


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John F. Clark

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1

Elite Political Identity and the Genesis of African Foreign Policies

John F. Clark and Paul A. Kowert

AFRICAN STATES AND THEIR LEADERS ARE NOT MERELY the pawns they are sometimes imagined to be by those who focus on the influence of international capital, extracontinental great powers, or wealthy and influential international organizations. All states, African or otherwise, face myriad constraints both internally and externally, and the weaker are naturally more constrained than the stronger. Yet African states have more freedom of action in their foreign policies than is sometimes imagined.

The chapter authors of this volume do not, therefore, expect African states to act in unison in their foreign policies. It is certainly true that a shared sense of historical victimhood and marginality in world affairs has united most African states on certain issues. Perhaps this is one reason why some scholars (Zondi 2013) find that African states do act in concert on certain issues and in certain fora. Yet the one issue on which African states were most united—the persistence of colonialism and Whites-only rule into the late twentieth century—is fading into history. African states have often been divided on other international issues. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of South African apartheid, African states are more likely than ever to take differing positions on momentous questions. To take but one recent example, African states were divided in their votes on UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022, condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On this resolution, twenty-five African states either abstained (seventeen) or were conveniently absent (eight others); one, Eritrea, voted against the resolution; and the other twenty-eight countries of Africa voted in favor of it. Thus, the fifty-four sovereign states of Africa were almost

perfectly divided between those that opted to condemn Russia's aggression and those that sought to avoid the issue. In relations with their immediate neighbors, African states also display a diversity of behaviors ranging from hostile interventionism through neutral indifference to genuine efforts at economic and social cooperation. Yet scholars have struggled to describe and account for this variation (see, e.g., Henderson 2015; Whitaker and Clark 2018).

This volume exposes clear variations in African foreign policies by studying the relationships between the political identities of African leaders and the foreign policies of their states. Its contributors start with the observation that the way leaders and other elites come to power influences the policies they prefer. Leaders who owe their position to a prolonged insurgency campaign, for example, might use the instruments of foreign policy in different ways and for different purposes than those who presided over a sudden coup d'état. And both will likely differ in their policies from leaders who were elected. In the latter case, moreover, the nature of the electoral landscape—such as whether elections are dominated by a single party or contested by multiple viable parties—will also influence policies. In general, differences in the paths to power for African leaders tend to shape the foreign policies of their states.

If this linkage seems plausible and straightforward, it has nevertheless received surprisingly little systematic treatment. Often, a leader's "pathway to power" is treated as an intervening variable that modulates the relationship between the traits, interests, and decisionmaking style of leaders on one hand and their policies on the other. Margaret Hermann speculated, for example, that "the more dramatic . . . the means of assuming power, the more likely the personality characteristics of the head of state are to affect foreign policy behavior" (1976, 328). Others, like Amy Catalinac (2016), have documented instances in which electoral reform altered political incentives in ways that have led to shifts in a country's foreign policy. Yet arguments such as these do not propose any systematic link between a leader's path to power and specific foreign policies. One recent, notable commentary that does propose such a link is to be found in Daniel Drezner's (2017) argument that the fledgling Trump presidency was likely to pursue atypical foreign policies. Populists, he suggested, "argue that what ails society are corrupt elites that have squashed or swindled the people's true preferences" (Drezner 2017, 26). Campaigning against the entrenched policies of establishment elites implies, at the very least, a greater openness to policy change and to the use of foreign policy itself as a populist instrument. Moreover, he argues, "populists do not like alternative centers of power beyond their personal control. They are therefore likely to resist any

kind of multilateral institution that places hard legal constraints on their ability to act” (Drezner 2017, 28).

We are interested in arguments of just this sort, and indeed it is likely that versions of populism play an important role in some African contexts. Yet populist electioneering is not typically the most viable path to power in African states, and it is comparatively rare across the continent. To develop a more systematic appraisal of the linkage between means of attaining power and foreign policies, the contributors to this book explore three different types of African political systems in succession: *personalist* regimes, *one-party-dominant* regimes, and *competitive multiparty* regimes (see Clark 2023a). Each of these regime types entails certain typical pathways to power, which we will discuss in the next section. Each pathway, in turn, conditions the relationships between elite and national identities and the foreign policies of each country.

In order for these pathways to power to exert any general effect on foreign policy, they must not only predict a certain elite orientation toward the state’s foreign policy goals but also be sufficiently institutionalized that they represent a coordinated foreign policy strategy and not simply a leader’s whims. To the extent that such an orientation becomes deeply institutionalized, however, it lends a certain predictability to a state’s foreign policy behavior. One might even be tempted to attribute this predictability to a country’s national identity—thus, to make the argument that a state (African or otherwise) behaves in a certain way because of the kind of state it is. To be clear, we do not presume that every African state exhibits what is more typically called *national identity*: a coherent ideology of community linking the mass public and governing elites in a political whole. Indeed, this form of national identity is manifest in few African states, though Botswana, Egypt, and Tanzania come to mind as plausible candidates. For this very reason, observers are right to be skeptical about the extent to which national identity can serve as a guide to African foreign policy. If we allow the *elite identities* born out of struggles for power to stand in for national identities, however, then a more plausible argument can be made. This is the argument explored in this book: To what extent do elite identities, forged in the crucible of power contests, stand in for national identities as a guide to African foreign policies?

African Regimes and Pathways to Power

Aside from transitional regimes and those essentially controlled from outside the continent (e.g., Somalia), African polities are either *personalist* regimes, *one-party-dominant* regimes, or *competitive multiparty*

regimes (Clark 2023a).¹ In this section we briefly describe each of these regime types and discuss the implications of each type for the way individual leaders ascend to power. The elite identities formed through political socialization within each type of polity are central to the kinds of foreign policies that African states pursue, as the chapters in this volume demonstrate.

Although distinguishing among personalist, one-party-dominant, and competitive multiparty regimes is useful, this typology is not conventionally observed in the scholarly literature on African politics. Instead, political scientists often simply categorize African regimes as either democratic or authoritarian (e.g., Mylonas and Roussias 2008; Tiruneh 2006). Some others introduce a third category of “hybrid regimes” (Tripp 2010) or use terms such as “semi-democracy” (e.g., Coulon 1990) or “quasi-democracy.” The Freedom House division of countries into the categories of free, partly free, and not free also has some purchase among Africa specialists (Chourou 2002; Herbst 2001; Van de Walle and Butler 1999). Still others focus on the nature of the executive power, reflecting European differences, and categorize African regimes as presidentialist, parliamentary, or divided (between president and prime minister) (Van Cranenburgh 2008; see also Van de Walle 2003). This last set of distinctions according to executive power is somewhat closer to what we have in mind, but none of these other typologies direct our attention to the identities of ruling elites in African states or to the differences among their foreign policies.

Most common in Africa are personalist regimes, defined and dominated by a central charismatic leader. Historically, these regimes are created in one of several different ways, but the result in all cases is that politics and elite socialization are dominated by the singular vision of a strong leader. In some cases, this leader emerges from a coup d'état. Many of Africa's most notorious dictators, including Muamar Gadhafi (Libya), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), Idi Amin (Uganda), and Omar al-Bashir (Sudan, which is a case in this volume), all came to power through coups. Once in power, though, each was compelled to forge an ideology, and thus an identity, that served as the basis for both military and civilian elite support sufficiently robust to keep them in power for years on end. In other personalist regimes, this ideology of support was derived from a protracted insurgency that brought a leader—such as Paul Kagame and Denis Sassou Nguesso, both studied in this volume—to power. Perhaps an even more famous example is that of Yoweri Museveni, who fought a five-year “bush war” before attaining power in 1986 after defeating the second regime of Milton Obote. During his

years in the bush, Museveni and his fellow insurgent leaders developed a ten-point program that they used to recruit new fighters, and by which they promised to govern once in power (Tripp 2010).

Insurgent leaders typically promise to bring “democracy,” and some, like Paul Kagame, also promise an end to the oppression of an ethnic or regional minority. Promises such as these hint at a third path to the establishment of personal rule: through the crafty subversion of democratic institutions. The wave of political reforms that swept Africa in the early 1990s produced several new leaders through elections, many of whom were not actually committed to democratic rule. Notable among these were Pascal Lissouba (Congo-Brazzaville), Mahamane Ousmane (Niger), and Ange-Félix Patassé (Central African Republic). All three were freely elected in their respective countries in 1992 or 1993. After assuming office, however, all three demonstrated increasingly autocratic practices, consolidating their personal power rather than fostering support for democratic institutions (see Clark and Gardinier 1997, chaps. 5–7). Ultimately, Lissouba was ousted from power in a bloody civil war in 1997, while Ousmane and Patassé were overthrown in coups in 1996 and 2003, respectively.

Although there has proven to be more than one way to establish a personalist regime, we can offer the following generalization about successful governance within such a regime: The manipulation of symbols constituting an ideology of power and the gradual institutionalization of an elite identity supportive of personal rule are crucial for regime longevity. Without these, personalist regimes are vulnerable to coups or insurgencies and do not last (Roessler 2011). When they are able to establish a successful elite identity supportive of the regime and a system of patronage to reinforce this identity, however, they may persist for decades. Each of the three personalist regimes studied in this volume illustrates the successful institutionalization of personal rule: Omar al-Bashir (Sudan, 1989–2019), Paul Kagame (Rwanda, 1994–present), and Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo, 1979–1992 and 1997–present). One could name several others who enjoyed similar institutional success and who ruled for more than three decades, such as Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire, 1965–1997), Muamar Gadhafi (Libya, 1969–2011), and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda, 1986–present). In each of these cases, the ineluctable need to maintain personal power provided an orienting logic that came to define elite identities within these states.

Another group of African regimes is defined by the domination of the political space not by a single individual but by a single party over several successive elections. Africa’s one-party-dominant regimes have

not been much studied since the end of the Cold War delegitimated the *de jure* one-party state as a political form. As of 2022, Eritrea is the only remaining *de jure* one-party state on the continent. Yet there is a significant group of *de facto* one-party states concentrated in southern Africa, as well as Tanzania and Ethiopia (at least until 2019).

As with personalist regimes, Africa's party-dominant regimes have been established in more than one way. Some were created through negotiated arrangements with departing colonial authorities following political campaigns for independence. Where no large number of European settlers were involved, Britain was ready to grant independence to its African colonies by the end of the 1950s, following the difficult liberation struggles in Sudan and in the Gold Coast (Ghana). This led Britain to negotiate directly with the leaders of the major liberation parties and to organize elections in most colonies in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. In Botswana—one of the party-dominant cases studied in this volume—the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won the inaugural elections held in 1965, and it has ruled the country ever since. Likewise, in Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU, later renamed the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, or CCM) won inaugural elections in 1962, and it has ruled Tanzania since. From 1965 to 1992, Tanzania was a *de jure* one-party state, with the TANU/CCM in charge, whereas Botswana has maintained legal multipartyism throughout its independent history. Nonetheless, both are party-dominant states that resulted from peaceful negotiations with the departing colonial power.

Other struggles for independence were less peaceful, of course, but in those cases as well a protracted anticolonial insurgency sometimes gave rise to a single-party regime after independence. In Angola and Mozambique, the armed wings of the two now dominant parties, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Frente de libertacao de mocambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO), respectively, fought long wars against the Portuguese, beginning in the early 1960s and ending in 1974. In Namibia, the armed wing of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) fought an even longer liberation war, from 1966 until 1989, before it forced South Africa to accept a peace agreement with Angola leading to Namibia's independence. Zimbabwe's war of liberation was fought not against a foreign colonizer but with the White minority that had declared the country independent in 1965. As in Angola, the armed wings of multiple parties, in this case the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), participated in the Zimbabwean War of Liberation, but ZANU consolidated

power over its rival by 1987. Another long insurgency in Ethiopia beginning in 1974 gave rise to not one but two party-dominant states. The on-and-off war against Ethiopia's communist Derg finally bore fruit in 1991. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) soon established itself as a de facto one-party state, and it also negotiated independence for Eritrea in 1993. As noted above, Eritrea is now Africa's only de jure one-party state. It remains to be seen whether the country's Eritrean People's Liberation Front will continue to be the ruling party after the demise of the country's only independent ruler, Isaias Afwerki.

Finally, a few cases followed a path somewhere between negotiation and armed resistance on their way to achieving independence. South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) established its dominance through a combination of tactics. Negotiation and peaceful resistance against the apartheid regime were undoubtedly the ANC's primary strategy, but the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, also engaged in a series of bombings, acts of sabotage, and isolated attacks on police. After Nelson Mandela was released from twenty-seven years of confinement, negotiations with South Africa's White rulers began in earnest. These evolved into the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in late 1991, and the negotiations in this forum led to South Africa's historic free elections in April 1994. The ANC prevailed in that election, and in the five national elections since.

Along with Botswana and Ethiopia, the case of South Africa is explored in the second part of this volume. All of these party-dominant African states have had leadership turnovers at the top, but party ascendancy has been perpetuated. In such cases, the path to power is not through cultivation of personal loyalty but rather to be found in the embrace of a prevailing party orthodoxy. In rare cases, a politician may attempt to reorient the ruling party's ideology and goals from within, perhaps by exploiting differences between one party faction and another. But parties tend to sanction deviations. For successive generations of politicians, therefore, the path to power is far different than in personalist regimes. Although these single-party regimes are nominally democracies, the crucial competitions occur within the ruling party. The same is not true of the third and least common form of African political regime.

Competitive multiparty regimes are those that have had a succession of contested elections in which ruling parties or individuals have lost and given up power in a peaceful transition. They all meet Huntington's (1993) so-called two-turnover test, having transitioned to democracy and then experienced at least one further peaceful transition

through elections. Indeed, one may wonder why we should not simply label such regimes “democracies.” Yet there are good reasons to use that label cautiously. For one, the observation of civil liberties in some of these countries is not especially high, many of them (like Benin, Nigeria, and Zambia) only meriting scores of “partly free” from Freedom House. Second, and relatedly, the quality of elections in these competitive multiparty states has been variable and sometimes quite low. Notably, elections in Nigeria have been frequently criticized by the international community for the vote-buying, fraud, and other irregularities that have attended them. Third, many of these regimes have sometimes lurched toward authoritarianism, only to regain their balance and continue their multiparty experiments. In 2021, several media sources predicted that the sitting president of Zambia, Edgar Lungu, would illegally hold on to power through fraudulent elections, though the Zambian people managed to avert this outcome (*Economist* 2021). As of late 2023, the multiparty experiments in Benin and Tunisia are also under extreme pressure from autocratic-minded presidents. Over a longer period, multiparty competition in Lesotho has only survived thanks to repeated South African/ Southern African Development Community interventions.

Like the other regime types discussed here, competitive multiparty systems have come into being in several different ways. In general, the democratic institutions bequeathed by Africa’s erstwhile colonizers after eighty-odd years of colonial rule mostly failed to take hold, and within a decade African states largely devolved into either personalist or party-dominant regimes. Only two, Botswana and Senegal, maintained legal multipartyism, though Senegal had no official opposition party between 1966 and 1978 (Coulon 1990). Thus, multipartyism had to be “reborn” after a long era of *de jure* single-party states and “presidents for life,” ubiquitous in Africa from the mid-1960s to 1990. In the early 1990s, coinciding with democratizing impulses flowing from the end of the Cold War, competitive multipartyism gained new life as elites mobilized against Africa’s delegitimated dictators and parties.

In the first instance, this mobilization occurred through mostly free elections organized by the sitting regimes themselves. Constitutional reforms ended the one-party state model throughout most of Africa at this juncture, and the old ruling regimes were forced to stage elections. In some cases, the prevailing rulers opened the political space enough for opposition parties to prevail, whereas clever autocrats in many other cases managed to create “electoral autocracies.” These contests in Africa have been intensively studied over the past thirty years (see, inter

alia, Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Cheeseman 2015; Clark and Gardinier 1997; Lindberg 2006; Villalón and VonDoepp 2005). In the case of Nigeria, the political space was opened by the unexpected death of the military dictator Sani Abacha in June 1998. Abacha's military successor, Abdulsalami Abubakar, organized free elections in the following year, leading to a return to competitive multipartyism in Nigeria.

In other cases, elections were organized only after a major campaign of civilian resistance led to the overthrow of an autocratic ruler. The so-called Jasmine Revolution that ousted former dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is the only example of a popular revolution that has led to a long-lasting competitive multiparty system. A similar revolution in Egypt in the same year did lead to elections, but then to the failure of the democratic experiment with the Abdel Fattah el-Sisi coup in 2014. Whether the popular revolution in Burkina Faso of the same year will lead to durable competitive multipartyism remains to be seen (for more on the survival of such democratic experiments, see Villalón and VonDoepp 2005).

Finally, some multiparty regimes have been established not through popular revolutions but instead by elites through a so-called good coup, overthrowing longtime autocrats and leading to free elections as in Mali (1991) and Mauritania (2005). Only in Mali did the new multiparty regime survive long enough to be considered consolidated (twenty years), and even there it succumbed to yet another coup in 2012. Most coups in Africa thought to have been "good" initially have only led to either persistent instability (as in Guinea-Bissau) or the consolidation of new autocratic regimes (Miller 2011). The putatively good coup in Mauritania in 2005, for example, was followed by a decidedly less good coup in 2008 and the return of authoritarianism.

The three cases studied in this volume in which multiparty electoral regimes have been consolidated—Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal—are thus part of a comparatively short list. Yet this form of political regime is nevertheless an important model of politics on the African continent, both in practice and as a source of inspiration for other states. And like the other regime types, it entails distinctive forms of elite socialization. In the case of multiparty regimes, elite loyalty can be neither to an individual nor to a party. Instead, therefore, loyalty must be to the ideals of multiparty democracy or to some other specific form of multiparty competition. In this regime type unlike the others, moreover, elite socialization must entail at least some degree of responsiveness to popular opinion in a way that the other regime types do not require. Although both African citizens and Africanists lament it, building successful electoral

coalitions usually means assembling ethnic, ethnoregional, or religious constituencies. To take one example, Kenyans have voted primarily along ethnic lines in recent elections even though most Kenyans do not claim their ethnicity as their primary identity (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008).

The remaining chapters of this book cover each regime type in far greater detail, but even this brief overview should suffice to establish that the incentive structures and socialization of political elites vary considerably across these three forms of regimes. We conclude this section with two final observations about the characteristics of African political regimes.

First, what makes these regime types a valuable heuristic for understanding African foreign policies is their durability. Despite the recurrent trope of African states as “unstable,” it is remarkable how many African states maintain a given type of regime over several decades. All of the cases in this volume maintained the same regime type for twenty-five years or more over the periods that are studied. The BDP of Botswana has now been in power for fifty-six years and the ANC for twenty-eight. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front also had an impressive twenty-eight-year run under three successive prime ministers, and the Prosperity Party that supplanted it may prove to be a renamed version of the old party. The democratic experiments of Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal have proved far more durable than many expected. Meanwhile, the personalist regime of Omar al-Bashir nearly made it to the thirty-year mark, while that of Paul Kagame is apparently going strong at twenty-eight years. The second regime of Denis Sassou Nguesso is now in its twenty-fifth year, following that ruler’s prior thirteen-year stint in power. None of these examples are meant to suggest that African regime types cannot change. Indeed, Africa’s current competitive multi-party regimes all emerged out of either personalist dictatorships or *de jure* one-party regimes. The point is that regime types are durable enough to imprint upon political elites a certain consciousness that can inform their countries’ foreign policies over significant periods.

Second, as with any typology, there are some liminal cases that do not fit neatly into one of these three categories. The population of African polities has its occasional duck-billed platypus, such as the regime of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (1980–2017). Mugabe certainly relied heavily upon the Zimbabwe African National Union–Popular Front (ZANU-PF) to come to power by overcoming the Whites-only regime of Ian Smith. As the years unfolded, however, Mugabe behaved in an increasingly autocratic fashion, using violent and repressive tactics against the opposition. Following the land seizures and terrible vio-

lence of the 2000 elections, Mugabe consolidated personal power and relied decreasingly on consensus within ZANU-PF. He attempted to position his wife Grace as his successor. Both media and scholarly observers described him as a personal ruler during this period (e.g., Meredith 2002; Winter 2019). Yet the nature of Mugabe's demise suggests that his efforts to personalize his regime and sideline the ZANU-PF ultimately failed. When the Zimbabwe military intervened against him in November 2017, they demanded that he resign and put his erstwhile vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, into the presidency. Since then, the Zimbabwean regime has been considerably depersonalized, with the ZANU-PF, rather than Mnangagwa himself, in charge of the country's politics. Zimbabwe seems again to be a party-dominant state, as it appeared in the 1980s.

Whatever the vagaries of internal politics in established African regimes, the basic regime type embraced by elites and the foreign policies of the states they rule are often stable over long periods. In order to gain some insight into the relationship between regime type and foreign policy, we must first say more about how elites are socialized within each type of regime. To develop this argument, we turn next to an underappreciated literature on social interaction and identity formation drawn partly from earlier sociological research and highlighted more recently by some constructivist scholars in the field of international relations.

From Pathways to Policy

In an innovative study of Soviet leadership, James Goldgeier argued that Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev each fought their way to power through a series of domestic political contests that left a lasting imprint on policymaking styles. In the wake of Stalin's death in 1953, for example, Nikita Khrushchev rose to power through a combination of "public confrontation, bluster, and bluff" (Goldgeier 1994, 74). His acquired faith in the efficacy of bold confrontation and faits accomplis led him to build the Berlin Wall, Goldgeier argues, and propelled him into the Cuban Missile Crisis. Mikhail Gorbachev enjoyed early success with agricultural reform as a party secretary in Stavropol, to take another example, and was ever on the lookout later in his career for reform opportunities.

Goldgeier's study is a beautiful illustration of the way all people (including national leaders) are deeply influenced by certain formative social experiences. As we encounter and interact with others, we learn not only about them but also about ourselves. A sense of ourselves—our

identity—suitable to that interaction takes shape and becomes a role that we perform in our interactions, more or less successfully. As our children are born and grow up, for example, we also grow into the role of parent, adopt that identity, and learn how to perform this role accordingly. To be effective in public life, likewise, we develop a persona endowed with competencies suited to our social environment. For the political leaders about whom Goldgeier wrote, early successes provided a template that they enacted throughout the remainder of their careers, defining their approach to politics and giving them a readily understandable identity, such as a “reformer.”

Sociologists in the tradition of George Herbert Mead (1934), Herbert Blumer (1962, 1969), and Erving Goffman (1959) have devoted particular attention to the way our social selves take shape and evolve over time. One of Mead’s students, Blumer is generally credited with coining and popularizing the term *symbolic interactionism* as a general description of the approach. Symbolic interactionists see relationships among individuals within society as the foundation of individual identities. These identities, in turn, function as scripts that guide future behavior. Erving Goffman, perhaps more than anyone else, developed the idea that our lives unfold as a drama in which we each learn to perform the role of the central character. In this role, we learn what works and what does not. We take on an identity suited to our role, and we act out this identity according to our understanding of what it requires.

The core insights of symbolic interactionism have been influential among social constructivists in many fields, including international relations (Schimmelfennig 2002). Most obviously, they served as inspiration for Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) and its conviction that the fluidity of social roles permits states to make what they will of an anarchical international system. As they interact, they also make themselves into different kinds of states: partners, rivals, or enemies. This insight has been embraced as well by scholars applying role theory to the study of foreign policy. K. J. Holsti pioneered this approach in a classic 1970 article in which he explicitly acknowledges a debt to Mead’s “useful conceptual distinctions between the ‘self’ and the ‘alter’” and his exploration of the way individuals take on roles. In subsequent decades, the pace of role theory scholarship increased slowly at first, and then more dramatically among students of foreign policy (see, e.g., Walker 1987; and in the past two decades, Aggestam 2006; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011; Kaarbo and Cantir 2013; McCourt 2011, 2012, 2014; Thies 2010, 2013; Thies and Wehner

2019). And Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2016) has developed a thoughtful account of the way constructivists in international relations could draw more usefully on what she calls the “symbolic interactionist roots” of constructivism to bridge the division between notions of role and social practice and the voluminous constructivist literature on “national,” “state,” and other forms of identity (for overviews of the latter, see Kowert 2010; Hopf and Allan 2016).

Our purpose here is not to become lost in the intricacies of how best to parse the meanings and relationships among terms such as *symbolic interaction*, *role*, *identity*, and so on. Nor is our interest in this chapter and in this edited book to prescribe a specific theory of social identity formation or a methodology of dramaturgical interpretation. We intend to leave it to the authors of the empirical chapters in this volume to highlight different ways in which elites in different African states learn early in their careers how to manipulate the tools of power and to deploy them in the service of specific policies.

We do wish to highlight, however, several themes common to the studies presented in this book. These themes may be thought of as the operational basis of an application of symbolic interactionism to the problem of elite socialization in African states. They are joined, moreover, to several general hypotheses about how elite identity socialization functions as a substitute for national identity and serves as the basis for certain tendencies in the foreign policies of different African states.

- First, politicians and other national elites must perfect a successful narrative of themselves in order to attain any degree of political success. This starting point is a basic premise of symbolic interactionist accounts of identity: we find ways to present ourselves as agents in our social interactions, and others react according to the success of these self-presentations. Some people are more successful than others at conveying specific images of themselves, of course, and some are mostly unaware of their own efforts at self-presentation. We do not necessarily assume that self-presentation is a conscious, strategic activity. For politicians in particular, though, it is likely that efforts to present a well-defined public image will be both conscious and strategic.

- Second, this narrative is generally the product of a leader’s formative political successes. When efforts at self-presentation are rewarded with acclaim, political support, or other resources, that success reinforces a specific self-image or identity. Success can mean many things: attracting followers, achieving wealth, or rising within a political hierarchy, *inter alia*. Inevitably, however, success has a socializing effect.

We learn and repeat what works and avoid what does not. And while symbolic interactionism presumes that we all live at least partly within the public eye (Goffman calls these “front settings”), political elites are even more likely to be sensitive to public approval and shaped by its socializing effects.

- Third, because the requirements for political success differ according to regime type, successful personal narratives are likely to be different for the leaders who found and dominate personalist regimes, for those who succeed in single-party-dominant regimes, and for those who rise to power in competitive multiparty electoral regimes. In general, public status depends on the political environment—either weakly or heavily institutionalized—in which political elites operate. In the weakly institutionalized setting of a personalist regime, elites may need to create a narrative of personal power and success. In the more thickly institutionalized settings of single-party and multiparty regimes, on the other hand, success may require espousing either the approved narrative of the dominant party or another narrative suitable to the requirements of party competition.

- Fourth, regardless of regime type, narratives of political success have socializing effects on political elites over time, conferring distinct political identities. The narrative espoused by a successful leader in a personalist regime or by a dominant party will tend over time to attract support from political elites. In the case of multiparty competitive regimes, this narrative tends to be one of support for an ideology that legitimizes the regime—such as support for democracy—rather than one that legitimizes the rule of a particular leader or political faction. No matter the regime type, however, repetitive public rehearsals of dominant narratives will strengthen the prevailing elite identity unless something (such as a successful coup d’état) happens to disrupt it and to fracture the prevailing political consensus.

- Fifth, and finally, successful elite narratives and the identities they forge have implications for foreign policy. In some cases, the implication is fairly straightforward: policies—foreign and domestic—must serve to maintain the power and prestige of the leaders who enact them. This is particularly true in the weakly institutionalized settings of personalist regimes. In other cases, and especially in more thickly institutionalized regimes, policies must be consistent with prevailing ideologies of political legitimacy. Our argument is not simply that regime identity drives policy, however, but also that this linkage is mediated by the specific ways leaders are socialized to embrace regime identity as they come to power.

Taken together, these arguments form the basis for our expectation that the way elites come to power is gradually institutionalized as a prevailing elite identity that, in turn, can be expected to shape the policies—including the foreign policies—that leaders pursue. To illustrate these premises, consider the following examples drawn from a range of different regime types.

Policy in Personalist Regimes

Leaders in personalist regimes structure policy to support their own position and ambitions. We would expect that such leaders might look at foreign policy as just one more tool for personal aggrandizement in terms of wealth and power. Even to the extent this is true, however, it does not explain what sorts of policies leaders might conclude will best serve their own interests. In truth, there is almost always more than one option. Which options leaders choose, we anticipate, will reflect the lessons of their distinctive paths to power.

The case of Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni is instructive. Although most outside observers have now come to perceive him as an aging autocrat, it should not be forgotten that he came to office with a strong reform agenda and that his regime spent its first ten years in power restoring order to the fragmented country, engaging ordinary citizens, and launching basic development (Muhumza 2009). He was surrounded by a group of educated and like-minded elites, many of whom had fought with him from the bush to overthrow the moribund Obote II regime. For Museveni and the elites around him—who included some theretofore marginalized groups, especially women—these experiences fostered an identity as pragmatic reformers who wished to relaunch the country along a path of development.

Although it is no surprise that a personalist regime such as that built around Museveni would tend to reward its elite supporters and to use resources for patronage and personal enrichment, the type of development and growth strategy embraced by the Museveni regime is still notable. Museveni quickly established excellent relations with the Western donor states (Hauser 1999) and used these relations to gain early and generous debt relief terms. Arguably, Uganda's support for Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front insurgency/party and its later interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo represent efforts for it to spread its reform model to neighboring states—at least, so elites claim (Clark 2001). Uganda also played a critical role in ending the first civil war to break out in South Sudan (Kasaija 2015). In 2000, Museveni's Uganda joined with Kenya and Tanzania to relaunch the then lapsed East

African Community, another pragmatic foreign policy initiative. Since the early 2000s, Uganda's relations with China have expanded rapidly, with Uganda receiving substantial economic investment and aid. China's National Offshore Oil corporation has taken a one-third stake in Uganda's new oil field, and China built a major new road between the Entebbe airport and the capital, Kampala (Shinn and Eisenman 2012). What unifies the diverse local and global engagements of Uganda since the late 1980s is a theme of pragmatism and the promotion of development opportunities. Ugandan elites see themselves as the agents of progress and development, and this reflects a political socialization built on the foundation of Museveni's own pragmatic path to power. This identity has its roots in the preservation of a personalist regime, but its distinct "developmentalist" flavor is based on Museveni's own convictions about the requirements for successful rule.

We might compare the sort of elite identities that grew out of Museveni's path to power with the very different identities fostered by Omar al-Bashir's successful coup in Sudan. Although the political elites of Sudan have also been development-minded, their identities as Arabs and Muslims have tended to take precedence in their policies. In Sudan, a process of *ta'rib* (Arabization of language and identity) has been unfolding for centuries, as the ruling elite has tried to assimilate Black and animist Africans into this dominant culture (Sharkey 2008). When al-Bashir sought a path to power, therefore, he did not repudiate this existing identity culture but rather embraced it to enhance his own position. Military rulers in Muslim states from Atatürk to el-Sisi have sometimes tried to use a Western model of social and economic development, but al-Bashir happily collaborated with Sudan's most famous Islamist politician, Hassan al-Turabi, in his 1989 coup. And even after al-Turabi threatened his hold on power and fell out with al-Bashir a decade later, the latter continued to court other Islamist figures in the country and reinforce the Islamist grip on the country. By this point, of course, his early successes had established his pro-Islam public identity. Moreover, the identity of Sudan's elites helps to explain the brutality and indifference to human suffering with which the country fought its long war to suppress the autonomy aspirations of the Christian/animist south of Sudan, and to explain why the same elite used similar tactics against the Black Muslims of Darfur.

Sudanese foreign policy aligned with these internal policies over the course of the past thirty years. Reflecting the Sudanese elites' own insecurity about their Arab identity, Sudan has been among the most fervent members of such international organizations as the Arab League,

which it joined within weeks of its independence, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, Sudan was among the few Arab or Muslim states to side with the Iraqi dictator (Swaidan and Nica 2002). Later in the 1990s, Sudan allowed a succession of Salafi terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, to use Sudanese territory as a safe haven (Sharfi 2015). Al-Bashir later curbed some of these behaviors, but only because he faced the threat (and reality in 1998) of severe military action by the United States. At this point, it is likely that whoever finally emerges from the political chaos of contemporary Sudan, even if it is the relatively liberal-minded prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, will have to pursue policies that resonate with the country's dominant elite identity community, which was not swept away along with the power of al-Bashir (see Chapter 4).

What the cases of Museveni and al-Bashir show, taken together, is that we can say more about personalist regimes than simply that they are structured to pursue an autocrat's power. They take on distinctive policy agendas that depend, in turn, on the way their founders interpret their political environment and on the ideologies of personal rule that they choose to foster or embrace. Their political successes are gradually institutionalized in the form of elite ideologies that not only serve as a guide to their own policies but that socialize surrounding cadres of elites as well.

Policy in Single-Party-Dominant Regimes

Over time, successful personalist regimes may gradually (though not inevitably) give rise to single-party-dominant regimes that rely on identity communities built by the regime's founder. Uganda and Sudan may both move in this direction if the institutions built during a long period of personalist rule have enough staying power. This remains to be seen. Côte d'Ivoire serves as another telling case. The founding president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960–1993), was another developmentalist and agricultural reformer with his own strong and distinct convictions about what development would require. He demonstrated great respect for local, traditional chiefs in their country, but also celebrated their country's close ties to France. Houphouët-Boigny famously distinguished himself from the radical Kwame Nkrumah in the "West African Wager" of 1957, publicly asserting that his country would achieve better results through fulsome cooperation with France than would Ghana following Nkrumah's radical approach (Woronoff 1972). He subsequently recruited like-minded Ivorian elites, encouraging them to get technical education in France and other Western countries. Houphouët-Boigny's

successor, Henri Konan Bédié (1993–1999), was elected under the banner of the former’s Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and followed this same path of European cooperation.

As a result, hundreds of French companies remained in Côte d’Ivoire throughout the Houphouët-Bédié period, numbering approximately seven hundred in the early 2000s (see Whitaker and Clark 2018, 313); some sixteen thousand French expatriates were in the country at the same time. Both French technicians working for the government and private businessmen were welcome, and the French military base that remained in the country upon independence has continued to operate until the present, despite the tumult of Franco-Ivorian relations under the Laurent Gbagbo presidency. Notwithstanding the hostility that arose between France and Gbagbo, the latter is also a part of the Ivorian elite that Houphouët nurtured: Gbagbo holds a PhD from Paris Diderot University, and *his* successor, Alassane Ouattara, has a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania. Ouattara has been married to a White French woman since 1991 and maintained a French residence before becoming president. These successors, despite their political differences, represent the sensibilities of the pro-West elite that Houphouët cultivated over his thirty-three years in power. Nothing in this elite identity prevented Côte d’Ivoire from participating actively in African regional organizations and in the subregional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among a multitude of others. But the connection between the pro-Western elite identities and Côte d’Ivoire’s close ties to French and American educational institutions and businesses is undeniable. This, in turn, works to keep Ivorian political and economic relations open to the West.

By contrast, the national elites associated with the ruling MPLA party of Angola made a different bargain to attain power, and they have evinced an “institutional revolutionary” political ethos since their ascent to power in 1975. The founding president, Agostinho Neto, had received his education, as a doctor, in Portugal, but he is more famous for being a visionary, poet, and revolutionary. He met Che Guevara in 1965 and subsequently traveled frequently to Cuba and to eastern Europe. His successor Eduardo dos Santos (1977–2017) received his education (in petroleum engineering) in the Soviet Union, as did hundreds of other MPLA revolutionary elites. Dos Santos was even married to a Russian national for several years, and one of their children is Isabel dos Santos, allegedly Africa’s richest woman. Dos Santos’s successor, João Lourenço, received his education at the former Lenin Military-Political Academy in Moscow from 1978 to 1982. These three were only exemplars of a larger elite, mostly Mbundu and *mestiço* from northern

Angola, who absorbed an anti-imperialist, but also rather bureaucratic, identity as vanguards of the revolution.

The corresponding foreign policy is no surprise: Angola signed a twenty-year treaty of cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1976. The number of Cuban troops in Angola fighting the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and South Africa gradually rose from twenty thousand to fifty thousand, as circumstances required. The regime elites also took “progressive” stands on continental issues, for instance, voting to admit the Western Sahara to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), after its prior occupation by Morocco. Angola also remained a stalwart friend of both Zimbabwe’s liberation groups and the ANC in South Africa, allowing both to undergo military training on its soil. As a practical necessity, Angola *did* do business with Gulf Oil (later Chevron), since this company was heavily invested in Angolan oil operations on favorable terms. More characteristic of the Angolan elites’ ideology, however, was the MPLA decision to nationalize the former Portuguese oil operations in the country and found the national company Sonangol in 1976. Contemporary Angolan elites remain suspicious of Western foreign investment and impose strict bureaucratic regulations on it. Another echo of the Angolan elites’ attitude of socialist fraternity were the warm relations between Angola and Brazil during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s term as president of Brazil.

Policy in Competitive Multiparty Regimes

In some cases, even when a dominant elite political ideology is present, it fails to translate into single-party rule. In Ghana, for example, Kwame Nkrumah tried but mostly failed to create a modern, revolutionary identity among political elites during the period that he governed, from 1957 to 1966. The West African Wager never truly received much of a test, as it turned out. Both the military and republican regimes that followed, lasting into the early 1990s, attempted to supplant Nkrumah’s nascent radicalism with a more technocratic and also pro-Western identity, reflecting the values of Ghana’s well-educated elite classes. In the background, the relevance of the political traditions of the great Ashanti empire and other precolonial political entities remained as well, as does a certain nostalgia for Nkrumah’s revolutionary stance.

The political identity of Ghana’s political elite could only be described as fractured, therefore, when the former military ruler Jerry Rawlings reopened the political space for multiparty competition in 1992 after more than a decade of dictatorship. Although Rawlings himself won the first two competitive elections under Ghana’s Fourth Republic constitution in 1992 and 1996, the first election was regarded

as reasonably fair, and that of 1996 even more fair and with a better turnout. Even more impressive, an opposition candidate of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), John Kufuor, beat Rawlings's former vice president, John Atta Mills of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, by a margin of 57 percent to 43 percent in the runoff elections of 2000. This marked the first transition by peaceful means from one civilian leader to another in Ghana's history. After Kufuor's two terms in office (until January 2009), Atta Mills was elected president on his second try, and he took office, representing yet another peaceful transition in Ghanaian politics. After the terms of Atta Mills and John Mahama (who succeeded the former upon his death in 2012), yet another NPP candidate, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, was elected in late 2016 and narrowly won reelection in December 2020 with 52 percent of the vote.

Ghana has thus seen three changes of the political party in power since 2000, with all the presidential candidates winning by either modest or razor-thin margins. The two-party system in Ghana seems now to be well-established, unlike in most of Africa's other new democracies. In addition, the country has seen almost no ethnic or religious strife during the period of multiparty competition (even if the NPP has a recognizably strong Ashanti-Akan political base). Such events could not possibly have transpired without a deep commitment of the Ghanaian elite class to the rule of law, democratic governance, social tolerance of religious and ethnic difference, and other such norms associated with maturing democracies. Ghana's military has been willingly and fully subordinated to civilian rule (Agyekum 2020). Further, Ghanaian elites are inevitably contrasting the fate of Ghana since 1992 with those of its neighbors: Côte d'Ivoire experienced ethnoreligious prejudice ("Ivoryité") in the 1990s and then civil war in the 2000s; Burkina Faso suffered dictatorship until 2014, and then escalating Islamicist violence since; and Togo has replaced one longtime dictator, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, with his son (in 2005). Faure Gnassingbé has since staged and "won" a succession of four manipulated, fraudulent elections. The starkly different experiences and political trajectories of these neighbors have surely informed the nascent identity of Ghana's elites as the leaders of the subregion's most stable and democratic country.

In this case, therefore, the elite identity that has taken root is not indebted to the specific political vision of either a founding autocrat or a single, dominant party, but rather to the attractive qualities of a specific political system. And although little has been written so far on the subject, one can perceive that a commitment to democratic values in the case of Ghana has implications in turn for the country's foreign policy.

Not surprisingly, Ghana's recent foreign policy behavior has mirrored that of young, small-power democracies on other continents. In its own immediate neighborhood, Ghana tends to mind its own business: it did not intervene in the long Ivorian civil war of 2002–2010 or even do much in the way of mediation; it has not rushed to the assistance of Burkina Faso in that country's recent struggle with a rising Salafi threat; and it has not tried to advise Togolese elites on the urgency of having a democratic transition.² In terms of democracy, Ghana prefers to play the role of the proverbial city on a hill. When its immediate neighbors ask for assistance, for instance with possible emerging insurgent groups, Ghana is cooperative (*ARB* 2012). Whereas Ghana does not intervene unilaterally with its neighbors, it is a "good citizen" in the broader ECOWAS and African Union context, contributing to both peacekeeping missions and economic initiatives.

In the global setting, Ghana has generously contributed to UN peacebuilding missions, and the Ghanaian soldiers who have returned from them mostly claim that their experiences in war-torn foreign countries have reinforced their own commitments to peaceful political development (Agyekum 2020). In dealing with European donors, Ghana evinces pride and self-confidence, as reflected in an amusing and widely circulated exchange between President Nana Akufo-Addo and French President Emmanuel Macron delivered at a press conference in the presidential palace in Accra (Akufo-Addo 2017). In reply to a question about foreign aid, Akufo-Addo instead took the opportunity to stress the importance of Ghanaian self-reliance. Ghana also enjoys some soft power attributes dating to its early independence years, when Kwame Nkrumah was at the vanguard of African independence movements. In this respect, its historical standing allows it to play roles similar to Senegal, another West African country with strong democratic traditions and a sense of historical greatness (see Bodian and Kelly 2018).

The Prospect of Generalization

Of course, there are limits to the generalizations offered here. To begin with, hypotheses about the socialization of political elites depend, to a certain extent, on regime duration. The more stable the political environment in a given country, the stronger its socializing effects are likely to be as new generations of political elites rise to power. Happily, Africa's reputation for political instability is overstated. Although a handful of African countries have fallen into a pattern of coup after coup, sometimes punctuated by outright and long-lasting civil wars (e.g., Benin in the 1970s, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra

Leone, and, more recently, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali), there is often a stable cadre of elites even in these cases who share a basic worldview. A good example is Liberia, where so-called Americo-Liberians play an outsized role in the country's politics, even when one of their representatives does not occupy the presidency.

In any case, the two most widespread and stable regime types in Africa are clearly the long-term personalist regime and the *de facto* (if not *de jure*) single-party-dominant regime. The list of long-term African rulers is long, and those who served in power for over twenty-five years include Omar al-Bashir (Sudan), Omar Bongo (Gabon), Paul Biya (Cameroon), Muammar Gadhafi (Libya), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), and Teodoro Obiang (Equatorial Guinea). A quarter century (or more) is undoubtedly a sufficiently long period for a national elite identity to coalesce and influence the foreign policy of a country. Likewise, in the case of single-party-dominant regimes, the parties now in control of many African states are the same parties that ascended to power upon independence. The list includes most of the countries of southern Africa, like Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, as well as Tanzania in eastern Africa. Others (like Congo-Brazzaville and Ethiopia) were ruled by the same parties for extended periods, even though these parties were not direct products of independence movements. Congo's Parti Congolais du Travail in its original iteration (1969–1991) espoused a fervent Marxist, but also nationalist, ideology that guided policy under three successive presidents. And Ethiopia's EPRDF adopted a federalist, developmentalist ideology that oriented foreign and domestic policies for three prime ministers (1991–2019). Unlike the parties created by personalist rulers for popular mobilization, these parties embodied ideologies relevant to key historical moments, and they provided a context for the coalescence of national elite identities. In general, then, the most coherent elite identities have emerged in African states that have experienced the kind of stability associated with long-term rulers and parties, and the argument presented here about the socializing effects of political success applies less to unstable states like the Central African Republic and Somalia.

Second, it is worth acknowledging that national elite identities are not the only source of the foreign policies of African states. To begin with, the weakness of African states compared to their peers in some other regions provides them with rather limited opportunities for effective agency outside the continent. Changing international circumstances naturally cause them to alter long-enduring foreign policy orientations. For instance, when Zaire was abandoned by its long-term external

patron, the United States, at the end of the Cold War, the Mobutu regime had to undertake an urgent search for alternative patrons.

In addition to the vicissitudes of great power politics, economic pressures can also have important effects. Sometimes business elites push African states to adopt foreign policies that political elites may not favor, though this is less common in Africa than in environments with larger, more empowered bourgeois classes. Indeed, the relative powerlessness of (nonstate) African bourgeois elements is one reason why elite (political) identities loom larger as a source of foreign policy. Tellingly, it is common in Francophone Africa to hear citizens speak of “la class politique,” and there is a widespread sense in many places that successful political participation is itself the surest route to personal wealth. Even in de facto one-party states like South Africa or Tanzania, moreover, a change in leadership can naturally lead to some foreign policy redirections. The frequent cabinet shake-ups that African rulers undertake in response to internal economic or political crises can also have an impact on foreign policy orientations. Yet the continuities of foreign policy across a succession of leaders and cabinets in countries like South Africa or Tanzania suggest that something larger is also at work. The identities of regime-associated elites are good candidates to explain these continuities, and they are relatively under-studied by the international relations and also Africanist academic communities compared to other sources of foreign policy.

Finally, for better or worse, it is *elite* identities that matter most in the African context. The extent to which the values and orientations of political elites are mirrored in the wider population is a question of degree for every state. The states with the greatest integration between elite and popular attitudes are presumably those that are old, ethnically homogenous, and highly literate, like contemporary Japan, Norway, and Sweden. African states have hardly any of these qualities. Both African peasantries and urban underclasses can be astonishingly disconnected from their own ruling classes in terms of values and worldviews. This gap between elites and “the mass” of African publics was created by the training of an Indigenous elite during colonial times (Ekeh 1975), but it has persisted in the face of the lack of development, limited access to education for Africans, and the scarcity of opportunities for meaningful political participation. The gap between the political identities of African elites and their publics remains wider than in any other world region. This is not to say that ruling political elites have not attempted, with some success, to harness mass opinions to their political projects, including to some external political projects. Yet African peasants and informal urban workers share relatively little of the worldview embraced by their

far more cosmopolitan rulers. It is for this very reason that one must speak with caution about “national identity” in an African context. And it is for this reason that we propose to treat “national *elite* identities” as stand-ins for more broadly societal national identities in our efforts to account for differences in the foreign policies of African states.

The argument presented in this chapter—and in this book—clearly has limits. African national elite identities are more or less coherent and durable, depending upon how well they resonate with the lived experiences of those elites. When the policies that correspond with those identities are successful in reinforcing the standing and domestic power of those elites, the identities grow stronger. Although national elite identities are only one source of the foreign policies of African states, they are an important and overlooked one.

Conclusion

African states have autonomy. With this autonomy comes the freedom to make foreign policy choices. We do not intend to propose a deterministic, structural model or to suggest that African states of a given regime type have little choice but to accept the sort of policies best suited to that type. Rather, our argument is that African leaders—like leaders anywhere—learn different lessons and embrace different policies as a result. Still, we expect the policies of a given regime type to bear a certain family resemblance, one that is explained in part by the prevalence of certain distinct elite national identities.

Elite identities are undoubtedly capable of changing, but they also demonstrate continuity over time, often over decades. Elite identities are layered, reflecting the socializing effects of elites’ political experiences and the pathways to power available to them. To understand the foreign policies of African states better, scholars need to spend more time teasing out the nuances of the identities of political elites, along with the sources of their identities.

In each part of this volume we explore the influence of elite socialization on foreign policy in distinctive political regime types. In Part 1 we study the cases of Sassou Nguesso (Congo-Brazzaville), Paul Kagame (Rwanda), and Omar al-Bashir (Sudan). These three personalist leaders came to power in different fashions, the last through a classic coup d’état, the second through a lengthy insurgency, and the first through a short civil war that many have called a coup. Each has been (or was, in al-Bashir’s case) in power long enough to perform a succession of different political roles and to forge new identities in order to

stay in power. The durability of these personalist regimes helps the authors uncover linkages between prevailing elite identity and these countries' foreign policies.

In Part 2 we study foreign policy within three party-dominant regimes, those in Botswana, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Ethiopia's dominant party, the EPRDF, was supplanted by the Prosperity Party in 2019, yet the latter continues to put national economic development at the center of its ideology and clearly strives to dominate the national political space in much the same fashion as the EPRDF. For contemporary Ethiopian elites who came of age under the EPRDF, it will be interesting to see whether their socialization extends to matters of foreign policy. With regard to Botswana and South Africa, the contrasting pathways to power for the two ruling parties, the BDP and the ANC, respectively, make a useful point of comparison. Whereas the BDP enjoyed a peaceful "inheritance" of power from departing British colonizers, the ANC had to fight bitterly for three decades to prevail.

In Part 3 we explore elite identities in three competitive multiparty regimes, those of Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria. These cases represent a continuum of elite identity solidarity, reflected in the levels of political violence since their respective democratic experiments began: Ghana has had only localized political violence during and after elections; Kenya experienced a major bout of electoral violence after its 2007 elections, followed by significant, though far more muted, violence after elections in 2013 and 2017; and Nigeria has experienced both major electoral violence and also the outright insurgency of Boko Haram since 2009. Nigeria just experienced its first change of parties in power in 2015, when the All Progressives Congress defeated the Peoples Democratic Party, which had ruled the country since the return of multiparty competition in 1999. Both elite identities and democratic norms are thus unevenly consolidated across these three cases, and Chapters 8, 9, and 10 thus provide another way of comparing the importance of institutionalization and elite socialization over time.

In the concluding chapter we return to the task of generalization, bolstered by the insights of the contributors. As we assess in the conclusion, we might expect that personalist regimes will pursue foreign policies that bolster personal rule and reflect the identities of rulers and the elite groups that support them. Similarly, one-party-dominant regimes will tend to pursue foreign policies that reinforce party rule as prescribed by the prevailing narratives and ideology of their dominant party. And more than Africa's other states, Africa's multiparty regimes will tend to avoid hostile or unilaterally interventionist foreign policies

that might inflame domestic political disputes. Finally, across all regime types, durability and institutionalization of prevailing elite identities will tend to lead to more stable foreign policies over time.

Notes

1. We do not examine the foreign policies of transitional or externally controlled regimes here. Transitional regimes are not in power long enough to develop the kinds of consistent, medium-term foreign policies with which this book is concerned. And externally controlled regimes lack the ability to develop and pursue their own autonomous foreign policies.

2. These characterizations are based upon a small number of interviews with Ghanaian social scientists and low-level political figures.