, <https://data.imf.org/?sk=abff6c02-73a8-475c-89cc-ad515033e662>.

Figure 1.2 GDP Trends, Regional Comparison, 2021 vs. 2022



Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, Asia and the Pacific, October 2021.

Prior studies have noted the particular effects of Covid-19 on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and point out that manufacturing and service sectors have been particularly hard-hit.¹⁵ In many small states of Asia Pacific, tourism plays a key role in the overall economic outlook, and experienced high levels of growth in the pre-pandemic years. This trend was driven in no small part by outbound tourists from mainland China, which dried up after March 2020. The knock-on effects of these occurrences are reflected in Figure 1.3, which details unemployment figures in APEC countries for the period 2019–2020. These are up virtually across the board, and sharply up in some cases.

Yet the grimness of these graphics belies resilience in many Asia-Pacific economies. Indeed, Figure 1.1 suggests that GDP decline in 2020 is a trough—albeit a fairly pronounced one—with output returning to pre-Covid

Table 1.1 GDP Growth Projections, Selected Countries, 2020–2022

Region/Country	2020	2021	2022
Aotearoa/New Zealand	–2.1	5.1	3.3
ASEAN	–3.3	2.6	5.5
Asia	–1.3	6.5	5.7
Asia AEs	–2.7	3.7	3.4
Asia EMDEs	–0.7	7.2	6.3
Australia	–2.4	3.5	4.1
China	2.3	8	5.6
India	–7.3	9	8.5
Japan	–4.6	2.4	3.2
Korea	–0.9	4.3	3.3
PICs	–8.5	2	5.5


Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/APAC/Issues/2021/10/15/regional-economic-outlook-for-asia-and-pacific-october-2021>.

levels within twenty-four months in most countries. Likewise, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is now discussing the post-pandemic recovery of the tourist sector. “In many respects, COVID-19 has presented destinations in the region with a ‘reset moment’ that they can and should use to address long-standing challenges and seize new opportunities, such as putting tourism on a more sustainable trajectory, enhancing digitalization, and stepping-up community engagement and inclusion,” reads an ADB industry report from early 2022.¹⁶ Unemployment has shown signs of abating too, though this has been met with a corresponding rise in inflation, including in places that were largely spared that problem in earlier stages of the pandemic. According to APEC, the Asia-Pacific region recorded an inflation rate of 2.6 percent in the first nine months of 2021, compared to an average of 1.5 percent in 2020, something that “points out the risk of an upward trend in inflation to economic recovery if left unaddressed.”¹⁷

Defining “Asia Pacific”

This discussion of regional trends raises a logically and analytically prior question—what exactly is Asia Pacific? What are its boundaries? Settling this issue is important not just for understanding the scope of our enterprise, but because there seems to be little consensus on precisely which states can reasonably claim to be a part of the Asia-Pacific region, or indeed whether this is the best term by which we might refer to such a vast portion

Figure 1.3 Unemployment in APEC Countries, 2019–2020



Source: APEC in Charts, 2021, https://www.apec.org/docs/default-source/publications/2021/1/apec-in-charts-2021/221_psu_apec-in-charts-2021.pdf?sfvrsn=50537c36_2_

the planet.¹⁸ Some have used the term “Pacific Rim” or “Pacific Basin” to capture roughly the same bit of territory. Such a term could incorporate places as distant from one another as Russia and New Zealand, and feasibly include every country of the Americas having a Pacific coast. However, it also comes with the liability of heavily discounting South Asian countries’ role in regional economics and geopolitics. That problem is rectified by the term “Indo-Pacific,” which gained traction in the era of the Trump presidency, but in fact has a usage that extends back much further.¹⁹ It was not Trump but Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe who in 2007 used the words “free and open Indo-Pacific” to refer to a cooperative network of economically and politically aligned states that would counter the influence of ascendant nondemocracies, namely China.²⁰ The central tenets of Abe’s ideas later became part of official US parlance, notably the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. “We envision an Indo-Pacific that is open, connected, prosperous, resilient, and secure—and we are ready to work together with each of you to achieve it,” the president told the East Asia Summit in October 2021.²¹

This assemblage of different terms to refer—with a high degree of imprecision—to the same part of the world raises another issue: that the choice of one’s preferred terminology is largely a matter of location, political persuasion, and national interests. Indeed, the conceptualization of geographic theatres themselves are prone to shift over time and with changes in the nature of great power dominance and rivalry, and crucially, with accompanying trends in political economy.²² In the current context, this obviously encourages us to think about the weight of Chinese and US relationships within the region, though it does not necessarily help to elevate the perspectives or interests of smaller, more marginal voices.

In this book, we adopt the perspective that Asia Pacific is an “amoeba” region, with “a nucleus and a surrounding body in constant motion.”²³ Traditionally, the nucleus comprises states in northeastern Asia (China, Japan, South Korea), and southeastern Asia (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] member states). To this, we add Oceanic states like Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island countries such as Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa, as well as some consideration of other players exercising influence in regional economics and geopolitics not historically grouped alongside Asia-Pacific countries, like India. While we concede that there are many other states that might qualify for inclusion based on the definition of the region offered, we do not include them here, and indeed, only a select few “nucleus” countries are the focus of individual chapters.

Three main considerations drove the selection of particular cases for this volume. First, states under discussion had to qualify as “small,” a detailed conceptualization of which can be found below. While many interpretations

exist, we understand small states to be more than “non-superpowers,” a category that might well leave us with a universe of cases that includes every state in the region save for China, the United States, and perhaps India. Second, we have restricted the geographic scope of inquiry to small states in East and Southeast Asia, and the south Pacific. As the forgoing note regarding definitions of the region suggests, the full universe of cases could potentially be much larger, especially if one considers South American states with a Pacific coastline or Canada.

Small Economies Between Two Giants

As noted, one of our main case selection criteria is “small state” status. Our objective is to see how small states negotiate economic recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic amid increasing pressure from the United States and China. But what exactly is a small state? The most important point to note here is that smallness is a relative term—small states are distinguished by their relative capabilities, rather than their population size or geographic location.²⁴ This trait carries two further implications.

First, small states are typically very limited in their ability to exercise influence over great powers. Much more often, it is great powers who influence them, something that leaves small states vulnerable to tectonic shifts in great power politics.²⁵ Second, small states are also distinguished from each other in terms of their capabilities. By definition, small states may have lesser capabilities than superpowers, but they do not necessarily have capabilities equal to those of other small states—it is a designation that suggests a great deal of intra-category variation. Thus our understanding of small states enables us to consider and compare post-pandemic resilience and recovery in places as distinct as Singapore and Fiji, New Zealand, and Taiwan, all within a single volume.

There are two main pathways taken by small states attempting to navigate relationships with superpowers. One of these is to “bandwagon” with one superpower or the other, something that when practiced broadly is expected to deepen regional competition between “camps” of countries, in this instance aligned with either China, or with the United States, and its treaty partners and allies.²⁶ Assuming these pressures are a relatively fixed feature of the regional order, there is also significant potential for this situation to hobble efforts at multilateral cooperation in the long run rather than encourage it. In part, this is due to the autonomy/influence dilemma, in which small states seek to maximize their systemic influence, leading to deeper levels of institutionalization but results in a loss of autonomy and a corresponding spike in incentives to abandon cooperation and pursue more self-serving

policies aligned with one or the other superpower.²⁷ Alternatively, however, some states may be able to pursue some type of independent, non-aligned policy strategy. For example, Peter Katzenstein has shown how some small western European states facing economic vulnerabilities similar to those of their Asia-Pacific contemporaries managed to retain the integrity of the political institutions and their affluence by pursuing “democratic corporatism”—effectively charting a third pathway that helped them to ameliorate some of the bandwagoning pressures of superpower competition after World War II.²⁸

As the cases here attest, it is difficult to deny the predicament small states of Asia Pacific currently find themselves in. China looms increasingly large in economic fortunes, but many have long-standing cultural and security ties to the United States and its allies. Stuck between a rock and a hard place, the impetus to pick sides is strong, and in some cases may even prompt extremely contentious decisions to prioritize political or security concerns over economics, or vice versa. Moreover, even if small Asia-Pacific states were able to resist the pull of one or the other superpower and adopt some nonaligned “third way,” there seems little to suggest they would do so in a harmonized or concerted way, since international bargaining is likely to be hamstrung by complex domestic political wrangling among competing interests and groups in highly varied structural domestic settings.²⁹

Outline of the Book

The book is organized into two main parts. Part 1 examines economic impacts and experiences of Covid-19 in a range of small states in Asia Pacific, while Part 2 focuses on possible strategies for post-pandemic recovery and reemergence, including multilateral engagement.

Part 1 opens with Benjamin Ho Tze Ern’s exploration of resilience and recovery in the Singaporean context. Ho argues in Chapter 2 that the debate over Singapore’s Covid-19 response cuts to the heart of core national identity issues, and in particular the gulf between two social groups—“cosmopolitan elite” and “heartland supporters.” Through an examination of public debate on issues such as border closures, vaccine choices, and social gathering restrictions, Ho shows that Singapore’s Covid-19 policy walks a fine line between domestic and foreign policy imperatives and reveals subtle but important fissures in Singaporean politics.

In Chapter 3, Jason Young examines New Zealand’s trade relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and in particular the reemergence of debate over the question of dependence and diversification in New Zealand’s economic and foreign policy. One important stream of this debate focuses on China’s human rights record and the stability of bilateral rela-

tions overall, with some expressing worries of economic retaliation if that relationship were to sour as it has with other Asia-Pacific states traditionally aligned with the United States and its allies, such as Australia.

Steven Ratuva explains in Chapter 4 how Covid-19 had a particularly acute impact in Pacific Island countries, calling attention to the human security dimension of the pandemic and related international responses. Ratuva explores how “social solidarity economies” took shape in several PICs as a result of the pandemic, with local/national ingenuity becoming an important means of addressing people’s needs, while the benefits of foreign aid failed to trickle down to the local level.

Frank Siedlok, Natasha Hamilton-Hart, and Hsiao-Chen Shen explore Taiwan’s Covid-19 response in Chapter 5. They employ the case of Taiwan’s face mask production policy to examine the collaboration of government and private industry in rapidly increasing mask production to facilitate a relatively successful pandemic response. This, they contend, is something that differentiates the Taiwanese experience from that of other places, such as the United Kingdom, where involvement by the “regulatory state” shaped the pandemic response for the worse.

Part 2 of the book shifts from national experiences to explore recovery prospects in greater detail. In Chapter 6, Sung-Young Kim explores the prospects for “green growth” as a possible path out of the pandemic for Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. In contrast to scholars who posit that the pandemic has brought into question the appetite for continuing such initiatives, Kim argues that green growth not only forms a key part of each states’ economic recovery plan, but that these have been accelerated amid Covid-19 rather than delayed or sidelined, in large part due to the effects of a United States–China technological rivalry that predates the pandemic.

In Chapter 7, Roy Lee examines how public- and private-sector actors in Taiwan have attempted to mitigate disruption in the global supply chain in electronic contract manufacturing resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic. Lee argues that while supply chain “autonomy” has been touted as a means to safeguard economic security for Taiwan and is promoted by the United States and European Union to hedge against a rising China, global supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic have fueled the rising importance of autonomy as an economic policy.

Charles Finny and Neel Vanvari argue in Chapter 8 that the protectionist economic stance of the Trump administration in the United States has produced a vacuum in the regional economic architecture of Asia Pacific, creating a range of uncertainties for multilateral economic cooperation.

Stephanie Honey calls attention in Chapter 9 to the special role of small Asia-Pacific states in establishing digital trade agreements. Covid-19 catalyzed an acceleration of digitalization of trade around the world. While Asia Pacific contains some of the most open digital markets (i.e., New Zealand,

Singapore), it also has some of the most closed-off (China, Vietnam). Honey makes the case that the region's small and open digital markets hold a growing hope for the development of stronger digital trade rules in the future.

Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the book with a summative comment on the overall impact of the pandemic and the nature of regional economic reemergence, taking the opportunity to identify some key trends raised collectively by the other chapters.

Notes

1. See <https://covid19.who.int>.
2. Michael Daly, "Omicron Wave Receding, but Ashley Bloomfield Warns New Zealand to Expect Ongoing Waves of Covid," March 22, 2022, <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/coronavirus/128135143/omicron-wave-receding-but-ashley-bloomfield-warns-new-zealand-to-expect-ongoing-waves-of-covid>. Accessed 22 April 2022.
3. For an overview of this claim and a poignant rebuttal, see Benedict Atkinson, Jacob Wood, and Haejin Jang, "Does Covid-19 Spark the End of Globalisation?" in *Community Empowerment, Sustainable Cities, and Transformative Economies*, edited by T. Chaiechi, and J. Wood (Singapore: Springer, 2022).
4. For example, see Shahar Hamieri, "Covid-19: Is This the End of Globalization?" *International Journal* 76, no. 1 (2021).
5. Zhaohui Wang and Zhiqiang Sun, "From Globalization to Regionalization: The United States, China, and the Post-Covid-19 World Economic Order," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 26 (2021).
6. Here, we understand multilateralism in John Ruggie's terms as "relationships involv[ing] three or more states coming together to tackle a specific issue or set of issues on the basis of specific generalized principles of conduct." See "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 567.
7. G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2, no. 1 (2002).
8. John Ravenhill, *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 185.
9. Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia Pacific Region* (London: Routledge, 2019); Richard E. Feinberg, ed., *APEC as an Institution: Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the 'ASEAN-Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'?" *Pacific Review* 10, no. 3 (1997): 319, 346.
10. Avery Goldstein, "US-China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century: Déjà Vu and Cold War II," *China International Strategy Review* 2 (June 2020); Minghao Zhao, "Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US-China Strategic Competition," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2019); Yuen Foong Khong, "The US, China, and the Cold War Analogy," *China International Strategy Review* 1 (2019): 223–237.

11. John Ravenhill, "Economics and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Pacific Review* 26, no. 1 (2013).

12. The WHO does not track cases in the "Asia Pacific" but breaks this wider category down by subregions. See <https://covid19.who.int>.

13. General Assembly Resolution 66/290 states that "human security is an approach to assist member states in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people." On the pandemic's impact's specifically, see Edward Newman, "Covid-19: A Human Security Analysis," *Global Society*, December 29, 2021.

14. United Nations, *Framework for the Immediate Socio-Economic Response to Covid-19*, April 2020, <https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/UN-framework-for-the-immediate-socio-economic-response-to-COVID-19.pdf>.

15. See Kazunobu Hayakawa, Hyun-Hoon Lee, and Cyn-Young Park, "The Effect of Covid-19 on Foreign Direct Investment," Economics Working Paper no. 653 (Manila: Asian Development Bank, March 2022).

16. Asian Development Bank and World Tourism Association, "Covid-19 and the Future of Tourism in Asia and the Pacific" (Manila and Madrid: March 2022), p. vi.

17. "APEC Region's Economy to Grow by 6% in 2021," November 8, 2021, <https://www.apec.org/press/news-releases/2021/apec-region-s-economy-to-grow-by-6-in-2021-report>.

18. Brian Job, "Grappling with an Elusive Concept," in *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by W. Tow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

19. Hansong Li, "The "Indo-Pacific": Intellectual Origins and International Visions in Global Contexts," *Modern Intellectual History* 19, no. 3 (2022).

20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Speech by His Excellency Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India: 'Confluence of the Two Seas,'" New Delhi, August 22, 2007, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.

21. See <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states>.

22. See Sanjay Pulipaka and Mohit Musadi, "In Defence of the Indo-Pacific Concept," September 2021, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-defence-of-the-indo-pacific-concept>.

23. J. S. Eades and Malcolm J. M. Cooper, "Introduction: The Asia Pacific World—A Summary and Agenda," *Asia Pacific World* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 3.

24. Paul Sutton, "The Concept of Small States in the International Political Economy," *Roundtable* 100, no. 413 (April 2011): 141; Mathias Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," *International Politics* 46 (2009); Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 2 (April 1995): 171.

25. Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013); Harvey W. Armstrong and Robert Read, "The Phantom of Liberty? Economic Growth and the Vulnerability of Small States," *Journal of International Development* 14, no. 4 (2002).

26. Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" *Security Studies* 1, no. 3 (1992): 409; Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983), p. 9–10; Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization* 23, no. 2 (Spring 1969).

27. See Anders Wivel, "The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43, no. 2 (2005).

28. Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

29. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988).